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The Europeanization of Political Parties; A Study of Political Parties in Poland 2009-2014

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The Europeanization of Political Parties:

A Study of Political Parties in Poland 2009-2014

by

Dennis Jan Blew

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science
in
Political Science

Thesis Committee:
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Portland State University
2015
Abstract

On May 1st 2004, Poland entered the European Union (EU), introducing new variables into the domestic politics of the Polish Republic. Since gaining its independence from Soviet control in 1989, Poland’s political landscape can be described as a dynamic and ever changing force towards democratic maturation. With the accession of Poland to the EU, questions of European integration and Europeanization have arisen, most specifically with how these two processes effect and shape the behaviors of domestic political actors.

With Poland entering its second decade of EU membership, this study attempts to explain how, and if, further European integration has had any effect on the Europeanization of political parties in Poland. Building upon the work of various scholars, most notably Aleks Szczerbiak, this study examines the years 2009-2014, and the examines Poland’s political parties through Robert Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization.
Dedication

For my father, Gary Blew, whose memory guides my academic pursuits, and my mother, Krystyna Blew, who continues to encourage them.
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the members of my committee. I would also like to thank Dr. David Kinsella for all his advice and direction as my graduate advisor. Special thanks to Dr. Birol Yesilada for introducing me to European Union politics, and Professor Doug Clark at Oregon State University, for his past and continued support of my education.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOS</td>
<td>Centre for Public Opinion Research (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KORWiN</td>
<td>Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic- Freedom and Hope (Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRL</td>
<td>People’s Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZPR</td>
<td>Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SdRP</td>
<td>Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>Single European Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Self-Defense (Samoobrona)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>Your Movement (Twój Ruch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Union of Labor (Unia Pracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Union of Freedom (Unia Wolności)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiP</td>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party (Wolność i Praworzędność)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZChN</td>
<td>Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijansko-Norodowe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSL</td>
<td>United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe)</td>
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Introduction

On May 1st, 2014, The Republic of Poland celebrated its tenth anniversary as a member of the European Union (EU). The accession of Poland to the EU ended a fifteen-year effort of membership aspirations and signaled another transformative change to Poland’s political system. Poland’s accession to the EU can be seen as the culmination of a transitional political effort decades in the making. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, Poles took the streets in protest and civil unrest aimed at resisting the communist Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). The unrest led to the introduction of martial law from 1981-1983. In 1989, the communist government of Poland sat down with leaders of the Solidarity Movement which led to the Round Table Agreement, ushering in the first open and free elections in Poland since before World War II, culminating in Poland’s independence from the USSR and the creation of the modern Republic of Poland in December of 1990. In the 25 years since Poland became a democratic republic, Poland’s political and party system has been of dynamic transformation, as the republic matured into a democracy. EU membership has been just another facet of that transformation.

The purpose of this study is to see what, if any, effects EU membership has on political party systems in member states. Specifically, this study will look at how further integration with the EU has effected political parties in Poland. This study will examine political parties in Poland from 2009 to 2014, and build upon the work of various scholars. The aim is to see whether so called “Europeanization” exists, what its effects on political party behavior are, and whether EU membership is a new political cleavage in Poland. Chapter 1 examines the theoretical issues and a framework of what political
parties are, and explains Poland’s political and party system. Chapter 2 examines the issues of European Integration and Europeanization, specifically, outlining what EU integration is and attempting to define the phenomenon of ‘Europeanization’. Chapter 2 also discusses previous research on the Europeanization of political parties in Europe and Poland in the first five years of EU membership. Finally, Chapter 3 will examine Polish party behavior between 2009 and 2014, and examine if there has been a Europeanization effect on the parties.
Chapter 1- Political Parties

The following chapter will look at the theoretical underpinnings of what a political party is and attempt to find a definition of political parties to use as a guide for this study. The second part of the chapter will examine the dynamic changes that created the political and party system in Poland since the end of communist rule in 1989.

Defining Political Parties

Explaining what a political party is with one specific definition is not an easy task. Attempts to define what a political party is, have been an elusive puzzle for political science scholars. As Henry Steele Commager wrote, “It is easier to say what a party is not than to say what it is” (Commager 1950, 309). The study of political parties has come from a multitude of scholars. The sheer breadth of political party study has evolved over the many decades of scholarship, changing to better reflect the true meaning of a political party and its functions.

The study of political parties is a corner stone topic of political science research. Early scholars of political parties struggled to define what they were and what their true functions were. Robert Michels, writing about his experiences with the Social Democratic Party of Germany, famously wrote, “who says organization, says oligarchy”, finding an incompatibility of democracy with large scale social organizations (Michels 1949, 32). Michels viewed political parties as oligarchical associations, which inherently would lead the party to be a reflection not of its constituents, but of the bureaucratic elites in charge of the party. Anthony Downs and Leon Epstein similarly studied political
parties, focusing attention on parties as being teams seeking control of the governing apparatus. Downs wrote that the primary concern of party members is to be elected. Downs stated that parties formulated policies to win elections, rather than winning elections to formulate policies. (Downs 1957, 25-28). “The party which runs [the] government manipulates its policies and actions in whatever way it believes will gain it the most votes without violating constitutional rules” (Downs 1957, 30-31). Leon Epstein studied parties not from their structural development, but from their functions. Epstein stated that parties developed primarily on a basis of electoral function. Similar to Downs, Epstein concluded that a party’s function was to elect government office holders under a specific label (Epstein 1967).

Downs and Epstein can be categorized as being part of the competing teams conception to the study of political parties. In their view, electoral victory is the key to understanding political parties. This conception of political parties is one of many that encompass the overall study of political parties. JP Monroe explained the study of political parties as falling into two broad categories. The first, “conceptualizes the party as an organized expression of citizens to alter the balance of power in the formal institutions of government” while in the second approach, “the party is an institution through which elites coordinate their activity as they attempt to satisfy the interests of their supporters” (Monroe 2001, 16-17). From these two approaches, Monroe identified the two main conceptions of political parties that have arisen through time. The competing teams conception, as illustrated by Downs and Epstein, begins any definition of a political party within the premise that parties are distinguished by their capacity to contest and win elections. In addition to Downs and Epstein, scholars such as Edward
Sait, Austin Ranney, and E.E. Shattshneider fall into this approach of political party study. These authors identified electoral struggle and the competition between parties as the paramount of function and motivation of parties (Monroe 2001, 19-21).

The organizational conception attempts to define parties by how they are organized. Michels earlier mentioned work, was an early example of an organizational definition of political parties. One of the most important contributions to the study of parties came from Maurice Duverger, who was the first to develop the idea that a political party “is a community with a particular structure” (1954, xv). Within this conception, parties are defined by their organization and structures, that without these attributes they would cease to be parties at all. The organizational conception of parties is perhaps the most varied and expansive approach to defining parties. Numerous scholars, from Michels to Duverger, to Samuel Eldersveld, have broadened this approach to studying political parties. The organization of structures, from the interaction of party elites, members, and voters, to the leadership structure of the parties, views the party as an institution with structure that guides its actions and the actions of its participants (Monroe 2001, 21-29).

The two conceptions of political parties as defined by Monroe might have their critics. However, they do highlight important features of political parties. The competing teams conception highlights the central feature of parties; “they are the only groups that contest elections…whatever else parties do, they do as a consequence of the electoral requirement” (Monroe 2001, 21). The importance of the organizational concept of political parties is that it gives a clearer meaning to what a political party actually is. “Party organization is the institutional consequence of the deliberate coordination of
activity to win public office in the party’s name. Party organization is an institution organized to capture public office” (Monroe 2001, 17). The dual conceptions of organization and competition, allow for a clear definition of political parties.

Samuel J. Eldersveld’s work in party politics and behavior combined the two conceptions outlined by Monroe. Eldersveld built upon the ideas and definitions of those scholars that came before him to thoroughly define political parties. Eldersveld did not conceptualize parties solely on the basis of electoral competition. Nor did he see the party as strictly a tool of political elites to gain office. Rather, Eldersveld analyzed parties and their structures from the elites to the masses. Eldersveld expanded the definition of party elites, to include not just those seeking to hold office, but also those who worked for the party. The importance of those he called the ‘party activists’, members of the party who hold important positions, have roles of influence, and who exercise important functions in the party. He purposely broadened the definition of party elites to underscore the importance of these activists in the party. “The party activist cadre keep the party an organizational reality and do thus contribute significantly both to party system survival and to party system adaptation to new social forces” (Eldersveld 1989, 14). Eldersveld’s broadening of the definition of party elites is important because it helped move away from oversimplifying the purpose and characterization of party elites and signifying the importance of party membership as a whole.

Eldersveld found that with an expanded definition of party elites, party structure and purpose became clearer. In opposition to Michels’ Iron Law and the oligarchical tendencies of party elites, Eldersveld found that three theoretical constructs emerged in
regards to parties. First, parties had to be understood to be permeable and adaptive, always open for new membership, not only at the base level in regards to new party activists to do party work, but also with non-activist supporters. Also, the party is open at the elite level, if such a strategy will profit the parties aspirations. Second, because parties are a structural system seeking to translate social and economic interests into political power, it inevitably becomes a conflict system (Eldersveld 1968, 44-47). Finally, Eldersveld found that party power and structure is not hierarchical. Rather it is defined by what he called stratarchy. Stratarchy refers to the “proliferation of the ruling group and diffusion of power prerogatives and exercise. Rather than a centralized ‘unit of command’… ‘strata commas’ exist which operate with a varying, but considerable degree of, independence” (Eldersveld 1968, 49). The idea of stratarchy is vital to understanding Eldersveld’s definition of political parties, because unlike scholars that came before him, he focused on party activists, or members, as a whole, and their functions within the party.

Generally speaking, definitions of political parties include some mention of the party as a ‘social’ group. The characterization of political parties as more than factions, voting blocs, or interest groups, comes down to the fact that there is a large social component to political parties. And this social component is important to understanding how tradition, history, and socio-economic factors shape party interests, positions, and conflict. The base membership of the party, what Eldersveld referred to as “the critical action locus of the party”, drives parties as they enter into electoral conflict, and personifies the social dimension of political parties (Eldersveld 1964, 9). From these theoretical constructs, a clear and concise definition of political parties emerges.
The political party is a social group, a system of meaningful and patterned activity within the larger society. It consists of a set of individuals populating specific roles and behaving as member-actors of a boundaried and identifiable social unit. Goals are perceived by these actors, tasks are assigned for and by them, and communication channels are maintained (Eldersveld 1968, 42).

This definition is a vital guide to understanding the nature of political parties in Poland. Poland’s Communist history still casts a long shadow on its political parties. Employing Eldersveld’s definition of a political party, especially his emphasis on broadening the sense of party elites, helps to understand how Poland’s political parties are organized, gain support, and survive electoral competition.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether EU membership and integration has become a realigning or political cleavage in regards to party politics. In Patterns of Democracy, Arend Lijphart introduced seven issue dimensions of partisan conflict. These seven issues areas were, (1) socio-economic, (2) religious, (3) cultural-ethnic, (4) urban-rural, (5) regime support, (6) foreign policy, and (7) post-materialist issues (Lijphart 1999, 79). The issues of EU membership and Europeanization would fall into the ‘foreign policy’ dimension. Poland’s pre-communist history continues to shape political conflict and party behavior to this day. To fully understand whether Polish political parties have been undergoing a process of Europeanization or whether EU integration has been a salient issue dimension for Poland’s political parties, the foundation and current state of party politics must first be explored. The following section is a brief synopsis of the birth and history of Poland’s political parties since 1989 and summarize Poland’s current political party field. Poland’s political and party system is one of the most unique of the
post-communist democracies of Europe. Born out of compromise and molded by decades of political fighting and fine-tuning, Poland’s party system is one of stability and continuity, unlike many party systems in former communist states.

**Poland’s Political and Party System**

Poland’s path to democracy started with the conclusion of the 1989 Roundtable Talks between the PZPR (the communist Polish United Worker’s Party) and representatives of the Solidarity Movement. Political change and the transition to democracy in Poland happened more swiftly than anyone could have anticipated. The bargaining process of the Roundtable Talks were started with the support of the leadership in Moscow. Throughout the 1980s, discontent with the communist party reached a fever pitch. Mass strikes orchestrated by Solidarity movement, the imposition of marshal law, and an economic downturn were all factors that led to the Roundtable Talks. In 1986, after Mikhail Gorbachev announced his policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring), the scene was set and the PZPR’s hand was forced to enter in negotiations with Solidarity to avoid further domestic turmoil. (Kaminski 1999, 83-85).

Even with a green light from Moscow in support of liberalization, the leaders of the PZPR entered the Roundtable Talks not expecting a transition to democracy. Rather, the PZPR entered the negotiations expecting to give some concessions to its opposition, while still maintaining its power. The PZPR believed that it could incorporate a carefully crafted and well-organized political opposition into the government, while still maintaining control. In doing so, the PZPR made two mistakes that led to the end of communist rule in Poland. First, the PZPR had overestimated its support with the public.
Focusing on public opinion surveys conducted by the Center for Public Opinion (CBOS), the PZPR felt that it enjoyed a great deal of support from the public. Its second mistake, came during the actual talks, in which the PZPR agreed to a single-member district majority runoff as electoral law.

Concluding the talks was the signing of the Roundtable Compact. The first semi-free elections since before WWII were scheduled for June 1989, with thirty-five percent of the lower house seats (Sejm) and one hundred percent of the higher house (Senate) seats to be freely elected. A simple majority in the Sejm would select the Premier (Prime Minister). In addition, a strong presidency would be created, with the candidate for President elected with a simple majority by both houses (Kaminski 1999, 83, 88-89). The political system created was a variation of what Maurice Duverger described as ‘semi-presidential’, in which there is a president elected by universal suffrage, given considerable powers, who coexists within a government that rests on the confidence placed in a separately elected parliament (Duverger 1980, 165-167). This semi-presidential system was created during the bargaining process as a compromise between both sides. As Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey described this transition, “the establishment of a presidency initially reserved for the outgoing dictator but subsequently to be an elective position could be seen as an ingenious form of conflict resolution. The Polish bargainers set aside a presidency to provide assurances to the defeated forces of the old regime while leaving primary legislative responsibility to a more democratically endowed parliament and a government responsible thereto” (Shugart and Carey 1992, 285).
The June elections surprised both the PZPR and Solidarity. Solidarity won all of the freely elected seats it was entitled to in the Sejm, and 99 out of the 100 seats in the Senate, giving it blocking capacity. The PZPR won 37.6% of its allotted 65% of seats in the Sejm, with the rest going to its puppet satellite parties and “catholic-Marxist” parties under communist control. The PZPR’s underestimation of its popularity was a shock to its members. This coupled with the weakness of the electoral law, through the majority run off system, allowed Solidarity much greater power than the PZPR had anticipated (Kaminski 1999, 89, 95-96). The PZPR did not want to give any leadership roles, the presidency nor the premiership, to any member of the opposition. They believed that they would be able to placate the opposition by giving Solidarity several cabinet posts under the prime minister. On July 19th, General Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected President with a majority of only one vote, and nominated General Czeslaw Kiszczak to the premiership. However, Solidarity leaders were able to convince the PZPR’s communist allies, the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and the Democratic Party (SD), to turn on the PZPR and form a new coalition. The PZPR became the minority party, and the new coalition government selected opposition activist Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the new premier (Wrobel 2010, 273-275). The path to democracy was set. In December of 1989, the Sejm approved government and economic reforms, as well as changes to the constitution that would lead Poland to democracy. In January of 1990, the PZPR dissolved itself ending over forty years of Communist rule in Poland. The first free and open elections for the Presidency took place in 1990, with parliamentary elections taking place a year later (Castle and Taras 2002, 95-96).
The bargaining process of the Roundtable Talks was a back and forth game between the PZPR and Solidarity. What was created is a system that still endures to this day, although with some changes. Since the Roundtable Talks, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland was amended several times to be more democratic and politically and economically liberal. The current Constitution of Poland was adopted in April of 1997. The new constitution cut down on the power of the presidency. The president is elected by popular vote to a five-year term and is the head of state. The only legislative power the president has is the right to veto legislative. However a simple majority in the Sejm can override the veto. The prime minster is chosen by the president, and is usually the leader of the party that obtained the most seats in the Sejm. The prime minister and his chosen cabinet are then appointed through a vote of confidence in the Sejm. Members of the Sejm are elected to four-year terms by proportional representation using the d’Hondt method, while the Senate is elected by a single member, first past the post voting method (Nikolenyi 2014, Sydorchuk 2014). Elections to the EU Parliament are conducted by elections in Poland’s thirteen constituencies, with seats allocated by the d’Hondt method (European Parliament 2014a).

Poland can still be considered a consolidating democracy, still facing many challenges as it transforms into a mature democracy (Kunovich 2013, 65). This fact is highlighted by the state of political parties in Poland and the way party competition since 1989 has evolved. The Polish public is highly cynical of political parties and support for individual parties is low. Recent public opinion polling shows that only 25% of Poles consider any one party to be close to their views, while a majority, 56%, say that no party aligns with their views (CBOS 2013a). Turnout for elections are low, especially for
legislative and EU Parliamentary election, while presidential elections, where the focus is on the individuals running, is somewhat higher. Even with low levels of support, parties have thrived and become the de facto mean of interest articulation and aggregation in the Polish political system. Though Polish parties have thus far failed to cultivate their electorates, because of Polish voters exhibiting low levels of party identification and high levels of electoral volatility, Polish parties maintain an effective monopoly on forming and shaping political discourse (Jasiewicz 2007, 96-101).

In regards to examining the effect that further EU integration has had on Polish political parties, the political-social cleavages and issue dimensions that shape party behavior have to be explained. The last section of this chapter will highlight how parties born in a post-communist state behave and how this past affects the political system. In addition to the expected left-right dimensions of party classification, tradition, history, and culture are all important factors that shape party behavior in Poland. In order to show that EU membership has had any effect on the political parties of Poland, a link must be made between EU membership and a change in party behavior.

**Polish Parties and Issue Dimensions**

Several different variables can be linked to the stability of party systems in new democracies, such as the permissiveness of electoral institutions, the emergence and strength of certain social cleavages, history of the previous regime, and economic conditions. However, one area of research into party systems of post-communist states that also can be an important variable of stability is that of party organization. Margit Tavits found that in post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, party organizational strength was an important variable in determining electoral success. She
found that strong party organization, regardless of party wealth, resources, or popularity of party leaders, was an important factor in continued electoral success (Tavits 2013, 67).

Party organization is an important indicator in examining Polish political parties. In new democracies, especially those in post-communist states, Tavits found that party competition and party systems were not structured in the same way that they are in more advanced democracies. In new democracies, voters lack experience with the functions of a democratic electoral system, are less likely to identify with a certain political party, are more likely to be confused about the ideological difference between parties, and may even be hostile to parties. In addition to these factors, in post-communist democracies, the social cleavages arising in the new democracy were not as pronounced or even existed under the previous regime. Communist societies were leveled in terms of social class, urban-rural differences eliminated, the role of religion largely diminished, and ethnic difference suppressed (Tavits 2013, 5-8). Finally, Tavits argued that organizational strength was important because it influenced party unity. The stronger the party organization, the more valuable party identification becomes in terms of electoral success (ibid, 9).

These findings are important to understanding the Polish party system. In 1991, after the first fully free legislative elections, 29 parties were awarded seats in the Sejm. By the next election, only five of those parties had survived to win elections. By the end of the most recent elections in 2011, only two of those parties still had seats in the Sejm. This volatility in the electoral success of parties underscores the dynamic nature of party competition in Poland. However, there are certain elements of the party system that show stability and continuity. Regardless of the party composition, all governments since 1989
have conducted largely similar domestic and foreign policies. They have developed a market economy and pursued the integration of Poland into European and Atlantic structures. Secondly, voters seem to be less confused ideologically than party elites, and tend to support political parties that are aligned with their political ideologies. Ideologies in Poland can be separated into four distinct political fields. The first encompasses voters that strongly support secularism and a free market enterprise system, which can be described as a liberal democratic field. A combination of pro market reforms and high religiosity brings about a Christian Democratic field. Thirdly, support for state interventionism and religiosity creates a populist field. Finally, support for state intervention and secularism identified as a socialist field. With these four political fields, describing Polish party politics through the traditional left-right political dimensions obscures party positions in the political field (Jasiewicz 2007, 86-89).

Voters preferences and party activity within these four fields, lead to the polarization and fragmentation of parties in Poland. Political party positions in these four fields are more strongly related to one of these cleavages, and are more ambiguous in relation to others. Within this, two major cleavages are salient to the study of party politics in Poland. The first is the socio-economic cleavage, and the divide between support for neoliberal free market enterprise and the support for state intervention in economic matters and welfare-state type social policies. The second is an ideological cleavage that can be understood as a choice between different visions of social and political order. Included within this cleavage are the issues dividing citizens between Poland’s strong Catholic traditionalism, with a strong anti-communist component, and
cosmopolitan secularism, with an indifference to Poland’s Communist past (Jasiewicz 2007, 88, 111-112).

These cleavages are most apparent at the party elite level. Every government since 1991 can either be described as post-communist or post-opposition, meaning that either members or supporters of the communist regime, or those that were members of the Solidarity movement formed the majority coalition. This cleavage characterizes the left-right dimensions of party politics in Poland, with leftist parties viewed as the successors of the communist party and the right wing seen as the successors of the Solidarity movement. This divide extends to the public. Even those who were born after the fall of communism or took no part in the communist regime are divided based on their feelings of Poland’s communist past, and can be placed on the left-right political spectrum based on their attitudes (Castle and Taras 2002, 108-113, 161-162). This cleavage is also tied to the role of the Catholic Church and religiosity in Poland. Though 96% of Poles identify as Catholic, the religious cleavage is based on the divide between devout Catholics and those in whose lives the church does not play a vital role (Castle and Taras 2002, 158).

Unlike the political cleavage that results from Poland’s communist past and religiosity, economic factors have not been as salient of a cleavage in Polish party politics, on either the elite or public level. There has been a lot of continuity in the economic policies of every government, regardless of party affiliation. There are differences between the left and right parties based within the free-market/welfare state dimensions, but they have largely been unchanged by either side. Poles do differ from one another in terms of class and occupational differences. The end of communism’s
most profound effects were on the working middle class, with the shrinking of the manufacturing and industrial sector. Agricultural workers, which constitute one in four Poles, have remained largely unchanged since the fall of communism. However, the service industry and opportunities for white-collar employment have increased since the end of communism. In terms of the political system, factors such as unemployment are most critical during elections, while the divide between free market enterprise and social policies are not as pronounced (Castle and Taras 2007, 153-155; Jackson et al 2010).

Membership in the EU encompasses a wide field of political and economic issues. The division of Poland’s political system based on its communist past and religious context shapes party behavior and dictates electoral success. The purpose of this study is to analyze if, and how, the added dimension of EU membership ads to shaping party politics. Chapter two will deal with the issues of European integration and Europeanization. It will analyze the theoretical background of what European integration and Europeanization is, provide a review of literature on the Europeanization of political parties in Europe, and finally summarize the findings of previous scholarly work on the Europeanization of political parties in Poland in the first five years of membership.
Chapter 2- European Integration and Europeanization

European Integration

European integration refers to the process of economic, political, monetary, and social integration of the states of the EU. European integration is a process that has been evolving since the end of WW II. The aftermath of WWII created staggering economic and reconstruction problems. Europe needed help to rebuild itself and a need for stability and peace created the conditions for what would become the EU. Through the funds provided by the European Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), later renamed the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), provided a framework for European states to cooperate and integrate across national borders. Shortly after the founding of the OEEC, the Council of Europe was created, which would lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to the eventual creation of the EU. The ECSC was the brainchild of Jean Monnet, a French civil servant, who believed that economic integration in the coal and steel industrial sectors of Europe would to a supranationally regulated market that would encourage peace and stability. Monnet presented his vision to French foreign minister Robert Schuman, who fought for the creation of the ECSC. In 1951, after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the ECSC was established, setting up an organizational blueprint for the future of Europe (Staab 2011, 5-8).

European integration would be furthered through the signing of EU Treaties. Table 1 shows a summary of EU Treaties, from the establishment of the ESCS in 1951, to the signing of the latest EU treaty, the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The two forces of
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism have defined European integration since WWII. Supranationalism refers to the creation of institutions and policies that would supersede the power of their national counterparts. Intergovernmentalism envisions European integration as a process that minimizes the creation of new institutions and policies in favor of conducting integration through a process between national governments (Staab 2011, 5-6). This intergovernmental-supranational divide has characterized efforts of EU integration since the signing of the Treaty of Paris.

Inherently, European integration involves national governments voluntarily entering into agreements that can put constraints on national sovereignty and the autonomy of national governments in favor of joint decision-making and pooled sovereignty between the members of the EU (Bache et al 2011, 3,17).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Signed</th>
<th>Entered into Force</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Economic Community (EEC)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single European Act (SEA)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Amsterdam</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Nice</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon Treaty</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Staab 2011, 9)

The struggle of whether the European project would result in a supranational structure or simply be an intergovernmental project has been a back and forth game primarily between elites. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman envisioned a European
community that would be integrated not only economically, but also politically. The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, established the European Economic Community (EEC), which sought further economic integration and set an ambitious framework for future political integration. However, throughout the 1950s and 60s, efforts for a united European Political Community failed. The first blow to this political unification was the failure of the French parliament to ratify the proposals of a European Defense Community (EDC) in 1952. The incorporation of Western European nations into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly the addition of West Germany in 1955, the idea of the EDC evaporated. In the 1960s, the sovereignty of national governments and the will of government leaders further eliminated hopes of political integration. Most notably was the so-called “empty chair crisis” in which French President Charles de Gaulle, recalled all French Ministers from Brussels. The actions of de Gaulle were in response to Walter Hallstein, the president of the European Commission, and his plan to introduce majority voting into the EEC (Staab 2011, 9-12).

The intergovernmental state of mind in Europe persisted with little variation until the 1980s. A significant change occurred in 1979, when Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were directly elected by the citizens of European Community (EC) members. Although the European Parliament (EP) had only an advisory role, it did give a much needed degree of legitimacy to the EC. The EC project, and European integration, was largely seen by the public as an elite-driven process. The election of MEPs by citizens finally gave the citizens of the EC a voice and was the start to the elimination of a much-perceived democratic deficit in the EC (Staab 2011, 16; Finke 2010, 6-7).

Supranationalism began to dominate European integration in the 1980s, with the signing
of the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA introduced majority voting, eliminating the
to the EP by giving it a voice in
amending legislation, and also set a deadline for the Single European Market (SEM) to be
implemented by 1992 (Staab 2011, 18-19).

The 1990s and the new millennium saw the implementation of four new treaties
that further integrated Europe, that would see further supranational European integration.
The fall of the Soviet Union, and the seeking of greater cooperation of the former
communist satellite states with Western Europe signaled more changes to the structure of
the EC. The result was the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), also called the
Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992. The EC was renamed the European Union (EU), gave
citizens of the EU member states uniform rights, gave even more power to the EP with
the power to draft legislation, and elevating new policy fields away from national
governments and to the EU. The Maastricht Treaty created three pillars, the Economic
Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) pillars. The Economic Community was the greatest achievement in terms
of supranational governments. It created the single currency, Euro, and the Economic
Monetary Union (EMU), which created a single monetary policy for all EU members.
After serious setbacks in ratification of the TEU in Denmark, France, and the UK, the
second and third pillars of the EU took a more intergovernmental character, as decisions
regarding the CFSP and JHA had to be undertaken through unanimous decision of
member states (Staab 2011, 19-23).

The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, and the Treaty of Nice of 2001, further
tried to increase the supranational powers of the EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam’s most
important features were the creation of the Schengen Agreement, which allowed for the free movement of people, goods, and services across national borders, created the position of the High Representative for the CFSP, and clarified the concept of European citizenship. However, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark all received opt-out clauses for the Schengen Agreement, cutting down on the power of the treaty. The Treaty of Nice was a response to institutional and enlargement challenges facing the EU. The size of the EP was capped at 732 MEPs and a new voting formula was introduced in the Council of Ministers (the intergovernmental forum for legislative approval). A fundamental rights charter however failed to be included as part of the Treaty after UK Prime Minister Tony Blair refused to allow the charter to be enforceable in the UK. The Treaty of Nice attempted to address some of the undemocratic practices of the EU and eliminate the democratic deficit. However, unanimous voting was still a part of many policy areas, such as taxes, the CFSP, and JHA (Staab 2011, 23-27).

The most recent EU treaty was the Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty came as a result of the failure to ratify a Constitution of Europe. Spain and Poland refused to ratify the Constitution, on the grounds that it would give them a smaller voice in terms of voting rights. The Lisbon Treaty was a water-downed form of the Constitution. New institutional mechanism, such as an increase in MEPs to 750 and the extension of an equal partnership between the EP and Council of Ministers on approving legislation were ratified with the treaty. The Three Pillars of the Maastricht Treaty were eliminated, and the European integration project was put under the umbrella of the EU. Power of review of EU legislation was also given to national assemblies, which could send legislative back to the Commission if one third of assemblies voiced concerns. The
EU’s powers also grew greater in terms of its role as a supranational institution. The European Court of Justice was given authority to rule over JHA issues and allowed to overrule national courts within this domain. The Treaty of Lisbon also created new offices, the President of the European Council and the High Representative for Common and Security Policy. Although some member states, such as the UK and Ireland were able to negotiate opt-out clauses to certain features of the treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the EU as a supranational organization. Unanimous approval was eliminated on most all policy areas, except for defense and taxation (Staab 2011, 27-30).

Since 1986, the treaties of integration have propelled the EU into a strong supranational institution. Although there have been setbacks in terms of government opt-outs for certain EU measures, the treaties have overall strengthened the EU as a united entity in the global world. A further development of the treaties has been a greater voice for the citizens of the EU. Once considered an elite project, European integration has been largely impacted by the citizens of the EU. In addition to the direct election of MEPs, the use of national referendums has been an area that has effected integration and changed its scope. Since 1972, there have been over forty referendums held on various aspects of European integration, with the majority of referendums held on the issues of EU membership and candidacy (Hobolt 2009, 7-11; European Election Database).

The prevalence of referendums on European integration has opened up research opportunities attempting to explain how citizens of the EU vote in these referendums. Sara Binzer Hobolt studied the voting behaviors and patterns of EU citizens during referendums on European integration. She found that voters take into consideration a broad spectrum of issues related to European integration. They often make choices
between their perceived benefits and costs of accepting proposals that may take powers from the nation state, and weighing them against the dangers of rejecting a proposal that could leave their country on the sideline of the EU. Furthermore, she found that voters in many cases look to parties in deciding how they will vote. The information given to voters by parties can shape the outcome of a vote. Voters also look at cues given to them by parties in deciding whether to vote yes or no on a referendum (Hobolt 2009. 233-249).

Public opinion and the preference of voters also have an effect on parties and their positions on European integration. As European integration has evolved through the various treaties, the way party elites and government leaders frame their positions on European integration has also changed. Prior to the Maastricht treaty, the interests of the most powerful domestic producers were identified as the most relevant to understanding the origins of governmental positions on integration. In particular, the divide between the powerful industrial sectors of the north and powerful agricultural sectors of the south framed positions on integration. As the agenda of EU treaties shifted from economic to political integration and institutional reforms, governmental positions on integration shifted as well. Post Maastricht, positions on integration became more heavily contested at the domestic level, as voters’ participation and interest in EU politics has been steadily increasing. Conventional wisdom used to dictate that member states that received the greatest benefits from EU membership, either through the common market or as beneficiaries of EU funds, were the greatest supporters of further integration. However, studies have shown that this is not the case. Rather, governments have increasingly looked at public opinion and support of integration of its citizens to craft their positions (Finke 2010, 134-145).
Increased importance of EU politics as the domestic levels, as well as the greater incorporation of the citizenry of the EU into the mechanism of integration has shaped the integration process. One of the chief issues that have arisen with further European integration has been that of Europeanization. Europeanization, sometimes referred to as Europeanism, is the result of European integration. With increased integration, questions of Europeaness and notions of a European identity arise. This issue is a polarizing divide in the politics of the EU. The following section will define Europeanization and its importance in terms of European integration and its effects on the political and party systems of member states.

**Europeanization Defined**

Defining and conceptualizing Europeanization is a monumental task. The term has been used in scholarly work since at least the 1990s. However, the term Europeanization has fallen victim to either being under-theorized or conceptually confused. In order to fully grasp the meaning of Europeanization and understand its effects on political parties, the concept has to be defined for the purpose of this study.

John Gerring identified a criterial framework for understanding how to form a new concept. He argued that for a concept to be sound, it has to have three elements. The first is extension, or the events or phenomena to be defined. The second, intension, refers to the properties that distinguish one concept from another. Thirdly, the term, or the label that covers the first two elements (Gerring 1999, 357-358). In addition to these three elements, Gerring also offered an eight-part ‘criteria of conceptual goodness’. This criteria included; familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility and field utility (Table 2 explains each of the criteria) (ibid, 367-368).
Following Gerring’s framework, a definition of Europeanization can be constructed, that is not under-defined or conceptually stretched. This eight-part framework provides a readily available schema from which someone is able to easily judge the relative strengths and weaknesses of a concept. Familiarity, the degree to which a new definition makes sense or is clear, so that it can be fully understood. Resonance, or what Gerring referred to as the ‘cognitive click’, gives the new concept power. Parsimony is the sign of a good concept, in that its definition is not endless, and that the concept should be able to be described with only a few attributes. Coherence is the sense in which the attributes and the definition of the concept belong to one another. Differentiation is important to a good concept because it gives clarity to the concept apart from already existing concepts. Depth of concept is vital to understand the instances/characteristics that bundle under the umbrella of the concept. Finally, theoretical utility refers to the concept’s ability to help in the development and formation of theses, while field utility ensures that the concept causes the least amount of disruption in the ‘semantic field’ (Gerring 1999, 368-384).

Table 2- Gerring’s Criteria of Conceptual Goodness

1. Familiarity  How familiar is the concept?
2. Resonance  Does the chosen term ring (resonate)?
3. Parsimony  How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes (the intension)?
4. Coherence  How internally consistent (logically related) are the instances and attributes?
5. Differentiation  How differentiated are the instances and the attributes (from other most-similar concepts)? How bounded, how operationizable, is the concept?
6. Depth  How many accompanying properties are shared by instances under definition?
7. Theoretical Utility  How useful is the concept within a wider field of interest?
8. Field Utility  How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes?

(Gerring 1999, 367).

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Using these criteria of conceptual goodness, many present ideas and definitions of Europeanization can be dismissed. Some definitions of Europeanization have referred to it as the development of institutions of governance at the European level (Cowles et al, 2001, 3), others have defined it as the distinct forms of governance that have been exported outside of Europe’s boundaries (Cole and Drake 2000, 27), or that the concept refers to an idea of identity and post-modern values that are unique to Europe (McCormick 2007, 166). However, the problems with these definitions is that they do not adequately describe Europeanization. The first definition refers to the process of European integration, the second explains the process of ‘policy transfer’, while the third definition explains one side of post-modern values, that could be extended easily outside of Europe. Europeanization is more concrete than a set of values, more intensive than the export of policies, and goes beyond simple matters of integration. Europeanization has to be thought of as a stand-alone process as a result of European integration, in which EU governance and institutions have transformed the domestic policies of member states.

Claudio Radaelli presents one of the most commonly cited definitions of Europeanization, which also fulfills Gerring’s criteria of a good concept. He defines Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, and ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national) discourse, political structures, and public policies” (Radaelli 2000, 4). Radaelli also further states what Europeanization is not. Europeanization is not a convergence, of
policy or otherwise, between the bodies of EU governance and domestic governing bodies. Although convergence is possible, Europeanization can produce divergence. Radaelli also makes a clear distinction between European integration and Europeanization. Europeanization is not political integration, but rather Europeanization is a consequence of integration (ibid). This definition is especially important for the course of this study, as it focuses on how the process of Europeanization is incorporated into the domestic politics of member states.

With a working definition of Europeanization at hand, how can scholars be sure that Europeanization does affect domestic politics, or party politics? Robert Ladrech introduced an analytical framework that has been employed by numerous scholars to investigate whether there is a Europeanization effect on member states’ political parties. Ladrech stated that the primary task for the analyst is to “…trace changes back to an EU source, or else to recognize an intended use of the EU as a possible aid in the resolution of an issue, or to evaluate the problems that the presence of the EU issue presents for parties” (Ladrech 2002, 396). Ladrech identified five areas of investigating the effect of Europeanization on political parties.

The first was Programmatic change, citing that the most explicit type of evidence of Europeanization will lie in the modifications of political party programs. This can be measured quantitatively by the increased mention of the EU in electoral programs and references tying the EU to policy areas normally considered to be of a domestic arena, such as unemployment. Qualitatively, references to the EU as a factor in pursuing national policies, references to transnational organizations and EP party federations, as
well as mention of EU institutions, can all signal a Europeanization effect on parties (Ladrech 2002, 396-397).

Secondly, organizational change, through the affiliation of parties with European level institutions and organizational links with actors outside of the domestic arena, can signal the Europeanization of political parties. This can include the incorporation of references to a party’s respective transnational party federation, or domestic party leaders entering EU institutions (Ladrech 2002, 397). Third, patterns of party competition can also be investigation for possible Europeanization. This refers to the extent that the EU itself becomes politicized in national elections and politics, and the way in which parties seek new voters by using an either anti- or pro-EU position (ibid). The fourth part of the framework, party-government relations, refers to the party-government relations on EU matters. Parties may either be pushed or pulled by EU issues. A government can be pushed by a party to maximize positions close to the party program, or pulled by parties to distance themselves from positions of institutional change, if national sovereignty could be undermined (ibid, 398). Finally, the fifth part of the framework refers to the relations beyond the national party system. Europeanization could have an effect on the transnational cooperation of parties from different EU member states to the extent that new organizational and programmatic activities are promoted (ibid, 399). An example of this would be two Christian Democratic Parties having regular meetings on EU policies. With this five-point framework in mind, party systems of EU member states can be analyzed and a Europeanization effect found. Ladrech’s framework is one that has been employed by several scholars and will also be employed as part of this study.
Having a working definition of Europeanization and a working analytical framework to study political parties, the final sections of this chapter will examine evidence of the Europeanization of political parties. The next section will explore previous scholarly work on the Europeanization of political parties in EU member states, and will look specifically at the evidence of Europeanization of Polish political parties between the years 2004-2009.

**Europeanization of Political Parties; Poland 2004-2009**

The effect of European integration on the Europeanization of political parties can be understood through two related dimensions. On one hand, Europeanization can be viewed as having a shaping effect on parties. As Europe becomes a more important issue in domestic politics, parties are forced to take positions on European issues, policies, and developments. On the other hand, Europeanization has a strategic dimension, in that parties may seek to use Europeanization as a political strategy (Hepburn 2010, 12). Eve Hepburn’s research on the Europeanization of political parties focused on how regional parties in Sardinia, Bavaria, and Scotland responded to European integration. She found evidence that demonstrated regional parties had undergone a Europeanization effect. The formulation of positions on EU policy, participating in European-wide networks and organizations, and overall increased engagement in European activities all demonstrated a Europeanization effect on these regional parties. Furthermore, she found that EU and European issues were not affiliated with a particular ideology, and that these issues cut through the traditional left-right political dimensions of party competition. This allowed parties to advance their own interpretation of European policies and integration, aligning
their views of European issues with their party’s policy demands (Hepburn 2010, 20, 195).

The accession of Poland into the EU on May 1st, 2004 was the most important event in Poland’s political history since the collapse of the Soviet Union. European integration in Poland has been described as a “return to Europe”, and the accession of Poland into the EU can be linked to the broader process of political transformation post-communism in Poland (Klatt 2012, 14; Szczerbiak 2012, 9). Figure 1 presents the timeline of Poland’s ‘return to Europe’. EU membership was the realization of Poland’s return to Europe and reaffirmed its legitimate place in European politics. In Poland, the prospect of EU membership and was a reintegration into the West, giving Poland access to Western markets, investments, and financial services, and was viewed as a catalyst for greater standards of living. Unlike other countries, Poland initially did not view EU membership as a constraint on national sovereignty or independence.

Accession negotiations and the first years of EU membership were marked by problems, mostly based in the political competition of the ruling parties of the Polish government. The governments following the 1991 and 1993 general elections crafted Poland’s pro-Western and pro-European foreign policies, and subsequent governments continued these policies. The result of the 1997 elections saw the right wing Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) grouping take control of the government from the post-communist left Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).
Table 1: Timeline of Poland and the Return to Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</table>
| 1989 | Roundtable Talks  
First Semi-Free Elections |
| 1990 | PZPR dissolves after final congress  
First free and open Presidential Elections  
First free and open Parliamentary Elections |
| 1991 | Poland’s application for EU membership submitted  
EU Summit in Luxembourg- invitation to open accession negotiations extended to Poland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia |
| 1997 | First free and open Parliamentary Elections  
Formal negotiations with ‘Luxembourg Group’ begin  
Poland joins NATO |
| 2002 | Negotiations between Poland and the EU finalized  
Treaty for Accession signed  
National Referendum in Poland passes with 77% approval for membership |
| 2003 | Poland becomes Member of the EU  
Eastern Partnership (EaP) finalized |
| 2004 | Poland holds the Presidency of the Council of Europe  
Formal negotiations with the EU finalized  
Treaty for Accession signed  
National Referendum in Poland passes with 77% approval for membership |
| 2009 | Former PM Donald Tusk becomes President of the European Council |

The SLD government, in coalition with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), had submitted the formal application for EU membership in 1994. Over the next several years, the member states of the EU began planning on how to accommodate an Eastern enlargement. Poland was a particularly challenging hurdle, as it was the largest country seeking access, both in size and population. These difficulties were also exacerbated by Poland’s backward agricultural sector, the structure of its economy, and disparity with EU norms (Szczerbiak 2012, 10-11). The AWS was not a formal political party, rather a fragmented and fractionalized grouping encompassing similar ideologies. The AWS also was in a coalition with the Freedom Union (UW) and the far right clerical-nationalist Christian National Union (ZChN) party, all led by Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. Because of the anti-EU stances of the UW and ZChN, and a large Eurosceptic support base of the AWS, Buzek took a hardline approach and uncompromising stance to negotiations with the EU.
The result of this approach was a stalemate in EU accession negotiations, as Buzek tried to win over his coalitions base of support.

In the 2001 Elections, the AWS was defeated and the SLD returned to power. The SLD government, under PM Leszek Miller fulfilled its promise to speed up accession negotiations, granting major concessions to the EU on completing various chapters of the Copenhagen Criteria\(^1\). However, the 2001 Elections did give a rise to anti-EU parties. Namely, Self Defense (SO) and the League of Polish Families (LPR), both won seats. These two parties would later spearhead the anti-membership campaign in the run up to the 2003 membership referendum. The SLD once again entered into a coalition government with the PSL. Before membership in the EU was finalized, two small hurdles in negotiations between Poland and the EU were worked out. Following an EU Summit in Copenhagen in 2002, news emerged that Poland would become a net contributor to the EU budget, because its accession would provoke a budget crisis in the EU. As a result, the Miller government took a tougher stance in the final phases of negotiations to ensure this was not the case. Secondly, a proposal from the EU Commission stating that post-communist states would not receive full agricultural subsidies for the first nine years of membership created problems in Poland. Again the government had to take a hard line in negotiations over this proposal, because of Poland’s reliance on its agricultural sector. The base of the PSL’s support were Polish farmers, and as coalition partners with the SLD, were able to spur PM Miller into a tough stance. In the end, last minute agreements on the EU budget and support for agricultural subsidies allowed for accession negotiations to continue. Poland finished accession negotiations in 2002 and after the

\(^1\) The Copenhagen Criteria are the various chapters of the EU’s rules for accession.
sighing of the Treaty of Accession in 2003, the referendum on Polish membership passed with a margin of 77.54% to 22.55% (Szczerbiak 2012, 12-15).

The accession negotiations and resulting referendum showed that Poland was a willing new member of the EU. With the support of its elites, as well as the public, Poland, (along with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) became the newest member of the EU in 2004. The accession process showed that there was a considerably large segment of the population that was against membership in the EU and European integration, and this voice was represented in the government.

Aleks Szczerbiak, author of *Poland within the European Union*, wrote the most comprehensive account of the effect of Europeanization on the political parties of Poland. His study examined the effect European integration had on Poland’s parties during the first five years of membership. Using the framework developed by Robert Ladrech, Szczerbiak examined the six parties and political groupings that won the most seats in the parliamentary elections between 2001 and 2009. (Appendix A provides a table of Polish Parliamentary election results from 2001-2011). The six parties in his study were the Civic Platform (PO), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Law and Justice Party (PiS), the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Self Defense (SO), and League of Polish Families (LPR).

The first part of Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization was to examine how European issues or developments emerged as issues of contestation in inter-party competition. Szczerbiak found that in the elections of 2005 and 2007, the role of the EU was largely diminished and was not a salient issue in terms of party competition. The one exception to this was the issue of the ratification of the European Constitution before the
2005 elections. However, after the Constitutional Treaty faced no votes in France and Spain, plans for a referendum in Poland were scrapped and EU issues took a back seat during the campaign. During the 2007 election, the EU issue again seemed to gain importance with infighting between the PO and PiS. However, it was not the issue of European integration that took center stage during the campaign. Rather, it was the issue of the government’s conduct of European policy, as the issues of Europe become assimilated in more general domestic debates (Szczerbiak 2012, 164-168).

The prominence of European issues in party programs, the second tenant of Ladrech’s framework, can be measured by examining the amount of space specifically devoted to European policy and the number of mentions of the EU in other sections of the party program that would previously have been considered the domain of domestic policies. Party programs in Poland fall into a political grey area. Party programs are “rarely reported in the media. They are almost never discussed by a political party’s rank and file, nor do party political activists contribute to their contents. They are also largely ignored by the party’s opponents… they are useful though…as they provide a snapshot of the state of mind of a party’s political leadership as it faces the votes” (Bobinski 2007, 4). Szczerbiak found that for the 2001, 2005, and 2007 elections, programs varied in length, and some parties did not produce or update their programs for successive elections. He found no link between the support or opposition to EU integration and the amount of space devoted to European policy in party programs. However, there was a trend across all party programs, to include more mentions of the EU and Europe in sections of the party programs that would have been considered in the domestic policies domain,
showing slight support for the Europeanization of parties in Poland in this realm (Szczerbiak 2012, 168-173).

The increased role of European integration on party organization was also minimal. Only two parties, the PO and SLD changed their party structures in response to EU membership. Both parties allowed their MEPs to participate in their party’s parliamentary caucus. The smallest impact of the EU on party organization was evident in the examples of PiS, the PSL, LPR, and SO. In these parties there was virtually no impact on the organization of the party after accession to the EU. Prior to accession, the PSL had a commission on international affairs and European integration, which ceased to exist once Poland became a member of the EU, and the forum for European integration was discontinued shortly after membership due to lack of interest (Szczerbiak 2012, 174-176).

Finally, the impact of European transnational party influences was also not significant. The exceptions were the PO and the SLD, whose MEPs were part of large EP groupings. These parties also created links to domestic parties in other EU member states and transnational political groupings. The impact of European transnational influences was the smallest in relation to the PSL, SO, and LPR. During the time period of Szczerbiak’s study these parties had the smallest number of MEPs. Therefore, they did not create any significant transnational links. SO only had one MEP and he was not invited to join any EP party grouping. The PSL only had five MEPS, and their impact on creating transnational links did not go beyond joining an EP party group. The LPR, which did have ten representative in the EP, failed to make any meaningful transnational links. Due to political fighting within the LPR, the party split and with its MEPs. Some chose to
be non-aligned, and others joined more Euro-skeptic parties in the EP (Szczerbiak 2012, 177-180).

The first five years of EU membership showed there was not a significant Europeanization effect on the political parties in Poland. The most prominent examples of Europeanization were in the PO and SLD, who were part of large EP groupings and sought to create transnational links with other parties in Europe. However, even with this in mind, the measurable impact of the EU on Polish parties was overall small. Party organizations remained largely unchanged and party programs did not cast European issues into a realm of great importance. Instead of being a realignment issue, membership in the EU was simply absorbed and assimilated into domestic policies. Instead of having a direct impact on the political parties, European integration and EU membership was subtle. Although the issue of the Constitutional Treaty was a significant source of political fighting between parties during the 2005 election, the failure of its ratification in Spain and France and dissolved the salience of the issue. Party patterns of activity and competition during the 2005 and 2007 elections remained largely unchanged in terms of EU membership.
Chapter 3 The Europeanization of Polish Political Parties 2009-2014

This chapter will examine the Europeanization of Polish political parties in the latter half of the first decade of Poland’s membership in the EU. Between 2009 and 2014, Poland held four elections, one for the presidency in 2010, legislative elections in 2011, and two EP Elections, in 2009 and 2014. (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the results of these elections). This study will be similar to the one undertaken by Aleks Szczerbiak, although with some changes, most notably with the parties studied. PO, PiS, SLD, and PSL, which were profiled in Szczerbiak’s study, will again be examined. However, LPR and SO will not, as these parties are no longer represented in the legislature. Adding to the four parties mentioned above, Palikot’s Movement (RP), now called Your Movement (TR), will be examined, as well as the Congress of the New Right (KNP) and its successor parties, the Freedom and Justice Party (WiP), and the Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic-Freedom and Hope (KORWiN). Although the KNP is not represented in the Sejm, during the 2014 EU Parliamentary Election, it succeeded in sending four of its members to the EP. This chapter will examine some of the significant developments in the relationship between Poland and the EU from 2009 to 2014, then continue with an analysis using Robert Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization on the six above mentioned parties.

Developments since 2009

The first decade of EU membership has been a successful one for Poland in economic terms. In the first ten years of membership, Poland was the largest single beneficiary of EU budget funds, receiving over EUR 61.4 Billion. This will remain unchanged for the EU budget period of 2014-2020. Despite mass cuts to the EU budget,
Poland has been earmarked over EUR 108 Billion, which will again make it the largest net beneficiary of funds. Over the first ten years of membership, Poland’s GDP grew close to 49%, and its GDP per capita has grown to be 67% of the EU average. Unlike all other EU member states, Poland avoided a recession in the fallout of the global financial crisis in 2009. Unemployment, though still high in the 14-15% range, has fallen since EU membership. So far, two million jobs have been created, and Poland was able to turn its trade-deficit into a trade-surplus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, 11-17).

Politically, Poland has also shown itself to be an important actor in EU politics. In 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), prepared by Poland, was officially launched. The EaP was the result of the 2004 Enlargement, as the borders of the EU moved farther east, bringing them closer to the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. The Central and Eastern European countries that ascended to the EU were the driving force behind the creation of the EaP, because of the sensitive relations between these countries and Russia, due to their collective Communist pasts. The EaP was also a result of the failure of the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was unsuccessful in fulfilling its objectives to the EU’s eastern neighbors. Unlike the ENP, which received its direction from the Commission, the EaP’s initiative will come directly from the Eastern EU member states. Poland’s place in the EaP is the fulfillment of its willingness to bring stability to Poland’s relationship with its eastern neighbors. With the launch of the EaP, an important cornerstone of Polish foreign policy has been implemented at the EU level (Klatt 2012, 64-81).

Another significant development was Poland’s Presidency of the European Council in the second half of 2011. The presidency is responsible for the function of the
upper house of the EU legislature, the Council of the European Union. The presidency rotates to a different members state every six months. During the six-month term, the presidency chairs meetings at every level in the Council, ensuring continuity of the EU’s work in the Council, as well as allowing for the host nation to dictate EU agenda. Poland’s presidency focused on economic growth and closer relations with the EU’s eastern and southern neighbors. During Poland’s presidency, the negotiations for the 2014-2020 were started, which were a catalyst for Poland’s success in negotiation for the largest outlay of EU budget funds (European Commission 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). The Polish Presidency was viewed very favorably by both the Polish public, with an 81.3% approval rating, and with members of the European Commission, with a 75.5% approval rating (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, 184-186).

In December of 2014, former Prime Minister Donald Tusk became the second President of the European Council. The President of the European Council is the principal representative of the EU, and is the driving force behind the European Council, which is compromised of the heads of state of the member states. The appointment of the two term Prime Minister was seen by many as the culmination of Poland’s return to Europe. As Prime Minister, Tusk oversaw much of Poland’s integration with the EU between 2007 and 2014 (The Economist 2014). The Polish public sees the appointment of Tusk to the presidency as greatly beneficial and a positive development in Poland’s relation with the EU. According to a CBOS opinion poll conducted shortly after Tusks appointment, 62% of Poles thought that the appointment of Tusk would improve the image of Poland in Europe and in the world, 60% believed the appointment would better
represent Poland’s interest in the EU, and 52% believed that it would increase Poland’s influence on EU policy (CBOS 2014a, 2).

These developments show the substantial role that the EU has played in Poland both economically and politically, as well as the effect Poland has had on the EU. The Polish public seems to be aware of the larger role that the EU is playing in Poland, and overwhelmingly support for the EU in Poland is high. A CBOS poll taken at the ten-year anniversary of EU membership showed that 89% of Poles supported Poland’s membership in the EU, with 7% opposing it. CBOS polls on the perceived benefits of EU membership have been consistently rising. In 2004, 39% of respondents surveyed answered that EU membership brought more benefits than losses for Poland, and by 2014 that figure rose to 62%. The ten year anniversary poll also showed that Poles overwhelmingly perceived the EU as a positive in terms of aiding the Polish economy, agricultural sector, roads and infrastructure, and environmental concerns (CBOS 2014b, 1-5).

Domestic developments in Poland between 2009 and 2014 saw four elections. The 2010 Presidential Election. President Bronislaw Komorowski, former Marshal of the Sejm, won the election after a second round run-off vote. Komorowski had been acting president following the death of President Lech Kaczynski in the Polish Air Force crash in Smolensk, Russia. Komorowski ran against nine other challengers, including PiS candidate Janusz Kaczynski\(^2\). The 2010 Presidential election brought to an end a period of cohabitation in Poland’s political structure, as the head of state had been a member of the opposition party in the Sejm. The presidential campaign was mostly characterized by

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\(^2\) Janusz Kaczynski is the twin brother of former President Lech Kaczynski.
fighting between the PO and PiS. Economic and left-right socio-cultural issues took center stage. Foreign policy issues, which usually are an important facet of electoral competition in Poland, were not as salient during this election. EU issues played an even smaller role during the election, even with a small political controversy having taken place in 2008. Both the president and prime minister traveled to a EU summit in October of 2008, after disagreements between the legislature and the executive that fell on party lines. The PO, which controlled the Sejm, felt that Prime Minister Tusk should represent Poland at the summit, while President Kaczynski, member of the opposition party PiS, felt that he was the rightful representative of Poland in EU matters. However, by the campaign, this disagreement was largely forgotten, as the death of President Kaczynski overshadowed many issues areas (Rosset 2011, 241-243).

**Table 3- 2010 Presidential Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1st Round</th>
<th>2nd Round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronislaw Komorowski</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>41.54%</td>
<td>53.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaroslaw Kaczynski</td>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>36.46%</td>
<td>46.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grzegorz Napieralski</td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>13.68%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz Korwin-Mikke</td>
<td>WiP</td>
<td>2.48%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldemar Pawlak</td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Electoral Commission- Presidential Election The Republic of Poland (2010)

The Polish Parliamentary Election of 2011 resulted with the PO remaining in power and PiS keeping its position as the main opposition party. The 2011 election was also significant in that it saw the return of the SLD. The SLD suffered major electoral defeats following a litany of corruption scandals in the mid 2000s. 2011 also saw a new party, Palikot’s Movement (PR), gain a respective number of seats. The election of PR to the Sejm was the first time a new party had won seats in a parliamentary election since SO in 2001. The Smolensk tragedy had divided Poland based on party lines heavily in the
run up to the 2011 election. Some commentators referred to it as the ‘Polish-Polish War’. PiS had painted itself as an anti-system party, with a primacy of interests during the campaign based in cultural and social issues. The effects of the 2009 financial crisis, and the multitude of crises in the Euro-zone did play a significant role in the campaign. This steady stream of bad news was most detrimental to the governing PO majority in the Sejm. PiS used the PO’s pro-European stance and attacked it. During the 2011 election, PiS positioned itself as a more euro-skeptic party. The base of its supporters was more religious and anti-EU integrationist. PiS radicalization ended up being its downfall. Although the PO lost seats from the previous election, it received the largest share of votes and was able to form a majority coalition with the PSL (Tworzecki 2012, 617-619).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palikot’s Movement (RP)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (PSL)</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Minority</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The period between 2009 and 2014 also included two Elections for the EP. In the 2009 EP election, the PO won the largest share of votes and was awarded half of Poland’s seats. PiS came in second with 15 seats, and the SLD and PSL split the remaining seats seven to three respectively. The turnout for the 2009 elections was low, especially when compared to the rest of the EU, with only 20.87% of eligible voters taking part in the election (European Parliament 2014b). The 2014 European elections were a stark contrast to the 2009 elections, both in Poland and abroad. The 2014 election
saw a rise and a surge of support for Eurosceptic and anti-EU parties. In total, 212 of the 751 seats in the EP were awarded to Eurosceptic parties, with the largest Eurosceptic parties winning votes in Greece, Spain, the UK, France, Denmark, and Lithuania. The surge of support for these parties cannot simply be seen as a protest vote against unpopular governments. Rather, the rise of these parties signaled a large contingent of the EU electorate that is worried about the deepening of European integration. The worries over Eastern European immigration into Western Europe, the anxieties caused by financial crises, and voters who feel that mainstream parties don’t adequately represent them, are all factors in the large victories for Eurosceptic parties. Although these parties hold 28% of the seats in the EP, for now they have been effectively marginalized and are unlikely to play a pivotal role in EU policy-making (Treib 2014, 1542-1551).

In the 2014 EP Election in Poland, 25 of the 51 MEP seats were awarded to the PO and the SLD. PiS, which can be viewed as a soft Eurosceptic party, won 19 seats. The real anti-EU voice came with the KNP’s victor of four seats. The PSL won the remaining four seats (PKW 2014). Just as in 2009, the 2014 EP elections had a low turnout rate, with only 23.83% of eligible votes casting ballots (European Parliament 2014b). Overall, voters’ interest in EP elections are low, as illustrated by the low turnouts in both elections. Furthermore, a CBOS poll indicated that Polish voters view the EP elections as the least important elections in their country. Only 32% of respondents surveyed before the 2014 election expressed any interest in voting in the upcoming election (CBOS 2014c). In addition, the Polish public also has an overwhelmingly negative opinion of the MEPs. The CBOS found that 52% of Poles believe that the MEPs have little work to do,
and 47% do not believe that MEPs sufficiently defend Poland’s interests in the EP (CBOS 2014c; 2014d).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance- Labor Union (SLD-UP)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (PSL)</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance- Labor Union (SLD-UP)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of the New Right (KNP)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (PSL)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With these developments and the results of the four Polish elections, the next section will undertake an analysis of the PO, PiS, SLD, PSL, KNP, and TR. Using Robert Ladrech’s framework, the parties studied will show whether Poland’s political parties have been Europeanized during the second five years of Polish EU membership.

**Analysis of Polish Political Parties**

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) is the successor party of the former communist ruling PZPR. After the dissolution of the PZPR many of its members went on to found the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), which then became the SLD. From 1991 to 2001, the SLD was one of the strongest parties in Poland, before corruption scandals led to political downturn in the 2005 election. In 2007, the party entered into the Left and Democracy (LiD) grouping with several other leftist parties,
before leaving the group in 2008. The SLD has always presented a pro-Western and pro-EU front, and the party was the main driver in securing EU membership. The SLD has always supported full economic and political integration of Poland with the EU, as well as supported a federal model of European integration (Castle and Taras 2002, 117-118; Szczerbiak 2012, 154-156). Although scandals in the SLD led to a PiS controlled coalition government after the 2005 Elections, the SLD remained an important player in Poland’s EU politics. In the 2009 EP election, the SLD secured seven seats, and in 2014 it was able to keep five. In the EP, the SLD’s MEPs are grouped with the Socialists & Democrats European Political Group.

The SLD continues to be the most pro European integration party in Poland. It’s party program, “Tomorrow with Confidence”, is a 228-page document outline the goals and visions of the SLD for Poland. The program covers the areas of domestic, foreign policy, and economic affairs. The SLD provides the most comprehensive example of a party has fully integrated itself into EU structures. Throughout the course of the document, over 100 references are made to the EU and European integration, including a separate twelve-page chapter dedicated to Polish-EU relations. In the realm of domestic affairs, the SLD program calls for the advancement of Polish domestic polices, ranging from economic to cultural and social dimensions through deeper integration with the EU. The program contains numerous mentions of the inequality, economic and social, between the rest of the EU and Poland (SLD 2011, 1-13). It calls for a deep integration of the Polish budget with that of the EU, full integration of Poland into the Schengen Agreement, and united EU-Polish immigration policy (ibid, 27-39). The SLD also advocates for improvements in the agricultural sector through use of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) funds, the expansion and integration of rail and maritime structures to existing EU structures, and the integration of the Polish military with the EU and NATO (ibid, 45-72).

In the foreign policy dimensions, the SLD program calls for a three-pillared approach for Poland. “Poland within the EU must follow a progressive model with which it can make possible the creation of an international governance structure, with a sense of responsibility and responsibility towards the millions of citizens of Europe” (ibid, 79-80). The three pillar approach advocated by the SLD is that Poland be politically aligned with Europe, secure the harmonious relations between itself and the rest of the Central and Eastern European states, and ensure the continued participation of Poland within the transatlantic security structures (ibid, 76). The program also calls for the immediate ratification of the European Fundamental Rights Charter, which has so far not been presented to the Sejm for approval.

The SLD’s link with transnational political groups within the EU is highlighted with co-publishing of a EU party program with its EP partner, the Socialists & Democrats and the Party of European Socialists (PES), ahead of the 2014 EP elections. This program, entitled “In the Direction of a New Europe”, is a twelve-page document that highlights many of the ideas found in the SLD’s 2011 program. The program calls for a greater integration of the EU with its member states, including the strengthening of existing EU structures. Among many other issues, the program advocates for gender equality rights of EU workers, calls for financial institutions and reforms aimed at improving the lives of EU citizens, calling for greater implementations of environmentally friendly policies, and greater democracy within the EU (PES 2014, 1-
The SLD has also held conferences with the PES, on a range of issues, such as the PES & SLD Poland Conference on Gender Equality, held on March 7th, 2015.

The SLD has also minimally changed its party organization structures based on its membership in the Socialist & Democrats EP Grouping. The National Board of the SLD elects the representatives (MEPs) that will join the Socialist & Democrats in the EP, and the SLD created the position of Delegation Coordinator for the Polish Delegation to the Parliamentary Group of the Progressive Socialists & Democrats. However, in terms of a greater role for EU specialists, no roles have been created, nor has party organization been changed on this front. The final aspect of the Ladrech framework, the effect of European integration on inter-party competition is also not as evident when analyzing the SLD. Following the 2005 corruption scandals, the SLD’s role in the Sejm greatly diminished. In the 2010 Presidential Election, the SLD’s candidate, Grzegorz Napieralski, received just shy of 14% of the vote in the first round. The SLD’s campaign focused on social and welfare issues, but the campaign was dominated by the competition between the PO and PiS. In the end, the SLD did not support either the PO or PiS candidate in the second round (Rosset 2011, 241,243). During the 2011 parliamentary elections, the SLD was able to secure only 8.2% of the vote, giving it 27 seats in the Sejm. The aftermath of the Smolensk crash and political fighting between the PO and PiS once again took center stage. Many of its ‘economically left’ voters left to support PiS, and its socially left leaning and young voters went on the support Palikot’s Movement (PR) (Tworzecki 2011, 618-620).

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3 From the SLD website- http://www.sld.org.pl/strony/5-struktura_krajowa.html
The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) has been a relative small party in Poland, but nevertheless an important one. The PSL has been a minority partner to the PO led coalition government since 2007. The Polish Peasant party is another post-communist successor party, to the United Peasant Party (ZSL), a loyal communist satellite party. The base of the PSL’s support comes from the rural and agricultural sectors of Poland’s population (Castle and Taras 2002, 141-143). Aleks Szczerbiak described the PSL as having an ambivalent approach towards European integration. The PSL’s rural and agricultural ties have always positioned the party as taking a tougher stance on EU negotiations, in order to secure the best possible outcome for Poland’s farmers. After the PSL joined in coalition with the PO, its stance on EU membership and integration softened, and in many cases the party does not present any meaningful dialogue in terms of the EU (Szczerbiak 2012, 157-158).

The PSL is a party that falls into the ‘grey area’ of party programs. Although the PSL publishes a party program for all elections, the programs amounts to only small variations in message from previous party programs. The PSL party program is usually shorter than most other parties. In preparation for the 2011 elections, the party program published by the PSL was a simple 23-page document. The program contains exactly three mentions of the EU, two of which deal with the CAP policies and funds. The third mention of the EU comes when the PSL discusses energy policy, stating, “the development of renewable energy sources must be linked to Poland’s obligation with the EU” (PSL 2011, 17). The only other mention of a transnational body is the PSL’s commitment to Poland’s security through the continued membership of Poland in NATO (ibid, 21-23). The rest of the program includes no mentions of the EU or European
integration. Domestic and foreign policies are discussed in a limited fashion, and the bulk of the program is reserved for highlighting the PSL’s continued support of Poland’s agricultural producers. The PSL did publish party programs for the EP Elections in 2009 and 2014. The 2009 program was 24 pages long, and resolved a common theme of recognizing the desirability of EU integration, but also striving to ensure the “preservation of identity and of Poland” as the most important position to take in the EU (PSL 2009, 1-2). The bulk of the 2009 program focuses on the role of the Polish agricultural sector and the importance of CAP funds to Polish farmers. The goal of the PSL in the EP is to support the comprehensive socio-economic development of Poland in relation to the rest of the EU, and the leveling of difference in development (PSL 2009, 8-10). The PSL also states their intention of consolidating the “essential European and Christian values”, namely the principals of “peaceful development, human and civil rights, democracy, solidarity, justice, and the dignity of all persons” (PSL 2009, 10). The 2014 PSL EP program, at only four pages, offers some of the same themes from the 2009 program. Regional development, particularly that of Poland’s agricultural sector, dominates the discussion in the program. In terms of European integration, the PSL contends that it is open to further integration, but with respect to a Polish identity (PSL 2014, 1-4).

European integration has had little effect on the electoral competition of the PSL. The PSL has had an important role in the Polish governments, having been a junior partner in ruling coalitions from 1991 to 1997, 2001 to 2003, and from 2007 to today. Following the 2005 elections, the PSL took a pro-European stance and has continued to do since in subsequent years. The PSL takes a more cautious tone when discussing
certain EU matters, such as the adoption of the Euro, generally the party favors deeper integration with the EU. It’s position as junior coalition partner with the pro-European PO, has also had its effects on the party’s position on the EU (Szczerbiak 2012, 155-157). In the 2010 elections, the PSL was represented by Waldemar Pawlak, but he secured less than 2% of the vote in the first round. During this election, as well as the legislative election of 2011, the PSL lost substantial portions of its vote to PiS. However, both the presidential and legislative elections showed a continued support of Poland’s rural and agricultural vote (Rosset 2011; Tworczecki 2012).

During the first five years of EU membership, the PSL had no significant party organizational change due to EU membership. This also continued in the years between 2009 and 2014. In 2009 the PSL was able to secure three seats in the EP and in 2014 it secured four. The extent to which the PSL works with its EP grouping is the addition of a link to its EP Group, the European People’s Party, a center-right Christian Democratic party grouping.

The Civic Platform (PO) has held the presidency since 2010 and has been the ruling the Sejm since the 2007 elections. The PO was the former party of European Council President Donald Tusk. Throughout its history the PO has been a staunch supporter of the EU and further EU integration, with few exceptions. Outside of its opposition to the Constitutional Treaty and its critical stance against the Belka government over the 2007-2013 EU budget (when it was a minority party), the PO has been ardently pro-European. It has called for deeper integration, and has called for the EU to be more than an agreement between states, but rather a community. Between 2004 and 2009, the PO expanded its links with its EP grouping, as well as creating links
between like-minded political parties in Germany. It has always advocated for Polish foreign policy to be centered around Europe, and in recent elections, it stance on Europe has been in contrast to its main opposition party PiS (Szczerbiak 2012, 143-146).

The last party program published by the PO was for the 2011 election, as the party has switched to dedicating its party positions on policy issues through the use of its website. The 2011 programs is a 194-page document on various issues. Although the PO has always been a supporter of the EU, its party program differed greatly from that of the SLD in this regard. In the 194 pages, the EU or European integration is mentioned over twenty-five times, but unlike the program of the SLD, the main areas the EU is addressed is during foreign policy, environmental, security issues, and the negotiations for the 2014-2020 EU Budget. Most mentions of domestic policies that make mention of the EU, do so in regards to how the PO would use EU funds to complete their objectives (PO 2011, 56-188). The 2011 general election was a hotly contested competition between the PO and PiS. Because of this, the PO might have found it more prudent to focus on domestic policies and how it deviated from the positions of PiS.

As was previously noted, the 2010 Presidential elections, and to some degree, the 2011 general elections were marred by the Smolensk tragedy that had claimed the lives of President Kaczynski and 95 others. Early on in the 2010 campaign, public opinion polling showed that PO’s candidate Bronislaw Komorowski and PiS’ candidate Janusz Kaczynski were the frontrunners for the presidency. With neither side wanting to be viewed as taking advantage of the Smolensk tragedy, the presidential campaign focused on each candidate’s personal and presidential attributes. No substantive debates over policy occurred, as both sides avoided strong stances. The little debate there was focused
on economic and socio-cultural issues. EU relations and integration also played a very
minor role in the campaign. The result was a second round victory for the PO, and
Komorowski was elected president (Rosset 2011, 242-243). The 2011 general election
was a much more polarizing one than the presidential election a year earlier. PiS general
strategy was the attack the PO’s close ties with the EU and support for further integration.
In response the PO took credit for steering the countries economy away from recession,
as had been the case in most of the EU member states. The PO’s main strategy was to
convince Polish voters not to change parties amidst a global financial crisis. In the end,
PO emerged victorious gaining the most seats in the Sejm with 207, and together with he
PSL’s 27 seats was able to form a governing coalition once again (Tworczecki 2012,
618-620).

The PO’s organization changed immensely following the accession of Poland into
the EU. With these changes were also the creation of transnational links between the PO,
its EP grouping, and other parties in EU member states. First, the PO’s MEPs became
immediately active in their EP caucuses, and they were also made de facto members of
the PO’s regional and national boards. The PO also created the position of Deputy
Secretary of International Affairs, serving as a link between the PO, the MEPs, and the
PO’s sister parties in other member states (Szczerbiak 2012, 174). The PO’s 19 MEPs are
part of the European People’s Party group. The PO is also active with pan-European
Christian Democratic parties, most recently sending 57 delegates to the EPP Congress in
Dublin, Ireland4.

4 http://www.platforma.org/aktualnosc/34997/kongres-epp-w-dublinie
The Law and Justice Party (PiS) was formed in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins. From its founding, the party's attitude towards the EU and European integration was more uncertain and not as well defined. PiS leadership from the very onset of EU membership had had a distrust of the EU as an organization. For the first five years of membership, PiS was part of the anti-federalist and Eurosceptic Union for a Europe of Nations EP grouping. PiS has always stressed a vision of the EU as a community, with the national sovereignty and solidarity of nations taking precedent over the EU. In other areas, such as increasing the EU budget and CAP funds, PiS advocated for deeper European integration (Szczerbiak 2012, 147-154). Following the 2009 EP elections, PiS joined the European Conservatives and Reformists Grouping, which included members of the Conservative Party in the UK, the Civic Democratic Party from the Czech Republic, among others. This program of this group was based on the so-called Prague Declaration. The Prague Deceleration outlines the principles of the European Conservatives and Reformist Group, including reforming the EU based on Eurorealism, which included a respect of national sovereignty of members tastes, importance of the family, opposition of EU federalism, controlled immigration, and an end to wasteful and excessive bureaucracy in the EU\(^5\). Though its EP grouping, PiS has created substantial transnational networks among EU member states.

PiS’ party programs are always the lengthiest. The program for the 2009 EP and 2010 presidential elections was a staggering 216 pages and for the 2011 general elections 256 pages. The 2009/2010 election program made numerous references to the EU and to European integration. The common theme throughout was that Polish sovereignty and

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solidarity had to be protected above else. “The formation of external relations will be based on realism… Polish membership in the European Union cannot mean giving up sovereignty or violate the supremacy of the Polish Constitution” (PiS 2009, 172). All issues areas in regards to the EU followed logically from this premise. The main theme being that European integration was not bad, but it had to be done without compromising Polish sovereignty. PiS also stated that democracy is only possible within the framework of a nation-state, and that at the EU is not capable of being a true democratic institution (PiS 2009, 68-73).

The 2011 program describes PiS as a construct of several “political trends related to the ideas of Christian-democracy, Catholic-nationalism, and conservatism… Invariably, Christian values shape the identity and the culture of Poland and have done so for over a thousand years” (PiS 2011, 7). This focus on religiosity became a main feature of PiS campaigns. During the 2011 Election especially, PiS attempted to create a clear ideological and cultural distinction (the Polish-Polish War), between itself and the PO. The socially and culturally far right placement of the PiS during the election ultimately failed as a strategy, as PO remained in power (Tworzecki 2011, 619-620). The EU did not play a significant role in the 2011 Election, and this is reflected in the party program. In all 256 pages, the EU is mentioned only 56 times. Most mentions to the EU are the same as in the 2009 program, with integration favored in terms of security and the EU budget, but with the sovereignty of Poland of most importance.

The SLD, PSL, PO, and PiS are the prime political forces in Poland. These parties have dominated the political landscape in Poland since its accession to the EU. However there have been two new political movements of note. Palikot’s Movement (RP) founded
in 2011 and renamed Your Movement (TR) in 2013, is a political party created by Janusz Palikot, a former PO politician. RP’s electoral strategy was to gain the support of a wide variety of groups that had not been represented by any previous party. PR positioned itself as an anti-clerical party, seeking to end privileged status enjoyed by the Catholic Church, supported feminist and LGBT causes, as well as the legalization of Marijuana. RP was able to win 10% of the vote in 2011 Election, enough to give it 40 seats in the Sejm, more than the SLD and PSL (Tworzecki 2012, 619-620).

During the 2014 EP Elections, TR banded with other small left leaning parties to form the Europa Plus-Your Movement Group, but the alliance failed to get the minimum 5% threshold vote for representation and disbanded shortly after the election. The party did publish an online program stating its party views. Overall the party can be described as being generally pro-European (Thompson 2013, 328-329). TR maintains a three part party program on its website entitled “Modern State, Secular State, Friendly State”, which consist of one hundred articles defining the party’s ideology. The EU and European integration is mentioned eight times in this document. Most notably, TR calls for the creation of a European Federation and for the wider and deeper integration of the Euro-zone with immediate adoption of the Euro in Poland (TR, 68-69). TR also calls for the integration of EU standards and policies in the areas of gender and pay equality, energy efficiency, and the adoption of the EU Fundamental Human Rights Charter (TR, 10-48). Following the failure of the Europa Plus Group to win any seats in the EP, TR has not been active in any transnational of EP groupings.

The 2014 EP Election did show that there is a strong anti-EU presence in Poland. The Congress of the New Right (KNP), led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, was able to secure four
seats to the MEP. Korwin-Mikke, who has participated in every presidential election since 1989, is ardently anti-EU and during his campaign promised to “blow up the EU from within” (Szczerbiak 2015). The KNP was a successor party to the equally right wing and anti-EU Liberty and Rule of Law Party (WiP), which participated in the 2010 presidential elections with Korwin-Mikke as its candidate. The party only garnered 2.5% of the vote in the first round. In 2015, Korwin-Mikke was expelled from the KNP and formed yet another party, the Coalition of the Polish Republic’s Renewal Freedom and Hope (KORWiN). Korwin-Mikke was joined by one other KNP EP, giving KORWiN two seats on the EP. In the EP, KORWiN and all but one member of the KNP are not attached to a EP grouping. The sole KNP member aligned with an EP grouping is part of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, a self proclaimed Eurosceptic political grouping. KORWiN has not published any party program materials. The KNP offers a three-part document that articulates its positions. Each part is simply on page of positions and fundamental principles of the KNP. The KNP promises to “end the mindless subordination to the Brussels bureaucracy” and to “restore the EU to its original intention, as an area of free trade and free movement of people”. Further, the KNP’s ideological declaration states “Polish sovereignty is a fundamental political value” (KNP).

**Conclusion**

The above analysis examined the Europeanization effect on Poland’s political parties using Robert Ladrech’s framework. The first part of the framework, examining political party programs showed that there is a great deal of variation between Poland’s
parties. The SLD seems to be the most Europeanized in this sense. Affairs from domestic to foreign are all integrated alongside EU frameworks and European integration. The PSL, true to its agrarian and rural roots, had minimal references to the EU. Most references to the EU were not along the lines of integration, but rather dealt with various provisions of the EU Budget and CAP. PO, KNP, and TR showed that parties are moving away from publishing formal electoral programs, relying on the use of their websites to articulate their party’s positions. The PO’s 2011 party program articulates a greater integration of EU and integration matters, but not to the extent of the SLD program. EU issues and integration policies are primarily concentrated in the programs foreign policy, environmental, and security issues. PiS’ numerous and lengthy party programs articulate a theme of Polish sovereignty before furthered European integration. Though the PiS is not anti-EU, its approach to EU issues and integration is as a Eurorealist party. It accepts the EU as an institution and the benefits Poland receives through the various EU funds, but it maintains the primacy of Polish sovereignty. Integration of EU matters into domestic matters is very limited. Although the party program of the TR makes few references to the EU, it advocates for deeper integration with calls for a European Federation, as well as the immediate adoption of the Euro as Poland’s currency. Finally, the short (or in the case of KORWiN non-existing) party program of the KNP mainly illustrates the party’s belief in a limited EU and a fully sovereign Poland.

In the dimension of inter-party competition, the period between 2009 and 2014 was not incredibly focused on the issues of European integration. Arguable the most pro-EU party in Poland, the SLD, spent much of this five-year period fighting for its political life after years of corruption scandals marred the party. The PSL, which has enjoyed the
position of ruling coalition partner since 2007, has not based its campaigns on EU or integration issues. If the PSL has gone under any significant change in party competition, it has been in softening its stance towards the EU because of its continued partnership with the PO. The PO and PiS have dominated the political landscape in Poland since 2007. The competition between these two parties has defined the political system. In the aftermath of the Smolensk tragedy, the 2010 and 2011 elections were predominantly free of EU issues. The two parties focused their campaigns on domestic, socio-cultural, and candidate issues.

In the final two dimensions of Ladrech’s framework, the effect of party organization and the establishment of transnational links remain uneven between parties. The PO has undergone the most significant changes in its party organization and through the creation of links with other national parties, its EP grouping, and the incorporation of EU specialists and its MEPs into the domestic party structure. The SLD has expanded its links with its EP party groupings as well as with other national parties. Its party structure has had minimal changes due to European integration. The PSL’s party organization remains unchanged, and it has not made any considerable efforts of creating transnational links. Although PiS has made significant links with its EP grouping and other conservative parties across the EU, its party organization and structure remain unchanged. The anti-EU parties, KNP and KORWiN, and the new TR, also show no changes in party structure or the formation of transnational links.

Aleks Szczerbiak concluded that the first five years of Polish membership in the EU had not had a significant Europeanization effect on parties. The results of this study show that Europeanization as a result of European integration is mixed at best. The SLD
remains the most fervent pro-EU and European integration party, and offers the best example of a party that fulfills almost Ladrech’s entire framework of Europeanization. The PO would be a close second to the SLD, in that it has moved its party organizational structure and created meaningful links with its transnational partners. The main conclusion of the application of Ladrech’s framework to Polish parties show that they vary in how they are integrated on each dimension of the framework. PiS for example, has built meaningful transnational ties, but has not altered its party organization and its approach to European integration is one of extreme caution. The rise of anti-EU parties (KNP and KORWiN), also highlight the frameworks inadequacy in examining these parties. The parties unwillingness to create transnational links, join EP groupings, or to publish party programs makes them hard to classify under Ladrech’s framework, even through it could be argued that these parties have been substantially Europeanized, although in an anti-EU direction. One other significant explanatory in why European integration has been slow in Europeanizing Poland’s parties is the way party competition has evolved since 2005. Since the 2005 election, Poland’s elections, both presidential and legislative, have been centered on the competition between the PO and PiS. Though other parties have been able to secure seats, these two political forces have dominated campaigns. The EU as a non-issue in the 2010 and 2011 elections can be seen as a result of this two-party competition.

The EU and European integration has certainly become a dimension of political competition in Poland. Each party has a clear position on the issue, but most European issues in Poland have been overshadowed. The most salient EU issues regardless of party have been that of the EU budget and security concerns. Budgetary and security issues are
the most well integrated into the platforms of each party. Outside of these two areas, EU issues have not become a realigning or even central feature of the political system in Poland. Although parties have incorporated various EU policies and structures into their organization in various ways, it is not enough to conclude that Polish parties have been Europeanized.

More research will have to be done in Poland, and in other member states. For future research, Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization must be amended to better understand how European integration has affected political parties in member states. Although Ladrech’s framework presents viable dimensions for research, it must be changed to more accurately reflect the process of Europeanization of political parties. One important addition to the aspect of Europeanization of political parties must be added to better reflect the dynamic between parties and their roles in democracies. Samuel Eldersveld outlined six crucial roles that parties play in democracies. These party functions include “(1) control and recruitment of elites, (2) interest aggregation, (3) conflict management, (4) competition maximization, (5) policy innovation, and (6) socializing citizens to a system consensus” (Yesilada 2002, 125). The sixth role, that of the party’s function in socializing citizens to a system consensus, would be key in further understanding the Europeanization effect on political parties. Within the confines of Ladrech’s framework, it would be difficult to extrapolate this link. The evidence provided in this study focused on the ways in which the EU and European integration had a distinct effect on political parties in Poland through changes in party structure and organization, the salience of EU issues in party programs, inter-party competition, and ties between transnational parties and EP groupings. The processes identified by Ladrech focus on
these narrow categories. Further research will have to include a discussion and research on if, and how, parties are socializing their citizens to a consensus on issues of European integration.

This study is a stepping-stone to greater understanding of political party behavior in relation to EU membership. Robert Ladrech’s framework allows for a structural understanding of Europeanization, but it leaves questions unanswered. Mainly, issues of how parties socialize their constituents to EU membership and integration remain unclear. Researching only one EU member state also does not provide a full comprehensive understanding of the issue of Europeanization. Though Poland has always been a willing partner in the EU project and its citizens overwhelmingly support EU membership, Poland is unique in that it is a relatively recent member, and differs from other EU members. The EU consists of over 500 million citizens in 28 member states. Although the EU has been most important to member states in economic and security realms, the EU also strives to become an important social actor. The objectives of the EU include goals of establishing European citizenship, ensure freedom and justice, and promote social progress. The social aspects of the EU also further expand the definition of Europeanization by introducing the question of what EU citizenship and social progress mean. Adding dimensions of European values and ideals will undoubtedly create a different meaning of Europeanization and how it effects domestic politics of member states. By employing Ladrech’s framework and building upon the work of Aleks Szczerbiak, Europeanization of Poland’s political parties yields limited and mixed results. Further research and study will hopefully make issues of Europeanization clearer and illustrate how the EU changes the politics of its member states.
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## Sejm Election Results, Prime Ministers, and Coalition Governments 2001-2014

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<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats 2001 Elections</th>
<th>Prime Minister 2001-2014</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
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<td>SLD-UP-PSL</td>
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www.electionresources.org/pl/sejm.php