Title

Evolving Strategies to Help Resolve Tragedy of the Commons Social Dilemmas

Published In

2015 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG)

Document Type

Citation

Publication Date

9-2015

Subjects

Game theory, Evolutionary computation, Cooperativeness -- Mathematical models

Abstract

Social dilemmas require individuals to choose between their own interests (by defecting) or group interests (by cooperating). N-player mathematical games such as public goods games have been extensively investigated to identify circumstances that promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In this paper the tragedy of the commons, a related social dilemma, is investigated. The population consists of cooperators, defectors and altruists. It is shown it is possible to evolve strategies that resolve (i.e., solve) a tragedy of the commons social dilemma. It will also be shown how trigger strategies can significantly increase cooperation levels in the population. Proximate explanations for why these trigger strategies work are offered.

Description

Appeared in Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG), 2015 IEEE Conference on, published by IEEE. © Copyright 2016 IEEE - All rights reserved.

Conference held Aug. 31-Sept. 2, 2015, in Tainan.

Locate the Document

Researchers can access the work here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CIG.2015.7317905

DOI

10.1109/CIG.2015.7317905

Persistent Identifier

http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/16656

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