1965

"Coexistence, not Coeducation: Some Aspects of Moral Education in Comparative Perspective"

George Z. F. Bereday

"Coexistence, not Coeducation: Some Aspects of Moral Education in Comparative Perspective"
George Z. F. Bereday
[date unknown], 1965
Portland State College

Portland State University Library Special Collections and University Archives
Oregon Public Speakers Collection
http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/11102
Transcribed by Anvesh Chagarlamudi and Carolee Harrison, Fall 2024

HOST: [recording begins mid-sentence] …it is a decision that they made. I think that we ought to mention that this is the sixth year that the lectureship has been in operation. It has been growing each year, something like […]. I think we ought to say thank you to Dr. Hummel and to the other people of Portland State College, and to the various committees that have been operating to give us this fine lectureship series.

I think that there are some other things we need to mention. If you feel that the setting in which we are operating this morning suggests that there is going to be a very dramatic approach to this, you're possibly right. There was some question as to whether we should be speaking from the balcony or from the lectern. I think I can assure you, though, that there will be no death in the third scene. At least I trust there won't be any.

I think before I introduce the speaker, two or three very brief announcements. The first announcement was that as I left my house this morning, my wife, who always comes up with some excellent counsel, said, “Just remember one thing. You are not the speaker.” And I shall try to remember this. Lunch will be served directly following this meeting, and it will be served on the third floor of the College Center, which is out the door to the rear of the auditorium to your left, down the street one block, and you take an elevator to the third floor. If you can't find an elevator, ask. Those are my instructions. But I think you will find it there. You'll need a ticket to get in, so be sure you have such a ticket.

I had the opportunity of meeting Dr. Bereday for the first time at 7:35 this morning. And I noticed that we had a number of things in common. We ordered eggs, two; I ordered one. We had bacon and consumed some coffee. I noticed also in checking the record that there are other similarities. We both served in the military forces, as did lots of people. We both attended colleges, and we both worked with students at one time or another. But here's where the distinction seems to come to an end, or the distinctive items, things in which we agree. I noticed in looking more closely at the things they've said about Dr. Bereday—and you've read some of these—they used the words "distinguished guest," and I have never been referred to as a distinguished guest. They referred to him as an internationally recognized scholar in comparative education, and I certainly have never been referred to as such.

But we do have with us today an outstanding scholar in the area of comparative education. During our short chat over coffee this morning, he immediately challenged us on a number of things. And Dr. Hummel, who was sitting with us, said, "I must disagree with you on some of those things." And he said, "Fine." I think he's going to bring to us some things which will be valuable in our discussions this afternoon. His topic you have seen before. He's going to say more about it. But I feel very privileged to have the honor to introduce to you at this time Dr. George Bereday. Dr. Bereday.

DR. GEORGE BEREDAY: Mr. Fuller, ladies and gentlemen. I know that there will be no dead bodies in the third act. I hope that there will be no fainting fits. The subject before us today has to deal with sex. It is a bad word, but we have made it a bad word. If I substitute for it what is used for it in sociology and say that the subject is kinship, the word has ceased to be bad. But we all know that whether bad or good, it is here with us to stay.

When Dr. Hummel first invited me to write out an academic lecture for the purpose of this meeting, I gave him as a title, a title which you have received in an introductory announcement. The title was "Coexistence, Not Coeducation." The point of departure of that lecture for me—which has since broadened out into what it is today—was the institution of coeducation in our society. For the first six or seven years of young school life, for reasons which are laudable, we attempt to get people not to be divided by sex any more than we want them to be divided by nationality, race, or creed. For reasons which are laudable, we have been one of the first countries that has thrown boys and girls in the same teaching situation together.

In this situation, our schools have prospered, our nation has prospered, and our practices become increasingly adopted by other systems in the world. But we have been pioneers in this. We continue in spirit to be pioneers and innovators more than any other nation in the world,

and it is because that we are being innovators that we ask ourselves again: are our assumptions right? Have we done a good thing? Have we solved more problems than we have created? Ought we not question some of our practices? Coeducation is among them.

For the first six or seven years—at least that much we know—of school life, boys perform in classrooms less well than girls. While girls are “sugar and spice and all things nice,” their calligraphy beautiful, their concentration span admirable, their perseverance remarkable. Boys are “snips and snails and puppy dog tails,” climbing trees, pulling hair, making ink blots on the walls. This is because “boys will be boys.” The differences in the learning of the two sexes are there and clear and on occasion are remarkable. For instance, Anton Dvorak School in Chicago, a Black Belt Negro school, but now a beautiful, alive experimental school, began the experiment in separate education of the sexes, because the young principal noted that when in the first grade the children arrived at the beginning of the school year, the ratio of good readers to poor readers is evenly distributed. Half the boys and half the girls are good readers; half the boys and half the girls are poor readers. But ten months later, after the first year of the elementary school had run its course, 95% of all poor readers are boys.

Something may be inside the instruction system. The fact that the women teachers teach boys, and there are some different sexual mechanisms for learning reading, which we do now not yet know. Or simply the classroom situation and operation as we know it. The girls quiet, nice, concentrated, working hard, being encouraged, as good students are. The boys restless, fidgety, snippety, being deterred and discouraged, as we know the boys to be.

Now, so far, this is purely a classroom situation, but the consequences of it, it occurred to me, may be much wider. No matter what any suffragette or the feminist may say, congenitally, instinctively, intuitionally, I believe that there is built into a woman a need for strength to protect her. For one half-hour of her lifetime, when she's on her back delivering a newborn baby, or for the three or five years afterwards, when she is thrown by life into the necessity of tending to her helpless infant. Psychologically, the woman has a need for someone to stand guard over her nest and protect her. For those tender moments, her tender body devised by creator for procreation imposes upon her mind and psyche these deep-felt needs.

When a little girl, as her perceptions of society begin to open, as she has just left her sheltered home in which the family had protected her from all and sundry and entered the classroom, the first miniature society. When a little girl in these first experiences of childhood begins to see the operation of the boys, potentially her mates and her protectors, she wants to see reassurance, the security that she needs in her future life. She wants to see in front of her the image of that strength, rock-like but tender, not abusive, not coarse, not brutal, that she can see in a way […]

little boy; but thoughtful, tender, protective, stable, secure, masculine strength. When she sees the little boy in the classroom, she begins to see that need of hers is not likely to be fulfilled. [laughter] If her experiences, first experiences of her about the boys were boys two or three years older, she might be more likely to accept that she is safe in the world. But with the boys of her equal age, she begins, however, dimly to perceive that her needs are not likely to be fulfilled.

As she grows from year to year, from a little toddler to a little girl, she has to draw on her inward resources. She has to seek for strength in herself. She has to make up in rock-like structure for the pebbles instead of the rock that she sees on the side of man, even though the performance of the boys can finally catch up and match hers by the seventh grade. Or perhaps, even as the masculine dominators claim, exceed hers in the 10th or 11th or 12th grades. The personality formation of those early years persists; the girl begins to emerge stronger and stronger. We begin to see the emergence of a dominant female rather than this submissive, passive female.

It only takes two generations for such a female, now a mother, to contribute congenitally, genetically, to the further weakening of the fiber of her growing sons. The results of very innocent experiments that we have made in the field of coeducation may be much more far-seeking and far-reaching that we were likely to imagine. It may well be a tool for altering the very structure of genetic relations of the sexes and obliterating the thousand-years-old image of a strong protective male and of the protected, soft—and yet so vitally important to happiness of men—female; we may create a society in which confusion of sex roles occurs. And while it is not my premise to say that such confusion is good or bad, perhaps we should be a unisex—psychologically—rather than a bisexual society.

Nonetheless, this is the problem, and this is the problem that I wanted to place before you. But as I went on writing my presentation, like most things, it began to broaden on me. And pretty soon, instead of wanting to talk to you purely about a small sector of our enterprise of school—the impact of coeducation upon the morality of men—I came to want and wrote instead a *tractatus* on moral education as a whole. It is this moral education, reflections on moral education as a whole, of which the coeducation problem is a part, that I offer to you today as a presentation—which later in a fuller and a better form, it will be my privilege to place before you in a printed form, for it has already been printed.

This problem of coeducation is in a sense a problem of moral education. From the problem of coeducation as I saw it stems a much larger problem of general structure of behavior. We have been confronted in the thousands of years that our educational systems have been in operation, and in the 200 years in which the American school system has been in operation, with a

tremendous increase of knowledge. If you wanted to say something about our schools, it is that they are so heavily under the shadow at the present time of a fantastic increase of knowledge. At first, when we started the enterprise of our schools, the problem was relatively simple. You took at learned John Locke, and then you knew how to teach. There were six or seven established subjects; there were six or seven established textbooks, and you could teach it, and you could teach it reasonably well. The group of people in front of you was small and select; the notion that education is rigor was firmly established. A New York teacher could answer, when he was asked by a visiting journalist why he never allowed his children to move their heads during the hours of instruction, he could answer, "Why should they move their heads sideways when all the time I am in front of the classroom?"

Then knowledge began to burgeon; then we began to be flooded with an avalanche of more and more demands; then more and more diverse groups came into our schools with more and more diverse interests and desires and ambitions, and our road became much less clear and much more confused. We attempted and still are attempting to retreat from the position which nobody now would describe—that the business of the school is to teach everybody all. Until the progressive revolution and John Dewey, unquestionably the business of the school was to teach everybody *all there is to know.* But from there we began to retreat and attempt to find a way of short-circuiting, short-cutting the process. To this very day, our problem is: what keys to find? What gimmicks to bring about? What digestion to give to our material? What are the important things to learn and which aren't?

At first, it was the era of progressive education in our society—in which we all live still and from which we have been raised—and we are tempted to get away from the problem of this burgeoning system of knowledge by saying—not without reason—the important thing is curiosity. They will learn more if they are curious. I know that there is knowledge, but the only meaningful key to it is interest. If you are going to behave yourselves in such a way that your children are going to keep the fires of curiosity burning, then it doesn't matter what you teach them. They are forever going to learn some new things; their thirst for knowledge will be unquenchable. Was it not, basically, insofar as it wasn't a social concern, a basic tenet of progressivism?

Then, as we found out over the years, somehow we haven't found the key to the interest; that our children sit in our classes still bored, listening to the mortifying sounds of their own indigestion, that they ask of teachers soulfully one day, "Oh, teacher, do we have to learn today what we want to learn today?" Then we found that somehow we haven't found the clue, and now we are in the era of retreat from the early progressive tradition—or, I would prefer to think we march forward from the early progressive tradition, and we say, "Very well, you can't teach

mathematics just by teaching them the letters and the algebra and the calculus, and you can't teach mathematics just by keeping them excited and interested." But you've got to have something to keep them excited about it. What are the shortcuts? Is it Walt Disney's Mickey Mouse? Or is it some other approach to the decimal system, or some new cross-cutting things that will give them not only an interest in, but a system with which to approach this body of knowledge? We have been under this tremendous impact of knowledge in education, and we are still coping with how to deal with it.

As this impact of knowledge grew like a mushroom over us, we began naturally to start losing some dimensions, or rather, fusing some dimensions. We in America, who are pioneers of education, were the very first to collapse these two dimensions. We said to ourselves, "Ignorance is darkness and evil. Knowledge is light and good. Ignorance are the bad guys in the Western TV serial; knowledge is the good guy in the Western TV serial." The trick of an educator is like the trick of a script writer—be sure that the good guys will win over the bad guys. Get everybody to know, and all will be well. Only now, after 150 years of a fantastic spread of mass education—which resulted not in increase in attendance in the churches, but the decline of attendance in the churches; not increasing human fraternity but increasing social tension; not the abolition of the bar and the strip girl magazine, but the increase of the bars and the strip girl magazines—we are beginning to ponder whether indeed our TV serial wasn't somewhat mis-written, whether knowledge is indeed the golden clue to goodness, or whether knowledge is, like all things in human life, a key to forward progress. The good men through knowledge becomes saintly, and the bad men through knowledge become cleverer rascals. That is an equation which, by and large, squares with human existence.

Now we begin to say to ourselves—and this is the topic of my lecture—Well, maybe knowledge isn't everything. When we were tempted in the early progressive era to cater to other things—the teeth of the children, the lunches of the children, the social adjustment of the children—maybe what we really were groping for is an answer to this great question. We now fairly well know, or will soon know, how to teach them knowledge, but how do we know how to teach them behavior? What do we do to teach the children behavior? Is it what we say to them that teaches them what to do? Is it how we act that teaches them what to do? If it is what we say to them that teaches them what to do, what do we say to them? What we think in the innermost of our hearts, or what the nation thinks, the elusive public opinion thinks? If we are fortunate that what we think and what the nation thinks are one and the same thing, is it a good thing or a bad thing? Have we been reduced to the average, the automaton, the "no-thinks" who simply look sideways—the other-oriented personality of Riesman—and take their cue from what other people do? Is this not a real alarm bell, when we think what the nation thinks? Should we not,

particularly in *this* nation, seldom think what the nation thinks? For after all, the nation is we; it is only the sum total of what we think that becomes what the nation thinks.

If this is the case, in what way do we have the right to address our children with the speech coming out of our hearts and out of our convictions, if we know these hearts and these convictions to diverge from the established opinions—and yet it is the established opinions that pay for schools, that sustain schools, that appoint us to the schools; it is the children of the established opinions that we are having our impact upon.

Here is a great problem: even if we admit that moral education is telling children what to do, what about if moral education is simply acting in such a way that children can follow us? Here we are, the teaching profession—as Allison Davis puts it in a lovely little book seldom-known but which should be [paraphrasing]: the influence of social class upon learning of children[1]—here we are, the teachers, the members solidly of the middle class. Maybe you'd like to be higher in the middle class along the pecking order than we are, but we are in the middle class. Maybe our parents were in the working class and we are the first that have climbed out to the middle class—that makes us even *more* middle class, for in the confines between the two, we rigidly stick to it.

So we have the notions of how many times a week we should wash our hair, and how many times we should change our underclothes, and what is a nice thing to eat and not nice, and what is the nice attitude towards books—which one of my colleagues called, forgive me, "those damn black dots"—and what is not the right attitude towards books. And we have a *Weltanschauung,* as the Germans say, a viewpoint on life which is fairly set. We know what the nice things in life are, don't we? Is a boy who is wearing a hairstyle which reminds you of the back of a migratory bird in flight nice? [laughter] Obviously, he is not nice. Is a boy who saws off the muffler of his automobile and drives outside your house with a screech of the tires nice? He is clearly not nice. On the other side! Is a boy who is interested in school, as a millionaire friend of mine was in my college days, only in two "G"s, girls and golf, nice? He is clearly not nice. We have mapped out for ourselves the nice, solid, dependable middle, which is nice. And anything above and anything below is not nice. We know it. Nobody can tell us any different.

What happens when we have in front of us a big gangly boy born to fame and fortune who has a little red sportscar outside just waiting, raring to go on his next spending spree as soon as he lets us with our concern for numbers and hieroglyphs—what do we think of this boy? Is he nice, or he potential troublemaker? And worse still, what do we think of the boy who sits down there

[1] Allison Davis, *Social-class influences upon learning* (1962)

with the greasy hair and his shirt unbuttoned almost to the navel and a leather jacket on top and the tight little trousers—you know, a less interesting society than ours uses these things to advantage. In Bulgaria, for instance, they go out in the streets every night and round up all the boys that loiter in the streets, and take them in police stations, and then tell them to take their pants off over their boots without taking their boots off. If they can take their pants off over their boots, they release them—they are clearly legitimate boys. [laughter] But if their pants are so narrow that they can't take them on and off over their boots, they lock them up for the night as delinquents.

How do we, then, adjust to these people? They are clearly not nice people. Our notions of morality are fantastically bound. And still, what if we are a nice, elderly lady, who is—let's say sixties immediately before retirement—who has grown up in a nice, old-fashioned, established old American family, who had gone through life without an opportunity of raising a family and having children, but who has channelized her yearning for this in a lifetime of most rewarding activity teaching to other people's children? How is her viewpoint—which must be serene, set, established, noiseless, harmonious; if she had lived her life successfully, it cannot fail in the twilight of her years but to be this, a gently flowing stream of a river. How is she to meet the turbulent ocean wave of a youngster from an underprivileged slum, with perhaps a disorganized family background—but certainly irrespective of background, with a body just fulminating with the new sexual forces about to enter it, as they do in puberty. With the pimples just pushing out onto the stubble of an unshaven chin. You tell them, "Children, children—Alexander the Great." He looks at you and says, "Yeah, the prominent ragtime band leader." [laughter] You say, "Children, children—Plato"; they say, "Yeah, I saw a dog on the TV called Plato."

How do we deal with such a child? Is he nice? Is he not nice? Do I by my own moral… [tape skips and pauses, then resumes, replaying part of what has already been recorded]

… How is she to meet the turbulent ocean wave of a youngster from an underprivileged slum, with perhaps a disorganized family background—but certainly irrespective of background, with a body just fulminating with the new sexual forces about to enter it, as they do in puberty. With the pimples just pushing out onto the stubble of an unshaven chin. You tell them, "Children, children—Alexander the Great." He looks at you and says, "Yeah, the prominent ragtime band leader." [laughter] You say, "Children, children—Plato"; they say, "Yeah, I saw a dog on the TV called Plato."

How do we deal with such a child? Is he nice? Is he not nice? Do I by my own moral behavior provide an appropriate beacon, or am I just miscuing, misfitting, immoralizing, demoralizing the youngster before me, who cannot, try as he will, follow my example? He is not an unmarried

lady of sixty. He is not a mother of three children who is a teacher of thirty-five […]. He is something entirely different. Can I rely on my inner behavior, or must I also tell him what he should do; do I know what I should tell him? Confusion is fantastic. We can all talk about moral education, and we all *do* talk about moral education, but to know about it—we know, painfully, very little.

The Russians have twenty rules for pupils printed in black and white; we have cardinal principles of education—or if not, the Boy Scout movement's things. The Japanese have the code of *bushido,* the proper relationship of men to society. We have all these things listed on the walls, and we want to teach them. How to teach them? What is it we are teaching them? And furthermore, how does it stick? The principle which I have used in my own work, when I identified in one of my articles the difference between exposure and effectiveness—that indeed is a very tall order. For we always have, even in this case, have a difficulty of confusion. We always think of effectiveness of moral education, but we really always do things only to tamper with the exposure to moral education.

We are talking about, should we add an hour or two—when we went to Japan, they had a moral education subject, *shushin*; it was a teaching of filial piety and obedience to the Emperor which had led the Japanese into the militarist period and the war. So we abolished the *shushin*, but what did we do? We cut out one hour out of the week in a school system in which the teachers are telling the children how to be obedient to the Emperor. When the Japanese revolted against the American importation, they have re-introduced *shushin* three years ago. It's not the same *shushin*; it's now called *dotoku*, a different moral educational system, but still, all they did is introduce back the one hour into the school curriculum in which the teacher will now tell the children roughly, "What you have inherited from your ancestor is better than what they had, and you are going to be sure that what they inherit will be better still." We have assumed in our minds that putting this hour in or taking it out makes any difference. We don't know whether it makes any difference to what we talk and tell them. This is purely tampering with exposure.

If you want to try and test the effectiveness of moral education, let's see our tax evasion records. Let's see our willingness to take compulsory service. Let's see our crime statistics. Let's see the statistics of our family units in disorganization. Let's scan the gossip columns of the newspapers to see how much venom flows daily from our fangs, and how much doesn't. There we will find the indices of the effectiveness of what our senior colleagues thirty years prior to it did or did not do in the classrooms in the field of moral education.

We have a terribly difficult thing in establishing and defining moral education. And the kinds of difficulties of which I spoke are not the only ones. The variation, when you start studying moral

education in world perspective, which is after all my object today—I'm sorry, I apologize; I could confine myself to talk to you about American education, but I would do less that justice to this meeting. My entire work consists with comparing different countries' systems. I have devoted my life to studying others, to bring back their experiences so that we may use them, if it is usable. And when you try to compare in world perspective the attitudes to moral education which people have, the difficulties are still more fantastic than the ones which I have described which are purely national, one […] type of difficulty is still more fantastic.

How do you equate, for instance, the morality laws between one country and another? To engage in a romantic enterprise in the United States with a girl even a day younger than 18, even though with her consent, is statutory rape punishable by 15 years under the law—one of the more stringent laws in the United States. United States' laws in terms of sex deviance are all stacked in favor of the woman. If a woman goes under a window and sees a man disrobing in the window, he is going to be charged with exhibitionism. If a man goes under the window a sees a woman disrobing in the window, he is going to be charged with peeping Tom-ism. [laughter] It is always he that is going to be charged, because the American sex laws are fantastically in protection—in comparative perspective—in protection of the woman. So tampering with a person one day under 18, one month under 18, be she ever so ready for matrimony—in the state of Kansas, she can legally get married when she is 15—is statutory rape, which is punished by 15 years of imprisonment. But not to betroth a girl when she reaches 12 years in India is to do her a great disservice, because she is supposed to marry at puberty in a country in which fertility is so important; bearing children is the only reason for existence for both sexes, and in which the status of a woman begins when she is not married rather than when she is married, when she becomes a full-blown person.

How do you then reconcile the notions of morality between different countries, where you have to start comparing behavior of the legal system in India as compared to the behavior of the legal system of the United States? The difficulties are fantastic; even in this great area of moral education in the sphere of sex, we have such difficulties in determining precisely the appropriate standards. When you can't even inside the countries, how do you know what morality is?

The law about juvenile delinquency in New York City is based on the following sentence. Who is a juvenile delinquent? A juvenile delinquent is a person under 16 whose behavior does not square up with the established expectations of the adult society. That is the legal definition of juvenile delinquency, on the basis of which the police commissioner in New York can establish rules such as the following one: If you see three youngsters together at a street corner, you are entitled to take them into the police station for questioning. So now, even the gangs, when they

go into their rumbles, go in pairs and not in threes, because three makes a gang under the laws of New York state. How do you reconcile the notions of the operations of juvenile delinquency laws with say, a youngster caught shoplifting a magazine? They are considered to be a juvenile offender unless the authorities can establish that their shoplifting is part of an initiation into a sorority or fraternity. Many of our sororities and fraternities, as part of their initiation, have a demand that a youngster lift something from a shop. That clearly is not delinquent behavior in terms of the notions of private property—it is a lark. But if he is found not to do this, there you are: he is a juvenile delinquent.

What do we do if a […] judge in Kentucky, who treats identical delinquents differently only on the basis of whether they come from a broken home or not? For an identical theft, for an identical outrage performed by two boys, he will parole and remand the one who does not have a broken home, and he will send to the reform farm the one that does have a broken home. When you ask him and attack him for it, he can defend himself by saying, "I am only a judge; I have thousands of people going through my hands; if they've got two parents, chances are they'll take care of it, but if there is only one parent, chances are something's already wrong. Maybe I am not a good psychologist, but let me off the hook; I am a lawyer and I've got to do something fast for these people."

The notions of what moral education need to be is fantastically difficult in our society. It is multiplied in difficulty also by variations from time to time. Not long ago, a sociologist in the *American Journal of Educational Sociology* published an interesting article. She picked up a pamphlet published by the United States Children's Bureau about the care and feeding of young children. She first picked up a pamphlet written in the early 1900s, just at the break of the century, and in there she looked up the short paragraph dealing with thumb-sucking. Certainly, a lot of our children—in this day of complete felicity, abundance, social and psychological security, and otherwise sublime adjustment—certainly, a lot of our children do this for quite a few years. She found this paragraph in the pamphlet of the early 1900s, and there it said, "It's a bad thing." Tie his hands down to the bed. Do something. He's not supposed to do that; it forces his teeth out; it will make him a psycho; it's a bad thing. She picked then a pamphlet, the same one with the same cover, but as it was reprinted in the 1930s by the same office. Sigmund Freud's ideas by then became a household word in American home and school. The very same paragraph on how to deal with thumb-sucking was rewritten entirely: "Do nothing!" You are going to damage his psyche; you're going to traumatize him for life. Let him suck all he will—sooner or later, he will get rid of this inner, deep urge to fulfill himself with oral or oscular satisfaction. She picked up the same pamphlet again printed very recently in 1960; some kind of a more balanced view appears in the paragraph on thumb-sucking. Sigmund Freud is all there: "It's a bad thing to disturb him when he sucks his thumb," if you're going to do it by force, it's

going to damage his psyche. But the older thing has come back—it's a bad thing for him to suck his thumb, too. So talk to him; distract him. Try, whenever you see him sucking his thumb, try in non-compulsive ways to cure him of the bad habit.

What is moral education? Is thumb-sucking good, bad, or indifferent? What, indeed, is moral education?

Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly: do as I say, don't do as I do. Isn't that all fathers' notion for the young? Do as I tell you to do, don't copy me. I may want to skip through the red lights, but you've got to abide by the law. I may go and fix my parking ticket, but for you the law is important. I may try to sneak in front of you not to try and tell my wife that I just looked sideways, but you must always be truthful. Do as I tell you; don't do as I do. From the moment the little ones open their eyes, they see what we do, and from the moment we start telling them what to do, they see that what we do and what we tell them not to do are not the one and the same thing.

There comes into being what we cope with so violently now—the youthful cynicism; the feeling that nothing is really right. The feeling that all is just a cycle of hypocritical nothing; the feeling that we need something to save us from our elders, instead of the feeling which is such a strong cement of all mankind: we and our elders are one. They have nourished us; they are our wisdom; we depend on them; we want to look after them when they are old and feeble. They are ours; they are part of our blood. This has disappeared from our minds just as the old resident mothers disappeared from our homes. It's a sad thing when we think of an American society as a man and woman and the children. It's a sad thing when you think of the society of a hundred years ago as the great-grandfather or the one surviving grandparent and the old maiden aunties and the father and the mother and the children and a couple of foundlings to throw in—a big social organism from which the strength of this land has come. Now, 20% of us are changing homes every year, and there are so few together—they grow up and go to college and we get so lonesome and old, and we are heard in those old mens' communities and we're such a pitiful, bereft sight, cut off from the life blood, the life of young people. How bitter we feel at the loss of young people. Nobody can have young children in this culture and not feel that they should have a grandmother around.

We have these problems of generational discontinuity, and we have the problems of the youngsters' starvation for some ideals to follow. You haven't lived until you have seen as I have in the Virgin Islands not very long ago, sixty youngsters bound for the Peace Corps in Gabon, Africa. They were enormous, lumbering, husky lumberjacks. They were not going to teach in schools like most of the Peace Corps; they were going to build schools in Gabon. You know what

it means when you build schools in Gabon? You're going into the jungle; it's equatorial Africa and you live in tents. You build schools and you live in tents; fungus comes and eats you from the ground up the next day. They were going to go there and build those schools for the equatorial Africans—and you haven't lived, nor known about the thirst for ideals that young people have, until you've seen those husky, sixty lumberjacks with minds supremely unstained by thought! [laughter] Learning French eight hours a day. French eight hours a day, because that's the language you have to use when you are in Gabon.

We have suppressed and killed, through our misbehavior—we are not individually guilty, but as a nation, surely we are—we have suppressed and killed, as a nation, as a world, as adults of the world, in our youngsters, the right to be idealistic, the right to be romantic. March with great flags for causes! We know the youth in most societies; in most societies students riot. They riot in Latin America, they riot in Burma, they riot in Poland, they riot in Turkey. Students riot for what they consider a righteous cause, and our students just make panty raids once in while. Only recently, thankfully, on the civil rights issue! Only recently have we had flare-ups in San Francisco, in Washington, because the youngsters are fighting for something they consider right. It doesn't matter whether they are right or wrong. It matters that they should have a star to lead them, and because there is such a growing gulf between the adults and the youngsters in our society, we have pushed them into a shell, and they are now, when you take Philip Jacobs' study of the values in college, we are just angling for a middle-class home and a nice middle-sized income, and we want to avoid all the controversial issues, and we just want to be safe. We don't want ideals to follow; we want to be safe. Twenty-three people behind the curtains of a window of a woman being murdered in cold blood in the streets of New York—you have read about it in the newspapers—a terrible thing. And it is in defense against that that the youngsters organize themselves in juvenile gangs, and have created instead a sub-teen or teen culture different from adult culture. We've never known that there had been a different culture from adult culture. In our concern that we try to make the youngsters vocal, we have created some of this culture; we've said we are going to let you have a student council, and you have a president of the homeroom election. Or we've said in other societies, now you are going to be a pioneer or […] group and you are going to supervise all the bad learners in schools. We have attempted very feebly to create subcultures as means of expression of the young, who are suddenly confronted and believing and gasping: we have already created powerful subcultures.

What is a delinquent gang but a Boy Scout group? The very same boy, if you are born into a middle-class neighborhood, would enter a Boy Scout group. The very same boy, for the very same reasons—if he is born in a slum neighborhood, enters instead a gang group. What does this gang group mean to him? It means first of all that he can, from day to day, display courage, […] reputation. This is the most important thing for gang members: to maintain face, reputation.

It means to time that he is disciplined and a member of a whole. It means to him that he is fighting for something. What is he fighting for? He is fighting for the destruction of the established adult authority. His great war is against the property rights or the police force of the established adult authority.

If he were an Irish in the 20s, or a Moroccan or Algerian in the 60s, a Frenchman during the Second World War, he would be a national hero, would he not? He would be fighting against the police, but it would be the German police or the French police in Morocco or the English police in Ireland. He would be a hero! The same bombs, the same organized nightly trips, would be patriotic deeds. But here he is, in the slums of an opulent society which disbands him and loads him in a police car when he walks with two friends along the streets. Here he is in a society which permits other rival gangs in other territories. I picked up a little boy in Harlem, where I do a lot of work; he was reading at the second level (grade); he was eleven years old and should have been reading in the fifth grade. I took care of him for six months, and he caught up in six months from second to fifth grade. We were all wondering about it afterwards, how can he be caught up so quickly? And he told us, this little boy, about much of his life, and we found that he is living four blocks away from the Hudson River and six blocks away from Central Park, and he's never been, at the age of eleven, in either. And the reason he hasn't been able to go away four blocks from his home in one direction and six blocks from his home in the other direction is because on the next block is a neighboring gang. A different turf. And if you cross that without the protection of an adult, you get beaten up or stiffed of your money or something.

So here is this gang system, which is really not a delinquent system at all but a system of defense, purpose, against the lack of moral stability that we give our youngsters. Have you observed—I wonder if anybody has made a solid study of this—that in the criminal statistics of adult criminals, there are virtually no individuals who are members of the gangs as youngsters? Somehow the youngsters in the gangs grow up into normal citizens; they disappear when they become adult persons, persons of the adult world.

So the different difficulties of establishing moral education are substantial, and the first part of my lecture, in the same vein as I do to you today, now I describe the difficulties in knowing what moral education is. A great many more heads have to be put together for us to know what it is we want. It is from the classroom teachers—we always repeat, those of us who are teachers of teachers—whose duty it is to prepare classroom teachers. Those of us are forever aware of our own weakness. We have so little time, for we are so pitifully few; our work is so fantastically catapulted upon our shoulders. We cannot man the research that needs to be done in the schools by simply those who teach teachers. We need the medical people, grassroots research movements. The medical people cannot leave the matter of controlling disease in the hands of

the professors of medicine! Every practitioner forever is attempting to do research and report unusual cases in medical journals. It is from the classroom teachers that must come forward a much clearer definition: what is it that we mean by moral education?

Particularly—and this is very important—do we mean only by moral education integration of the young into an adult society, after all that has been said today? Or do we mean precisely that security of conviction which leaves in one's heart the margin of breadth to be able to live with evil?

When I went to Japan not very long ago, on a […] project that is destined to be a half-million dollars to bring prominent Japanese teachers to study at American schools, the first thing I asked was, "What do you want to learn most?" And they with one voice replied, "Democracy." I know the Japanese; I speak their language and I have read their sources, and I was at once able to answer, "But you will not find in America the democracy that you look for. For you, democracy is an ideal construct that means cooperation with each other, of good men alone. But you will find in America a democracy which means cooperation of good men with bad men." We are forever reaching for noble men and to make them all better, but meanwhile we make deals with the bad men, so that government can go on. Precisely the nature of our democracy is to make a new peace with the bad men. When you compare the American elections with the English elections, all the fantastic, despicable fluff that we are willing to put up with, moral nations as we are in election time, that the British wouldn't follow it for one day. Clearly democracy for us is a working model; we want it to be a cooperation of good men, but it really is a enough of the breadth of understanding to make deals, to temporize, to bring around to your side those whose intentions are clearly not of the best.

Must we not now define moral education not purely an integration in the adult world, knowing what the adult world is, but teach precisely that capacity of knowing the distinction between how I should behave in terms of the sacred things that my culture has furnished me with, and how this ought not to be invalidated, jeopardized, limping! Because I see people who are the very people who teach me this not behaving in a similar way. That toleration of which so many have spoken for so long; how much importance it has in the field of moral education.

So this, by way of a definition, or groping for a definition, of what a moral education is—and then I want to say, having defined it in this sort of somewhat nebulous way—what I would like to do, and I can do it in just a few words, for I see that our time marches on and I've spoken more than an hour already—after all, professors of education have an irresistible urge to go on and on and on… [laughter] Then, by the way of illustrating of how I attempt to do it, I furnish you with an emphasis on what has risen from the courts and for coeducation and what has

resulted in the description of sex education as a whole in the United States and the Soviet Union.

See, the things I said at the beginning about coeducation in American society—it looked at beautiful theory. And professors of education will never let a beautiful theory be disturbed by ugly facts. I made a mistake; I let it be disturbed by ugly facts. I said if coeducation has done this to us, then it must have done this to all of the other societies. And I picked the two, the Soviet Union and Japan, which have comparable systems to ours; these are the large mass education systems. The French? No, that's a selective system. In Mozambique? That's a non-existent system. But the Japanese and the Russians, they have comparable systems. The Japanese actually graduate from high school the same 65% that we do now, and teach everybody 100% under the age of 15, and in the process teach them not 37 letters of the alphabet but 1300 characters. So you might say they have a better mass system than we have. The Russians graduate 45%, not 65, so they're a little behind, but still these three are the mass coeducational systems.

I looked and I saw, unfortunately, that the coeducation that I thought had an impact in American society on the masculinization of the woman does not have the similar effect in the Soviet or in the Japanese society. The eye-fluttering Madame Butterfly in Japan is too well-known to need restatement; I say simply by way of illustration of that product of coeducation a story of my secretary when I was a Fulbright professor at the University of Tokyo and I was writing a book, *Comparative Methods in Education* which was published last year. One morning I said to my secretary, "Well, you know, Toshiko-san, I really came here to write my book, but Japan is so madly exciting, I feel I want to roam the streets and observe your customs all the time, and I feel that I will not do justice to my book." And Toshiko bowed and said, "Master"—they call the professors masters; most appealing—[laughter] and she said, "Master, you can always write your book. Meanwhile, enjoy beautiful Japan." And that evening I had a spurt of writing fever, and I wrote like mad. The next morning I said to her, "Toshiko-san, I think I can write my book in Japan…" [tape pauses and skips back, replaying part of previously recorded speech]

See, the things I said at the beginning about coeducation in American society—it looked at beautiful theory. And professors of education will never let a beautiful theory be disturbed by ugly facts. I made a mistake; I let it be disturbed by ugly facts. I said if coeducation has done this to us, then it must have done this to all of the other societies. And I picked the two, the Soviet Union and Japan, which have comparable systems to ours; these are the large mass education systems. The French? No, that's a selective system. In Mozambique? That's a non-existent system. But the Japanese and the Russians, they have comparable systems. The Japanese actually graduate from high school the same 65% that we do now, and teach everybody 100%

under the age of 15, and in the process teach them not 37 letters of the alphabet but 1300 characters. So you might say they have a better mass system than we have. The Russians graduate 45%, not 65, so they're a little behind, but still these three are the mass coeducational systems.

I looked and I saw, unfortunately, that the coeducation that I thought had an impact in American society on the masculinization of the woman does not have the similar effect in the Soviet or in the Japanese society. The eye-fluttering Madame Butterfly in Japan is too well-known to need restatement; I say simply by way of illustration of that product of coeducation a story of my secretary when I was a Fulbright professor at the University of Tokyo and I was writing a book, *Comparative Methods in Education* which was published last year. One morning I said to my secretary, "Well, you know, Toshiko-san, I really came here to write my book, but Japan is so madly exciting, I feel I want to roam the streets and observe your customs all the time, and I feel that I will not do justice to my book." And Toshiko bowed and said, "Master"—they call the professors masters; most appealing—[laughter] and she said, "Master, you can always write your book. Meanwhile, enjoy beautiful Japan." And that evening I had a spurt of writing fever, and I wrote like mad. The next morning I said to her, "Toshiko-san, I think I can write my book in Japan. My only regret is that I will not have enough time to observe the beautiful customs of your country." And Toshiko bowed and said, "Master, Japan will always be here. Meanwhile, write your book." Here, coeducation has produced this! So different from what we have.

Then I said, well, maybe this is an unusual example, because it is Orientalist, and this is a place where there are more women than men—which turned out to be untrue, too—I went through a hundred years of studies, and in Japan there are as many women as we have here, the same percentage. So I said that maybe in the Soviet Union I will be saved; in the Soviet Union the ladies are built on what can only be described as the solidest of foundations. [laughter] Maybe in the Soviet Union, coeducation has produced also a masculinized type of a woman. Again, no. They are solid, to be sure, and indomitable, and dig tunnels, and shovel show, and play football together with men, but there is between men and women, even in these identical situations, this unspoken aura of tenderness that flows from a man who feels himself in a position—as all honorable men do and want—in the position of protecting something very dear and something very precious, and something that needs protecting. Which in our society has often been formed instead into a duty, a "You must do this or else" broomstick. The duty, not the voluntary kind of protection, as I used it in another place where I have attempted to describe this.

For reasons which are entirely appropriate, an American woman regards a man as a dog to be housebroken. But when she is through the process, she finds that instead of having on the leash a magnificent hunting dog who is tugging at the leash, she finds herself petting a biscuit- and

milk-fed household poodle. This kind of problem that we have had in our society that I have been concerned about I don't find in Soviet society.

So again, my coeducation concern has broadened out into a more general education concern. In this lecture, I treat in particular the interesting problem that Americans are considered all over the world, miraculously and surprisingly, an immoral nation. Certain of my comparisons with the Russians—you remember when Nikita Khruschev, blessed be his memory, came to Los Angeles. Some of the […], they show him can-can. Can-can is a dance invented in 18th century France for the society which now typifies moral decay. The one thing they have to show him in the United States is can-can, which gives him a chance to give the line, "In my country, we don't make girls make their livings by showing off their backsides." So, we have a reputation all over the world of being essentially an immoral people, especially when compared with the Russians or with the Japanese, who are essentially quite a puritan people, geisha or no geisha, all these things or no things that I mentioned, essentially they are a very puritan people, a very strict, rigid people from the point of view of morality and sex education.

I devote the rest of this to illustrate how confused moral issues, issues of moral education, are in the world by showing that in fact the Americans are more puritan, more moral—or at least as moral—as the Japanese and the Russians. Only in our society, the notion of morality is tied up with "me," the individual. With my own capacity to resist temptation. The other societies rely on external means to enforce morality upon the youngsters. In our society, it is built inside. So there is the continuous and awesome titillation in our society which you don't find in the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union is a fantastic absence of sex problems in school. Boarding schools have boys' dormitories and girls' dormitories facing across the corridors. At nine o'clock at night, the gong rings and all teachers leave the building; when they come back the next morning, nothing happened. How is it possible to have this kind of behavior in the youngsters? It is possible in a society which relies on the moral behavior on external means, because it is a state-controlled society. There isn't, in the Soviet Union, a pin-up picture, a suggestive exposure of anything that might conceivably lead to sex titillation. Once, there was a Soviet whodunit in which there was a sex scene, and the authorities pounced upon it, but it was too late—it was sold out the first day. You have, as a result, this immunization of young people from temptation. They can behave like children under the age of 18, because they have no stimuli, or very much fewer stimuli, than the Americans.

With us, the movies, the TV commercials, the pulp press, the magazines, the suggestive thoughts from the age of six! From kissing in public, kissing booths in fairs—few Americans

consider it an odious oscular practice—the old-fashioned thing of putting a young girl in a booth and letting her give a kiss for a dollar. Few Americans consider that a deplorable practice the fact that a young girl who is taken out to a movie on a date considers herself dishonest if she doesn't repay this by kissing the boy. Few Americans consider that the very essence of femininity lies in feminine untouchability. The very essence of femininity lies in feminine untouchability. I would even go so far as to say that a man has never felt a deep love for his wife in his heart as he feels for his daughter, because his wife is not pure—he has corrupted her himself. But is daughter is a picture of the Virgin Mary, the holy of holies, the untouched, the pure. Deep down in his heart, man has the image of feminity precisely as this—not a friend, not a partner, but something much more dignified—an object of my centuries-old yearning for merging with beauty and perfection, or an object of a saintly love, yearning, of respecting that one person in life that bears the dignity of being mother of my children. These are very precious things for men, as I talk to men, and I do talk to men and they talk to me.

This kind of pattern is so difficult in a society in which we have brought a moral profile which says we must have these things, but we must go through trial and error of coming close to it and yet resisting it. We don't speculate about the feminine form in a mirage of gauze in a ballet dance. We've got to see it exposed in a bikini in a beauty contest, and yet you must not touch. We do not think of romance as some secretive whisper of something very beautiful in a marital chamber after the consummation of marriage, a thing which nobody is prepared for. After all, the maximum sexual adjustment is likely to occur when neither the bride nor the bridegroom has any experiences whatsoever before marriage, or are not likely to have them with anybody else in their entire world.

These principles of chastity have not arisen because some lugubrious old person has taken out his hatred on the society because he could no longer do these things, so he didn't want anybody else to do them either. These things have arisen because somewhere in the deep wisdom of social living as developed over the ages, it was clearly understand that it's an ephemeral pressure, it's an elusive thing, the fullness of love and fulfillment of sexual satisfaction, and it is attained most securely when one has had no experience prior or after with anybody but the object of one's love.

But we don't believe in it this way. We believe in it as exposure. We've got to come close; at the age of ten we've got to come close. I say in my lecture I had a foster child, a Hawaiian foster child for a year in my house. She was ten years old. Two weeks after she came to my house, there was a bell on the door ringing, and a woman came in with her boy, a very fat little boy of ten. She was very worried, because he was fat and therefore doesn't mingle with the girls. So she bought two theater tickets, and she was going to send this little fat ten-year-old boy with

my little ten-year-old girl to the theater, alone, at ten, so he would learn how to handle girls. And what's so good about learning at the age of ten how to handle girls? At the age of 18, you don't care whether you handle them or not anymore. These kinds of things which we have in our society, which are born from deep puritanism, actually, from strong morality—we want exposure so that virtue is autonomous; so that virtue is really the effect of our commitment of the will. We are a society of free men, and free men means that they are good because they want to, not because their neighbor tells them to.

It's because of this that we have made such a difficult job for ourselves in the field of preparing ourselves for life in a bisexual society, and it's because of this that foreigners, when they look upon us, find us in such a precarious position, and consider us immoral. It is hard to understand that there was, for instance, no nudity shown in Japan before the Second World War. We brought the nudity shows to Japan. It is hard to understand. It is hard to understand the function of the geisha in Japan, which is an entertainer devoted to establishing the image of pure femininity, completely untouchable. It is we who have made the geisha a prostitute. Now it's not clear which one is and which one isn't—before, it was.

It is so difficult to understand these things, but it's most difficult to understand it, as I say in my lecture, that when Americans, particularly American young males who are abroad and engage in immoral acts—and many of them do—I challenge anybody to see a young American do so when he is not drunk. Because an American will know that to commit an immoral act anyplace in the world he must be drunk. He must dull the pangs of his conscience before he can do bad. Without the befuddling of his mind—I say this in this lecture—the American is the most moral of persons. The morality for which we strive is of a higher order; it is an internalized, personal morality rather than the morality of others. This, by way of an illustration or an interpretation of a specialist in this field when he attempts to unravel what I'm sure has been a maze to you, the intricacies of what seem simple, the intricacies of moral education.

Dr. Hummel, when we had breakfast today, said to me, "I just sat with a doctoral student yesterday, and he said 'You gave me so many books to read! What am I here for? What am I here for in this institution?!'" And the doctor replied to him, "You are here so that I can introduce in you such a state of fermentation that you will never know for sure […] what is right and what is wrong. For virtue that is sure is no longer virtue at all." And in a sense, it is the essence of our total society that we forever strive to this truth, to this virtue, but the way to strive is never to be sure if we've got it in our hands. That is why my lecture has been couched in the form in which it has been presented. I thank you very much for your very careful attention.

[applause]
HOST: Thank you very much, Dr. Bereday. We will now—those of us who are leashed—pick those up and we'll all report now to the College Center for lunch. Thank you. We are adjourned.

[program ends at 01:21:24]