I. Democratic choice and political transitions in Egypt

Democracy requires the presence of *substantive* political choice, differentiated through robust competition between intermediaries – especially political parties – that serve to effectively aggregate and articulate political preferences (Schedler, 2004; Morlino, 2009). Furthermore, there must exist an observable and genuine linkage between public preferences and government policies. Put simply, “policy should be affected by the partisan composition of government” as determined by the public through elections (Dalton, Farrell & McAllister, 2013: 208). Accordingly, in democracies, intermediary institutions (political parties, unions, interest groups) are required to assist in the organization and conveyance of partisan preferences (Morlino, 2009). In Egypt, the lack of a coherent and viable alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – itself an amalgamation of conflicting and particularistic interests – has deprived the people of any substantive political choice. Further, because the FJP is governing largely via thin electoral victories (in terms of voter turnout) – derived from a high reliance upon clientelistic campaign tactics – democratic linkage is largely absent in Egypt (DEDI, 2012: 38-39; Sabra, 2013). As a result, the current Egyptian regime suffers from a ‘legitimacy gap’ exemplified by increased tensions with the Judiciary¹, an inability to effectively enact government economic policy², threats of election boycotts by the major secular opposition parties³, and violent popular outbreaks reflecting severe discontent and disillusionment (Stacher, 2013).

The persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and elsewhere, despite the general trend towards democratization throughout the latter half of the 20th century – the so-called ‘third wave’ – prompted many scholars to  

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reexamine the relationship between democratization and liberalization (Munck, 2011; Schedler, 2002; Diamond, 2002). However, following the Arab Spring, three states – Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia – have broken the trend of robust electoral authoritarianism and are now in varying stages of transitioning away from authoritarianism. Consequently, researchers must now look at the MENA region in a new light – again. Specifically, two pressing questions arise: 1) what factors will contribute to the success or failure of these transitions?; 2) can the scholarship about democratic transitions in other parts of the world – previously criticized for its failure to reflect the MENA region – inform analysis of the Arab Spring cases? The answer to both questions is a qualified yes. Indeed, an analysis of the Egyptian experience, thus far, makes a compelling case for the importance of institutional intermediaries in linking the population to its government through the establishment of “robust” party competition. Further, it does so more convincingly than region-specific or exceptionalist, hypotheses, rooted in cultural or historical arguments, as well as other institutional explanations.

II. Institutional theories of democratic transitions

Scholarship on the subject is wide ranging, especially with regards to post-Soviet Union democratization in Eastern Europe as well as transitions in South America (Morlino, 2002). Within the former region, scholars have looked at a diversity of independent and dependent variables using varying levels of analysis. Democracy, according to various accounts, can be considered successful when there is successful and repeated alternation of leaders in and out of office – allowing for some measure of accountability, as well as precluding the need for political violence (Schumpeter, 1976; Przeworski, 1999, 2010; Slomczynski, Kazimierz, Goldie Shabad et al., 2008). Regime-level analyses have
attributed favorable outcomes to the adoption of parliamentary as opposed to presidential
democracy (Przeworski, 2003; Fish, 2006), the presence of multiple effective parties in
legislatures (Przeworski, et al, 1996), state size (Diamond, 2002) and to a high per capita
finds that the post-Soviet states with strong national legislatures produced liberal or
electoral democracies, which lasted, while those with weak national legislatures produced
more authoritarian regimes. Finally, Anna Gryzmala-Busse provides a political actor-
level account of post-Soviet transitions. In *Authoritarian Determinants of Democratic
Party Competition* (2006), she compares how the “strategies of the dominant actors of the
*ancien regime* can affect the robustness of subsequent democratic party competition”
(2006: 416). Consequently, her work is especially relevant to contemporary cases of
democratic transition where pre-transition political parties and elites are present or – as
relates directly to MENA transitions – absent in the post-authoritarian political arena.

Interestingly, the best outcomes within Grzymala-Busse’s sample were in the
states where the communists left power, transformed and reentered on near-equal footing
as the inchoate post-communist parties. Consequently, in the two cases where this optimal
outcome was observed, Hungary and Poland, voters were able to perceive, “several clear
alternatives, no party could assume it was secure in parliament, and political competition
held governing parties in check” (420). Conversely, where the communist party was
absent from the democratic regime, “*dominant parties were far more secure in their
tenure in office, few credible critics arose, and fewer checks existed on the governing
parties*” (emphasis added, 420). This translates remarkably well to the Egyptian case: as
political parties under the authoritarian regime “consisted of a domineering, corrupt, and creaky machine and a host of desiccated and forgotten paper organizations…” (Brown, 2012: 1), trade unions “functioned as an arm of the state rather than as democratic representatives of workers” (Beinin, 2006: 69), and civil society was extremely weak (Bellin, 2004). Essentially, the only organized and known political entity still standing in the post-revolution political environment was the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, the FJP was able to take advantage of the inchoate and fractured political atmosphere and, subsequently, to dominate democratic elections.

III. The importance of political intermediaries to democracy

Political parties are vital to democracy because they are the means by which preferences by the people are conveyed to government in order to create policy outcomes for the people. In this way political parties are “…an institution with a connecting role vis-à-vis the other regime institutions, on the one hand, and the people, on the other.” (Morlino, 2009: 202). Also, “accountability works through political parties” (Slomczynski, Kazimierz, et al., 2008: 88). The means by which this is effected via parties relates to the myriad procedural and institutional services that parties jointly or solely provide; including: candidate recruitment (perhaps the most important), “interest aggregation”, policy formulation, representation in government, and establishing accountability (Morlino, 2002: 202; Dalton, Farrell & McAllister, 2013: 7). Regarding the role of parties in democratic transitions, Morlino provides three patterns, similar to Gryzmala-Busse: “elite continuity, party continuity, and elite and party discontinuity” (205). The latter, elite and party discontinuity, is often seen in cases characterized by the “broad turnover of the political elite, usually no previous experience of democracy, and a
previous regime with no mobilization characteristics” (Morlino, 2011). It is in cases such as these – i.e. Egypt – where party competition and interest linkage are the most tenuous and corruptible.

In the case of Egypt, Gryzmala-Busse’s full framework of ‘robust’ party competition is particularly instructive. First, party competition must present a “credible threat of replacement” to governing parties; second, competition therefore “fulfills the fundamental role of opposition in a democracy: to present alternatives”; third, political parties and actors are “easily differentiated”; finally, the opposition is situated so as to be able to effectively monitor and critique government actions, as well as being understood by the electorate as a “capable” alternative in government (2006: 416). Party competition in Egypt has been dominated by the FJP and its former Islamist coalition partner al-nour, at the expense of a realistically capable, effectively critical, and easily differentiated opposition. The thin voter turnout in the Shura Council (upper house) elections (2012), and the constitutional referendums (2012-2013), are deleterious symptoms of non-robust party and elite competition. As a result, the FJP-led government, under the assertive leadership of President Mohammed Morsi, has little effective political accountability – and has proceeded to become increasingly undemocratic and opaque since being voted into power in 2011-12 (Goldberg, 2013: 29). In short, substantive choice is Egypt is severely limited. How did Egypt arrive at this precarious point?

IV. The ancien regime: political institutions and civil society in the Mubarak Era
Three important points should be stressed in understanding the effect of the Mubarak era on the current political environment: the nature of political competition in Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak; the absolute dominance of the public sphere by the Muslim Brotherhood from the Sadat period on; and finally, the complete lack of non-authoritarian intermediary institutions before 2011. First, Albrect and Wegner (2006) lay out a convincing framework for understanding the nature of the Egyptian regime since the departure of colonialism. The legitimacy of the Egyptian president depended mainly on “the hegemony of [his] party in parliament” (129). Consequently, “political elites” were “…co-opted via the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)”, precluding genuine electoral competition. Indeed, political “dissent and contention” were limited and periodically repressed with violence and coercion (129). Given this state of affairs, where did political competition take place in prerevolutionary Egypt?

*The pillars of undemocratic competition*

Albrect and Wegner suggest four “pillars of the state” between which real political competition and cooptation took place: the military, the “religious world of al-Azhar”, civil-society, and the “authoritarian system” (129). Of these four pillars, the most important rivalry was between the military and the president. Bellin explains the complicated relationship between these two actors:

“In Egypt, for example, the president retains control over promotions above brigadier, has a final say over the military's budget, and can dismiss popular military leaders… if they become too popular. The military has independent sources of financing, seems to exercise veto power over the designation of Mubarak's Successor, and has saved the regime from fatal attack on at least three occasions” (2004: 155).

The primary consequence of inter-regime competition in lieu of competition within parliament was that the state was incentivized to seek out and minimize “potential dissent
from political forces… independent from direct state control” (Albrect & Wegner, 2006: 129-130). This manifested in a constant balancing act wherein civil society actors were brought into or banished from the political arena to varying degrees, balanced against each other, and even coopted as tools of the regime. Civil society actors who desired inclusion and thus access to rents were brought into the clientelistic system emanating from parliament. Actors who sought political liberalization, opposed regime policies, or represented opposing ideologies (e.g. Islamism), were either oppressed or, as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, included in politics in an “informal, individual basis” (Albrect & Wegner, 2006: 130). This nuanced form of inclusion for the Muslim Brotherhood, primarily as a balance against more extreme Islamists as well as troublesome secular movements, would have ominous implications for the post-Arab Revolt transition.

The rise of the Brotherhood/ the demise of civil society

Starting with President Anwar Sadat in the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed greater latitude with regards to its political activities. While the organization would never been allowed to form a legal political party, at various times its members would be permitted to run candidates as independents (including in the 2005 elections where it won a large share of seats). In return, the Brotherhood expressed support for Sadat’s economic policies – they were after-all a historically anti-communist organization (Naguib, 2006). This precipitated an era wherein the Brotherhood was able to vastly increase its membership, drawing first from university students, and later from the professional associations (doctors, lawyers, businessmen). Subsequently, throughout the 1980s, under President Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood began to take over “the task of providing social services which had been largely abandoned by the state” (Naguib, 2010).
As a result, this period of expansion resulted from and necessitated a widening of the organization’s political platform, making it increasingly populist – both supporting economic liberalization and reaping the benefits of public dissent. As Sameh Naguib explains, this was not necessarily an opportunistic, politically motivated or pragmatic move; rather, it simply reflected the Brotherhood as being comprised of a diversity of socioeconomic and ideological factions (2010). Following the crackdown on extremist Islamism in the 1990s, the Brotherhood stood as “practically hegemonic” and was able to expand its support further still – incorporating members of the urban poor, industrial workers, and labor unions (Naguib 2010: page). Indeed, in the face of severe political repression under the iron fist of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), “religious organizations were among the only forums in which average citizens could express themselves or participate actively in the lives of their communities” (Berman, 2013). Thus, after the fall of Hosni Mubarak in January 2011, civil society, outside of the popular mobilization that brought down the regime, was practically nonexistent.

V. Where is the substantive choice post-revolution in Egypt?

Is post-revolution Egypt demonstrably different from the *ancien regime*? Where and between whom is political competition currently taking place? Moreover, is substantive political choice present in the Morsi regime? The answers to these questions may determine the trajectory of democratic transition in Egypt. It follows then, that the answer to the former question is a function of the other two. Firstly and unfortunately, it appears that political competition is largely continuing to take place between the ‘pillars’ of the state – i.e. primarily between the Morsi government, the Judiciary, and the Military. Secondly, the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus the FJP, continues to stand as the best-
organized and most well-known political entity in Egypt (with the exception perhaps of the military). Thus, taking into account the FJP’s particularistic orientation, differentiated party competition along partisan lines is largely absent in Egypt. As a result, the prospects for democracy look quite dire going into the next set of legislative elections.

_Elections and the People: the Islamist head start_

Egypt’s first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections were held from November-January 2011/12 for the lower-house, the _majlis al-shaab_ or People’s Assembly. According to Carter Center monitoring, the elections represented “a broadly accurate expression of the will of the voters” (2012: 1). The upper-house elections, held in January-March 2012, however, were “characterized by a lack of interest”, which contributed to a “low level of engagement by voters, candidates, political parties, media, and civil society organizations” (2012: 150). The results of both elections represented “a sweeping victory to the Islamic parties”, the FJP being by far the largest such party (DEDI, 2012: 24). The key explanatory variable in both cases was the failure of political parties in Egypt to present differentiated – and thus robust – party competition. While the ‘will’ of the voters was ostensibly expressed, it was not reflective of there being a substantive choice among plausible alternatives. Consequently, the FJP, along with other Islamist parties, were able to take advantage of their superior level of organization, pre-existing tribal and local connections and relationships, and a shared history of separation from the previous regime – while other parties were left scrambling to keep up.

The failure of secular and leftist parties to achieve success in the elections has been due largely to their inability to effectively resonate with the electorate – especially in the
rural areas. According to the DEDI, “new liberal parties had a hard time attracting strong political personalities as candidates, and in some rural areas their representatives were not just inexperienced as politicians, they also had a hard time communicating the policies of the movement to voters” (2012: 26). Additionally, their campaigns were “described as being week”, having started too late in the process, as being in “a disarray”, as well as being poorly organized (26-27). As a result, not only did non-Islamist platforms fail to resonate with voters, in many cases voters in a given constituency were unaware of the “possible presence of any of the new parties” (27). Indeed, many (liberal) candidates remained essentially unknown throughout the entire process.

The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, was able to rely upon its pre-revolution credentials as a provider of social services, as not being established with the corrupt practices of the previous regime, as well as its publicized involvement in the revolution itself. Ironically, this permitted the FJP, after the revolution, to resort to many of the same campaign practices that had characterized the pre-2011 multiparty period. Among other things, this included promoting a primarily personal-oriented vote, independent “of the general ideological or political support that the party had” (DEDI, 2012: 28-29). The presence of a personal vote implies “that the person up for election matters, not just the candidate’s party” (Valdini, 2013: 76). Further, as in Egypt, a high personal vote is usually seen in systems where parties are poorly differentiated or publicized and thus “factors other than party typically influence the voters’ selections” (2013: 76). Accordingly, Islamist candidates attended social events – including funerals and weddings – intervened in a strike in Qalubiyya, selected candidates from locally-prominent tribes in certain constituencies, and ultimately, relied “on forms of constituent
clientelism” (DEDI, 2012: 29; Carter Center, 2012: 150). As the literature on states with a high personal vote suggests, electing candidates based on their personal appeal or promises significantly contributes to a general lack of representative accountability – beyond the fulfillment of particularistic benefits (Dalton, Farrel, & McAllister, 2013). Furthermore, “[a]nother central and common issue was funding: to the large parties – or those who became large very quick - al-Wafd, the Muslim Brothers’ Freedom and Justice, and the salafi al-Nur, there seemed to be no limits to the funding” (28). Hence, while money, personal vote-seeking, and party organization played a key role in the 2011-12 parliamentary elections, competition along lines policy-preference – effectively differentiated and conveyed – was not a major factor in determining vote outcomes.

The lack of robust ideological differentiation and competition is illustrated by voter polls taken before, during, and after the elections. Tessler, Jamal, et al. (2012) report that, prior to the November 2011 elections, poll data reflected “extremely low” party affiliation, with few respondents expressing “strong attachment” to a political party (100). Further, when given the question “which party best represented their personal political, economic, and social views, only 3 percent named the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Freedom and Justice Party” (100). Similarly, recent data presented by Benstead, Lust, et al. (2013), found that “34% of Egyptians could name the leader of the FJP, nearly twice as many as for the leader of the next-most-recognized party, Al-Wafd.” With regards to relative clarity of political platforms, respondents viewed the FJP’s as being “very or somewhat clear (15% versus 5-10% for non-Islamist parties)” (2013). From this they conclude that, “weak political parties in Egypt have led to ‘weak representative
institutions’, which are consequently vulnerable to influences from more established institutions, notably the Judiciary and the Military” (2013).

Back to the pillars, back to the streets

Accordingly, without any credible competition – either in elections or in parliament – opposition has largely manifested in popular protest and violence. There exists strong dissatisfaction with President Morsi’s numerous attempts to imbue his office with more power (Stacher, 2013; Brown, 2012; Cook, 2012). The constitution and electoral rules, drafted largely by the FJP-controlled Shura council – the sole legislative body following the 2012 dissolution of the lower house – represents the preferences of an extremely thin percentage of the electorate (Carnegie Endowment, 2012). However, such dissatisfaction has thus far been unable to coalesce within legitimate political institutions. Given the “underdevelopment of other civil-society and political organizations… [there are] few institutions capable of channeling, much less responding to, popular grievances” (Berman, 2013). Resultantly, Egyptians have taken to the street, expressing an unwillingness to “tolerate old Mubarakist behavior and practices” (Stacher, 2013). Recent violence surrounding the two-year anniversary of the revolution, followed recently by the planned boycott of the 2013 parliamentary elections (date now TBD) by the main opposition bloc – the National Salvation Front – have brought into stark relief the inability of the average Egyptian to convey her preferences to the government. Further, this dissatisfaction is raw and unfocused, taking place not along Islamist/secular lines. According to Goldberg (2013), in addition to being a refutation of the Brotherhood specifically, polarization has largely taken on a Muslim/Christian dimension as well as a rural/urban dimension, thus economic and sectarian cleavages, not ideological partisan
competition, characterize the current situation (Goldberg, 2013: 28-32). This is largely in conformance with Gryzmala-Busse’s analysis, where, in cases where the party system was not robust, “voters… had to resort to mass protests… or to referenda and mass mobilization against the ruling party” (421).

It follows then, that political competition in Egypt must be taking place elsewhere. As described above, popular opposition has largely manifested outside of the political process. However, despite this, political competition is taking place in Egypt. Following the 2012 presidential elections, President Morsi, representing the ‘legitimate’ government of Egypt, has been in direct competition with the military and the judiciary. Thus, in the post-Mubarak era, political power continues to be reliant upon the successful cooptation and/or marginalization of one ‘pillar’ of the regime by another. Largely, since 2012, Morsi has proved adept at the tactics once mastered by Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak before him. The constitution – established via referendum in December 2012 – reflects a simultaneous empowering of the executive branch, along with concessions to military demands and a not-too-subtle effort to limit the power of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)⁴ (Brown, 2012; Stacher, 2013; Benstead, Lust, et al., 2013). In an effort to assert itself, the SCC has stepped into the political process at numerous points during post-revolution period. In June 2012, the court ruled that the electoral rules governing the disqualification of independents to be unconstitutional and therefore ordered the dissolution of the Islamists-dominated parliament. More recently, the court halted plans for a April 2013 round of elections for the same house of parliament they dissolved, questioning again the constitutionality of electoral rules. The military, on the other hand,

⁴ http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/18/next-steps-toward-egypt%E2%80%99s-2013-elections-2
has attempted to strike a more neutral position, in order to retain its legitimacy in the eyes of the people (Stacher, 2013, 2012). This bargaining and competition between the pillars of power have thus proved to be “divisive and destabilizing” (Benstead, Lust, et al. 2013).

Finding choice – the ‘silent majority’

Going forward, there is manifest popular discontent with the current situation in Egypt – along political, economic, and social lines. Egyptians are increasingly becoming disillusioned with the current government, with a significant number of those polled (38 per cent) feeling as though “their country is worse off than before the revolution” (Benstead, Lust et al. 2013). An explanation for this disillusionment is that citizens are unable to convey their political preferences to their government and to see them reflected in policy platforms and initiatives, a key, if not core, promise of democracy. This is due to the failure of intermediary political institutions, primarily political parties, to present clear, differentiated choices to the public. This is mostly seen in the size of the so-called “silent majority” of undecided voters in the country (Sabra, 2013: 34). Indeed, according to Sabra, while the Muslim Brotherhood can rely upon a bloc of voters numbering “between five and 10 million”, in a county as large as Egypt, this means that the biggest bloc is “…unaffiliated – either because they don’t care, don’t know enough about politics, or are disillusioned” (2013: 34-35). In a democracy, it is the raison d’etre of intermediaries to assist the public by providing a legitimate, organized forum wherein apathy can be transformed into activism, ignorance can be turned into acumen, and disillusionment can become influence. In this respect, certainly, political parties in Egypt can be seen to have failed on a fundamental level.
Moreover, both the extremely low voter turnouts for the upper-house elections and the constitutional referendum in 2012 (11 million voters for the latter) reinforce the general lack of democratic linkage within the population. While these other 39 million voters (the electorate is roughly 50 million) are not necessarily rejecting government actions, this has been the general stance of “Egypt’s non-Islamic bloc…” where the strategy has been to be the “…party of ‘no’” (2013: 35). Beyond this, the opposition has remained feckless, irresponsible, incoherent, and virtually unknown in many rural areas (Goldberg, 2013: 28-32; Sabra, 2013: 34-36). This means one of two things: either the massive ‘head start’ that the Islamists enjoyed from their pre-revolutionary activities is insurmountable, or it is not. Predictions regarding the 2013 elections, whenever they are held, appear to support the former assertion. Nevertheless, the opposition has the potential to channel popular dissent into coherent institutional processes. If a clear alternative does not present itself, providing a substantive choice in Egypt, political competition will continue to primarily take place between the pillars of the state, largely independent of public preferences while gradually shedding democratic legitimacy. While substantive choice is not a panacea, without it, elections are merely processes open to manipulation, constitutions are just pieces of paper, and democracy is ephemeral and illusory.

VI. Alternative explanations revisited

Other arguments have been presented as possible explanations for the stalled status of democratic transitions in Egypt and the other Arab Spring states. First among them are cultural arguments, primarily those that describe both a tension between Political Islam and Democracy as well as between secular and religious divisions within the country. This has been successfully discredited elsewhere (Benstead, Lust, et al., 2013; Lynch,
2012; Cook, 2012; Tessler & Jamal, 2012). Specifically, the Benstead study presents compelling evidence that democracy and Islam are indeed compatible, as well as that the main polarization in Egypt is not occurring along secular lines (2013). This is reinforced by Goldberg:

“Much of the violence in the streets today is occurring outside of Cairo in the Canal Zone and the provincial cities of the Delta, places not known for their large, secular middle-classes. The violence is often specifically between the Muslim Brotherhood, its direct supporters and its occasional allies on specific issues, and the restive lower middle and working classes in these cities” (2013: 33).

The institutional theories Prezworski (2003) and Fish (2006) mentioned above may have some explanatory value with regards to the Egyptian case. The capacity for presidential power to be abused and to derail democratic transitions is certainly being made manifest vis-à-vis President Morsi. Further, Morsi continues to empower his office at the expense of parliament, which as of this writing, continues to be controlled by the parsimoniously elected upper house. Other parties in parliament are either in coalition or alliance with the FJP or are largely a non-issue in terms of the two fundamental indicators of party power: “coalition potential” and “blackmail potential” (Magaards, 2009: 222). However, the precipitous accumulation of power undertaken by Morsi was only possible due to the Muslim Brotherhood and the SCAF essentially dictating the timing of elections and a constitutional referendum. By influencing the SCAF and the public – due to the conspicuous absence of any sufficiently relevant voice to the contrary – to hold elections first and earlier than many would have preferred, the FJP, and later Morsi, were able to control the entire transition post-SCAF. Thus, this unfortunate turn of events relates back to the lack of competition in Egyptian politics after Mubarak. Finally, in her cases, in
opposition to the institutional and social levels of analysis, Gryzmala-Busse failed to find “sufficient” correlation with outcomes using electoral, elite-level, historical, or communist regime-level analyses; for instance, she argues that the latter is simply “too broad an analytical category” (423). Robust party competition, according to Gryzmala-Busse, is the essential independent variable because it has been shown to facilitate economic reform as well as to enhance, “democratic legitimacy and accountability” (420-421).

VII. Areas for further research:

A key approach by which this analysis could be expanded, and thus enhance the explanatory power of party differentiation and democratic linkage in Egypt, would be to expand the analysis across other similar cases. States such as Tunisia, with a similar history of pre-transition civil-society fragmentation and suppression, would be quite illustrative. This is especially so in light of the relative success of democratization in Tunisia versus Egypt. One potential explanatory variable would be the existence of *some* alternative civil society intermediaries outside of the party system – such as the fairly effective labor unions. As opposed to Egypt, where post-Mubarak unions – having been coopted and suppressed by Mubarak – have been unable to provide such an alternative, Tunisian unions have been able to apply some pressure to the regime (Benstead, Lust, et al., 2013). Additionally, the relative strength, due to differences in their authoritarian experiences, between the various Islamist organizations in both countries, may describe some variance in outcomes.
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