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# Has Capitalism Lost its Puritan Spirit? What do Recent WVS Data Say about Religiosity and Work Values?

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## Citation Details

Bozkurt, V., & Yesilada, B. (2017). HAS CAPITALISM LOST ITS PURITAN SPIRIT? WHAT DO RECENT WVS DATA SAY ABOUT RELIGIOSITY AND WORK VALUES?. *Economics & Sociology*, 10(2), 125.

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**ECONOMICS***Sociology*

Bozkurt, V., Yesilada, B. (2017), Has Capitalism Lost its Puritan Spirit? What do Recent WVS Data Say about Religiosity and Work Values? *Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 125-139. DOI: 10.14254/2071-789X.2017/10-2/9

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*Received:* December, 2016  
*1st Revision:* February, 2017  
*Accepted:* April, 2017

**DOI: 10.14254/2071-789X.2017/10-2/9**

## HAS CAPITALISM LOST ITS PURITAN SPIRIT? WHAT DO RECENT WVS DATA SAY ABOUT RELIGIOSITY AND WORK VALUES?

**ABSTRACT.** This paper tests the arguments of social theorists about the changing spirit of capitalism in countries with different levels of economic development using the recent World Values Survey (WVS). Max Weber claimed that the Protestant Ethic was the spirit of capitalism for salvation and improved economic development in Europe. During the last 40 years, sociologists, such as Bell and Bauman, have claimed that capitalism has started to lose its puritan spirit and a new secular/hedonist personality type has emerged as the new characteristic of post-industrial/ consumer capitalism. The data show that religiosity and work values decline but leisure and self-expression values increase in knowledge economy-based post-industrial societies and late consumer capitalism has a new spirit which is the polar opposite of the Protestant ethic. However, the puritan spirit has not totally disappeared from the world but has migrated to newly industrializing societies.

**JEL Classification:** A13,

**Keywords:** post-industrial capitalism, religiosity, work values, protestant ethic.

### Introduction

It is well established that the industrial and post-industrial transformations have profoundly altered how humans think, work, and live. The emergence of knowledge-based post-industrial societies has accelerated the cultural change not only in rich and developed countries but also throughout the world (Bell, 1973; Turkle, 1995; Toffler, 1989). Sociologists such as Daniel Bell (1976), John Carroll (1977), Christopher Lasch (1979), Zygmunt Bauman (1987, 1999) and Richard Sennett (1998) etc., claimed that capitalism has lost its puritan spirit during the post-industrial era.

This paper is about the cultural shift from the puritan to a secular spirit of late capitalism, which has been defined under different names by social theorists. The issue of “new man” or the “epoch of new age” has become one the central topics of social theory. In the transformation process from an agricultural/traditional society to an industrial society, the ethos of society has changed. Modern/industrial capitalism has created a “new man” or the “new man” has created the new society.

The Puritan work ethic belongs to modern times in human history coinciding with the industrial revolution. Work had never been a virtue or a way of salvation before the industrial

age. According to the Oxford Online Etymology Dictionary, *labor*, the synonym of work, means trouble, difficulty, hardship, toil, fatigue, exertion and pain at the same time. For example, the ancient Greeks and Romans considered work to be a curse and fit only for slaves (Kaplan, 1979; Ciulla, 2000). The ancient philosophers had a consensus about the abhorrence of work. Plato and Aristotle believed that work (for commercial gain) humiliated the people who performed it (Lafargue, 1907).

However, with the coming of an industrial society, schools, industrial organizations and religious associations started to preach the virtue of hard work and the well-organized use of time (Polanyi, 1957; Kaplan, 1979; Bozkurt *et al.*, 2010). The Ford Company founded the Sociological Department to examine the private life of workers. Researchers from this section visited workers' homes and encouraged workers to aspire to the Ford values of industriousness, thrift, sobriety, saving, and hygiene. Ford tried to reduce absenteeism and the turnover of workers. Moreover, the Sociological Department endeavored to enforce puritan morality (McGraw, 2007; Lasch, 1979; Clegg, 2009).

According to Weber (1971, 1956) occidental industrial capitalism, which is the rational organization of free labor, is unique and has not existed elsewhere. The ethos of this capitalism was "Protestant ethic" codes that emphasized the importance of the values of work, anti-leisure, saving, abstinence, moral orientation, frugality, sobriety, industriousness, achievement, moderation, sexual restraint, tranquility, temperance, silence, order, resolution, sincerity, justice, cleanliness, chastity, humility, and forbidding (Bell, 1976; Furnham, 1990). For Weber, the Puritan ethic, which was a rationalization of life and economic action, justified all the restraints and sanctions for individual life and advanced the development of capitalism. Early industrial capitalism also desperately required the puritan mood and values. One major outcome of restraints on consumption was the accumulation of capital, which in turn led to the expansion of production and further development (Bell, 1996).

In another important study, Carroll (1977) demonstrated how Puritan theology helped liberate individuals from the ties of the traditional values of pre-industrial societies. This was crucial for it emphasized man's general responsibility and the passionate early Puritans played an important role in the shaping of industrial society. These values expanded religion beyond the borders of the church and made it of this world. Vocation in Protestant theology was considered a sublimation of guilt and man was also considered a sinner at birth.

According to Daniel Bell (1996), the character of mankind and the form of human relations is formed for the major part by the kind of work they do and he divides work modalities into pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial. The transition from industrial to post-industrial societies, which was based on a knowledge economy and consumerist culture, has weakened work-oriented puritan culture and capitalism has abandoned its religious transcended ethic.

The decline of religion was one of the major assumptions of Enlightenment philosophers and the founding fathers of modern social theory such as Comte, Durkheim, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber etc. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997; Berger & Zijderveld, 2009; Casanova, 1994). They claimed that the importance of religion would diminish in modern societies because of rationalization, industrialization, urbanization etc. Despite the opposition of some contemporary sociologists of religion to the secularization hypothesis (Berger, 2008; Smith, 2008; Casanova, 2007), knowledge based post-industrial societies are less religious than newly industrial (izing) and pre-industrial societies. For Bruce (2010) it is not a coincidence but an unintended result of modernization. It has predominantly been the members of the well-educated middle and upper classes who have accepted secular, modern culture.

According to Bauman (1997) the idea of human self-sufficiency weakened established religion and work values lost their privileged place. The puritan, an "ideal type" of industrial

capitalism, is dead and the importance of leisure-oriented consumer culture has risen. He also (1987, 1999) maintained that the puritan has become the consumer which is the polar opposite of the driven puritan.

Some scholars (Mirels and Garrett, 1971) have claimed that the Puritan ethic was the moral justification of early industrial capitalism, which needed hard work and saving for capital accumulation. However, the cultural justification of post-industrial capitalism became hedonism which is different as an idea of immediate satisfaction rather than the delayed gratification found in puritanism. According to Bell, traditional morality was replaced by psychology, guilt by anxiety.

Christopher Lasch (1979) also supports Bell's conclusions in that the work ethic has been diminished by capitalism. He argues that the "ideal type" of new (economic) man is not an "authoritarian personality". Rather, the basic trait of the new narcissist man is anxiety not the guilt which stimulated the self-denial of the ascetic puritan to work hard and delay gratification. Lasch's new narcissistic man also rejects competitive ideologies. Puritan values no longer stimulate passion for him. Thus a fundamental paradigm shift has occurred in the work ethic of people in knowledge-based economies thus transforming the spirit of these new modes of production.

Hedonist-consumers follow the principle of comfort as does remissive man. The psychoanalysts and healers of the post-industrial age advise forgiveness for therapy and the removal of guilt. Carroll's new "ideal type" personality of late capitalism is remissive man/culture that has abandoned the sins of the fathers. Remissive man is a hedonist like the "new man" of the other above-mentioned social theorists. He releases all his internal constraints, no longer bound by puritan guilt. The remissive culture is ethically anti-moralist and anti-Puritan that disapproves of authority. This culture is characterized by forgiveness of all guilt. The passionate puritan obtained satisfaction from hard work, whereas remissive man seeks comfort.

According to Florida (2013), the "Rise of the Creative Class" influenced the shift in values which was identified as Individuality, Meritocracy, Diversity and Openness. He claimed that the associates of Creative Class have a tendency to individuality and self-expression. This class prefers hard work, achievement and stimulation. Creative Class people have an openness to diversity.

All these theoretical arguments about the changing spirit of industrial and post-industrial societies have not previously been tested by data at different development levels, except in Inglehart's self-expressive/secular culture (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 1997). The aim of this paper was to *investigate the arguments about the changing spirit of capitalism from work-oriented, religionist and puritan values to the leisure-oriented, secular and hedonist values* using the most recent data of WVS. However, the main problem was that it was beyond the scope of this paper to consider all dimensions of the new emergent culture. Only the arguments about "*the decline of religious and work values*" and "*the rise of hedonist and leisure values*", were tested in pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies.

## 1. Data/M Measurement

The most recent (2010-12) World Values Survey data from 36 countries were used to examine these arguments of the social theorists. The total sample size was 50,551 and the details are shown in *Table 1*.

Table 1. The sampling of data (WVS, 2011-2014)

Low Level Knowledge	N	Knowledge	Medium Level Knowledge	N	Knowledge	Advanced Knowledge	N	Knowledge
Economies		Economy	Economies		Economy	Economies		Economy
		Index			Index			Index
Ecuador	1200	3,72	Azerbaijan	1002	4,56	Australia	1477	8,88
Ghana	1552	2,72	Armenia	1100	5,08	Cyprus	1000	7,56
Kyrgyzstan	1500	3,82	Belarus	1535	5,59	Estonia	1533	8,4
Morocco	1200	3,25	Chile	1000	7,21	Japan	2443	8,28
Nigeria	1759	2,2	Colombia	1512	4,94	South Korea	1200	7,97
Pakistan	1200	2,45	Kazakhstan	1500	5,04	New Zealand	841	8,97
Philippines	1200	3,94	Malaysia	1300	6,1	Spain	1189	8,35
Rwanda	1527	1,83	Mexico	2000	5,07	Sweden	1206	9,43
Zimbabwe	1500	2,17	Peru	1210	5,01	United States	2232	8,77
Uzbekistan	1500	3,14	Poland	966	7,41			
			Qatar	1060	5,84			
			Romania	1503	6,82			
			Russia	2500	5,78			
			Trinidad and Tobago	999	5,91			
			Turkey	1605	5,16			
			Ukraine	1500	5,73			
			Uruguay	1000	6,39			
<b>Total</b>	<b>14138</b>	<b>2,8726</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>23292</b>	<b>5,6813</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>13121</b>	<b>8,518</b>

Total sampling: 50.551

The World Bank Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) was used for the classification of countries. A value of less than 0.450 was classed as a Low Level Knowledge (Traditional) Economy, 0.451-0.750 as Medium Level Knowledge (industrial/industrializing) Economy and over 0.750 as Advanced Knowledge (Post-Industrial) Economy. KEI was also used as a continuous variable without any categorization in correlation analysis.

The KEI is constructed as a simple average of 4 sub-indexes which are “Economic Incentive and Institutional Regime”, “Education and Training”, “Innovation and Technological Adoption” and “Information and Communications Technologies Infrastructure”. The Knowledge Economy Index has a very high correlation with the Human Development Index ( $r=0.958$ ). Similarly KEI is negatively correlated with employment in agriculture ( $r=-0.753$ ) and positively correlated with employment in service sector ( $r=0.755$ ).

We applied a factor analysis (principal component analysis) for religiosity, leisure and work related values which revealed six important factors:

The first factor, *religiosity*, consisted of 8 items such as the importance of God and religion, belief in hell and God, attendance at religious services etc. This factor explains 24.27% of the total variance. All items are shown in *Table 2*.

Table 2. Factor analysis results

	Component					
	Religiosity values	The Importance of work for surviving v.	Creative/ Intellectual Tasks	Pro-competition and hard work	The importance of friends and leisure	Puritan values
How important is God in your life	.820					
How often do you pray	.799					
Religion important in life	.793					
Religious person	.769					
Believe in: God	.757					
How often do you attend religious services	.709					
Believe in: hell	.610					
Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right	.602					
Worries about losing my job or not finding a job		.871				
Not being able to give my children a good education		.832				
Work: important in life		.584				
Nature of tasks: routine vs. creative			.861			
Nature of tasks: manual vs. intellectual			.855			
Competition is good				.823		
Hard work usually brings a better life				.812		
Friends :important in life					.791	
Leisure :important in life					.768	
Important child qualities: Hard work						.839
Important child qualities: Thrift, saving money						.502
Variance T: 60.686%	24.275	9.228	8.049	7.256	6.421	5.458
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. KMO: ,830 ; df. 171, Sig .000						

The second factor, “*The Importance of work for survival*”, contains 3 items of “*Worries about losing my job or not finding a job*”, “*Not being able to give my children a good education*” and “*Work is important in life*”.

“*Intellectual/ creative tasks*” is the third factor and consists of 2 items, “*Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual?*” If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means “mostly manual tasks” and 10 means “mostly intellectual tasks” and “*Are the tasks you perform at work mostly routine tasks or mostly creative tasks?*” If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means “mostly routine tasks” and 10 means “mostly creative tasks”.

The items of “*Pro-competition and hard work*” factor are “*Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas*” versus “*Competition is harmful. It*

*brings out the worst in people*” and *“In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life”* versus *“Hard work does not generally bring success – it’s more a matter of luck and connections”*.

*“The importance of friends and leisure”* is the fifth factor consisting of *the importance of friends and leisure* in life. It is scored in 4 ranges from “Not at all important” to “Very important”. *The puritan values, “Thrift, saving money and hard work”*, as childhood qualities, are the last factor. Questions which were ranked from positive to negative in the Questionnaire were recoded from negative to positive.

## **2. Results**

*Table 2* shows the details of the factor analysis which has been partly explained above. The WVS work-related items are not homogenous and this diversity created different factors. The importance of work is correlated with the worries about losing a job and not being able to give the children a good education.

Puritan values such as thrift, saving money and hard work as childhood qualities and “Competition is good” and “Hard work brings success” did not come together. Moreover, the importance of friends created a new factor with leisure.

### **2.1. Correlation Analysis**

*Table 3* shows that religiosity is positively correlated with the values of “Importance of work for surviving”, “Pro-competition and hard work”. However, it is negatively correlated to the knowledge economy index, education level, social class, self-expression and friend/leisure values. There is no statistically significant relationship between religiosity values and income level in this sample.

Furthermore, there was a significant negative correlation of KEI to all work values factors such as “The importance of work for survival”, “Thrift, saving money and hard work as a child”, “Pro-competition and hard work”, but a positive correlation with self-expression and hedonist leisure values.

Educated people endorse the “Work is important for survival” and “Religiosity values” less and “self-expression” and hedonist leisure values more. However there was no relationship with puritan values.

Table 3. Correlation among the variables

Correlations										
	The Knowledge Economy Index 2012 WB	Religionisity	Work is important for surviving	Thrift, saving and Hard work	Pro-competition and hard work	Leisure/Friends Important	Self-expression	Scale of incomes	Social Class	Highest educational level attained
The Knowledge Economy Index 2012 WB	1									
Religionisity 8 items	-,458**	1								
Work is important for surviving	-,306**	,204**	1							
Thrift, saving money and Hard work	-,055**	-,042**	-,019**	1						
Pro-competition and hard work	-,033**	,068**	,016**	,025**	1					
Leisure/Friends Important	,135**	-,056**	,062**	-,052**	,020**	1				
Self-expression	,117**	-,135**	,007	-,129**	-,047**	,053**	1			
Scale of incomes	-,019**	,002	-,033**	-,014**	,021**	,110**	,010*	1		
Social Class	,124**	-,051**	-,069**	-,016**	,016**	,096**	,055**	,467**	1	
Highest educational level attained	,251**	-,197**	-,045**	,001	,000	,127**	,111**	,245**	,337**	1

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Intellectual/Creative tasks are negatively correlated with “religiosity values” ( $r=-0.069$ ), “Work is important for surviving” ( $r=-0.069$ ), “Thrift, hard work and saving” ( $r=-0.028$ ) but positively correlated with “The importance of Friend/Leisure” ( $r=0.099$ ), “Pro-competition and hard work” ( $r=0.063$ ) and self-expression as child quality” ( $r=0.088$ ). These results confirm the claims about the values of the creative classes which were asserted by Richard Florida (2012).

As the rank of social class and education level increase, the endorsement of religiosity and the importance of work values decrease, but the importance of leisure and self-expression increase. There is no significant relationship between religiosity and income level.

## 2.2. Analysis Of Variance

To understand the differences in religiosity and work related values, analysis of variance tests (ANOVA and MANOVA) were applied. For MANOVA, all the factors revealed from the factor analysis were dependent. The self-expression item was also added to the analysis. The Knowledge Economy Index and religious affiliation (Christian {Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox} or Muslim) were independent variables. Other religious groups were limited so they were recoded as a missing value. According to both the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) and Religious affiliation, Wilks’s Lambda (and other tests) was significantly differentiated and the MANOVA tests revealed these results:

**KEI**, Wilks’s Lambda=0.867,  $F(14.69676)=368.76$ ,  $p < .000$

**Religious belonging** Wilks’s Lambda= .951,  $F(21.100036)=84.713$ ,  $p < .000$

**KEI\* Religious belonging** Wilks’s Lambda=. 888,  $F(42.163408)=99.939$ ,  $p < .000$

After MANOVA, the ANOVA test was computed for each factor. The mean score of the ANOVA test showed that religiosity values were largely in decline from traditional (low




knowledge) economies to advanced knowledge economies (ANOVA test:  $F(2, 50536) = 7185.191, p < .000$ ).

Table 4. Religiosity means

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Traditional/Low Level Knowledge Economies	14138	4.2548	.71009
Industrial(izing)/Medium Level Economies	23290	3.7135	1.00661
Post-Industrial/Advanced Level Knowledge Economies	13111	2.8282	1.20047
Total	50539	3.6353	1.12294

Graph 1 also shows that there is a regular decline in religiosity values among the four religious groups. Today, religiosity among Protestants is at the highest level in traditional societies and at the lowest level in knowledge-based societies. Religiosity also declined among other groups. These data endorse one of the basic assumptions of the modernization theory and the arguments of social theorists as cited above.




Graph 1. Religiosity values

The mean scores of “The importance of work for survival” also decreased from traditional ( $M=3.4062$ ) to advanced knowledge economies ( $M=3.1514$ ) in the same manner as religiosity values. The results are significant as shown in the ANOVA test:  $F(2, 50306) = 1916.2, p < .000$ . Work is not a virtue in post-industrial/knowledge societies (Dawes and Bozkurt, 2010). Neo-liberal globalization has removed many social regulations or protection for workers and increased flexibility has brought more insecurity (Grint, 1998; Standing, 1997; Sennett, 2006). However, knowledge economies still have better social standards than traditional and newly industrializing societies. Furthermore, the importance of work is closely related to the fear of losing jobs or not being able to provide one’s children with a good education.

Table 5. Work is important for surviving

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Traditional/Low Level Knowledge Economies	14112	3.4062	.67743
Industrial(izing)/Medium Level Economies	23173	3.1789	.79864
Post-Industrial/Advanced Level Knowledge Economies	13024	2.8263	.83452
Total	50309	3.1514	.80542

As with religiosity values, the sharpest differentiation in “the importance of work for survival” values is among the Protestants (see *Graph 2*). It is at the highest level in traditional societies and the lowest level in advanced knowledge societies. However, not only Protestants, but also Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims place less emphasis on these work values, when the knowledge economy level increases.




Graph 2. The importance of work for surviving values

The “Pro-competition and hard work” factor was at the highest level in traditional societies and at the lowest level in industrial societies as shown in *Table 6*. The ANOVA test result was  $F(2, 49769) = 161.202, p < .000$ . The belief that “Competition is good” and “Hard work brings success” partly increased in advanced knowledge economies. There was less social and economic differentiation in traditional societies and people did not know exactly what competition was. In the early stage of an industrial society, the regulations have not internalized and competition might be more destructive because legal-rational authority does not work properly, which may discourage people from competition. In advanced knowledge societies, the rational-legal authority works better than in newly industrialized societies and this may encourage people to believe in the virtue of competition and “Hard work brings success” values.

Table 6. Pro-competition and hard work

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Traditional/Low Level Knowledge Economies	13948	7,2014	2,33874
Industrial(izing)/Medium Level Economies	23007	6,7682	2,34955
Post-Industrial/Advanced Level Knowledge Economies	12817	6,9649	1,97341
Total	49772	6,9402	2,26279

According to the development level, Orthodox and Muslim people regularly lose their confidence in “Competition is good” and “Hard work brings success”. Protestants have the highest endorsement at every stage of economic development. This factor moderately matched with the protestant ethic thesis of Weber. Most of the Orthodox and Muslims of Post-Industrial societies in this sample live in non-Orthodox and non-Muslim countries. This may lead to avoidance of competition among Muslim and Orthodox people in post-industrial societies.




Graph 3. Pro-competition and hard work

The next issue examined pertains to the values of “Thrift, saving money and hard work as a childhood quality”. Descriptive statistics demonstrated that these values decreased during economic development. The ANOVA test result was  $F(2, 50548) = 58.374, p < .000$ . Rich societies emphasized these puritan values less than poor societies as the value priorities of families changed from material to self-expression values as highlighted by Ronald Inglehart (1997).

Table 7. Thrift, saving money and hard work

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Traditional/Low Level Knowledge Economies	14138	1.5275	.30678
Industrial(izing)/Medium Level Economies	23292	1.4948	.36084
Post-Industrial/Advanced Level Knowledge Economies	13121	1.4851	.36839
Total	50551	1.5014	.34902

However, when these values were compared with religious groups, there was heterogeneity. The puritan values among the Orthodox and Muslims firstly increase and then decrease in knowledge economies as seen in *Graph 4*, whereas the opposite applies to Catholic and Protestants.




Graph 4. Thrift, saving money and hard work values as child quality

As Freud (1920) stated, ‘human nature is that of a pleasure-seeker’, but work values are taught by society in the socialization process. We observe that modern consumer capitalism has supercharged the hedonist instinct of humankind. Ironically, one of the most important aspects of the puritan ethic was anti-leisure. The data in *Table 8* show that while puritan culture has been declining, the importance of leisure is increasing in rich post-industrial societies (ANOVA test:  $F(2.50396) = 724.805, p < .000$ ). The arguments of the social theorists mentioned in the Introduction are also confirmed by this data. The culture of Post-Industrial capitalism is more hedonistic more than that of Pre-Industrial or Industrial societies.

Table 8. Importance of Leisure/Friends

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Traditional/Low Level Knowledge Economies	14133	3.1399	.65406
Industrial(izing)/Medium Level Economies	23263	3.2005	.64120
Post-Industrial/Advanced Level Knowledge Economies	13003	3.4102	.53002
Total	50399	3.2376	.62705

The results in *Graph 5* show that the endorsement of Muslims for “Importance of friend and leisure” has sharply increased. On the other hand, post-industrial transformation augments the importance of leisure for the members of all groups.




Graph 5. The importance of leisure/friends

The last value of Puritanism examined is characterized by self-denial. However in the remissive culture of our age, self-expression has become important. In knowledge economies, people place more emphasis on self-expressive values for themselves as well as for childhood qualities (ANOVA test:  $F(2, 50548) = 58.374, p < .000$ ). Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics on self-expression values.

Table 9. Self-expression value as a childhood quality

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Traditional/Low Level Knowledge Economies	14131	1.1919	.39382
Industrial(izing)/Medium Level Knowledge Economies	23292	1.2889	.45324
Post-Industrial/Advanced Level Knowledge Economies	13121	1.3451	.47542
Total	50544	1.2764	.44720

As shown in Graph 6, the importance of self-expression increases with economic transformation from traditional to knowledge-based economies. The Orthodox, Muslim, and Protestant groups also placed more emphasis on self-expression. Only Roman Catholics placed less emphasis on self-expression, but it can be generalized that the culture of new capitalism is self-expressive.



Graph 6. Self-expression value as a childhood quality

## Conclusions and further thoughts

Work remains an important part of life with 89% of those surveyed stating that “Work is important in life”. However, while it is important for survival, it is no longer considered to be essential for salvation or virtue. Among the religious groups examined above, qualities such as importance of work, thrift, saving money, and hard work as a childhood quality all decreased in post-industrial societies.

There is a close relationship between economy and culture. Economic development and values influence each other (DiMaggio, 1994; Yesilada *et al.*, 2009; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). However, these changes in values are not linear as noted by Inglehart (1997). The results of this study show that there is a significant correlation between the knowledge economy and the diminishing of religiosity and work values. Although 70% of this sample declared that religion was important for them, the individual of late capitalism is more secular and less authoritarian. This is further supported by the fact that confidence in religious institutions and religious leaders declined from 82% in traditional societies to 44% in knowledge societies.

Muslim societies endorse the work ethic more because they are in the early stages of economic development. Furthermore, we found that Muslims in knowledge economies endorse religious and work values less than Christians living in traditional societies because early capitalism, which characterizes most of the Muslim countries, needs hard work, thrift, saving and a strong work ethic for capital accumulation and motivation of reluctant manufacturing workers.

Another significant observation is that the culture of advanced knowledge economies places more emphasis on self-expression values than in traditional and industrial societies. The individual of late capitalism is losing his/her religious restraints and can express themselves more freely than in traditional societies. This decline of religious values has led to an increase in the search for the meaning of life. Psycho-analysts, self-help books and post-modern healers preach to followers to enjoy life, remove guilt, and simply be themselves, In the same way as the remissive man of John Carroll, the new man in a self-expressive culture is freed from puritan guilt and forgives everybody including himself. Tolerance of abortion, sex before marriage, homosexuality and divorce are sharply increasing in knowledge societies.

Bell and Bauman's hedonist consumers also need to be freed from guilt to be able to spend more money. Late capitalism does not need the values of the Ford Company Sociological Department. New capitalism needs hedonist and narcissist consumers who are different from Weber's puritans.

In conclusion, the data support the hypothesis that late knowledge-based post-industrial new capitalism is losing its puritan spirit. However, the religious and puritan spirit has not totally disappeared from the world but has merely migrated to newly industrializing societies in new forms (Berger, 2010; Bozkurt *et al.*, 2010; Bozkurt, 2000). A belief in God was declared by 88.5% of this sample. Contrary to assertions of the return of God, these data also show that post-industrial man is more secular than the traditional or industrial one. God did not die as Nietzsche said, but there can be no return to the idea of Divine vengeance.

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