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Maure Leonard Goldschmidt

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Maure Leonard Goldschmidt
"Nation-Building in Kenya"
World Affairs Forum, Reed College, Portland, Oregon
January 23, 1969

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PETER GANTENBEIN: President of the World Affairs Council of Oregon: To call our meeting to order, we want to welcome you all here tonight on behalf of the World Affairs Council of Oregon. My name is Peter Gantenbein, I'm president. I'd like you to meet our friends at the head table. On my far right is the gracious wife of our guest speaker, Mrs. Maurice Goldschmidt, and seated next to her is Mrs. Hollis Ransom, who is an area chairman for the Great Decisions program that's coming up the first week in February. On my far left is Mr. Ned Place, whom I understand is working hard for his wife on area chairman responsibilities for the Great Decisions program, and Mrs. Place. I'd like to introduce the gracious wife of our Great Decisions chairman, Mrs. Sumner Sharpe; and now I'd like to call on Sumner who will introduce our guest speaker.

[applause]

SUMNER SHARPE: Thank you, Peter. I'd like to call your attention, before we get going, to the schedule of events that are coming upon us soon in line with Great Decisions this year. Before I begin I would like to particularly urge those of you who are new to Great Decisions and who are taking part in the discussion group, to either contact myself at Portland State College, or the World Affairs Council office. Next to you there's a mimeographed sheet which has my number at the bottom. Mrs. Place and Mrs. Ransom are working with us in terms of getting new discussion groups started and can provide you with assistance if you so desire. In addition,

there are discussion groups that are open to the public that are scheduled in the downtown area, and this mimeographed sheet also includes the scheduled discussion groups in the downtown area. There are some minor corrections on that sheet. If you'll note it says the central YMCA and the central YWCA, they've got the days of the week reversed. The central YMCA, the discussion groups are noon lunch on Wednesdays, and the central YWCA starts seven-thirty p.m. on Tuesday nights. Finally, to bring your attention to the coffee hour series which is scheduled to begin next week, January 30th, at ten am, ten-thirty a.m., at the Equitable Center auditorium. The first speaker will be Dr. Frank Munk.

Also, next to your seats—you're welcome to take with you—there are outlines of Great Decisions the program for this year, the eight topics; also indicating a little bit about how Great Decisions groups operate. If there are those of you here who wish to have fact kits—the information sheets that the Foreign Policy Association prints—if you wish to have those tonight they are for sale at the table at the back of the room; if you need one, raise your hand. Right back there.

Sometimes those of us who are close to the issues related to foreign policy and the problems related to foreign policy and American policy, and the problems of development in the nations around the world, we get so close that we don't really see and perhaps lose sight of some of the major problems. Particularly in 1968, we are faced with a lot of issues related to dissent at home, perhaps in some ways an over-emphasis on domestic affairs or a lack of interest on foreign affairs. And among some people, a tendency as I see it, or feel anyway, a tendency perhaps to move toward isolationism in various forms. I think that perhaps the problem of foreign policy and the problems of development, particularly in the foreign and developing nations, is perhaps one of the most crucial, if not the most crucial, issue facing us at least at the end of this century. And by not paying attention to the issues and the problems, they're not going to go away, and I think we're all aware of that, particularly those of you who are here this evening. The reason why I participate in Great Decisions, and I hope many of you will take the opportunity if you haven't before, is that it's one of the few opportunities we get as citizens to participate either in discussions or by balloting on foreign policy issues. There are very few other ways to do so, and so I certainly urge you to take advantage of the program this year.

Along the line of my personal concerns is the problem of developing nations around the world. I feel this, of all the issues, is probably the most crucial one. We're very fortunate tonight to have with us Dr. Maure Goldschmidt, a professor of political science at Reed College who has just returned from two years in Kenya, where he was working with the Rockefeller Foundation Group in trying to establish or establishing a department of political science at the University of East Africa. He presently tells me there's a book that's gone to press, he is co-editor of the book

and the title is *Government and Politics in Kenya*. His topic tonight—I wish you'd give him a welcoming round of applause—is nation-building in Kenya. Dr. Goldschmidt.

[applause]

MAURE GOLDSCHMIDT: One of the problems in discussing the new sub-Saharan African states is a problem of perspective. Can you all hear me? We are inclined to apply the standards of the highly developed states to the new states, and this is of course an exceedingly unfair way of looking at them. When you consider the fact that it took Great Britain, for example, about three to four centuries to establish a peaceful society—in fact, beginning in the sixteenth century, it wasn't really until the nineteenth century that Britain could have been said to have developed a peaceful, orderly society which was well on the way to modernization. This is true of almost all of the highly developed states: that it took them centuries to achieve stability and modernization. Many people express disappointment about developments in Africa without considering the fact that most of these states are less than ten years old. Kenya has had its independence for five years. There are a few that have been independent a little longer and there are some whose independence is even shorter than that. So I think in looking at these new states, one should bear in mind that the so-called developed states went through very serious traumatic experiences, many of them repeated coups and assassinations, revolutions, and all sorts of disorder before they were able to establish a modicum of order. In fact, in some of them, they still haven't succeeded in spite of very long histories, so that one shouldn't be surprised that in the new African states to find coups, to find various sorts of disorder.

The country I want to talk about today has had a relatively good experience in terms of maintenance of order; I refer to Kenya. What I want to talk about is the process which is referred to in the African states as nation-building. In Africa, there are many states, but there are very few nation-states and in the sense that the large majority of the people have a feeling of nationality which is coextensive with the boundaries of the state. Loyalties in most of the African states and in Kenya tend to be much more parochial, much more local, and to be confined very often to the tribe, or to some sub-section of the tribe.

Now, part of the responsibility for this, of course, rests with the colonial powers who divided up Africa without any particular regard for so-called natural boundaries, either economic markets or physical characteristics of the environment. With the result that the boundaries of many African states actually divide tribal groups from one another. So that in a very real sense many, probably most, African states are highly artificial entities which have not yet had the time, and it takes a great deal of time to acquire a genuine national identity. Now in the case of Kenya, it is here; its boundaries, which were defined by the British, have of course caused it a good deal

of trouble. In the North East, for example, it has a boundary with the Somali Republic. Now, this boundary is drawn in such a way that a large number of Somalis are on the Kenya side and of course, more of them are on the Somali side. And the Somali leaders, having read the Western literature on nationalism, included in their constitution a claim to rule all Somalis. Well, since a good many live in Kenya and quite a few of them live in Ethiopia, the Somali Republic was embroiled in hostilities with both Kenya and Ethiopia, and carried on or encouraged the carrying on of guerilla warfare in Kenya and Ethiopia with a hope of annexing areas inhabited by Somalis.

One of the difficulties here, of course, is that the Somalis are pastoral peoples who wander around with their herds in search of water. These people aren't very boundary-conscious and they wander back and forth across the borders of Kenya and the Somali Republic and Ethiopia and even the Sudan. They're paying very little attention to these boundaries, and the pastoral peoples who inhabit the North of Kenya by and large have very little sense of being Kenyans. The same thing is true on the boundary between Kenya and Uganda. This boundary during the colonial period was altered several times by the British colonial service to suit their administrative convenience. There still is a great deal of difficulty on this boundary because of the widespread practice of cattle-raiding. One of the traditional forms that tribalism and tribal competition takes in East Africa is of course cattle stealing and cattle-raiding. On the border between Uganda and Kenya, there is a constant movement back and forth across it, particularly between the Turkana tribe which is largely located in Kenya, and the Karamojong tribe which is located over here in Uganda.

Now, cattle stealing is regarded as part of the natural order of things among many of the pastoral peoples, and it goes on not only across the boundaries but as between various tribes within Kenya. There is a myth which is held by some of the pastoral peoples that all cattle belong to them, so that in taking cattle from other tribes, they aren't really stealing. Now some anthropologists insist that this myth is consciously regarded as a myth by them. However, others have said, and I had a student who was a member of one of the pastoral tribes who insisted that her people believed this, and therefore found it perfectly legitimate to steal the cattle from other tribes. So that cattle-raiding and cattle stealing is one of the traditional forms of tribal competition and conflict, not only in Kenya but all over East Africa.

Tribalism takes other forms and in its modern form, it is comparable to the kind of ethnic politics which we've had for many years in the cities. The tendency on the part of tribal leaders and tribal members is to try to gain political and other advantages for members of their people, of their tribe at the expense of others. And one of the things which causes a great deal of difficulty in Kenya today is the charge by members of various tribes that certain other tribes are

using their positions of influence to monopolize jobs. Now this in Kenya takes the form to a large extent of a tax on the Kikuyu tribe, which is the largest tribe, the best-educated, the most achievement-oriented as we say in the jargon, the most Westernized, the most interested in making money, and the most energetic. The president of Kenya belongs to this tribe, and a very sizable number of the top political leaders and administrative officials and so on are members of this tribe. Their answer always is, of course, that the reason that our people have so many of the jobs is that we simply have more of the able, educated people. This doesn't satisfy the tribes that feel they're being left out, and this is potentially a very explosive issue.

In other parts of Africa, of course, it has resulted in very serious explosions, and is at the bottom of a good many coups and the most extreme example of this, of course, we see in the case in Nigeria where tribalism has led to this tragic conflict between the Biafrans and the rest of Nigeria. Another aspect of tribalism which complicates the problem of achieving some sort of national identity is the fact that nearly all the tribes have their own language. So there is no language which is common to all the people of Kenya. A kind of a lingua franca is developing in the form of Swahili, but so far in Kenya, while it is spoken by nearly everybody at the coast, in the rest of Kenya it is spoken chiefly in the urban areas, though it is spreading.

The absence of a common language means, of course, also the absence of a common culture and is a source of divisiveness. The result is that the official language in Kenya is English. This, of course, has meant that the people who have gotten places in Kenyan politics have been largely—in this first generation of politicians and civil servants—former teachers, because they had a command of the language and had sufficient education to carry on in politics and in administration. About the only country in sub-Saharan Africa which has an indigenous official language is Tanzania, where Swahili is the official language. I say Swahili is indigenous because it is primarily a Bantu language, though it has a very considerable admixture of Arabic and Portuguese words. But even in Tanzania, not all the people speak or understand Swahili, but the majority do.

The fears about tribal rivalry are, I think, very real, and tribalism penetrates into a great many areas. For example, in the area of sport. In the football league there are tribal teams, and sometimes the rivalry becomes very extreme and blows are resorted to, and it has been proposed that tribal football teams be abolished. Even among the students at the university, in the dining halls for example, the students tend to sit together by tribe and speak their own languages. One of the curious things is that at present there is in Kenya a considerable revival of tribalism. Not among the uneducated so much as among the highly educated, among university students who perceive that the tribe is the preferred group to advancement politically and in civil service. So that you have this rather strange situation that the most enlightened part of the

population has become highly conscious of its tribal affiliations, and in a sense is applying it or practicing tribalism in a new and somewhat different fashion.

Tribalism, then, is one of the main obstacles to the development of national identity, but by no means the only one. Race is a serious problem in Kenya in a way in which it is not in most of the sub-Saharan states north of Rhodesia, because Kenya was the only sub-Saharan state north of Rhodesia which had a sizable white population. And this came about because the highland areas of Kenya, Nairobi on to higher altitudes, are temperate in climate and have very good soil, and the British colonial administrators were able to attract a sizable British population. British and South African, I should say. And it was touch or go whether Kenya would become another Rhodesia or become an independent African state. During the British hegemony, complete segregation was enforced as between the three races which... the three main races which you find there. The whites were known as Europeans, the Indians were called Asians, and the Africans. In Nairobi, for example, they had segregated living quarters and they went through the whole kind of business right down to the toilets.

Now, while this was abolished at independence, it's impossible in such a brief time to overcome this kind of social segregation, so that socially, contacts between the races are not very great. There is actually very little overt hostility to Europeans, but a great deal of prejudice and hostility is directed at the Asians, who are the shop-keeper class. There are about two hundred thousand Asians in Kenya, concentrated in the cities and towns, and they almost completely dominate retail trade, a considerable part of wholesale, and they also play a dominant role in the skilled crafts and in the white-collar fields. There is a great deal of resentment against them, and their position is similar to that of the Chinese and Southeast Asian, that of the Jews in the old days in central Europe. So that their situation is not likely to improve and it will probably get worse, although the Kenya constitution has a provision against racial discrimination. It is, of course, difficult to enforce it and there is a discrimination in the civil service against Asians. Although there isn't in university and they do occupy many important positions, largely because the country cannot afford to get along without their skills. If the Asians were all to be deported, a good deal of the economy would probably grind to a halt and many essential services would be, for the time being, hard to man.

Africans are, of course, attempting to Africanize the important positions in the economy as rapidly as possible, but this takes time. They have Africanized the civil service almost completely, but this doesn't mean that they have dispensed with the Europeans. Many of the former European colonial servants have simply moved over a bit, and now serve in advisory capacities instead of in responsible administrative posts, and there still is a substantial number of such Europeans both in the civil service and there are still some in the armed forces. For

example, the chief of police of Nairobi is still an Englishman. The head of the army until about a year ago was an Englishman; at that time an African was appointed commander in chief, but at the same time another Englishman was appointed as chief of staff. So that they still rely to a considerable extent particularly upon the British; to a lesser extent upon advisors from other countries, including this country, for assistance.

The race problem, particularly so far as the relations between the Asians and the Africans, again, is a potentially quite explosive problem. Religion, for the most part, has not been seriously divisive. Over half the people are still committed to their original native religions. The overwhelming majority of the rest are divided between Catholics and Protestants, and there are several hundred thousand Muslims. One of the interesting developments, though, in the area of religion which has been going on for a long time is the development of breakaway Christian sects with native African leadership. There have been such developments in both the Catholic and Protestant churches, and these African independent churches, as they are known, are a very interesting phenomenon which have some political significance, because they were, during the colonial period, and still are centers of considerable anti-foreign sentiment. And the government is somewhat concerned about some of them and has continued to harass one or two of them that worry them. But by and large there is no serious religious problem.

One of the most difficult problems in Kenya is of course the problem of the control of the economy. Although political independence has been secured, most of the money economy is in the hands of foreigners. A book has just been published in Kenya called *Who Owns Kenya*. It is a survey of the ownership of the major industries in Kenya carried on by the church council, and the British are still overwhelmingly in control of the economy, with the exception of the retail sector, which is largely in the hands of the Asians. If you go to Nairobi, for example, on the main streets you just don't see any African shops; all the shops are in the hands of Asians. You get out in the outskirts, there may be a few small African shops. But the mainsprings of the economy, the banks, the utilities, the industrial concerns, are almost entirely owned by the British, with very small amounts of American capital and a little other foreign capital.

Now this is of course reflected in the distribution of income, which again is extraordinarily lopsided in terms of its distribution between Africans and non-Africans. For example, if you look at those who earn a hundred and twenty pounds a year, under a hundred and twenty pounds a year, ninety-one percent of the Africans are in this category. There are only half of one percent of Africans who earning four hundred pounds and over a year. On the other hand, if you look at the Asians, there are only eleven percent of them who earn less than a hundred and twenty pounds and sixty-eight percent of them are earning over four hundred. If you look at the Europeans it's even more striking. Only one and a half percent are under a hundred and twenty

and ninety-two percent are over four hundred pounds. So that most of the economy, a very large part of the income of the cash income in the society, is earned and consumed by foreigners. It is of course this fact which Africans have in mind when they talk about neocolonialism: that in spite of political independence, their economies are still largely under foreign control.

Now, this is a situation which cannot be overcome very easily, because the Africans lack both skill and capital. I think the most striking lack is, of course, skill. If you have skill you can frequently attract capital, but it is the lack of technical skill which is so striking in the society. There are fewer than forty dentists in all of Kenya, and most of them are serving Europeans and Asians. There are six to seven hundred doctors in Kenya, very few of whom are as yet Africans. Again, most of them serving Europeans and Asians who have the buying power to support them. There are relatively few Africans still in the other professions. Now, strenuous efforts are being made to educate and train Africans in the professions, and the university is playing a part in this, other technical schools are, and students are being sent abroad. But when you consider how long it takes to train a doctor—it takes more than five years which is the length, the time they've been independent, to train a doctor. At the university for example in Nairobi, only about... in spite of, again, of very strenuous efforts to Africanize the faculty, only about twenty percent of the faculty was African. One reason why the percentage wasn't growing any faster—actually in numbers it was growing, but they continued to add new departments, which constantly threw them back. For example, the time I was there they just added a medical school. Well, here's an area, of course, where we see very few trained Africans, so the percentage of Africans in the university went down right away.

The level of technology among the Africans is of course very low. Most of them come from a rural background in which many of them had very little experience with machinery. In fact, many Africans carry on their farming with nothing more complicated than a hoe. President Nyerere of Tanzania said some time ago, "What we need is not tractors and that sort of thing, our big problem is to secure a cheap, easily used plow." The problem in East Africa is that when the British came, there was no knowledge of the use of draft animals, the wheel was unknown, and so the general technological level was extremely low. In contrast to the situation which prevailed in some parts of West Africa, where quite a few centuries ago quite skilled work in metals and so on was carried on by Africans. But in East Africa, the technological level is extremely low. This means that it becomes more difficult to educate students in science and technology when they come out of a non-scientific or technological background. We have the same problem in this country, where you take people who have not had any experience of modern technology and try to give them a technological education, it's a very difficult and slow process.

Not only is there a lack of skill, but in Africa, as in many traditional societies, the men are rather allergic to manual labor. It's customary in African societies for the women to do most of the work. Not only raising the children and doing the cooking, but to carry all the wood and the water and do much of the tilling of the land. Now this is changing of course in those areas, particularly in the central provinces where I think some of you gentlemen come from, where land has been converted from communal tenures into private ownership and where the stimulus of profit and the money economy is entered. Here you find men farming as they do elsewhere and working hard, but there are still many parts of Kenya where the traditional type of subsistence agriculture is carried on, and where the men do very little farm work. An expert, a French agronomist, Professor Dumont, has estimated that perhaps the quickest and one of the most effective ways of raising African productivity would be to get the men to do as much work as the women. There would be an enormous expansion in output if that could be achieved. This is an extremely difficult thing to achieve because of the traditional attitudes in a subsistence farming economy. Now, one of the reasons that in Kenya, what is called land consolidation and registration is being pushed very rapidly, that is to say the conversion of communal land tenures into private ownership, is to stimulate the men to work and to get them into the cash economy. Once they get in the cash economy, then many of these traditional notions about how much or how little you should do fall by the wayside.

Another serious problem in Kenya, as in many of the sub-Saharan states, is of course unemployment. One of the consequences of land consolidation and registration is, of course, that it throws a good many people off the land. In fact, what you see taking place in Kenya now is what took place in Europe under the enclosure movements and so on from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. As land is converted into private property, a good many people who had traditional claims through subsistence are thrown off, and many of these people move to the towns in the hope of finding work, but don't find it. Unfortunately, the number of labor-intensive industries which are available today are not relatively as numerous as they were during the period of the great enclosure movements in Europe, when people who were thrown off the land could move to the towns with a fair expectation of employment. So that there is, in the big cities, a very large amount of unemployment and underemployment, and you have developed in Kenya, in most other African countries, as well as in Latin America, these terrible shack towns on the outskirts which are slums of a very untidy sort. So that the existence of a sizable group of unemployed people who are at the same time landless is another threat to the stability of these countries.

Another difficulty which the African countries face, including Kenya, is of course the problem of corruption. Now, the problem hasn't been as serious in East Africa as it has been in West Africa.

In West Africa, corruption has been cited as one of the main causes of many of the coups, and there is a great deal of evidence in the form of official inquiries indicating the extent of it. In East Africa there's much less of this kind of evidence, though it is fairly obvious that a good deal of this kind of corruption exists. There's one well-known minister in Kenya who's known as "Mr. Ten Percent"; he is reputed to have gotten ten percent on every import permit issued. It is also obvious that the chief road to economic well-being for Africans, in Kenya as elsewhere, is political power. This is so because Africans lack capital, lack other types of skill which would enable them to establish themselves effectively in the private sector. The way to wealth and privilege is therefore through office. It's obvious from the style of living which top African politicians enjoy that they are enjoying very large incomes. There are various kinds of favoritism which are extended to them. I don't mean to suggest that corruption in Kenya is any worse than it is in the United States; perhaps it is probably much less. The only thing is the United States can much better afford it. The amount of the national income of Kenya which is absorbed by a relatively small upper crust of African leaders is much greater, and this means that there's much less money available for development, because much of this income goes to expensive foreign cars. There is a group of people, of Africans in Kenya and Tanzania, who are known as Wabenzi. The Wabenzi are the tribe of people who drive Mercedes-Benz cars, and they are known by all Africans. And this kind of high living, of course, consumes badly needed resources.

One way in which this came about, of course, was that the African governments, when they took over from the colonial governments, took over the colonial governments' salary scales. They took over the salary scales for colonial civil servants which were based, of course, upon European standards of living and competitive European salaries. So that there are civil servants in Kenya, for example, who earn incomes of up to about, that is *honest* incomes, of up to about thirty-two, thirty-three hundred pounds, and cabinet members get about thirty-five hundred pounds, in a country where the per capita income is thirty-eight pounds. In this situation, students, for example, upon graduation from the university, immediately are eligible for jobs in the civil service paying a minimum of eight hundred and fifty pounds. If they go into private employment with one of the big European companies, they may get from twelve to fourteen hundred pounds. So that the situation in Kenya generates a relatively small class of educated Africans who are siphoning off a relatively high percentage of the income of the country. Of course it's hard... it's very difficult in this situation to say... well, their argument is of course that the European civil servants are worth that much, so are we. They ignore, of course, the fact that the European salary scales were determined by European conditions, rather than by local conditions.

These, then, are some of the problems and some of the threats to stability, some of the threats to development and national identity. Well, what are the Kenyans doing about this by way of

attempting to build the nation? I think they've done quite a lot. In the field of education, for example, there has been a substantial increase in primary school enrollments, so that as of now about sixty percent of eligible children are in primary schools. This is a rather sizable number by African standards, and one has to remember that primary education is not free. It is necessary to pay tuition except for a very few poor children who do get bursaries. In the secondary school, enrollment has been doubled in the last few years, but the figures I think are interesting. Whereas in 1963 there were only thirty thousand students in secondary schools, today—well, I should say in 1966—there were sixty three thousand, and there may be about seventy thousand by now, an extremely small percentage of the population which gets secondary education. With regard to adults, although there is a large-scale UNESCO-sponsored literacy program, it is still true that four out of five adults cannot read and write. So that although very considerable progress has been made in the area of education, the distance before even the population is literate is enormous. Kenya could not afford, in its present stage of development and present resources, to provide even universal primary education free. This would probably absorb all of the funds available for development.

Nevertheless, as I say, they have made considerable strides. There has been a great deal of land converted into private ownership and that has tended to bring about a real stimulus to agricultural improvement. About half of the land in the highlands, all of which formerly belonged to the Europeans, has now been bought by the government, and Africans have been settled on it. There has been a large-scale Africanization of the civil service, as I pointed out. There has been a very substantial modernization of the roads and highways and considerable improvement to the major arteries. There is the beginning of a welfare state, although only in a very small way, in that a pension scheme has been started for those in the area of employment. Now only less than ten percent of the population is employed in industry or commerce, and it's only in this area that this scheme works. There is free medical service, but here, again, this isn't as meaningful as it sounds because of the lack of facilities. Nevertheless, the government is attempting to expand the hospital and health services as rapidly as possible. And Kenya, unlike most of the sub-Saharan states, has had a steady growth rate since independence, averaging from five to about eight percent, so that in spite of very serious difficulties, they have made progress.

Another area in which I think the government has extremely well is in the protection of the wildlife resource. There were a lot of prophets of doom who predicted that once the Africans got into control that the wildlife would be slaughtered. The Africans of course have seen that tourism is one of their major assets, and is now the second largest earner of foreign exchange, and will soon be the first. And in fact wildlife are better preserved, I think, now, generally more recognized than they were under the colonial regime. It's much easier for the Africans to get

after the poachers than it was for the colonial administrators and they can get after them with a good deal more success.

Now if there were time, I could speak a little more about the kind of government and constitutional system which they have, but I'll just say a word about that. Kenya, like all the other African states under British and French control, was given a ready-made liberal democratic constitution, but it doesn't quite work in the way in which it does in the mother country. Although there are guarantees of free speech, free press, and all the other civil liberties, these are not enforced. There is in Kenya, as in every other African state black and white, a preventive detention act which enables the administration to detain anyone indefinitely whom it regards as a threat to public safety. And of course this is held over the heads of people, and a certain number are detained. In Kenya, there is formally a competitive party system, but as soon as the second party was organized, almost the next day, the government detained several of its leading members, which was not a great encouragement to other people to be active in it. The second party is not permitted to hold public meetings, it is not given access to radio or television, and is continually harassed. There were supposed to have been local government elections in Kenya a few months ago, but it was discovered by the returning officers that all eighteen hundred of the candidates of the opposition party had not filled out their papers properly, so they were all disqualified. So that in fact Kenya has what is called a dominant party system, it is really a one-party system, but it's very doubtful whether in the socioeconomic conditions which prevail there that a competitive party system could work, any more than it was possible for a competitive party system to work in the older countries for quite some time.

Some of you may have seen a recent book by an English historian, J.H. Plum, who argues that the reason that Britain was able to stabilize and settle down in the eighteenth century was they had this long period of one-party rule under Walpole. Now I don't know to what extent J.H. Plum was looking at the current African situation and then applying this to Great Britain in the eighteenth century, but at any rate Britain also experienced a long period of one-party rule before it developed a competitive party system. So that nowhere in Africa I think, does one find genuine competitive party politics on the British or American model, and I think it's naïve to expect that it will develop in the near future, or I don't know about the distant future.

In spite of this, as I say, I think the impression which I have of Kenya in particular is that in spite of very considerable obstacles, it has been moving ahead. Now I don't mean to say there aren't some very serious problems. One of the most serious is of course the problem of succession to the presidency. Every time there is a rumor that Mr. Kenyatta is ill, everybody gets scared to death because there is grave concern about whether the succession can be made peacefully. As

you know, the crisis of succession is a problem everywhere in developing states. In the Soviet Union, for example, it produced great crises every time, and it has in many others. Whether Kenya can weather the transfer of power from Mr. Kenyatta to someone remains to be seen. Certainly, there is no other politician in Kenya with the same charisma, the same sort of nationwide appeal as Mr. Kenyatta enjoys. It's difficult to know what will happen, but as of today it seems to be for a country that has been in operating business for five years, I think they have done pretty well. That's about all I'm going to say now, but I'll be glad to take questions.

[applause; program ends]