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Portland State University

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HOST: On behalf of the Joint Inaugural Committee, we'd like to welcome you to the second in this series of public events marking the inauguration of Professor Victor Rosenblum as President of Reed College, Professor Gregory Wolfe as President of Portland State University. I hope our speaker tonight will not be offended if I pass over all the usual mentions of where he was born, what he has done, the books he's written, honors he's won. And I hope you will forgive me, too, I'd like to pass on to one or two other remarks and then let him have the floor. He's going to speak for a while and he's indicated he'd be happy to answer your questions.

I want to note only that Mr. Alex Campbell is currently the managing editor of *The New Republic*, and that *The New Republic* carries on its masthead the legend, "A journal of opinion," and that it's played this role in this country, as I recall now, since 1914. I consider that a very important role all through our history in this part of the century. I'd like to add to that information a line from John Milton from a pamphlet in which he was defending, during times of stress—perhaps not as dangerous as our own, perhaps with more hope than our own time—defending the right to dissent, the right to publish without a license, the right to be free from prosecution for the expression of opinion. "Opinion," Milton said, "is but knowledge in the making." *The New Republic* and its staff, over the years, has made us all wiser by the expression of its opinions, even though those opinions have, in my view, sometimes been wrong. It's the

continuing dialogue, I think, through which *The New Republic*, journals of that kind, have made their contribution.

Finally, I'd like to add to both those facts the idea that one proper function of the University is what has been called "the sanitation of knowledge." In our own way, that special critical role is the one we perform best in the society and for the society. I think, therefore, it is especially fitting that we ask Mr. Campbell to talk with us tonight. Especially fitting that we ask him to talk with us, to explore his opinions, on what has become the central subject in all our consciousnesses; the war in the Far East. Beyond that, the Far East itself, where he has been now for the last several months, surveying the problem, learning what he could, adding to his large store of knowledge on that subject. It's my privilege to present to you, on behalf of the Joint Inaugural Committee, Mr. Alex Campbell.

[applause]

ALEX CAMPBELL: [off mic] Well… doesn't matter. [on mic] Thank you very much indeed.

The founder of *The New Republic*, Mr. Croly, once wrote that the magazine had been founded in order to start revolutions in men's minds. And so I'm delighted to know that you didn't agree with at least some of what you read in *The New Republic,* because I think part of our function is to provoke a strenuous dissent as frequently as possible, and this we try to do, and I think we quite often succeed. Well, I must make two apologies; first of all, for an uncontrollable Scottish accent, and secondly for a bad head cold which will probably make the accent even more difficult to follow than usual. I trust you will bear with me, and also with the voices that come over this machine; I don't have any control over that either.

I'm going to talk about Asia, because I have in fact been there with my wife for several weeks now, certainly more than a month; and I had been in the area before on a number of occasions, so I was able to make some comparisons and contrasts. And of course, as one travels about there, one has to keep very much in the forefront of one's mind the problem of the Vietnam War, how it affects these other countries, and what these other countries think of this country's conduct of it.

This is the final year of the '60s we're in now, and the '60s are the decade when the attention of the West, such attention as it's given to Asia, has been concentrated there on Vietnam. Now we're on the edge of the '70s, and the Vietnam War, which has been going on, off and on, for some twenty years, will hopefully be ended in the coming years. Asia after Vietnam is an

interesting speculation. What will it be like? The trip that we made through Asia last year at least yielded some clues.

I would like to risk making four generalizations about that. First: in most of Asia outside Communist China, there are some real glimmers and glimmerings of prosperity, and that's in spite of population problems and problems of foreign indebtedness. The Japanese have been busy conquering or reconquering the world marketsn and they've been too busy doing that to raise their standard of living sensationally. But they are living better now than they did before, they're saving much more money than they did before, and they have the best color TV in the world. Okinawa, the island there which belongs to Japan, but which is at the moment a United States military base, will go back to Japan very soon. And that island, which I also visited, has actually got more automobiles per head than Japan has itself. The growth rate in Okinawa is a staggering 18%. And the growth rates of Taiwan and Thailand have been averaging between 8 or 10% a year, and been doing so for the last ten years. South Korea and Malaysia have been averaging well over 6%. Last year South Korea claimed 13%. Pakistan didn't do as well as that, but until recently it wasn't doing badly either.

The Asian countries that are still below a reasonable growth rate include the Philippines and India, Burma and Ceylon, and Indonesia where population growth is still ahead of economic growth. India is showing signs of progress, but even in Asia there is a material level below which countries may not fall without falling into deadly peril, and I would think that both Burma and Indonesia are in that situation, because there, these two countries, the standard of living of the average family is well below what it was was thirty years ago. I don't think that sort of thing can continue without catastrophe.

My second generalization brings us back to Vietnam. How much of this new prosperity, which does exist in Asia, is due to the Vietnam war? One is compelled to answer that a good deal of it is, though by no means all of it. The Asians are conscious of this fact, and most of them would like American military spending to continue, but they'd want that because of the economic benefits that that spending confers upon them, and not because they feel that they need the American forces, in large degree, for their own security. Most of them don't have any serious fear of becoming a Vietnam themselves.

My third generalization is a little more complicated, but I think very important. Though they're not afraid of Communism, many of these Asian countries are spending a grievously high percentage of their gross national product on armaments. They're doing this because they have serious quarrels with one another, and the West—to which in this context includes the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries—the West in that sense is supplying the Asian

countries with the arms which they ask for, but of course is doing so at a price, a profitable price. We are selling these countries large quantities of our secondhand arms, which we don't need anymore, as well as more up-to-date and much more expensive arms. I don't think it's in Asia's best interest that we should do this, and I don't think it's in the interest of the non-Communist West that we should do so either.

If these countries overspend on armaments, their economies may fail; and if their economies should fail, then I think it's quite likely that they would go Communist. Burma, Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Taiwan, to mention these almost at random, are spending somewhere between 5 and 10% of their gross national product on arms. Japan, which is far richer than any of these countries, is spending less than 1%. Now why do the Asians want to have these arms, if as I think, they don't particularly fear Communism? The Malays of Malaysia and the Chinese of Singapore are a little apprehensive about one another. And they're both also afraid of Indonesia and of the Philippines. And the Philippines, which occasionally has Indonesian backing in its claims on Malaysia, is also afraid of Indonesia itself. Cambodia is afraid of Thailand and also is afraid of both Vietnams, both South Vietnam and North Vietnam. India and Pakistan have been at war before, may be at war again.

So the whole area consists of a number of quarrels which have nothing whatever to do with the one quarrel which obsesses us here over Communism, and some of the quarrels are almost comically obscure. For instance, the state of Malaysia includes a part of North Borneo called Sabah, and there doesn't seem any doubt that this incorporation was achieved with the full knowledge, consent, and hearty approval of the people who live in Sabah. But the government of the Philippines claims that Sabah was once leased to the British by a sultan called the Sultan of Sulu sometime in the 19th century, that the heirs of the Sultan are now citizens of the Philippines, and therefore the legalistic argument goes: Sabah ought to be ruled from Manila whether the people of Sabah want to be ruled from Manila or not. That sort of quarrel is the sort of quarrel which is really much more real to most of these Asian countries than any fear of Communism.

The situation has a saving grace, which is part of my complicated generalization, and that is that though all these countries are arming themselves, all are inhibited from attacking one another by their own internal strains and stresses. The 22-year-old quarrel between India and Pakistan over Kashmir led to fighting several times and may do so again. But Pakistan is now having its time of troubles, and India has only very recently emerged rather shakily from a similar period. Indonesia was led by President Sukarno to the brink of war against Malaysia and Singapore, and then the Indonesian armed effort collapsed for internal reasons, and Sukarno vanished politically, and then Indonesia may now, or may *not* be, slowly emerging from a period of

confusion and chaos under the new president, President Suharto. Communist China has troubles with Soviet Russia as well as internal troubles, and is probably in no situation for embarking on any military adventures in either Southeast or South Asia.

Now, my fourth and final generalization about the area specifically concerns Vietnam, but I think has a wider application. The lesson of the Vietnam War for the West is that Asia cannot be quantified. The United States figured, in Vietnam, that given so many troops, so many helicopters, so many warships and bombers and tankers, so many modern rifles, that the war could be won. There are about 1 ½ million soldiers, South Vietnamese, Americans, Koreans and others, engaged at this moment in South Vietnam against an estimated maximum of about 400,000, under half a million, Communists. But the quantifying hasn't worked out. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, he says that the Americans didn't understand what goes on in the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese. Other Asian political leaders agree with this. The question in Vietnam was not how many battalions does Saigon have or how many battalions has Hanoi got, the question was a question of will or the lack of will. Do the non-communist South Vietnamese care enough to unite solidly behind one leader, at least until the war is won, or would they rather continue having, as they do have, some 80 or more factions calling themselves political parties, in spite of the fact that they're fighting a war. Lee Kuan Yew and other Asians strongly suspect that the latter is true, and therefore they think that the outcome of the war will be an eventual political victory by the North, because Hanoi does know what it wants and is united behind a totalitarian leader. In that case, Lee Kuan Yew says, that the fault will not then lie with the Americans, it will lie with the South Vietnamese, because the Americans can say that at least they did their best. But what Lee Kuan Yew and the other Asians really think is that the Americans have blinded themselves by trying to quantify the war, instead of trying to find out just what political animals the South Vietnamese people are.

Well, after these generalizations, let me try to throw out some hints and suggestions about other countries in the area, beginning with China. China is a paper dragon and it may wind up as a Soviet Russian mule. It has a mutual security treaty with Russia, and it has bi-lateral friendship treaties with Mongolia, and with North Korea, but in fact the only ally that China has is Albania, in Europe. The Chinese may have a few hydrogen bombs, but Chinese progress with with missiles has been much slower than was expected, and this is because of disaffection in the province of Xinjiang, where a number of the Chinese nuclear experts have been arrested by the Chinese government and charged with sabotage and with being Soviet agents. The Chinese armed forces, meanwhile, consist of about two and three quarter million men, but it's a very poorly armed large force. Their heavy artillery and their tanks are old-fashioned and imported; half of the army, that is about 56 divisions, is pinned down in Canton by Chiang Kai-shek's

forces in Taiwan. The Navy is a third of the size of the United States Navy in number of ships, but these ships, the Chinese ships, consist mainly of merely torpedo boats, and river gunboats. The air force is negligible, it has about 2,500 aircraft, but that's fewer aircraft than the U.S. Tactical Air Command has and most, or more likely *all* of the Chinese airplanes, are now obsolete.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution tore down most of the Communist Party organization in China and it has led to a growth of the influence of provincial and local military leaders. That means that the People's Liberation Army has either been handed or has had to take over the job of holding China together. And that means in turn, that that army is less capable than it might otherwise have been of attacking anyone. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union which is militarily powerful, far more powerful than China which has become self-enfeebled, Russia has exchanged shots with China over a frozen island somewhere on a shifting river. And these tactics are quite reminiscent. The Japanese, about thirty years ago or more, used to bite off chunks of China. They did so at intervals after producing or provoking an incident as a pretext for their meal. The Russians may be tired of the Chinese Communist heresy, they may be unwilling to wait for Mao Tse-tung to die, and they may be unwilling to wait until China acquires nuclear capability. They're not likely to launch an attack on China at the Amu River where the recent clash took place, but they might invade and attack Xinjiang, where China's nuclear installations are and also where there has been much political turmoil. The Russians have got nuclear missiles in outer Mongolia, from which they could easily hit Xinjiang or Peking itself for that matter. And Russia for years has been accusing the Chinese rather bitterly of oppressing ethnic minorities in Xinjiang by saying that the Chinese drive these minorities into lifeless deserts. Xinjiang doesn't only have ethnic minorities who might be conveniently rescued by Soviet comrades, and it doesn't only have nuclear installations which might also be either liberated or destroyed, it has oil and uranium which the Russians might quite like to have.

In a war the Chinese strategy would be defense in depth, to lure the enemy into the country by offering little resistance at first and then surround him as he got in deeper, and cut him to pieces. The Russians did that to Napoleon, and General MacArthur always feared that the Chinese one day might do it to the Americans. But the Russians, if they chose to attack Xinjiang, probably would simply bite off as much of Xinjiang as they desire to do at any one time. In which case, the Chinese strategy of defense in depth might not work. Peking has vowed that it won't rest until Taiwan once again becomes part of China. But suppose that Communist China decided that its real interest lay in acquiring membership of the United Nations, instead of spurning and despising that body as it does now. The Soviet threat to China might bring that change of heart about. In which case, Peking might well wish to have two voices instead of only one at the United Nations.

And ironically, it might learn this was a good tactic from studying the Soviet Union itself. The Russians have a system of nominally autonomous federal republics, and this means that the USSR has more than one voice, more than one vote in the general assembly of the United Nations. A similar system, if applied to China, might suit both Peking and Taipei. The Taiwanese would be happy to defer to Peking on foreign policy if they got practical home rule in exchange. And even a completely independant Taiwan would probably, in practice, follow the policy line of its large neighbor, China.

May we turn for a moment now to India, the other large country in Asia. Stories about China… about India breaking up into warring states I should think ought to be taken with a grain of salt. All that's breaking up at present is the Indian Congress Party. In spite of great outcries, riots, shootings, occasional lynchings, and other spirited manifestations of local political independence, India doesn't really seem to me to be on the point of splitting up. Nor does Pakistan. The situation there looked very grim last month, and it might become grim again. Pakistan is a bird with two wings, and the two wings, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, are about 1,000 miles apart with the whole breadth of India in between, so it's a very difficult place to run as one country. East Pakistan is smaller, much smaller than West Pakistan, but it actually does contain more people. Nevertheless, West Pakistan has lorded it over East Pakistan for many years.

This year, President Ayub Khan's government fell apart with a mighty crack, and the people of East Pakistan rose, who were led by an ambitious and handsome young sheikh and a rather mad old mullah. What the east wing are after is a very large degree of local autonomy. If India and Pakistan were willing to give a good deal of home rule to those states in both countries that really want it, this might solve the Kashmir problem which has led to war between them, just as China's possible need for the United Nations might lead to a solution to the Taiwan problem. The '70s may see not only the end of the Vietnam War, but it could see an end of both the Kashmir problem and the Taiwan problem, and that might be as big a blessing for Asia as the end of the Vietnam War itself, which really concerns the United States rather more than it concerns most of the Asian countries that I visited.

Let me revert for a moment to Taiwan. There, thanks in part to a lot of American aid, about $1.4 billion from 1951 through '65, Taiwan has forged ahead in growth and in trade. It spends somewhere between 8 and maybe as much as 15% each year of its GNP on armaments, but the nationalist Chinese who run the island claim that the living standards are going up, and they base this on annual import and export trade, which is now well over 1 billion American dollars. Unfortunately, none of this can disguise the fact that politically speaking, Taiwan is a rather cement-headed dictatorship. This state of affairs is not likely to change very much for the

better, as Chiang Kai-shek, now in his 80s, passes on politically to give way to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who is now in his 50s and has spent much of the earlier part of his life in Soviet Russia.

I mention that because of an interesting political development that occurred shortly before we visited Taiwan. The wall slogans in Taipei, the city, denouncing Russia, recently vanished overnight. The wall slogans denouncing Mao Tse-tung remained up, but the ones denouncing Russia came down. And the reason for this rather surprising move was that a visitor to Taipei, a prominent visitor, was a Soviet Russian journalist called Victor Louis who carries out little missions for the Kremlin from time to time. And he… no other, no Soviet journalist would visit an unfriendly capital without having got official permission from Moscow and a mission to fulfill. And there doesn't seem very much doubt that Victor Louis had been sent to Taipei to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Kai-shek's son a common anti-Peking platform. And the Chiang Kai-sheks sent to Moscow, at the same time, a member of the Taiwan National Assembly, presumably to have similar discussions in the Russian capital.

The population of Taiwan is over 13 million, that's more than Australia I believe, about twenty times as much as Cyprus, and much more than a good many members of the United Nations, so there is no real reason why Taiwan shouldn't one day be an independent state on its own, which is what most of the people there would like to have. But can smaller units be successfully independent? I was surprised to discover on my trip that this could well be so, that victory doesn't necessarily go to the big battalions in any sense.

The island of Singapore, for instance, is now a republic and is only 4 million people. But they have an income… their average income per head is well over $1000 a month, it's higher than the Japanese, and that puts it a good deal ahead of Taiwan, where factory girls are still expected to live on something like fifteen American dollars per month. The Singaporeans owe their good fortune in part to the fact that they're Chinese, which means they're very hard-working and ingenious, but also to their political sagacity, which took the form of maintaining in power a man who is really a sort of genius in politics, Lee Kuan Yew, whom I referred to earlier, the Prime Minister. He is now 46 and he demanded from his people a great deal and promised very little, but in practice he gave them a great deal, although only in return for a continuous effort by them. The taxes in Singapore are spent on welfare projects, from medicare to workers' apartments, and they're building these at a prodigious rate. And the island, which is tiny, is forging ahead very rapidly indeed and doing very well.

Same thing applies to Hong Kong, which also has a population of 4 million. About a quarter of the population of refugees from Communist China, and quite a number of them are now

millionaires. Very few of the textile workers in Hong Kong are millionaires, but they can rent an apartment for as little as three American dollars a month. Hong Kong's skyline is, when you approach it through the bay, is like a miniature Manhattan. And it's rather odd, a very odd place indeed because the Communist… the tallest building in Hong Kong is the Communist Bank of China, and it stands right next door to the Hong Kong Hilton. [laughter in background] Hong Kong has been under a Communist gun, of course, for about twenty years, which is quite heartening, because it has never fallen to anybody and it continues not only to survive but to flourish.

North Korea—which we didn't visit, of course, but we did manage to get to South Korea—North Korea is a hermit kingdom. Even the Russians and the Chinese don't get much of an entry in there anymore because the ruler of North Korea, Kim Il-Sung, is on bad terms with both of them, as well as with everybody else. He is the man who stole the *Pueblo*. By doing that, he proved that Okinawa is not as useful a base as the Pentagon thought it had been, which is why Okinawa will probably soon be handed back to the Japanese. He risked a war when he stole the spy ship, and also last year when he sent assassins into Seoul, the capital of South Korea, to murder the President there and they almost succeeded. But what alarmed American and South Korean intelligence, was that in neither occasion was there the slightest evidence that Kim Il-Sung had made any defensive preparations whatever to defend himself against a possible counter-blow, which he would have a legitimate reason to expect to receive. That makes Washington uneasy because they look upon Kim Il-Sung as a rather irrational gambler, which he probably is, but Washington is also nervous about South Korea; there, the growth rate, as with so many of these countries, is now very high; Japanese capitalists coming in, the city of Seoul has changed out of recognition, but the South has also become increasingly cocksure. And Washington would rather have 50,000 South Korean troops in South Vietnam and 50,000 Americans in South Korea than the other way about. The reason being that the American troops are not likely to jump the gun and start a shooting match with the North, but 50,000 well-armed South Koreans on the demilitarized line very well might do that and start a war with the North. The Koreans, both North and South, seem to me to be one people in Asia to look out for and keep an eye on.

The people to watch out for most in Asia, though, are the Japanese. If China is a paper dragon by necessity, which I think it is, Japan is a paper dragon by choice. But that may not last much longer. Japan is the phoenix that rose from the ashes of Hiroshima and Tokyo and Nagasaki to become the third leading industrial country in the world, which it is today; it's first in shipbuilding, second in truck building, third in steel, and fourth in the production of hydroelectric power. I saw the Ginza, which is Tokyo's 5th Avenue, twice in the last three years,

and was even more impressed on the last occasion than I had been the first time. It's better kept, better lighted, and better dressed than the real 5th Avenue in New York.

Other things besides prosperity are happening to Japan: this summer, for the first time since the Pacific war, the Japanese Navy will be visiting Southeast and South Asian ports. There isn't anything bad about that, but I think it's very interesting. Also, there's nothing bad about the fact that the Japanese have just produced their first quantity of enriched uranium. I think that's interesting too. The emperor has a brand-new palace, and a political religious group called the Soka Gakkai have ten million members, that's one Japanese in every ten, and are now the third largest political grouping in the country. Japan is the critical mass in the physics of Asia; a combination of Shinto revival and continental missiles would be a frightening phenomenon. I don't think it's likely to happen; the Japanese people do abhor war, and especially nuclear war of which they were the first victims. But I don't think Japan's pacifism is going to prevent Japan emerging from its present weakness or its present ambiguity, and becoming, certainly, *the* great power in Asia. I think this is more likely to happen to Japan than it is to happen to either India or China. By 1985, and that's only about 16 years away, the Japanese are going to be as rich as Americans are now.

As far as India is concerned, I think that if any dream is coming true there, it's Gandhi's dream of a reasonably prosperous, reasonably contented peasantry, and not Nehru's dream of power through steel. I think India will manage to feed its many mouths, but I don't think it's going to become a major industrial power or a major power in Asia. I'd like finally to say a word or two about Indonesia and the Philippines; these are the two sad cases in Asia. In Indonesia, per capita income has declined well below the rate of growth. And the army, which saved Indonesia from Communism in 1965 and 1966, has really become an army of occupation. The soldiers are very badly paid, and they rob the poor farmers as well as the rich Chinese merchants. And the generals of the army, apart from General Suharto, the president, who is an honest man himself, some of the other generals frankly just steal and live like pashas. There's a strong smell of oil and corruption in Jakarta; the place is filled with American, European, and Japanese carpetbaggers, who are there looking for oil and mineral concessions. Anti-Communism has been a cover for many sins, including a constant witch hunt, slow starvation or forced labor for political prisoners, and the torture and murder of political opponents. The government of Holland recently asked General Suharto, the president, to postpone his visit to Holland from May until some later time. The Netherlands have done much wrong to Indonesia in the past, but in my view they did right to ask Suharto to do this, because they intended a rebuke and the rebuke may prove to be salutary. I think it was merited.

The Philippines seem to be hell-bent on fulfilling Lenin's three preconditions for successful revolution. These were, Lenin said, first: "A people that has lost faith in its government's capability of doing anything," secondly, "A government that has similarly lost that faith in itself," and thirdly, "A hardcore communist leadership that is prepared and ready to take advantage of these circumstances." Well, all that the Philippines now lack is number three. And this may be forthcoming again unless the Philippines can produce a new Ramon Magsaysay or somebody of that caliber. This man, if there is such a man, could be a fellow called Senator Aquino, who seems to understand just how bad things have become there. But Aquino is only 35, and is therefore debarred by the Philippine constitution from running for President until 1973 at the earliest, and by 1973 it may be too late. If experience is any guide, experience elsewhere that is, the existence of large American military bases in the Philippines won't really improve matters very much. However, if the United States can live with a Communist Havana, which it does, no doubt it could survive a Communist Manila. But with the two exceptions of Indonesia and the Philippines, I was fairly happy about what I saw and the things I heard on my trip through Asia this year, and that was a pleasant surprise to me, because my natural disposition is to be very pessimistic. I hope that tonight I've been neither too pessimistic, or over-optimistic. Thank you very much.

[applause]

HOST: Mr. Campbell has indicated he'd be happy to answer some questions. Try to speak in a loud a voice as you can, the room doesn't have much bounce in it. Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. […] has just recently spoken here also and he painted a sort of picture of South Vietnamese government sort of like you pictured the government of Indonesia. Could you make any comments that you observed of this kind of government in Vietnam?

CAMPBELL: I didn't visit Vietnam on this occasion, but I was there three years ago, and I've kept closely in touch with it as far as I can through people we have there. There obviously are parallels between the two, but the one in Indonesia, despite the fact that South Vietnam is having a war there, the one in Indonesia is even more incompetent because there's no reason why they shouldn't be able to control their army or control the looting generals, and they've failed to do this, whereas in South Vietnam, presumably because of the disturbances and chaos that the war tends to produce, they may have some excuses. But broadly speaking, I'm afraid that there are these similarities. The Indonesians have yet to prove that they are not merely going to become another South Vietnamese regime.

HOST: Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'd like to know if Mr. Campbell feels that the Nixon administration will be able to remain the Nixon administration and still get the United States out of the war in Vietnam within the next four years.

HOST: That'll test the journal of opinion.

[laughter in background]

CAMPBELL: I don't know what "remaining the Nixon administration" means. I've always thought that the hallmark of the Nixon administration was put upon it by President Nixon himself years ago when he was running in a campaign against John F. Kennedy in 1960, and I understand he went up and down the country in the address meetings and he said, "My opponents go to the North and say one thing about the racial issue, and then they go to the South and they say something different about the racial issue, but I always say the same thing." But he never said what that was.

[laughter in background]

So I don't know what the Nixon administration is; isn't that the question, what is it? I think though, about the Vietnam War, that Mr. Nixon is quite a sagacious politician and he doesn't want to be just a one-term President. I'm pretty sure that in fact, he is now endeavoring to try to end the war within his term of four years. I don't know whether he will succeed, but I'm sure he's endeavouring to do that. Does that answer the question?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: In your talks with other countries… with leaders of other countries in South Vietnam, what would be the biggest price we could pay to get out of there fast? Without making people uneasy?

CAMPBELL: I think that the… the *biggest* price? You mean the smallest price.

[laughter in background]

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Biggest concession.

CAMPBELL: What they expect us to do is to work out some form of coalition government which will include the NLF, and which these other Asian leaders don't expect for a moment will endure. They would like to think it might, but they don't have very much faith in this. And under

cover of this coalition government collapsing and Hanoi taking over, we could then say… this is the United States could then say that it wasn't our fault, and they expect us to shuffle out of it more or less like that; they wouldn't blame us for doing so. But I don't… I still don't know what you mean by the biggest price. You mean should we get out in the next six days or something?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, what I meant was, we went in supposedly to stabilize the region. The region has been stabilized, according to official statements. What would make this destabilization occur? What price would we pay?

CAMPBELL: Now, I don't think… I don't think I'm following this.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, should we give up our bases in Thailand? Should we remove our presence in South Vietnam completely, would…

CAMPBELL: Yes.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: …both be completely acceptable to the…

CAMPBELL: I don't think they would both be acceptable; I think what they would like to see would be the Vietnam War to end, which means, of course, American forces getting out of Vietnam…

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Completely.

CAMPBELL: …completely. But they wouldn't be too happy about a total withdrawal of American forces from Thailand or anywhere else, because that would be a little too precipitous. What they would like to see is the Vietnam War finished, and the American forces in places like Thailand cut back to a very modest amount. For instance, they've got 50,000 airmen there now. The Thais wouldn't be unhappy, and the other countries further south of Thailand wouldn't be unhappy, if in Thailand, because we have this bilateral treaty, we kept maybe 5,000 men as a maximum. That wouldn't make them too unhappy, not so much because they're terrified or they're going to be attacked or anything, but because they don't really want to see all this money we're spending there dry up suddenly and be cut off drastically. They really are pretty dependent on it. So they want this military thing to remain, this military commitment to remain at least in a token form so that the spending will continue for a while before it begins to taper off and disappear, but it's really mainly for the economic benefit; this is what they have their eye on. They're apprehensive about the shock to their economies if we all just packed up and went off. And they have of course, heard reports from here which I think are pretty garbled,

about the possibility of the United States suddenly becoming totally isolationist, suddenly packing up, leaving the Pacific in a sort of huff, saying "Never will we ever return in any shape or form." I think this is silly, but I have heard these stories, and I don't think any of these countries would particularly welcome that. Does that answer the question?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, it does.

CAMPBELL: Okay. [laughs]

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, if Vietnam were to have a self-deterministic type of government right now, is it the NFL, or the South Vietnamese government which mostly… or which best meets, in your opinion, the needs of the populace? I'm not saying the particular governments in power but... land reform if that's what's needed, agricultural reform, whatever…

CAMPBELL: I don't… you mean if the people could choose, and it was a dreamlike world in which they could get what they wanted? They would choose neither. [laughs] I think they're gonna get the National Liberation Front of the Viet Cong, or call it what you will, but I think if you were to ask all the people quite fairly, sort of take them one by one into a room, I think you would end up with a majority voice for neither. They would really like to be quit of the lot. Start all over again without the war, or any of its memories. I don't think the Viet Cong have a majority of the people of the South behind them.

HOST: Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: President Nixon […] said that 85% of the war materiel or hardware comes from the Soviet Union. He made that statement. In other words, we're fighting… in your opinion, are we fighting the Soviet Union, by proxy?

CAMPBELL: Only by choice. Not their choice. [laughs] But they are… of course he's right about those figures, I would guess, I see no reason to disbelieve that. The Soviet Union wishes to influence the Hanoi government in its favor against the Chinese government, so they supply them with as much as they can to keep in their good books. But not necessarily to keep us hanging around the area. The Russians wouldn't be unhappy with a peace settlement in that part of the world, they would like to have one.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, by [...] 85% of the military materiel, they certainly have a large say with the North Vietnam…

CAMPBELL: Less than you would think.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: ...if you cut that off, their troops…

CAMPBELL: Yeah, but the… Hanoi in turn knows that they're not going to cut it off, you see, the bluff wouldn't work. [laughs] Moscow wouldn't dare to cut it off, because then they would not achieve their object.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well…

CAMPBELL: So, Hanoi is in the happy situation of the tail wagging the dog. It's happened so often in the world; the East Germans wag the Russian dog, and quite often the South Vietnamese wag the American dog. [laughs]

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: It seems like they wanna fight wars by proxy.

CAMPBELL: Unwillingly, too. [laughs]

HOST: The other quest… yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What do you think… [in background, unintelligible]

CAMPBELL: Wait now, wait now, the phoenix?

[audience member elaborates; background music drowns it out]

CAMPBELL: When did that happen, it was some while back, wasn't it?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yea, and thehn they jailed… [indistinct]

CAMPBELL: Yes, well, why not? I have no objection to anybody taking medical supplies to anybody, but I don't think the exploit can be repeated very often. It hasn't been, has it? It's only done…

AUDIENCE MEMBER: They're, they're going through it with China… [indistinct]

CAMPBELL: They are?

[audience member responds]

CAMPBELL: Uh-huh. Well, I certainly respect their courage, they're certainly very brave people. I wouldn't be on that ship myself. [laughter in background] I'm too much of a coward.

HOST: Any other questions? Yes.

[audience member asks question off microphone]

CAMPBELL: Yes.

[audience member finishes question]

CAMPBELL: Well, they might do so; the Thailand government certainly is corrupt, and has not been moving fast enough to help the Northeast, but I think it's moving now. I don't think the insurgents are lying low from choice. I think they're lying low because they've not in fact been able to get up a mass movement there. I think there's an awful lot of ethnic differences there which make it very difficult to do this, so many cross-currents. So I think the insurgents are pretty weak; I don't think the government's… it's been very tardy, but I think it's moving now and probably moving in more or less the right direction. And as in some of these countries, it's the best government you've got, because unfortunately the military people there, with some tempering by the King and by other elements and by the United States, by and large you have a reasonably good government, corrupt as it is, they take their 10%, but the politicians who might replace them if you had the whole thing thrown open have never been any good. Not yet. They've been worse, I mean, than these military rulers, which is saying a good deal, that's just how it's been. So I am optimistic about Thailand, it seemed to me that they are forging ahead and that the insurgency didn't seem to me to be becoming a great flame burning up much. It's remained more or less at the same level now for a good five years; I don't see any sign of it growing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: ...are there no… you said that there are no significant Thai leaders…

CAMPBELL: No, I don't think so.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is a man who is... in Bangkok, in Thailand by the name of…

CAMPBELL: Well, he was, but he's been in China for twenty years. That's a long time. He's a good fella, I mean he's one of the founders… one of the fathers of the nation, nobody denies

that, but the thing is that he's missed the bullet. He should have been back there years ago and he's never come back, and if he came back tomorrow I don't think most people would… don't forget, in all these countries, more than half the population are usually under the age of eighteen and Pridi to them isn't even a name; they would say, "Who's he?" It's most unfortunate. He probably would have been the George Washington of Thailand, but I think he missed his chance.

HOST: Yes?

[audience member poses question]

CAMPBELL: If we had a world recession. In Asia you mean, how would it affect Asia? Oh, it would be very bad, if we had that sort of upsetting of this apple cart that I'm describing, it would be very bad indeed, because even as things are without a world recession, there are lots of iffy things in the picture. And if you have that, then they would really be down and out, because everything is depending on their expanding trade with the richer countries, and they're managing to live off that and push things up. If that shrank and we started getting into a depression ourselves, and putting on more quotas, more tariffs, we weren't buying the Japanese goods, and so on, it would be a… they would go into a spin.

[audience member responds]

Well, you could be right. [laughs]

HOST: Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You stated that the Chinese were having internal problems with their… some of their military personnel forming sort of a government of their own. Is Russia still apprehensive in regards to China, as the possibility of invading Russia and it becoming a whole [indistinct] conflict?

CAMPBELL: I wouldn't think the Russians are apprehensive; I think the Chinese have got much more reason to be apprehensive of the Russians. I didn't say, by the way, that the military leaders were setting up, what are warlords… becoming warlords in the old sense, I don't think they're doing that. I think the National Liberation Army, in fact, is doing a pretty good job, they have managed to… more power has been shoved in their direction without them particularly asking for it. They're trying to hold the country together. It's just the opposite of setting themselves up as warlords, but of course, that takes up all their energy, so in the event of a

sudden attack on China by Russia, they would be doing two jobs at once and probably doing neither of them very well, and it certainly inhibits the Chinese Red Army from any sort of aggression against somebody else, they've got their hands full at home. That's what I really was trying to say.

HOST: Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'd like to know what your opinion is on the tendency toward Nasserite military governments in many underdeveloped nations; can the nations develop better with the Nasserite governments than the People's Liberation Army in China or the Suharto government in Indonesia or […] in South America. And can a government with… can a country with a Nasserite government have peaceful relations with other nations it has conflict with?

CAMPBELL: I would say that if you had a Nasserite government it would be very difficult to have peaceful relations, but I don't see any strong tendency for Nasserite governments to appear. Each country has its own particular set of problems; it produces a government but it's not nece… I don't think you can label it that way, as "Nasserite." I don't think, for instance, the Suharto government is a Nasserite government, just the opposite in a way. The Sukarno government was a Nasserite government, if you like, but not the Suharto one. Unfortunately, the Suharto one has got its own form of ill-doing, it's exploiting its own people. The Sukarno government tried to stay in power by drumming up rather artificial quarrels with its neighbors, the way Nasser does. So it was more a Nasserite government than the Suharto one.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: In the sense of military and nationalistic government…

CAMPBELL: Oh, but you can have a military government which is military and which is nationalistic, but which is not necessarily Nasserite, I mean… [laughs]

HOST: Yes?

[audience member asks a question]

CAMPBELL: I think it's a long shot, I mean, if you were to assume that all these countries adopted Communist governments, and all these Communist governments, instead of quarreling with one another, which is what Communist governments nowadays mostly do, were to get together and look around for some victim, then of course Australia would probably be a reasonably obvious target. But there are so many ifs and assumptions in that, I think that the Australians can probably sleep at night without too much worry.

HOST: Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you think the lessening of…

HOST: Speak, speak up a little bit more.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you think the lessening of Indonesian antagonism toward Malaysia is the result of existing internal problems in Indonesia itself? Or is this something that sort of passed with Sukarno?

CAMPBELL: I think it probably passed with Sukarno because he invented it. It wasn't a thing which was very deep-seated among the Indonesians; he created the issue and then proceeded to exploit it. And the Suharto government—after all, Suharto was a general who owes the fact that he's now running the country to the fact that he was in charge of the troops which were prepared for the invasion of Malaysia—that put him in a nice position to take over when the Communists tried, and he was the only body around with armed forces at his disposal. But he's never raised that issue since; it's dead, as far as Suharto seems to be concerned. And I don't think anybody but a rather flamboyant character like Sukarno would bother to raise it, it's not a natural thing to the Indonesians as much. But of course, it's difficult to see ahead, I mean, suppose time passes, suppose the Indonesian regime settles down, and suppose they find themselves with problems internally like Sukarno did. I mean—suppose the other islands begin to get very restive with what they talk very freely about as Javanese exploitation of them—then the person sitting in Jakarta might be tempted to create a foreign enemy to divert their attention, and then you would get that one popping up again. So in that sense, going back to your question, I suppose it could become a Nasserite government, but it's by no means inevitable; there's no logical law about it.

HOST: Yes?

[audience member asks question]

CAMPBELL: I don't think so. The Philippines talk about it a great deal more than they're likely to do, but they keep on talking to the point just enough to keep Singapore and Malaysia afraid, but I would doubt that they would do much about it. Some of… they have some people that would be inclined to run a little private campaign of their own, and under the guise of it being the government of Manila, they might run a few speedboats into a few harbors there and wreck and steal as much as they could and dash off. They're really just being pirates.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: They have, as a matter of fact.

CAMPBELL: They have done that and they might do it again, yes. But I don't… the Philippine government as a government makes this claim every time there's a presidential campaign on as there is now, and then after the fellow is… becomes the president again or somebody else becomes the president, they forget about it for a while. It's not very serious, no.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: […] …in your opinion, is a major conflict inevitable?

CAMPBELL: No. I don't think so, but I think it's quite possible that they might have a series of small conflicts, which would be very bad for them because they can't afford it. It would upset their stability and send them into that spin we're all afraid that might happen to them anyway, and that's why I deplore the fact that they're spending what I regard as a ridiculously high percentage of their growth on this. They need all that, they need… all the margin they can get, they need to stay ahead of their population problem to raise their living standards. And they do have these little quarrels, which are really quite absurd quarrels, and if they get into little wars, they're simply going to destroy their chances of getting anywhere in the world… and then somebody, of course, will to take them over.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What do you think we should do with regards to arms to the area then? We tried to limit arms in the Middle East, with the result that the Arabs went to the Russians. We're not… we're captives of a situation, we've got to give 'em a minimum large amount of arms just to keep these people from jumping the fence. It's a different dilemma.

CAMPBELL: It's a dilemma. But I think it's… I don't think it's an insoluble dilemma. I think common sense should dictate that if Singapore, for instance, tomorrow, were to ask us to supply them with… something pretty big in the way of very superior jet aircraft, I think we should say, "No, we're not going to sell them to you, it's ridiculous that you should ask for them, because you may need other things from us that we'd much rather give you," and we'd be most reluctant… we should at least try to talk them out of it by making counteroffers. And I don't think we're doing that, I think there is a tendency now to… we're spending an awful lot of money on arms, and our taxpayers are mourning, and this is a little offset which the Pentagon it seems to be quite fond of having. I think we should be against it. I'm sure the State Department and the Pentagon don't see eye to eye. I think there are quarrels that go on there inside, and I would be on the State Department's side.

HOST: Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'd like to hear a comment on what you think our general military and political role should be in the Asian countries we're in. Whether the United States should be committed to the internal affairs of… [indistinct]

CAMPBELL: Now, that's the biggest question of the evening. [laughs] Well, I think you've got to take each case by itself. I don't think you can lay down any general principles on that one. I don't see how you can work out some general law that applies to all these quite different countries. We certainly shouldn't be getting inside anybody's internal affairs at all to begin with.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: In other words, you don't think that we should commit ourselves to a particular government, even if it's clearly being threatened by a socialistic government?

CAMPBELL: No, I don't think we should commit ourselves to a government on that basis; you mean, threatened by a socialistic government outside, or inside?

[audience member responds]

CAMPBELL: Oh yes, we can, we've got a base in Cuba. With a Communist government. [laughter in background] It's there, though.

HOST: You think that's the best exit line you're likely to have?

CAMPBELL: Yes. [laughs]

HOST: Mr. Campbell feels that's the best exit line. Thank you, Mr. Campbell, on behalf of the students and faculty. [applause]

CAMPBELL: Thank you.

[applause and some background noise for about 20 seconds; program ends]