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Gregory Baker Wolfe
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Portland State University

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[Transcriber’s note: The first eight minutes of the recording are unclear. Some words and phrases are unintelligible.]

DR. GREG WOLFE [recording beginning mid-sentence]: ...that is complacent, evasive, and equivocal. The people, Saslow went on, are looking for a man who are truthful and resolute, and eloquent in their conviction that the American destiny is to be free and magnanimous. Who will talk to the people about their duty and about the sacrifices they must make? And about the discipline they must impose upon themselves? About all of those things which make a people self-respecting, serene, and positive? And then [...] he says, here, precisely was the dilemma between President Nixon and his [...]. And then he goes on—if you’ll forgive me, this is quite relevant to what we want to get at this afternoon—well, that’s asking a lot, says [...], especially from a president in distress. But it may be that [...]. It cannot be done with economic problems [...]. The president can say one year of Watergate is enough, but this only provokes the opposition’s slogan that five years of Nixon are too many. The problem, of course, of the president is deeper than this, and he didn’t really deal with it as effectively as many of his supporters hoped. 1974, he said, at the end, would be a year of unprecedented progress toward our goal of building a structure of lasting peace in the world, and a new prosperity without the war in the United States. But this, he concluded, would require the cooperation of the Congress and the support of the American people, which in turn requires [...] of the president. And this is still the issue. Well. One of the things that I heard long ago from a governor I once worked for was that... he said, Never walk ahead of the voters. And it may be that as some of the [...] of the administrative... of the development of the deepening [...] in the
state of our nation is that it has walked for too long ahead of the voters. It has not listened nor
heeded to counsel often enough that the people give. And in our system, this American... all
through that gnawing doubt that [...] the Americans, that whether [...] whether the
Constitution is operative, that all through... whether or not it’s adequate, but one thing we... I
think have come to without necessarily discussing it too far [...], but the delicate balance
between public opinion, what the people will take, has nevertheless [...] walked very far ahead
of where they are. Most of us in this class are political science majors and they know that better
than most of the teachers in this room and the other members of the audience. When you get
into the field of foreign affairs, more than in domestic government, the question is how far you
can walk ahead of the people [...] even more crucial and perhaps even more delicate. The... [...] talked about the need for tranquility and I was reminded of a friend of mine downtown who’s
gone into the travel business, and he said to me today, I’d like you to know I learned that this is
very [...] when you think about tranquility, the need for tranquility and the problems of war and
peace he said, a man came in the other day and said he and his wife wanted to make a trip to
restore their tranquility, and [...] he said I told them to pick a different liner. I think very often of
that. Maybe one of the solutions to our political dilemma in the world [...] if we could sell one
trip to that group in the [...] that would be happy with the pragmatic [...] politics approach, let
them go on their cruise, and the other group would be the idealists, [...] sell them a trip on the
liner of peace and let them go on their cruise. I only wonder though if when they came back
they’d be any happier, or any more compatible, than they were before they had their cruise.
But this is to make a point that I may not get back to. It is that the pursuit of morality or the
pursuit of pragmatism in foreign affairs exclusively... leads to orthodoxy, and there’s probably
nothing less desirable in maintaining the balance of power within a country or a balance of its
capability to negotiate for those countries’ interests, or the general interests that may be
broader than the country. If morals on the one hand and pragmatism on the other are too far
or for too long separated. Now the other little story I thought I might mention by way of getting
down to work... had to do with a [...] and [...] said well, Brezhnev was a politician who lived in a
time of [...] and that’s of course if the UN hadn’t [...] I doubt that I would be able to tell that
story myself [...] but I may be quite wrong, when you think about it. It may be, it just could be
 [...] that if we look back one day at this period in our history that Solzhenitsyn may have been
 [...]. The point is that the American people find so much, without even reading his book August
1914 [...] we seem to feel a sense of rapport, a sense of identity with a spirit in the world that
cries out for freedom, for human rights, for mobility across national lines. All things we hadn’t
had [...] that appeal to our sense of what is moral and [...] what is right. And we use this in our
foreign policy, the popular will [...] urged upon the government, certain demands upon the
Soviet Union as a price of our continued good relations. [...] I think we’d do better without this [...] in common or [...]. I can’t afford a lawyer like Rosemary.
Well, as I said earlier, I think that the theme of this academic seminar has some discussion of morality as it applies to foreign affairs, somewhat relevant to the theme of the all-University conference. I think that Americans are understandably troubled by the level of public evil today. Not just in the White House but all around us. I found back in the [...] 1968-70 period a great malaise [sound quality improves here] amongst students and teachers over the level of real, imagined, or alleged evil in high places. They were concerned about the tragic use of authority by the White House, by high officials in the federal establishment. I mentioned in my introduction that Dr. Saslow, the numerical data on high officials in the presidential establishment in Washington, and before this, of course, the whole uptightness of our people with Vietnam, and the escalation of the war without a declaration. Against, really, what I think most of us were brought up to believe in elementary civics courses, were just basic process requirements of our federal establishment in the field of foreign affairs. And this whole unthinkable war in Vietnam was sort of both the final irony and the final tragedy in the disenthronement of law and order by leadership.

And then we saw, of course—and we’re further dismayed by—the brutality of our military, our own soldiers in the field; we were concerned about, we talked about at our last seminar meeting Sunday evening about some of the treatment of prisoners of war. And moreover we have had a kind of a gnawing suspicion that our leadership is not always truthful, not only with the diplomatic adversaries—and even some of the allies—but not even truthful with the people. We’ve seen presidents from Kennedy through Nixon actually lying to us about the facts surrounding certain incidents. One of these is said to be the Gulf of Tonkin. Others are said to be what we’re really doing to support or achieve the election of certain governments in Chile and Vietnam and you name it, Peru and elsewhere. We’ve been, I think, worried about that.

We’ve been worried about the manipulation of intelligence information, to have it come out the way we want to see our goals, our policy goals come out, and we’ve had—I remember in my own experience, as I think I’ve told this class before—that the treatment by the press of the facts surrounding the Dominican crisis of some years ago were far more accurate than the kind of garbage we were passing around in the intelligence community in Washington, and persuading ourselves of a false reality. Because it was to our convenience, we thought at that time, to manipulate that information and have it seem other than it was. All this, by the way, has been described better than I can in this brief period, I think rather well at least by David Halberstam in the *Best and the Brightest*. And even this morning, if you watch the *Today Show* as faithfully as I do, you saw a returned minister of God and a returned IBM executive, bereft father of a son who died in Vietnam, alleging again that our embassy in Saigon is essentially not
telling us the truth, not even telling itself the truth about certain political intelligence now being
gathered and surveyed in Saigon and in Washington.

So it’s very hard not to believe... to believe, again, in the integrity of some of our processes. To
believe that we are not, in a sense, the patsies of—that name, Pat, you know, in the Nixon
family, has more symbolic meaning than perhaps we thought it did. We are the patsies of this
Nixon administration in many ways. But we’ve been the patsies to other First Families in recent
years, so we mustn’t blame it all on one troubled president. They all add up to a sense of
appalling immorality at the highest levels of our civil, military, and diplomatic leadership. Now,
the flip side of this lack of confidence, this embarrassment of the lack of truth, of course, is that
there can be something moral, there can be something better. And underneath, I think, all of
our doubt and all of our protest is this fact that we want to be confident that it can be turned
around, and so there is on the other side something better. And in addition to that, I think we
are searching in terms of our private accountability or our private responsibility. Many of us—
many of you, certainly—are searching your souls and your minds over what your role may have
been in bringing to such high places, in contributing to the system that has brought to such high
places, to education, to elections, men and women in whom we can have so little trust. And
what, during this period of guilt reflection, are you doing about it? What can you do about it?
Are you powerless? Will, indeed, the system now... is it so frozen that you can have no influence
on it?

Sin, by the way, is now being examined, for three weeks, by one of our local ministers. I think in
the First Unitarian Church of Portland, the minister there is giving a series of three sermons on
sin. Part of our guilt feeling is, I think, the feeling that we have sinned. And I suspect that in
America during the end of this decade and the beginning of the next there is going to be a great
resurgence among our people on how to find salvation through prayer, how to find salvation
through improving our social work, our civic enterprise. I think one voguish manifestation at the
highest level is Billy Graham at the White House and these Sunday prayer meetings which the
president has rather regularly. You haven’t arrived in Washington, I understand, in this
administration unless you have been to prayer meeting at the White House. I mean that
seriously. I think, furthermore, in our movies—the popularity of The Exorcist and the rise of
exorcism—are kind of manifestations of the American interest in how to rid itself of devils.
Then, we are going to see, then, getting back to prayer, getting back to some early lessons of
morality and the practice of the Golden Rule.

Now, in American society, in American political life, I think we’ve long seen the necessity for
liberty under law. And therefore we have done what we can at many levels about achieving a
legal order that recognizes rights, that places some emphasis and priority on responsible
conduct, of participation through representation. These processes have been established—I
know that I’ve leapt quickly from questions of morality to questions of political process, but
they are related—all these processes have been established to help us determine through
mechanics, if you will, what the popular will is. What is reasonable, then, in terms of what the
people may be thinking or wanting? Seeking? Kennan calls this—George Kennan—the
“lighthearted space in the assimilated powers of our national tradition.” Or our national values.
There is a lighthearted belief that if we can have liberty under law, representative government,
that we can have a national tradition that elevates the individual, that reaches that individual…
that the individual reaches dignity in his popular will through an association that is elective, and
so on and so forth. I think the essence of most American historical political tradition has fulfilled
this definition of morality, or the definition of morality as being in conformity with the rules of
higher conduct. That’s what the search for liberty is all about.

Now, politicians, in applying diplomats, in applying or explaining their application of morality,
have very often indulged in... oh, rhetoric that leads you away from strict applications of what
the moral precepts may be. I’ve lost a page of notes, but we’ll go on from there. I was going to
say something about the elements of American political philosophy that have moral overtones.
They are talked about in almost all the literature that I examined in thinking about this subject
for this class meeting. Even the critics of the lack of morality in our life today or the prophets of
its needed return cite the Founding Fathers and the influence of those founders on American
diplomatic life. And I think it’s interesting that isolationists, that nationalists and
internationalists, the moralists themselves, the moral philosophers if you will in political
science, and the power school like Morgenthal all agree on the significance and the
transcendent influence of 18th-century political philosophers on our national life. And they have
given us these philosophers what Dennis Rogan called “the illusion of omnipotence” in the
world. This universal emphasis on the individual and his fulfillment, and our ultimate definition
of these in terms of liberty and equality and the process of achieving greater liberty and
equality for all people. They certainly have, I think—and maybe you disagree—but in our view a
certain universal validity when it comes down to our policies and how we promulgate them.

The open society is highly idealistic. We have achieved an open society. And it’s occasionally
corrupted into moralizing, and the most recent case of moralizing—and I want to distinguish
here moralizing from morality—has been that of our law-and-order, peace with honor prophets
in the highest offices of the land. I suppose the leading exponents of this are the president
himself and his late vice-president.

Ernest Lefebvre has a little book in which he pointed out that “the moralism of the naïve and
the well-intentioned may be sincere; the moralism of the ambitious and sophisticated is likely
to be dishonest. Intellectually flabby and morally undisciplined moralism tends to focus on private interest rather than public good, on the immediate at the expense of the future, and on sentiment rather than reason. It is more often concerned with appearances than with consequences. Morality is a synonym for responsibility, and moralism is a conscious or unconscious escape from accountability.” That’s kind of a tough paragraph, but the more I read it the more intrigued I was by it. And as I looked back on some of the rhetoric of the 60s and early 70s, the more true I think it holds, this statement.

Well now, America, in its foreign affairs, like all nations, has had a good deal of moralism on the part of its leadership, the practice of moralism if you will, and I think it has a large dose and a certain amount of practice too of morality. What does this mean for the task of the diplomatist and the statesman? I think it means that the diplomacist or the statesman, the president, has to meet a multiple mandate to use the resources at his command to maintain a tolerable balance among the competing claims of order, justice, and freedom. These are all kernels of the American political tradition: order, justice, and freedom. It’s the job of the leader to maintain some balance among them. In grave crises, he may sacrifice one temporarily to save the other two. At Pearl Harbor, for example, the American people sacrificed peace in the interests of security, and were prepared to accept limitations on freedom for the same ends. Any political community must enjoy minimal security before it can develop the discipline of justice and the safeguard of freedom.

Now, in that—if you assume that—let’s get back for a moment to diplomatic applications of the moral standard and take a few. What are some of these applications in the American diplomatic experience? I like to think one of them, and maybe one of the first, was neighborliness. We haven’t talked in our class yet about the good neighbor policy, but in this chapter of American foreign affairs in which we are now... maybe from which we are now moving, remember it was Franklin Roosevelt who said, “In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor.” Now he didn’t confine that to just Latin America, where it got most of its jazz. He applied that or laid that down as a world policy, and I think that really it antedated his statement of that, that the American foreign policy has traditionally asserted the need to be neighborly. Just to be generous and good? No. But to be left alone, to have its independence, to have its prosperity. We have asserted this business of neighborliness. And this includes being a good ally, but it also includes not being an ally at all. You see, historically—and we’ve argued this in our class earlier on—we went over Washington time and again, remember? All this business of no entangling alliances? Part of that’s our business of being neighborly, good neighbors. Good neighbors don’t get too intimate. And alliances are a form of intimacy, and intimacy, as well all know, can breed contempt, or war, or difficulty. So we’ve had
very few alliances until recently. That’s why I think this chapter may be closing; but nevertheless, neighborliness.

Now, another thing we have talked about—for those of you who don’t have the privilege of sitting with us day after day—is meeting our commitments. But we’ve talked about it a little differently in our seminar. We’ve talked about it as what? Trust. There has to be, in all diplomatic relations, a certain amount of mutual trust. The development of trust, I think, cost us our first modern historical breakdown: the concept of how we... or the idea of developing trust on a global basis, and I’d go back to the Versailles treaty, I suspect, and talk about Wilson’s unfortunate experience with that treaty. Of course, he’s such an interesting case, Mr. Wilson, because he was a moral absolutist. If you didn’t agree with him, you were wrong. We said at the outset, if you over-moralize, as he did, you lose your allies, as he did. He not only lost his allies, he lost his loyal opposition. But nevertheless, he was the first great exponent of actually having open covenants openly arrived at, you’ll recall, and thereby making a commitment to the peace of the world and actually keeping it. I want to talk about him again a little later, both Wilson and Jefferson and this business of recognition, which you could put under neighborliness or you could put it under the next subject of openness. I mentioned open covenants openly arrived at.

It was Washington in his farewell address who said, “The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.” And so to avoid either of these entangling alliances and to enhance meeting our commitments, we have pursued historically a policy of openness, of not being habitually friendly or habitually unfriendly to anybody. Now there are exceptions, of course, we can argue about later. But I think this quality also suggests non-entanglement, it suggests our desire to have open diplomacy, until fairly recently, to seek frankness in our negotiations, as in the naval limitations of the 20s. We were probably the most naïve negotiators at the table at the London naval conference. We were so frank and open at the treaty of Portsmouth negotiations at the end of the Russo-Japanese war that I think both parties were ready to throw up their hands and walk out and deal with a different amiable compositeur than they had.

Well, finally, then, in addition to neighborliness and meeting of commitments when we have them and openness, has been our desire to do business with all emerging countries, and even some of the [...] old historic countries. And this suggests the policy I told you I wanted to talk about before we get to the last principle of justice, and that’s recognition policy. Now, our recognition policy, if I may refresh your memories just a bit, was really first stated by who? A great Secretary of State. No, Jefferson. And he really pursued what was called and is called a de facto recognition policy of asking no questions about how it got there—the nation—but if it
existed, if it controlled the government, that is, land and people, and had some machinery of government—whether you liked the government or not, whether you liked the people or not, whether you agreed with all of its territorial holdings or not—if it had effective control over these, you recognized it. And pretty much down through history until—with some exceptions, of course—but pretty much down to Wilson, we’ve practiced a de facto recognition policy. But after Wilson, what happened? We had this moral absolutist in office, and he said that the government to be recognized must what? Have the consent of the governed. And he got all hung up. What on? A moral principle. And if you study his recognition policy, particularly toward Mexico but not exclusively, you have a very interesting story in moral diplomacy.

And in the end, you know, he was sending General Pershing all over Mexico, chasing people he didn’t like that happened to be Mexicans, to enforce his—or help enforce—his policy of moral recognition, principally. Well, I don’t know whether you think that a government, to be recognized, should have the consent of the governed or not, but I’ll bet you there are many in this room who do. You want to take a poll? How many think the governments we do business with—that is, that we trade with, that we exchange ambassadors with—should be governments that represent the consent of the governed? [some remarks from the audience] Well, sure. Well, it exists. Let’s assume it exists. Let’s say, like… what do you mean, if it would work? [audience member responds] Well, let’s take Franco’s Spain. Or South Africa. Either one of those. Now a lot of people don’t think we ought to do business with South Africa, because they mistreat not the minority, but the majority! Now what kind of democracy is that? What kind of… [audience member speaks again] No. Well, right. Of course it doesn’t. Well, Mr. Wilson probably would have had a hard time. How many want to agree with Wilson on this business of having the consent of the governed, represented. I used to, would have been with you. But now, how many are Jeffersonians here? Well, you have a slight edge, you Jeffersonians. And I suspect I’m with you. It doesn’t matter where I stand; I always tell the class, you know, the one that meets formally with us twice a week, I always think I’ve leveled with them on what my opinion is when we’re discussing these big issues and we’re just sort of laying out the turkey. Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: [in background, unclear] How come they don’t want to recognize Cuba, which is next door? Why… ?

WOLFE: Well, we didn’t ask the Jeffersonians how they felt about Cuba. [laughing] But I’m glad you raised that […] How many think we should recognize Cuba tomorrow? But they don’t have the cons… Thank you. [laughter] I’ve thought so, ever since I was in the government. But it was regarded in those days as only being next to subversion to advocate that. How many think it was correct to do what the President did with respect to mainland China? [some voices begin
Well, we didn’t quite recognize China, did we? Do what we did, I said. But we did admit a diplomatic delegation. This is a new departure, by the way. If I were talking about international law, I’d want to have a good discussion with you on have we had a de facto recognition of the People’s Republic of China? I would argue that we have had, and all the rest of this clever Nixon rhetoric and maneuver, you see, to avoid facing the facts, again—you see, he just hates to face the facts. The fact of the matter is, if you had a lawyer in there as Secretary of State, then you’d have to argue legally that we’ve recognized... but that’s a cute political point. The point is, he has made a thrust in the direction, and he is opening up the doors of political dialogue and economic exchanges and cultural exchanges.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I resist the question on the grounds that I can question whether or not it’s indicative of the times or it’s indicative of the individual. I think men like John Patton Davies deserve more recognition than Richard Nixon for our dealings with China. Davies had staked his reputation and his career and lost, and I don’t really like the way the question is presented, because I think it puts too much emphasis on Richard Nixon in decision-making and less on that of general consensus of many people in the area.

WOLFE: Well, I’d like to agree with you in principle, or morally. But John Patton Davies does not bear the awful burden—awesome burdens—of office that the President of the United States, who ever he is, does. And when we deal in questions of statecraft, we don’t deal with even the foreign service, we deal only with the President and the Secretary of State. So that’s why I’m going to, in this case, insist upon being a strict constructionist. I think our seminar, by the way, is pretty loose on a lot of things, but every now and then we get strict, as we will when we write the final exam and things like that. [laughter] Those two principles of recognition are pretty much, with some minor modifications we don’t have time to go into this afternoon, are pretty much American doctrine. Stimson doctrine varied a little bit, but we won’t go into that unless you want to come to it a little later.

The final point I would just make with you is that American foreign affairs also have one final kind of pillar in their practice, and that is the constant reassertion of the principle of justice and the pursuit of justice or law. I’m not talking now just about human rights, though I would include them, but the bases on which everything from telecommunications, maritime law, to international law in the broader sense are concerned. That the principle of the search for justice and even the development of institutions around it that will help both codify it and make it available to the state itself and to, after World War II, even to people to a certain extent, to make them subject of it. I would add further, in summation here, that this has been one of the great attractive principles, moral principles, that have given to the United States until reasonably recently vast public support, not just in our own country but throughout the world,
this insistence upon justice and right, openness, fairness, recognition, even if there be
differences and disagreements. I’m talking now about recognition.

Now, there probably are many more, but those are some that I threw down and wished to
leave with you for purposes of discussion later. Now what difficulties have we found or
encountered in the employment of these principles? I think you have to turn them around a
little bit. When we talk about diplomacy, you know, it was Sir Harold Nicolson who said that the
diplomatist was sent abroad to lie for his government. But he added to that axiom, “But they
must return to try again,” and that modifies the style of your lying, is what he was implying; it
modifies the way in which you leave or do not leave some credibility behind, and it may even
kind of do what I think is the just thing to do with that statement, which is that they don’t go to
lie for their government, they really go to negotiate in the broad sense, and there are times
when you don’t quite reveal all of your hand. That, by the way, is not necessarily confined only
to the diplomatist. I’ve known students to do it with more finesse than some colleagues I’ve
met across the table in Paris. I’ve known professors to do it with equal finesse, and I’ve known
businessmen and even some taxpayers, not to mention college presidents, who have also done
it.

In any case, there is also the question of not being non-neighborly in your relationships. If we
have been neighborly, is our pursuit of isolation, our non-practice of multilateral trade, for
example, the urge to return under the Hartkey act, the Hartkey trade bill, sponsored so
vigorously by organized labor, is this going to take us into a reversion to isolation, into a non-
neighborly, unhopeful, rather selfish policy in commerce with the world? What about our
principle, by the way, I didn’t mention, but it has to do with being neighborly, of being non-
interventive in the internal affairs of other nations? We’ve turned from non-intervention, you
know, into inventiveness in our relations, but anyway. Non-non-intervention. When we have
intervened, if you will. Now, there’s a great deal of American diplomatic history that concerns
intervention. We used to think it was confined pretty much to Latin America. We learned, of
course, in Vietnam that it had reached a whole new level of activity there, but it was also
alleged to have occurred in Greece and Turkey, in Lebanon. So intervention—the opposite of
non-intervention—related to neighborliness, is something you want to think about in terms of
the American diplomatic practice.

And then you have to think about—in terms of openness and fulfilling the processes that we
have agreed to agree to follow—is war without declaration. Now, the Constitution places the
war power pretty clearly in the hands of the Congress, as you know. But more and more
recently, we have been urged to abandon that. Most recently, it was last Sunday; I don’t know
if you saw Buckley interviewing Rusk on television. Did you? He was on, on the local tube, and
in one little part of the interview, Mr. Rusk almost smirked, and he said, “Mr. Buckley, we’ll war if you want to declare it.” Nobody really does that anymore. I was surprised at Dean Rusk—for as many times as we might disagree with him, he is a lawyer—for this sort of realpolitik that so invaded his soul that he would make the kind of statement he did with the insinuation and kind of innuendo that attached to that statement. But increasingly, we are told that wars are too important to be declared. And I think, of course, the greatest exponent of the old tradition is in our own retired senator Wayne Morse, who long argued, rather futilely in the end, that the whole Vietnam War was illegal if for no other reason than it was not properly declared.

Well, then we come to recognition. And we’ve talked a little bit about the recognition by the president, or the de facto recognition if you will of China; we’ve struggled through with some of our memories in this room, I’m pretty sure, of the development of recognition of the Soviet Union after a long period of pretending it wasn’t there, and as somebody has already mentioned, we’ve pretended for quite a number of years now that Cuba has not changed hands; in fact it’s not even there at all. Which is a rather peculiar irony for the pearl of Antilles, we’ve always had hopes, you know, would fall even into our own union—some Americans have—but here we are just gradually coming to terms with the idea that Cuba should be recognized. But this non-recognition, where does it get us? What kind of an instrument of policy is it? How moral is it? How helpful is it to the advancement of the abstractions we’ve talked about, of neighborliness, of trade, and all the things that go with that? To a political future? To the admission of people to concepts of justice and other blessings that the American system, if our principles are universal, could make available, if we were more flexible in the way we used the recognition instrument?

I think that we can see these things in lots of ways, but I have chosen to look at them just briefly in terms of some national policy problems or themes that are characterized post-WWII diplomacy. I think you would call them “Atlanticism,” “wounded idealism,” and “American Gaullism”—G-a-u-l-l-i-s-m. Atlanticism, you know, is merely the force in our recent history that stresses the ties, the natural ties, the cultural ties, historic, political, and economic ties of the United States with Europe. In a very large sense, we have, since World War II, as we have emerged from the period of national statism in our diplomacy and moved haltingly toward multilateral diplomacy and the concept of a one world, we’ve tended pretty much to cast all these concepts—from the United Nations charter on—in terms of this deep commitment and faith that we have as Americans in our cultural antecedents: English, French, German, and so on. I suppose one of the chief exponents of this general theory that I’d recommend to you for further reading would be George Ball. At least I think he’s one of the most balanced of its advocates.
Just briefly on wounded idealism, or outraged moral isolationism, if you will: I think that’s best represented by George McGovern in terms of he and his followers being the direct descendents of the American mid-century populist. They are prepared, if you will, to intervene in the outside world, but overall their reactions are simple and very often simplist. Where Atlanticists would grieve over the failure of West Europe to fulfill the expectations of American foster fathers, members of the outraged group grow wrathful and think of punishment like cutting troops in Europe. They forget the assumption, or maybe they never accepted it, that a disintegrating Europe under Soviet pressure could be a disaster for the United States. So the consequences of pursuing disenchantment or wounded idealism can conceivably—if you pursue the reasoning to its end—force you into a kind of new isolationism, where you lick the wounds of your disenchantment.

Finally, we come to a kind of American Gaullism, as I mentioned, typified, I think, by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. It’s the American form of grandeur that De Gaulle talked about, with a kind of a post-anti-Communist character. Nixon, who now asks us to forget the quarter-century of anti-Communism and the high priesthood he gave it and become—and, he was also, you know, its producer, prophet, and manager of all the anti-Communism of the McCarthy period—and he’s asked us now to accept a deteriorated bipolar world that’s given way to a new world of détente, of shifting power relationships and new balances. A world to be manipulated rather than saved. A world to be thought of in terms of Bismarck and Machiavelli rather than Richard the Lionheart and Philip II.

With those themes, we might turn just briefly to the question of the war in Vietnam as a kind of major example, the Vietnam episode, of some of the operation of these themes, and particularly... well, I think the Atlanticist theme, you know, some of our leadership, I felt, when I was in the government during the Kennedy-Johnson years, was so absorbed in Europe and what it meant to the survival of our system that they couldn’t really concentrate on Asia. It was never important. And it took them a very long time to focus on it. And if that was difficult, getting them interested in Latin America—which was my area of specialty and responsibility—they haven’t come to it yet! So I don’t mean just to indict one president and his advisors, I would indict some of the people I’ve been closer to and worked for.

Anyway, was the Vietnam episode as we are thinking today moral or immoral? Did it involve a question of national interest, and if so, was this national interest a moral interest, or simply sort of a function of moralism? Arthur Schlesinger has said that national interest was not at the base of our Vietnam calculation, as Walter Lippman, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthal have all argued that it should be. Rather, we were living in the afterglow of the assumptions we made about Communist expansionism and its influence on wars of national liberation. You see, for
years we assumed that Communist expansionism was simply bent on gobbling up the Asian continent. And then we concluded that somewhere along the line that maybe this Communist expansionism was indeed not just all directed by the Soviet Union or by China or a combination of the two, but rather it might be a war of national liberation, and therefore we could deploy our power to stop a war of national liberation where we wouldn’t think of trying to stop a war of mere continental dominance by the Soviet Union over the continent of Asia. But in so doing, when we persuaded ourselves that this might be a war of national liberation, we also began to learn something of the limits of American capability in fighting guerrilla warfare.

I remember well a conference at West Point some years ago, where, again, I was so caught up in my own concerns for Latin America that I hadn’t paid much attention to the war. It was such a sanitary war, you know, you never saw many soldiers in uniform on airplanes or anything. But anyway, we were there at West Point meeting on some world problems, and there was a series of young captains that had come back on rest and recreation, and they kept saying, “We were not taught here to fight the kind of war we’ve been engaged in. And they don’t seem to know anything about it even yet in the command schools, either here at the Point or in our command centers in Virginia,” and so on. So we thought that we could employ traditional techniques, I suppose, that’s what those young officers were telling us, in wars that we had barely begun to learn to fight.

The rhetoric of Kennedy, Rusk, Johnson, and Nixon was all that directed toward meeting sometimes a Communist threat, sometimes a war of national liberation, and national interest was less an issue than misdirected moralism of an unsophisticated set of leaders. For example, President Johnson declared in 1965, “History and our own achievements have thrust upon us the principal responsibility for the protection of freedom on Earth. No other people in no other time have so great an opportunity to work and risk for the freedom of all mankind.” That’s quite a statement. And got him, as you all know, into a lot of trouble.

And yet, I kind of find the Lefebvre conclusion to this more to the point, where Lefebvre says in his little book called Ethics and World Politics, “The Vietnam War was a morality trip. The moral absolutism was the final stop.” As early as 1965, the New York Times quoted an American pilot who said, “I do not like to hit a village. You know you are hitting women and children. But you’ve got to decide that your cause is noble, and the work has to be done.” In this anointed spirit, we conceived ourselves the world’s judge, jury, and executioner, and did our work in Indochina. The moralistic cant of Presidents Johnson and Nixon helped delude a lot of pilots into supposing they were doing God’s work. This experience should suggest the perils of moral absolutism in foreign affairs; unfortunately, instead of strengthening the national interest wing of the opposition to the war, Vietnam seems to have incited an equally moralistic outburst on
the part of the war’s most clamorous critics. Too many people on both sides of the Indochina debate feel they know exactly what the Lord would do, if only he knew the facts in the case.

Well, I think Senator Hatfield had an interesting comment on this, in this same little book. And since he is an Oregonian, we hasten to add him, especially in some contrast to what you just heard. He said, “Our experience in Vietnam is one reason for us to reapply moral values to our thinking about international relations. Another is the revolutionary changes sweeping the world. The cleavage between the affluent and the impoverished is the salient division in the world today. This is not an ideological distinction between the Communist bloc and the free world, but an economic one between the rich and the poor,” and I kind of wonder here what he’s really saying. Is it time to reapply our moral values, or is it time to get down to hard economics? Maybe he is saying both.

On balance, and in conclusion, I’d like to leave you with a thought of Arthur Schlesinger’s with which I think I agree, and then we can talk a little bit broadly together in the question period about some things that I won’t take time to mention formally. He says most values do have a fundamental role in the conduct—moral values, pardon me—"...have a fundamental role in the conduct of foreign affairs. Not to provide abstract and universal principles, but to illuminate and control conceptions of national interest. The righteousness of those who apply personal moral criteria to the relativities and complexities of international politics can degenerate all too easily into absolutism and fanaticism. The assumption that other nations have traditions, interests, values, rights, and obligations of their own, is the beginning of a true morality of states. The quest for values common to all states and the embodiment of these values in international covenants and institutions is the way to establish a moral basis for international politics.”

I mentioned a while ago that I think we are moving from a preoccupation with the role of our own country as a world leader to a new preoccupation of the place of our country in a more broadly-based, more collectively organized set of operating procedures for achieving peace in the world. One of these is manifestly typified by the effort to strike a partnership with the Soviet Union, with whom, I suppose—with which, if you will—we have very few values to share. Except one, and that’s the survival of mankind on the earth; and maybe that, in the end, that concept of national interest, will become the concept of the universal interest, and will provide the [...] to a new morality in the way in which foreign affairs are conducted. Thank you.

[applause]
Well, I don’t think I’ve ever lectured my own seminar before. I didn’t mean to today, but there were some things I had on my mind I wanted to get off of it. So if you have any questions or comments we’d certainly welcome them—all of us, all 26 of us.

ANDRIES DEINUM: [off microphone and partly inaudible]: I have one. [...] I would like to suggest a more general disbelief, that we have in the academy defined these principles of neighborliness, [...] openness that draws into this country in [...] and that is that all of us, every person alive, even the [...] pretension that the brighter we are the more [...]. You brought up Arthur Schlesinger. Arthur and I were in the OSS together during the Second World War. [...] we wanted to call this conference [...] good people, [...] equally guilty. [...] I can’t find it in me to blame them, although I should, because I had trained with them and I’d done the same thing, and so did Arthur. And that was in the Second World War. I was trained as a spy, and I was a good one. Talking about that, who was I assigned to spy on? Under [...] governments [...] was London. And I did a hell of a job. I had bad ministers before [...] Now, it goes way, way back. Somehow or other, I feel it’s much more [...] you know, moralism and all that, there is something really basic in all of us that I would like to get at. I don’t know what it is. I feel as guilty as hell when I think back to what I did then.

WOLFE: I don’t know why. We all of us...

DEINUM: Well, what justified my doing it then? What justified [...] about the Bay of Pigs? [...] WOLFE: But this is what I said at the outset we are going through, Andries, as a nation. And maybe we have to do it generationally.

DEINUM: I would like for us to go through it as persons, not as a nation. It’s not [...] responsibility, it’s personal responsibility.

[tape skips ahead briefly]

WOLFE: ...can’t be relevant to you. But maybe it would be helpful if we looked at it in sort of Fuller—Fullerian—Buckminster Fullerian terms. Who might say—and I don’t want to speak for him; what little I’ve read of his and the few opportunities we’ve had to talk together—that perhaps some of these games that you have played, and Arthur Schlesinger and others have played, of writing letters in lemon juice and so on, or with big high-intensity cameras taking pictures of somebody’s papers someplace else that weren’t meant for you to read in the first place. Maybe some of that is all going to become child’s play and stupid because today our information revolution has proceeded at such a pace, and there are so few secrets than
anybody really keeps from anybody anymore, that these are immaterial to the new morality and the new processes that nations are engaging in. I tried to mention at the end, this whole détente between mortal enemies with absolutely incongruous value systems, and now there’s this third one coming in, the Chinese, but who could ever learn to read their language in the first place? So... breaking their codes is a similar problem. But the point is that new sets of objectives may be prompting us to abandon old habits of tactics.

DEINUM: Do you have any inside information that we don’t have on [...]?

WOLFE: [laughing] I’ve been in Oregon too long for that.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: We talk about this in diplomatic terms, but [...] has a wider applicability in bureaucracy. Whether it’s the government, or the university, or oil companies. Where our livelihoods and our professional careers are so vitally involved. There are all kinds of pressures that leaders who make decisions and mistakes [...] It’s almost impossible, I think, for people in these positions to think of where is the good and what’s [...] to further the interests of the institutions that we’ve identified ourselves with.

WOLFE: Right, but you only do that some of the time, don’t you?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: Yes, [...] at the university where there is academic freedom and our careers aren’t endangered by criticizing our institution, but even so, when we feel critical we often talk to each other and perhaps to ourselves rather than to the public, and [...] but in other kinds of organization a person can jeopardize his career [...] There are all kinds of ways you can rationalize [...] making decisions and following [...] rather than in the interest of... the immediate interest of the United States, for example. Loyal to the U.S., but we’ve seen them on TV, these [...] traitors, and while I’m not sympathetic to them, I understand.

WOLFE: Don’t you think though...

AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: [...] 

WOLFE: Oh, I do, too. We only focused on this one because it’s our bag.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: Can you restate the problem? We can’t hear him, what he was saying.

WOLFE: Well... Do you want to say so yourself? Well, he was really suggesting that the problems we were addressing here in a foreign policy context extend far beyond foreign policy,
to conduct of business, to the conduct of our domestic or civic affairs. Wasn’t that essentially what you were getting at?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: I characterized it as bureaucratic and the pressure that leads you to make decisions and to say things that will advance the organization that you are identified with, whether it’s a business or a university or a professional organization. The AMA has a party line on national policy, and I think a lot of people within the AMA govern their positions in their public statements at least by the pressures with their fellow doctors and by the interests of the AMA as they understand it. I’m just saying... I’m talking about a universal thing.

DEINUM: Am I right, you are saying that organizations cannot be moral, but only people can?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: No, I didn’t say that. Perhaps you’d generalize it that way, I’m not sure. I guess I would.

WOLFE: Well, I suspect that’s right. An institution will only reflect the level of morality of the people who are operating it. And of course... Pardon?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: [...]

WOLFE: Well, the people have to work to make an institution work. And if they don’t work, of course, the people aren’t working. Now, some people are working in institutions to devious ends, of course. That’s always... but I suspect you see that values change; I think our values are changing now. I’ve tried to suggest that this afternoon. I think this is true in medicine, and in the bureaucracy of life, generally in society. I think we need some articulators that know how to make that balance I alluded to earlier, whether it’s again in the academic bureaucracy, which is just as brutal as any bureaucracy I’ve ever worked for, even though you may be able to say what you think, there is some other brutalities that you don’t talk about. But nevertheless, the institution functions and lives a kind of a moral life to the extent that its leadership can somehow apply a standard of values that will command adherence and general practice. And you can’t do any more than that. That goes back to, you know, how far ahead of the voter does the leader walk before he gets shot by a short-range or a long-range gun? And in systems of public accountability, that’s the most you can hope for. To keep your range reduced enough to make the firing difficult. Of the gun, that is. So... But that’s the price, as I see it, of leadership. Then, of course, the other thing we talked a little bit about is how you generate through education within institutions, within the diplomatic service, within the educational enterprise, within the medical system, the pursuit of the big questions. I have a hunch that we’ve been getting at this, but there’s so much specialization in all our worlds today. In the engineering
world, in the medical world, in the diplomatic world. That one of our problems is to build in, as Dr. Saslow talked about needing to build in mechanisms of criticism, we also need to build in systems for broadening the base of our experience and our skill. In education alone, I’m very troubled by the fact that we’ve so specialized and compartmentalized our departments that you have to almost re-invent the liberal arts college and rediscover the educated woman and man in our world.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: Something struck me; I was watching the one man in China program last night, and in reference to your question, it dealt with the athletic program of China. At the end of the program, the orator expressed the opinion that the Chinese government emphasized friendship first and competition second. And I thought about it, and I think that in our society, we think in terms of competition first and friendship second. We always have to be number one; we always have to be the best at whatever it is that we’re doing. No matter what method we use, we have to be the best. We set a goal that we want to obtain and we usually have the methods that are available to us to get there.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: I’ve been thinking about this since you first brought up this discussion [...] I think that’s entirely correct, I think that’s been the biggest problem... like you said, the majority of the people have enough... I don’t know what you call it, moral ethics, I don’t know, but there are so many people that—especially in big business and other places in government—they put more emphasis on being number one in competition [...] the ends outweigh the means. [...] while they accomplish what they want, they really aren’t... [...] what happens in the interim, and I think that’s one of the biggest problems with the government, and [...] the oil companies, and a lot of big business today. And unions, there’s... you can make... it’s almost endless, but I think that’s the problem. There’s too much emphasis placed on competition and being number one, and I can speak as an example of this is just that I’m somewhat familiar with my father’s business, and I know that he is very successful, but I know the reason that he’s been successful is that he is a highly competitive person. And there’s a lot of people that probably suffered because of him. I think that [...] in trying to be successful, you have to be better than people, and [...] people that are going to suffer the consequences [...] I think that’s part of the problem...

WOLFE: I think you had a comment over here?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: There was something that was bothering me about that I guess... it occurs to me that... like the Watergate problem, we’re not so much competition as friendship of [...]... I mean, if you can equate the two, I mean you can’t do that. But maybe the competition
was something larger, but I would think a lot of the pressure that kept a lot of these men doing the things they did was friendship.

WOLFE: Well, let me help you as an old economist, here, a little bit. Maybe the fruits of competition bred the concept of monopoly, and maybe was in the exercise of the desire to continue the monopoly that all of this friendship developed around the perpetuation of it. You don’t have to accept that… that’s a step you left out.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 6: Along with group loyalty goes the idea of being the best men that he could have had for a… shall we say, his employees’ relationship. There is some competition involved in it.

WOLFE: Well, you know, you all left out—and I’m surprised you didn’t call me on it before now, and I’m glad you reminded me though—nationalism. You’re talking in a sense in the international context; it’s not just da-da… da-daism, as you were discussing. But nationalism and a corporate national sense. But the pursuit of nationalism, especially amongst the acquisitive, tends to prompt competition, and where do you cease in your quest for dominance? Again, I think the American experience, if we look to that a moment, has varied with leadership again, and the articulation of manifest destiny, of TR’s global concept of sending the Navy around the world and all of that, didn’t it? Is this a fair extension of your point? But it never has quite… this conflict between competition and—what did we call it? Amiability or cooperation, or both—has never quite pushed us over the brink as, say, Nazi Germany did, or Fascist Italy, for example. Why? Was it the operation of national interest, or the moral principles, do you think?

[someone replies in background; unintelligible]

AUDIENCE MEMBER 6: History also proves that it was only a good neighbor as long as there’s no endangerment to our security […]

[several people speaking at once]

AUDIENCE MEMBER 7: Survival seems to be the whole basis of what we are talking about here. We’re talking about friendly competition during world war—there ain’t no such animal—and it’s just not going to exist. When you’re about to be eaten by an alligator you don’t have much time to think about […] the alligators. […] I think you also have to look at the fact that the competition we are a product of is competition based solely for the realization of our own boundaries and our own existence, and a survival ethic is a very difficult thing to break away
from. I think we’re seeing now a change in national survival, corporate survival, into one of race survival, whether or not as a species *Homo sapiens* shall survive. This may be the ultimate fad; it may not; it may provide us with direction to reduce our desire for competitiveness for the sake of competing and put in terms of competitiveness with the desire to find the most efficient and effective methods to ensure our survival. I think it’s entirely self-destructive to view [...] with too much hindsight sometimes. It’s awful difficult to be friendly if your competition is bent on your destruction and total demise. In a corporation, this ethic was part of the product of the steel... the iron revolution of the 1800s, the necessity to produce and being number one; if you didn’t produce as much as you could, you didn’t survive. I think in an organization and an organism the primary motivation is survival, and I think we’re now at the point where we can discuss some modification of survival in terms of, are we going to survive and what quality are we going to survive?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: Yeah. I was thinking that maybe the next question is [...] type of morality. And I was wondering here whether anybody here had a copy of that of [...] book on critical theory. Because there’s a fragment in there by Thomas Aquinas discussing the role of the bureaucracy, the head of state, whatever you care to call it, where he may use tactics in promoting his country’s policies that may not be strictly moral from a personal viewpoint. The point is that he is responsible for the people of the country; he presides over it and his responsibility is to them first. [...] to defense of war, but the point remains the same that the man does have this responsibility and he can’t overlook it even if morally the tactics or the objectives used don’t jibe with his own personally.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: I was thinking about Mr. Deinum’s question and I keep thinking that the individual would never be caught in such a moral dilemma if somehow we could transcend our national interests. It just seems like that’s where we’re hung up, and [...] moral positions being made [...] on a sub-national [...] such as General Motors [...] and then of course the super-national, right, or international? But the individual would never be caught in that bind, because it depends on the national interest.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 9: That brings up a question that I raised the other day about what place does moralism have in international affairs? [...] saying that it doesn’t have any place at all, and we require a [...] to fight the people in South Vietnam. It was our moral absolutism that stopped us from recognizing [...] in North Korea and Cuba [...]. It’s forcing our morals on other people that got us into those problems. What place does it have? [...]
WOLFE: I think it’s one of the instruments, but you can’t rely entirely on a single quality, whether it’s the use of power or the use of principle, as a statement of principle. You have to find this combination and its appropriate application.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 9: To justify your actions?

WOLFE: No, to take effective action, not to justify it. Of course, you know what you justify in one time may not be justifiable later. I’m thinking for example of our support for the establishment of the state of Israel. Thoroughly defensible at one time, perhaps, is now more difficult to justify in terms of the precipitation of a new Middle East crisis. [audience member responds] Well, whatever they may have; they both have oil there. But it may play a different role. My point is that we have to be very flexible in the way we assess the use of our power and the application of that power to given situations.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 9: Are you saying… […] in turns to our national interest we should be changing our views? It was easy to accept Israel and defend it and everything, but now the Arabs have all the oil it is in our national interest to […]

WOLFE: I’m only saying that again, you have to remember all that went before here. What I have asserted about the operation of our government in terms of the popular support that we must have as a government to continue in existence as a nation, or a community if you will, today when the people’s gas tanks, for example, and their ability to fill them is in question, it’s posing for the first time in recent memory the question of our policy toward Israel, and what the price of the continuation of that policy may be. It has prompted within our country some of the first anti-Semitism outbursts—that are visible—in many years. It has always been invisible. But it hasn’t reached Oregon in any degree that I’m aware of, but I read about it in the New York Times and I’m told you can see it on the streets of New York and Washington D.C. and elsewhere. So these are foreign policy problems brought home, and I’m only saying again I think it’s a question of how you balance these things, and how you… in this case, I think that some leadership is going to have to come out and state some hard principles, the moral principle of the American people, pretty soon, domestically. About the extent to which we can allow our own national greed to exceed our sense of national pride.

Now, in that context, if I may, I’ve pointed out this afternoon—we won’t keep you here, I don’t know what you want to do—the point may be pertinent here to me at this moment. I tried to pose the question of the new dimensions, if you will, of our concern for the world as taking us from purely nationalist definitions and practices to maybe internationalist ones. At the same time, I think, we are going to have to grapple with that part of the dilemma of our foreign policy
construct. What we are doing internally to create a situation first of all that builds confidence and trust within our people for whatever we are doing with the world or trying to do through our government in the world, and which builds confidence in the world that we are indeed a viable and trustworthy ally, or partner, or adversary even, internationally. And I think that, again, George Kennan spoke to this point very, very eloquently in a speech he gave at Williamsburg way back in 1968, and talking about Vietnam and what it did to our country. But he said—and this speaks a little bit to Andries’ point—“Whoever has looked closely at international affairs knows that the way in which nations really commend themselves to the respect and confidence of others is not primarily through their words, or even primarily through their external actions, but rather through the tone and quality of their domestic life. It is not only between individuals that the power of example is greater than the power of precept. This is also true among nations, and until we in this country have restored the quality of our domestic life to a state where we can exhibit it to the rest of the world without shame or apology, we will not get very far in advancing our prestige either by talking at people in other countries, or by dispensing aid and technical advice to them, or by force of arms.” I think that speaks in part to your…

DEINUM: I think to sum it up in my way the question would be, how do you get more [...] involved in government, and fewer [...]? Right? Is that fair?

WOLFE: Well, you’re desperate to take any warm body! [laughing]

DEINUM: All I’m saying is that you know, [...] the point is to get as many people who are aware of the moral dimensions in government as we can. Now, it seems to me that we all know that there are two jobs in the world that no one needs any qualifications for. [...] and that is to be a parent and to be a politician. Anybody can play that game, and they do, unfortunately, [...], but OK. It seems to me this has a lot to do with education, and [...] that is that there is a hope, then, towards, you know, specialty education, craft education, and away from liberal arts and humanities education. And it seems to me that [...] I would like to check the backgrounds of a lot of these people who we complain about, and my hunch is they are deficient in humanities education. It’s indicated to me that for example many law schools are beginning to add courses in ethics in law they never thought of before. Medical schools are. Of course the lawyers [...] qualification, as you all know. Now, that has to do with what we are doing here.

AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: [...]
AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: [...] 

[conversation ensues between audience members; unintelligible] 

DEINUM: [...] OK, no, I’m glad you said that. I hate to say, even me, but so help me, even me. [...] 

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But you are concerned about it, which is more than most of the men involved in Watergate did not... [...] 

[more discussion between DEINUM and members of the audience] 

AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: I think it’s... in your own case, that I think you’re more a victim of this number one or anything; nothing less than being number one... you have a lot in common with many men in government, even the president, [...] that we will remain number one. 

DEINUM: I thank you for saying that, but I don’t want to get off the hook that easily... 

AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: You’re not off the hook, but the thing is that we have to have a change in the ideology, because the people in this country and people all over the world feel that because we have [...] that tomorrow, the day after, and forever we will be on top of the world, but if we think of the world in terms of what Senator Fulbright said, if we think of them as “we,” when we dropped the bomb on Hiroshima, if we thought of those people as being “we,” they would have had to think twice about dropping the bomb on Hiroshima. And if we think in terms of “we” when we intervene in some other country’s problem or whatever we do, it would be more difficult for us to engage in the practices that we have engaged in. [...] as long as nationalism prevails over a universalism, there will be this “we” and “they” and [...] we have it now in this country. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER: [...] the point you’ve gone to with Hiroshima a little more carefully, though. It was, first, something we did after four years of war, and I think we were a little bit numb to what we were doing. And also at that point we were starting to play a numbers game. We figured that the 70,000 that bomb would kill was not as high as the 200,000 Americans who would die in a Japanese invasion, or the 2,000,000 Japanese [...]. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: Is that just based [...]
AUDIENCE MEMBER 7: Unfortunately, that’s the number one-ism in World War II, as ugly as it may be, Nazi alligators are alligators nonetheless, and when you have the choice of either the United States in combination with Britain and Canada, the three nations that have both productivity and raw mineral resources to fight the Axis powers, and it makes intellectualizing the hows and the whys pretty damn hard. Particularly when it’s yours.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think what you have to look at is... 70,000 people dead, or 200,000 dead? And then you consider the fact that there is a war on, that it wasn’t about plan, that the Japanese were all set to play the [...] game.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, we were saying earlier, the fact that when you have a war, can you be moral about it? Can you decide that you’re going to be number two or can you decide to transcend this competition... if you go to war, you go to war, [...] who have tried to moralize on the battlefield and it just doesn’t get it. If you’re going to fight, fight. If you’re not going to fight, don’t commit the army, don’t commit the military to war in [...] Vietnam. You put us in the Reichstag, you left us in the Reichstag, and then you [...]?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: The thing is that even in this country during the Civil War they had to [...] and they developed this ideology and reasoning for destroying people of our own country, no matter what the cost or what [...] [they destroyed [...] because of the “we” and the “they.” And as long as we do have that, my children, your children, and your grandchildren’s children will never be able to live in a friendly world.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I don’t know if this is a cheap shot or not, but what was the ostensible public reason for entering the Civil War?

WOLFE: What?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Entering the Civil War.

[several voices respond at once]

WOLFE: The first reason was secession of one set of states from a full set.

[...]

WOLFE: They had a hell of a time revving up the army, and it almost failed, you will recall.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You’ll recall it was directly related to the industrialization of the nation, and the inherent conflicts between the agrarian economy and the industrialized economy.

WOLFE: We had one of the age-old problems, too, in those days, of having generals who thought they knew so much that the President, a stupid civilian leader, didn’t know what he was talking about when he questioned their loyalty to the principle of civilian supremacy and to certain ways that things had to be done whether the generals liked it or not. This was recently dramatically illustrated on your TV tube, a fairly accurate history of that period, you may recall. So again, I think it’s very interesting principles here that have to do with the American value system, if we can link back to that just a bit.

[response from DEINUM; mostly unintelligible; some audience members laughing]

WOLFE: But isn’t it interesting now that we’re going to have a new problem, borne of whipping up people to fight something they found they didn’t like to fight about?

DEINUM: You mentioned American values. These films were made to subvert American values by the American government. And they did not [...] [continues for a few minutes; one audience member responds; echo on the recording makes their remarks mostly unintelligible]

WOLFE: And how do you get new models? When the old model no longer serves?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: First of all to get a new model the assumptions have to change. The assumptions that we have had for our world view, of the world as it is today, have to change before we can get a new model. We...

AUDIENCE MEMBER: ...ourselves, the individuals. We have to stop and take a look at ourselves, like the [...] had a very good point that especially in diplomacy and foreign affairs, the morality of the individual and the morality of the institution, your morality and how you feel towards yourself and how you would treat others on an individual basis, and how you feel towards a different viewpoint in foreign affairs, and I think that this is the kind of thing that can’t happen, you have to have [...] more latitude towards yourself as you do other countries, as you do everything. You can’t make exceptions. I think that’s part of the problem. I think that’s part of the problem of why we got involved in Vietnam, because we made too many exceptions to personal morality and our feelings about... if everybody would have sat down and looked at the situation and said, now, do we really want to do this? We would have never intervened. But it was due to a lack of [...]
AUDIENCE MEMBER 7: It’s curious to me, too, particularly for this nation, particularly in the craft of [...] [also mostly indiscernible due to echo and background noise] I don’t know if at any time in the White House or in the State Department or in the other institutions involved [...] whether they actually sat down and said well, is it really our business to determine the outcome, number one, and how effective can we be in determining the outcome? [...] It is actually incredible that this nation was so vehemently attacked... England and France, in their operations during our own Civil War, could have the audacity to do the same for other nations?

AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: I think that’s where we stepped over [...] WOLFE: Well, I’m glad you caught that out.

[more discussion off-microphone]

WOLFE: Well, I think we switched signals on ourselves, myself, in that. The chief architect, as I call him, the manager and producer of that whole idea that the Communists were sleeping over was also one of the accessories to the development of the guerilla war concept which...

AUDIENCE MEMBER 7: I think we also have to look at the end of World War II, we had a great desire to kind of patch over our relationship with France, and despite the ugly facts of history, America still wanted to view the French in a more sympathetic light. I don’t like that word—I don’t know why the words that haven’t expressed the sentiment—I don’t want to [...] The United States was trying to give the French [...] something to kind of soothe their own anguish. But the [...] acted during World War II to collaborate with the Nazis, and it’s a very very touchy area. An area that deserves much more attention by the French than it’s been given, and much more attention by the rest of the Western world. And in the [...] of healing this great wound to the French people, the United States felt it was a realistic cause to give the French back colonial territories in Indochina when we had had direct contact with leaders of military governments in that area, i.e. Ho Chi Minh. Which seemed to indicate a very strong [...] to ask the United States to remain neutral. But the United States chose in the name of amity with the French, I guess, a desire to help soothe over World War II’s wounds, to let the French return to colonial control in Southeast Asia. And [...] the same as the British in Burma.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think it goes much further than that; I think that might have been part of the reason, but I think it goes far, far beyond that, and I think the main reason for that was that American... although Ho Chi Minh had successfully fought, fighting off the Japanese through World War II and had fairly successfully nationalized Vietnam with French intervention in 1946, we as a people in the United States never really accepted the fact that Ho Chi Minh was only
trying to do what we were trying to do maybe 200 years ago. Dean Acheson put it very succinctly when he said that Ho Chi Minh was nothing but another dirty Commie. Well, no one ever accepted what he was; they never really questioned their moral values. It was just kind of “we” versus “they,” and he was just another Commie, and we don’t feel sorry for him at all in fighting the French. The point is there was advocacy for Ho Chi Minh and that was crushed. There was evidence of [...] American military establishment; we worked directly with Ho Chi Minh [...]. [...]

[reply from DEINUM in background; mostly unintelligible, with some input from other members]

WOLFE: Oh, I would argue with that, Andries. Substantially. If there were time. Political Science 407’s been sitting here since before most of you came. We met at 1:30. I want to thank my own class, not to mention the audience, for being so coherent and helping us discuss our problem. So why don’t we dismiss now. Thank you very much.

[about two minutes of silence at end of tape; program ends]