"China in Crisis: the Chinese People and the Communist Political System"

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CHAIRMAN: On Friday we will have a debate between a Maoist, which will be between Ray Klonsky and Mark Traeger who will be in attack from the left, a former Maoist now Trotskyite. Our speaker today is the former Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, he is the editor of Asian Survey, and he has worked with the Ford Foundation-supported Asian Studies Center at the University of California: Dr. Robert Scalapino.

ROBERT SCALAPINO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me in the back?

[applause]

Can you hear me in the back? Fine. Well, let me say firstly that I’m very glad to be here, after circling Portland for about thirty-five minutes and being told at one point that we were going to go on to Seattle. So I have... I think I’ve caught my breath at this point at least.

I’m going to speak on what has been labeled a liberal criticism of the Chinese People’s Republic. I’m not certain what these terms means anymore; there are some people I know who think I’m very illiberal, others who think that I’m too liberal. So what I’m really going to do is to try to present what I regard as a scholar’s attempt at objectivity concerning a very complicated subject. Let me begin by saying that there are certain accomplishments which I think the Chinese People’s Republic has to its credit, and I want to present these at the outset before I
present my bill of particulars which I regard to its discredit. In one sense, one of the most remarkable accomplishments of this regime is law and order, albeit Communist style.

To bring a people of somewhere between 750-800 million—I think we do not know the precise population—to bring such a people under the control of a central government, albeit one that is experimenting and has experimented for a number of years with varying degrees of decentralized administration, to bring those people under such a government after decades of civil and international war in which millions of people lost their lives is no mean accomplishment. That it was done under a certain type of dictatorship, I will try to point out a little later on. I think it’s clear that the PLA or the People’s Liberation Army, does run China today. Now who runs the PLA is a very intriguing question at the moment and I will come back to this.

But almost everyone with whom I have talked, and I think most of the written evidence, suggests that particularly with the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution the Red Army was assigned major tasks in the administrative and political arenas. I’m not saying here that the army men are precisely like army men in other societies; they are deeply politicized, they are also party men. This may not be called a military junta, therefore, but one of the things that we’re going to have to study in the years that lie ahead is what are the distinctions within the People’s Liberation Army, within the Red Army forces, between the highly politicized types, those that have served at top echelons within the party for many years, and the more purely professional military types. A few months ago, I think all of us would have said that Lin Biao represented the former: the highly politicized military man who’s been on the Politburo of the party for a number of years, and that a man like Huang Yongsheng, the present—at least we think he’s still the present commander-in-chief of the Red Army—represented the more professional military man without a limited entrée to top party circles until the Cultural Revolution. What type of man succeeds in the top echelons of army and party is going to be very fateful for the future of this regime.

But I repeat my first point: up until the present, notwithstanding the Cultural Revolution, China has probably had more law and order in the last twenty years since 1949 than she had for many decades previously. Thousands, hundreds of thousands of people have been killed to make that possible; many of them falling into the so-called hostile categories of landlord, et cetera. But this has provided a degree of stability, out of which some considerable economic growth has taken place, and that’s the second point I want to make. If you equate the primary goals of emerging societies as those of nation-building on the one hand and economic development on the other, the Communists should be given a certain score on the plus side for both. A certain element of nationalism, I think, has come to the fore quite clearly; as a matter of fact I’m going
to suggest a little later on that what concerns me most about the People’s Republic is a kind of militant nationalism coupled with an older xenophobia, even more than the socialist elements in the society.

But what I want to say about economic growth is this. China remains a desperately poor country, as its own leaders admit, and so far as I can determine, the process of bringing China into modernity, of significantly raising the standards of living, will be a process taking many decades. China, like some other massive societies, has the distinct disadvantage of being so huge that incremental changes in economic development don’t mean a great deal when they’re filtered down into the lowest levels. Nor am I convinced as yet that there is a true equity of poverty. I think, for example, that some groups in some areas have done considerably better than others. But I think the Chinese Communists can claim that they have prevented massive starvation of the sort that occurred on occasion in the pre-communist period, partly because of their improvements in transportation, partly because particularly in the last ten years they have made agriculture the foundation, and taking advantage of certain international capacities, the Green Revolution, more scientific seeding, but above all improvements in irrigation. They have had a series of better crops, raising productivity. Now, some outside observers that I think are reasonably neutral feel that the crop yields in the last ten years since the very bad days of 1960-61—when the Communists, due to mistakes, did skirt famine—since those days, the crop yields have gone up through incremental processes and that 1970, perhaps, represented the best year, when total grain production may have been in the neighborhood of 210 to possibly 220 million metric tons. Compared with 185 million metric tons, as the bumper harvest of 1957, presumably the best year at an earlier point.

Now, how good that is depends a little bit of course upon what happened to population. And if we can assume that population increases dropped to somewhere around 2.0% or slightly less under the impact of the regime’s birth control delayed marriage program, then this represents a modest but comfortable margin, and it suggests that while the tasks of modernity will be very severe for the Chinese, and as I said earlier, stretch over many decades, that this massive population can be kept from starvation and that agriculture can service industrial development which is, of course, the ultimate goal. Now these are points that I make in what I would regard as a scholar’s attempt to set forward some of the more positive sides of the coin. Let me now turn to those elements of the regime that I would criticize, setting forth, of course, my own cultural and political biases as we go along.

In the first place, I cannot avoid feeling that political instability may be a recurrent feature in China, partly because of the nature of the party itself. Now, I have just said that one of the pluses is law and order, but at this very moment some kind of political crisis is going on in
China, connected broadly I would assume with the succession crisis. China, as you know, is governed by the oldest political elite of almost any country in the world. Mao Zedong himself is 77. Clearly the most vigorous day-to-day leader of today, Zhou Enlai, is 73. Most of the members of the Politburo are in their late 60’s or early 70’s with a couple of exceptions. And what is I think terribly difficult in a Communist regime is to move from the kind of cult of Mao, which has been spread over this society with a pervasiveness scarcely equaled in modern politics. Mao is the omniscient, the omnipotent, the omnipresent. To move from that cult of personality to a post-Maoist period, is, I would suggest, an extremely difficult task, and I think it has already preoccupied some elements of the political elite. Since the masses cannot really penetrate this process, since there is a very sharp dichotomy between how top power is chosen and kept in office, perpetuated, as it were, and the role of the commoner, there is no one in Peking or Canton today at the level of the streets or in the colleges that really has anything to say about this political process, in my opinion, or probably has even the remotest idea of what is going on.

We know that Lin Biao has disappeared from the scene, at least publicly; there are a number of ominous reports in the press suggesting that another purge is underway. I brought a couple of quotations to show you the kind of data that we have to use in trying to assess what may be going on at the very top of Chinese politics. This, for example, is a report that was carried from Harbin, a report of a party committee meeting, but it was carried over national radio so it presumably has some significance far beyond Harbin. It says, “Another committee member said, ‘I thought that through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, with which Liu Shaoqi and other political swindlers like him...’” incidentally, the term “political swindlers” is now a key to broadcasts, to reports in Renmin Ribao, the Peking organ of the central party; that term is attached to somebody or some group, we do not yet know whom. But in so many authoritarian regimes, you pick a slogan, like “political swindlers,” and then you’ve got to find out who is that being directed toward. Only gradually will it come out. China’s Khrushchev, of course, we found out rather quickly it was China’s Liu Shaoqi, but long before Liu was mentioned, the term “China’s Khrushchev” was being used and even before that, certain terms like “pseudo-Marxist.” Well, now the term is “political swindlers.” Now, to go on, “...Liu Shaoqi and other political swindlers like him have been ferreted out. I thought that there was no longer any question of importance. If there were still a few small ones, they were not strong enough to cause the ship to capsize. But I was wrong, I did not understand the protracted and complicated nature of the class struggle and the struggle between the two lines.” But what this says to us is that signals are going out to the local and provincial party levels that some very big fish have got to be purged. We don’t know yet who they are, but the evidence says very strongly that they lie within the military, or at least partially so. The evidence is also strong that for one
reason or another, Lin Biao is out. Is it because he is ill or dead? Is it because Mao, who still seems to have supreme control in the final analysis, has decided that Lin must go?

Any regime that is dependent upon the whims and the will of a single man is precarious, and while no single man can ever dominate the totality of politics, in China or anywhere else, this cultivation of the cult of Mao has made for the most extraordinary relationships at the very top levels of this regime. Men who served the party loyally for thirty years, for forty years, were suddenly denounced, thrown out, and to a fate we simply do not know; they have simply disappeared. Now the evidence suggests that most of them have not been liquidated in the Stalinist sense; rather, we presume that they’re under house arrest or that they’ve been relegated to the provinces, or that something of this sort has happened. But isn’t it rather ominous that a party eats up its own senior people and that no one near the top has any kind of security, whatever service they’ve given to the movement and the regime? And doesn’t this also signal—at least it does to me—that we cannot be at all certain about the political stability of the future?

Everything that we know about the recent past suggests that China is going to be dominated by army people, and therefore that the unity of the army is absolutely critical to the future stability of this country. And yet in recent weeks and months, almost all of the top army people have disappeared from the public scene. The men who are at the very top of the military apparatus are no longer being seen publicly. Is this because they are sorting out relations? Have they been sent to certain strategic areas in command of troops? We don’t know the answers to these things, but nothing that’s going on within the topmost echelons suggests that this is a regime that can easily accommodate difference or power rivalry, and that a succession crisis is one kind of symbol of the precarious nature of an authoritarian regime that places all of its credence in a single man and in his omniscience. And I think that anyone who is acquainted with the more open systems realizes that however inefficient they may be, and often however much they may be mistaken, they don’t hinge in this fashion on a single person, nor are all of the people close to the top of power always in the most frenetic search for some kind of security.

Let me just end on this point by saying that if we look at the echelon of people that are showing up when Emperor Haile Selassie appeared, more recently at the anniversary of the Albanian party in early November, it would appear that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai have formed a close alliance for the purposes of the present. The people that are showing up are, generally speaking, people that have been in their group, but we simply don’t know yet what the army’s lineup is and what kinds of factions within the army have chosen what kinds of roles.
Let me move on then, to the question of—that I regard as very important—namely the question of the intellectual and the regime. Now, first of all, I suppose one would say one has to define “intellectual.” As far as I’m concerned, an intellectual is a person with higher education who plays some kind of role, either in writing, or in teaching, or in science and technology, or in art and literature, that is essentially brain work. I define intellectuals by occupation; therefore, not all intellectuals are intelligent, and not all intelligent people are intellectuals. But, I am concerned about that area within any society, and I’m sure you are, as college students, from whence comes creativity. From whence comes the capacity to think, write, act, freely. And I suppose I would be inclined to argue that of all of the classes, the intellectual class as I have defined it has suffered the most in terms of the inhibitions that have been placed upon it. In fact, I would say that in fields like my own, that is to say the social sciences, and in fields that are irrelevant to me, such as the arts and literature, China has fallen back into that stale, I would say conservative mold that marked early Stalinism, where all must be socialist realism, where there is no real room for exciting creativity, and where the thoughts of Mao Zedong pass for depth in philosophy and in social science ventures.

So many of the older intellectuals, of course, particularly those that were Western-trained, have been pushed aside. During the Cultural Revolution, colleges and universities, as you know, were for a long period of time closed. They have gradually reopened in a most curious fashion. They are run supposedly by a triumvirate of soldiers, workers and peasants, students, administrative help, and teachers. Many of the so-called instructors are now peasants and workers who give their life experiences as a part of the educational process. Now there is some rationale behind this, and I think it behooves us in all of these matters to try to probe for the truth and not to be polemic. I think that the Communists discovered in the late ‘50s and the early ‘60s that their rate of development was not sufficiently fast nor in the particular directions to accommodate the younger, educated groups that were coming out of universities and colleges. What they were faced with was a growing problem of underemployment and unemployment in the urban centers, and we have ample evidence of this from interview schedules and other matters. What they therefore needed to do was to make higher education much more elitist, and to gear it towards certain kinds of objectives. Meanwhile, to turn out huge numbers of low-trained quasi-technicians, et cetera, and see to it that most of them got to the countryside.

This ran counter, incidentally, to the desires and wishes of many of the young people, and the types that are swimming down the Pearl River and trying to get out of China today are, in many cases, young people; one, who don’t want to be sent to the hinterland; two, who don’t want to end up on a commune and be peasants or low-level technicians all of their lives. They want to stay in the urban centers; they want to have some kind of opportunity for higher education. But
the whole thrust against Beida and the other universities of China is in an effort to turn out large numbers of this kind of person, and the bringing in of the peasant and worker to be instructor is to humble the traditional intellectual who undoubtedly did disdain hand labor, but it is also to reduce intellectualism down to a norm which is little more than a kind of life experience at certain levels.

Now, I think that those of us who believe that it is important to keep creativity alive at the highest levels, who believe that the right of dissent extends further than merely the right to criticize method of a program, those of us who have lived on behalf of the right of the social scientist and the artist to express himself, find this enormously troubling, and a sacrifice that can scarcely be measured in terms of its future. Let me say in passing that there is one arena which seems to have been preserved from this process, and that’s the arena of science and higher technology. Here, the institutes of China continue to work, because here you can gear the intellectual to certain specific tasks of state. And Chen Yi said, “We will have the bomb even if we don’t wear pants.” He was very serious, and of course China has done rather remarkably well, as did the Soviet Union before it, in getting the bomb, in conducting the nuclear tests, in moving forward in military technology, because here you have had the capacity to draw upon a cadre of individuals—some of them Western-trained, the top Chinese scientists in a number of cases were Western-trained. Here you have had the opportunity also to pool resources and in general to protect the environs against the onslaughts of politics. Here you have had the capacity, in some, to do precisely what the Russians did again in the Stalinist period, and commit certain kind of intellectuals to certain purposes, and the scientist is one of the privileged classes today in China. China is not a classless society, there are privileged classes, and the scientist, the military man, the party man, these are all parts of the privileged strata of Chinese society.

But what I am saying is that I regard this as a very serious problem, not just to Chinese living today but Chinese yet unborn, for I think we have seen in the Soviet Union the enormous difficulty of moving out of a Stalinist-type era toward the kind of free intellectual creativity that we associate ultimately with freedom and progress and democracy. All of the terms, incidentally, which the Communists use. You see, I wouldn’t cite these terms against them if they didn’t insist that they wanted to use those terms: freedom, democracy, total opportunities for the individual. And we have not yet seen this emerge in any real sense in the Soviet Union, after somewhat similar kinds of operations against the intellectuals.

Let me turn then, in the final moments, to two other problems that I think are very acute. I said earlier that one of the things that worries me about this regime is about any authoritarian regime, and particularly one engaged in nation-building rapidly, is the militant nationalism that
characterizes its approach to indoctrination and training. There are very few pictures coming out of China today that are broadly gauged, that do not show masses of youngsters marching. Sometimes they are only kindergarteners marching with wooden guns. The hate-love theme is pressed home again and again in schools, in institutions, in Young Communist League organizations, and so forth. Hate the enemy, love the people. Now that’s fine, depending on how you define “people” and define “enemy,” but what this reminds me of is, of course, the kind of marching that we saw in the ’20s and the ’30s in Europe. The kind of marching that we saw in the late ’30s and ’40s in Japan. Always the causes were good, you know; no regime ever admits that it’s doing anything except to support moral causes, to fight defensive wars, and to suggest that it stands on the side of righteousness. The Chinese Communists have no monopoly on insisting that this is their role in history, but when you inculcate in the children, in all of the echelons of the society, a deep and bitter hatred toward most of the governments of the world, not just the United States but the Soviet Union, Japan, India; all of these governments are under enormous attack, whereas the love is expressed for the peoples of these regimes. But the possibility that the people support some of these regimes is never admitted. It is always people versus government; we must overthrow or we must attack the governments while we support the people. There is built up here, I think, a very unreal concept of the world, and a very dangerous one potentially. The kind of concept of the world that Hitlerian youth had, that the youth in the era before Tojo had in Japan: an extreme militant nationalism coupled with a sense that we are going to become a great power, coupled with the doctrine “We will have the bomb even if we don’t wear pants.”

All of this, incidentally, would have been very strange to Marx. Marx would have found what is going on in China today, for the most part, incomprehensible. He was an internationalist, he saw the abuses, as it were, of 19th-century capitalism in its early stages. He thought of communism as the culmination of the industrial process, as the final step toward freedom. Once you turn this around and you make communism the entrée to modernity, the means of modernization, you have already raised, I think, some very interesting questions, and they do not relate to freedom, they relate to organization. They do not relate to internationalism, they relate to nationalism. They do not relate to the ultimate capacity to engender different ideas and encompass a lowered state profile, they relate to statism and conformity. And I do not see Peking, at present, moving very far away from all of the problems of an authoritarian society. Let me make it very clear that for the average person, perhaps, this is not so important in the immediate sense; the Chinese peasant still lives very much as he always has, except for some improvements in his economic standard of living. He’s still not, in general, mobile; he’s still not moving into different occupations and so forth, by and large. The point I want to emphasize is, however, that this general approach to politics and life, this view of the world, is, I think, a
difficult and dangerous one for the Chinese, and for their neighbors, ultimately. Let me just close with some observations about China and the world.

Few societies have been as isolated, really, in recent decades as the Chinese people. Very very few of them travel abroad; the media and communications have been almost totally controlled. Indeed, I think it’s truly remarkable that you could have a first-level political crisis in this country at the very top since at least August, and we still don’t really know what’s going on, and neither do the Chinese people. This tremendous control over media and communications; this telling the people what you want them to know. This causing them to respond and participate, for this is a participatory government, like many other authoritarian systems. This engendering of huge sentiments, directed first of all toward the leader, then toward the party and the system; this attempt to utilize the people in order to enhance the work ethic, to increase production, to get more commitment and unity. Unity, unity, unity. All of this, as I said earlier, is understandable, but what does it mean in terms of China and the world?

Well, I want to make it very clear that I was one of those who long ago felt that we should explore, step by step, bringing the Chinese People’s Republic into more active roles in international affairs, including the United Nations, because in my opinion isolation always feeds fanaticism. Exclusiveness always plays to the deeply existing currents of xenophobia, and in every respect I think our gamble is that over the long run, the involvement of China in organizations like the U.N., et cetera, will make more complicated her decision-making process, less pure her positions; it will engender some of the complexity into that process of decision-making which is essential if the world is to live with China.

Now I think it’s very clear that one of the reasons, not the only reason, that Peking finally acknowledged our overtures was their deep concern about the Soviet Union. Russia and China today are in a situation of bitter antagonism, there can be no doubt about that, and I think Peking is deeply worried about the immediate future. There are at least 750,000, perhaps a million Soviet troops on the China-Soviet frontier. The background is one which the Chinese know very well; the Soviets actually hinted at war in 1969, and the building of air raid shelters in Peking and elsewhere signals continuing Chinese concern. There’s no time here to go into the reasons for this dispute, which are complicated and would take a long time, but I think that for the foreseeable future the chances are strong that China and the Soviet Union will be deeply at odds, and that while all-out war will probably be avoided because no one could win it, there will not be any all-out peace. And to give you an illustration of this, let me just read something that the Chinese press put out in Ningxia, which is on the border, on the fifth of November, just a few days ago. It says, “Following the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, the ruling class has used state power to suppress the resistance within the party and to suppress people’s
opposition, has arrested and murdered Marxists, revolutionary cadres, revolutionary people, by
accusing them of various crimes, and has repressed worker’s strikes and people’s resistance.
They have thus opened the door to all kinds of counterrevolutionaries, bourgeois elements, and
opportunists who seek promotions and money, and let these men ride again on the backs of
their people.” Well, now, an attack like that on Moscow would not even come from
Washington, I suspect, today, and it illustrates I think the bitterness of relations between these
two self-proclaimed communist states.

It also illustrates something which is probably more important, and that is the fact that each of
these states cannot avoid intervening in the affairs of the other. You can rest assured that we
don’t have any pro-American clique inside the central committee. But the close historic
relationship between the Soviet Union and China makes almost inevitable the deep
involvement of one with the other, particularly when the Maoists were proclaiming Liu “the
Kruschev” of the Soviet Union, and when one formidable member of the central committee,
Huang Min, is now in Moscow in exile broadcasting in Chinese to the Chinese people. Thus, I
see this as a long-range conflict, but there is no evidence in my opinion, incidentally, that
Peking is yet prepared to come to terms with certain other governments. The Japanese
government, for example, demanding Taiwan be returned as an inalienable and eternal part of
mainland China. Maybe we’ll go into the Taiwan issue more in detail during the question and
discussion period. It’s certainly an issue of one which Peking has placed enormous weight, and
has almost made it the sine qua non for any improvement in relations. All I want to say here is
that in 1944, the Chinese Communists themselves, from Yinan, established a league for the
freedom and independence of the Korean and Taiwanese people. So as late as 1944, the
Chinese Communists were prepared to see the Taiwanese become independent. Now much has
changed since then, but that ought not to be forgotten.

Let me close, therefore, by saying that China’s rhetoric in the world is still pretty rough. It’s still
directed toward most of the governments with which she asks to do business. Over time I
suspect this will moderate; the opportunities for better state-to-state relations are now
available. Whether the Peking leadership can and wants to take them up is up to it. Meanwhile,
I have no doubt that Peking will continue with so-called people-to-people relations, in which it
attempts to use diplomacy for political purposes, and comrade-to-comrade relations. A
Communist state like this always operates at three levels: state-to-state, people-to-people,
comrade-to-comrade, and the mixture of these relationships is the key to the given diplomacy
of the period. Perhaps you see why, whether you want to label me liberal or illiberal, I have
certain grave doubts about this regime. And I think on a balance sheet basis, the issues that
have to be raised are the ones that I have raised with the hope that, like other regimes of its
type, a way to evolve toward some greater meaningfulness, to intellectual creativity, to
freedom, to the term “democracy” will ultimately be found. That doesn’t mean it has to be the American style, but I would like to see the Chinese intellectual of the 21st century have the right to really speak his own mind if he differed fundamentally from the government.

[applause]

CHAIRMAN: We will have a quick question and answer period, a very short one of five or so minutes, as our guest does have to reach a plane. I would encourage you, again, while people are leaving for their classes, to return tomorrow at twelve and also Wednesday at twelve to complete our China Symposium, and on December 1st, at eleven o’clock here in the Ballroom, former Senator from Oregon Wayne Morse will be speaking on limitations in presidential power. OK, other questions?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is this mic working?

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It was astounding to me that in the presentation of Scalapino, that there was no description in describing China of today, of U.S foreign policy toward China over these past two decades, which has from the beginning been a policy of precisely causing and pushing the Chinese regime into isolation. The surrounding of the seventh fleet, the actions taken in Korea, the systematic opposition and hostility that this regime has carried out toward China has been a principal factor in precisely the development of certain distortions within the Chinese regime. That’s the first point, and it seems to me that from that point of view, that in a sense the concern over China that Dr. Scalapino expresses has something of the character of wolves’ tears. The second point I think that must be made, is that I think it is certainly true that Marx would have considered some of the events—not incomprehensible, because I’m sure he would have understood and analyzed them and drawn some conclusions—but certainly a departure from any conception of communism that was characteristic not only of Marx but also of Lenin and Trotsky in the period of... the early period of the Bolshevik revolution. And I think that the identification of the Maoist regime, or of the Stalinist regime in Russia which preceded it and upon which it is in the main modeled, the identification of those two regimes with communism fits in very neatly to the entire political and cultural bias of Dr. Scalapino to which he referred, which is the bias, in the last analysis, of supporting the continuation of an imperialist regime in the United States, and the oppressive nature of that regime around the world, in the attempt to strangle the Chinese revolution.

SCALAPINO: Well.
Let me start by saying that if you blame Chinese isolation on American policy, then you must find some rather esoteric reasons for explaining China’s attitude toward all of the major countries of Asia, not just the United States. Why its unbounded hostility to India? Why its total opposition to Japan? Why its feud with the Soviet Union? In other words, I wonder if we’re prepared to say that all of these countries, under all of the circumstances into which they came into conflict with China, were wrong, and China was always right? This is not just a question of American policy; it is a fact that the People’s Republic of China has bad relations today with every major country on its borders, every major country. And I think this bespeaks something of the zealotry of the regime.

Let me say also, that we had withdrawn—there isn’t time here to go into the history of American foreign policy in any detail—but it might be remembered that we had begun a withdrawal process earlier. We had withdrawn, for example, from the Korean Peninsula, and actually defined at one point that peninsula outside our sphere of concern when the Communists launched an attack upon South Korea and we had to make a decision. It was that issue, Communist-inspired, which changed American policy on the China question, because the Korean War brought about a change in position on the China straits issue and Taiwan. So I think in all fairness it should be said that it was the Communists who initiated certain kinds of actions in Asia that created new American policies.

There’s absolutely no doubt, in the fall of 1949 and in early 1950, we were prepared to see the new regime recognized, and as a matter of fact left our consular officials in Mukden, Shanghai and elsewhere. Peking was not interested at that point in American recognition, and as a matter of fact, the actions that it subsequently took were such that made recognition impossible. So I’m afraid I can’t agree with you factually and analytically either.

Now on the question of Marx, Stalin, and Mao, let me just say here that—I don’t want to get into the polemics of whether ours is an imperialist regime in this country—but I think it’s very clear that all of the small countries bordering China, including those that have attempted neutrality, have had a very rough time. It was in 1967-’68, for example, that General Ne Win was being called a “heinous, fascist beast” by Peking. Now Burma was trying to maintain a kind of strict neutrality but it objected to the intrusion of Chinese politics into the Chinese community in Burma. This may have been due to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution for the so-called leftists, they may have been punished subsequently, for Ne Win now has been able to go back to Peking and be greeted by Mao. But Peking still harbors the Vice-Chairman of the
Burmese Communist Party, still helps to sponsor and arm the White Flag Burmese communists, and therefore, I think what is legitimate to ask in these cases is what does peaceful coexistence mean? And if we can ever define that, define its methods and what will cause it to work, then we may work toward peace in Asia, which I hope we can do; but this is going to require some cooperation from Peking, because you can’t subvert a government on the one hand, arm its guerilla opponents and acknowledge its leadership on the other in Peking, and Peking’s got to make up its mind on these matters.

[chatter between CHAIRMAN and SCALAPINO]

CHAIRMAN: OK, are there any other questions?

SCALAPINO: I’ve got plenty of time…

CHAIRMAN: Uh, there is time, I was afraid that the plane was leaving an hour earlier, but there’s time for questions.

SCALAPINO: No, I’ve got a half-hour if they want to stay.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: If I could… If we could just stay on this last point for a second, I think that you seem to have a convenient way of omitting a few facts. If the Chinese were so bent on isolation, a question, I think, arises exactly, what was the basis of this? And the previous questioner brought up a few examples, but I think there are a few more, and there are many more as a matter of fact. If you recall, at the end of the Second World War, with the defeat of the Japanese, the U.S. sent marines to China to fight against the Communist Party. This is one of these so-called great powers that the Chinese are hostile to. There’s another great power, so-called, or major power rather, India, and the Chinese have again, a certain objective basis in reality for this hostility, because indeed wasn’t it India that initiated aggressive action against the Chinese a few years ago? I think that we can look at Japan, a country that, in the past, has showed aggressive activity towards China, and if we examine what is happening in Japan today—and the Chinese seem to be very concerned about that, I think not out of any rabid paranoia but real facts, real reality—the remilitarization at a rapid rate of Japan, the showing of movies which glorify certain fascist bandits like Admiral Yamamoto under the guise of being a sort of a liberal anti-war activist, and so on and so forth. So I think that… and of course I’d like to dispute your version of the Korean events, because I believe that any honest person who checks out the facts will see that it was indeed not the Chinese invading or instigating a war in Korea, but precisely the opposite. I would ask you a question: if the Chinese are on such a trip of militant, rabid nationalism, why is it that they have no foreign military bases? And I would
ask you, what is the proportion between the number of Chinese military bases abroad and the number of U.S. military bases abroad? And then I think we can arrive at an objective consideration of who the rabid nationalists are.

[applause]

SCALAPINO: Well, you’ve raised a number of questions. Reminds me at the outset that an old professor of mine once said that a fact was something of which there is no difference of opinion. So maybe there are very few facts that you and I can agree upon here, but let me present my facts as I see them. First, the American marines did not go into China at the end of the war to attack the Communists. As a matter of fact, they came in at the joint request of Communists and nationalists to such areas as Tianjin to help with the Japanese surrender. Now, there’s no need to go through the whole complicated business of the Marshall mission, the attempts of the United States to serve as mediator between Communists and nationalists, but right at the outset, you’re just dead wrong on the events of 1945. We had relatively good relations with the Chinese Communists at that time, and they had no objections whatsoever to the landing of the marines. On the contrary, they helped us and even cleared certain rail lines so that American forces could operate in certain areas. But to be sure, by the end of the civil war, the Chinese Communists were very antagonistic to us, and felt that we had ultimately ended up supporting the nationalists. If you want to read a more or less dispassionate account of all this, read Barbara Tuchman’s book on Stilwell, which I think is a pretty good book.

On the question on India, and her... and the issues of the Sino-Indian dispute, I think that probably the definitive or seminal study here remains to be written, but remember this: in the 1950s, a man named Nehru sought to develop a policy based upon neutralism and non-alignment. It was a policy not particularly attuned to American governmental interests or desires. It was a policy indeed, which in many respects, won the plaudits of the Chinese Communists. Yet when a dispute emerged, Nehru ended a broken, shattered man, because he didn’t have the power to try to put his own position forward, whereas the Communists had the power to put their position forward. Now, however you may define the Aksai Chin road area, whatever you may think about the Chinese necessity for having some way to control the Tibetan people—and incidentally Tibet’s a very interesting moral-political issue, where the Tibetans have never been reconciled to Chinese control. They didn’t like the nationalists, they didn’t like the Communists, and more Tibetans have suffered under this regime in terms of outright slaughter than almost any other minority people in the central Asian region. But the point that I want to make here is that Nehru, the progenitor of neutralism, Gandhian non-violence and non-alignment, had to abandon his policy as a result of this controversy, and the humbling of India before her own people and the world by Chinese military power.
Now on the Japanese side I find it rather curious, quite frankly, that there is this enormous emphasis right now on Japanese militarism, when the Japanese have an army of around 370,000; totally defensive in terms of its military equipment, small air force and small boats, when even the conservatives have stated that they are not prepared, at this point at least, to amend the Japanese constitution so that military forces can be used overseas. When Japanese public opinion and Japanese political elite opinion are totally opposed at this point to nuclear weapon development. There are two things that could change Japanese policy and I will state these quite frankly: one is a greatly increased perception of threat from China or elsewhere, the other is the complete end of American credibility as an ally. Now I’m not making any predictions about the future of Japanese policy beyond 1975, but I find it ironic, incidentally, that the one Asian country that has said it will develop nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and is currently testing nuclear weapons and is developing an army as modern as it can make it—of somewhat over 3 million at present, and has its first nuclear-powered submarine being built now and its first advanced fighter model plane on the construction galleys—I find it somewhat extraordinary that such a country could talk about militarism on the part of a country like Japan, which still is a very small military power in comparison.

As for the question of foreign military bases, you know, I don’t remember that Hitler had any foreign military bases preceding the development of his program in Europe. To me the key is not the actual immediate disposition of one’s military forces. It begins with one’s ideology. Who believes that there has to be violence and revolution to induce change? It goes on with the question of, what kind of indoctrination is being given young people? It seems to me that if anything is avant-garde in this society today, it’s anti-nationalism, and I detect very little sign of pro-nationalism. I don’t see any marching children in the streets or up and down the highways. I don’t see any practice with wooden guns out in the back of the schoolyards. These are all elements in the building of a creed of one sort or another, and I think that our role of foreign military bases was a defensive role. I think that it helped save Western Europe at a critical time, for if you think that Russia would have stopped just because it had reached the Czechoslovak border, or for some other ideological or political reason, I don’t think you know the Soviet creed in the Stalinist period, and I think similarly that our preparedness to play a certain role, to create a balance of power, has had much to do with the prevention of nuclear war. Of course we’ve made mistakes, and I would be willing to talk to some of them, but in my opinion our foreign bases have been defensive in character. We reacted to Korea, and make no mistake, Korea was a Communist aggression; even the Khruschev memoirs make that fairly clear, along with masses of other data. So it seems to me that what we have to do is simply, I guess, to disagree on the facts.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just stay on the same question a minute more. [SCALAPINO laughs] In terms of Japan, you’re saying that there is only an army of approximately 300,000 soldiers, but besides the number of soldiers, you have to look at the composition of the army. The composition of the Japanese army is over three to one officers to enlisted men, which means that in a very short time they are capable of raising an army of a million people. Secondly, you said that Japanese public opinion was opposed to the development of nuclear weapons and militarization of Japanese government and economy, but I think that it’s important to consider what role public opinion plays in stopping fascist militarization. For instance, right now the overwhelming majority of public opinion in Japan is against the treaty that Japan has signed with the United States on Okinawa. There’s been large demonstrations by students in the streets, there was a general strike of most of the workers in Japan opposing it, and it’s still going on that when a country remilitarizes, it doesn’t… a government doesn’t necessarily, isn’t necessarily stopped by public opinion. Another example of that is Vietnam in this country, public opinion is opposed to us being in Vietnam and we’re still there.

Moving on to India, something that you said earlier I thought was pretty good and it struck home to me. You said that sure China says that its military preparations are defensive, but every government says they’re defensive; just to say that your military preparation is defensive doesn’t mean anything, because everybody claims that, and I think that’s true, and so what I think that you have to do is look not just at the rhetoric but at the actual facts, the actual practice. What governments are saying they’re doing at the same time that they’re talking about peace and defense, and that should be applied to Nehru too, and the Indian government. I believe it was the January issue of last year in the *New York Review of Books*, they have a review of two books on the India question, on the Sino-Indian dispute, and they go considerably into the history of that dispute. The disputed territory between India and China. India claiming that it was their territory, China claiming that it was their territory; and I don’t remember all the facts. The people in the article seem to think that China had more reasonable claims, but what was important was that what China proposed was that everybody withdraw from that territory, there be no new troops sent into that territory, there be no bases set up, and they would negotiate it. While China was making that proposal, Nehru was sending troops into that region. It was a pathetic thing because the troops weren’t prepared, did not... [audio skips briefly] ...other than negotiate, while China did not send troops into the disputed area and tried to negotiate until the area was actually invaded.

SCALAPINO: Well, I think that on the question that you related, or that you raised with respect to Japan, let me first repeat what I said, because I want to be understood on these matters. I’m
not disinterested in the debate. There are two conditions under which Japanese policy may change with respect to playing a military role. One is if there’s a greatly increased perception of threat. If China begins to drop, as it were, nuclear tests around Japan, threatens Japan, begins to use its power in such a way as to change Japanese elite and public opinion. The other is if all Japanese credence in our credibility in providing a nuclear umbrella for her is ended by American isolationism, total withdrawal, or some other set of factors. Now, when it comes to public opinion in Japan, you know there’s one obvious and rather quick answer, and that is Japanese public opinion has a lot more influence over that government than Chinese public opinion over Peking. But I don’t want to rest with this; I want to say that there’s always a complicated interaction between public opinion in a parliamentary system and policy, and we don’t vote directly upon issues, but there is absolutely no indication that the Japanese government at this point is prepared to move in the direction of playing a major military role in Asia outside...

[audio cuts; program ends]