Perceptions of Peacebuilding and Multi-Track Collaboration in Divided Societies for a Sustainable Peace Agreement at the Political Level: A Case Study of Cyprus

Brooke Patricia Galloway

Portland State University

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Perceptions of Peacebuilding and Multi-Track Collaboration in Divided Societies
for a Sustainable Peace Agreement at the Political Level:
A Case Study of Cyprus

by
Brooke Patricia Galloway

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science
in
Conflict Resolution

Thesis Committee:
Harry Anastasiou, Chair
Rachel Hardesty
Birol Yesilda

Portland State University
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Abstract

It is the purpose of this study to propose that perceptions of peacebuilding activities in all tracks of divided societies (political, civil society leaders, and grassroots), and the perceptions of the collaboration between the tracks are essential processes to a sustainable peace agreement at the political level. This study will examine multi-track peacebuilding and the collaboration (or lack of it) between tracks in Cyprus. Additionally, it will analyze the perceptions of the necessity of collaboration across tracks. The analysis of this study is conducted in two phases: (1) analyzing interviews with Track One diplomats and examining previous and existing peacebuilding processes within Cyprus through observation, interviews, and analysis of existing studies; and (2) through student observations and interviews of the Cypriot populace on the perceptions of the conflict and peacebuilding collaborations among and across tracks. The results of this research indicate that there is a need for stronger connections between the political and societal level peacebuilding strategies in Cyprus for a sustainable peace agreement. Furthermore, the findings of this research suggest that multi-track collaboration should be added to Conflict Transformation Theory.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Cyprus, a divided society in the Mediterranean, has been plagued with conflict within its borders for several years. Nonetheless, Cyprus has engaged in peacebuilding activities for many years as well. While these activities have contributed to rehumanized perceptions and a greater understanding of the “other,” there has been little progress at the political level for a peace agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

As a student in the Conflict Resolution Graduate Program at Portland State University, I spent five months on the divided island of Cyprus, interning at a civil society peacebuilding non-profit, learning about the history of the Cyprus conflict, and spending time discussing the current situation in Cyprus with Cypriots. After spending great lengths of time discussing the Cyprus conflict with people on both sides of the divide, including people from civil society, nonprofits, and academia, and attending formal and informal interviews with political figures from the North and the South, I was able to view and understand both the Northern and Southern perspective of the Cyprus conflict. It was the informal, unscripted conversations that I had with friends, colleagues, and acquaintances from both sides of Cyprus that enabled me to fully understand the Cyprus conflict. I was able to gain perspective on issues of identity, emnification, nationalism, and “us” versus “them” dichotomies, which, paired with the education I received through the Conflict Resolution Graduate Program, permitted me to grasp the complex issues ingrained within the Cyprus conflict.

While I was in Cyprus, the current political leaders of the North and South were in the process of attempting to negotiate a settlement to the Cyprus conflict. Previous
negotiations have failed and the visible reminders of the conflict (such as the Green Line) are still prominent in the minds of Cypriots and all who reside on the island. Throughout my conversations and experiences with Cypriots, it became apparent that transforming the Cyprus conflict would only be successful if everyone on the island were involved in peacebuilding and confidence building measures, not solely the political leaders and governments.

Although peacebuilding activities have been present in Cyprus, the current strategy to bridge the political, cultural, and psychological divide in Cyprus is not effective. The ineffectiveness is perpetuating the conflict within Cyprus and constitutes a barrier to creating a lasting peace agreement. The current conventional parallel track approach is not effective in Conflict Transformation Theory. Will a more integrated approach of the tracks be a more effective way of inducing conflict transformation? Will perceptions of peacebuilding and multi-track diplomacy affect the integration of tracks?

It is the purpose of this study to propose that perceptions of peacebuilding activities in all tracks of divided societies (political, civil society leaders, and grassroots), and the perceptions of the collaboration between the tracks are essential processes for a sustainable peace agreement at the political level. While the importance of peacebuilding and multi-track diplomacy has been the hypothesis in other theses, I hypothesize that beyond it being imperative for multi-track diplomacy to occur, perceptions of the necessity of collaboration in peacebuilding efforts across tracks are essential for the creation and the sustainability of a lasting peace agreement. This study will examine multi-track peacebuilding and the collaboration (or lack thereof) between tracks in
Cyprus. Additionally, it will analyze the perceptions of the necessity of collaboration across tracks. The analysis of this study is conducted in two phases: (1) analyzing interviews with Track One diplomats and examining previous and existing peacebuilding processes within Cyprus through observation, interviews, and analysis of existing studies; and (2) through student observations and interviews of the Cypriot populace on the perceptions of the conflict and peacebuilding collaborations among and across tracks.

By examining peacebuilding at all levels of society and the collaboration between the societal levels, this study will examine existing peacebuilding strategies and provide recommendations of the necessary steps in peacebuilding at all levels to create a sustainable peace agreement at the political level.

In chapter two, this study will explore existing literature and theories on the topic and will briefly review the history of Cyprus. Chapter three will examine the methodology, an analysis will be conducted in chapter four, and chapter five will discuss conclusions and recommendations.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Overview of Peacebuilding Terms and Theories

To fully articulate and comprehend the theories and terms relevant to perceptions of multi-track collaboration in a divided society for a sustainable peace agreement, this literature review will examine the elements of peacebuilding, exploring Conflict Transformation Theory and practices utilizing multi-track diplomacy.

Peacebuilding.

While peacebuilding is a relatively new concept, there are many scholars who have devoted their research to addressing the effectiveness of peacebuilding and improving peacebuilding strategies. Christie, D. J., et. al., (2001) states peacebuilding is the process of physically and psychologically rebuilding war torn societies at the political, cultural, and institutional level. Peacebuilding often gets confused with peacekeeping, which is the confined effort to prevent parties from engaging in continuing violence by physically separating the parties to prevent them from coming together violently, and peacemaking, which is to establish mechanisms which preclude the need for future violence between parties.

Peacebuilding as a theory was not introduced until the 1960’s and 1970’s. It became a popular concept at the end of the Cold War. However, peacebuilding did not enter the diplomatic sector until 1992 in UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (Chetail, 2009). This document proposed that it was the responsibility of the UN and the international community to respond to violent conflict.
and the prospect for conflict in a variety of ways. *An Agenda for Peace* discussed preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict peacebuilding.

While agreeing with the Secretary General for the need and the responsibility of peacebuilding efforts, Lederach (1997) believes that the timeframe of peacebuilding should not be confined to post-conflict settings. Many current peacebuilding scholars agree that Lederach has highlighted the most accurate definition of peacebuilding: Peacebuilding is understood as the most comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. This term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords. (p. 19, 1997)

Lederach’s definition of peacebuilding is the definition used within this thesis and by scholars. However, it is important to point out that there are some scholars, such as Chetail, (2009), and Murithi, (2009), who adhere to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s peacebuilding definition and use the concept of peacebuilding as a strictly post conflict theory. While it is widely understood that standardized formulas for peacebuilding do not work for every conflict setting (Lederach, 2008), the main objective of peacebuilding is to transform unequal relationships in social structures to new sets of relationships where all groups involved have equal access and control over resources needed to ensure basic human needs (Christie, et. al., 2001). To reach this objective, scholars emphasize the importance of elicitive strategies, strategies that are unique to each conflict setting, to respond to the needs of the individuals and groups within that

**Rehumanization.**

After widespread violence, many groups have psychologically dehumanized their enemies as a result of hate, and “us” versus “them” dichotomies. Barash (1991) states that images, both visual and in writing, are exaggerated by the “nasty traits” of the “other” and conflicting groups refer to each other with names that represent irritating or dirty animals and/or pestering insects. Barash highlights that by dehumanizing the enemy, it becomes easier and, in many cases, is encouraged to murder and completely eliminate the “other.”

Many scholars and organizations have been assiduously working to counter dehumanization. The Metta Center for Nonviolence Education has defined rehumanization as “the process by which an individual or group is recognized by the opposing group as innately worthy, noble and deserving,” (2006). Rehumanization processes are the continuum of events, progression, and psychological developments that transform negative emotions, feelings of hatred and emnification into forgiveness, mutual respect, and peaceful coexistence.

Chigas claims that rehumanization is necessary because issues of identity, survival, and fear of the other can only be addressed in a process directly aimed to change
the underlying human relationship, promoting mutual understanding and acknowledging people’s concerns, (2006). “Us” versus “them” dichotomies, group think, emnification, and many other negative results of divided societies cannot be addressed until rehumanization processes begin.

**Forgiveness.**

The term forgiveness within the realm of peacebuilding refers to reconciliatory forgiveness. Ausburger (1992) defines reconciliatory forgiveness as:

…(a) transformation of the relationship. It is true forgiveness. As the responsible ego forms, the person is at last capable of truly seeing the self from the other’s perspective, so decentering of the self, reversal of ones past behavior, and repentance, and reciprocity in relationship become possible to see the self from the other’s perspective. (p. 279)

Goboda-Madikizela (2002) researched the importance of rehumanization and forgiveness for reconciliation in divided societies. She found that remorseful apology and genuine remorse can result in the humanization of perpetrators and can also result in forgiveness.

Rehumanization and forgiveness are elements of peacebuilding and cannot work independently of each other. They lend themselves to reconciliation. They must be utilized to create and sustain a peace agreement at all levels of society.

**Conflict Transformation Theory.**

Conflict Transformation Theory is a relatively new theory that encompasses the successful pieces of conflict management and conflict resolution theories and offers alternatives to the pieces that have not been successful in leading to lasting peace.
agreements. Peacebuilding is at the heart of Conflict Transformation Theory. Miall, (2001) examined the history and contributing elements of Conflict Transformation Theory. He argues that while conflict transformation is an emerging theory, it is nevertheless a theory. He further states that this is a theory that has emerged out of the ineffectiveness of conflict management theory and conflict resolution theories. In an effort to articulate the process of Conflict Transformation Theory, Miall states the following:

Conflict transformation theorists argue that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict. Conflict transformation is therefore a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuum of violent conflict…People within the conflict parties, within the society or region affected, and outsiders with relevant human and material resources all have complementary roles to play within the process of peacebuilding. (2001, p. 4)

Miall notes that the following scholars have contributed to Conflict Transformation Theory: Curle (1971), Azar (1990), Vayrynen (1991), Rupesinghe (1995, 1998), Lederach (1995, 1997), and Galtung (1996). Lederach, one of the leading scholars of this theory, provides the most comprehensive definition of Conflict Transformation Theory:
Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interactions and social structures, and respond to real life problems in human relationships. (2003, p.14)

Conflict Transformation Theory perceives conflict as a variable that is constantly changing with the attitudes and perceptions of those involved and emerged out of the Conflict Resolution Theory. While both Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation Theory focus on finding a solution to a conflict, Conflict Transformation Theory places great emphasis on the relationship of those involved. This theory suggests that after any conflict, relationships will be transformed, either positively or negatively. While Conflict Resolution Theory is content centered, Conflict Transformation Theory is relationship centered, (Lederach, 2003). Conflict Transformation Theory attempts to maximize the potential for a constructive and sustainable change. Lederach critiques Conflict Resolution Theory by stating, “the narrowness of resolution approaches may solve problems, but miss the greater potential for constructive change,” (2003, p. 29).

Lederach (2003) states that Conflict Transformation Theory looks through the following lenses:

The immediate situation, the underlying patterns and context, and a conceptual framework.” The conceptual framework addresses the content, the context, and the structure of relationships. All of these contribute to change. Additionally, the goals of change in Conflict Transformation Theory are the personal, relational, structural, and
cultural and it meets these goals as an intervening strategy that “promotes constructive processes.

Conflict Transformation Theory utilizes peacebuilding strategies at all levels of society.

**Multi-track diplomacy.**

One of the significant contributions of Conflict Transformation Theory is the promotion of multi-track diplomacy. Multi-track diplomacy emerged from diplomacy at the official level. After realizing that only bringing a few officials at the political level together was not the most effective method for peacebuilding and conflict resolution, scholars, such as Fisher (1972) and Flack (1972-73), began examining the effects of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is defined by Tuch as "official government efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out, in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and other nations," (1990). In 1982, Joseph Montville, of the Foreign Service Institute, coined the term “Track Two” to discuss diplomacy that occurred outside of the official and traditional political level (Diamond & McDonald 1996). The term encompassed nongovernmental, informal activities between non-state actors at the civil societal level. After the creation of the “Track Two” theory, many scholars began researching the effects of public diplomacy. Diamond & McDonald (1996) discuss the immense growth of “Track Two” diplomacy and its influence in academics, religious groups, nonprofits and other groups. The contribution of many
different groups with different skills and backgrounds were significantly improving
peacebuilding measures in divided societies.

Leaders in multi-track diplomacy research and practice, Diamond & McDonald
(1996) further dissected multi-track diplomacy into nine separate tracks:

1. Government, (Track 1),
2. Nongovernmental/Professional, (Track 2),
3. Business, (Track 2),
4. Private citizens, (Track 3),
5. Research, training, and education, (Tracks 2 and 3),
6. Activism, (Tracks 2 and 3),
7. Religion, (Tracks 1, 2, and 3),
8. Funding, (Tracks 1, 2, and 3), and
9. Communications and Media, (Tracks 2 and 3).

Many academic scholars respect and utilize the methods of multi-track diplomacy
in their analysis. They argue that the most significant aspect of multi-track diplomacy is
the overlap and interrelatedness between the tracks. Because of this, and because of time
and length constraints in several academic articles utilizing multi-track diplomacy, many
scholars distill the 9 tracks proposed by Diamond and McDonald into three tracks (i.e.,
Lederach, Chetail). For the same purpose, this thesis will also utilize three levels in multi-
track diplomacy: Track One, political, Track Two, civil society leaders, and Track Three
grassroots.
Figure 1: Reproduced from John Paul Lederach’s book, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997), 39.
Lederach (1997) states that there are three levels with a top down/ bottom up approach. “Track One” is the leadership level. It refers to the political, military, and religious leaders within societies. “Track Two” includes civil society leaders; leaders from academics, non-profit organizations, well known and/or influential business leaders, etc. “Track Three” represents the grassroots level of society including community members, health officials, refugee camp leaders, etc., (see Figure 1). Lederach also highlights the approaches to building peace at the different levels. Level one focuses on the high level negotiations, cease fires, and highly visible political activity from a mediator. Level two focuses on problem solving workshops, dialogue, conflict resolution training, and peace commissions. Level three focuses on prejudice reduction, grassroots training, and psychosocial work.

Yilmaz (2009) analyzes the need for multi-track diplomacy and the components to building peace after conflict. Yilmaz emphasizes that there should be collaboration between government representatives, community leaders, nongovernmental organization leaders, business leaders, and leaders at the grassroots level to provide input on a range of issues pertaining to designing and implementing specific projects.

Chigas (2003) researched multi-track diplomacy while specifically focusing on Track Two intermediaries and Track Three at the grassroots level. She discusses the importance of the Track Two interaction of diplomacy between each group in a divided society and with Track One leaders. Her research found that traditional mediations and negotiations within Track One and between Track One levels of a divided society are not adequate as the only faction addressing an intractable conflict. Furthermore, Track One
diplomats cannot address the psychological needs of the citizens within the conflict. She argues that it is imperative to incorporate “Track Three Diplomacy” for sustainable peace agreements:

In “track three diplomacy,” unofficial third parties work with people from all walks of life and sectors of their society to find ways to promote peace in settings of violent conflict. This work is aimed at building or rebuilding broken relationships across the lines of division among ordinary citizens in communities, in a range of sectors. (Chigas, 2003)

Initiatives for peacebuilding at the civil societal level and in the population at large ensure that peacebuilding programs are centered around the people and locally owned. All actors involved are connected to various degrees (Chetail, 2009).

Miall (2001) examines the magnitude of multi-track diplomacy in regard to its significance in conflict transformation. He claims that in Conflict Transformation Theory, the question remains on how best to work effectively with interventions at all tracks. Furthermore, frequently different tracks have different and sometimes opposing purposes, which can further propel a conflict and have negative effects on peacebuilding measures.

To create a sustainable peace agreement, tracks one, two and three need to work closely together. Yilmaz (2009) claims that peacebuilding activities in post-conflict settings include “strengthening the institutional base, making a constitution or a new one, and establishing the rule of law; strengthening security; economic reconstruction; as well as national reconciliation,” (p. 240). Through his analysis, Yilmaz also found that strengthening the political level, or Track One, includes bringing all tracks to the table
since, “…dealing solely with the government cannot foster political reconciliation, as the legitimacy of the government is under question for some segments of the society,” (241).

Jarstad and Sisk (2008) have conducted in-depth research on the inconsistencies between Track One and Tracks Two and Three, particularly, the inconsistencies between building democracies at the Track One level and building peace on all levels. Jarstad describes democratization as the process of opening up political space, including improvements regarding contestation, participation, and human rights. She further claims that there is a dilemma currently facing the simultaneous effects of peacebuilding and democratization.

In war to democracy transitions, there are four sub-types of dilemmas that arise when democratization and peacebuilding efforts have adverse effects on each other.

First, the horizontal dilemma considers who should be present and represented at both peace processes and democratization processes. While a selected group of elites can more easily create and commit to difficult compromises (democracy efforts), a more sustainable peace agreement may occur if all parties with a stake in post-conflict developments are included at the table,

Second, the vertical dilemma is one of efficiency verses legitimacy pertaining to the relation of the elite versus the mass population,

Third, the systemic dilemma is that of ownership referring to the international versus the local control of both peacebuilding processes and democratization processes, and
Fourth, the temporal dilemma is that of the short term versus the long-term effects of democratization and peacebuilding processes.

Jarstad (2008) states that democracy has the potential for intensifying violence on two levels. Firstly, through the very definition of democracy through contestation and polarization in post war societies where weapons and negative emotions towards the other are rampant. Secondly, the process of democratization can increase the risk of violence through shifts and changes of power. Even when peace agreements at the political level have been made, they may not be sustainable due to the rest of the population remaining polarized. Chetail (2009) further argues that democratization can lead to further polarization within divided societies by political antagonisms. Additionally, Chetail states that “the importing of the neoliberal model combining democracy with a market economy may indeed be particularly counter-productive in societies weakened by war.”

Conversely, peacebuilding efforts may also hinder the sustainability of democratization processes. According to Toft (2003), in the long run, civil wars that end in rebel victory usually have higher levels of democracy than wars that end in a cease fire or peace agreement. Jarstad (2008) and Chetail (2009) claim that peacebuilding efforts need to place higher priority on security and self-sustaining institutions or new conflicts may arise that undermine democratization. Chetail highlights further criticisms of peacebuilding, claiming that many people think that peacebuilding is a concept exploited by Western States as a form of interventionism.
Strimling (2006) argues that official intermediaries (Track One) and private intermediaries (Track Two) need to come together and effectively negotiate the needs for the society. She argues that this collaboration will be beneficial in utilizing different sources of power including financial resources and networks, and will increase openness and transparency. She also states that a barrier facing the collaboration between Track One and Track Two include power dynamics threatening the risk of transparency and cooperation. After analyzing the collaboration, Strimling makes four recommendations:

1. Focus on communication,
2. Institutionalize mechanisms for regular and sustained interaction,
3. Design processes to support achievement of objectives, and
4. Establish strong linkages to research.

Scholars are discovering the necessity for stronger ties between democracy building and peacebuilding efforts. As a result, in 1996, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan supplemented Boutrous- Ghali with an Agenda for Democratization (1996) and the Framework for Cooperation and Peacebuilding (2001).

While scholars have analyzed the necessity for peacebuilding, multi-track diplomacy, and Conflict Transformation Theory, Notter and Diamond argue that the integration of all three should go beyond the theoretical framework and be utilized as a systems approach. They describe the systems approach as the following: “(a) what needs to change about a conflict (conflict transformation), (b) how that change is effected (peacebuilding), and (c) the actors involved and the environment in which such change
takes place (multi-track diplomacy),” (1996). This approach enables the transformation of conflict within a society at all levels.

While peacebuilding, multi-track diplomacy, and Conflict Transformation Theory have been studied and utilized in conflict settings, there is only one study that suggests the need for all tracks to use these elements through track collaboration and crossing tracks. Broome, et al. (2009), discuss the concept of breaking out of the mold of peacebuilding between parallel tracks, and actually “crisscrossing” tracks. The authors of the article explained how the crisscrossing of tracks was responsible for curbing the violent episodes in the Green Line in Cyprus in 1996. Broome, et al, are the first authors to present this notion in the field of conflict resolution.

The existing literature highlights the history of peacebuilding, types of peacebuilding, peacebuilding theories, and how they all point to the importance of multi-track diplomacy. With the exception of one study, the literature lacks research on the collaboration between tracks in multi-track diplomacy. The lack of collaboration between tracks in peacebuilding processes contributes to the disconnect between the political track and civil societal track in theory and in practical application. Additionally, findings prove that the lack of multi-track diplomacy and the collaboration between tracks can result in tracks working at cross purposes, resulting in exacerbated violence, failed peace negotiations, and/or the lack of sustainable peace. As this review suggests, there has been great progress in creating theories and practical applications in peacebuilding. Nonetheless, now it is time to examine the perception of the need for peacebuilding efforts in all societal tracks to collaborate and cross tracks. The following sections of this
study attempt to demonstrate why peacebuilding, Conflict Transformation Theory, and multi-track diplomacy are necessary for Cyprus.

**Overview of the Cyprus Conflict**

Until British Colonial Rule, Greek and Turkish Cypriots had a relatively peaceful relationship with one another. Greek Cypriots immigrated to Cyprus from Greece in 1190 B.C. (Greek Cypriot Chronology). Turkish Cypriots occupied Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire in 1571 A.D. (TRNC Chronology).

After the conquest from the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots lived together peacefully, with few outbreaks of violence. This was the result of the tolerance of Christianity under Ottoman Rule (Kallistos, 2008). Under the Ottomans, the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church became the political leader of the Greek Cypriots. However, they still remained under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. This resulted in the Greek Orthodoxy becoming its own political unit referred to as the Millet System. The Millet System was present not only in Cyprus, but in many other areas under Ottoman rule. While the Millet system enabled the Greek culture to survive four centuries of alien rule, it led to confusion between Greek orthodoxy and Greek nationalism which emerged during the 19th century, with no distinction between the church and the nation. This confusion contributed to the creation of Greek nationalism (Kallistos, 2008).

In 1878, Cyprus was leased to Britain in return for military help in the Crimean War. The fall of the Ottoman Empire led to British Colonial rule and British occupation in Cyprus. From the beginning of the British occupation in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots
formally requested union with Greece. Unification with the motherland Greece is otherwise known as enosis (Denktash, 1982).

In 1931, pro-enosis riots by Greek Cypriots occurred in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus. The British enforced anti-sedition laws to inhibit the spread of the enosis movement (Spyridakis, 1974). The impact of this law was not the effect of the British desired as the law further stimulated the Greek Cypriots struggle for enosis. By 1955, the Nationalistic ideology of enosis spread among Greek Cypriots. In lieu of the enosis movement, Greek Cypriots formed the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, known as EOKA. Their main mission was to fight for unity with Greece and the overthrow of British Colonial Rule.

During this time, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were neighbors, business partners, friends, and had integrated communities. However, the more strongly the Greek Cypriots fought for enosis, the thicker the tension grew between them.

Turkish Cypriots opposed enosis as the plan for unity with Greece completely disregarded Turkish Cypriots and their presence on the island. To counter enosis, Turkish Cypriots developed Taksim, meaning uniting part of Cyprus with the heir of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey. Turkish Cypriots initially claimed that Cyprus should become part of Turkey, (Attalides, 1979). This claim was soon moderated to partitioning the island. The Turkish Cypriots wanted to give Turkey fifty percent of the island and have the British troops remain. According to Attalides, Turkish Cypriots demanded the removal of Greek teachers from Cyprus, the separation of the church from politics, forbidding the raising of
the Greek flag, and that the British troops stay in Cyprus, (1979). This was due to the Greek influence in schools, church, and politics.

Turks were initially part of the Ottoman Empire and their identity was dominantly based in Islam until the twentieth century. Because of their powerful position in Cyprus through the Ottoman Empire, the Turks originally had no need for nationalism. Their identity was within their Islamic faith and the Ottoman Empire, not their relationship to a motherland. However, Turks began to follow Ataturk’s (the leader of Turkey) reforms and identified with Turkish nationalism as early as the 1930’s.

In response to the Greek Cypriot enosis, the Turkish Cypriots began to take on methods for their own nationalism that had successfully promoted the Greeks enosis decades before, (Anastasiou, 2006). Another method that mirrored the Greek Cypriots was the formation of the Turkish Resistance Organization (originally called Volkan and later became known as TMT), thus emulating the Greeks nationalist group, EOKA. All Turkish Cypriot groups and organizations became exclusively Turkish. Anastasiou (2006) notes the following:

The result of this historical process was the birth and rapid development of a stern, defensive, and aggressive Turkish Cypriot nationalism among the Turkish Cypriot community. For its historical energy and mobilizing symbolism it began to draw directly from the Nationalist tradition of its motherland, Turkey; just as the Greek Cypriot had done with its counterpart Greece. (citation?)

The creation of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, in response to Greek Cypriot nationalism, erupted in violence between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.
As a result of all the violence, political deceit, threat of enosis and threat of Turkish invasion, there was a strong animosity between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots suffered from political deceit even among their own, with an attempted assassination of Makarios III. The attempted assassination was the result of Grivas, the leader of EOKA, and mainland Greek leaders feeling that Makarios was not moving quickly enough for enosis, therefore, not being true to his ‘motherland.’ As the result of Nationalism, the Greek Cypriots purpose in life had become enosis. Their mission was to live and die for it.

For the Turkish Cypriots, the threat of enosis was constantly looming.

If Cyprus was to become united with Greece, they feared the Turkish Cypriot’s nationalistic identity would cease to exist. There were many peace talks and negotiations, but nationalistic identity hindered any progress for peace processes.

In 1960, Cyprus became an independent bi-ethnic state. Britain, Greece, and Turkey attempted to forge a settlement to the Cyprus problem as a response to colonialism, taksim, and enosis. Broome and Anastasiou (2010) state the following: Britain, Greece and Turkey, all of whom were NATO members, forged a settlement of the Cyprus problem by agreeing to establish Cyprus as an independent bi-ethnic state. The Treaty of Establishment founded the Republic of Cyprus, while the Treaty of Guarantee established Britain, Greece and Turkey as guarantors of the Republic’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The resolution that led to independence was an attempt to curb the three sources of the Cyprus conflict, namely, colonialism, enosis, and taksim. Thus it brought colonial rule to an end while crafting a
constitution that forbade both enosis and taksim. While Greece and Turkey convinced their Cypriot ethnic counterparts to accept the settlement, the question was whether the long-cultivated belligerent nationalisms that gave rise to the agendas of enosis and taksim could be curbed. (citation?)

In 1958, the first act of inter-communal violence occurred. In 1963, full fledged violence broke out between the two communities. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to flee their homes and live in small enclaves, with no communication among other enclaves. On December 30, 1963 a cease fire line (the Green Line) was established in Nicosia (Oberlong, 1982). Due to the outbreak of violence, UN Peace Keeping forces arrived in Cyprus in February, 1964. Due to the violence that was occurring, there was an increasingly high number of Turkish Cypriots forced to leave their homes and become refugees. While participating in peace talks, Greek Cypriot Archbishop, Makarios, was still ordering violent attacks on the Turkish Cypriots within the enclaves.

Anastasiou states that “in this context, Greece and Turkey sustained an ambiguous relationship vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and their nationalistic aspirations” (2008). As a result of a stronger Western Alliance which all three factions were integrated with, Greece, Turkey, and Britain came to a settlement of the Cyprus problem in 1959. Cyprus became an independent, sovereign nation. However, the deeply ingrained nationalistic perspectives among the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the psychological effects of years of ethnic tension and fighting resulted in an unstable and violent nation. Anastasiou states that the newly formed agreement was destined to fail:
…it was fairly easy to see how the republic of Cyprus was doomed to fail from the outset. All the rival groups, while deeply divided around competing nationalistic movements and political ideologies, were pressed together into an artificial solidarity inside the machinery of a unitary state of the republic. The later proved too weak to curb or contain the range of antithetical forces of autocratic colonialism and revolutionary nationalism, (2008).

Due to political differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in 1974, following a junta in Greece and a violent coup conducted by the Greek junta and an extreme right Greek Cypriot group, the Turkish Military intervened and, depending on the perspective, either invaded Cyprus, or, came to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. This attracted attention from the global community and to the partition of the island. Greek Cypriots from the North and Turkish Cypriots from the South were forced to leave their homes out of fear for their lives and become refugees. Turkish Cypriots fled to the North and Greek Cypriots fled to the South. The division between the North and the South was the Green Line that was created about a decade earlier.

The physical division in Cyprus created psychological obstacles along ethno-demographic dimensions. The actual visible barrier between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots resulted in obstruction to any rapprochement between the two communities. The barrier affected the psyche of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots so deeply that the mindset of each community during negotiations and peace processes was oriented towards win-lose as opposed to win-win solutions.
Cyprus has been divided since December, 1963. While peacekeeping efforts have been enforced and successful, peacebuilding efforts have not. Nevertheless, there have been peacebuilding attempts at the political level. While negotiations started in 1969, there were top level agreements made between the Greek Cypriot president and the Turkish Cypriot leader that any solution made should be based on a bicomunal, bizonal federation in 1977 and 1979. However, it is of significance to indicate that the interpretations of what was agreed upon at the political level were dramatically different between the two communities (Theophanous, 2008). The different interpretations of a bicomunal and bizonal federation have subsequently affected all negotiations, including the current negotiations.

In 1983, the peace negotiations resumed in New York between the leaders of the two communities. However, in the same year the Turkish Cypriot leaders declared a declaration of independence for Northern Cyprus, defying international law, naming northern Cyprus the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Anastasiou, 2008).

In 1988, Cyprus elected a president that for the first time had a strong commitment to finding a solution and attempted to alleviate nationalistic ideologies (Anastasiou, 2008). President Vassiliou applied for membership of the entire island into the EU in 1990. Additionally, he supported Turkey as they attempted to align themselves with the European community. Right wing Greek Cypriot nationalists disagreed with President Vassiliou’s vision of a bicomunal island and his public support of Turkey. Consequently, he was not reelected as president and lost to Glafkos Clerides. According to Anastasiou, the campaign against Vassiliou was premised on the “direct accusation
that he had sold out the nation by accepting the framework for a settlement presented in
the 'Set of Ideas' proposed by the UN Secretary General, Boutris Ghali” (2008). This
underscores an important piece of Cyprus history that has affected Cyprus ever since: the
lack of trust from foreign intervention.

Upon being elected, President Clerides began the UN-led Cyprus negotiations
with Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash. Additionally, President Glafkos Clerides, in 1998,
created efforts to move away from violent and military confrontation and to reduce
nationalistic rhetoric. Simultaneously, accession talks between the Republic of Cyprus
and the EU began while Turkey’s candidacy to the EU was rejected. This put significant
strain on the relationship between Greece and Turkey and affected the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot relationship (Anastasiou, 2008). However, for the first time, Greece had
an official change in policy towards Turkey and engaged in dialogue with Turkey about
many of the hard pressing issues between them. Furthermore, Greece insisted on and
assisted with the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership in 1999, at the
Helenski summit (Anastasiou, 2008).

Unfortunately, after a decade of progress towards a seemingly potential solution,
two major peacebuilding opportunities at the political level failed: the UN-led Hague
talks (2003), and the Cyprus referendum in 2004. In 2002, the UN proposal entitled,
*Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, generally referred to as the
Annan Plan, resulted from the UN led Hague talks and was voted on as a referendum.
This resulted in the Turkish Cypriots demonstrating public support of the plan between
November, 2002 to January, 2004 (Anastasiou, 2007). Although the Turkish community
supported the Hague talks, TRNC former leader Denktash objected to putting the plan to a referendum. When each community voted for the Referendum, 64.9% of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the referendum, and only 24.2% of the Greek Cypriots supported it (Anastasiou, 2007).

According to Anastasiou (2007), “Denktash and Papadopoulous shared a profound similarity in that they both operated from an ethno-centric nationalistic approach to politics, democracy and statehood.” The blame cannot be put completely on the two Nationalistic leaders, but should be placed on the Nationalistic ideology behind them. An “institutionalized democracy between ethnic groups” (Anastasiou, 2007) does not exist in the minds of nationalists.

Outside the political arena, both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots held differing fears about the outcomes of any negotiations. The Turkish Cypriots did not want their position to revert back to a dominated isolated minority. To the Greek Cypriots, any solution that did not include the withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers would be of no improvement to their current situation. According to Michael, “Fear of worst case scenarios paralyzed the will and thwarted the efforts of those pursuing a riskier, but ultimately more promising course,” (2007).

In response to the Cyprus stalemate, the International Crisis Group (2006) stated the following:

Given that no negotiated settlement is presently in sight, the only way forward appears to be a series of unilateral efforts by the relevant domestic and international actors, aimed at sustaining the pro-solution momentum in the north, inducing political change in the
South, and advancing inter-communal reconciliation. External players should, to the extent of their capacity, seek to exert pressure upon the political elites of both communities for immediate recommencement of negotiations and do everything possible meanwhile to reduce the isolation of the north.

**Analysis of the failure of the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum.**

The conflict has become attached to the Cypriots identity, no matter on which side of the divide they live. Cypriots have become prisoners of their own psyche, and cannot break free from their nationalistic mindsets. Nationalistic identities are hindering peace processes and cannot be overcome without effective rehumanization processes.

Anastasiou (2007) claims that one of the major components of the failure of the 2003 Hague talks and the 2004 referendum was the similarities between Denktash and Papadopoulos as they both operated from ethno-centric nationalist approaches.

Tantamount to the nationalistic perspectives between the two leaders and two communities, Papadopoulos gave a speech which was broadcast on Greek Cypriot national television on April 7, 2004 in an attempt to gain support to reject the Hague talks and the referendum (Anastasiou, 2007). In an effort to launch his “no campaign,” Papadopoulos delivered a political speech full of nationalistic rhetoric pleading with the Greek Cypriot community for a “no vote” to the referendum. During his speech, Papadopoulos had tears streaming down his cheeks as he urged rejection of the plan, on which he had formally agreed to negotiate in good faith and to accept the UN Secretary General’s final and completed version (Anastasiou, 2007).
Papadopoulos’ Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Denktash was also at fault for attempting to gain support for a no vote, although more discreetly than Papadopoulos. The Cyprus Network (2004) reported that Denktash secretly supported groups that were terrorizing Turkish Cypriots who were encouraging a yes vote. However, there was a surfeit of Turkish Cypriots that were hopeful of a peaceful solution and wanted a yes vote. The Turkish Cypriot’s began large peace rallies in support of the referendum.

The main difference between the two communities and their ethno-nationalistic leaders is the fact that while the Turkish Cypriots came together and the majority voted yes, despite the attempts of their former leader and the Greek, Cypriot’s followed the instruction of their leader and voted no, further exacerbating the Cyprus stalemate.

Prior to the Annan Plan, Cyprus had never came close to resolution. According to Michael (2007), the main thread in the previous failures in attempted negotiations was the mistrust and insecurities felt by Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots. The ‘motherlands’ or external powers (Greece and Turkey) fed and fueled the conflict. The Cyprus problem was at the center of the ongoing Greece and Turkey conflict that continued to fuel nationalistic ideology. Additionally, the multiple failures of talks have been the result of several factors including: poor leadership in regard to peace processes, the polarization of ethnocentric nationalism between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, and the nationalistic identities that are at the root of the Cyprus problem which have exacerbated enmification and “us” versus “them” dichotomies, etc. Furthermore, the European Union deeply affected Cyprus relations.
It is important to note that the failure of the peace processes is not isolated to the Cypriot population, the contributing elements are complimentary of human nature. The way in which we process information and make decisions is the outcome of our “attitudes, schemas, attribution, social identities, and social representations that are integrated in studies of stereotype, prejudice, and intergroup attribution,” (Augoustinos and Walker, 1998). These attributes combined with nationalistic rhetoric created the framework for the failed 2003 negotiations in Cyprus. These attributes spilled beyond the political leaders into the grassroots level. With limited collaboration between tracks in the peace process, the 2003 negotiations had slim chances of succeeding.

**Cyprus and the European Union.**

A premiere study on the contribution of the European Union to the failure of the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum was conducted by Yesilada and Sozen (2002). Using game theory as their framework of analysis, they examined the failure of the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum and the EU’s contribution to the failures. An important aspect to the failure of the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum was the role of the European Union (formerly the European Commission). Greek Cypriots applied for European Commission membership in 1990. When the Council of Ministers endorsed its application, the Council indicated that the “EC expected progress on the Island’s political problem while the parties continued working to meet those conditions necessary for accession,” (Yesilada and Sozen, 2002). Basically, the resolution of the Cyprus problem would be advantageous to all parties. In addition, the Luxembourg European Council stated the following:
the accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations that must continue with a view to creating a bicomunal, bi-zonal federation. In this context, the European Council requested that the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the accession negotiating delegation be acted upon. (2002)

Unfortunately, as historical events in Cyprus have proven, this wasn’t the case. As Yesilada and Sozen (2002) uncovered while utilizing game theory analysis, the emergence of the EU factor made the Cyprus problem take a turn for the worse. The EU factor led to a non-cooperative game, giving the Greek Cypriots incentive to defect hoping the Turkish Cypriots would give into the Greek Cypriot side if they wanted Turkey to join the list of potential members of the EU. This resulted in the Turkish Cypriots breaking off all communication with the Greek Cypriots and began a tit-for-tat strategy towards non-cooperative behavior and began a process of economic integration with Turkey, (Yesilada and Sozen 2002). After applying the game theory analysis to the situation in Cyprus, Yesilada and Sozen concluded that it would be beneficial for the peacebuilding process to combine game theoretic analysis with multi-track diplomacy:

There are strong domestic and international factors that create conditions for each side to follow a non-cooperative strategy aimed at unilateral victory. The resulting deadlock game carries with it a serious danger of distancing Turkey from the EU that, in
turn, could weaken the position of democratic reformers in this country. It is against this background that the current negotiations are being held. The challenge for international mediators is to move the two parties away from deadlock and engage them in an iterated bargaining within a Prisoners’ Dilemma framework (as the worst acceptable game option). In this regard, mediators could benefit from combining game theoretic analysis with multi-track diplomacy. (Yesilada and Sozen, 2002)

Further attempts for peace within the same nationalistic structure will continue to fail. Attempts for a sustainable peace agreement have been at the political level, excluding civil society leaders and the grassroots community. The lack of collaboration and crisscrossing of tracks in peacebuilding, multi-track diplomacy and conflict transformation has lead to failure in politically uniting Cyprus. All societal tracks should be included in the current attempt for creating a sustainable peace.

**Cypriot Public Opinion.**

The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) Report (2007) stated that there is a lack of interaction with the other, lack of activism within one’s own government, and lack of exposure to the other side of the island. Cypriots participation in socio-political (political) organizations is slim with only 19.3% who are very active, 20.5% being partially active and 60.2% being not at all active, (see table 2).
Although Cypriots tend not to participate in socio-political organizations, the statistics for participation are higher for voluntary civil society associations with 20.5% of respondents being very active, 34.2% being somewhat active, and 45.3% being not at all active.

The PRIO Report (2007) concluded that civic involvement (involvement or non-involvement in voluntary, social, and political associations and organizations) holds a significant variable. This study provides clear evidence that exposure to the “other” is one of the leading variables contributing to Cypriots believing that reconciliation, co-existence, and forgiveness are possible. The research found that the very small minority of pro-peace, rapprochement and multi-ethnic NGOs portray the strongest disposition for
reconciliation (85%), co-existence (95%), and forgiveness (70%). Those who are not directly involved with pro-peace, rapprochement activities, but are involved in social welfare associations also hold dispositions that there are possibilities of reconciliation (58.8%), coexistence (78.8%), and forgiveness (60.6%). As to be expected, those who are not involved in any activities hold the strongest opposition, choosing no reconciliation (35%), no coexistence (31.3%), and no forgiveness (34.2%).

There is a clear correlation between civic involvement and the desire and belief that the two communities will find a solution. Although the correlation between civic involvement and peace is significant, another significant variable that overlaps with civic involvement is contact and exposure to others. In addition to civic involvement, contact and exposure were strong variables in the Center For European Policy Studies (CEPS) 2008 study.

CEPS conducted a report on public opinion of the Cyprus Peace Process, entitled *Building Confidence in Peace* (2008). The researchers gathered a total of 1,000 public opinion surveys across the North and South of Cyprus. An Executive Summary of their research was presented to both President Christofias and Northern Cypriot leader, Talat. Conclusions included that it is necessary to engage the public in the peace process, while establishing communication and debate between local leaders and the public. They recommended that the peace process needs to be as open and participatory as possible. CEPS (2008) has suggested that it is essential to engender public confidence in the peace process during the negotiation process to ensure that Cypriots will support the process and that it will be sustainable.
With regard to political satisfaction (see table 3) the CEPS (2008) research discovered that only 15% of the Greek Cypriot population and 9% of the Turkish Cypriot population are satisfied with the current political situation in Cyprus. 30% of the Greek Cypriot’s are not satisfied with the current political situation and 45% have mixed feelings. In contrast, 46% of the Turkish Cypriots are not satisfied with the current political situation and 38% of the Turkish Cypriot’s have mixed feelings.

Figure 3: Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot levels of satisfaction regarding the current political situation (table replicated from CEPS, 2008).
When asked to choose up to two of four public policy priorities (see table 4), the highest priority among all Cypriots was maintaining order in the nation (71% Greek Cypriot and 59% Turkish Cypriot). The remaining three priorities differed between the two communities: 51% of Turkish Cypriots and 33% of Greek Cypriots selected giving people more say in important government decisions; 59% of Greek Cypriots and 41% of Turkish Cypriots selected fighting rising prices; and 45% of Turkish Cypriots and 34% of Greek Cypriots selected protecting freedom of speech as a top public policy priority.

Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots felt that maintaining public order was the most important aspect of public policy, however, Turkish Cypriots felt that giving people more say in important government decisions was second only to public order and Greek Cypriots found it to be the least important of the four options. Both sides are mirroring
the view of their governments/political leaders regarding the stances on public engagement in peacebuilding activities.

While the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots differed on their opinions about giving people more say in important government decisions, both communities seemed to be in agreement on the importance of forming a social reconciliation committee which focuses on examining the current state of suspicion and mistrust between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, discover what causes it, and suggest ways in which it can be overcome. 42% of Greek Cypriots selected tend to agree with forming this committee and 43% selected strongly agree. 46% of Turkish Cypriots selected tend to agree, while 25% selected strongly agree.

These studies recommend exposure to the other, participation in peacebuilding, and engendering public confidence in peacebuilding among Track Three as a means towards a peaceful settlement. The majority of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are unsatisfied with the current political situation and the public priorities between the two communities differ. However, both communities are in agreement on the importance of forming a societal reconciliation committee.

**Track One influence over Track Three.**

Although Track One is currently involved in peace negotiations and Track Two provides several opportunities for the general public to engage in peacebuilding activities, there is still a significant lack of Track Three participation in these activities by both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. With the political leaders promoting separation of the two communities until after a peace agreement has been settled on, perhaps the
general public adheres to their leaders’ wishes. There is clear evidence of this with the 2004 referendum when former Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos appeared on the local Southern Cypriot news pleading with the Greek Cypriots community for a no vote.

The general psyche of the Cypriots towards the “other” community is greatly affected by their respective leaders. This was not only apparent in the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum, but is also apparent through public records. The Ministry of Justice and Public Order of the Republic of Cyprus has recorded the pedestrian crossings of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots from both sides of the UN Buffer Zone. In 2003, when both sides of the divide were hopeful for a solution and excited about the potential for a sustainable peace agreement, a total of 1.12 million Greek Cypriot crossings across the Green Line into the Turkish Cypriot side were recorded. There were 1.37 million Turkish Cypriots crossings across the Green Line into the Greek Cypriot side. However, in 2007 when the Cypriot communities lacked enthusiasm and hope for the prospect of a peace agreement, there were only 600,000 Greek Cypriot crossings and 1.12 million Turkish Cypriot crossings across the Green Line to the other side (CEPS, 2008).

The data and history suggest Cypriots, particularly Greek Cypriots, support and follow their leaders. While the leaders of the communities are not encouraging peacebuilding activities and confidence building measures between the two communities and while the hopes for a negotiated settlement seem slim, only a small minority of Cypriots will engage in peacebuilding activities. The political leaders from both sides of the divide are engaged in very difficult negotiations that will affect the entire Cyprus community. If they do not support and collaborate with civil society in terms of
peacebuilding, they will continue to divide the two communities which will significantly reduce the potential for a sustainable peace agreement.

**Example of successful multi-track peacebuilding across tracks.**

As I have highlighted, there was hardly any mention of the possibility of multi-track collaboration among and between tracks in former studies, until Broome’s work in 2009.

The tragic and violent clashes of opposing demonstrators in the Cyprus buffer zone (Green Line), which led to the death of two Greek Cypriot civilians in 1996, increased the potential for further violence, and perpetuated “us” versus “them” dichotomies. Greek Cypriots were planning a protest against Turkish troops on the island. A group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were going to ride to the Northern Cypriot coastal town, Kyrenia. While the UN was advising against the ride, the majority of the Greek Cypriot community was supportive. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots were gathered on the Turkish Cypriot side of the Green Line and threatened violence against any Greek Cypriots who attempted to cross.

As the UN warned, clashes broke out and a Greek Cypriot man was beaten to death. Three days later, a Greek Cypriot man ran into the buffer zone attempting to take down the Turkish flag and was shot and killed. Both deaths were captured on film and aired in Southern Cyprus and in international media.

As the likelihood for further violent outbreaks seemed high and the potential for a peace agreement seemed distant, if not at all, Cypriots and the international community began anticipating the worse. However, the Track Two leaders from both sides of the
divide engaged in dialogue on the reasons for the sudden outbreak of violence and, after identifying the reasons, created policy suggestions for the political leaders in Track One: The peacebuilders crossed over to the domain of official politics, trying to offer political officials well-reasoned interpretations of the happenings, as well as constructive input on possible ways forward that would both contain and supersede the negative impact of the tragic events. At the most critical moment in the escalation of events, the peacebuilders, after consultations with each other on both sides of the ethnic divide, shifted their communication to UN officials and embassy personnel. Although their interactions with these persons were unofficial, their input ended up shaping official policy and related actions taken both by the UN and by third-party diplomats in Cyprus. Under the circumstances, had communication by the peacebuilders remained confined to the track of civil society, working in parallel to whatever what happening at the official levels, the chances of curbing the negative impact of the buffer-zone incidents would have been minimal, if not altogether negligible. However, by crossing over from the civil society track to the official politics track, the peacebuilders momentarily but strategically influenced the course of events in the immediate aftermath of the tragic events of the summer of 1996.

This work of the bicomunal peacebuilders opens up new vistas for peace scholarship and, in particular, for communication activism in the service of conflict transformation, as it invites consideration for expanding and complementing the concept of parallel tracks in conflict transformation with the addition of crisscrossing tracks in conflict transformation. Theories and strategies, consequently, need to be broadened to
analyses and designs that differentiate the appropriateness and underscore the complementarities of parallel tracks and crisscrossing tracks as pathways to peace. (Broome, et. al. 2009)

The multi-track peacebuilding collaboration conducted after the tragedy of 1996 enabled the hopes of peace and reconciliation to re-emerge in both communities in Cyprus. On a larger scale, it demonstrated the powerful outcomes of multi-track collaboration in peacebuilding, in Cyprus and beyond.

The perceptions of multi-track peacebuilding and perceptions of criss-crossing tracks seem to vary among Cypriots and among tracks. Cyprus has a complicated history of conflict and of perceptions of peacebuilding. While the public opinion of Cypriots agree that they want peace and reconciliation, they differ on what peace and reconciliation look like. However, a handful of Track Two leaders were able to demonstrate the effectiveness of multi-track collaboration and peacebuilding across tracks. The purpose of this study is to examine the perception of the need for peacebuilding efforts in all societal tracks to collaborate and cross tracks. The following chapters will examine the methodology, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations.
Chapter 3: Methodology

As the review of literature has highlighted, there is a shortage of research on peacebuilding through the collaboration between societal tracks within divided societies. This research aims to address this deficit by studying collaboration, or lack of collaboration, in peacebuilding processes, with Cyprus as a case study. This study consists of a two phase analysis. The first phase occurred while I was in Cyprus in 2008. It consists of interviews with top level (Track One) government officials in Southern and Northern Cyprus, and consists of informal observation of the peacebuilding initiatives among all tracks. The second phase consists of focus groups extracting the perceptions of students of the 2009 Cyprus in Transition course observations of Cypriots towards multi-track peacbuilding and the collaboration between tracks.

The goals of the study include an examination of peacebuilding at all levels of society and the collaboration between the societal levels. In addition, this study examines existing peacebuilding strategies with the intent of indicating Cypriots perceptions of the necessary steps in peacebuilding at all levels to create a sustainable peace agreement at the political level. Achieving these goals will illuminate the hypothesis of this study: to propose that positive perceptions of peacebuilding activities in all tracks of divided societies (political, civil society leaders, and grassroots) and collaboration between the tracks are essential for a sustainable peace agreement at the political level.

The use of ethnographic qualitative research for this study is most appropriate as this research is trying to shed light on the validity of an integrated theory, this theory draws from multi-track diplomacy and Conflict Transformation Theory in order to more
fully explain perceptions of multi-track collaboration for a sustainable peace agreement at the political level.

**Phase One (Tracks 1, 2, and 3)**

**Political interviews.**

In September of 2008, I participated in a study tour to Cyprus. Through this study tour, I was able to participate in two group interviews. The first interview was with the Southern Cypriot Presidential Assistant, Leonidas Pantelides and the second interview was with the Northern Cypriot leader, Talat. Each interview consisted of the Track One diplomat presenting their perceptions of the Cyprus conflict and the steps they see as necessary for a sustainable peace agreement. Their presentation was followed by questions from the students of the study tour. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. It is important to note that since these interviews have been conducted, Northern Cypriot leader Talat has been replaced by Dervis Eroglu in 2010, and the two have different approaches to the negotiations.

**Observation.**

In 2008, I interned with a civil society non-profit in Cyprus, Future Worlds Center, where I was able to interact with and observe several Track Two leaders and Track Two organizations. These projects would occasionally cross tracks, exposing me to Track One diplomats. Additionally, I was able to informally observe the perceptions of Cypriots toward peacebuilding measures and multi-track collaborations through my friends and acquaintances by engaging in conversations with them. Our conversations would lead to my inquiring about the Cyprus conflict and their perceptions of peace.
building among and between tracks. The informal conversations I would engage in and
the questions I would ask formed a pilot methodology from which the focus group
questions emerged (see below).

**Phase Two**

**Focus groups.**

The students of Dr. Harry Anastasiou’s Cyprus in Transition Course were asked
to be qualitative data collectors for this study as part of their grade for the course. With
instruction from Dr. Anastasiou and I, the students were given a list of questions to
incorporate into informal conversations with Cypriots (see Appendix A & B). These
questions were reviewed and approved by the Human Subjects Committee at Portland
State University. The students were instructed to include the questions into everyday
conversations with Cypriots and to keep the data collection at the informal level to
respect the boundaries of Cypriots, as the Cypriot culture would find formal interviews in
the street inappropriate. Including the questions in everyday conversation with the
Cypriots creates an ethical approach to gathering the data. Additionally, while the
students were asked to record their findings by taking notes after conversations, the notes
were never collected.

After engaging in several conversations with Cypriots from both sides of the
divide and returning home to Portland, OR, the students participated in focus groups to
discuss the perceptions they had formed based on the responses they received from
Cypriots. The focus group enabled the students to analyze their conversations with
Cypriots. I was assisted with facilitating and transcribing the focus group conversations
by Portland State University (PSU) Conflict Resolution graduate students, Amanda Englund, Claire Adamsick, and Collin Lavalle, who were receiving practicum credit for assisting with the focus groups. The focus group transcriptions and audio recordings were read and listened to numerous times in order to code and extract themes that repeatedly emerged from the data. Once these themes were identified, the corresponding text from the transcriptions were placed together and analyzed within each theme.

**Study limitations.**

A serious limitation to this study is the changing in Track One diplomats since the political interviews have been conducted. As mentioned above, TRNC leader Talat was replaced by Dervis Eroglu in 2010 and Talat and Eroglu have different approaches to the negotiations. Due to time restraints, this study was unable to interview or analyze Eroglu’s approach.

Another limitation to this study was studying the Cypriot population in and of itself. Through my experience living in Cyprus, gathering questionnaires and conducting interviews for a separate project, it became apparent that Cypriots are sensitive to being researched due to the high number of social scientists studying the Cyprus conflict. My background in psychological research has taught me that a populace which has participated in multiple studies may not always yield truthful responses, which may compromise the validity of this study. Consequently, this may be a limitation to this research because the western human subject review protocols are not always appropriate when researching the Cypriot population and the results of the information may be less reliable if they are followed.
There are limitations to the legitimacy of the interview data for the following reasons. First, as previously mentioned, Cypriots have been continuously interviewed on the topic of the conflict and this may encourage them to answer in defensive, circumspect ways. Additionally, due to accusations from former Cypriot leaders, some Cypriots believe that the United States has had a heavy hand in contributing to the Cyprus conflict. Hence, Cypriots may not be willing to participate in conversation with United States citizens. Additionally, while students were asked to take notes immediately after the interview, they may have forgotten or excluded key pieces of information. Furthermore, there was no way to check the notes as the participants did not bring them to the focus groups.

Likewise, the information that I gathered through interviews and observation, and the data gathered through the existing studies may also be affected due to Cypriots perceptions of outsiders and researcher biases. However, the focus groups did reveal that the students themselves formed opinions on the attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. It was decided that the focus group transcriptions and the students' perceptions would remain primary data as they allow us to fully understand the validity of our conclusions, having been undermined by inadequate foresight with regard to record keeping by the student researchers.
Chapter 4: Analysis

The analysis of this study will examine two phases of research: (1) analyzing interviews with Track One diplomats and examining previous and existing peacebuilding processes within Cyprus through observation and analysis of existing studies; and (2) analyzing student observations and interviews of the Cypriot populace on the perception of the conflict and peacebuilding collaborations across tracks. It is the aim of this analysis to understand the perceptions of the necessity of collaboration in peacebuilding efforts across tracks.

Political Context

**Track One interviews with diplomats.**

In 2008, current Cyprus President, Christofias, and former Turkish Cypriot leader, Talat, resumed the reunification talks. In September of 2008, I was able to participate in a group interview with the Greek Cypriot Presidential Assistant at the presidential palace through the Cyprus study tour. A few days later, we were allowed the same access to the former Northern Cyprus leader. Each diplomat presented their perceptions of the Cyprus conflict and the steps they saw as necessary for a sustainable peace agreement. Their presentation was followed by questions from the students of the study tour. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. Recording devices were not allowed in either interview, however, the participants were permitted to take notes.

**Track One interview- Southern Cyprus.**

In Southern Cyprus, Presidential Assistant, Leonidas Pantelides, met us in an office at the presidential offices and discussed the progress and concerns of the peace
agreement. He spoke for about 20 minutes on the Greek Cypriot, Track One perception of the conflict. The participants were then permitted to ask questions, with most of the questions centered on potential peace agreements and peacebuilding. Two major themes emerged from the interview with Pantelides: 

(a) unification through a centralized government, and (b) negotiated settlement preceding societal reconciliation.

During his presentation, Pantelides stated that the most important issues concerning the Greek Cypriot community are ensuring that Cyprus will be a unified country with one centralized government, regaining Greek Cypriots property in the North, and ensuring security through the removal of Turkish troops. “The main concern for the Greek Cypriots is to ensure the country remains as one,” (Pantelides, 2008).

According to Pantelides, the Greek Cypriot government favors a centralized government with limited regional control, ultimately preventing a regional divide (bizonal governing party) with partitionist tendencies. He claims the Turkish Cypriot government prefers a regional divide in power. When asked to highlight the top concerns for the Greek Cypriot government at the negotiation table, Pantelides stated that it was a top priority to ensure that Cyprus is unified. He explained that before the events of 1974, the Cypriot government consisted of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots within the Cypriot government was equivalent to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots populace ratio within Cyprus. This resulted in the Cypriot government consisting of 20% Turkish Cypriot positions. Pantelides insisted that this is not the best way to develop a strong government. He believes the most
qualified individual should get the job, regardless of their ethnicity. He claimed that if Cyprus had a bizonal government with limited centralized authority, this would allow the Turkish Cypriots to make decisions for all Cypriots, and that any decision made for the entire population needs to be made jointly by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, he believed that if Cyprus were to have regional governments, Cyprus would become a separated country.

Pantelides indicated another issue of concern regarding a bizonal division of power is the fear that Turkish Cypriot government would grant Cypriot citizenship to Turkish immigrants and other immigrants who currently reside on the island. Hence, a bizonal division in government would hinder their ability to control Cyprus’ borders. Additionally, two major areas of concern with a regionally divided government is foreign policy and security policy.

After Pantelides stated the reasons for not agreeing to a bizonal division in government, he discussed reconciliation at the civil society level. He stated that negotiations should precede societal reconciliation or else they run a risk of being exploited politically. Pantelides stated that the Greek Cypriot government feels it is best to create a peace agreement, excluding civil society until after an agreement has been reached. After which, societal reconciliation will be possible. Pantelides claimed that not allowing the negotiations to be public will simplify discussions of a peace agreement.

**Track One interview- Northern Cyprus.**

A few days after meeting with Pantelides in the South, I was able to participate in a meeting with former Northern Cypriot leader, Talat. Like Pantelides, Talat discussed...
the progress and concerns of the peace agreement. He spoke for about 20 minutes on the Turkish Cypriot, Track One perception of the conflict. Participants were permitted to use the remainder of the hour asking him questions. Two themes emerged from this interview: (a) a negotiated settlement including equal power sharing, and (b) minor inclusion of Track Three in negotiations to prepare Greek Cypriots for power sharing with Turkish Cypriots.

Talat stated that he and Southern Cypriot president, Christofias, were looking for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. One of the major barriers facing the negotiations is that the Greek Cypriots are reluctant to share power with the Turkish Cypriots because they currently possess all of the power through the Republic of Cyprus; they have the support of the international community and the European Union. Beyond that power, Greek Cypriots have freedom of movement which the Turkish Cypriots lack. Turkish Cypriots must first go to Turkey to fly anywhere and must use Turkey country codes for their phones.

After discussing the potential reasons that the Greek Cypriots may not want to reconcile with Turkish Cypriots, Talat analyzed the current potential for peace. Talat thinks that President Christofias’ background with communist ideologies will contribute to peace in Cyprus. Additionally, because Greek Cypriots fear Turkey’s military presence on the island and fear permanent division, Talat believes that they do want successful peace negotiations. The main issues concerning the TRNC in the negotiations are property and power sharing between the governments on the island. Talat believes that the governments need to start with a loose federation and an evolution of powers.
Talat believes that civil society should be included to a small degree. He claimed, “It will take some time to prepare the Greek Cypriot community to share power with the Turkish Cypriots,” (2008). In closing, Talat informed us that he believed that they will have an island where everyone will call each other by name and not identity. Again it is important to note that Talat has been replaced by Dervis Eroglu in 2010 and the two have different approaches toward the negotiations.

**Analysis of themes and implications of Track One interview data.**

After reviewing the stances of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Track One diplomats, interpretations and comparisons of the themes emerging from the interviews arise. The Turkish Cypriots approach is one that is open to civil society peacebuilding processes among both sides. They are advocating for two states with little centralized government. The Greek Cypriots approach is focused on the high level negotiations. They are not interested in civil society peacebuilding processes until after the high level negotiations are completed. Their aim is to achieve unification with a large centralized government. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot government does not believe in equal power sharing, since the Greek Cypriots consist of 80% of the population.

In addition to their different approaches, upon reflection, it is also important to identify the power imbalance that Talat discussed between the two communities. The different agendas and power imbalances between the two communities will likely intensify the emnification between tracks across the divide, thus the need for cross track peacebuilding measures.
Dervis Eroglu was elected as the TRNC leader in April of 2010. According to TurkishPress.com (5/25/2010), the reunification talks will continue between Christofias and newly elected Turkish Cypriot leader, Eroglu. Eroglu wanted to scrap all previous agreements in the negotiation and start over, but Turkey and international pressures prevented him from doing so, resulting in Eroglu moving forward with the current negotiations.

**Initiatives at Conflict Transformation – Tracks 1, 2 & 3.**

Despite the shortfalls of the negotiations and referendum, Cyprus has undergone extensive peacebuilding measures at all levels of society, including rehumanization processes, confidence building measures, and forgiveness. However, these peacebuilding processes have been present in Cyprus for several years, but have rarely crossed tracks, contributing to the stalemate in creating the conditions for a sustainable peace agreement at the political level.

Researchers and peace builders have implemented and documented many of the official peacebuilding activities that have occurred in Cyprus and, through national surveys and research, have tested their effect. Peacebuilding processes in Cyprus include conflict resolution training, dialogue, confidence building measures, and cooperative activities.

Between 1974 and the opening of the Ledra Street crossing in 2003, peacebuilding measures were difficult to conduct with large masses of Greek Cypriot’s and Turkish Cypriot’s due to the strict limitations on crossing the Green Line. Nevertheless, in the 1990’s, a handful of people on both sides of the divide saw the
significance and participated in peacebuilding activities (Broome, 2005). Broome states that the bicommunal meetings held before the opening of the Green Line were possible due to international diplomatic missions. Much of the peacebuilding activities in Cyprus consisted of physically bringing people from both sides of the divide together to engage in dialogue with the goal of promoting peaceful coexistence. There were separate meetings for political figures, civil society leaders, and Cypriots at the grassroots level. After the opening of the Green Line, more Cypriots were able to engage in peacebuilding processes in all tracks of society, but there was still a separation between tracks, with minimal multi-track collaboration.

**Track One initiatives at Conflict Transformation.**

Unlike the general public, Greek and Turkish Cypriot political leaders were able to maintain contact since the events of 1974. Broome states that it is potentially most important for political leaders to make contact with one another because military confrontation is more likely to occur without negotiation and discussion between them (2005). Cypriot political leaders have been engaged in unofficial discussions even outside the official negotiations in order to keep the lines of communication between them open.

There were a handful of unofficial, organized discussions between political leaders. The Slovak Embassy sponsored regular gatherings with the leaders from each side of the divide to exchange views and open lines of communication. Policy leader workshops occurred outside of Cyprus’s borders and consisted of elected officials and community leaders from both sides of the divide. Broome (2005) points out that while these workshops were not for the purpose of discussing negotiations or points of
settlements, they enabled party leaders to remain connected and engage in communication. Although there have been failed attempts at negotiations at the political level, it is possible that the open lines of communication contributed to the minimal violence between the two communities after the events of 1974.

**Track Two initiatives at Conflict Transformation.**

Track Two consists of civil society leaders in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. These are leaders in business, nonprofit organizations, and academics. This track may build a bridge between Track One (political figures) and Track Three (the grassroots). As Lederach (1995, 1997) has emphasized, Track Two has the ability to influence policy and political figures and engage the grassroots level of society in peacebuilding activities. Many peacebuilding activities are initiated by Track Two or initiated by international factors and implemented by Track Two.

Without collaboration or support from political leaders, Track Two, with the assistance of international factions including the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States, has been the leading force in bringing the two communities of Cyprus together to participate in peacebuilding activities and confidence building measures. While there are several bicommunal interactions between Track Two leaders that focus on particular areas of interest, there has also been a strong force of Track Two professionals who have dedicated much of their work to the peace process in Cyprus.

Despite many challenges and even threats against them, these leaders have designed much of their work and efforts to bring together both communities in many forms. This citizen-initiated peacebuilding has addressed many aspects of society and
formed several bicomunal peacebuilding groups including (but not limited to) the All
Cyprus Union Forum, Citizens Movement for Reunification and Coexistence, Harvard
Study Group, Technology for Peace, Women’s Group, and Youth Encounters for Peace
(Anastasiou, 2008). These groups began forming in the early 1990’s. The most prominent
strategies of the bicomunal peacebuilding groups are twofold; challenging the
overarching negative perspectives of the “other” on the island, and working with
individuals and small groups in confidence building workshops. It is beyond the scope of
this analysis to discuss every Track Two effort designed to improve peacebuilding in
Cyprus. Instead I will highlight the historical peacebuilding dialogue, and examples of
rewriting history education, non-profit organizations, and business collaborations as
examples illustrating the variety and effectiveness of such efforts.

**Peacebuilding Dialogue.**

Dialogue has been an important tool in Cyprus, lending to rehumanization and
individual reconciliation. Dialogue is a term in Cyprus that almost everyone understands
as it was one of the first forms of civil society peacebuilding activities in Cyprus to take
place after the events of 1974, beginning in the 1990’s.

Through dialogue, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot participants were able to
identify many of the underlying issues that contributed to the Cyprus conflict, both the
past and the present, i.e., nationalism. There were several issues that came up in the
dialogue that prompted people to react, yell, and even leave the dialogue. Although it
brought feelings of animosity to the surface, the dialogue enabled the participants to
engage in conversation and begin to understand each other, after being separated for decades.

While many uncomfortable truths were revealed, the dialogue fostered the peace process and was a peacebuilding tool that enabled many of the participants to move forward and create more peacebuilding processes that could incorporate Track Three and give policy suggestions to Track One. To this day, many of the participants of this dialogue are now strong advocates for peace in Cyprus.

**Education.**

Through a bicommunal effort, Dr. Yiannis Papadakis, a scholar at Cyprus University, conducted comparative research on the content of history education in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot school books. The findings identified that, until recently, textbooks in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parts of the island reflected ethnic nationalism, were male-centered, and paid little to no attention to cooperation or interaction between the two communities. These texts also failed to highlight internal differences within each community. The major themes found when examining the textbooks included history of the motherland, geographical location in relation to the motherland, and extremely negative images of the other. Textbooks from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot side of the divide reflected the history of their respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey, and had only small portions of the text designated to the history of Cyprus. Additionally, each textbook displayed Cyprus much closer to the motherland (Greece or Turkey) than its actual location, and each portrayed the
individuals from the “other side” as horrific, dehumanized beings that committed atrocious crimes.

However, in 2004, in an effort to rebuild peace between the two societies, the Turkish Cypriot community replaced their nationalistic textbooks with ones that expressed affinity with all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish, in a hope that a joint nation would one day materialize (Papadakis, 2008).

Papadakis suggested that Greek Cypriots should transform their textbooks from nationalistic perspectives to a more accurate representation of the history of all Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish. Additionally, Papadakis makes recommendations from his research including the creation of multiple textbooks for educators to diversify the history education consumed by the students. He suggests establishing collaborations on multiple levels including NGO’s, centers, and academics, including members of the major communities on the island and creating a unified teacher training system (2008).

**Non-Governmental Organizations.**

Beyond formal education settings, nonprofit organization leaders also contribute greatly to the peace processes. For example, Yiannis Laouris, Founder and Executive Director of Future Worlds Center (FWC), has developed a mission that focuses on improving the entirety of Cyprus, especially through peacebuilding projects that engage members from both communities.

Through its leadership and staff, FWC creates and conducts projects that engage citizens from both sides of the divide in dialogue and problem solving workshops. They have spearheaded and been involved in several peace building projects including
sponsoring Y2P, Youth Promoting Peace, aimed at bringing youth from both sides
together with the main objective of developing mutual respect and common
understanding between the two communities (Y2P brochure). Another of their projects is
Talk of the Island, the first and only bicomunal radio program. Jumpstart Youth
Campaign engages young people aged 18-30 island-wide who would like to get actively
involved in peacebuilding activities. While the projects listed here constitute only a small
fraction of FWC peacebuilding activities, they represent the breadth of their work. I was
privileged to experience this work firsthand for five months in 2008, as a graduate
student intern for the organization.

The Management Center, led by Dr. Bülent Kanol, is the Turkish Cypriot
counterpart to Future Worlds Center. The Management Center is dedicated to
peacebuilding and development collaborations through a number of projects including
Future Worlds Center.

The Women’s Multicultural Centre is the first bicomunal women’s center. It
opened on September 28, 2008. It was a pivotal step in progress for Track Two leaders
who implemented this center and for Track Three citizens who participated. The
Women’s Multicultural Centre promotes bicomunal interaction and peacebuilding
mechanisms among all Cypriots on the island. Political figures were also involved in the
centre, particularly at its inaugural opening. The Minister of Justice and Public Order, Dr.
Kypros Chrysostomides, gave a speech at the festivities in which he said:
At the present time, with the direct negotiations between the president of the Republic of
Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat in progress,
Civil Society, men and women, have a duty to, in every way possible, support the efforts of the political leadership, so that there will be a positive outcome. (2008)

While congratulating the communities and the founders of the centre, he emphasized the importance of supporting political leadership in an attempt at peace negotiations. This further exemplifies that Greek Cypriot political figures want a settlement before peacebuilding measures go into full effect.

Nevertheless, Track Two has been the leading track in creating peacebuilding processes within Cyprus and has made the strongest impact. It is through projects, activities, research, and programs that the Track Two level of society is able to connect all levels of society in peacebuilding processes. They are the bridge connecting Track One political leaders, and Track Three, the grassroots community.

**Businesses/Development.**

In addition to Track Two nonprofit and education leaders mindfully paving the way for peacebuilding projects, there were several instances throughout the history of the Green Line where business leaders and other professionals had to collaborate for the greater good of the island. They worked on projects that were indirectly designed for peacebuilding efforts. This contributed to the conflict transformation on the island.

Beginning as early as 1978, the mayors from both sides of divided Nicosia decided to employ a team of experts to complete a project that had been left unfinished after the events of 1974. The project was to complete the building of a joint sewage system. The success of this project inspired several other projects (Broome, 2005).
Another type of initiative involved workshops that were not specifically focused on peace negotiations or the settlements, but were related to particular areas of common interest. These brought together business professionals, and other Track Two leaders. These workshops and collaborations include events sponsored by the European Union, the United Nations, the United States, and the Cyprus Fulbright Commission (Broome, 2005). While the activities of these groups did not involve discussing the conflict or potential peace, they lent themselves to exposure of one community to the other, which contributes to rehumanization processes of those involved.

**Track Three initiatives at Conflict Transformation.**

Bicommunal citizen gatherings and activities composed Track Three peacebuilding. Over the years there have been several bicommunal activities funded by different diplomatic missions. Some of the events would bring massive crowds of over 2,000 people (Broome, 2005). Bicommunal activities included receptions, music concerts, art exhibits, a bicommunal choir, and several pilgrimages to the other side to visit religious sites. Many of the events were protested and the participants ostracized, but people from both sides of the divide continue to participate.

**Phase 2: Focus Group Analysis**

Focus groups were held on Portland State University campus with the students that had participated in this study. To accommodate the schedules of the participants, I held three separate focus groups. Focus groups were recorded and transcribed. The focus group transcripts were then analyzed for relevant themes and the relationships among these themes. There were a total of 10 students that participated in the focus groups. Each
person had been given five areas of questions in relation to the failure of the referendum and negotiations to incorporate into informal conversations with Cypriots (See Appendix A & B). While the questions in and of themselves were important in identifying certain aspects of the Cypriot perception of the protracted conflict, discussion of all five questions lent themselves to understanding Cypriot perceptions. These included the perceptions of the failed negotiations and referendum, and Cypriot reasons for voting for or against the referendum. Additionally, the students were asked to observe the Cypriot’s current emotions on the way they personally responded, their leaders responded, and their community as a whole responded.

When analyzing the transcripts, shared themes emerged from Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. These themes were as follows:

(a) Peace/Reconciliation, (b) Fear/Propaganda, (c) Clarity of Referendum
(d) Communication, (e) Prejudice/Compassion for the Cause, Not the People, and (f) Exposure to the Other.

**Focus group theme: Hopes of peace and reconciliation.**

Although expressed more strongly in the Turkish Cypriot community, both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots informed the students that they had hopes of peace and reconciliation:

“I talked to a woman on the Turkish side and it was really interesting because she talked about the peace rallies and she felt it was the first time she saw her community mobilize behind a cause. She said that the sort of energy that came from mass organizing was so powerful and got everyone excited and they felt this is it and they were going to change.
And she said after the Annan plan failed they lost that mobilization but she was still hopeful because she had seen it she thought that they could rally again and get it passed.” (Focus group participant)

“I think anyone who voted yes that we talked to basically said they wanted a resolution to the problem, they wanted peace. No matter if they were Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, they wanted a vote for peace.” (Focus group participant)

While many factors stand in the way, Cypriots from both sides of the divide want peace on their divided island. Within the transcription analysis, there was a correlation between hope of peace and reconciliation and communal action.

**Focus group theme: Fear/propaganda.**

Focus group participants stated that the obvious reason for the failure of the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum was the overwhelming “no” vote from the Greek Cypriots. They then delved deeper into their interviews and interactions with Greek Cypriots, and stated that they received many responses as a direct answer and/or pieces of conversations that lent themselves to explaining the failure of the 2003 negotiations/2004 referendum.

According to the focus group participants, the majority of Greek Cypriots stated or implied that they voted “no” due to propaganda by their political leader, Papadopoulos. The propaganda fed into peoples fear of the “other,” fear of loss, and fear of the unknown. Not only did the Greek Cypriots fear the Turkish Cypriots, they feared losing part of their island and part of their identity. They feared that there would be no
benefit for the Greek Cypriots if they voted “yes.” Furthermore, they feared not knowing what changes might lie ahead of them.

“…The prospect of uniting Cyprus instilled fear in several people. They felt that they would lose their part of the island” (Focus group participant).

“Greek Cypriots did mention the political game and the propaganda” (Focus Group participant).

**Focus group theme: Clarity of referendum.**

According to the focus group participants, another contributing factor to the failure of the negotiation was the lack of clarity of the referendum and the time constraints surrounding it. “…quickly it was supposed to be reviewed and voted on. It just happened too quickly for anyone to really grasp…” (Focus group participant).

Due to the swift production of the referendum and the voting timeframe, most Cypriots did not get a chance to read the referendum and were dependent on what their political leaders told them. Since Papadopoulos created propaganda for a no vote, Greek Cypriots felt that this was the right decision.

**Focus group theme: Communication.**

Another major theme that emerged from the focus group was the lack of communication between Papadopoulos and Denktash, the lack of communication between the current political leaders and the rest of the community, and the lack of communication between tracks. Communication, or lack thereof, between tracks was a theme that several of the students identified while on the island.
“...talking to Talat and then talking to the vice president of the Greek side, one could see how they were not communicating even though they are the leaders and they still can’t look at things from the outside…” (Focus group participant).

“There was a feeling that the conversations on the political level were happening completely independently of what the people cared about” (Focus group participant).

**Focus group theme: Prejudice/compassion for the cause, not the people.**

As the literature has highlighted, Track Two has been bringing together Cypriots from both sides of the divide to engage in peacebuilding and rehumanization processes. While Track Two has made great progress, Cypriots clearly have not overcome all their prejudices towards the other. Although almost all Cypriots with whom the focus group participants interacted with supported the idea of a peace process, many were still prejudiced towards the other community.

“He said he voted for the referendum, but then said very demeaning things about Turkish Cypriots,” (referring to Greek Cypriot interviewed), (Focus group participant).

“I heard it from a Turkish Cypriot too, but it wasn’t quite as obvious,” (in response to the above quote), (Focus group participant).

“He claimed he voted for it, but then he talked about the Turkish side, he said ‘you can’t teach them anything’ so he was really, really prejudiced…” (referring to a Greek Cypriot interviewed), (Focus group participant).
While Cypriots hope for a peace agreement, many hold prejudices against each other. These prejudices will hinder a negotiation, let alone a sustainable peace agreement.

**Focus group theme: Exposure to the other.**

Another major theme that came up in the focus groups was exposure to the other side. There were many conflicting reports that exposure was a positive/ negative factor:

“I remember the young lady from the Turkish side said that her brother had said ‘wow, they don’t look like devils’ because they hadn’t seen the other side. This was at the friendship meeting [peacebuilding meeting]. She was telling the story of how her little brother was amazed that these people didn’t have horns.” (Focus group participant)

“I remember a woman I ran into on the Turkish side. She had gone over just after Ledra Street had opened to go visit the Greek side. She only walked for a few blocks within the Greek side before she was approached by a couple of men who started harassing her because they knew that she was from the Turkish Cypriot community. They told her she looked different and that she didn’t belong there. The experience was so upsetting for her that she left right after that and she has not gone back since that experience.” (Focus group participant)

The literature strongly suggests that the failure of the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum was the result of nationalism, and the focus group analysis tends to support this proposition. The nationalistic perspectives have fed into propaganda, the lack of clarity, and lack of communication of the 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum.
Focus group discussion.

The themes discovered through the focus group narratives highlight important connections to the necessity for multi-track collaboration. At the forefront of this analysis, a major theme emerged: the fear that the Greek Cypriot political leaders instilled in the community through propaganda if they voted yes for the referendum. The propaganda throughout the entire Greek Cypriot community was extremely strong. Participants felt they would lose part of their island, identity, etc., if they voted ‘yes.’ Interestingly, of all the Greek Cypriots who engaged in conversation with the students, everyone claimed that they voted ‘yes’ for the referendum. Statistically, this claim is highly unlikely. Either all the people who were approached happened to be part of the small minority who voted ‘yes,’ or they do not want to disclose the actual way in which they voted for a number of reasons. These reasons could include guilt, shame, or their reaction to the students. It is also a possibility that they were telling the students what they believed the students wanted to hear. Furthermore, the propaganda theme may support the idea that Cypriots tend to support their government’s decisions.

Three themes: prejudice/compassion for the cause, not the people, communication, and exposure are central in supporting the importance of perceptions of multi-track collaboration. While many Cypriots support the idea of peace and reconciliation, their views of the other hold prejudices. Although the opening of the Green Line exponentially increased exposure, the lack of participation in peacebuilding activities between all levels of society allowed for some exposure to be negative. The focus groups provide evidence for this as those who participated in peacebuilding
processes were surprised by the similarities between the two cultures and excited to be engaging with one another. The negative accounts of exposure mainly occurred outside of peacebuilding activities which reinforces the necessity for multi-track collaboration. Furthermore, the lack of constructive communication across and between tracks can lead to confusion and chaos throughout the entire island. The general consensus of the students that participated in the focus groups was that the Cypriots seemed to want peace and reconciliation. Although there may be underlying prejudices and other issues, overall they want to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

**Summary of findings.**

Several themes emerged from the analysis of phase one and phase two. At the political level, the Turkish Cypriot leaders seem open to a small degree of civil society peacebuilding processes among both sides. They are advocating for two states with little centralized government. The Greek Cypriot, Track One approach is focused on the high level negotiations. They are not interested in civil society peacebuilding processes until after the high level negotiations are completed. Their aim is to achieve unification with a large centralized government. Track Two leaders are attempting to provide opportunities for Track Three to engage in peacebuilding and/or exposure activities. As stated in the literature review, people who engage in peacebuilding activities are more inclined to hopes of reconciliation and a peaceful solution.

The themes that emerged from phase two of this analysis (focus groups) were (a) Peace/Reconciliation, (b) Fear/Propaganda, (c) Clarity of Referendum, (d) Communication, (e) Prejudice/Compassion for the Cause, Not the People, and (f)
Exposure to the Other. Many of the themes that emerged from the conversations were based around the failure of 2003 negotiations and 2004 referendum. The focus group themes demonstrate mixed feelings among Cypriots. For example, Cypriots want peace and reconciliation, yet they hold prejudices toward the ‘other.’ The lack of communication between Tracks One and Three may have resulted in the lack of clarity of the referendum among Track Three. This chapter has unpacked the findings of the analysis of phase one and phase two. In the next chapter, I will address the conclusions and recommendations that arose from this study.
Chapter 5: Conclusions

This study hypothesized that perceptions of peacebuilding and multi-track collaboration affect a sustainable peace agreement at the political level. While this study has proven that people who engage in peacebuilding activities are more hopeful for reconciliation across tracks, the process of the negotiations have not moved far enough to be able to address perceptions of multi-track collaboration leading to a sustainable peace agreement. However, this study was able to view perceptions of peacebuilding and multi-track collaboration among Tracks One, Two, and Three and identify inconsistencies between the track perceptions. After examining the political and civil stances to peacebuilding processes and attempted negotiations, the following can be concluded:

Track One leaders differ in their perspectives on peacebuilding and multi-track collaboration. The Greek Cypriot leaders approach is to wait until high level negotiations have concluded before beginning peacebuilding processes with Track Three. Turkish Cypriot leaders support a small degree of peacebuilding processes among Track Three to prepare the community for power sharing. Additionally, Track One leaders are failing to incorporate policy suggestions from Track Two into legislation.

Track Two leaders have been the driving force in creating and promoting peacebuilding activities. The Track Two perspective in both communities is centered around peacebuilding processes for all Cypriots, research on peacebuilding, and policy suggestions to Track One.

The perceptions of Track Three differ depending on their level of involvement with peacebuilding activities or social welfare organizations. While there were consistent
reports of Track Three citizens expressing their desire for peace and reconciliation, the 2003 negotiation and 2004 referendum still failed. This may demonstrate that Cypriots perception of peace and reconciliation may not translate into a negotiated settlement. This may be the result of the lack of participation in peacebuilding activities resulting in Cypriots not fully understanding what constitutes reconciliation. Additionally, the focus groups uncovered biases and prejudices towards the ‘other.’

While peacebuilding activities, including exposure, confidence building measures, dialogue, etc., are occurring on all tracks in divided Cyprus, there is a lack of participation in these activities from the general public. This may be the result of the failure of political leaders to promote such activities. Furthermore, it may be the result of the political leaders failing to value and collaborate with Tracks Two and Three.

The failure to achieve a sustainable peace agreement at the political level may be the result of a cycle with Tracks One and Three failing to make changes in the overall perspective of peacebuilding activities. Without these changes, Tracks One and Two may, at times, be working at cross purposes, which in some cases result in violence affecting the entire community, and continue to contribute to the stalemate of the Cyprus solution.

With the recent elections, Cyprus is once again at a crossroads. If Track One fails to support peacebuilding at all levels and fails to consider Track Two policy suggestions, than enmification, “‘us’ versus “‘them’” dichotomies, and further potential for violence will likely intensify. It is imperative that perceptions of engaging in peacebuilding improve in Cyprus. Hopefully this will lead to stronger multi-track collaboration in
Cyprus. Additionally, peacebuilding theories need to integrate multi-track collaboration as an essential approach to peacebuilding within divided societies.

**Conflict Transformation Theory and Theoretical Considerations**

While the focus of this thesis is on perceptions of peacebuilding and multi-track collaboration, it does not mean to simplify the additional components necessary for a sustainable peace agreement. The additional components are suggested by Conflict Transformation Theory. Conflict Transformation Theory recognizes the damage that outside factions can create in conflict settings and the people within the settings, while identifying the importance of the balance between the emic (insider) and the etic (outsider) perspectives in designing and implementing peacebuilding strategies. However, this theory does not emphasize the necessity for multi-track collaboration.

As stated in the literature review, Conflict Transformation Theory utilizes peacebuilding strategies at all levels of society. Researchers, such as Miall (2001), claim that in Conflict Transformation Theory, the question remains as to how best to work effectively with interventions occurring at other tracks. Furthermore, often different tracks have different and sometimes opposing purposes which can further propel a conflict and have negative effects on peacebuilding measures. This research has concluded that multi-track diplomacy among and between tracks can be an effective strategy to work with interventions occurring at other tracks. Additionally, in the case of Cyprus, a divided society with a slim chance of further communal violence, tracks should criss-cross to avoid working at cross purposes.
Multi-track collaboration and the criss-crossing of tracks in Cyprus can alleviate the four dilemmas which may arise when democratization and peacebuilding efforts have adverse effects on each other (see below).

1. The horizontal dilemma considers who should be present and represented at both peace processes and democratization processes,

2. The vertical dilemma is one of efficiency verses legitimacy pertaining to the relation of the elite versus the mass population,

3. The systemic dilemma is that of ownership referring to the international versus the local control of both peacebuilding processes and democratization processes, and

4. The temporal dilemma is that of the short term versus the long term effects of democratization and peacebuilding processes.

In response to dilemmas 1, 2, and 4, all tracks in Cyprus need to work more closely in terms of peacebuilding, including Track One integrating policy suggestions they received from Track Two. This would give all parties a stake in the peace negotiations while keeping only a selected group of political figures at the negotiation table. Additionally, this would alleviate dilemma number 3 by enabling the Cypriot society to have ownership of the conflict, reducing the need for international intervention.

The findings of this thesis support Notter and Diamond’s (1996) argument that the integration of peacebuilding, multi-track diplomacy, and Conflict Transformation Theory should go beyond the theoretical framework and be utilized as a systems approach. They describe the systems approach as the following: “(a) what needs to change about a conflict (conflict transformation), (b) how that change is effected (peacebuilding), and (c)
the actors involved and the environment in which such change takes place (multi-track diplomacy).” The findings of this thesis further conclude that perceptions of peacebuilding activities need to improve so that these activities can occur on all tracks and even cross tracks to work together within the systems approach.

**Recommendations**

This research has attempted to identify the perspectives of peacebuilding and multi-track collaboration and their connection to the prospect of a sustainable peace agreement at the political level in Cyprus and other divided societies. The results of this study lead to a few recommendations.

As the events following the tragedy of 1996 suggest, multi-track collaboration at all levels can assist in peaceful negotiations. Peace negotiations can still occur behind closed doors and political leaders should not be expected to attend all peacebuilding events at the Track Two and Track Three levels of society. However, Track One should meet and collaborate with Track Two leaders at various points of the negotiation to discuss the policy suggestions given by the researchers and experts in the field, and to discuss current peacebuilding activities on the island. This could be done several ways, including negotiation meetings where leading researchers and other Track Two leaders periodically present and converse with Track One diplomats regarding their research or activities that are relevant to Track One and their negotiations.

Track One should be proactive in promoting the peacebuilding activities among the general public, Track Three. This could be done by Track One diplomats having a
stronger presence at peacebuilding events. If this occurs, it will increase the likelihood that all levels of society will be working towards peace.

Building upon and modifying the CEPS (2008) suggestion of forming a reconciliation committee which focuses on examining the current state of suspicion and mistrust between the two communities, I recommend forming a reconciliation committee that does not delve into the past, but engages in peacebuilding activities and looks towards the future of Cypriots. This committee should engage Cypriots from all tracks and be inclusive to all ages, genders, etc.

After analyzing the perceptions of peacebuilding and multi-track collaboration among all tracks of society using Cyprus as a case study, and discovering perceptions may affect the outcome of a negotiated settlement, Conflict Transformation Theory needs to adopt multi-track collaboration as a significant strategy in creating peace in divided societies.

At the local level, the combination of regular meetings between Track One diplomats and Track Two leaders, Track One’s promotion of peacebuilding activities, and the formation of a reconciliation committee that focus on the present and future may lead to a stronger collaboration between tracks and hopefully be a step closer to a sustainable peace agreement at the political level. At the theoretical level, incorporating multi-track collaboration into Conflict Transformation Theory may be helpful in other divided societies across the globe.
Further Research

More research needs to be conducted in other divided societies to further substantiate the effectiveness of multi-track peacebuilding. Additional research needs to be conducted on societies that have incorporated multi-track peacebuilding contributing to peace agreements at the political level.
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Appendix A Greek Cypriot Interview Questions

Greek Cypriot Interview Questions:
A. 2004 Negotiations/Referendum

1. Why do you think the 2004 negotiations did not succeed?

2. Why do you think each side voted the way that they did for the Referendum?

3. If you feel comfortable answering this, how did you vote in 2004?

4. Looking back to 2004, do you think your community made the right decision in voting against the 2004 referendum?

5. Do you feel that the leaders negotiated successfully? Why or why not?

6. In your opinion, do you feel that the 2004 referendum failed because of the way people voted or because the leaders did not negotiate well enough?

B. Bicommunal Interaction

1. Do you think that the opening of the checkpoints in April of 2003 and the opening of Ledra Street in 2008 was a positive or negative development? Why?

2. Do you feel the freedom of movement across checkpoints has helped to bring the two communities closer together or do you feel it did not make any difference?

3. Do you think it is important for your leader to be engaging in dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot community? Why or why not?

4. Do you feel that it is important for people in your community to be more engaged with the Turkish Cypriot leadership? Why or why not?

C. Organized Bicommunal Activities
1. There are several bicommunal projects initiated by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots which intend to build relationships and promote cooperation between the two communities. These bicommunal initiatives include youth projects, projects by non-governmental organizations, by artists, academics, business people, etc. Have you ever participated in any bicommunal activities?

2. Do you think that the bicommunal projects will contribute to finding a peace agreement, or are they irrelevant to arriving to a final settlement?

3. Do you feel that bicommunal activities promote a deeper understanding of the other community or are they irrelevant? Why?

D. Northern Cyprus

1. Have you ever crossed into Northern Cyprus?

2. If yes, how many times? Why did you cross? If no, why haven’t you?

E. Post Solution

1. After a solution is found, do you feel that it is important for various sectors of civil society to establish and organize cooperation between the two communities on a permanent basis? That is to say, should the communities establish continuous cooperation between schools, labor unions, universities, youth organization, cultural centers etc., or do you feel this is unnecessary? Why or why not?
Appendix B Turkish Cypriot Interview Questions

Turkish Cypriot Interview Questions:
A. 2004 Negotiations/Referendum

1. Why do you think the 2004 negotiations did not succeed?

2. Why do you think each side voted the way that they did for the Referendum?

3. If you feel comfortable answering this, how did you vote in 2004?

4. Looking back to 2004, do you think your community made the right decision in voting for the 2004 referendum?

5. Do you feel that the leaders negotiated successfully? Why or why not?

6. In your opinion, do you feel that the 2004 referendum failed because of the way people voted or because the leaders did not negotiate well enough?

B. Bicommunal Interaction

1. Do you think that the opening of the checkpoints in April of 2003 and the opening of Ledra Street in 2008 was a positive or negative development? Why?

2. Do you feel the freedom of movement across checkpoints has helped to bring the two communities closer together or do you feel it did not make any difference?

3. Do you think it is important for your leader to be engaging in dialogue with the Greek Cypriot community? Why or why not?

4. Do you feel that it is important for people in your community to be more engaged with the Greek Cypriot leadership? Why or why not?

C. Organized Bicommunal Activities
1. There are several bicommunal projects initiated by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots which intend to build relationships and promote cooperation between the two communities. These bicommunal initiatives include youth projects, projects by non-governmental organizations, by artists, academics, business people, etc. Have you ever participated in any bicommunal activities?

2. Do you think that the bicommunal projects will contribute to finding a peace agreement, or are they irrelevant to arriving to a final settlement?

3. Do you feel that bicommunal activities promote a deeper understanding of the other community or are they irrelevant? Why?

D. Southern Cyprus

1. Have you ever crossed into Southern Cyprus?

2. If yes, how many times? Why did you cross? If no, why haven’t you crossed?

E. Post Solution

1. After a solution is found, do you feel that it is important for various sectors of civil society to establish and organize cooperation between the two communities on a permanent basis? That is to say, should the communities establish continuous cooperation between schools, labor unions, universities, youth organization, cultural centers etc., or do you feel this is unnecessary? Why or why not?