

8-24-1979

City Club of Portland Bulletin vol. 60, no. 13 (1979-8-24)

City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.)

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City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.), "City Club of Portland Bulletin vol. 60, no. 13 (1979-8-24)" (1979). *City Club of Portland*. 333.

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City Club of Portland

BULLETIN

Portland, Oregon

Vol. 60, No. 13

Benson Hotel, Mayfair Room

12:00 Noon

Friday, August 24, 1979

THE SPEAKER:

CHARLES JORDAN

Commissioner of Public Safety
City of Portland

THE TOPIC:

REDISCOVERING THE CITY

For the City of Portland, at least, the flight of residents from city to suburb is reversing. People are discovering city neighborhoods as attractive and exciting places to live.

Commissioner Jordan is responsible for a number of City bureaus which have a significant impact on the quality of life in Portland, including the Police Bureau, Bureau of Neighborhood Environment, and Metropolitan Human Relations Commission. Factors affecting the livability of Portland include the safety of its citizens, the strength of its neighborhoods, the relationships among divergent groups and lifestyles, and the confidence of Portland residents in City government.

The Commissioner will talk about the activities of his bureaus, and the ways in which those services can operate to attract people to the City and encourage residents to remain here.

PRINTED HEREIN FOR DISCUSSION AND ACTION NEXT FRIDAY, AUGUST 31:

**Report on Coordination Among Agencies Involved in Disaster Planning
in the Portland Metropolitan Area**

(see back page for details)

*"To inform its members and the community in public matters and to
arouse in them a realization of the obligation of citizenship."*

CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND BULLETIN

(USPS 439-180)

Published each Friday by the

CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND

730 Southwest First Portland, Oregon 97204

Phone 228-7231

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*and Executive Secretary*Second Class Postage paid at Portland, Ore.
Subscription rates \$6.00 per year included in
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REPORT ON

**COORDINATION AMONG AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DISASTER
PLANNING IN THE PORTLAND METROPOLITAN AREA**

To the Board of Governors,
The City Club of Portland:

I. INTRODUCTION

Your Committee was charged to study the Portland metropolitan area's preparedness to take prompt and effective action on a community-wide basis in the event of a disaster.

Your Committee was directed to define "disaster" and to review organizations, facilities and other resources available to respond to a disaster in a coordinated fashion. Your Committee was further directed to identify inadequacies in the current disaster plans and make recommendations to remedy any defects so identified.

A. Disaster Defined

Your Committee has defined a disaster as *any emergency (either actual or imminent) which cannot be controlled by a single municipal department (such as fire or police) working in routine coordination with other emergency related agencies.* Such a possible disaster may include, but not be limited to, unusually severe weather, an uncontrollable fire, flood, earthquake, pollution of the city's water supply, or radiation release at a nuclear power facility.

By way of example, the December 1978 crash of a passenger airliner in East Portland, although tragic, was not a disaster by your Committee's definition. On the other hand, the January 1979 ice storm approximated a disaster, both in terms of the number of people affected and the strain on the operations of local private and public agencies involved.

B. Geographic Limitations

This report deals with disasters occurring in metropolitan Portland and thus is related only to portions of Multnomah, Washington and Clackamas Counties.

C. Depth of Study

Your Committee has reviewed the plans of public and private agencies which would be called upon to respond in the event of a disaster. This report deals mainly with the City of Portland, not only because the population is concentrated in Portland, but also because Portland's disaster plan was more developed than other plans at the time of this writing. Further, the City owns the metropolitan area's largest and most complex communications facility.

Your Committee's concern has been confined to the *overall* coordination of these plans and the Committee has not passed judgment as to the adequacy of every detail in every plan.

The reader should be advised that many of the disaster plans reviewed by the Committee, especially those of the City of Portland, are undergoing continual adjustment. However, for the purpose of concluding this report, not every recent change in those plans has been noted here.

III. BACKGROUND

A. History of Disaster Preparedness

Present disaster planning by government agencies and citizen groups traces its origins to World War II when strong fears of enemy air raids sparked the formation of a civil defense system. Activities included patrolling the streets by air raid wardens during prac-

tice blackouts. With the passage of time, practice exercises became less frequent and the system was dismantled after the war. The growing atomic capabilities of Russia gave rise to renewed interest in civil preparedness. This interest led to the Civil Defense Act of 1949 and the subsequent emphasis on fallout shelters to protect the populace against a Russian attack.

As the years passed, the once frosty East-West relationship began to thaw and the sense of military urgency gave way to a feeling of guarded trust. The civil defense authorities then assumed secondary responsibilities for dealing with natural as well as military disasters. In 1962 the Columbus Day storm put Portland's civil defense organization to its first major test and for various reasons, including the lack of adequate authority, the organization was found wanting and was abolished shortly afterward. It was not replaced for nearly a decade. The successor agency in Portland was established in June of 1973 and is called the Office of Emergency Services, a title that reflects concern with peace time disasters, whether natural or man-made.

At the state level, the State Office of Emergency Services traces its origins back to the legislative session of 1949. The agency began operations in 1951 as a civil defense organization and was given its present name in 1967.

B. The City's Organization

Portland's Office of Emergency Services was created by Ordinance No. 136719, Title 15 of the City Code which provides for a coordinator of emergency services. This coordinator reports to the mayor, who can declare an emergency. In establishing the Office of Emergency Services the City Council directed the new agency to prepare a basic emergency services plan for the City in conformity with State and Federal intent as provided by ORS Chapter 401 and Public Law 81-920. The resulting plan is one of 37 (34 county plans and those of Portland, Eugene, and Springfield) of which those of Portland, Washington County, Clackamas County and Multnomah County, have been approved by the State of Oregon. Approval by the State qualifies local jurisdictions to receive some federal monies and federal surplus emergency equipment.

C. County Organizations

The Multnomah County unit was formed in April 1974 by Executive Order No. 49. Like its Portland counterpart, the county agency was set up to fit the pattern established by state and federal precedent. Originally called the Office of Emergency Services, the county agency was re-named the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the fall of 1977 to avoid confusion with the soon-to-be-formed Office of Emergency Medical Services. The Office receives its direct authority from the Multnomah County Sheriff, Department of Public Safety. The Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners has the sole authority to declare a formal disaster and direct the response.

In Washington County the Director of Emergency Planning reports to the Sheriff, who may declare a state of emergency, and, if the situation warrants, may recommend to the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners that a disaster be declared.

Similarly, the Chairman of the Clackamas County Commission has such authority to declare an emergency and coordinate control in a disaster situation.

Additionally, within each of these political subdivisions there necessarily exist lines of authority within the major departments which would be most affected by a disaster. Thus, for example, the fire and police bureau chiefs would still exercise considerable administrative and practical authority over their respective departments. As might be expected, the mayor or county commissioners must, to a large degree, rely on the expertise and experience of their department heads to coordinate an effective response.

The extent of authority within each political jurisdiction appears to be blurred. Similarly, there appears to be no express delineation of authoritative lines between political jurisdictions, for example, between the Mayor of Portland and the Chairman of the Multnomah County Commission.

In spite of the lack of such definitive lines of authority, some public officials interviewed by this Committee appear to be confident that effective coordination among overlapping personnel would not be a significant problem in a disaster situation. This point will be discussed later in this report.

The offices of disaster planning within the Portland metropolitan area are funded on a 50-50 basis between the city or county and the federal government. The federal government has committed funding for 50 percent of the cost to *develop* a plan, but your Committee is not certain that the federal government will continue this commitment once a plan has been developed. The various disaster planning activities of political subdivisions were staffed and funded for 1977 as follows:

Political Sub-division	Staff Positions	Annual Budget
City of Portland	Coordinator Secretary (½ time)	\$ 40,322.00
Multnomah County	Coordinator Resources Manager Public Education Coordinator Secretary	93,000.00
Washington County	Coordinator Secretary	36,000.00
Clackamas County	Coordinator (part-time) Secretary (part-time) Radio Tech (part-time)	30,000.00
Total Tri-County Budget		<u>\$199,322.00</u>

IV. OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS AND RESOURCES

A. City of Portland

1. Office of Emergency Services

Disaster planning in the City of Portland is directed from the office of the Mayor and headed by an Emergency Services Coordinator (Coordinator) appointed by the Mayor.

2. The Plan

The Coordinator is responsible for developing an overall disaster plan for the City of Portland. The Coordinator has no direct authority over any agencies (such as the Fire Bureau) that might play a role in responding to a disaster (see emergency organization chart, Appendix A). The Coordinator encourages and assists separate agencies in developing their own departmental plans.

The primary purpose of the plan is to provide a basis for the development of the City's emergency organization and to outline the basic operational concepts to be used when coping with major emergencies.

The Plan states that agencies and organizations having emergency responsibility are to prepare and continuously update service support plans, operating procedures, and checklists detailing the utilization and disposition of their resources in a major emergency. The Plan calls for four stages of a disaster reaction which are listed below.

a. Possible Emergency¹

When an organization or agency becomes aware that an emergency is imminent, the involved agency will place its own emergency plan into operation as the situation warrants and will notify the Office of Emergency Services. The Coordinator will determine what resources might be needed and advise the citizenry of developments. A possible

¹Headings taken from the Basic Emergency Services Plan, City of Portland, April 1976, which was the latest adopted plan at the writing of this report.

emergency would exist when conditions such as a continuing and excessive rainfall or an unusual rapid snow melt would post a threat to the community.

b. Expected Emergency

An expected emergency begins when the situation indicates "when" rather than "if" emergency conditions exist. At this point, the Mayor would declare an emergency and assume command of all city agencies. The populace would be alerted, appropriate emergency plans and resources would be activated. The Mayor also may activate the City's command center at Kelly Butte (see page 60) and designated agency leaders would assemble at the center.

c. Onset of Emergency

When the disaster strikes, all resources of manpower and material will be directed as needed by the Mayor. When the City expends its resources or when that possibility becomes evident, the Mayor may call upon the county and/or the Governor for assistance such as requesting the National Guard, or possibly the help of a federal agency.

d. Post Emergency

Each agency will be directed to take action to assist in the restoration of services and aid citizens who have been affected by the disaster.

3. Role of City Agencies Involved in Disaster Response

The agencies which would assume the major responsibility during a disaster would be the Police, Fire, Water and Public Works Departments, each of which has its own disaster plan. These departmental plans outline a course of action in an emergency which is largely contained by their own organization, with only informal coordination with other agencies which also may be affected or whose assistance may be required. Since there is no way to predict what specific disaster or combination of disasters may strike this area at a given time, specific plans to cover every contingency obviously cannot be developed.

a. Police Bureau

The primary responsibility of the Police Bureau is to safeguard lives and property. The Police have primary responsibility in cases of evacuation, law enforcement, and public warning. The Portland Police Bureau also has tacit arrangements with Multnomah County Sheriff and the Oregon State Police for mutual assistance if and when it is required. In addition, the Police have understandings with the Fire Bureau so that they can work in harmony on normal day-to-day emergency situations.²

b. Fire Bureau

The primary responsibility of the Fire Bureau is fire fighting, radiological emergency, and rescue. It has secondary responsibility for evacuation and warning. The department has written, well-developed and frequently used backup agreements with neighboring fire districts.

c. Bureau of Water Works

The primary responsibility of the Water Bureau is to provide an adequate supply of potable water and "to restore utilities." The Water Bureau does not participate in urban disaster training, and does not participate in "disaster exercises" that are conducted by other bureaus; however, they do participate in annual drills concerned with the control of wild fire in the Bull Run watershed. The Water Bureau's plans note that, "these exercises are conducted annually and consist almost entirely of classroom and demonstration work with little or no field exercise involved."

d. Public Works

The primary responsibility of the Public Works Department as outlined in its emergency plan is to "protect private and public property." As this plan reads, it also is responsible for such functions as waste water treatment, and refuse disposal. Although

²A "normal day-to-day emergency" differs from this Committee's definition of a "disaster." See page 53 of this report.

a part of the Department's major day-to-day responsibility, no mention is made of street or access route restoration in the event of an emergency.

In the case of limited emergencies, the Public Works plan provides for its own emergency command center. Should the emergency develop into a "declared" disaster, the command center would move to Kelly Butte.

The plan developed for Public Works also calls for participation in rescue operations with the Fire Bureau. The plan does not mention just how this cooperative effort is to take place and does not provide for drills or training programs relating to rescue operations.

Public Works, along with other City support services, has primary responsibility for the "restoration of utilities;" however, none of the plans cover any responsibilities of this type and it does not appear that any planning or coordination exists among these departments and the private utilities.

e. Support Services

The City of Portland Plan has assigned duties to other City agencies such as the Bureau of Electronic Services, Bureau of Financial Affairs, Damage Analysis Team, Public Information Officer, Bureau of Fleet Management, City Attorney, Bureau of Parks, Bureau of Personnel Services, and Bureau of Buildings. (See Appendix B of this report.)

These support service agencies have some general guidelines as to how and to whom they are to report in the event of a disaster. In some cases these plans are quite specific. For example, the Bureau of Electronic Services "shall provide the City with communications by engineering, establishing and maintaining radio and telephone communications," and the Damage Analysis Team is to "collect, record and plot field damage information in order to make a damage estimate." In checking with private utility companies, the Committee finds very little if any prearranged or detailed coordination among the utilities and these support agencies.

B. Utilities

The life of our City is heavily dependent on services provided by our local utility companies. The ability of these organizations to continue uninterrupted service during a disaster is critical. In checking with Oregon's Public Utility Commissioner, the Committee learned that there were no specific PUC requirements that a utility have a prepared disaster plan. However, the utility would be subject to criticism if it were unable to respond properly in a disaster situation.

1. Local Power Companies

After the October 1962 wind storm, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) developed and has maintained on its own initiative a formal disaster plan for its own organization. Its plan creates a separate disaster command with formalized lines of authority. In the event of an emergency, its resources can be mobilized and its plan activated by the Chairman of the Board or his authorized delegate. The plan outlines minor emergencies which can be handled solely by PGE and those of a more serious nature which would require the assistance of other utilities in accordance with formal mutual assistance agreements.

PGE has substantial resources available to it in the event of a disaster, including a radio communications system with an auxiliary power supply which can reach approximately 500 of its mobile units. PGE has a helicopter and a heliport which could be used to survey damaged areas and transport emergency officials to command centers, although no formal arrangements have been made with the City or the Counties to utilize these resources. There is no direct radio communication between PGE's command center and Kelly Butte.

As soon as a disaster strikes, the course of action taken is determined by projecting an estimate of total damage based on a two-hour survey that would cover ten percent of its system. This information would of course be of vital concern to the Mayor and his

staff at Kelly Butte, yet no formal arrangement has been made between the City and the utilities to transmit this information.

In checking with executives of Pacific Power & Light Company (PP&L), the Committee finds that a similar well-developed emergency plan exists, that there are tremendous private resources available that would be very useful to the metropolitan area, and that PP&L too, has not been requested by any local authority to integrate its plans with a master disaster plan.

2. *Pacific Northwest Bell*

Pacific Northwest Bell (PNB) has developed an extensive emergency manual detailing procedures to be followed in the event of major disruptions to the phone system. These procedures are tested at least once annually through practice drills to insure a high level of readiness to react to a disaster. The first major step in PNB's emergency plan is to set up emergency control centers. This action may be taken on a local or statewide basis and is the method of insuring the distribution of key personnel and supplies. PNB has stockpiles of equipment, for emergency only, stored at strategic locations. PNB has a cooperative agreement with other telephone companies throughout the country to supply needed staff and supplies should an emergency strike. In past emergencies throughout the country such arrangements have provided the required backup resources.

In the event of a major emergency or disruption, PNB will institute line load control and/or selective service restoration. In an emergency there is a tendency for everyone to use the phone. Left unchecked, the over use of a phone system could render it totally useless. Line load control is a system of selectively eliminating the ability of phones to call out in order to insure that phones directly relating to health and welfare will remain usable. Selective restoration is a procedure whereby key phones related to police, fire, health, and government authorities are restored first. Both line load control and selective restoration will insure that priority is placed on the phones most needed during and immediately following a disaster. It should be noted here that while selective restoration will allow certain phones to call out, an overload on the phone system could seriously retard the general public's ability to report to Kelly Butte Command Center situations related directly to the disaster at hand.

In the event phone operations could not be restored immediately at an important geographical point, PNB could dispatch mobile telephone cars to that location to restore service.

It is planned that eventually all phone lines will be placed underground and this arrangement should provide more reliability in the event of surface disruptions. Underground cables could, however, make the system more vulnerable to floods and earthquakes.

C. **Other Emergency Services**

There exist other resources which, depending upon the nature of the situation, would be available in the event of a disaster. For example, the manpower and resources of the National Guard could be made available by the Governor should a disaster reach major proportions.

The Port of Portland has a formal disaster plan, developed primarily for emergency situations at the Portland International Airport. In addition, the Port has mutual aid agreements with surrounding fire and police services and has, at least indirectly, a communication tie-in with Kelly Butte. Frequent drills are held at the Airport to test the effectiveness of the Port's disaster plan.

The Committee has not made in-depth studies to determine, as an example, if the National Guard has had adequate disaster training or if there is an adequate food supply available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Committee concerned itself with the organization of these resources and how they would be pressed into service should the occasion arise.

D. Volunteer Organizations

Portland has a large number of volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross, Volunteers of America, St. Vincent de Paul, Mennonites, Seventh Day Adventists, Latter Day Saints, Salvation Army, and others. The Red Cross has assumed a leadership role in a committee of 15 relief-oriented agencies to provide assistance in the event of a disaster. This group meets monthly to discuss and update its collective resources and capabilities. In the event of a disaster, the Red Cross command center would be activated and the resources of these organizations would be directed from there. Once again, no direct radio communication exists between the Red Cross command center and Kelly Butte.

The question was raised about the desirability of forming additional volunteer organizations. It was the unanimous opinion of both your Committee and those witnesses we interviewed that it is virtually impossible to create a special purpose organization solely formed to respond to disasters, in the absence of a sustained national threat such as war. Furthermore, if attempted, such an organization could actually become counterproductive.

E. Medical Staff

The Multnomah County Medical Officer is under contract with the City of Portland to provide medical services in emergency situations. In the event of a disaster or possible disaster, the medical officer would activate what is known as H.E.A.R. (Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio). This system, headquartered at Providence Hospital, would survey all the hospitals in the Portland area and determine the resources currently available, e.g., beds, surgical capabilities, blood, staff, etc. A command center would be established at Providence Hospital from which doctors, emergency units, resources, and patients would be directed.

During the course of the Committee's study one member visited the command center at Providence Hospital and observed a practice drill of the H.E.A.R. system. A simulated disaster with several hundred injuries was developed and the command center activated. The drill reflected several deficiencies in equipment and personnel that were at once recognized and should be rectified. The Committee's H.E.A.R. observer was favorably impressed with this organization, particularly with its interest in having organized drills within the system. Given the proper community support it could play a major role in minimizing the effects of a disaster.

Two emergencies last year demonstrated continuing weaknesses in the H.E.A.R. system. A multiple injury fire in March 1978, which was not of disaster proportions, emphasized the need for careful coordination and better communication.³ The December 1978 emergency involving the crash of a commercial airliner showed that an inadequate radio communication system still existed. Had the emergency been of greater proportions, unnecessary suffering and loss of life could have become a real possibility with the present communication system.⁴

Leaders of the H.E.A.R. system have had some contact with the Emergency Services Coordinators of the various political jurisdictions in the Portland area and, in the fall of 1978, direct radio communication capability was established between H.E.A.R. and the Kelly Butte Command Center. However, there seems to be some confusion as to exactly what role H.E.A.R. would play in working with each of the political subdivisions in the event of a disaster. For example, the Director of Emergency Services at Providence Hospital told your Committee that the City's disaster plan has never been made available to him. The leaders of H.E.A.R. indicated they would like to move their command center to Kelly Butte in the event of a disaster. Since Kelly Butte is a City-sponsored facility and the H.E.A.R. system operates under the auspices of the Multnomah County Medical Officer, the authority for such a move lies with the City.

³*The Oregonian*, March 8, 1978

⁴*Oregon Journal*, January 31, 1979

F. The Kelly Butte Communications Center

The City of Portland, through its Bureau of Emergency Communications, operates an underground command and communication center at Kelly Butte in Southeast Portland. From this center emergency calls from citizens of Portland, Gresham, Troutdale and Multnomah County are received and processed, and police and ambulance services are dispatched. Facilities for command of emergency operations also are provided.

This center is served by two sets of land telephone lines which would guarantee its continued operation should one set of lines be disrupted. In the event that both lines were disrupted, it would not be possible for the general public to make emergency telephone communications to this center.

While officials of Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington counties would be invited to use the Kelly Butte command center in the event of a disaster, no formal agreements have been made because the City is reluctant to authorize another political jurisdiction to activate the City's command center without approval of the Mayor. As a result, Multnomah County has plans to establish its own command center in the basement of the Multnomah County Courthouse in downtown Portland. Should this proposal become a reality, it is questionable that all the resources in the metropolitan area could be effectively drawn together in a coordinated fashion to minimize the effects of a disaster.

While the Kelly Butte facility appears to be an ideal location for a command center, it may be difficult to transport quickly key officials to the center if disruptions to thoroughfares and/or traffic jams prevent a reasonably quick assembly. A possible solution would be to arrange for helicopter transportation to Kelly Butte for authorized personnel. While helicopter service is available from private and public agencies, no known agreements or requests have been made for use of these resources.

V. DISCUSSION

Whenever a large metropolitan community overlaps several political jurisdictions, an attempt to coordinate an overall plan of any kind becomes difficult and the very nature of the situation lends itself to confusion, frustration, and finally noncooperation.

Disaster planning within the Portland metropolitan area is no exception. In its research, this Committee found many examples of obstacles to achieving a coordinated plan. Some examples are summarized below:

1. The Kelly Butte Command Center is controlled by the City of Portland, which is unwilling to give complete freedom of access to Multnomah County.

2. It is the Committee's opinion that there are feelings of ill will between the Emergency Services Coordinators of Multnomah County and the City of Portland. This atmosphere precludes effective cooperation and coordination of the programs.

3. During an important drill of the HEAR system, only the Multnomah County Emergency Services Coordinator was present.

4. Long delays result in funding programs or capital items that serve all the jurisdictions because no means or formula has been developed to negotiate cost sharing of these overlapping programs. As a result some desirable programs and additions and equipment never materialize.

5. The overlapping, duplicating, and competing governmental jurisdictions tend to frustrate private organizations such as the Red Cross in their efforts to provide services. During the ice storm of 1979 the Red Cross felt they had the capacity to provide the highest quality temporary shelters. They were frustrated when other shelters were set up in Multnomah County without any coordination with them.

Considering the results of the Committee's research, discussions and interviews, the lack of overall authority emerged as the crucial weakness in developing and implementing disaster plans. The Committee considered several alternative solutions which included an intergovernmental agreement to establish one jurisdiction as the party responsible for disaster planning; using the existing structure but improving communications and co-

operation amongst the various agencies; withholding financial support from recalcitrant jurisdictions; and establishing the power in an entity which would be charged with the responsibility to develop plans and assume authority in the event of a declared disaster.

After considering the research and the evidence contained in this report, the Committee believes the best solution would be to vest in a regional body the full power to develop, test, and implement a disaster response plan in the metropolitan area of Portland.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

1. *Most public and private agencies appear reasonably well-prepared to respond to a disaster on an individual basis.* However, based on the definition of a disaster as an emergency requiring extraordinarily coordinated action by more than one agency, this finding, by itself, offers citizens little comfort.

2. *No overall plan exists to coordinate all organizations and resources that may be needed to effectively respond to a disaster.*

Apart from the example of area fire departments, this Committee found little evidence of clear written agreements among organizations of the sort that would avoid duplication of effort, confusion and misunderstandings when a disaster strikes. While many officials could explain informal arrangements and understandings that they had with other organizations, the other groups involved did not always have the same understanding of the arrangements.

No plan could be considered complete without full coordination with public utilities, medical relief and volunteer organizations, all of which provide vital services to the community. Most agency representatives were confident that in the event of a disaster all resources would be made available and mobilized, and that concern for the public welfare would insure compromise and organization.

Your Committee believes that oral or informal agreements and a spirit of good will are inadequate to provide the needed coordination to respond to a disaster.

3. *The absence of inter-agency practice drills is a serious impediment to overall disaster planning in the metropolitan area.*

While some individual agencies have tested their own plans with practice drills (e.g., simulated airplane crash at Portland International Airport) no major *inter-agency* drills have taken place on a metropolitan-wide scale. Such drills are necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of a total response to a disaster situation, to locate and solve problems which invariably occur, and to familiarize oftentimes parochial agencies with their counterparts.

4. *There is inadequate coordination among the four political jurisdictions in the metropolitan area involved in disaster planning (City of Portland, Washington, Clackamas and Multnomah counties).*

Considering the difficulties of bringing four separate political jurisdictions to some kind of agreement, it is not likely any single comprehensive plan will ever be developed under the present structure.

5. *There is an over-reliance on the telephone for emergency communications.* Satisfactory radio communication does not exist as an alternative among the various resource agencies.

6. *Proper coordination in a disaster situation requires the centralized presence of key personnel.* Under current disaster plans, no provision exists for alternatives to surface transportation to the command center at Kelly Butte.

Summary

The Committee concludes that the present situation is so serious that an effective response to a disaster would be too much to expect.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that the Governor introduce, and the legislature adopt, legislation to grant to a regional body (such as the Metropolitan Service District or its equivalent) full power and command authority to develop, test, and implement an effective disaster response plan for the Portland metropolitan area.

2. An effective disaster plan should mandate periodic practice drills, and such drills should be mandated among agencies in order to insure an effective and coordinated total response to a disaster. A continuation of neglect by some agencies toward practice drills will only prolong the present fragmented approach to disaster planning.

3. City and county disaster plans should be amended to include full integration of all public and private resources. The chief executives of the political jurisdictions mentioned earlier should direct their emergency services coordinators to contact private resources such as utilities, medical relief, and transportation and integrate those emergency plans into the overall plan.

4. The state should not approve any local disaster plan that does not integrate available resources, private and public, and adjacent jurisdictions into one overall plan.

5. No plans to establish a separate emergency command center should be developed by Multnomah County or any other metropolitan jurisdiction.

6. All vital private agencies should be connected with Kelly Butte Command Center through a radio network enabling them to send information and receive instructions during a disaster response. Such a network would improve the capabilities of separate groups to act in concert.

7. Definite arrangements should be made in advance to provide helicopter service, should it be needed, to assemble designated key personnel at the Kelly Butte command center in the event of a disaster.

Respectfully submitted,*

Guthrie Baker

John S. Black

George J. Cooper III

Richard A. Cox

Arne Westerman

G. Park Woodworth


R. J. (Joe) Okoneski, *Chairman*

*We wish to acknowledge the help of member James Danner who participated during earlier stages of this study.

Approved by the Research Board April 12, 1979 and submitted to the Board of Governors. Received by the Board of Governors May 14, 1979. Ordered printed and submitted to the membership July 9, 1979 for discussion and action on August 31, 1979.

**APPENDIX A
EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION CHART
CITY OF PORTLAND**

The magnitude and nature of a disaster might require that City government be realigned in order to more efficiently cope with the situation. This chart illustrates the initial realignment in response to a disaster.



*The Mayor may choose to appoint a Director of Operations based on the nature of the disaster, i.e. major fire, fire chief; civil disturbance, police chief; major flood, Public Works Administrator or city engineer.

(Source: Basic Emergency Services Plan for City of Portland, Oregon, April, 1976)

APPENDIX B

FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENTS

	CITY ATTORNEY	CITY/COUNTY HEALTH	ELECTRONIC SERVICES	PUBLIC WORKS	FINANCE OFFICER	FIRE BUREAU	MAYOR	POLICE BUREAU	PUBLIC INFO OFFICER	RED CROSS	SUPPORT SERVICES	WATER BUREAU			
Communications		P													
Damage Analysis Prop.										P					
Debris Clearance			P												
Directional Control						P									
Emer. Procurement				P											
Engineering			P												
Evacuation					S		P		S	S					
Fire Fighting					P										
Flood Fighting			P												
Human Needs									P						
Law Enforcement								P							
Legal	P														
Manpower										P					
Medical & Health		P							S						
Public Info								P							
Radiological					P										
Rescue			S		P										
Restoration of Utilities			P	P								P			
Shelter, Medical Care		S							P						
Shelter Management						P									
Transportation										P					
Warning					S		P	S							

P = Primary (Responsibility)
 S = Secondary (Responsibility)

(Source: Basic Emergency Services Plan for City of Portland, Oregon. April, 1976)

APPENDIX C**PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

Bruce Baker, Chief of Police, City of Portland
Ginny Bass, Emergency Services Coordinator, City of Portland
Steve Bigg, Operations Supervisor, Portland International Airport
Stanley Black, M.D., retired Deputy Senior Administrative Medical Officer,
NE Region, Scotland
Richard K. Bass, Director, Communications and Emergency Services, Clackamas County
Robert Evans, Disaster Planning Coordinator, Emergency Services Division, State of Oregon
Raymond Friedman, M.D., Disaster Communication Coordinator, H.E.A.R.
Fred Gardner, Director of Regulatory Affairs, Pacific Power & Light Co.
Myra Lee, Emergency Services Coordinator, Multnomah County
James Monahan, Assistant Division Manager, American Red Cross
Gordon Morterud, Fire Chief, City of Portland
James Murphy, Assistant Management Analyst, City of Portland, Bureau of Management
and Budget
Archie Mustard, Plans and Operation Officer, Emergency Services Division, State of Oregon
George Nostrant, General Superintendent and Assistant Vice President,
Pacific Power and Light Company
Roy Schnaible, Portland Division Manager, Pacific Northwest Bell
Ruth Shoepe, Coordinator, Emergency Planning, Washington County
Hugh Tilson, M.D., then Medical Officer, Multnomah County
Joseph B. Vander Veer, Jr., M.D., Director of Emergency Services, Providence Hospital
Eric P. Verheiden, Division Operations, Portland General Electric Co.

APPENDIX D**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Basic Emergency Services Plan for the City of Portland, Oregon. April, 1976.
City Club of Portland. "Emergency Care to the Injured and Stricken in the Portland Area."
Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 9, July 31, 1970.
McCready, Connie. *Proposal to Establish a Comprehensive Emergency Medical Service System
for the City of Portland and Multnomah County.* September 7, 1977.
Office of the State Fire Marshal. *Oregon State Fire Service Plan.* 1974.
Oregon State Emergency Services Division. Numerous articles, disaster planning outlines,
and booklets.
Oregon Trail Chapter, American Red Cross. *Disaster Plan.* (undated)

PROPOSED FOR MEMBERSHIP

If no objections are received by the Executive Secretary prior to September 7, 1979, the following applicants will be accepted for membership:

Gale S. Rankin, R.N. Director of Nursing Services, U of O Health Sciences Center. Sponsored by Elaine L. Orr.

Al Washington, Health Plan Manager, Kaiser Foundation. Sponsored by Mark Knudsen.

Janet M. Spuck, R.N., vice president, Nursing Service, Emanuel Hospital. Sponsored by Patricia K. Buescher.

Theodore Colombo, Director, Dept. of External Affairs, Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Program. Sponsored by Mark Knudsen.

POSTAL WOES OR, LATE IS NEVER BETTER

Your staff has received an avalanche of complaints about late delivery of the weekly Bulletin. Alas, there seems little we can do to effect improvement in postal service.

Bulletins are delivered to the main post office at N.W. Broadway and Hoyt each Tuesday between 5 and 6 pm. From that point on, delivery to your door is in the hands of the central distribution system and the branch post offices. Theoretically, it should take no longer than two days for delivery of Second Class mail, according to post office officials. Since that seems only to be theory, we offer the following suggestions:

1) Check the address on your Bulletin and make sure that all necessary information is there: proper street address or box number; room, suite or apartment number; correct zip code; company name if necessary. If something seems amiss, call the Club office.

2) If your Bulletin is *consistently* late (arrives Friday, Saturday or Monday) contact your branch post office and find out why it is taking so long for delivery. Ask your mailman for assistance.

3) If you are in a large firm or office building, check with the mail delivery

system in your building. Perhaps someone else is getting your mail by mistake.

4) *Read the back of the Bulletin.* The announcement of the next week's program is always there unless we do not have confirmation when we go to press. Rarely (and we mean only 4 times in the past five years) does a speaker cancel at the last minute. You can rely 99 percent of the time on the announcement of the next week's program. Or call the Club office for confirmation.

5) Write to Benjamin Luscher, Postmaster for Portland. His office is in the Broadway & Hoyt building. (City Club member Sid Lezak has a great letter he would probably make available to you.) Perhaps an avalanche of complaints would trigger an internal investigation of the problem.

7) Write your Congressman.

8) Don't give up. If change is inevitable, there is always hope. —C.T.

AUGUST 31: DISASTER RESPONSE

Printed in this issue of the Bulletin is the City Club committee report on "Coordination Among Agencies Involved in Disaster Planning in the Portland Metropolitan Area." This study will be presented to the membership next Friday, August 31, by Committee Chairman *R. J. Okonowski*. Members will have an opportunity to debate and vote on the recommendations contained in the report.

In addition to discussion of the report, we will hear from *William H. Mayer*, Director of the Disaster Response and Recovery Division of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Seattle. Mr. Mayer's basic responsibility is that of administering disaster relief laws in Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Alaska. In this capacity he coordinates activities of all Federal, State, local and volunteer agencies assisting in disaster relief when there is a Presidentially-declared disaster. He is well-versed in the status of disaster response plans in Portland and Oregon, as well as in other cities and states.

Next Week: Disaster — Are We Prepared? Benson Hotel, Mayfair Room, 12:00 noon.