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<https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.350>

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

GERALD H. CONRATH FOR THE MASTER OF SCIENCE IN TEACHING IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Date thesis is presented: May 13, 1968

Title: Leisure, Condition for Man's Freedom

Abstract approved:


(Major Adviser)


(Dean of Graduate Studies)

ABSTRACT

Leisure is defined as a mode of human existence in which the individual is subjectively engaged in the pursuit of an activity solely for the inherent qualities in the activity. This concept, derived from the writings of Aristotle, is in direct conflict with the popularly held assumption that leisure is parcelled out and measured in quantities of time. Leisure is dependent upon the existence in a human life of time free from work, but free time, or "leisure time," is by no means the same as leisure.

The attitudes appropriate to leisure, as described in the study, are spontaneity, solitude, and renouncement of competition. Without such attitudes, man cannot be subjectively involved in the re-creation of himself, nor can he create and comprehend the magnitude of the full human life. Just as the alienated individual is not a free individual, the competitive, busy man is not a free man, for he is tied to a work-ethic which pays little respect to the subjective qualities in experience. The human condition, it is argued in the study, is one of ambiguity which requires man to define himself and decide who he wishes to be. It is only in the state of freedom that the individual can choose. Freedom, then, is dependent upon leisure in which man is open to the multiplicity of qualities in experience.

The difference between leisure as time, a contradiction in terms, and time to be at leisure, is significant. Man divides his time into three categories: subsistence time in which he works at the functions required to maintain himself; existence time in which he personally

cares for himself and his home; and free time in which he engages in non-work activities. In free time man is using unsold time that is not directed by an employer or customer. It is argued in this study that very little of man's free time, in modern competitive capitalism, is free from the work-ethic. To the contrary, most free time is spent pursuing activities that resemble one's work, particularly in that it is competitive and "useful." With "time on one's hands," modern man in our culture, the alienated man, is uneasy, for he may "waste" time on activities that have no measurable gain (Contemplation cannot be measured, nor can loafing.) As Sebastian de Grazia states, "A man sitting under a tree thinking and smoking will be described as a man smoking." Smoking is outwardly observable while thinking is inner-directed.

The conclusions reached in this thesis are that a sophisticated society like the United States need not require a conservative ideology suitable to a "leisure class" to provide a justification for leisure. Technology, freed from the work-ethic, can make the opportunity for leisure available to all humans in a society based on equality. The individual's position in the production-consumption cycle is no longer a valid measure of the quality of a human life, for the development of uniqueness in each individual is a value in itself. Should leisure become the social ideal, work will take its proper place in the full human life and not constitute the dominant factor. The free man in a free society requires leisure as the central goal.

LEISURE, CONDITION OF MAN'S FREEDOM

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in Teaching

by

Gerald H. Conrath

May 1968

APPROVED:

[REDACTED]

Professor of Political Science in Charge of Major

[REDACTED]

Head of Department of Political Science

[REDACTED]

Dean of Graduate Studies

Date thesis is presented May 24, 1968

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PART ONE: LEISURE AS A HUMAN ACTIVITY

LEISURE DEFINED

If it is true that the life-long search of man through the ages is to find a way to become master of himself, I think it is clear the search is not yet over. Somewhere between the decline of Mediterranean, classical civilization and the dawn of the cybernetic, technological civilization, man lost the willingness to contemplate. A contemplative society based upon the work of human slaves and the ideology of a free-citizen elite has been, after about two thousand years, replaced by a competitive society based upon the work of machine-regulated and adjusted citizens and the ideology of a business and industrial elite. In the former case leisure and the cultural benefits that can only come through it was the privilege of the elite while the workers received the "advantage" of being part of a civilization making monumental esthetic, economic, intellectual, and political contributions to future generations. In the second case leisure is denied to all, as it has little compatibility with the ideology and the workers receive the benefit of sharing in the fruits of the production process as consumers.

In Mediterranean, classical civilization, leisure was an end in itself and, according to Aristotle, was necessary for happiness. Work was aimed at a goal beyond itself. Work was considered necessary and useful for society to enjoy the beautiful and the good. In the ideology of modern industrial civilization work is all too frequently considered an end in itself and leisure is an alien,

heretical idea that has been replaced by the consumption-oriented concept of recreation. The pursuit of the beautiful and the good has been sacrificed to the promotion of the necessary and the useful. Modern man has overlooked being his own master in favor of increased spending power. He is mastered by others, by dogmas, by systems, and by goals, all of which thrive on his being busy, non-engaged with his fellow humans, and disinterested in his true self.

In classical Athens the highest aim in life was leisure, that time in which man was his own master, and the good life was one of contemplation when man could be in tune with his truest self. It is this concept of life and an attempt to revive to a supreme position in the lives of men the love of the beautiful and the good that is the theme of a few thinkers in our time, most notably Josef Pieper in Germany and Sebastian de Grazia in the United States. Many writers, of course, now express concern for such themes as the negative effect of industrialization and urbanization on the life of man and human values and the restoration of the idealistic and humanistic basis of culture within which man can participate. What makes Pieper and De Grazia notable for a study of leisure is that they begin their concern with an examination of the thought of Aristotle. To base one's ideas on Aristotle's is, of course, not notable for its uniqueness, but rather for the challenge it offers modern thinkers who must ultimately deal with the society at hand rather than a super-imposed reconstruction of classical Athens. Modern thinking on leisure, happiness, and the good life can begin with Aristotle, but it must not end there.

To Aristotle, all life was "divided into work and leisure, war and peace."¹ Man chose war for the sake of peace just as he chose work for the sake of leisure. Education was to make one capable of leisure and peace, with the superior man being especially marked by the capacity to behave well in periods of peace and leisure. Leisure was taken very seriously by Aristotle as he insisted in The Politics that a great deal of time and effort was required for one to prepare for spending time at leisure. He requested of his fellow Athenians that they do not always ask "what's the use" of some activity or learning, but to concentrate on ideas and subjects that have intrinsic merit. Leisure, then, was to be cultivated, worked for, and taught, and "there must be present in the state the virtues that lead to the cultivation of leisure."² It was everybody's business, citizen and slave, to make the life of contemplation and the enjoyment of leisure possible. The state was to not only guide the political destinies of the people, but to promote "the virtues" of intellectual ability, restraint, and honesty in the state itself as well as in the individual citizens who were to be working for leisure. Leisure was not a block of time when man was not working, but it was an ideal, engagement in an activity that was worthwhile and valuable for its own sake. Leisure, to Aristotle, was not to be thought of as a means to a higher end, but as an end in itself. From leisure came the potential

¹Aristotle, The Politics, Trans. T. A. Sinclair (Baltimore, Md., 1962), p. 287.

²Aristotle, Politics, p. 290.

for happiness, but the purpose of a free individual's life was to live it in accordance with virtue. The man at leisure was the man living the contemplative life, an active life of the highest nature. The activity of contemplation was the only activity or engagement that contained a complete intrinsic value, for the only result of contemplation was the act of contemplation. An individual engaged in the act of contemplation was intellectually involved in the process of life, of being human; as such he was doing what only a free individual can do. Through this leisure he not only perfected himself but contributed directly and indirectly to the free institutions of his state and society. The highest level of human existence was to be reached through leisure when not only was man employing his reason but he was also capable of listening to reason. To Aristotle "the life of the intellect is the best and pleasantest for man, because the intellect more than anything else is the man. Thus it will be the happiest life as well."³ The happy life, which could be evaluated only at a very great age, was to be one compatible with the humanness of man, a subjective life of the intellect. The contemplative life was the process by which the end sought in human life, happiness, was attainable. The human condition in which contemplation could function was the most human of all activities, leisure.

³Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, trans. J. A. K. Thompson (Baltimore, Md., 1953), p. 305.

Many activities, such as military and political, were considered vital to human existence by Aristotle, but one must never mistake them for what they are not. There are pursued for the sake of other goals and not chosen for their own sake. As such they are necessary, but they are incompatible with leisure which must involve activities chosen entirely for their own sake.

A possible confusion here is the concept that "to have happiness, one must have leisure."⁴ One could easily interpret this to be a contradiction in Aristotle since he insists that leisure must be for no other goal. I think Aristotle's position is clear the leisure is a necessary condition to the contemplative life which in turn is fundamental to happiness. What is significant to an understanding of Aristotle is not the placement of leisure in the existence-essence duality, but the state of mind with which one approaches leisure. For Aristotle's thought to be seen as consistent, leisure must be conceived as a highly subject-oriented concept. The objective activity itself may be irrelevant, although Aristotle recommends some that he clearly prefers, but importance lies in the attitude the individual holds toward what he is doing. If he is performing a task for the sake of some other goal he is not at leisure. If he is doing something for its own sake, he is. Leisure opens the door to the happy life, but it is not sought for the sake of happiness. The latter, according to Aristotle, comes through the pursuit of activities proper to man's nature, the intellectual engagement of contemplation, and the activity that involves the total being, leisure.

⁴ Aristotle, Ethics, p. 304.

The Aristotelean definition of leisure is not the only current one, for modern sociologists prefer another frame of reference when discussing contemporary society and man's usable time that is not devoted to work. However, it is important to understand the ideas held by De Grazia and Pieper before moving on, for their thought is classical and Aristotelean in content.

Josef Pieper's thoughts on leisure, expressed in a series of lectures at the time of the post-WWII reconstruction of Germany, are primarily a plea for modern man to reconsider the Greeks before rushing any further toward a secularized, objectified civilization. In Leisure: the Basis of Culture he argues that leisure is the foundation of Western culture; a foundation that we have neglected since the decline of the Middle Ages. His position is that once all men are expected to work for their livelihood, as an ethic, the concept of work replaces the concept of leisure as the highest good. Where the Greeks thought of life as either leisurely or unleisurely, modern, Western man thinks of work and non-work, or free time. We should work, argues Pieper, in order to live, i.e., to have leisure. Leisure and a leisure-ethic should be the logos of human existence rather than work and the work-ethic.

Pieper is as critical of what he considers idleness as he is of the work-ethic. He considers work essential to life, but he insists that it remain as a means to a higher end. Idleness, however, is a condition where man renounces the claim implicit in his human dignity. He denies both work and leisure and does not want to be what he fundamentally is; he refuses to be himself. He negates both the means

and the end of a full human life. The idle person in Pieper's thought would be one who has not engaged his intellect in living and who is incapable of contemplation. In non-work time he would find only boredom and emptiness. He is one who is unaware of what Pieper considers the "philosophical act," "an attitude which presupposes silence, a contemplative attention to things, in which man begins to see how worth of veneration they really are."⁵ Pieper goes beyond Aristotle in his concentration on the openness required on the part of the individual engaged in contemplation. He distinguishes between observation, which he considers a tense activity aimed at the possession of knowledge or experience, and contemplation which "means to open one's eyes receptively to whatever offers itself to one's vision, and the things seen enter into us, so to speak, without calling for any effort or strain on our part to possess them."⁶ The observer, or possessor, is much too influenced, according to Pieper, by post-Renaissance philosophy which is rationally oriented and approaches philosophy as active work. Pieper's position is that "the philosophical act" is a passive, receptive act with emphasis on the intuitional. Only in leisure can the individual be open to release the intuition, the receptiveness to the unique experience. Where Aristotle's ideal man is intellectually engaged in the act of contemplation, Pieper's is open to the emotional impact of experience. The great similarity of the two thinkers is their positions that

⁵Josef Pieper, Leisure: the Basis of Culture, trans. Alexander Dru (New York, 1963), p. 18.

⁶Pieper, Leisure, p. 25.

leisure cannot be a means to another end, and that it is the foundation of meaningful human existence. In Pieper's words, "Leisure cannot be achieved at all when it is sought as a means to an end, even though that end be 'the salvation of Western civilization.'"⁷ A fundamental difference between Aristotle and Pieper, however, is that Aristotle sees leisure as a total human activity, and Pieper's man-at-leisure is passive and receptive. Contemplation to the former is involvement and to the latter is openness to what is offered.

Sebastian de Grazia, in his study for the Twentieth Century Fund, does not go as far beyond Aristotle as does Pieper. De Grazia sees leisure very much as a state of mind rather than a block of time; a position he shares with both Aristotle and Pieper. Where Aristotle insists that leisure is freedom from the necessity to labor, De Grazia sees it as freedom from the necessity of being occupied. De Grazia is more concerned than Pieper with the effect of the clock and time on modern living, particularly its effect on attitudes toward leisure. We are, he states, enslaved to an idol--the clock--and time is our master. De Grazia argues that the phrase "leisure time" is a contradiction of terms since time is measurable and quantitative and leisure, as a state of mind in pursuit of an activity for its own sake, is qualitative and has no dependence on time. Therefore, he distinguishes between free time, time free from work thus dependent upon work since one must first work to have it, and leisure, a concept outside of time and an activity of the mind. He states it the

⁷Pieper, p. 62.

following way: "Free time is opposed to work, is temporarily absence from work, but leisure has as little to do with work as with time. If someone has to work it means he has to do something not for its own sake but for money or something else. Therefore it is not leisure. A man of leisure, however, may be intensely engaged in something which an innocent observer might call hard work. The difference is that its end or pursuit was chosen for its own sake."⁸ Like Aristotle, then, what is important is not the physical activity, but the state of mind in which one approaches the activity. It is either leisurely or it is not, and only the individual can fully determine what the case is. From the outside we can only watch and speculate, we cannot be judgmental.

Since non-work time is an increasing phenomenon of industrialism with which social scientists concern themselves, De Grazia's book Of Time, Work, and Leisure, is receiving attention. Most of the writing done recently on the subject of leisure has been done by sociologists who, however, differ with De Grazia's concepts. De Grazia is generally considered, and rightly so I think, the chief spokesman today of the Aristotelean position. A second school of thought, held by modern sociology, is that leisure and free time are synonymous. This position is expressed articulately by Erwin O. Smigel, editor of the study Work and Leisure. Smigel argues that De Grazia's concept is too complex because of the difficulty in objectively measuring subject-oriented phenomena. In other words, Smigel sees the study of leisure

⁸Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work, and Leisure (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), p. 331.

(free time) as pointless unless we can determine through social science methods what an individual is doing with his non-work time. The study of leisure to Smigel is a study of behavior, a study that is possible because it arbitrarily labels all free time as leisure, rather than a study of attitudes and states of being. This way leisure is taken as a particular kind of time. By using this definition of leisure, as time not occupied by necessity, social scientists can undoubtedly make significant contributions to the study and development of man in the industrial, urban culture. I applaud these studies for I think they are needed in a culture that is far too dedicated to work and the production-consumption process. However, the weakness of this concept is just that it is a scientific study of overt behavior and not an attempt to come to terms with the fundamental condition of man. Man in society is a thinking and feeling animal as well as a performing animal and we need to question all three interrelated aspects of man's nature: the intellectual, the emotional, and the physical. Leisure, in the Aristotelean sense, is a phenomenon of the intellectual and the emotional which may or may not include the physical. As a subjective experience it can seldom be measured objectively. Therefore, I prefer the term "leisure" to remain in the tradition of Aristotle, Pieper, and De Grazia, as a subjective involvement in an experience that is not work-related. What is significant is the position of subjectivity over objectivity and intention over action.

The sensations of leisure—spontaneity, renouncement of competition, and solitude—are attitudes. They are all qualitative

concepts that cannot be measured just as leisure is a qualitative fulfillment of a human capacity for inner experience. It is the realization of self through the re-creation of the self. It is an activity of the free spirit: a logos for the entire day of an individual. An attitude of leisure places everything else in the human life-cycle in the perspective of the basic humanness of man. It is with this in mind that the man who can be at leisure is the free man, one who is constantly in touch with not only what he is, but who he chooses to be.

With an attitude of leisure comes a detachment and objectivity toward time which frees man. From the position of freedom, time becomes at least secondary and man can see each situation as potentially a nothingness to which he alone must supply meaning; he subjectively engages himself in experience with no pre-determined conclusions. In existential terms, existence as a human precedes essence as an individual. In this way he selects himself because he has an openness that comes with no other state of mind. With a leisure attitude as a logos, man is open to meaning and delight in all situations and experiences, since every event in the life of man proceeds from nothing to something as man enters the situation, engages himself, and creates the meaning, just as the life of an individual proceeds from nothing to something as the person begins to choose who he wants to be. For the purposes of this study, then, I would define leisure as a state of being in which activity is pursued for its own sake and man is subjectively engaged in re-creating himself in a continuous process of approaching situations for

qualities inherent in the experience. This is really little more than Aristotle, Pieper, and De Grazia with an existential concept of the human situation.

It would be significant to briefly explain the relationship between time and leisure. I do not fully agree with De Grazia that leisure is totally unrelated to time. It is true that man can feel at leisure in a minute as well as an hour or a day if he has the openness necessary for a leisure condition. It is also true that an attitude of leisure sets the entire life-style of an individual. However, I do argue that one must have free time to be at leisure. Either one must never work (as De Grazia ultimately recommends for those who "have it") or one must have time free of work in order to engage in the openness of leisure. Leisure, then, is not free time, but it is dependent upon free time. Free time, as time either unsold or undirected, or both, is dependent upon work, but leisure is dependent upon only having time available to pursue activities for their own sake. Seldom can one be at leisure working, no matter how much one's work may resemble an activity pursued in free time, since work is done to finish a task, earn money, or both. Free time is a concept that is quantitative (so many hours spent not working) and negative (not sold, and not directed). Leisure, to the contrary, is both qualitative (a state of being) and positive (openness). I think this distinction is necessary even though it is clearly obvious that one must have some time available before leisure is possible. The significance is that one does not judge the quality of leisure by the quantitative criteria of blocks of time. It is, again, an inward experience rather than an outward manifestation.

LEISURE AS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE HUMAN CONDITION

The humanness in man is not totally satisfied through the process of work. If the preceding statement were false there would be no significance to the study of leisure. Since it is not false it is important that some effort is spent discussing the contrasts between work and leisure with a brief discussion of the importance of leisure to human consciousness.

In her book, The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt separates human activity into three categories. Labor is that which is necessary to merely continue life and maintain the environment with no human creativity involved nor any significant changes taking place as a result of the effort. Most housework would come under this category as would janitorial service, and, at least in the minds of the employee, most factory production. Unhappily, the majority of adults in the United States spend over eight hours a day (more than one-third of their time) at labor. Work is that type of activity where change does take place in one's environment as a result of the effort and human creativity is involved to varying degrees. With the rapid increase of managerial and white-collar jobs in both government and business bureaucracy, the majority of middle-class Americans think they should be working when they in fact feel they are laboring, by Miss Arendt's definition. It is this cultural commitment to work and labor that is the main interest of much of the second part of this study, but even though this is a study of leisure which is more compatible with Miss Arendt's third category, action, rather than work and labor, it is necessary to investigate briefly the differences between them in their importance to man.

De Grazia argues that it is impossible to determine whether the human condition prefers work or leisure since society places such obvious rewards, the right to life and security, on work. Furthermore, work and freedom are so separated that the individual's desires are immersed in the syndrome of the work-ethic. Do workers work hard because they like work or because they fear no work? How can we tell when no work is so devastating to the individual? On the other hand, are the habitually unemployed reluctant to seek a job because they don't like work or because they fear the humiliation of refusal? It is really impossible to answer these questions with knowledge presently available. De Grazia does venture the assumption that, "The less the time, place, and movements can be chosen by the worker himself, the more likely he will be to seek relief by avoiding work."⁹ Work and labor, then, are not only regulated and controlled by others than the worker, but they are generally so confining in physical nature that it seems safe to assume that the individual does not seek them as expressions of his human potential. As long as work requires that the individual subject himself to relative discomfort and control by others he will probably avoid it. However, as long as work is required for mental, social, and economic security he will seek it. What we cannot ask is that he remain untroubled and unconfused by the contradictions of the cultural attitudes toward work.

Pieper argues that we need to begin seeing man as a complex human rather than as a "worker." "A new and changing conception

⁹De Grazia, p. 157.

of the very meaning of human existence--that is what comes to light in the claims expressed in the modern notion of 'work' and 'worker.'¹⁰ In modern social terminology we describe an individual by what he does to earn his right to live, we say what he is, rather than define his human qualities, we do not say who he is. We de-personalize individuals by identifying them with their job. Their work, or labor, or job become the logos of their life-style rather than leisure, or what Arendt calls action.

Ben Seligman argues that the tragedy of the modern human is that one can only influence society through work in spite of the contradictory nature of work to individual freedom. According to Daniel Bell, "The most characteristic fact about the American factory worker today--and probably the worker in factories in other countries as well--is his lack of interest in work. Few individuals think of 'the job' as a place to seek fulfillment."¹¹ Bell's and Seligman's positions lead to that of Pieper when the latter claims that "the power to know leisure is the power to overstep the boundaries of the workaday world and reach out to superhuman, life-giving existential forces that refresh and renew us before we turn back to our daily work."¹² (But not, it must be remembered, in order to turn back to work!) Human values are saved and preserved, and one's being is affirmed in leisure, not work. Leisure may aid work in that it is

¹⁰Pieper, pp. 22-23.

¹¹Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York, 1961), pp. 390-391.

¹²Pieper, p. 44.

restorative, but it does not serve work. Rest can be pursued for the sake of work, but leisure cannot. Work is business, toil, and serves a social function; leisure is "an attitude of non-activity, of inward calm, of silence,"¹³ of not being busy, of letting things happen, and of being at one with one's self and the world.

With these wide differences between the concepts of work and leisure it is indeed regrettable that modern culture has been so closely identified with the former. What we have, at best, is a work culture with free time as a fringe benefit. When full industrialism is guided by the work-ethic it is unlikely that leisure will become the fundamental aspect of life and work the secondary, human need to the contrary, for it would sacrifice efficiency and material well-being. This is what I consider the great lag in our time: that in spite of man's need for leisure and a leisure-ethic, modern industrial society has united work with culture. The latter is dependent upon the former, and leisure is confused with a measurable quantity, free time.

I have attempted to point out above that only through leisure can man free himself to the openness required for him to make choices about his life that reflect his true nature or condition. When man is at work he seldom if ever entertains the attitudes of leisure: renouncement of competition, spontaneity, and solitude. The negation of these attitudes inhibits man and makes it possible for him to remain unfree for long durations of time. If man is closed to spontaneity it is probable that he has little desire to choose who he

¹³Pieper, p. 40.

wants to be. He willingly allows others to choose for him. This condition of negation of freedom is what Erich Fromm calls "false consciousness." "Only if false consciousness is transformed into true consciousness, that is, only if we are aware of reality, rather than distorting it by rationalizing and fictions, can we also become aware of our real and true human needs."¹⁴ The argument presented here is that the individual must discover his true human needs, and the human condition requires an attitude of leisure for the freedom that is necessary to open the consciousness to an awareness of these needs. Man has both an objective and subjective nature; he is a member of society and as such must interact with other members with honesty, i.e., in good faith, and he is himself, which requires that he live an authentic existence by not trying to be who he does not elect to be. "Human reality includes the possibility of solitude, where subjectivity can have free play, and life in society, where the objective nature is dominant. The life of the individual is a tension between these two poles, neither of which offers a permanent refuge."¹⁵ This is the ambiguity of human existence, that man finds refuge in neither his existence nor his essence, but his life constantly fluctuates between the polarity of the objective and subjective worlds. Man lives in the continuous present which is shaped by both the past, what he has been, and the future, what he wants to

¹⁴Marx's Concept of Man, ed. Erich Fromm (New York, 1964), pp. 21-22.

¹⁵Norman Greene, Sartre: The Existentialist Ethic (Ann Arbor, 1963), pp. 37-38.

be. It is only by an openness to both the rational and intuitional in man, which comes through an attitude of leisure not of work, that man is free to shape his self-identity in the life of ambiguity.

The affirmation of life, which is vital to man, comes when man can control the ambiguity of his existence by meshing the objective with the subjective. Man, by choosing to be something out of the nothingness of the present, becomes the synthesis, or merger, of the polarity. But existence only reveals nothingness when human consciousness is, through the leisure attitude, open to the freshness and uniqueness of experience. If man allows others to deny the nothingness, as he does at work and in activities dominated by work, he is closed off from either affirming life or creating himself and his identity.

Man, like experience, must be revealed as fresh and unique. By describing man, as discussed above, by what he is rather than who he is, we deny that uniqueness, for what man is is that which he has in common with others: where he works, his race or ethnic group, his income level, as a consumer, etc. To know who he is we must know the individual and we can only know him when he is choosing himself, when his being is opened by the leisure attitude. This is what Hannah Arendt means by "action," when man exposes his uniqueness. "The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected of him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable."¹⁶ She argues that we must not continue to allow the process of living and keeping alive through work to replace the con-

¹⁶Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, N.Y., 1959), p. 158.

cept of being. Her position is that in the modern age thinking has excluded contemplation. Thinking is described by Miss Arendt as an "inner dialogue" in which the individual decides what to do, and doing something measurable is what is valued. Thinking as an inner dialogue is very similar to what Pieper considers "observation." Both take place in an attitude of tension and busyness which is antithetical to leisure and contemplation. The latter exposes consciousness to the rational and irrational, where the former, it seems, remains in the rational alone. Reason and sensation in man must together make reality with neither excluding the other. "...The sheer functioning of consciousness...confirms beyond doubt the reality of sensations and of reasoning, that is, the reality of processes which go on in the mind."¹⁷ The free man can accept and cherish both as his reality, and not be intimidated into denying the validity of that which is solely his: the human sensations that he feels, the intuitional, and the spontaneous. It is in this way that the individual can discover what it means to be a human as well as to be human. By freeing the emotional in man the merging of the objective and subjective can be natural rather than contrived. Or as Marx put it in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, "Need and enjoyment have thus lost their egoistic character, and nature has lost its mere utility by the fact that its utilization has

¹⁷Arendt, p. 255.

become human utilization.¹⁸ If man is to synthesize, through his freely chosen self, the objective and the subjective, he is also going to unite the ego with the whole man, or what Marx calls the "human." Thus humanity becomes a community of subjective and free individuals rather than a mere place for objectified and de-personalized egos immersed in work and the work-ethic. This is what Jean-Paul Sartre is describing when he speaks of responsibility for all men. He puts it as follows: "When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses all men. In fact, in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be. To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for us without being good for all."¹⁹ The ethical position here is that we cannot choose for ourselves what we deny to others. If we choose what we think is good for us, we must assume it is good for all and insist upon the right for all to choose it. The work-ethic contradicts this, for it assumes that all must feel obligated to work in an industrial system that requires some to receive less status and material gain than others; where the ethic is

¹⁸Marx's Concept of Man, p. 132.

¹⁹Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York, 1957), p. 17.

one of equality of obligation the practice is one of inequality of gain. With such a dichotomy it seems doubtful that individuals can resist surrendering to the nothingness of an absurd situation. The nothingness which should show man freedom remains constant and man remains absurd, impersonal, and relates to the objective world only through his ego. Thus he does not synthesize the objective and the subjective, and he cannot know the leisure attitude that he fundamentally needs. Competition, lack of contemplative solitude, and fear of spontaneity become negative ways of life. The opposite of these, the attitudes of leisure, are personal and human feelings that are vital to man, if he is to choose who he is rather than what he is.

LEISURE AND THE GOOD LIFE

It is easy enough to see that the whole man, the human, is the man committed to the principle of the happy life. This is an individual as well as social commitment based upon the concept that happiness comes to the freely chosen individual, one who is and is becoming who he chooses to be. The free man, then, is one who is engaged in the process of becoming happy. What restricts man's freedom and capacity for happiness is what is alien to the humanness in man. That which forces man to deny his own reason, intuition, and authenticity binds him to other-imposed values and destroys his freedom. If we are in doubt about what the "good life" is we do know that it is not an alienated life. The free, happy individual who affirms his own being, who can choose the leisure attitude as his personal frame of reference,

is indeed the unalienated individual. Enslavement to the work-ethic, on the other hand, implies a basic depravity in man, ties him to material standards, and closes the door to contemplation and openness to leisure. As Hannah Arendt points out, alienation is ancient in origin. "Ancient world alienation in all its varieties--from stoicism to epicureanism down to hedonism and cynicism--had been inspired by a deep mistrust of the world and moved by a vehement impulse to withdraw from worldly involvement, from the trouble and pain it inflicts, into the security of an inward realm in which the self is exposed to nothing but itself. Their modern counterparts--puritanism, sensualism, and Bentham's hedonism--on the contrary, were inspired by an equally deep mistrust of man as such; they were moved by doubt of the adequacy of human reason to receive truth, and hence by the conviction of the deficiency or even depravity of human nature."²⁰ This withdrawal from involvement in the world and from the subjective self has caused, it seems, man to develop a negative approach to life as something to be either endured or to be manipulated in order to find comfort in exterior modes. The work-ethic, especially in a culture where work is done with automated machinery, feeds upon this individual who finds security in his objective self because this individual can easily be synchronized with a life-rhythm that is not his own. Once he is synchronized he pursues his own alienation in seeking comfort and security. The unalienated individual finds a rhythm that is uniquely his. De Grazia, in

²⁰Arendt, p. 283.

speaking of classical Athens, has made the following statement:

"Leisure was the most precious thing imaginable because only in leisure could a man keep his particular rhythm and discover how it merged with the pervasive rhythm of nature."²¹

I think it is important to consider this point of merging one's particular rhythm with the rhythm of nature. Aristotle points out in his Ethics that happiness extends only as far as does leisure. On this concept De Grazia has said, "The man in contemplation is a free man. He needs nothing. Therefore nothing determines or distorts his thought. He does whatever he loves to do, and what he does is done for its own sake."²² It must be remembered that Aristotle's position is based upon a slave economy with an elite that was economically justified in "doing whatever he loves to do." Leisure, to the Greeks, was found in a particular kind of freedom. Today if we are to find our own particular rhythm we must not assume we have, or should have, the same conditions that prevailed in classical Athens. Man lives in the world, not above it. One of the crucial themes of this study is that freedom is found in leisure, and that freedom and free time are by no means synonymous. If the good life is to be discovered it must be discovered by neither withdrawing from involvement with others nor by owning slaves. On this point Arendt's concept of "action" and Sartre's emphasis on "engagement" are vitally

²¹De Grazia, p. 302.

²²De Grazia, p. 18.

significant. To both, experience is basic to man's life, for experience turns him toward the world and other people rather than withdrawing into himself and away from the world. Fromm has said of Marx's position on self-activity that "man is alive only inasmuch as he is productive, inasmuch as he grasps the world outside of himself in the act of expressing his own specific human powers, and of grasping the world with these powers."²³ It seems to me that both the experiencing and contemplating natures of man must be recognized. It would be just as easy for experience to become an over-emphasis on busyness and succumb to allowing one to let others choose his being as it would for contemplation to become seclusion and withdrawal from living into a refuge in the objective self. Both are alienating, and both would be inauthentic. It is true that the experience of active engagement in a situation and with others requires thinking-in-situation and as such frees the intuitive, just as it is also true what Marx says of human relations. "Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life."²⁴ One's will and one's "real individual life" are discovered in neither contemplation nor experience alone, but in both, just as the intuitive and the rational are necessary components of the intellect. The unalienated individual freely chooses his essence from the nothingness of his existence. This free choice, it seems, should come from contemplation

²³Marx's Concept of Man, p. 29.

²⁴Marx's Concept of Man, p. 168.

as well as from experience.

We must assume, then, that the good life is that which values highly the individuality that springs from contemplation and the experience of human involvement. If one is engaged in living the good life one is not preoccupied with the greed of having, but is filled with the joy of being. To Aristotle the ideal life was that of intellectual activity. To many, perhaps most, modern Americans it is epitomized by the slogan, "a full day's pay for a full day's work." As De Grazia sees it (but not to De Grazia), "The good life consists in the people's enjoyment of whatever industry produces, advertisers sell, and government orders."²⁵ The role of industry and advertising in the denial of a basically human good life will be discussed in Part Two of this study so it need not detain the reader here. The chief concern is to consider what leisure is, for "we must know what leisure is before we can tell anyone how to make life worth living."²⁶ My position here is that the good life is dependent upon an acceptance of a leisure ideal. Max Kaplan has argued that "The phrase good leisure cannot make sense without a prior conception of the good life."²⁷ I would just reverse that, although I agree with Kaplan that the reward of leisure is freedom, to be completely ourselves, rather than pleasure. Much pleasure can be found in leisure, to be sure, but to be seeking pleasure as a goal is not to be at leisure. Leisure

²⁵De Grazia, p. 279.

²⁶De Grazia, p. 226.

²⁷Max Kaplan, Leisure in America (New York, 1960), p. 161.

and the good life are also not just non-activity. Pieper has compared leisure to "the tranquil silence of lovers,"²⁸ and sees an interesting comparison in that "a man at leisure is not unlike a man at sleep."²⁹ The significance of these statements of Pieper's is the identification of the good life, of leisure, with inner peace and tranquility. He argues that we should have the deep confidence to let things happen, to let things take their course, to accept reality and celebrate it. Pieper sees the universe as rational and man's role is to accept and enjoy what is. This should not, however, deny to us the validity of his position regarding peace and tranquility. The individual who is open to the possibilities provided by the ambiguity of the human condition should indeed celebrate reality because he is celebrating his fundamental affirmation of life and his oneness with himself; he is celebrating his freedom. Pieper identifies the educated man as "a man with a point of view from which he takes in the whole world," and one "capable of grasping the totality of existing things."³⁰ As argued above, man's point of view, or man's education and knowledge come from both the rational and the intuitional, both experience and contemplation. The unalienated individual, one who is capable of maintaining a leisure attitude and identifying with a leisure ideal, is free to "grasp the totality of existing things." The unalienated individual is not at all unlike a man falling asleep, for he has the courage to see the potentiality for good in situations

²⁸ Pieper, p. 42

²⁹ Pieper, p. 41.

³⁰ Pieper, p. 36.

as they come to him. He is not imbued with the moral of the work-ethic, that the greater the difficulty the greater the virtue; hence, hard work is good. It is this denial of the good life, of leisure, that is the basis of modern industrial culture. Jules Henry claims that man's "capacity to use his culture against himself may yet overtake man and destroy him while he works on his ultimate problem--learning to live with himself."³¹ In order to learn to live with himself, man must be free of other-imposed ethics and morals that strive to pull him in one direction or another away from his own being. Again, the capacity for leisure opens man to the nothingness in situations, thereby freeing him to make of it what he will. Once he has made something of it by engaging himself it becomes his own, not in a possessive sense, but through the confidence he has in his freedom.

The voluntary nature of the leisure attitude and the freedom it provides for situations strike me as quite similar to the position taken by Johan Huizinga in his book, Homo Ludens, where he describes play, which is free and voluntary (as well as taking place in free time) as an experience in which "there is something 'at play' which transcends the immediate needs of life and imparts meaning to the action."³² The unalienated man at leisure does have something in him which is "at play" and is "transcending the immediate needs of life."

³¹Jules Henry, Culture Against Man (New York, 1963), p. 11.

³²Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston, 1950), p. 1.

The good life should show us that what is fun is at least, if not more than, as significant as what is difficult. Play, which is pursued in leisure, not work, requires that we release the spontaneity in us. "The very existence of play continually confirms the supra-logical nature of the human situation....We play and know that we play, so we must be more than merely rational beings, for play is irrational."³³ David Riesman has put it this way. "Play, far from having to be the residue sphere left over from work-time and work-feeling, can increasingly become the sphere for the development of skill and competence in the art of living."³⁴ The good life is to be lived, and leisure provides us with the state of mind conducive to living.

³³Huizinga, pp. 3-4.

³⁴David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd (Garden City, N.Y., 1953), p. 315.

PART TWO: TIME IN AMERICA

THE DIVISION OF TIME

Although this study is devoted to the concept of leisure, which, as discussed above, is not a time-oriented concept, it is necessary to consider how Americans use time. One reason for this is that modern man in the United States lives in an industrial, clock-centered society. Also, by studying the breakdown of an individual's day, we can try to determine if it is true, as so many are telling us, that the modern American has more "leisure" than ever before. Finally, my contention is that the modern American is incapable of leisure, not from inherent weaknesses in man, but because of the nature of the American economic, cultural, and value systems which are reflected in the way he spends his time. A multitude of factors stand between Americans today and the freedom they could have if they could be open to leisure.

Employers and employees alike are confused when they speak in terms of a "work week." Usually they refer to this in terms of a 35, 38, or 40 hour week with extra pay for overtime work. Man sells his time to his employer, or customers in the case of the self-employed, and views his 24 hour cycle in that frame of reference. It is true that the hours of the official work week are declining. But does that necessarily offer the individual more free time, or leisure in the popular definition? De Grazia has pointed out, for example, that only with the coming of the Industrial Revolution and private enterprise does the worker pay for his own time while transporting

himself to and from work. "It is the worker, not the employer, who pays for time spent in traveling to work and back, just as it is the worker who pays for the toll of factory smoke on health and hygiene of home and person."³⁵ Yet what union or legislator today would suggest that the travel time, which De Grazia estimates at 8 1/2 hours a week, should be included in the worker's work week? Is it free time? As time unsold, it certainly is, but, except for listening to the radio while driving, or for the man who clearly delights in his car pool companionship, for what is the traveler freed? His basic purpose while getting to and from work is just that, to get to and from work. His time, for the most part, is not his, but his employer's. If we add this to the 40 hour work week we easily have a 48 1/2 hour work week. To be sure, De Grazia may be accused of exaggerating the travel time for many of the employed, but I do not think by far, if at all. Few of us spend less than an hour from the time we leave home to the time we actually begin our official work even when we are operating at a highly efficient level. If the adjusted work week of 48 1/2 hours is subtracted from the hours in a week we now have 119 1/2 hours that an individual does not need for his subsistence.

A night's sleep, pursued for the sake of being rested for work, is clearly not leisure. Sleep, like eating and matters of personal hygiene, is neither free time nor subsistence time. A human existence is dependent upon these activities even when work is not; therefore, I think it is necessary to further subtract the hours

³⁵De Grazia, p. 135.

spent on these activities in order to come to a realistic picture of the time that an individual in the United States has in which the potential for leisure exists. Probably an average of 7 hours sleep a night is adequate to give us a workable number. That would mean 49 hours sleep a week reducing the total free time hours to 70.5. If we assume that an individual eats on the average of 2 hours a day and spends another hour on personal hygiene the total is further reduced to 49.5 hours per week. In order to complete the hours spent on subsistence and existence it is necessary to consider the time used by the individual for household work and chores. This is a difficult area to handle because much of the activity in this line may be considered by some to be leisure even on the terms I have established in this study. This is entirely possible, but I do not think that many individuals, no matter how much enjoyment they may receive from gardening for example, pursue household and yard maintenance as an end in itself. It is fair, I think, to assume that the desired end lies closer to upkeep, status, resale value, or to simply have a nice home and yard for one's family to enjoy. De Grazia argues that a weekly average of 7 hours is not too high and I am inclined to agree with him, although again it is significantly flexible from individual to individual. By accepting his figures the total free time per week left to the individual is now reduced to 42.5 hours. This is high and no doubt much higher than in past years. What is important, I think, is that it is considerably less than one would generally assume when considering the "rapid growth" of free time in

the United States. We must also keep in mind that abundance does not necessarily mean an increase in free time. If the affluent decides to move to suburbia to enjoy his "leisure" in the fresh air he must be prepared to consider the increase in not only travel time to and from work which may substantially increase his work time but also his increased travel expenses which will reduce his potential for enjoyment of his free time that is left. He may even take on another job to pay the increased bills, further reducing his free time. It is safe to claim, I think, that the newly won "leisure age" is a myth. Forty-two and one-half hours a week is relatively little, even if every minute of it indeed was free time, on which to build a democratized renaissance. As we will see later, few if any of those 42 1/2 hours are spent sitting under a tree contemplating.

So far I have not considered overtime work. Overtime would be a factor if it were not that at the moment of writing the United Auto Workers are in the process of demanding a reduction of overtime. According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics one third of the nation's work force, i.e., about 25 million individuals, work in excess of 40 hours a week. That is, we must keep in mind, official work hours. Overtime, according to the newsarticle, has become a "way of life," for employers find it cheaper than hiring additional workers. This is logical but annoying with an unemployment figure of about 4 per cent. Currently many contract clauses require workers to work overtime if the employer wishes which leaves the worker no control over that particular block of

"free time." (It is also a commentary on the widely held point of view that all one needs to be induced into working is enough economic incentive!) It is worth noting in this connection that the Auto Workers are apparently interested in increasing free time even at the cost of decreasing take home pay.³⁶

If, however, one third of the nation's labor force is working in excess of an official 40 hours a week, the 42 1/2 hour figure I came up with is for many workers a very high one. We also need to understand that of the adult population in the United States I have been primarily concerned with the segment that probably works the shortest weekly hours. Housewives, professionals, business executives, and small proprietors probably work far in excess of an official 40 hour week. Even small proprietors, solo lawyers, and industrious, frightened white-collar workers must travel to and from work, eat, sleep, etc. which would require that these people spend about 119 1/2 hours weekly on subsistence and existence. It would be unsafe to say that income is the sole purpose for one working a strenuous and long work week. The evidence that many employed are seeking more free time than those who are self employed, professionals, or managers indicates to me that there is an obvious desire for more out of life than purchasing power no matter how strong a drive the latter may be. When the group that sells its time to others wants to sell less of it, and the group that can find some outlet for creativity in

³⁶Samuel Sharkey, "Overtime Control Sought by UAW," (Portland, Oregon, July 16, 1967), The Oregonian, 4F.

their work and can involve more of their whole being in the enterprise wants to increase the effort the argument is strong that man dreams of more than income. Both groups indicate a capacity to be motivated by something other than a work-ethic. Both groups are economically in a position to discover leisure. Neither, however, is likely to enjoy it under existing circumstances.

The "leisure problem," as many socially concerned like to call it, is not however of the magnitude one study indicates: "The 40-hour week may drop to 32, and some even predict an eventual decrease to 24 hours in the manufacturing industries. This condition may mean that the working man may have from 72 to 80 hours per week available as discretionary time."³⁷ I think that De Grazia's position is far more realistic than the above as a breakdown of man's division of time; especially when one considers work time to be more complex than the official concept that only counts the actual involvement in producing goods and services.

Free time, as discussed in Part One, is, unlike leisure, dependent upon work. It is time unsold and not directed by one's employer, clients, or customers. Unhappily some of those least likely to feel free are among those with the greatest amount of time that fits the above definition. These are the individuals who through a production-consumption oriented economy are inhumanly brutalized into having free time: the involuntarily retired, the intermittently

³⁷ Reynold E. Carlson, Theodore R. Deppe, and Janet R. MacLean, Recreation in American Life (Belmont, Calif., 1963), p. 508.

unemployed, and, worst of all, the chronically unemployed. To say that these people have leisure is a cruel joke. There is little if anything about the lives of most of these economically "useless" humans that leaves them open to discover inherent meaning in situations and experiences. To be subjectively engaged in re-creating themselves is a luxury the work-ethic does not allow. Nevertheless, it is still evident that free time is a factor in the lives of most Americans. In spite of all the social, economic, and political problems inherent in unplanned, industrialized, urbanized society three conditions of civilized living are apparent: 1- there are more disposable hours that do not need to be sold in the market-place; 2- there is more disposable energy unspent in the process of earning a living and unwasted by ill health; and 3- there is more disposable income beyond that which is needed to satisfy man's basic material needs. The potentiality for man's freedom is within our grasp. However, few have made the choice of freedom over boredom, as we shall see.

FILLING FREE TIME IN THE UNITED STATES

One of the great ironies of modern living is that many of the industrial employed work long hours in industries that produce free-time goods, and then spend much of their free time in work-oriented activities. The amount of business contracts that are negotiated during a golf game is probably exaggerated in American folk-lore, but the truth of the observation is obvious enough to have become a

cliche in modern fiction and non-fiction writing. Expense accounts for entertainment, tax deductions, and compulsive participation in evening activities, clubs, and organizations which enhance one's prestige either because of the status attached to the organization or because of the socially satisfying image of service are pervasive facts of American life.

What Riesman termed the "other-directed" personality is the individual who, either afraid of leisure or ignorant of its freeing qualities, spends his free time doing what most resembles his work. Free time to many is little but time to engage in work-like activities that will bring status, prestige, job advancement, self improvement, and other qualities that come under the heading of "wise use of leisure time," or "useful employment of one's free time." The prevalence of such words as "useful," "wise use," and "employment" when discussing such activities is revealing of the connotation these people give to free time. It is, as I said, to be spent doing what most resembles one's work: competing at games, impressing one's neighbors and bosses, and attending cultural events that are widely publicized, densely attended (especially by the "right" people), and generally "uplifting." The American businessman, when he does not bring home work in his briefcase at least brings home as much of the office atmosphere as he possibly can. He will not be caught wasting his free time sitting under a tree. When he goes out he wants the whole cultural-package: entertainment, atmosphere, prestige, improvement, and self-esteem.

Others, however, do not need to use their free time in work-imitating activities. To these, primarily the industrial employed, free time is all too frequently conceived of as time to kill before going back to work. Increasing amounts of free time may only make many individuals aware of their own self-limitations. Free time exposes them to how incredibly bored with themselves they are. Instead of creating themselves they discover that they are the most dull people they know. This must be the height of alienation (or, more accurately, depth). Finding a continuous vacuum within themselves, they must escape themselves. Free time to them, is indeed in Robert MacIver's terms "the Great Emptiness." It must be killed or fled. "One doesn't just go bowling; one joins a league. One doesn't waltz for pleasure, but to improve physical fitness. Or one becomes involved in spectatorship, busyness, and boredom."³⁸ To both the one who finds only emptiness in free time and the one who feels compelled to imitate work, free time becomes a very expensive luxury. According to Seligman, approximately 16 per cent of total family income is spent on occupying free time.³⁸ Free time, unfortunately, is used rather than lived in. One spends it, kills it, anticipates its arrival, moans its departure, but few live it to the fullest of their human capacities. Few see in free time opportunity for revealing a subjective meaning to personal situations.

³⁸Ben B. Seligman, "On Work, Alienation, and Leisure," The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, XXIV, No. 4 (October, 1965), 337-360.

Even the increase in paid vacation time (a potential semi-victory for leisure were it not expected to be used to restore one's energies for the return to the job) is offset by a variety of factors. Moonlighting takes many free time hours and re-sells them as does increased work hours in executive and professional offices. Few need the extra income as badly as they need freedom to contemplate the nature of one's being. For many of these who voluntarily over-work themselves existence does not precede essence, it excludes it.

Perhaps the situation would be more manageable if we could, with great imagination and ingenuity, take the 42.5 free time hours in each week and have them in one great block. Since we can't do that without fundamentally changing traditional living and working patterns, the 42.5 hours are even farther misleading. They are unevenly dispersed both daily and weekly. Most free time activities that are compatible with a leisurely state of mind must be postponed until the weekend, except loafing which takes little time but great courage. Harry Swados in his essay "Less Work--Less Leisure" discusses a study of workers in Akron who worked an official 6 hour day. He supports the argument that those with the most free time have the least preparation for leisure; hence, they get bored. Of his Akron workers approximately 40 per cent took part-time extra work, and somewhat less than 20 per cent had a second full-time job. For time left unsold most searched the supermarkets for do-it-yourself repair materials or sought out pool halls and bowling alleys for recreation. Swados argues that since they couldn't handle free time and they could handle consumption they retreated to buying more things with their

extra money. At least the latter is patriotic, profitable for their employers, and sufficiently de-personalized to avoid a confrontation with their selves. Most of the workers saw the solution to unemployment in having workers not take a second job, but at the same time refused to advocate that. Swados interprets this as indication that industrial workers are still basically insecure from fear of being laid off. They don't really know how to live, but they have been trained and synchronized to work. They substitute economic security for emotional peace and material pleasure for personal happiness.

Free time, again, is time that is dependent upon work. It is free from work. Few would probably argue with the assumptions previously made that both killing time because it only brings emptiness and busily filling it with work-like activities are uses of free time that support the thesis that it is dependent upon work. I think, however, that there would be more controversy over the interpretation I am giving to a third work-influenced use of free time, recreation. By recreation I do not imply the philosophical concept associated with leisure, that leisure is a state of being in which one can re-create oneself.

In the popular terminology recreation and leisure are as frequently considered synonymous as are free time and leisure. It is significant that the library most frequently used in this study placed the majority of the books on leisure under the category: Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, which indeed is how most of the authors who dealt with the subject approached it. Just as sociologists

tend to see leisure quantitatively, as a block of time, other commentators see it as a means of resting after a day's work so that the individual will be relaxed and refreshed to attack another day's work. It is in this sense that recreation is also dependent upon work. If you do not work, by this standard, what reason (or right, to many) do you possibly have for recreation unless you are very young or very old? I do argue that of the three work-influenced uses of free time, work-like activities, emptiness, and recreation, recreation is by far the best choice. It is even needed, not only for physical health but also for mental health. Taking out one's aggressions on a badminton birdie is preferable to murder, and second only to feeling neither anxiety nor tension. I cannot see that the first two uses of free time are fundamental to the human condition, but recreation, even though it is not leisure, is. It seldom, however, involves an activity pursued for its own sake. If one is seeking physical health and/or releasing tension one is finding (hopefully) a pleasing, happy means in recreation toward another end. Most proposals that I encountered in this study for "creative use of leisure time" were in fact proposals for increased public concern for recreational facilities and expenditures.

Loafing is another matter. It is not work-related; it is pursued in a leisurely state of being until guilt sets in. Unfortunately it sets in early. Our value system cannot tolerate a loafer. He is unproductive. He is not even resting so that he can be productive. He is simply loafing. In Bertrand Russell's essay "In Praise of

Idleness" loafing is given dignity, for Russell sees loafing as a valid human activity. The person who is physically idle is demonstrably doing nothing and in America is therefore scorned. Doing nothing, which is quite compatible with leisure, is often considered a vice. What is worse, for the most part the person who is loafing is not open to leisure because the moment he becomes physically idle he is a social outcast. Only the individual engaged in idleness can determine whether or not he is at leisure. Perhaps he is solving a mathematical equation that will lead to previously unimaginable scientific discovery. He will still tend to feel guilty if he appears to be loafing unless he is one of the few individuals who is not afraid of leisure and who is aware of its freeing qualities. Others will scowl and his friends will be quick to rationalize that he is tired and needs a rest. As De Grazia aptly put it, "If a man is thinking and smoking he will be described as a man smoking."³⁹

It is important to keep in mind that a qualitative approach to leisure rather than a quantitative one requires that we do not consider the activity itself as our frame of reference, but the attitude of the individual pursuing the activity. Therefore, just as with loafing, almost any activity could be approached with a leisure attitude. Golf may be work-like to one but to another it may truly be leisure. The same can be said for gardening, fishing, and a multitude of other free time activities. It is far too easy to be super-

³⁹De Grazia, p. 89.

ficial and try to outwardly determine why another is doing what he is doing. Significance lies in what the individual inwardly feels about his activity. If he feels he is open to an inherent value in an activity or situation and is not predetermining the gain from it he is indeed at leisure. He may look as though he were impressing a business client, but he may feel at leisure. Unless he is incapable of leisure (which is likely in our society) he may well be at leisure. There is, however, a great lag between intention and action. The actor in a situation must be intensely aware of this. An increase in outdoor recreation and concert-going proves nothing although some studies argue to the contrary by measuring both attendance and expenditures. It could be an increase in people's acceptance of leisure or it could be an increase in the desire for recreation or prestige. We can only, at best, make assumptions. After a look at some specific activities that are popular in the United States I shall deal with why I think leisure is improbable in contemporary American society.

POPULAR FREE TIME ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

In the above discussion I have tried to explore the states of mind with which people approach free time. Such an exploration is useful if we are to assume that free time offers man an opportunity for self-affirmation and self-actualization that is not found in subsistence or existence time. It does little, however, to indicate what effect free time actually has on individuals. Regretably little has been done in the way of analytical studies in this area, especially in the past few years. De Grazia cites an interesting Roper

poll of 1957 in which the following question was asked: "There's a lot of talk about the possibility of a 4-day work week in the future, or maybe even a 3-day work week. Which one of these statements do you think comes closest to expressing the general over-all effect it would have on people?"⁴⁰ The responses are significant in that they support some of the assumptions made earlier in this study regarding the choice between added free time or extra income. It also should be noted that some respondents obviously gave more than one answer.

1. People would get soft and lazy with all that leisure time - 20%
2. People would simply get bored having too little to do - 20%
3. People would find things to do so that they would be just as busy as they are now - 32%
4. People would enjoy the extra time, relax more, and be happier - 24%
5. Don't know - 6%

The heart of a good Puritan probably suffers greatly that answer number one did not receive at least 100 per cent of the votes, just as I should like to think that at some happy time in the future answer number four would be the unanimous choice. The 40 per cent that responded to the first two questions clearly take a negative view of free time, considering it either empty or harmful. It is also interesting that the 72 per cent that saw meaning in all of the first three questions see busyness as either a virtue or a

⁴⁰ De Grazia, p. 132.

necessity. Only the 24 per cent that answered question four apparently see value in free time and even perhaps meaning in the choice of leisure. (These interpretations are based on the assumption that the answers reflect the attitudes of the respondents, which of course may be false.) In spite of the fact that the report claimed that 56 per cent (answers to questions three and four) wanted extra time, number three clearly does not indicate an acceptance of leisure. Number three is, however, at least a favorable choice in the eyes of many Americans. I think that it is popularly linked with number four as a positive response to the questionnaire. If, then, one can be somewhat cheered that in 1957 56 per cent of Americans polled desired or at least saw a favorable effect from free time, we can, I think, be even more cheered that 24 per cent indicated an appreciation of the leisure condition. Elitists would have us believe that only a handful of society are interested in or capable of leisure. This Roper poll seems to contradict that assumption. A 1959 study mentioned in another source by Havighurst appears to support the above interpretation. "The principal meanings which people find in their favorite leisure activities are:

I like it just for the pleasure of doing it, that's all.

It is a welcome change from my work.

I like it because it brings me into contact with friends.

It gives me a new experience: I feel I learn something from it.

It gives me a chance to achieve something.

I feel I am being creative.

I like it because I like to do things that will benefit society."⁴¹

The last answer is obviously given by a person who finds only emptiness in free time just as the second answer reflects the popular and sociological concept of leisure: as time free from work but still work-dependent. The first answer, which did receive the most support as the answers are ranked according to frequency of response indicates a true capacity for leisure. Those who answered "I like it for the pleasure of doing it, that's all," are individuals who can engage themselves in an activity as an end in itself.

With the 1957 Roper poll indicating nearly a quarter of the population interested in leisure, and the above study finding that more respondents gave the "leisure answer" than any other it would now be interesting to look at a survey that De Grazia uses to indicate just what the people who are giving all these answers do with their free time.⁴² This 1957 survey gives the per cent of the population over 15 years of age engaging in various free time activities on the day prior to being questioned:

1. Watching television	57%
2. Visiting with friends or relatives	38%
3. Working around yard and in garden	33%
4. Reading magazines	27%
5. Reading books	18%
6. Going pleasure driving	17%
7. Listening to records	14%

⁴¹ Ageing and Leisure, ed. Robert W. Kleemeier (New York, 1961), p. 317.

⁴² De Grazia, p. 441.

8. Going to meeting or other organizational activities	11%
9. Special hobbies (woodworking, knitting, etc.)	10%
10. Going out to dinner	8%
11. Participating in sports	8%
12. Playing cards, checkers, etc.	7%
13. None of those listed	7%
14. Spending time at drugstore, etc.	6%
15. Singing or playing musical instrument	5%
16. Going to see sports events	4%
17. Going to movies in regular theater	3%
18. Going to drive-in movies	2%
19. Going to dances	2%
20. Going to a play, concert, or opera	1%
21. Going to lectures or adult school	1%

The flaws of such a survey are numerous. We do not know what day of the week the question was asked, or what special was or was not on television, or what time of the year the survey was taken. (For example, if the questions were asked during World Series time in one of the participating cities it is more than likely that "Going to see sports events" would be near the top of the list.) We also do not know the average income level of the people questioned. The qualifications could go on and on. What I find particularly revealing about the result of this survey is that all of the first seven activities contain qualities that can easily be approached in a condition of leisure, as could many of the others. Again, we cannot be overly concerned with the activity itself when studying leisure, for we do not know what the participant felt about his involvement, but the assumption that there is a potentiality of leisure although highly subjective, in visiting with friends, working in the garden, reading, pleasure driving, listening to records, and even watching television is, I think, valid. These are not activities incompatible with

leisure. The fact that Aristotle would clearly have preferred "Singing or playing a musical instrument" does not deny that many activities preferred by modern Americans contain qualities compatible with a leisure attitude. The purpose of this study is not to argue that we are in the New Athens. It is to argue that we could be. It is also not to argue that most or many Americans engage themselves in activities leisurely, for I have tried to make it clear that I think they do not. But I do argue that many Americans (even perhaps most) could be opened to leisure's freedom if they were not so grotesquely alienated, and if our social ethic would make it easier for them to freely choose themselves. If they would do that I think they would also choose leisure. De Grazia has mentioned another survey of manual workers that lists as favorite hobbies and recreation of 38 per cent (the most by far) noncompetitive sports and games.⁴³ The man that goes hunting, fishing, boating, camping, rowing, etc. in his free time is neither driven by a competitive nature nor is he inherently closed to leisure. Riesman is perhaps even more optimistic in the following statement: "...the other-directed person in his approach to food, as in his sexual encounters, is constantly looking for a qualitative element that may elude him."⁴⁴ Why it eludes him and why he may even be unaware of the significance of his own search is the topic of the following discussion.

⁴³ De Grazia, p. 121.

⁴⁴ Riesman, et al, p. 170.

FACTORS AGAINST LEISURE IN THE UNITED STATES

Conditions, both social and personal, in the lives of most individuals in the United States are such that leisure is not only elusive but widely scorned. Free time is another matter, for sociologists have discovered it to be a "problem" worthy of their consideration. Those, however, who seek leisure are generally afraid of it, as most fear the ambiguous and the unknown. The sociologists are right, free time is a problem in America. What can be the result but chaos and bewilderment in the minds of citizens of a nation that through technology and cybernation has made work far less significant, and in some instances obsolete, but still clings desperately to an outmoded social ethic that requires hard work and busyness for an individual to attain social dignity? In other words, society has made it theoretically possible for more and more humans to engage themselves in the creation of their essence, but in fact binds them ideologically to existence. And for far too many existence is grim. Perhaps Michael Harrington is correct in saying that, "A society with a cybernated revolution and a conservative mentality is not going to make new definitions of leisure and work."⁴⁵

To begin with we still doggedly stick to our insistence upon wealth as pursuit of happiness. In spite of the gains made in the past 30 some years toward a relatively unsophisticated welfare state we have not done much to widen the emotional opportunities of the

⁴⁵ Michael Harrington, The Accidental Century (Baltimore, Md., 1966), p. 264.

dispossessed, Caucasian and Negro, and the untrained, unskilled workers who live in constant fear of loss of their already meager income. The welfare state in America is still a holding operation to make misery less intolerable. No matter how idealistic and noble the individual, to say that all one need do is choose to be open to the awareness of happiness, freedom, and leisure is either terribly glib or smugly academic. If humans are hungry, pathetically trained to work rather than educated, in ill-health, or afraid of the law, they are open to very little other than day to day subsistence and existence. Doctors, lawyers, dentists, and grocers must be paid. We have socialized education under the assumption, I hope, that it is a human necessity for modern existence, just as we have somewhat socialized recreation through public parks. We retain medical help, dental care, legal aid, and food largely on the private enterprise profit motive in spite of the fact that they are also human necessities for existence. Medicare, court appointed lawyers, and food stamps are evidence that we do consider an emergency right of humans to stay alive, but we are reluctant to include them as fundamentally equal birth rights to individual happiness. I will discuss this concept more thoroughly later, but no discussion of "factors against leisure" can adequately begin in twentieth century United States or any other nation without commenting on the decaying effects of ill-health and poverty on the human condition, and the way in which they pre-empt thoughtfulness and openness.

I have commented above on the role of the urbanization of society

as an added hindrance to free time. Political scientists, geographers, sociologists, economists, and educators have given admirable consideration of late to the effects of urbanization on the lives, attitudes, and wants of people. This is neither the place nor the writer to recount the entire social science of urbanization. However, few urban areas are even remotely designed to maximize man's capacity for leisure. The idea that "downtown is for people" is not a revolutionary intellectual concept, but very few cities are consciously designed for living. Cities and downtown areas are places to buy things, to segregate the wealthy from the poor and the white from the Negro, to keep up lawns, to maintain property values, and to buy and sell houses, but realtors and business men are far more influential on city councils, school boards, and citizen committees than are social scientists or architects. Solitude may be too much to ask for in urban living although I think not, but it should be possible to design plazas and centers, for example, around the needs of human living rather than those of sellers of products.

Age is another significant factor that prohibits leisure. I doubt if few societies put their aged out to pasture in quite the same dehumanizing style as we do. The calendar, rather than any human qualification, determines when most individuals are no longer useful to their employer. Once this arbitrary age is reached time is very difficult to sell, products are no easier to buy, and little or no preparation for a humanly pleasant retirement has been made. Friends on the job are likely still there, cut off from the one who

now has free time on his hands. The economic system now considers the newly retired as fruitful ground for a rush of advertizing campaigns on all kinds of drugs, and equipment which can be sold to the lonely aged who now find medical bills even more difficult to pay than before. They can, of course, apply for Medicare and, without even going to a hospital for the aged, qualify as what Jules Henry terms "obsolete social security paupers." How can such an existence, which for the majority is kept, through social security and retirement funds, at just enough affluence to qualify as consumers - hence useful to the national economy - be one in which the individual with ample free time for probably the first time in his life be open to a condition of leisure? Can one blame them for finding little other than emptiness? Nels Anderson argues in Work and Leisure that the present trend in technological development may require workers to retire at the age of 60 by the year 2000, and the trend in medical science may well prolong an individual's life so that at 60 he is in a splendid state of health. With perhaps 25 per cent of his life to go social and economic isolation will only be lengthened, increasing the tremendous loneliness of old age. As a consumer, a "senior citizen," a retired worker, he will have little success in explaining to friends why he does not "enjoy his leisure." The entire process of retirement in the United States is, like most free time, work-dependent. You are entitled to retire from work, not to live, contemplate, and grow old.

By no means do all cultures take such a dehumanized view of

old age and retirement. In Robert Kleemeier's Ageing and Leisure, there is a highly revealing comparative study of the aged in Japan, the Quechua Indians of the Andes, the St. Lawrence Island Eskimos, and in urban Burma and India. What is significant about the two cultures that are primitive is that in both the aged feel a need to remain useful. (This is also true in the United States where, however, it is unnecessary to national economic growth.) In our culture, usefulness in the aged is an other-imposed social more that negates a true self-actualization of the part of the individual. It is not an economic necessity but it is a culturally imposed psychological necessity. Without being useful we are considered parasites. Even the aged cannot get away with loafing. In the case of the Quechua Indians the great reward that accompanies age is not retirement, but respect. Children in America are indeed trained to "respect their elders," but in order to get a vivid picture of the horrendous lack of human respect that accompanies age in this country one must read Henry's Culture Against Man where the author describes treatment of the aged in three hospitals: a municipally operated, and two private, in one of which lower-class patients are treated little better than animals in the zoo (probably worse since the economic investment in them is less--after all, they did not have to be captured and brought to captivity for they were self-captured by their poverty) and in the other where upper middle class patients were treated decently physically, but still were objectified and de-personalized by their "keepers."

In all five cultures mentioned in Kleemeier's book personal utility is identified with one's age rather than the ability to sell one's time or to copy the actions involved in selling one's time. Wisdom, it appears, is valued highly in other cultures, some primitive, some modern and industrialized like Japan. Where there is respect for wisdom there must be hope for contemplation. In the United States on the other hand there is little hope for at least the immediate future. What Henry says of the hospital patients is not inaccurate for the aged in general in this culture. What patients suffer from most "is the sense of being dumped and left; the emptiness of the life, the vacant routine, the awareness of being considered a nuisance and of being inferior to the most insensitive employee."⁴⁶

Leisure is antithetical to planned recreation and organized activities. It is highly individualized and comes from within the person. It is, in a sense, an agreement between the human and the activity that neither will exploit the other. The human will seek inherent qualities in the activity and the activity will not become a social club or a skill to be mastered. Americans seem to find this simple arrangement difficult to effect, for the desires to be entertained and to perfect one's talents have pushed leisure far into the background. We are either pleasure mad with a great interest in spectatorship rather than participation or we master

⁴⁶ Henry, p. 407.

a particular position on a team and become a specialist rather than allow ourselves to play the game on its own terms. Both of these characteristics sprout from our social ethic in that the professionalization of sport allows us to hire done for us what we can afford to have done so that we may invest our time and energies in more profitable ways. Mastering a position makes winning a competitive struggle much more likely than if all participants, though enjoying the play, performed tasks at which they had little skill. It is interesting that we say we "play" baseball, football, etc. which have become work to many professionals, but we do not use the word "play" when referring to hiking, bird-watching, camping, etc. which are almost totally amature and individually done. The former, games that are "played," tend to be spectacles in which the spectators far outnumber the participants. It strikes me as unfortunate that American sports come far closer to resembling the Roman concept than the Greek. "The typical American intensity as manifested in the desire to win, whether displayed by player or spectator, often seems to approach the excitement of a blood-lust."⁴⁷

As with so much in our culture, the spontaneity has nearly escaped from our sports. Where sports are highly organized there is little or none. Spontaneity cuts down on efficiency and limits the chances of winning. Even spectators are organized. In our passion to be entertained and bring as little of our person as

⁴⁷George R. Stewart, American Ways of Life (Garden City, N.Y., 1954), p. 216-217.

possible to the experience we go to a game with a host of preconceived notions about what will entertain us. A particular team must win, a special hero must be skillful, and so on. Our task is to buy a ticket and amote at the proper times. As Henry Steele Commager has pointed out, "Where English spectators applaud the play, Americans cheered the team, and when English applause was spontaneous, American cheering was organized, and the 'cheer leader' was unique to America."⁴⁸ To use McLuhan's argument, the medium is the message in American sports.

I think this is true of American entertainment in general. Very often people "go to a concert," or "watch TV," but frequently it does not matter what is being performed or which program is on. Opera stars are made heroes but scores are seldom understood or appreciated. Orchestras and their conductors are enthusiastically applauded but individual members are rarely known. People spend a Sunday out in the air, but what is often required is equipment, planning, and organization before the participants feel they received their money's worth and enjoyed their outing. It always perplexes me that on many a hot weekend day the city parks are not crowded but there are many trees to sit under. Apparently it is not entertaining enough.

Harold Wilensky points out that nine out of ten American homes average 5 to 6 hours daily with the television set on, and 8 out of 10 Americans spend at least four hours daily watching TV, listening

⁴⁸ Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind (New Haven, 1959), p. 425.

to the radio, or both. I argued earlier that watching TV was not incompatible with leisure. Both television viewing and listening to the radio can be pursued for its own sake, but this is unlikely for 5 or 6 hours a day. It must also be admitted that television and radio are excellent time killers; they frequently require nothing of the audience intellectually or emotionally, and on occasion to have watched a special program advances one's status.

If entertainment is the goal most of us are seeking rather than rich, self-revealing experiences, we will want our pleasure to be quick. We will want to view a painting like we would take an efficient shower to get clean rather than a long, soaking, hot bath. The "art of the obvious" is what we want: non-contemplative art, literature, and music. One very rapidly reaches the point of diminishing returns on invested time when one looks at a painting. The artist as hero and the frequency with which paintings are looked at rather than contemplated certainly reflects the crushing effect of the entertainment urge on creativity and leisure. All too often only the shock-value of a painting will hold the viewer. As Swados states, "What is needed is a social order in which, most important of all, the masses of man will be protected against the swelling flood of 'entertainment' opiates in order that they may be energized to search freely for new patterns of spontaneous living for themselves and their children."⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Mass Leisure, ed. Eric Larrabee and Rolf Meyersohn (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), p. 363.

De Grazia argues that for approximately 50,000 dollars a year a wealthy individual could keep a trio or string quartet around the house. Although the idea of possessing a string quartet for personal enjoyment smacks of antiquity, elitism and the worst kind of decadence, his point is perhaps a strong one as revealed by his following statement: "...the rich man would get no fun out of having a chamber-music quartet around, and neither would the poor man. To get even the former to like such music, you have to organize a program for him somewhere and then get him to attend by hook or crook, generally by stressing its publicity and uplifting aspects."⁵⁰ All too frequently one allows class or ethnic group, social in-group, or work associates to determine the use of free time. What is even worse, perception, distorted by all kinds of imagery, of what others expect of one determines use of free time. It is this loss of self that is probably most damaging to individualized, free, open, spontaneous leisure.

The individual who has lost himself is wide open to what has traditionally been called the mass media. Walter M. Gerson has pointed out that the concept of mass society does not imply a structural breakdown but the effect of the media on society. By no means in the United States do we have a classless society, but our culture is one that de-personalizes life and objectifies humans. As such they are open to both intentional and unintentional manipulation

⁵⁰ De Grazia, p. 274.

on the part of those who control the media. It is a media that denies exchange, dialogue, and engagement. It demands an uncritical, alienated, entertainment-seeking audience. In De Grazia's words, "An uncritical audience develops because the media transmit rather than communicate. They offer no real response."⁵¹ It is possible for one to become engaged in watching television, listening to the radio, attending a concert, or viewing a painting, but it is not required. There is little chance for true human intercourse in modern life, which makes it not surprising that most individuals find it difficult and alien to become involved with either other humans or the media. Consumption and free time entertainment (which is also consumed) are now the ends for which many work. As Gerson indicates, since leisure is seen as an escape from work rather than as an end in itself, it is relatively meaningless. "The idols of leisure" have replaced the "idols of work."⁵² Life becomes a second choice. Our first choice in free time is to escape from our selves, to have a flight into something, a fantasy land where western heroes and secret agents inhabit the mind. Whatever is done with free time makes little difference, for it does not matter as long as one is entertained and not forced to define himself by coming to terms with himself. "If one is alienated from one's Self, so that one is inwardly roleless, and estranged from others, so that it makes no difference whether

⁵¹De Grazia, p. 319.

⁵²Recreation in America, ed. Pauline Meadow, Vol. 37, No. 2 (New York, 1965), p. 147.

one withdraws or mixes with them, then one lets others define one's role, for whatever one does, it is all the same."⁵³ At this point, as in Camus' The Stranger, it is impossible to determine who is doing what to whom. The molders and perpetuators of the social ethic get little resistance from the alienated individual. The most thoughtful description to my knowledge of the alienated individual in situation is from an article by Mathilde Niel and printed in the symposium, Socialist Humanism:

The alienated man...never succeeds either in being himself or in living in a state of creative synthesis with other beings or things. He does not live in the present, whose wealth he fails to appreciate; he is interested only in the future, which draws him in quest of some kind of absolute, or in his desire to conform with a model or ideal. The alienated man does not think or act by himself; he always refers to something or someone outside himself, to tradition, a creed, an ideology, a transcendent being, or a superior. He does not know how to live either in a dialogue with others or in an interior peace; he always needs someone to worship or to serve, to hate or to fight. He spends his life in pursuing something, either a material end which has been turned into an absolute (desire for wealth, comfort, the symbols of prestige), or a spiritual end, also turned into an absolute, which leads him to disdain life and the world. Sometimes he believes he has attained this absolute good, and then he is joyful and exalted; at other times he feels frustrated, and then he is miserable and depressed. His life is passed in desiring, hoping, despairing, worshiping, and despising. The alienated man is tense, embattled, violent; he is narrow, intolerant, and authoritarian; he is the passionate man. But he is also the pusillanimous man who fears authority, who is afraid of not thinking and acting like everyone else; he is cowardly, timorous, conformist; the gregarious man."⁵⁴

⁵³ Henry, p. 340.

⁵⁴ Socialist Humanism, ed. Erich Fromm (Garden City, N.Y., 1966), pp. 335-336.

The cowardly, timorous, conformist, and gregarious man possibly wants to be a western hero or a secret agent. He would delight in shooting down "bad guys," making love to a female spy, and chasing away invaders from another planet. These fantasies of the mind occupy his intellect as well as his emotions, and as such they are most entertaining as well as non-engaging. Rather than pursue one's project, the alienated man can sit back and watch an actor play his role for him. He does not need to commit himself. Alienated free time has now taken its place alongside alienated work.

It is argued that since work is no longer a moral occupation, the study of free time is a look at what morally involves members of society.⁵⁵ It seems to me that the above discussion suggests rather strongly that there is little spontaneous, uninhibited selection of free time activities. To argue that free time has replaced work as the reflection of society's moral choices is missing the point, for one's attitudes toward work and free time are, I have argued, often the same. They are usually either boredom or striving for success and status. The individual's choice of attitudes regarding work and free time are widely influenced by social and cultural factors. I have selected four such factors in American society that impress me as powerful motives for human behavior in this culture. The first of these is the infamous Protestant-Capitalist Work-Ethic which causes work attitudes to control one's entire life

⁵⁵See for example, Work and Leisure, ed. Erwin O. Smigel (New Haven, Conn., 1963), p. 30.

style. The second is the tyrannizing effect of the clock and calendar on our concept of time and space. The third is what Jules Henry calls the "pecuniary philosophy" or "consumption ecstasy" ruled over by the advertising industry. And the fourth is the role American education plays in transmitting to the individual our chief cultural values: fear and competition.

The work-ethic requires that individuals not only constantly do something, but that they do something measurably productive. They are to keep busy, improve themselves, keep up their property, and better their position. It is doubtful that many of us still cling to the notion that pleasure is sin, but we do somehow insist that pleasure be rational and for a purpose rather than spontaneous and intuitive. There is still no room in society for the time-waster. Free time is now legitimately considered free from work (although, as such, it is still work-dependent), but we have not progressed as far from the Puritan Era as many might like to think. Free time is still very much dominated by the work-ethic. The Protestant-Capitalist values of thrift, initiative, competition, busyness, drive for success, and wealth as a determinant of human merit are at the core of the American image. The theory of egalitarianism, and the folk-lore of the easy going frontiersman do not stand up in practice against the great virtue-of-busyness. The American character is molded by the work-ethic and the cost to leisure is profound. Eric Larrabee has commented in an interesting article, "What's Happening to Hobbies?," that hobbies must be both

pointless and productive. Pointless so not to resemble work too closely and productive so not to ruin character.

Recreational programs are heavily endowed with the virtue-of-busyness. There is a tremendous emphasis on group activities, planning, leadership, and "keep moving." The following statement clearly reflects an attitude that is work oriented: "The program of recreation succeeds or fails on the basis of its leadership."⁵⁶ If re-creating individuals are left to their own resources and to move at their own speed they just might gradually get slower and slower until they begin loafing. The loafer is idle and as such violates the conscience of our society; he is not busy, hence lacking in virtue. If man's utility is based upon his ability to sell his time the man who is not driven by the work-ethic, even in his play, looks to others like the man who is incapable of being useful. Nels Anderson makes the thoughtful comment that "For the old to be negatively affected in work means also to be negatively affected in leisure. For the old as for other workers, status in leisure often reflects status in work. Although they have 'earned a rest,' their position with respect to leisure remains ambiguous..."⁵⁷ The entire concept of "earning a rest" indicates how thoroughly saturated our lives are by the work-ethic. By what other rationale must we work before we play, or eat our vegetables before we eat

⁵⁶ "Leisure and the Schools," Journal of Physical Education, and Recreation, XXXII, No. 8 (November, 1961), 21-23, 64-65.

⁵⁷ Recreation in America, p. 39.

our dessert? Why must our position in regards to leisure remain ambiguous? (The ambiguity of leisure is another matter, but Anderson in the above quotation is using the sociological definition of leisure, as synonymous with free time.) There is no reason, it seems to me, that the entire proposition cannot be turned around. We could work when we are tired of play. The spontaneous and intuitive individual could be the virtuous rather than the hard working and thrifty. The play-ethic is just as valid as the work-ethic, and the virtue-of-spontaneity could be just as meaningful as the virtue-of-busyness. However, the work-ethic came first and has been year after year, generation after generation drummed into our consciousness. Some of the studies cited previously indicate that many Americans are freeing themselves from being dominated by the work-ethic, but there is still plenty of evidence to support the argument that they feel guilty because of it and that they respect the authority of the work-ethic and virtue-of-busyness, at least for others. To these people, fun, or family togetherness become Things, something to work at, to achieve. Henry says, "...we are as determined about the pursuit of fun as a desert-wandering traveler is about the search for water, and for the same reason."⁵⁸ Fun becomes a matter of survival. The individual needs to "save part of his Self from the system that consumes him."⁵⁸ We, in this way approach a weekend with our family or an hour of anticipated fun with grim

⁵⁸ Henry, p. 43.

resolve. We are determined to make it a happy experience. This grim determination, so clearly influenced by the work-ethic, destroys any openness that might exist to leisure. The individual is no more transcending his existence than he is when at work. Thus the work-ethic and virtue-of-busyness requires that time on one's hands be used energetically rather than leisurely.

To some cultures time is so unimportant that many individuals do not even know their age. To others, as in the United States, it is a preoccupation. We are always on time, ahead of time, or behind time. We seldom just go anywhere, we plan to arrive on time and leave on time. We sleep when the clock indicates the proper hour, and eat at a specified time. If we eat when we are hungry regardless of the time we are gluttons. If we sleep when we are sleepy, in spite of the dictates of the clock, we are lazy. We take holidays, not when we feel like it, but by the calendar, just as we stay home from work when the calendar informs us the weekend is here. We are legally allowed to drive, drink, and vote by the calendar. The "Tyranny of the Clock" is a fact of life in industrialized society. Employers need to know exactly when the workers will arrive. Largely for the employers' economic and psychological security we subject ourselves to such a tyranny. To be sure, it tidies up life for all of us. If we have to keep appointments with others on time we can expect the same in return.

As De Grazia says, we count on "parcels of time," whether it be lunches, free time, holidays, or vacations. Lunch is a parcel

of time to be used, not relaxing, but for most merely eating. What else can one do with 20 minutes to a half hour? At lunch-time, which is frequently unpaid time, you re-fill yourself so that you can put in an energetic afternoon working. After work, on your unpaid time but for the employer's ultimate benefit, you relax so you can return to work the next day. Only when a business man discusses work can he justify taking a lengthy lunch-time. Eating could be an excellent leisurely activity if we did not do it on time. The Tyranny of the Clock has destroyed such opportunities for leisure.

De Grazia tells us that in the Middle Ages there were approximately 167 holidays counting Sundays.⁵⁹ The rise of Protestantism and the clock-oriented factory denied most of them. Now they are legitimate for religious or patriotic purposes, even paid for in some cases, but they are carefully controlled parcels of time, lest they get out of hand. Time without obligation is rare. De Grazia considers a holiday "a day to dance in," and as such there should be many in an individual's year. Not counting Sunday, which is hardly a holiday and is not a day without obligation for most people who either owe it to their church to attend or owe it to their employer to rest (or in teaching owe it to their students to grade papers and prepare lectures), there are only five holidays consistently observed throughout the United States that are not planned to fall on Sunday. These are Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Years, the Fourth of July, and Labor Day. These are so few in number that they have simply

⁵⁹De Grazia, p. 82.

become, for most Americans, a day when one is free from work. They are, then, free time days rather than holidays. They are not days to dance in although they all are in honor of an event or concept that is worthy of a human celebration. They are little more than highly publicized (and in some cases highly commercialized) parcels of time that defy celebration, dancing, and leisure.

The most human of all festivals is the one celebrating the birth date of an individual. Some cultures, even some that are industrialized and time-oriented, see significance in birthdays and they are celebrated. This is not so in the United States except that we are expected to contribute to the GNP by purchasing gifts for the person who thinks he is celebrating his birthday. Seldom does the individual not have to sell his time that day, for it does not fit into our scheme of parceling time. Time is a de-humanizing factor that does not stop for birthdays.

Another great irony in American life is that the advertising industry tells us day after day that we must possess more things. Advertising preys upon the assumption that man is a possessive animal. Once the individual is convinced that he really must have the item, he frequently finds he must work more hours to pay for the good that he then no longer has energy or time to use. Henry argues that all cultures must have a philosophical foundation and ours is what he terms "the pecuniary philosophy." The high priests of this philosophy, far from resembling Plato's Philosopher-Kings, are producers and advertisers. Those who remain in the cave to forever see

things as diffused light reflects it to them must take the word of the Advertiser-Kings that all is well and consumption is indeed a patriotic duty. Primitive man produced for the sake of consumption, for a known market. When that market was satisfied he went fishing. We produce for a manipulated market, consumers are created, and consumption must continue for the sake of production.

Riesman pointed out in The Lonely Crowd the absurdity of striving for full-employment in the economy of abundance when we could be striving for full-nonemployment. Henry considers advertising "an expression of an irrational economy that has depended for survival on a fantastically high standard of living incorporated into the American mind as a moral imperative."⁶⁰ Advertising, then, is dependent upon full employment which is dependent upon the diffusion of leisure. As a quasi-moral institution with its own philosophy, advertising, according to Henry, is based upon three postulates:

1. Truth is what sells; 2. Truth is what you want people to believe; and 3. Truth is that which is not legally false.⁶¹ It is a total system that substitutes things for humans and is based on the life and death of products. The work-ethic, the virtue-of-busyness, and the "tyranny of the clock" are well served by this philosophy.

Individuals are trained to serve the philosophy. The loss of self is replaced by a modern pseudo-self that is "trained to heroic feats of consumption."⁶² Neither the individual who might be open

⁶⁰ Henry, p. 45.

⁶¹ Henry, p. 50.

⁶² Henry, p. 44.

to leisure nor his Congress can match the power of the Advertiser-Kings. In 1960 Congress appropriated \$33 million for the Federal Trade Commission, The Federal Communications Commission, and the Food and Drug Administration, all three of which have noble regulatory functions. This sum, however, comes to about .3 per cent of that spent on advertising that year.⁶³ American tastes and values are molded by churches, schools, and advertising, and only advertising has not accepted much social responsibility. Of course, it does not have to, for as pointed out above, the regulatory agencies cannot match advertising's spending power in a culture where spending power is sovereign.

There is no room for leisure, for sitting contemplative under a tree, in the "pecuniary philosophy," for thinking and contemplation does not require consumption. Violence, not thinking, is a basic natural resource. The GNP is mightily served by purchases that reflect the public fascination for toy pistols, toy soldiers, tanks, missiles, boxing, football, hockey, Western movies, gangsters, war, and the "funny papers." All these, which are promoted by advertising and the media, are the antithesis of the attitudes of leisure. It would be interesting to discover just how much profit is made by American Business each year off violence after the seed is planted, nursed, and harvested by advertising and the media. One of the great contradictions of our culture is that most Americans do not

⁶³ Henry, p. 58.

enter careers that require violence. We make heroes of cowboys, movie stars, generals, and secret agents, rather than accountants, computer programmers, and business executives. Alienation is certainly increased as individuals feel betrayed when their work appears to be meaningless, or at least dull and unworthy of glorification. Most Americans work in a bureaucracy of some kind, public or private, but we certainly do not dramatize bureaucracy. "A culture which has not learned to honor what it is actually committed to produce creates an uneasy population."⁶⁴ Uneasy indeed when the great myths of the American ideology are individualism, courage, and independence, but what in fact is being turned out is what Erich Fromm calls the "marketing personality," a conformist who waits to see what is selling on the personality market before choosing his own. That is undoubtedly good business sense, but it can only cause conflict in the mind of the individual who is caught in between theory and practice. Our traditional value system shapes our theory and our current "philosophy" shapes our practice. That is the Great Contradiction, that "we are all status seekers, but nobody defends status seeking. We don't know how: our value system does not provide us with the moral vocabulary to defend much of the behavior and many of the roles which the social structure requires."⁶⁴ Our social-ethic trains people to become superficial with transitory tastes in need of immediate gratification. This is, as discussed earlier,

⁶⁴Work and Leisure, pp. 31-32.

disastrous to the poet, painter, novelist, composer, and dramatist who need an audience with deep feelings that can be moved intellectually and emotionally. The media and advertising give us "facts" to have us believe a reassuring or entertaining lie in our non-fiction age. "The Medium mediates between us and raw reality, and the mediation more and more replaces reality for us."⁶⁵ Displaced reality, then, makes the leisure state of being a fictionalized truth in a culture of non-fiction facts and lies.

The fourth, and last, social and cultural factor that I have selected as being fundamental in shaping an individual's choice of free time activity is education. If it is true that American education transmits to individuals the chief cultural values of fear and competition it is equally true that leisure is negated rather than promoted by the schools. I refer again to Aristotle: "...Preparation for spending time at leisure requires a great deal of learning and education."⁶⁶ The subjects taught in the schools must have intrinsic merit; they must be studied for their own sake. Few courses in the modern schools offer such a reward as job-preparation and college-preparatory courses dominate. Businessmen of a local area who want their future workers trained to work with specific skills are very successful in influencing school boards and administrators to offer such courses. Colleges are equally successful in persuading primary and secondary schools to train their graduates for a

⁶⁵Recreation in America, p. 161.

⁶⁶Politics, p. 302.

successful college career. School administrators, who, like their students, are motivated by fear and competition, are quick to oblige and turn their school into an object to be used for the success of other institutions. As the school becomes a manipulated institution the students and teachers become de-personalized and objectified. Neither remains open to engagement in the learning process when the schools are run by administrators, the agents of absentee employers, and express the demands of the community and the desires and frustrations of the adults who run it. To remain uninvolved becomes the obsession of many students when fear and competition dominate their environment. Coaches and principals have to validate their jobs to Dad's Clubs, School Boards, and business-dominated civic groups by getting as many students as possible involved in athletics, social clubs, and other success-oriented status activities. Parents and teachers on the other hand are busily emphasizing high grades. Both adult groups are pulling against one another but to the same ultimate end: status through competition and fear of not achieving it. To the students caught in the middle, emotional uninvolvedness is the best way out. "...Only by remaining absurd can one feel free from fear."⁶⁷ American education primarily becomes an exercise in "learning to be absurd." "In all the fighting over education we are simply saying that we are not yet satisfied--after about a million years of struggling to become human--that we have mastered the

⁶⁷Henry, p. 297.

fundamental human task, learning."⁶⁸ What we really want is acquiescence, not originality; skills, rather than creativity. We are trying through our educational system to bind individuals to their present culture, rather than to free them. If they want to survive in their culture they must understand what motivates other individuals in it. Fear of not succeeding, either at games, grades, business, or friendships, and competition, which is based upon the fear of not being able to win or get somewhere first with the most, are the motivating forces in American culture. There is little place in such a culture for one who desires to create himself, release his urge for spontaneity, and contemplate human situations. Henry has put it extremely well: "Children everywhere have been trained to fit culture as it exists; and to the end that they should not fail to fit, man has used the great ingenuity of which he is capable. As a device for teaching what was necessary and preventing deviation, education became an instrument for narrowing the perceptual sphere, thus defining the human condition of being absurd; of learning to be stupid; of learning to alienate one's Self from inner promptings."⁶⁹ One who hears no voice from "inner promptings" has no "leisure problem." One must be very quiet and still to hear such timid urges and American education trains us to be anything but quiet and still.

⁶⁸Henry, p. 284.

⁶⁹Henry, p. 320.

PART THREE: A LEISURE IDEAL

THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

In his essay The Myth of Sisyphus Albert Camus has written, "One does not discover the absurd without being tempted to write a manual of happiness."⁷⁰ It is the purpose of the third, and last, part of this study not to write a manual of happiness, but to perhaps examine some fundamental questions left unanswered in the first two parts regarding the desirability of leisure, freedom, and happiness to the human condition. In Part One I attempted to explain that only through an attitude of leisure can an individual affirm his own being by freely choosing, out of the ambiguity of existence, who he wants to be. The improbability of free, human choices in the contemporary United States was demonstrated in Part Two with a concluding emphasis on the alienating processes resulting from the social and cultural consequences of the work-ethic, the clock, advertising, and education which influence an individual's choice of attitudes regarding free time. Now it is necessary for me to take a position on how I think an attitude of leisure could be effected without recreating the conditions of classical Athens.

Traditionalists, reactionary liberals, modern liberals, and radicals share a passion for looking to the thought of Thomas Jefferson to validate their programs. The first two become misty eyed when considering Jefferson the defender of states' rights, the

⁷⁰ Sources in Twentieth-Century Political Thought, ed. Henry S. Kariel, (New York, 1964), p. 258.

spokesman for the yeoman farmer, and the original opponent of judicial review. These groups also demonstrate an attitude of tenderness regarding the Constitution, but tend to look somewhat askance at a mention of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence outside its historical setting. The second two, modern liberals and radicals, salivate at the image of Jefferson the proponent of religious freedom, the opponent of the commercial elite, and as the first President not pessimistic about the democratic process. These groups see the Declaration of Independence as a basic statement to which any further addition to the American ideology must conform. By denying the sanctity of the work-ethic, this study supports neither the traditionalist nor reactionary positions; therefore, it is to the Declaration of Independence that I now briefly turn.

It is widely known and appreciated that one of the "self evident truths" of the Declaration was the right of pursuit of happiness. This was, with life and liberty, considered an inalienable right among which, as the wording of the text implies, others could be included. Jefferson also makes clear in the Declaration that all men are equally endowed with these inalienable rights. Both De Grazia and Henry Steele Commager have discussed the role of a leisure ideal in the concept of the happy life as conceived by the American Founding Fathers, especially Jefferson. These men were men of the Enlightenment and as such were largely influenced by John Locke and other thinkers of middle-class liberalism, but many of them were classicists as well and as such could hardly have escaped awareness of

Aristotle's position that happiness extends only as far as does leisure. Many of the Founding Fathers were indeed men of leisure in the Athenian tradition. "The Founding Fathers had their ideal of the good life. It embraced a creator and the belief that life here on earth is not the first nor last; it held that full happiness is for the hereafter, yet man can pursue and find a measure of joy on this earth, too, if he has a small estate, unharrassed by tax collectors, on which to enjoy good friends and good wine, a choice library, tranquility, and the contemplation of the cosmos, the world and its affairs. To be free of necessity and therefore free to do whatever one wants to do for itself alone--this to them was the pursuit of happiness. In this they could not have been more classical."⁷¹ Even the practice of leaving their books, conversations, contemplation, business and plantation affairs to take part in politics, rather than viewing politics as a way of life, was in keeping with the mode of ancient Athens. Of Jefferson, Commager has said, "...no twentieth-century statesman accomplished so much as Jefferson, and none enjoyed so much leisure."⁷² Leisure was highly valued by Jefferson and his contemporaries, it is apparent, as an ideal.

It would be folly, however, to argue that the Founding Fathers, including Jefferson, advocated a life of leisure for those lacking a "small estate, unharrassed by tax collectors." They might well have

⁷¹George R. Stewart, p. 264.

⁷²Commager, p. 406.

believed in the equality of men to basic God-given rights, but they were not egalitarians with a firm commitment to the equality of all men to basic government-given rights. What is significant about the wording of the Declaration of Independence is that the writers and signers advocated for all men the right to pursue happiness, and they practiced for themselves a life compatible with the leisure ideal. I cannot see how the concept of leisure should be divorced, then, from an ideology fundamental to which is the equal right of all men to pursue happiness. I see little relationship between the goals expressed in the Declaration and a society that has placed a high emphasis on competition, fear, production-consumption, materialism, and alienation. On Jefferson's concept of happiness, Adrienne Koch has made the following observation: "The concept of 'happiness' was the logical culmination of the tendency to emphasize social health through restrained self-interest, cooperation, and compromise."⁷³

The gap between theory and practice is no less to be criticized in those who applied the ideals of the Declaration than those who are applying the ideals of Marx. Changing economic and political conditions as well as personal prejudices of leaders quickly outdate any theory. Political and economic leaders, like the rest of us, have their own perception of reality. What is striking about the American Experience is the distance that has been traveled in less than two hundred years away from a basic commitment to the pursuit

⁷³ Adrienne Koch, The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson (Chicago, 1964), p. 43.

of happiness, from which the freeing aspects of leisure cannot be estranged. Of today, Paul Hollander has said, "In the United States, governmental interest in the leisure of the citizen is limited, the prevailing 'official' attitude fluctuating between indifference and spurts of ineffectual if benevolent anxiety."⁷⁴ When the concern is shown, Hollander argues, it is like the U.S.S.R., because the use of free time "exerts great influence on productivity."⁷⁴ There is a great self-consciousness drummed into the individual about not wasting his free time, as discussed in Part Two.

The Declaration of Independence, it must be remembered, is neither law nor a doctrinaire manifesto. It is simply justification for an independence movement based upon the argument that the mother country had denied her colonial residents their basic "natural" rights. Had the United States followed the Jeffersonian ideal of a nation of independent yeoman farmers, quite likely the work-ethic would never have been so solidly implanted in ideology. However, following instead the Hamiltonian plan, first commercial capitalism and then industrial capitalism married with the Protestant cultural domination to form a society where one's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness depended largely upon one's ability to work hard, prize success, compete against others, and regard self-interest as more valuable than social health. Gradually the right to pursue happiness became the privilege of those most deft at competition;

⁷⁴ Paul Hollander, "Leisure as an American and Soviet Value," *Social Problems*, XIV, No. 2 (Fall, 1966), 179-188.

to those who were weak competitors--the feeble-minded, crippled, uneducated, immigrants, non-Caucasian, second and third generation poor--the right to life was considered enough, along with a rigid, national concept of liberty. What began as a gentry's ideal of happiness through being relieved from the necessity of work, became a bourgeois position of virtue and happiness through work. The concept of leisure was taken from its Athenian philosophical tradition and reinterpreted by a Protestant culture to be equated with the depravity of the poor. "Leisure time" became the Devil's time. One striking similarity remained: the Greek concept rested on slave labor and the Protestant on the sin of idleness and the deification of work. In other words, both rested on their own kind of slavery, one on the work of slaves and the other on enslavement to a work-ethic. "America of the nineteenth century repudiated the eighteenth century. Discarded with it (for it was the repository of history) were the Renaissance and ancient times."⁷⁵

Capitalism, a system that uses the work of men and machines in terms of their money value with men selling their labor and time, reigned supreme and thrived on the alienation caused by the objectification of man through competition. To compete one must see others as a potential threat to his success. One cannot relate to others and engage in human situations in an attitude of good faith if one is concentrating on beating out the other. Competition requires bad faith and a retreat to the objective self. "In a competitive

⁷⁵ Stewart, p. 267.

culture one envies anything good that happens to anybody else; it is enough to know that somebody---anybody---has something good, for one to become depressed or envious or both. In a competitive culture, anybody's success at anything is one's own defeat, even though one is completely uninvolved in the success."⁷⁶ If individuals are fed a cultural value that has hostility to others at its root, how can they be open to peace and quiet? There is no room for leisure in a competitive society, only for work time and free time, and man is alienated from himself and others during both. Under competitive, industrial capitalism, individuals do not choose who they want to be, they become things or what someone decides they should be. Their value is measured in non-human terms such as efficiency, costs of production, and the Gross National Product. Man competes with machines which causes employers to prefer providing a maintenance crew for the machinery than paying taxes for a national health insurance program. Machines are expensive, but they are not organized into Unions. "For anyone in a factory to run to the window to see a parade pass is dangerous, for the machines do not wait. Even after 5:00 p.m. they wait impatiently for morning, silently depreciating away."⁷⁷ In 1848 Paul Lafargue wrote, "A good workingwoman makes with her needles only five meshes a minute, while certain circular knitting machines make 30,000 in the same time. Every minute of the

⁷⁶ Henry, p. 153.

⁷⁷ De Grazia, p. 55.

machine's labor, gives the workingwomen ten days of rest. What is true for the knitting industry is more or less true for all industries reconstructed by modern machinery. But what do we see? In proportion as the machine is improved and performs man's work with an ever increasing rapidity and exactness, the laborer, instead of prolonging his former rest times, redoubles his ardor, as if he wished to rival the machine. O, absurd and murderous competition!"⁷⁸

Lafargue has concluded his article with this statement: "Aristotle's dream is our reality. Our machines, with breath of fire, with limbs of unwearying steel, with fruitfulness, wonderful inexhaustible, accomplish by themselves with docility their sacred labor. And nevertheless the genius of the great philosophers of capitalism remains dominated by the prejudice of the wage system, worst of alleries. They do not yet understand that the machine is the saviour of humanity, the god who shall redeem man from the sordid arts and from working for hire, the god who shall give him leisure and liberty."⁷⁹ Lafargue's style may be a bit too baroque, but his remarks in 1848 could have been very prophetic for the mid-twentieth century. He argued that technology could liberate all men to enjoy the leisure ideal rather than imprison them by fear. With technology, vast wealth in natural resources, and productive abundance the United States could well be a society of free individuals. The theory of the Founding Fathers, practiced by the gentry, could be

⁷⁸ Mass Leisure, p. 109.

⁷⁹ Mass Leisure, p. 117.

reality for all. Men could, in the cybernated age, equally pursue happiness if motivated by a leisure ideal. Instead, leisure, freedom, and happiness are denied modern man in America because his system requires what I referred to in Part One as the "great lag." "that in spite of man's need for leisure and a leisure-ethic, modern industrial society has, united work with culture."⁸⁰ We do not, as Sartre asks, choose for all men when we choose our own self; we allow, in fact desire, others to choose for us out of preference for security over freedom. When we become aware of the contradiction between an ethic of equality of work obligation and a practice of inequality of reward we all too frequently perpetuate our own alienation by giving in to the absurd, a self-multiplying nothingness from which no choice of freedom is made. What Arendt considers labor is even frequently sought rather than work because it requires less involvement of the self, and is at least, as was seen in Part Two, rewarded by more free time. Rather than create a community of free individuals, the economy of abundance, guided by the work-ethic, has created a laboring class each member of which can best be considered an affluent Sisyphus, an absurd non-hero too involved in meeting work requirements, buying consumer articles, and filling free time to be conscious of his loss of the pursuit of happiness. Camus has drawn a significant contrast between the modern industrial laborer and his protagonist. In speaking of the absurd in Sisyphus'

⁸⁰ Mss., p. 16.

never-ending attempt to push his stone to the summit of the mountain, he has said, "If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where would his torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him? The workman of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious. Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent."⁸¹ The alienated under competitive, industrial capitalism are powerless and unrebelling. They are rarely tragic because they are seldom conscious of their absurd condition. Having no leisure attitude, they see only a pre-determined something instead of nothingness in human situations. They are not free to choose themselves by synthesizing the objective and the subjective. Their ego involvement in the pursuit of pleasure negates the possibility of a human involvement in the pursuit of happiness. It is not even tragic, it is pathetic. On the domination of economic "laws" in the regulation of capitalist society Fromm has pointed out, "the very fact that we are governed by laws which we do not control, and do not even want to control, is one of the most outstanding manifestations of alienation."⁸²

⁸¹ Sources in Twentieth-Century Political Thought, p. 257.

⁸² Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (Greenwich, Conn., 1965), p. 126.

What is astounding about the entire situation is that since the American Revolution, the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and the ratification of the 14th and 19th Amendments, the masses in the United States have become citizens with human rights and secular dignity conferred on them from their government. In keeping with the ideals of the authors of the Declaration of Independence, "as free men they have been invited to participate in 'activities worthy of a free man,' to pursue happiness and personal fulfillment."⁸³ It is an empty invitation, however, for competitive capitalism thrives on the work-ethic and the objectification of man.

A NEW SOCIAL ETHIC

De Grazia has pointed out that, "A page of the GNP devoted to Socrates' whole life would have been a blank, pure white, unstained by numerals except perhaps for the government's expense at his trial."⁸⁴ Socrates, by being conscious of his human condition, had far more in common with Camus' absurd hero than with the modern affluent Sisyphus. What is revealing about the contemporary absurd non-hero of competitive capitalism, as mentioned in Part Two, is that he has an increasing interest and fascination in free time activities which is partially reflected by the social value system that does not highly dramatize what society has become--bureaucratized, managerial, and laboring. Therefore, alienation not only from self

⁸³ Work and Leisure, p. 26.

⁸⁴ De Grazia, p. 377.

but from work is increased. Both man and his work have lost dignity. It does not strike me as altogether revolutionary that what is needed is to reverse the consumption-production cycle and produce for the sole purpose of satisfying human needs and wants in order to minimize the amount of work needed by society, maximize the need for a commitment to individual self freedom, and finish the divorce of ethics from work that is taking place on the human level.

In a study conducted by Robert Dubin in the mid-1950's (which is hardly recent), "Industrial Workers' Worlds: A Study of the 'Central Life Interests' of Industrial Workers," it is revealed that 75 per cent of the individuals questioned indicated that work and their workplace was not their central life interest, and 90 per cent preferred primary personal relationships, that is, face-to-face, continuous, and intimate relationships, elsewhere than on the job.⁸⁵ Dubin has concluded that, "We assume that holding a job is simply evidence of adequate performance above some minimal level that justifies continued employment by the company."⁸⁶ It must be remembered that Dubin is discussing industrial workers and not generalizing about the "average American." His statistics do not speak for white-collar, managerial, and professional groups, for whom they are probably too high, nor for the semi-unemployed and habitually unemployed, for whom the study is quite likely meaningless. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that for a large section of the American adult

⁸⁵ Work and Leisure, p. 54.

⁸⁶ Work and Leisure, p. 59.

population work is in fact a means to an end, a way of acquiring income for life in society. Somewhere lurking in the minds of these individuals is the Protestant work-ethic insisting that work is inherently good in itself and carries with it dignity and virtue. Apparently also motivating them is their personal commitment to better wages, improved working conditions, and more free time. Conflicting with the latter but building on the former, is the social ethic of competitive capitalism that they must "work for a living." The position of the industrial worker today, and probably of most white-collar workers as well, is little better socially than the feudal serf; there is slight chance of escaping from their bondage of working for a living into an independent life. Few industrial workers become managers or entrepreneurs, they remain wage earners until retirement. For those who fall below the permanently employed on the social-economic ladder it is even greater bondage. It may well be true that there is no longer a proletarian class in competitive capitalism since economic security has been obtained by most, but what has happened is that, in Pieper's terms, all men have been made a proletarian; "the proletarian is the man who is fettered to the process of work."⁸⁷ This is in spite of the indications that the Protestant work-ethic is no longer a strong motivating force. The gap here is that the ideology of competitive capitalism moves society by the force of a commitment to utility, private profit, and personal success, while the individual does not feel personally motivated by

⁸⁷Pieper, p. 50.

either the Protestant or capitalist work-ethics. The resolution, or lack of it, takes place in the mind of the individual who thinks he should be motivated by the ideological dogma and is inclined to feel guilty if he is not, or if he "wastes" his free time or even entertains the attitudes of leisure, which he needs perhaps second only to the right to live.

Industrial capitalism has gone from long hours of uninteresting work with little free time to relatively short hours of uninteresting work and more free time, but alienated free time. Leisure does not even enter the picture, for it is basically incompatible with the social ethic and ideology. The attitudes of leisure, again, are renouncement of competition, contemplative solitude, and spontaneity. These are not harmoniously combined with competition, fear of failure, utility, private profit, and personal success.

Society neither can, nor need, return to Jeffersonian yeomanry, primitive culture, or classical Athens to replace a work-ethic with a leisure-ethic. Nor need it renounce work. What it can do is endow work with some of the qualities of leisure. The conditions that make possible for man the sensations of leisure could accompany much of our work. Cooperation could well motivate the unalienated man interested in the good life to greater heights than competition drives the alienated man. According to Erich Fromm, Marx's primary criticism of capitalism was that "the perversion of labor into forced, alienated, meaningless labor, hence the transformation of man into a 'crippled monstrosity.'" Marx argued that work should be both a

means to an end, the product, and an end in itself, "the meaningful expression of human energy; hence, work is enjoyable."⁸⁸ Marx would have had work involve much of the phenomena that Huizinga identified as play to constantly remind man of the irrational in him that resides with the rational. Riesman appears to support this view with the following statement: "...What looks like laziness may be a reaction against the kind of work people are forced to do and the way in which they are forced to define it."⁸⁹

If we are indoctrinated to fear others and compete against them, it is not unreasonable that many individuals would tire of the struggle and drop out. As Camus has pointed out, the absurd becomes tragic only when one is conscious. The conscious human who recognizes the tragedy in his situation is not necessarily lazy because he chooses to deny it. His new tragedy is that there is no social ethic to lend support to a potential decision for freedom. If current attitudes advocated work to enjoy leisure, work would become far more personally rewarding than it presently is. One source argues that increasing free time "makes necessary a change from man's current work ethic to the conception that leisure will be the basic integrating factor of life, and the major source of value, although it will still be dependent upon a worthy work life and adequate meeting of basic material needs."⁹⁰ The authors of the above statement

⁸⁸ Marx's Concept of Man, pp. 41-42.

⁸⁹ Riesman, et al, p. 300.

⁹⁰ Norman P. Miller and Duane M. Robinson, The Leisure Age (Belmont, Calif., 1963), p. 150.

obviously do not hold an identical view of leisure with that taken in this study, for I have argued that leisure cannot be dependent upon work, but the significant position taken in the quotation is that leisure, and not work, can become the basic integrating factor of life, or the human logos.

Work and leisure can, however, cheerfully co-exist in the life of an individual. Work can be less alienating than it presently is if endowed with some of the play elements and sensations of leisure, if it is not required for a living, and if shorter durations of time can be spent at it. Man needs leisure to be fully human. He needs leisure, not work, to live. If we are to separate work from the right to live, we need to identify fundamental human needs (which is certainly within the possibilities of modern social science and the humanities) and remove them from the concept of earning. They can be birth-rights, not earned privileges. Bertrand Russell has argued in his essay, "In Praise of Idleness," that some obligation to work must be admitted since all consume the produce of human labor, but he advocates a shorter work day (four hours) than at present. He argues that the absurdity of competitive capitalism is that most are overworked and the rest not worked at all, when working all fewer hours would accomplish the necessary fruits of production. The added human energy, physical and mental, from working less could well restore the urge to dance, celebrate, be active, etc. Education could develop talents and tastes, and individuals could creatively indulge, not their egos as in the present, but their curiosities. "The work

exacted will be enough to make leisure delightful, but not enough to produce exhaustion."⁹¹ The right to life for all could well be dependent upon work by all rather than making it competitive and individualized and without forcing basic human needs, such as food, health, recreation, education, shelter, and legal help to be earned through one's income. The right of human liberty is necessarily dependent upon leisure. And the pursuit of happiness should spring from the mutual compatibility in man's life of work and leisure, when man derives satisfaction from work as a social contribution even though he is basically engaged in an activity for other ends, and when he chooses himself in his leisure, pursued for its own sake. Thus work would lose much of its alienating and negative qualities since the individual would no longer have to sell his time and energy for a living, and would even take on a positive quality through satisfaction in making a needed social contribution. If the "for a living" concept was taken from work, it is reasonable that the competitive nature of it would disappear, for if basic human needs were considered birth-rights much fear and urgency would be relieved of man. In a cooperative society where individuals are equally engaged in the pursuit of happiness, as their unique capacities define it, it is just as sensible to assume that human relations will be conducted in good faith as it is to observe that in a competitive society where income determines the pursuit of pleasure, or even a

⁹¹ Mass Leisure, p. 104.

minimal level of subsistence, human relations are generally conducted in bad faith. The fact that competition requires fear, aggressiveness, and bad faith is no reason to assume that such is basic to man. It could be that the negative impulses are closer to the surface of man, but that is a problem not to be resolved in this study. The position here is that the positive impulses can be released given the social, economic, and political circumstances compatible with them. To put it another way, "The for-itself cannot be social in 'nature,' as it has no nature. Instead, it must create its relation to society in the same way that it creates its own individuality."⁹² Man chooses his own individuality out of ambiguity. As was argued in Part One, leisure brings to man detachment and objectivity toward time out of which he freely chooses engagement and subjectivity. In the same way, a leisure-ethic would provide man the freedom to relate to others in terms of good faith. If the condition of leisure embraces human existence, freedom and happiness can become the individual essence. Only outside of a competitive context can individuality be developed. If what we are is not taken too seriously, who we are can be highly valued.

THE LEISURE IDEAL AND DEMOCRACY

Economic and social changes since World War Two have given birth to an enormously significant dialogue in the United States between intellectuals and the culturally learned in the differing

⁹²Greene, p. 52.

ideological camps. The great concern is over what is inappropriately considered "mass leisure." Conservative intellectuals are pessimistic about the possibilities of elevating popular tastes and tend to see social stratification of culture as the inevitable result of natural human inequality. The cultural elite, they argue, should remain aloof and ignore the mass media as it merely reflects tastes of the market. This position is one that believes in a cultural consumer sovereignty which is and always will be based on inferior judgment.

Liberal and radical intellectuals are inclined to blame the suppliers of mass culture for catering to uneducated and manipulated popular taste in order to maximize profits. Their argument is that the media is in a strategic position to elevate popular taste, a responsibility the media refuses to recognize, and that if all individuals may not become highbrow they can at least become more tasteful and wise in their own way.

The former argument concludes that leisure should be the prerogative of the cultural elite, in the Athenian tradition, as only a few individuals in society have the inherent intellectual and cultural superiority necessary for a leisure attitude. This position is presented most articulately in the book by Sebastian de Grazia so frequently used in this study.

The latter argument is optimistic about the democratization of leisure which they claim can follow increased free time, the breakdown of the work-ethic, and intensive efforts to educate all for living with less stress on training for jobs. One can read this

argument in the essay mentioned above by Bertrand Russell, as well as find it implicit in the humanist thought of Marx and Fromm. It is the second position that is supported by this study, although it is necessary to first understand the elitist theory.

De Grazia states that leisure and democracy are not compatible, for the democratic emphasis on free time for all and social mobility supports the American economy in its ultimate purpose to produce more commodities. He argues that, "An ideology not based on time and work could not support an industrial system."⁹³ De Grazia's concept of leisure, which is heavily relied upon in parts One and Two of this study, divorces leisure from any reliance upon time. (Although I did take issue with this aspect of his concept.) He insists that leisure must be considered in nothing short of an entire life span of the individual. What is needed, he claims, is a concept of a leisure class that reflects the thinking of neither Marx nor Veblen. "The world is divided into two classes,...One is the great majority; the other is the leisure kind, not those of wealth or position or birth, but those who love ideas and the imagination."⁹⁴ It is an elite class based on temperament made up of superior, creative, thoughtful individuals to whom the political system is irrelevant, for they would exist and be influential under any regime. They must not have to work, and their importance lies in the degree

⁹³ De Grazia, p. 335.

⁹⁴ De Grazia, p. 359.

to which their values, efforts, and ideas are treasured and supported. To De Grazia, anyone not capable of being a philosopher would be bored with leisure and a look to democratic education for help is wasted effort. "Education is the discovery and drawing out of the best that is in a person. How can it exist in crowds? Mass education is a contradiction of terms."⁹⁵ The classical ideal, so significant to De Grazia's concept of the attitude of leisure, must be recreated in the contemporary world. "The classical ideal of leisure was indifferent to what we would call materialism. It was even more indifferent to the idea that leisure was everyone's right and that everyone could benefit from it equally. Only men brought up as free men should be brought up could benefit from leisure."⁹⁶ Modern, democratic commitments to full employment and equality deny the possibility of leisure, De Grazia concludes. His position is consistent in that it maintains the classical ideal throughout.

Clive Bell, in his article, "How to Make a Civilization," agrees with the elitist theory of De Grazia. "Civilization requires the existence of a leisured class, and the leisured class requires the existence of slaves--of people, I mean, who give some part of their surplus time and energy to the support of others."⁹⁷

So much for the advocacy of an elite class. In an amusing poem,

⁹⁵ De Grazia, p. 343.

⁹⁶ De Grazia, p. 331.

⁹⁷ Mass Leisure, p. 32.

"The Creative Use of Leisure," Willem Sandberg has written the following:

"the greatest sin toward life
is pastime
boredom a curse
formerly monopoly of the privileged
today within everybody's reach"⁹⁸

Sandberg is correct, pastime and boredom are today within everybody's reach, but also, then, is leisure. The choice is being made available to man, and there is no reason to believe that the unalienated individual will necessarily choose captivity over leisure. De Grazia argues that the leisure ideal is a privilege of those brought up as free men should be brought up. Today, however, we have the means, through both our productive capacity and education, to bring up all individuals as free men. What concerns me about an elitist theory of natural superiority is that if through the bondage of poverty and family ignorance a child never hears good music or never reads Aristotle is it possible to assume that he is "naturally" of the "ordinary" class. (Or is reading Aristotle and listening to good music so inherently superior?) In an elitist system, and frequently in our present one, we would never know. It is far too simplistic for thinkers like De Grazia and Bell to ignore environment and opportunity and draw a circle around an assumed superior leisure class.

⁹⁸ Willem Sandberg, "The Creative Use of Leisure," American Scholar, XXIV, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), 227-232.

I have tried to point out above the negative effects of competitive capitalism on the availability of choices open to the individual and the degree to which alienation from self and others deny man his freedom. De Grazia is too quick to identify the capitalist mode of production and its ideology with the democratic process. The ballot projects political choices and the competitive market projects economic and cultural choices (although neither is an unfettered choice), but they are not one and the same. To argue that leisure is impossible in a democracy because the ideology needs the concepts of time and work to support the industrial system is to miss the point. Industrialism does not deny leisure, it makes it possible for all. It is the particular mode of production under competitive capitalism that places the work-ethic where a leisure-ethic should be. How the political leaders got into power has nothing to do with it. De Grazia is correct that mass education is a contradiction of terms under existing circumstances, but again, there is no reason to believe it must always be such. Democratic education does not have to indoctrinate youngsters to support the work-ethic. Nor does it have to transmit to them the cultural values of fear and competition. Adults who hold power in the educational system choose to indoctrinate for competition because it is the comfortable choice of those who prefer to follow rather than lead. Chances are that in a cooperative society they would choose to follow the new values (which would be better than their current choices but less good than if new leaders emerged). The questions that lead the elitist theorists to their

conclusions are: Does democracy bring mediocrity? If so, must it? Does equality deny quality? When thinkers such as De Grazia and Bell answer these questions in the affirmative it is because they see how it is in an alienated, competitive society and assume that is the way it naturally is. A man who lives by the favor of another is not a free man, but a dependent man, and as such his dependency is reflected in his attitudes and choices rather than the freedom he might have. This is true of the men De Grazia sees just as it would be true of his majority and superior classes, for both would be dependent upon the other, the former for their values, and the latter for their economic abundance. De Grazia's leisured elite would not be free men. Freedom and happiness could not come from their leisure because their human existence would be the closed one of a dependant group. As closed and dependent, they could not affirm life and all forms of individuality.

What is needed to effect the leisure-ethic is not a society of leisure for either a few or for all, but a society for leisure where engagement and contemplation were prime values. As argued above, work is not to be denied, but is to be pursued for leisure. "The leisure age makes possible for all a more vital family life, a more democratic community of equals, a greater share in a civilization that is refined, humane, cultured, and filled with beauty."⁹⁹

Riesman has argued that no society has ever come as close as

⁹⁹Miller and Robinson, p. 164.

ours to "fulfilling the age-old dream of freedom from want, the dream of plenty."¹⁰⁰ And Bertrand Russell adds that "Modern technique has made it possible for leisure, within limits, to be not the prerogative of small privileged classes, but a right evenly distributed throughout the community."¹⁰¹ Both Riesman and Russell see economic abundance as the liberating factor for society and the individual. Their positions are valid in that without abundance an industrial society can only with great sacrifice have work take place for the sake of leisure rather than economic growth. Marx, who also saw economic abundance potentially bringing leisure for all, takes a position closer to the theme of this study, however, in being fundamentally concerned with the total liberation of the whole man from alienation. "For Marx the aim of socialism was the emancipation of man, and the emancipation of man was the same as his self-realization in the process of productive relatedness and oneness with man and nature. The aim of socialism was the development of the individual personality."¹⁰² For Marx, as for Aristotle, the state was to make life good, not just possible. As Hannah Arendt has pointed out, to the Greeks the act of legislating was similar to that of an architect, to design the good state. Politics, however, was to live in the state, a daily process pursued by the citizens; "not Athens, but

¹⁰⁰ Mass Leisure, p. 381.

¹⁰¹ Mass Leisure, p. 98.

¹⁰² Marx's Concept of Man, p. 38.

the Athenians were the polis."¹⁰³ Marx, and other egalitarian humanists, have merely asked that all humans equally enjoy the existential experience of living in the state.

Far from being incompatible with democracy, the leisure ideal, as promoted in this study, is fundamental to democracy, to living in the state. The concept of democracy, however, must be broadened to include more than the free ballot and representative government. Basic to a human concept of democracy is the ideal of equality of individuals. Some thinkers, such as Alexis Carrel in Man the Unknown, argue that personality and individuality exist only through inequality and that we confuse the concept of human beings, who are equal, with that of individuals, who are not. What is significant in considering this argument is that differences are considered inequalities. Democracy must be based on an argument that insists that human differences are not inequalities. We cannot set up a hierarchy of values to place on differences, but we must value the uniqueness of each individual equally. In this sense all individuals are equal in a much broader frame of reference than just the political.

Modern competitive society, based on the inequality of differences rather than the equality of uniqueness (or put another way, the inequality of what men are rather than the equality of who they are) requires order over spontaneity, agreement over originality, and unity over individuality. Spontaneity, originality, and individuality

¹⁰³Arendt, p. 174.

are products of leisure, not of work and labor in industrial capitalism. They are also necessary components of culture in the democracy of equality in uniqueness. Only when the uniqueness of individuals is highly and equally valued can the internal desires of man be freed. If leisure is determined internally, society must respect and make possible internal values through the liberation of individuality and freeing of one's creativity. Leisure, which cannot be known by those who are dependent upon others because of their inability to be open to the ambiguity of nothingness, brings freedom and the capacity to choose happiness equally to unique individuals who not only make their own choices, but insist upon the right of others to make choices. In short, they follow Sartre who states, "I can take freedom as my goal only if I take that of others as a goal as well."¹⁰⁴ Leisure, then, is not only a condition of man's freedom, but the communities' as well.

¹⁰⁴ Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 46.

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