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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A PROCESS
ADOPTED BY OREGON'S FOUR-YEAR
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
TO SUPPORT FACULTY MEMBERS'
PARTICIPATION IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

by

PATRICIA LILLIAN CHADWICK

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

in

PUBLIC SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION
AND SUPERVISION

Portland State University
The University of Oregon
1985

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF Patricia Lillian Chadwick for the
Doctor of Education in Public School Administration and Supervision
presented May 22, 1985.

Title: Collective Bargaining: A Process Adopted by Oregon's Four-Year
Institutions of Higher Education To Support Faculty Members'
Participation in Institutional Governance

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE DISSERTATION COMMITTEE:

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In 1966, amid hostile concerns and myths, the process of collective bargaining entered the university system of higher education. A dynamic social process grounded in the labor movement dating from the industrial revolution, it was intended not as an alternative to the traditional governance mode of the academy, but rather as a supplemental mode to support the advancement of faculty rights (Polishook, 1982).

The purpose of this survey was to study select faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education to evaluate whether or not they perceive the process of collective bargaining as supportive of faculty members' rights to participate in institutional governance.

The population of the study consisted of 694 faculty members holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions during the spring of 1984. Those faculty members selected for the study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment during the academic year, (2) have been employed in the present institution for a minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on a tenure track appointment in the department.

The research instrument "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining As a Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance" was used to measure for faculty members' perception of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in their university system in three major areas: (1) Respondent Information, (2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information.

For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in institutional governance. The four hypotheses were:

- H:1 The collective bargaining process has affirmed the professional interests of the academician with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.
- H:2 Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education, has provided for the academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the economic interests of the institution.
- H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate in determining the institution's educational policy on academic issues.
- H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment.

The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was used to test each of the four hypotheses of the study. Although statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level were found within each dependent variable subset of data: (1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies, the four hypotheses of the study were rejected. The data, however, suggest that the respondents at all three of the subject institutions perceive collective bargaining to have provided for (1) a formalized structure and process for institutional decision-making and (2) the opportunity to make policy decisions for the two important issues of (a) dismissal for cause and (b) grievance procedures.

These are important results, even though the aggregate data suggest that academic collective bargaining in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education has not been perceived as having provided faculty members with the right to participate in many institutional governance issues.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to
my father, Mr. Virgil James Clark,
and to my niece, Deanna Marie Duyck

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I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Walter G. Ellis, Chairperson, Dr. Gerald K. Bogen, Dr. John D. Lind, Dr. David E. Willis and to Dr. Charles A. Tracy, the Graduate School Representative to the committee. Throughout the process of completing the dissertation, as well as at my oral examination and defense, they so generously shared their expertise as educators and scholars.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary American university system emerged in the 1960s as a powerful societal force, with economic and political influence, as well as a substantive concentration of resources and multipurpose capacity (Sherman & Loeffler, 1971; McHugh, 1973). As an enterprise, the university system was described by Clark Kerr in 1963 as:

A major producer, wholesaler and retailer in the knowledge industry, which was inextricably related to national growth and the well-being of society, as well as a major instrument of societal purpose (Kerr, 1963).

During the "era of growth" in the university system of higher education, the role of university teacher was professionalized. This status provided the academician with the professional autonomy required to participate in academic governance through (1) the setting of performance standards, (2) the regulation of terms and conditions of employment, and (3) the setting and regulation of academic standards and procedures for undergraduate and graduate education (Shulman, 1979). Furthermore, the academician's right to shared authority, as the traditional mode of academic governance, was developed and sustained in higher education, according to J. Victor Baldrige because:

- (a) Faculty had the direct flow of its members into

administrative positions;

- (b) Departmental members developed educational programs for students and faculty, hired faculty, and set the standards of performance.
- (c) Academic senates were formed to provide for influence/advice to the administration in institution-wide matters (Baldridge, 1982).

While the administration and faculty members were firmly committed to the concept of shared authority in the higher education enterprise, it was a brief golden age for the traditional mode of academic governance (Garbarino, 1973, 1975).

The mid-1960s brought a combination of contextual factors, both external and internal to the university system, which affected the governance structures and function of the academy (Garbarino, 1973). Among these factors were three major events: (1) the increase in campus size and in the number of colleges and universities, (2) increased financial problems, and (3) federal regulation that reduced the faculty members' influence in academic governance through departmental or campus-wide structures (Shulman, 1979).

By 1966, as a consequence of these events, academic collective bargaining emerged as a supplemental governance mode for the academy. It was a mode of governance that was not intended as an alternative to the traditional governance forms of the university system but rather as a supplemental mode that would guarantee the advancement of faculty governance rights (Polishook, 1982).

A dynamic social process, grounded in a labor movement dating

from the industrial revolution, collective bargaining has made enormous gains in higher education (Nelson, 1982). During the past 17 years, amid initial hostile concerns and myths, the process has increased in public and private 4-year institutions of higher education. As Irwin H. Polishook (1982) stated: "The proportion of academic professionals who have voluntarily joined unions is greater than the proportion of other Americans who have joined unions (Polishook, 1982; Nelson, 1982).

In the university system, the growth of academic collective bargaining has been assured because of a well-defined legal environment, with established laws as the basis for federal and state sector employee negotiation (Hedgepeth, 1974). Although federal sector bargaining laws are an important part of the legal framework, the enactment of state regulative laws, which include comprehensive and permissive legislation, is of particular significance to education, according to Joseph W. Garbarino:

Education is a function basically of the states. While the degree of encouragement among states varies greatly, permissive state legislation is the key explanation for the burst of academic unions of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Garbarino, 1973).

By 1973, Oregon was among the original eight states to have enacted significant comprehensive bargaining laws for the educator as a public employee. These laws permitted faculty members with an appointment in an Oregon 4-year institution of higher education to select collective bargaining as a supplemental mode for their

participation in institutional governance (Garbarino, 1973).

That choice has been confirmed by educational analysts such as Aussieker and Garbarino, Baldridge and Lee as the mode of governance adopted by academicians to improve or reinstate independence into their professional lives (Shulman, 1979). Furthermore, the recent scholarly works of Lee, Polishook and Kemerer/Baldridge have continued to support the position that faculty members have gained or maintained a substantive role in academic governance as a result of institutional unionization (Lee, 1979; Polishook, 1982; Baldridge, 1982). As Barbara A. Lee wrote in 1979:

Faculty as a whole gained formal governance powers through the union contract. Even on campuses where faculty have enjoyed considerable decision-making power, the contract legitimized and in many cases broadened the scope of faculty's governance rights (Lee, 1979).

In 1982, J. Victor Baldridge identified four positive trends in the formal governance rights of faculty members in university systems with academic collective bargaining. These trends, which support the formal governance powers gained by unionized faculty, are:

- (1) The collective bargaining process standardized procedures in personnel practices for the academicians, with the benefits to them identified as: (a) order to the system, and (b) increased equity.
- (2) The collective bargaining process helped the economic status of the profession. The bargaining process seems to have generated additional money.

(3) The collective bargaining process resulted in the so-called "dual track" relationship between faculty senates and unions, whereby senates serve faculty members' academic interests and unions serve their economic concerns, remaining viable at campuses that have both unions and senates.

(4) The collective bargaining process may be an incentive to the "decentralization" of administrative powers and authority (Baldrige, 1982).

Therefore, the research question arises: Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education supported the rights of faculty members for participation in institutional governance?

Purposes and Problems of the Study

The purpose of this study was to investigate the faculty members with academic appointments in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education to evaluate whether or not collective bargaining supports faculty members' rights to participate in institutional governance. To achieve the stated purpose, the following problems were investigated:

1. Have the professional interests of those academicians with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education been affirmed through the collective bargaining process?
2. Has collective bargaining provided for the academicians' participation in financial planning and policy-making related

to their economic interests as employees of an Oregon 4-year institution of higher education?

3. Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate in determining those institutional educational policies related to academic issues?
4. Has the collective bargaining process provided the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment?

Hypotheses of the Study

For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in institutional governance.

H:1 The collective bargaining process is perceived as affirming the professional interests of the academicians with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.

H:2 Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education, has provided for the academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the economic interests of the institution.

H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's

4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate in determining the institution's educational policy on academic issues.

H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment.

Scope of the Study

The population of the study consisted of selected academicians holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions in the spring of 1984. Those faculty members selected for the study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment during the 1983-84 academic year, (2) have been employed in the present institution for a minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on a tenure track appointment in the department.

The questionnaires for this study were sent to 694 faculty members with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions during the spring of 1984.

Data for the study were collected from the population of the study between May 21, 1984, and August 10, 1984. The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining As A Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance," was used for the data collection (See Appendix A).

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study, the following definitions of the major terms have been used:

1. Collective Bargaining -- Means the performance of the mutual obligation of a public employer and the representative of its employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to employment relations, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. However, this obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession (Oregon, 1982).

2. Institutional Governance -- The formal structure and related activities that are used to make decisions affecting organizational relationships, procedures and policies (Duryea, Fisk, et al., 1973).

3. Academician -- An educator who holds an academic appointment in a 4-year institution of higher education.

4. Academy -- A 4-year university/college of higher education.

5. Contextual Factors -- These are a combination of issues, both external and internal to a university system of higher education, that affect the institutional governance structure and function (Garbarino, 1973).

6. Professional Interests -- A stature, gained during the 1960s, which provides the academician with the right to pursue the three central elements of the traditional academic model: (1) research, (2) peer evaluation, and (3) scholarship, as well as the right to autonomy in setting professional standards and regulating the terms

and conditions of employment (Shulman, 1979). (See questionnaire items: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27).

7. Economic Interests -- In a university system, faculty members are expected to participate, either directly or indirectly through structures of self-government within the institution, in the determination of policies and procedures related to economic issues. There are three types of such issues, those related to: (1) the total resources available to the institution, (2) the distribution of resources allocated to provide for the academicians' economic security (e.g. salary, fringe benefits), and (3) the allocation of resources to major budgetary categories. (Brown, 1969; Wollett, 1971) (See questionnaire items: 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36).

8. Educational Policies -- Are the written policies within a university system that govern the implementation of such academic issues as curriculum, degree requirements, or professional teaching. (See questionnaire items: 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43).

9. Academic and Personnel Policies -- Are provisions in the academicians' employment agreement related to a wide spectrum of bargaining subjects in the university system, which include such issues as academic duties, standards, personnel policies, and support services. (Wollett, 1971) (See questionnaire items: 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56).

Chapter II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The University Enterprise

The Contemporary University Setting

The late 1950s and virtually all of the 1960s have been described as the "golden years" of prosperity for American higher education (Garbarino, 1973). It was an "era of growth," which Joseph W. Garbarino in 1973 described as the direct result of a combination of factors external and internal to the system of higher education. The factors included:

An increase in the college-age population, the continued growth in the proportion of the relevant age group attending college, the international scientific and technological competition touched off by the successful Soviet satellite launching in 1958, and the competition among states to provide university centers to facilitate the growth of science-based industry combined to expend university budgets and - because of relative shortage of experienced faculty - to expand salaries and prerequisites (Garbarino, 1973).

As a consequence of phenomenal growth, by the 1960s, the university system emerged with societal influence, as well as economic and political importance (Sherman and Loeffler, 1971). In 1963, W. Clark Kerr, in an address at Harvard University, stated:

We are just now perceiving that the University's invisible product, knowledge, may be the most powerful single element in our culture, affecting the rise and fall of professionals and even social classes, of regions and even nations (Sherman and Loeffler, 1971).

Therefore, the contemporary American system is best described as a corporate institution or social system (McHugh, 1971; Lipset, 1975). It is a system that has developed into a diverse and complex structure, with no single organizational form (McHugh, 1971). For while some private and public institutions have all their faculty members and staff located on one campus, others are widely separated geographically (McHugh, 1971).

Furthermore, the university system is composed of highly disparate elements (Lipset, 1975). Although most 4-year institutions of higher education have adopted research on the basic value of the academy, its traditional characteristic functions -- research, teaching, and public service are combined to provide for the acquisition, transmission, and application of knowledge in various degrees and for various programs (Lipset, 1975; McHugh, 1971).

Academic Professionalism

In order for the American system of higher education to meet the expected societal performances as an institution, diverse professionals are appointed to teaching positions within the academy. These appointments bring together the lives and works of the best in each field to form a "community of scholars," (McHugh, 1971) a

community that through the years has established traditions for the academy--traditions that have formed the academic model of higher education based upon the value and practice of academia.

The academic model of professionalized university teaching embodies three central elements: (1) Research is an important endeavor and the force of the university life, (2) academic work requires peer judgment, and (3) scholarship is a vocation in its own right (Shulman, 1979). The model brought a status that, according to Carol H. Shulman (1979), provides the academician with a new stature.

Professional prestige grew as scholars assumed more influence over areas for which they claimed expertise: (1) the academic standards and procedures for undergraduate and graduate education, and (2) terms and conditions for faculty employment. These gains furthered their concept of professionalism by allowing: (1) autonomy in setting standards of performance, and (2) in requesting the terms and conditions of employment (Shulman, 1979).

Academic Governance

The culture of the academy by the 1960s further reflected the professionalism of higher education, with the academician role within the university community defined as both a participant and employer. This culture set the standards to which all academicians in general may aspire, that a faculty, in a broad sense of the word, function as a responsible corporate body (Duryea and Fisk, 1973; McHugh, 1971). As James B. Conant, the former president of Harvard University, said:

This tradition, also developed in the medieval university, prevails in a large measure in the university of today. For in an institution which is a university, in fact as well as name, the teachers are members of a body with vast powers and commensurate responsibilities.... The autonomy of the institute rests fundamentally on the autonomy of each faculty, which embodies in its spirit and action the university tradition (McHugh, 1971).

Therefore, the concept of shared authority became the guiding principle for the development of the academic profession (Duryea and Fisk, 1973). It was a trend that, according to Robert E. Fisk and E. D. Duryea:

Stamped the services of the professionals, making them inherently more than employees and strengthened the ancient ideal of the university as primarily an association of academicians (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).

In 1966, these principles were concisely articulated for the academy in the "Statement on Governments of Colleges and Universities," which was jointly formulated by the American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (Haslam, 1974). This Statement called for a mutual understanding regarding the governance of the academic institutions, stressing shared responsibility and the proper interrelation among the constituencies of administration, faculty, and, to some extent,

students (Brown, 1969; Haslam, 1974). The appropriate scope of the academician's participation in the academic governance of an institution was defined in the statement as follows:

(a) The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter, and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life that relate to the educational process.

(b) The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees offered in courses, determines when the requirements have been met, and authorizes the president and board to grant the degrees thus achieved.

(c) Faculty status and related matters are primarily a faculty responsibility; this area includes appointments, re-appointments, decisions not to re-appoint, promotions, the granting of tenure, and dismissal.

(d) The faculty should actively participate in the determination of policies and procedures governing salary increases.

(e) The chairman or head of the department, who serves as the chief representative of his department within an institution, should be selected either by departmental election or by appointment following consultation with members of the department and of related departments; appointments should normally be in conformity with the department members' judgment (Sands, 1971).

Furthermore, the statement stressed that the principle of shared governance is important to the academy in contemporary times for three major reasons:

(1) The academic institution, public or private, has become less autonomous; buildings, research, and student tuition are supported by funds over which the college or university exercises a diminishing control. Legislative and executive governmental authority, at all levels, plays a part in the making of important decisions in academic policy. If these voices and forces are to be successfully heard and integrated, the academic institution must be in a position to meet them with its own generally unified view, (2) Regard for the welfare of the institution remains important despite the mobility and interchange of scholars, and (3) A college or university in which all the components are aware of the interdependence, of the usefulness of communication among themselves, and of the force of joint action will enjoy increased capacity to solve educational problems (AAUP, 1984).

A Conceptive Framework for the Traditional Mode of Academic Governances

The conceptive framework upon which the principles of the traditional modes for academic governances have been developed include these concepts: (1) authority, and (2) power. While these concepts are often confused, they can be clearly differentiated.

The Concept of Authority

Authority is a formal concept and issues from a formal organization (Hicks, 1967). It is always a property of social organization with the exercise of authority never extending beyond the limits of the association in which it is institutionalized and which gives it support and sanction (Flippo, 1970). Furthermore, from the use of a basic definition of authority, as a right to act or direct the action of others, two explicit characteristics of authority are stated: (1) authority is a right and (2) as a result of possessing the right, one is entitled and obligated to directly or indirectly act. Also implied but not explicitly stated in the definition is a third characteristic of authority, which involves the power to employ penalties or sanctions so that desired action is completed (Bierstedt, 1964).

The Concept of Power

Power is a broad concept that is not necessarily confined to an organizational contract and that is neither completely formal nor informal in nature, though it may be influenced by subjective factors including ethical and moral considerations (Sisk, 1979; French, 1974).

According to Max Weber: "Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1947). Gerald R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer define power as: "The ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done." (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). In

other words, power is the ability of a person to do something measured in terms of his/her ability to (1) give reward, (2) promise rewards, (3) threaten to withdraw current rewards, (4) withdraw current rewards, (5) threaten punishment, and (6) punish (Hicks, 1967).

Power, an emotionally laden term, particularly in organizational cultures that emphasize individuality and equality, is essentially a relationship between people operating as individuals or groups. It does not consist of brute force, coercion, and dominance, but it can be a highly effective instrument in an organization (Flippo, 1970). Although Warren Bennis has stated, "While power is the organization's last dirty secret," power is far from being a dirty business. In its most noted form, power is one of the few mechanisms available for aligning an organization with its own reality. Consequently, power can be viewed, not as a dirty secret, but as a secret to success (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).

To demonstrate power as a positive force in an organization Salancik and Pfeffer advance a strategic-contingency model of power theory. This model views power as:

Something that accrues to organizational subunits that cope with critical organizational problems. Power is used by all who have it to: (1) enhance their own survival through control of scarce critical resources, (2) through the placement of allies, i.e., key positions, and (3) through the definition of organizational problems and policies (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).

Therefore, by the use of the processes to develop and utilize

power by individuals or groups in an organization, the system becomes more aligned or misaligned with its environment (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).

The Concepts of Authority and Power in Academia

In academia, the concepts of authority and power, as implemented within the university system, are best described by three basic contingency models of governance, the (1) collegial, (2) bureaucratic and political.

As shown in Table I, the three models are different in their appearance/process related to governance in the university system in the arena of: (1) image, (2) change, (3) conflict, (4) view of social structure, (5) theoretical foundation, (6) decision-making, and

TABLE I

A Comparison of the Three Basic Contingency Models of Academic Governance (Baldrige, 1971)

	Collegial	Bureaucratic	Political
Basic image	Professional community	Hierarchical bureaucracy	Political system
Change processes	Minor concern	Minor concern	Primary concern
Conflict	Viewed as abnormal: eliminated in a "true community of scholars"	Viewed as abnormal: to be controlled by bureaucratic sanctions	Viewed as normal: key to analysis of policy influence
View of Social structure	Unitary; united by the "community of scholars"	Unitary; integrated by the formal bureaucracy	Pluralistic; fractured by subcultures and divergent interest groups
Basic theoretical foundations	Human relations approach to organizations; Literature on professionalism	Weberian bureaucratic model; Classical formal systems model	Conflict theory; Interest group theory; Open systems theory Community power theory
View of decision making	Shared, collegial decisions	Rationalistic formal bureaucratic procedures	Negotiation, bargaining and political influence processes
Goal setting and Policy: formulation or execution	Unclear: probably more emphasis on formulation	Emphasis on execution	Emphasis on formulation

(7) goal setting and policy formulation/execution.

A Supplemental Academic Governance
Mode For the University System

For the past two decades, collective bargaining has become a supplemental mode for academic governance in higher education. A complicated force, grounded in a labor movement that dates from the industrial revolution and the twentieth-century organization of workers, the process of academic collective bargaining has, according to E. D. Duryea and Robert S. Fisk (1973):

Posed a significant change in the academic milieu. By 1970, professionals in an expanded number of institutions had accepted bargaining agents, usually affiliated or associated with a national organization, to represent their interests. In effect, these individuals turned away from a primary dependency on shared governance to a more pragmatic reliance upon the power of organizations outside the disciplinary and professional societies (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).

The process was declared by Irwin H. Polishook (1982) as: "The practice of the decade in higher education, which has grown in greater proportions than the proportion of other Americans who have joined unions" (Polishook, 1982).

A Definition of Collective Bargaining

The process of collective bargaining, using the basic industrial definition, as written by Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg, (1979), may be defined as:

A joint determination of the terms and conditions of the

employment relationship by duly chosen employer and employee representatives. The process involves offers and counter-offers, with the ultimate objective of reaching a written contract (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).

Furthermore, the process of academic collective bargaining, which initially was introduced into the university system in 1966 at the United States Merchant Marine Academy, (Garbarino, 1975) has been defined by the following scholars:

(a) William F. McHugh (1971)--Collective bargaining is a process, adversary in nature, which is designed to resolve conflict arising in an employment relationship. The process consists of two fundamental elements: the act of negotiation and the more informal relationship created during the implementation of the contract after it is negotiated and accepted by the parties, i.e., faculty relations under the contract. This bilateral relationship between faculty and administration characteristically involves problem-oriented consultation between the parties and administration of the contract's grievance system for the purpose of reaching mutual accord. When mutual accord is not achieved, resort may be had to more formal procedures for conflict resolution, such as mediation, fact-finding and arbitration. Thus, collective bargaining, as the term is used here, means not only the actual collective negotiation sessions but also the complicated and subtle university-professional relationships

that develop as the parties live under the contract (McHugh, 1971).

(b) Donald H. Wollett (1971)--Collective negotiation in the context of higher education, like its counterpart in the private sector, is essentially a process of proposal and counter-proposal, of action and reaction, of give and take--resulting finally in "deal" or "no deal," in agreement or stalemate. The process assumes parity of legal standing between the parties and some bargaining power on both sides. Bilateral determination of the terms and conditions of employment through the process of collective negotiations means that neither party should have the ability to impose its will on the other and that each is able to veto the proposals of the other (Wollett, 1971).

(c) C. Donald Sands (1971)--Collective bargaining can reasonably be viewed as one among alternative procedures for achieving faculty participation in decisions affecting policy at academic institutions. The bargaining process is consistent with historic traditions of relative autonomy for institutions as well as individuals concerning matters of intellect and pays deference to the pragmatic consideration that absent such freedom and independence the academic enterprise cannot effectively serve its historic mission (Sands, 1971).

(d) C. L. Haslam (1974)--Collective bargaining is a process,

one which lends itself to a variety of expressions. It may indeed lead to an adversary relationship, but it may also result in a kind of enforceable shared authority by virtue of a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. The broad parameters that influence the ultimate impact that collective bargaining has upon institutional relations depend upon the nature of the institution itself, the quality of the issues of local concern, and, above all, the character of the collective bargaining agent (Haslam, 1974).

The Purpose of Collective Bargaining in Academia

The purpose of implementing the process of collective bargaining into the university system as an alternative mode for academic governance, according to Donald H. Wollett, (1971) is twofold:

First, faculty must have the right without legal or other restraints to form and join organizations of their own choosing, to designate their organization and their representatives for the purposes of dealing with their employing institutions, and to participate in related organizational activity. Second, both the faculty organization and the governing board must have the capacity to engage in a process of give and take negotiations (Wollett, 1971).

A Model for Academic Collective Bargaining

The general labor relations model, as seen in Figure 1, has been

adapted to the university system in order to manage activities related to academic collective bargaining.

The model has three major elements: (1) the structure of selecting the bargaining representatives, (2) the structure of negotiating the contract, and (3) the structure of administering the contract to emphasize decision-making by consensus, rather than to have unilateral decisions imposed upon a faculty by administration (Wollett, 1971). Furthermore, these elements, according to Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg (1979), "have a basic logic and a sequence that is controlled, in part, by established procedure and modified by the behavior of all the participants" (Wollett, 1971).

Figure 1. (Levine and Hagburg, 1979) The general labor relations model.

Patterns of Relationships in Academic

Collective Bargaining

The use of the general labor relations model to implement the process of collective bargaining into the university system is best achieved through the application of the general pattern of labor-management relationships as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. (Levine and Hagburg, 1979) The general pattern of labor-management relationships.

Of the identified patterns of possible ways to manage relationships in the academic milieu, two patterns, cooperation and collaboration, are best-suited to prevent or manage conflict in academic governances. First, cooperation is the pattern characterized as working together under law to achieve a common purpose (i.e., the

labor contract). Second, collaboration is that pattern in which the faculty members and administration consider institutional conflict dysfunctional; therefore, they make a commitment to work together, in order to prevent confrontation in bargaining, to achieve an effective organization system in the university system (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).

The Legal Framework For the Establishment
of Academic Collective Bargaining

The Federal Sector

Until 1962, federal employees were permitted but a limited right to engage in collective bargaining activities, in part because of the sovereignty doctrine (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). That doctrine held:

The employment relationship in government, like that in the private sector, appears more authoritarian at first than it really is. Government's apparently unlimited authority over its employees was originally based on its sovereignty. The idea that government employees have only the rights that the government permits them is related to the concepts that the king can do no wrong and that government can be sued only with its consent. The sovereignty doctrine has often been used to uphold a denial of the right of employee organizations to negotiate the terms of employment (Stanley, 1972).

Furthermore, prior to the enactment of executive order 10988 there was no government-wide system of rights and representatives for

collective bargaining between federal unions and the employer (Stanley, 1972). As Chairman John W. Macy Jr. of the Civil Service Commission stated in 1962:

The weakest single element in the personnel programs of the '40s and the '50s, in my opinion, was the lack of a realistic and reasonably uniform system of employee-management relations (Macy, 1962).

By 1961, the federal labor organizations were representing an estimated 760,000 workers on a broad internal scope. These organizations were restricted to the internal utilization of congressional lobbying to improve wages and the working conditions for the federal employees (Macy, 1962). However, these legislative efforts were, according to Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg, "rejected by the executive branch as unnecessary and unduly restraints of the administrative flexibility required by agency heads" (Macy, 1962).

During the 1960 presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy, the efforts of those involved in the federal sector labor-management relations began to identify a possible change in executive attitude toward the development of collective bargaining on a system of industrial governments when Kennedy stated that: "He had always believed in the right of federal employees to deal collectively with the federal departments and agencies in which they are employed should be protected" (Goldberg, 1962).

Upon his election, President Kennedy appointed a Task Force

chaired by the Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg to develop policies related to federal service labor-management relations. By late 1961, the Task Force reported to President Kennedy that a special program needed to be developed to meet the federal sector needs. The Task Force development: (1) recognized the right of federal employees and employee organizations to participate in developing improved personnel policies and working conditions; (2) recommended that employee organizations be consulted and that under specified conditions management be authorized to enter into agreements with unions; (3) called for regularizing arbitration procedures in handling individual employee grievances; (4) requested legislation to authorize voluntary withholding of dues; and (5) recommended the nomination by the Secretary of Labor, when necessary, of panels of expert arbitrators to make advisory recommendations as to what constitutes appropriate units for negotiating purposes and to supervise representation elections (Goldberg, 1962).

On January 17, 1962, President Kennedy issued and signed Executive Order 10988 entitled "Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service" - which established the basic pattern of labor and management relations in the federal sector (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). It introduced three levels of union recognition - informal, formal and exclusive. In addition, the law established the concepts of exclusive bargaining units and regulated agreements in government (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).

As shown in Table II, Executive Order 10988 was superseded by

TABLE II

A Summary of the Major Executive Orders Related to Labor-
Management Relationship in Federal Unions and Agency
Management (Levine and Hagburg, 1979)

Executive Order	Year Passed	President	Key Concepts of the Executive Order
E.O. 10988	January 17, 1962	John F. Kennedy	Established a basic pattern for labor-management relations for federal union and agency management; (2) it provided three levels of union recognition--informal, formal and exclusive; (3) the right of federal sector and employer to join/form a union of their choice without management interference was affirmed; (4) the negotiation of a labor shop agreement was prohibited; (5) the resolution of impasses was left to parties; (6) advisory arbitration became a method for resolving grievances; and (7) the Department of Labor was assigned to assist in the resolution of representative disputes.
E.O. 11491	October 29, 1969	Richard M. Nixon	The establishment of three new agencies to centralize decision making formerly exercised by the individual agencies: a Federal Labor Relations Council to administer the order, a Federal Service Impasses Panel to assist the parties to resolve negotiating impasses, and an assistant secretary of labor for labor-management relations to determine a number of issues formerly decided by the agency head; (2) the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service was granted a role to mediate negotiation disputes; (3) paid time could be negotiated for union representatives engaged in contract negotiations up to either a maximum of forty hours or 50 percent of the total hours spent in bargaining; (4) binding arbitration as the last step in the grievance procedure could be negotiated; (5) the administrative charge for dues checkoff could be negotiated; and (6) the requirement of reporting and disclosure procedures similar to those demanded of unions in private employment was imposed.
E.O. 11616	August 26, 1971	Richard M. Nixon	The administrative change permitting dues becomes a negotiable item; (2) the negotiated grievance procedure was now the only one available for handling disputes over the interpretation and application of the contracts; and (3) unions can negotiate paid time for union representatives engaged in contract negotiations up to either a maximum of forty hours or 50 percent of the total time spent negotiating.
E.O. 11838	February 6, 1975	Gerald A. Ford	Facilitated the consolidation of smaller, inefficient bargaining units into fewer larger ones; (2) broadened the scope of negotiation by limiting the power of national agency regulations to prohibit bargaining in conditions of employment; and (3) made the scope of grievance procedures in contracts a mandatory bargaining topic.

Order No. 11491 signed into law in 1969 by President Richard M. Nixon (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). This order introduced several significant changes, including the right of federal employees to negotiate binding arbitration as the last step in a grievance procedure (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).

In 1975, President Gerald A. Ford amended Executive Order 11491 with the issuance of E.O. 11838, which required the settlement of disputes arising out of unfair labor practices (Levine and Hagburg, 1979).

The Public Sector

State Public Labor Laws

In the United States, the legal endorsement guaranteeing public sector employees the rights to union representation in bargaining was slow to develop. As Joseph W. Garbarino wrote in 1973:

Traditionally, in representing the interests of their members, associations of public employees engaged primarily in lobbying and political activity. They usually limited their membership to a single employing jurisdiction such as a state or county. At times they did include substantial numbers of members from education, but in addition, organizations based upon particular occupational groups were formed to speak for the interest of particular constituencies (Garbarino, 1973).

By the late 1960s, the legal right of public employees to organize for collective bargaining began in the large metropolitan centers of Cincinnati and Philadelphia, with New York establishing a formal system of bargaining by executive order in 1958. The first

state legislation allowing for collective bargaining by state employees was enacted by the Wisconsin legislature in 1959. This development was further stimulated by President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988, issued in 1962 (Garbarino, 1973). As the president of AFSCME, Jerry Wurf, said in 1966:

His [President Kennedy's] action, which gave federal employees the right to organize and set an example that has been followed by many states, counties, and cities, probably was a major contributing factor in the rapid growth of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (Wurf, 1966).

The pattern of legislation on public sector collective bargaining that has emerged from the several states is one characterized by a noticeable lack of uniformity in legal requirements and practices. This pattern of diversity is due, in large part, to the absence of any federal standards governing labor relations for state and local government employees, analogous to those set forth in the Wagner Act of 1935 governing labor relations in private sector employment. It might also be argued that the absence of federal legislation on this matter has made it possible for the states to now pre-empt the regulation of labor relations for state and local government employees under a doctrine of States Rights (Levine and Hagburg, 1979). Following this line of reasoning, public sector labor law of the states has tended to be a reflection of the political values and demographic patterns within the various states. As is shown in Table

III, by 1978, thirty states had enacted collective bargaining laws that covered all or some categories of public employment, while three states had no laws pertaining to public sector collective bargaining, other states had blanket prohibitions on collective bargaining by public employees.

Collective Bargaining and the University System

The Entrance of Academic Bargaining

Into the University System

As society developed collective bargaining laws for both the federal and public sector employees, academic unionism emerged as a potent force in higher education (Garbarino, 1973). Joseph W. Garbarino wrote in 1973:

The exclusion to government workers, particularly at the state levels, of the right to organize for collective bargaining is the most significant single reason for the present form and growth of academic unions. Furthermore, since education is a function basically of the states, while the degree of encouragement among states varies greatly, permissive state legislation is the key explanation for the burst of academic unions in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Garbarino, 1973).

Although the legal base for academic unionism was developed, collective bargaining was slow to enter the 4-year institution of higher education. The rationale for this slower growth rate in the university system has been identified by labor relations scholars as

Table III
A Summary of the Characteristics of the Major
Laws Enacted in the Public Sector by
1978 (Levine & Hagburg, 1979)

Kind of Bargaining Law	Scope of Law	States Covered by Law	
(1) Comprehensive Law	Broad-scope collective bargaining on wages, hours and employment conditions for the state and local government employees.	Connecticut Hawaii Iowa Maine Massachusetts Minnesota Montana Nebraska	New Hampshire New Jersey New York Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Dakota Wisconsin
	Full-scope bargaining law for local government employees only.	Michigan Nevada Oklahoma	Vermont Washington
	Full-scope bargaining laws for state employees.	Alaska	
	Limited form of collective bargaining for state employees. These laws exclude wage and benefits from bargaining.	Delaware Vermont Washington	
	Law for local governments whose governing bodies opt for coverage.	Delaware	
(2) Meet and Confer Laws	A weak law that covers state and local employees; it is limited to "meet and confer" requirements rather than bargaining.	California Florida Kansas Missouri	
(3) No Law	No applicable negotiation procedures available for either state or local employees.	Arizona Colorado Ohio	

threefold:

(1) The elite institutions of higher education have continued to support the concept of the traditional shared governance mode to implement the employment relationships between the faculty and university, (2) in such quality institutions as the Ivy League schools, the prestigious public and private research institutions, and select liberal arts colleges, the professor is perceived as a master, not employee; therefore, an academician does not need a surrogate to plead the "master case" with the university system, and (3) the academy has lived with myths about academic unionism (Hagengruber, 1978; Polishook, 1982).

This rationale is further supported by the 1972 study "Professors, Union and Higher Education" conducted by Everett Ladd and Seymour Lipset. The data reported in their study concluded that:

Forty-three percent of the faculty sampled agreed that the growth of unionization of college and university faculty is beneficial and should be extended, while 44 percent disagreed, and 13 percent entertained conflicting assessments (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).

The study supported, as shown in (Appendix B), the 1969 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education survey findings that faculty members' selection of bargaining in the university system is based upon two independent sources: (1) class interest, and (2) ideology. As Ladd and Lipset (1973) stated:

Professors of low scholarly achievement give greater backing to the principle of collective bargaining than do their most productive colleagues; untenured professors more than those with tenure; and academicians with low salaries are more supportive than their better rewarded associates (Ladd and Lipset, 1972).

Furthermore, the general political views of the academicians are significant factors in the selection of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode for the university system. As Ladd and Lipset reported: "Eighty percent of the professors scoring on the liberal-quintile of the Liberalism-Conservative score, concurred that faculty strikes are legitimate means of collective action" (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).

The Scope of Academic Collective Bargaining

The United States Merchant Marine Academy is reported as the first 4-year institution of higher education to accept collective bargaining. A private school, the Academy was organized in 1966 by the American Federation of Teachers. However, academic unions did not attract public attention until 1969, when the collective bargaining process was introduced into the public university system in the City University of New York. This opportunity was provided for the faculty members of CUNY, as professionals, by the 1967 passage of the Taylor Law in New York State (Garbarino, 1973). It was a law which, according to Donald H. Wollett: "Provided for collective negotiation by state, county and municipal employees, including employees of any

governmental units operating a public school, college or university" (Wollett, 1971).

Since the initial battle cry, "Professors Unite," in 1969 by Myron Lieberman, a faculty member of CUNY, academic unionism has shown a dramatic growth in the 4-year institutions of higher education (Garbarino, 1973). As shown in Table IV, from the data prepared by The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions of Baruch College, City University of New York, the major growth years for academic unionism in the 4-year institutions were the mid to late 1970s, as well as 1981.

TABLE IV (Douglas, 1984)
GROWTH OF UNIONIZATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, 1974-1983

Academic Collective Bargaining Agents and Agreements

In 1984, as shown in Table V, there was a total of 134 recognized

bargaining agents in the 4-year institutions of higher education. Of this number, 71 are listed in public institutions, while 63 were reported in private institutions. At the same time, as Table VI demonstrates, 64 agreements were reported in the public institutions and 54 agreements were reported for the private schools.

TABLE V (Douglas, 1984)
RECOGNIZED BARGAINING AGENTS
January, 1984

	YEAR	AAUP	AFT	NEA	IND	AAUP/ AFT	AAUP/ NEA	AAUP/ IND	AFT/ IND	NEA/ IND	AFCE	AFSCME	SEIU	TOTAL
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS	4	21	14	18	6	2	2	0	3	2	2	1	0	71
	2	3	77	164	23	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	272
TOTAL	24	91	182	20	29	2	3	0	3	4	2	2	1	n=343
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS	4	19	17	15	10	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	63
	2	1	6	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
TOTAL	20	21	20	11	11	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	n=74
SUMMARY OF RECOGNIZED AGENTS	4	40	31	33	16	2	2	1	4	2	2	1	0	134
	2	4	81	169	24	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	283
TOTAL	44	112	202	40	40	2	3	1	4	4	2	2	1	n=417

TABLE VI (Douglas, 1984)
ACADEMIC BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
January, 1984

	YEAR	AAUP	AFT	NEA	IND	AAUP/ AFT	AAUP/ NEA	AAUP/ IND	AFT/ IND	NEA/ IND	AFCE	AFSCME	SEIU	TOTAL
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS	4	20	13	17	3	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	0	64
	2	3	76	158	22	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	264
TOTAL	23	89	175	25	25	2	3	0	2	4	2	2	1	n=328
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS	4	19	17	11	5	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	54
	2	1	4	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
TOTAL	20	21	16	6	6	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	n=65
SUMMARY OF BARGAINING AGREEMENTS	4	39	30	28	8	2	2	1	3	2	2	1	0	118
	2	4	80	163	23	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	275
TOTAL	43	110	191	31	31	2	3	1	3	4	2	2	1	n=393

The growth of academic unionism has been attributed to three major national organizations that have actively competed for faculty support in collective bargaining elections (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). These external organizations, the American Federation of Teachers, the National Teachers Association and the American Association of University Professors were identified by William T. McHugh (1971) as:

having a more practical appeal because they are better equipped to organize and promote collective bargaining than are local senates or traditional governance organizations because: (1) senates are often comprised of students or employees who do not share a community of interests with faculty in a collective bargaining sense; (2) they have money, trained staff lawyers, and other resources necessary to organize, campaign, and utilize the legal machinery of labor acts; and (3) they are willing to represent the particular cause of an individual faculty member (McHugh, 1971).

While these national organizations share a common goal in the university system, the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining statutes, as Table VII shows, each organization, as an academic union, has a unique profile.

In January 1984, as shown in Table VIII, these three national external organizations continue to represent the majority of faculty members in the 137 4-year unionized institutions. While the AAUP represents 40 institutions of the 134 schools in higher education, the AFT is agent for 31 of the schools and the NEA represents 33 groups.

TABLE VII

The Major National Organizations As Representatives
of 4-Year Institutions in Collective Bargaining
Negotiations (Garbarino, 1973; Douglas, 1984)

Organization	Entry Year Into Higher Education Bargaining	Organization Profile
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT)	1967	This organization is recognized as the pioneer of faculty unionism. Its most distinctive feature is the long-standing link with organized labor; it has championed the trade union model in education. The AFT has been strongest in public 4-year colleges in the industrial states.
The National Education Association (NEA)	1968	In this organization, the independent members are enrolled into three levels of membership--national, state and local--with the key structure of the organization at the state level. The NEA strength in the 4-year college has been almost entirely in former teacher colleges, particularly in the state of Pennsylvania.
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP)	1966	<p>The association developed in 1972 a "Statement on Collective Bargaining" to justify the association involvement in the collective bargaining process. These justifications are based upon the association's commitment to the fact that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The shaping of collective bargaining should not be left to organizations lacking dedication to principles developed by the Association and widely accepted by the academic community. b. The Association is influential in the shaping of collective bargaining, the principles of academic freedom and tenure and the primary responsibility of a faculty for determining academic policy will be secured. c. The implementation of Association-supported principles, based upon the profession's traditions and moral suasion can be effectively supplemented by a collective bargaining agreement and given the force of law.

While in the public institution, the AAUP is the most common elected bargaining agent, in the private institutions, the AFT is the agent of choice.

Table VIII (Douglas, 1984)
Analysis of Bargaining Agents and Collective
Bargaining Agreements

	TEAS	AAUP	AFT	NEA	IND	AAUP/ AFT	AAUP/ NEA	AAUP/ IND	AFT/ IND	NEA/ IND	AFCE	AFSCME	SKIU	TOTAL
RECOGNIZED	4	40	31	33	16	2	2	1	4	2	2	1	0	134
AGENTS	2	4	81	169	24	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	283
TOTAL	64	112	202	400	2	3	1	4	4	2	2	1	1	N=617
COLLECTIVE	4	39	30	28	8	2	2	1	3	2	2	1	0	118
BARGAINING	2	4	80	163	23	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	275
AGREEMENTS	63	110	191	31	2	3	1	3	3	2	2	1	1	N=393
BARGAINING UNITS WITHOUT CONTRACTS	1	2	11	9	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	N=24

The Subject of Contract Negotiations
in Academic Bargaining

The formal collective bargaining procedure as accepted in the university system of higher education is a process intended to contractually attain participation in academic governance. As William F. McHugh (1971) wrote,

Academic Collective Bargaining is a formal procedure which insures appropriate consultation and opportunity for the professional staff to present ideas and attitudes to the governing boards or other sources of authority are appearing in contracts (McHugh, 1971).

However, the negotiation of a contractual agreement in the academy requires that established labor laws be adjusted to the unique university governance structure (Schwartzman, 1974). Furthermore, in academic collective bargaining, where the application of these principles presents unique problems, (Glidden, 1977) the contract according to Herbert D. Schwartzman, must:

Determine not only the relative rights, duties and obligations of the contracting parties, but also the effect of the collective bargaining relationship upon the governance structure of the university. Conversely, where such matters as appointment, promotion, tenure, discharge, etc., are subject to peer judgment, the collective bargaining agreement should not provide a means of obviating, by arbitration or otherwise, an adverse decision by the peers or the reviewing bodies in the governance structure (Schwartzman, 1974).

For the faculty member with an appointment in the academy, the "terms and conditions" of employment have been defined to include the traditional issue of collective bargaining, as well as a wider spectrum of subjects than are usually found in public employee contracts (McHugh, 1971). The scope of these subjects is rooted in the concept of shared authority a concept, according to William F. McHugh (1971), that:

Faculty should share in the governance of the institution.

Thus, the concept of negotiable issues covers everything from admission, class size, academic calendar, procedures for

budget formulation, participation in physical plant planning and expansion, allocation of resources, to athletic policy and procedures for selection of administrators and department chairmen. This concept of "shared authority," peculiar to educational institutions, includes a wider spectrum of matters than customarily associated with industry or public employment bargaining (McHugh, 1971).

The right of the academician to a wider spectrum of bargaining subjects in the university system was fully supported by the American Association of University Professors' "Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities" as formulated in 1966 in collaboration with the American Council on Education and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. This "Statement" called for a mutual understanding regarding the governance of an institution, stressing the principles of shared governance as significant to the academy in contemporary times (AAUP, 1984). This position justified faculty responsibilities to participate in academic governance because:

Faculty judgment is central to general educational policy. Furthermore, scholars in a particular field or activity have the chief competence for judging the work of their colleagues, in such competence it is implicit that responsibility exists for both adverse and favorable judgment. Likewise there is the more general component of experience, faculty personnel committees having a broader charge (Sands, 1971).

Furthermore, the American Association of University Professors' 1969 "Statement of Policy on Representation of Economic and Professional Interests," detailed that:

Through the negotiation of a collective agreement it may in some institutions be possible to create a proper environment for faculty and administration to carry out their respective functions and to provide for the eventual establishment of necessary instruments of shared authority and responsibility in purely educational, curricular and legislative matters (Sands, 1971).

In 1971, Donald H. Wollett further characterized issues related to academic contract negotiation into four major categories of faculty concerns, during an address to the National Conference of Collective Negotiation in New York. As shown in Table IX, the five major categories of issues presented were: (1) procedures for faculty representation; (2) educational policies; (3) working conditions and the administration of personnel policies; (4) aggregate economic issues; and (5) public issues and the institution.

TABLE IX

The Specific Issues Relative to the Five
Major Categories of Academic Contract
Negotiations (Wollett, 1971)

Five Major Categories	Specific Issues of the Category
1. Procedure for Faculty Representation	The right to participate in the formulation of the organic law that defines the nature of their representation with the institution.
2. Educational Policy	These issues include: academic standards, curriculum, degree requirements, grading standards, standards of academic freedom, standards for student conduct and discipline, procedures for the appointment of administrative personnel.
3. Working Conditions/ Personnel Policies	These issues include: appointment, promotion, tenure, course assignments, work schedules, work load, salaries and fringe benefits, office space, secretaries, service and grievance procedures.
4. Aggregate Economic Issues	These issues include: the allocation of resources to major budgetary categories, salaries and fringe benefits and the allocation of funds to support the major educational objectives of the institution.
5. Public Issues and the Institute	The right to participate in the formation of institutional policies related to public questions that have a direct and important effect on the operation of the institution.

Collective Bargaining in the Oregon System of
Higher Education: Focus on the 4-Year Institutions

In 1973, Oregon enacted significant comprehensive bargaining laws for the educator as a public employee. These laws permitted faculty members with an appointment in an Oregon 4-year institution of higher education to select collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode for their participation in institutional governances (Garbarino, 1973).

Since 1973, three of Oregon's eight 4-year institutions of higher education have entered into collective bargaining. The initial contract was implemented in 1975 at Southern Oregon State College. In 1979, additional academic collective bargaining contracts were implemented for faculty members at Western Oregon State College and Portland State University (Douglas, 1984).

Faculty members at Southern Oregon State College are represented by an independent agent, while the American Federation of Teachers was chosen to represent Western Oregon State College and the American Association of University Professors was elected as the bargaining agent for Portland State University.

In addition, five "no-agent" faculty elections have been reported between 1975 and 1983 at other 4-year institutions of higher education in Oregon. Coalitions were defeated in 1975 at Oregon Institute of Technology and during 1977 at the University of Oregon, Eastern Oregon State College and Oregon State University. A second loss for a collective bargaining election was reported in 1983 at Oregon State College (Douglas, 1984).

The Effects of Academic Collective Bargaining
in the University System

Since 1966, acceptance of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode has grown in the university system of higher education. As Jack L. Nelson, a Rutgers University professor, wrote in 1982: "The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of states, institutions, and individual faculty members operating under collective bargaining agreements" (Nelson, 1982). Therefore, the myths that initially challenged the acceptance of collective bargaining by the academy have, according to Irwin H. Polishook:

Given way to mature relationships based upon the acceptance of collective bargaining by the administration and a mutual commitment to use the process to protect the integrity of the university (Polishook, 1982).

The research of Begin, (1974) Kemerer and Baldrige, (1976) Mortimer, et al. (1976) and Lee, (1979) as well as the scholarly contributions of Nelson (1982) and Polishook (1982) further support the selection of collective bargaining by faculty members as a positive supplemental governance mode for the university system. Their studies have documented that while collective bargaining is a form of adversarial governance, it has not fostered disharmony in the university system. Furthermore, academic collective bargaining has established faculty unions and faculty governance bodies as partners in a reciprocal process that has supported, clarified, and enhanced

institutional governance structure, in order to guarantee or advance faculty rights. As Jack L. Nelson wrote in 1982:

While there were some initial problems, collective bargaining actually clarified the decision-making process and a number of previously ambiguous topics in academia. Collective bargaining is one of the few ways to bring some semblance of balance into academic decision-making (Nelson, 1982).

In 1979, the study of Barbara A. Lee further identified the position of academic collective bargaining as a positive force on governance structures in the university system. Eight major conclusions confirmed that:

- (1) Faculty as a whole gained formal governance power through the union contract. Even on campuses where faculty had enjoyed considerable decision-making power, the contract legitimated and in many cases broadened the scope of the faculty's governance role.
- (2) Administrators at the vice presidential level and presidential level acquired greater authority over formal decisions, particularly in personnel matters, many of which had once been made by deans and "rubber-stamped" by administrators at higher levels. Contracts now stipulated decision responsibility and accountability at levels above the dean.
- (3) Deans appeared to have lost much of their autonomy over personnel and workload decisions; however, they retained much

of their authority to allocate budgets.

(4) The single most significant effect of unionization at the six institutions visited was the promulgation of a formal grievance procedure. This process resulted in promotion and tenure policies generally considered to be fairer and more consistent than practices prior to unionization.

(5) At institutions where senates were relatively new or had minimal faculty support, senates were abolished and replaced with union-dominated faculty committees. At institutions with traditionally strong faculty senates, unions respected senate prerogatives and focused on economic issues. At these latter institutions, senate and union leadership overlapped.

(6) On campuses that had a tradition of faculty participation in governance, union influence appeared minimal. However, it was evident that external threats against faculty autonomy or a reversal of the administration's cooperative attitude would energize and strengthen the union.

(7) Unionization tended to formalize relationships between faculty and administration, regardless of the quality of these relationships. This formalization reduced the ability of an individual to influence decision-making by informal means.

(8) Departments, as academic units, either retained their former decision-making power or gained additional power as a result of unionization. Nearly all academic and most personnel decisions were made at this level and usually

prevailed (unless prevented by budget restrictions). Because the grievance process usually started with the chairperson or the dean, departmental decisions seldom were challenged except on due process grounds (Lee, 1979).

The forthcoming study of Kemerer and Baldrige will identify four positive trends that have occurred in the university system as a result of academic collective bargaining. The trends, as reported in 1980 by J. Victor Baldrige support that:

- (1) The collective bargaining process standardized procedures in personnel practices for the academicians, with the benefits to them identified as: (a) order to the system, and (2) increased equity.
- (2) The collective bargaining process helped the economic status of the profession. The bargaining process seems to have generated additional money.
- (3) The collective bargaining process resulted in the so-called "dual track" relationship between faculty senates and unions, whereby senates serve faculty members' academic interests and unions serve their economic concerns, remaining viable at campuses that have both unions and senates.
- (4) The collective bargaining process may be an incentive to the "decentralization" of administrative powers and authority (Baldrige, 1982).

Twenty years of empirical study by the academy has disproved the initial myths and concerns about the adoption of collective bargaining

in the university system; therefore, in 1983, according to Irwin H. Polishook:

The real "adversary" within the academic community is the individual who continues to perpetuate a mythology of faculty unions without coming to grips with the practice of a decade (Polishook, 1982).

Chapter III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE

Introduction

This chapter presents the research methodology and procedures selected for the conduct of this evaluative research survey. The presentation will include a review of the (1) research model, (2) research methodology, and (3) procedures specific to the study, which includes a discussion of the (a) research instrument, (b) population, (c) data collection, and (d) the data analysis selected for the study.

The Research Model: Synthesis of Theory and Fact

Introduction

The research model for this study was developed from the comprehensive literature review as presented in Chapter II. Scholarly contributions and research studies, which cite academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode adapted in the university system to support faculty members' participation in institutional governance, were used to design the theoretical framework for this research study. Specifically, the literature supports:

- (A) A relationship between the faculty members' demographic profile (professional status and academic appointment) and their endorsements of academic collective bargaining (Ladd

and Lipset, 1973; Garbarino and Aussieker, 1975; Wollett, 1971).

- (B) A relationship between the influence of contextual factors on a university system's structures/function and the decision of a faculty to select academic collective bargaining as a supplemental mode in lieu of the traditional forms of institutional governance (Begin, 1978; Kemerer and Baldrige, 1975; Mortimer and Richardson, 1977; Lee, 1979).
- (C) The relationship of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode for the university system and the support that the process should provide for faculty members to participate in decision-making issues related to institutional governance (Baldrige, 1982; Hedgepeth, 1974; Lee, 1979; Nelson, 1982; Polishook, 1982).

The design for the research model, as shown in Figure 3, was based upon three fundamental assumptions regarding the adoption of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental institutional governance mode in a university system. These assumptions include (1) demographic factors, (2) contextual factors, and (3) those issues related to a faculty member's professional rights to participate in institutional governance.

Demographic Factors

This section of the study was developed to assess the demographic factors (professional status and academic appointments) of those

Figure 3. A schematic diagram of the theoretical research model

academicians who have endorsed academic unionism for one of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.

In the university system, there are two major sets of demographic factors: (1) class interest, and (2) political orientation, which can be used to profile those academicians who tend to support academic collective bargaining.

Most faculty members who select academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode hold an appointment in a 4-year institution identified with a lower scholarly prestige, fewer financial resources and economic benefits. Furthermore, these academicians usually hold a lower academic rank, lack tenure, are younger and perceive themselves as liberal in political issues/attitudes (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).

For this study, the following demographic factors were included in the research design:

1. The academic department/school.
2. Academic rank.
3. The number of years of teaching in a 4-year institution.
4. AAUP membership.
5. Salary.
6. Appointment to a university/department academic governing committee.
7. Age range.
8. The amount of involvement with the collective bargaining process.

Contextual Factors

For this section of the study, the research model was designed to identify the contextual factors, either external or internal to the university system of employment, which influenced faculty members to select academic bargaining as a supplemental governance mode.

Contextual factors are forces, either external or internal to a university system, which have the potential to influence both structural and functional changes within a system. Consequently, these changes can directly impact the governance structures of the institution, which includes: (1) the locus of decision-making, (2) the amount of bureaucratic regulations, and (3) the degree of faculty autonomy within an institution (Lee, 1979).

Two specific sets of issues related to: (1) external factors and (2) internal forces, which have the potential to impact the structure and function of a university system, were developed in the research model for this segment of the study.

Institutional Governance

Academic institutional governance is a process that refers to the formal structure and activities used in a university system to make those decisions that affect relationships, procedures, and policies (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).

As shown in Figure 4, the concept of academic institutional governance is used to form the dependent variable set of the research model. For this study, the dependent variable set is divided into four specific subsets related to governance issues: (1) professional

interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic and personnel policies.

Figure 4. The dependent variable set of the research model

Professional Interests

This dependent variable subset of the research model was designed to evaluate the impact of the academic collective bargaining process as adopted in three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education, on the professional status of university teaching.

Since the 1960s, shared authority has become an accepted form for academic governance for faculty members and administrators in the university system. Shared governance stamped with professional status the services of the professoriate, thereby making their role more than that of employees and strengthened the ancient idea of the university as primarily an association of scholars. Furthermore, the concept of shared authority became the guiding principle for the development of the academic profession, with research and scholarly contribution as the major criteria for evaluating the academician's achievement (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).

In 1966, the academy introduced collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode for the university system. This process has accentuated the organizational role of the academician as an employee in contrast to the ideal of a professional who is a participant in the academic enterprise (Duryea and Fisk, 1973).

Specific professional interests of the academician included in this dependent variable subset are (1) research, (2) scholarship, and (3) peer judgment.

Economic Interests

This subsection of the dependent variable set was designed to investigate faculty members' participation in the decision-making process of those academic governance issues related to economic interests.

Before 1972, the watershed years of academic growth provided the academy, as well as the academicians, with "economy gains" in salaries, student enrollment, and research funding. However, this past decade has shown a steady decline in academic compensation and student enrollment, as well as less federal and state funding available to the university system. Consequently, the American professoriate, while wanting to retain the academy's traditional belief that the academicians' salary is not a wage, has decided to accept academic unionism to protect its economic interests (Krueger, 1979). It is a decision that the American Association of University Professors recognized as significant and defined in the 1969

"Statement Policy on Representation of Economic and Professional Interests" by stating:

Collective bargaining may play a significant role in bringing agreements between faculty and administration on economic issues (AAUP, 1984).

The scope of faculty members' participation in the governance of the institution's economic issues should include involvement in short-range as well as long-term planning regarding budgetary decisions for the institution (Mason, 1982). As Henry J. Mason (1982) states:

In the budgetary process, while faculty must keep itself available to give advice day to day, it should also seek involvements in the planning process. Otherwise, it faces the real danger of lost initiative, in which budgets drive and control academic plans and programs, rather than the reverse (Mason, 1982).

For the study, three aggregate economic issues related to faculty members' rights to participate in the total financial process of the institution were included: (1) the total resources available to the institution, (2) the distribution of resources allocated to provide for the academicians' economic security, and (3) the allocation of resources to major budgetary categories.

Educational Policies

This particular dependent variable subset was developed to

measure faculty members' participation in those academic issues of institutional governance related to educational policies.

In the academic community, tradition has established the right of faculty members to be active participants in determining educational policies for a university (Sands, 1971). Furthermore, faculty members have the primary responsibility to establish those policies and procedures that govern the educational process because their judgment as educators is central to general educational policy (AAUP, 1984).

In addition, faculty members have the right and responsibility for the establishment of those policies and procedures specific to: admission standards, curriculum, teaching method, degree requirements, grading standards, types of degrees offered, the establishment of programs, as well as those issues related to student life, which includes conduct and discipline.

For the study, three areas of educational policies were included in the research model. These areas studied those policies in a university system related to (1) teaching, (2) programs, and (3) students.

Academic and Personnel Policies

This subsection of the dependent variable set was selected for inclusion in the study to evaluate the faculty members' participation in governance issues related to personnel policies and the working conditions of their institution.

University educators have the primary governance authority for

all matters related to faculty status (Sands, 1971). As the 1969 "Statement on Governance of Colleges and Universities" of the American Association of University Professors states:

Scholars in a particular field or activity have the chief competence for judging the work of their colleagues; in such competence it is implicit that responsibility exists for both adverse and favorable judgments (AAUP, 1984).

Among the factors that relate to the faculty status of the university educator in the area of personnel policies are: appointments, promotion, tenure, salary, and teaching schedule. In addition, the academician has a right to participate in decisions related to the working conditions of his employment, which includes the issues of office space or secretarial or support office services (Wollett, 1971).

Three major areas related to the personnel policies and the working conditions of unionized faculty members were used in this section of the study: (1) academic duties, (2) academic standards, and (3) employment conditions.

The Research Methodology

An Evaluative Survey

The purpose of this evaluative research survey was to study select faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education to determine whether or not collective bargaining has supported faculty members' rights for

participation in institutional governance. To achieve the stated purpose, the following problems were investigated:

1. Have the professional interests of the academician with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education been affirmed through the collective bargaining process?
2. Has collective bargaining provided for the academician's participation in financial planning and policy-making related to the economic interests as an employee in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education?
3. Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate in determining the educational policies for the institution that are related to academic issues?
4. Has the collective bargaining process provided support for the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education rights to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment?

The research methodology for this study was reviewed for compliance with the DHEW policies and regulations for the protection of human subjects by the Human Subjects Research Review Committee of Portland State University. The methodology was approved by the committee, as providing adequate provisions to protect the rights and welfare of the human subjects (See Appendix C).

Procedures for the Study

The Research Instrument

The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining As A Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance" was designed for this evaluative survey to include three parts: (1) Respondent Information, (2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information.

- a. Part I - Respondent Information of the questionnaire was designed to collect demographic information about the faculty members with an appointment in Oregon's three 4-year unionized institutions of higher education. The information, which includes personal and professional characteristics, was used to identify a professional profile of the faculty members as an aggregate group and as employees of the three unionized institutions.

The six specific demographic factors included in this research design are: (1) the number of years of teaching in a 4-year institution, (2) AAUP membership, (3) salary, (4) appointment to a university/department, (5) age range, and (6) institutional involvement with the collective bargaining process. (See Questionnaire items: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.)

- b. Part II - Institutional Information of the research instrument was a section designed to identify those contextual factors, both external and internal to the university system, which influenced the faculty members with an appointment in Oregon's three unionized 4-year institutions of higher education to vote for a new bargaining contract in 1983.

For the research design, those questions related to the contextual factors were: (1) student enrollment, (2) state and federal funding, (3) institutional growth, (4) a decline in academic programs, (5) decentralized policy-making, student power, and (6) the effectiveness of the university's academic senate/council, organizational structural change. (See Questionnaire items: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.)

- c. Part III - Institutional Governance Information - items were 36 statements developed to collect data specific to the dependent variables set of the research model, institutional governance. Four dependent variable subsets: (1) professional status, (2) aggregate economic issues, (3) educational policies, and (4) working conditions/personnel policies were used to study select faculty members with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education in order to evaluate academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in higher education to:

1. Affirm the professional status of the academician in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education (See Questionnaire items: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.)
2. Provide for the academic participation in the financial planning and policy-making related to the aggregate economic factors of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education. (See Questionnaire items: 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.)
3. Provide for the academicians' participation in determining the institution's educational policies related to academic issues (See Questionnaire items: 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43).
4. Provide for the academicians' participation in determining the conditions of employment and personnel policies (See Questionnaire items: 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.)

A Likert five-point scale: (5) strongly agree, (4) agree, (3) undecided, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree was used to measure the responses to each item of the questionnaire, except in Part III, D. Working Conditions. For this section, a 4-point scale of: (4) always, (3) frequently, (2) infrequently, and (1) never was used to evaluate collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode to provide support for faculty members' right to participate in determining those policies related to: (1) Academic Duties, (2) Academic Standards/ Personnel Policies, and (3) Support Services.

The research instrument was designed and developed between January 1983 and May 1984, under the direction of Dr. Walter Ellis, Chairperson of the investigator's Dissertation Committee. Special assistance with the final revision of the instrument was provided by Dr. Gary Johnson, a statistician; Dr. Mark Starr, a research methodologist; Dr. George Guy, Professor of Education; Dr. Daniel O'Toole, Associate Professor of Public Administration; and Dr. Ken Kemper, Assistant Professor of Education.

The Research Population

The population selected for this research study, as shown in Table X, was 694 faculty members with an academic appointment in one of Oregon's three unionized 4-year institutions of higher education, spring 1984. Each subject of the identified population met the following three criteria, as each: (1) held a full-time faculty appointment during the 1983-84 academic year, (2) had been employed by the institution a minimum of five years, and (3) had tenure or was on a tenure track appointment in the school/department of the university.

The population for this study was identified from the data base used for November 8, 1983, payroll tapes and the EEO-6 report Fall 1983 for the subject institution. This data was provided the researcher by Ms. Mary E. Ricks, Research Assistant, of the Office for Institutional Research at Portland State University (See Appendix D). Although all respondents nominally met the three requirements above,

TABLE X
Distribution of the Identified Population for the
Research Study in Oregon's Three Unionized
4-Year Institutions of Higher Education

Four Year Unionized Institution	Number in Population	Percentage of the Total Population
Western Oregon State College	129	(18.6%)
Southern Oregon State College	148	(21.3%)
Portland State University	417	(60.1%)
Total	694	(100.0%)

one respondent nevertheless indicated less than 5 years of teaching.

In order to secure permission to request the use of the data base, the legal ramifications for requesting access to the data were discussed with Mr. Michael A. Corn, Assistant to the President for Legal Affairs, Portland State University. Therefore, permission to secure and use the data base to identify the population for the study was given to the investigator through the office of Dr. Margaret J. Dobson, Vice President, Academic Affairs, Portland State University; Dr. James H. Beaird, Provost, Western Oregon State College in Monmouth, Oregon; and Dr. Ernest E. Ettlich, Dean of Academic Affairs, Southern Oregon State College in Ashland, Oregon (See Appendix E).

The Data Collection

On May 21, 1984, the research instrument "A Questionnaire to

Study Collective Bargaining As a Process in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Advance Faculty Members' Rights For Participation in Institutional Governance" was mailed to the 694 subjects identified for this research study. The questionnaire was accompanied by a letter and self-stamped envelope for returning the completed questionnaire to the investigator (See Appendix F).

A follow-up post card was mailed to the subjects on May 28, 1984, with a second appeal letter, accompanied by a questionnaire and self-stamped envelope, mailed on June 4, 1984, to all non-respondents, as of that date (See Appendix G).

Questionnaires were returned to the investigator from 523 or 75.4% of the population selected as subjects for the study between May 23, 1984, and August 10, 1984. As shown in Table XI, 277 or 51.0% of the questionnaires were returned from wave one, 100 or 20.6% were returned following the second wave, while 109 or 22.4% of the respondent questionnaires were returned following the third wave.

From the 523 questionnaires returned, 486 or 92.9% were accepted as data-producing and used in the analysis process of the study. However, in the presentation and analysis of the data, faculty responses to each category of the research instrument may not total 486, because the academicians did not always respond to each item of the instrument.

Thirty-seven or 7.1% of the returned questionnaires were rejected for use in the study because of: (1) incomplete data, (2) the educator, while retaining faculty rank and tenure in the subject institution, now holds an administrative position, and (3) the

TABLE XI

DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES RECEIVED
ACCORDING TO EACH WAVE BY EMPLOYING 4-YEAR UNIONIZED
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN OREGON

Number of Data-Producing Responses Received With Each Wave/Request							
Institution	First Wave May 22-30, 1984		Second Wave May 31- June 5, 1984		Third Wave June 6-August 10, 1984	Total	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N		(%)
Western Oregon State College	45	(56.3)	18	(22.5)	17	(21.3)	80
Southern Oregon State College	47	(47.0)	30	(30.0)	23	(23.0)	100
Portland State University	185	(60.5)	52	(17.0)	69	(22.5)	306
Total	277	(57.0)	100	(20.6)	109	(22.4)	486

questionnaire was received after August 10, 1984.

While 523 faculty members returned the received instruments to the investigator, 171 chose to not participate in the study and did not return the questionnaire. From the total data available, the non-respondents can be profiled, as shown in Table XXII, according to: (1) employing institution, (2) academic area of appointment, and (3) academic rank.

Following the selection of usable questionnaires for the study, the questions were coded and a "Respondent Codebook - Collective Bargaining as a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Support Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance" was written for key-punching the data for computer analysis (See Appendix H). Missing responses were recorded as a 9.

TABLE XII
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROFILE CHARACTERISTIC
DATA OF THE NON-RESPONDENTS

	Nonrespondents		Respondents		Total
	N	(%)	N	(%)	
Employing Institution					
WOSC	42	(34.4)	80	(65.6)	122
SOSC	31	(23.7)	100	(76.3)	131
PSU	98	(24.3)	306	(75.7)	404
Total	171	(26.0)	486	(74.0)	657
Department*					
Liberal Arts/Arts & Sci.	110	(27.7)	287	(72.3)	397
Professional	52	(24.2)	163	(75.8)	215
Other	9	(22.0)	32	(78.0)	41
Total	171	(26.2)	482	(73.8)	653
Academic Rank*					
Professor	93	(26.4)	259	(73.6)	352
Associate Professor	59	(25.2)	175	(74.8)	234
Assistant Professor	17	(29.3)	41	(70.7)	58
Instructor/Other	2	(22.2)	7	(77.8)	9
Total	171	(26.2)	482	(73.8)	653

*Four respondents did not indicate Department or Rank

The Data Analysis

The data analysis for this study was completed by selecting appropriate statistical programs from the (SPSS^x) Batch System. Among the research statistical techniques selected to study the data were: means, percentages, frequency distributions, reliability and ANOVA. More precisely, the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric test was used to further explore the sum scores or to identify sub-groups of the respondents whose answers generated significantly different sub-scores.

A complete presentation and analysis of the study's data is presented in Chapter IV, with the conclusions drawn from the data presented in Chapter V.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Introduction

Chapter IV deals with the data and findings resulting from the study. The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining As a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Support Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance" was used to collect the data for this investigation.

To aid in the presentation and analysis of data, Chapter IV was written in two major sections. The first section presents the results of the demographic data specific to the three major areas of the research instrument: (1) Respondent Information, 2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information.

The second section of Chapter IV presents an analysis of the interaction between select independent variables from Part I -- Respondent Information of the research instrument and the dependent variables of the research model (1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic and personnel policies specific to Part III -- Institutional Governance Issues of the instrument. This statistical information was used to test the four hypotheses of the research study.

- H:1 The collective bargaining process has affirmed the professional interests of the academician with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.
- H:2 Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education, has provided for the academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the economic interests of the institution.
- H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate in determining the institution's educational policy on academic issues.
- H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment.

Respondent Information

Years Of Full-Time Teaching In A
4-Year Institution of Higher Education

Respondents ($N = 483$) reported a range of less than 5 and more than 25 years of full-time academic teaching within a 4-year institution of higher education. While only 1 respondent had taught in higher education for fewer than 5 years, 72 of the total respondents had held an academic appointment for more than 25 years. As shown in Table XIII, the largest sub-group consists of those respondents who have taught between 16-20 years in a 4-year system of higher education.

TABLE XIII
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY EMPLOYING INSTITUTION
AND YEARS OF FULL-TIME TEACHING IN A 4-YEAR
INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Oregon's Unionized 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education	Years of Full Time Teaching Years in a 4-Year Institution of Higher Education					
	1-4 yrs.	5-10 yrs.	11-15 yrs.	16-20 yrs.	21-25 yrs.	Over 25 yrs.
Western Oregon State Col.	1	6	21	24	19	9
Southern Oregon State Col.			27	34	27	12
Portland State University		31	69	87	65	51
Total Population	1	37	117	145	111	72

Membership in The American Association
of University Professors (AAUP)

In those Oregon 4-year institutions of higher education where academicians have selected collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode, respondents at Western Oregon State College report only a 6.6% membership in AAUP, with a 6.3% membership reported at Southern Oregon State College and a 44.9 % membership reported for Portland State University. As Table XIV illustrates, the majority of the respondents do not hold membership in AAUP. This includes a 55.1% non-membership reported by 206 respondents at Portland State University, where AAUP is the collective bargaining agent for faculty members' contracts.

TABLE XIV
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY EMPLOYING UNIONIZED
INSTITUTION AND MEMBERSHIP IN (AAUP) AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

Oregon's Unionized 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education	Membership in (AAUP) American Association of University Professors			
	Frequencies		Percent	
	Y	N	Y	N
Western Oregon State Col. (N = 76)	5	71	(6.6)	(93.4)
Southern Oregon State Col. (N = 95)	6	89	(6.3)	(93.7)
Portland State University (N = 296)	133	163	(44.9)	(55.1)
Total Population (N = 467)	144	323	(30.8)	(69.2)

Faculty Members' Involvement In Institutional

Academic Collective Bargaining

The majority of the respondents reported nonparticipation in their institution's academic collective bargaining process. Table XV shows the extent of involvement in the collective bargaining process reported by respondents in each of the three unionized institutions.

TABLE XV
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PROCESS, BY INSTITUTION

Involvement in the Col- lective Bar- gaining Process	Western Oregon State College		Southern Oregon State College		Portland State University	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
No Involvement	36	(45.0)	49	(49.5)	214	(69.9)
Slightly Active	22	(27.5)	32	(32.3)	60	(9.6)
Active	10	(12.5)	10	(10.1)	22	(7.2)
Very Active	12	(15.0)	8	(8.1)	10	(3.3)

Analysis of involvement by institution indicates while 27.5% of Western Oregon State College faculty respondents were slightly involved in the collective bargaining process for their institution, 45% of the respondents selected to have no involvement in the process. This same pattern of respondent involvement in the bargaining process was reported at Southern Oregon State College where 32.3% of the respondents were slightly involved in the process and 49.5% of the faculty respondents selected no involvement in institutional bargaining. At Portland State University, 9.6% of the faculty respondents indicated they were slightly involved with the bargaining process; 69.9% have indicated nonparticipation in the process.

Age Of Respondents

Table XVI shows the distribution of the faculty respondents' age range.

TABLE XVI
INSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF
RESPONDENTS BY AGE RANGE

Employing 4-Year Unionized Institution	30-39		40-49		50-59		60 or above		Total
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	
Western Oregon State Col.	2	(2.5)	29	(36.5)	43	(53.5)	6	(7.5)	80 (100)
Southern Oregon State Col.	3	(3.0)	43	(43.0)	42	(42.0)	12	(12.0)	100 (100)
Portland State University	25	(8.2)	111	(36.3)	115	(37.8)	55	(17.9)	306 (100)

$$\chi^2 = 15.8, df = 6; p = .015 \quad N = 486$$

The respondents' age range in the study was from 30 to more than 60 years. The greatest percentage of Western Oregon State College respondents are in the 50-59 year age range. While at both Southern Oregon College ($\underline{n} = 43$) and Portland State University ($\underline{n} = 115$) the

greatest number of the respondents reported their age in the 40-49 range.

Furthermore, as Table XVII illustrates, while the largest number of respondents holding the academic rank of professor were between 50-59 years of age, the largest group of associate professors who responded to this question were between 40-49 years of age.

TABLE XVII
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY
ACADEMIC RANK AND AGE RANGE

Academic Rank	Age				Total
	30-39 yrs.	40-49 yrs.	50-59 yrs.	60 or over	
Professor	5	75	123	56	259
Associate Professor	20	83	61	11	175
Assistant Professor	3	20	13	5	41
Instructor	1	1	--	--	2
Others	1	2	2	--	4
Total Population	30	181	199	72	482

University/Departmental Academic

Governance Bodies

From the total population for the study ($N = 486$), during the 1983-84 academic year, 259 respondents were appointed to a university or departmental governance committee.

Membership in the Faculty Academic Senate was held by 28.1% of the Western Oregon State College respondents, by 33.3% of the 54 Southern Oregon State College total respondents and by 29.1% of the 148 Portland State University respondents.

While only 14.0% of the Western Oregon State College respondents and 20.4% of the Southern Oregon State College respondents were members

of the institution's Rank and Tenure Committee, 33.1% of Portland State's faculty respondents were appointed to this committee.

Faculty respondents, as shown in Table XVIII, were least represented by membership appointment to the Institutional Finance Committees. At Portland State University, 3.4% of the respondents held an appointment to the committee, while 8.8% of Western Oregon State College and 5.6% of Southern Oregon State College respondents reported an appointment to their Institutional Finance Committee(s).

Table XVIII
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL
GOVERNANCE BODIES AND THE EMPLOYING INSTITUTION

University Departmental Academic Governance Bodies	Western Oregon State College	Southern Oregon State College	Portland State University
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Faculty Academic Senate	16 (28.1)	18 (33.3)	43 (29.1)
Finance Committee	5 (8.8)	3 (5.6)	5 (3.4)
Rank and Tenure Committee	8 (14.0)	11 (20.4)	49 (33.1)
Other Policy-Making Committee	28 (49.1)	22 (40.7)	51 (34.5)
Total	57	54	148

Further analysis indicates that the greater number (136) of the 259 respondents reporting an appointment to a governing committee (either in the department or university), held the academic rank of professor. The faculty respondent membership on the four governance committees listed on the research instrument: (1) faculty academic senate, (2) finance, (3) rank and tenure, and (4) other policy-making committees are shown in

Table XIX.

During the 1983-84 academic year, in addition to the three specific governance committees used for the research instrument, respondents reported membership on such other policy-making committees as:

(1) Academic Requirements, (2) Curriculum, (3) Committee on Committees, (4) Teacher Education, and (5) Graduate Studies.

TABLE XIX
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY ACADEMIC
RANK AND UNIVERSITY/DEPARTMENTAL
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE COMMITTEES

University Departmental Academic Governance Committees	Professor	Associate Professor	Assistant Professor	Instructor/Other
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Faculty Academic Senate	42 (30.9)	24 (26.4)	9 (34.6)	1 -
Finance Committee	9 (6.6)	2 (2.2)	2 (7.7)	- -
Rank and Tenure Committee	37 (27.2)	24 (26.4)	5 (19.2)	- -
Other Policy-Making Committee	48 (35.3)	41 (45.1)	10 (38.5)	- -
Total	136	91	26	1 -

Salary

In the questionnaire seven intervals were provided to determine the salary range of the faculty respondents on a 9-month academic year contract during the 1983-84 academic year. The respondents reported salaries ranging from \$10,000 to more than \$40,000 for 1983-84 academic year contracts. While two respondents reported a salary between \$10,000-\$15,000 range, 176 of the respondents earned between \$26,000-\$30,000. Table XX provides a summary of the salary range.

TABLE XX
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY SALARIES

Salary Intervals Dollars/9 months	Number	Percent
10,000-15,000	2	0.4
16,000-20,000	14	2.9
21,000-25,000	129	26.7
26,000-30,000	176	36.5
31,000-35,000	108	22.4
36,000-40,000	40	8.3
40,000-over	13	2.7
Total	482*	100

*Missing values = 4

Table XXI reports salaries by institution. The table reveals while two or 2.0% of the Southern Oregon State College respondents are in the \$10,000-\$15,000 salary range, 50 faculty respondents or half of their total respondents have salaries ranging from \$26,000-\$30,000. Portland State University also reported the greatest percentage, 33.6%, of the 1983-84 respondents' salary contracts were in the \$26,000-\$30,000 interval. Western Oregon State College respondents reported 37 or 47.4% of the total respondents' salaries were between \$21,000-\$25,000 for 9 months, with 24 or 30.8% of the faculty respondents reporting a salary of \$26,000-\$30,000.

TABLE XXI
SALARY DISTRIBUTION FOR FACULTY RESPONDENTS
BY EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

Salary Interval Dollars/9 month	Western Oregon		Southern Oregon		Portland State	
	State College N	(%)	State College N	(%)	University N	(%)
10,000-15,000	-	-	2	2.0	-	-
16,000-20,000	3	(3.8)	1	(1.0)	10	(3.3)
21,000-25,000	37	(47.4)	26	(26.0)	66	(21.7)
26,000-30,000	24	(30.8)	50	(50.0)	102	(33.6)
31,000-35,000	6	(7.7)	19	(19.0)	83	(27.3)
36,000-40,000	7	(9.0)	2	(2.0)	31	(10.2)
over 40,000	1	(1.3)	-	-	12	(3.9)
Total	78		100		304	

Further examination of the salary ranges shows that in all three academic areas the greatest percentage of the faculty respondents employed are within the salary interval of \$26,000-\$30,000 for the 1983-1984 academic year on a 9 month's contract. The percentages of faculty respondents in the \$26,000-\$30,000 salary interval by academic areas were: Liberal Arts, 38.6%; Professional Schools, 34.0%; Others 32.2% (See Table XII).

TABLE XXII
DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY BY ACADEMIC AREA
FOR FACULTY RESPONDENTS

Salary Interval Dollars/9 months	Academic Area					
	Liberal Arts: College/ Department/ School		Professional School		Others	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
10,000-15,000	1	(0.4)	1	(0.6)	-	-
16,000-20,000	6	(2.1)	5	(3.1)	3	(9.7)
21,000-25,000	87	(30.5)	32	(19.8)	9	(29.0)
26,000-30,000	110	(38.6)	55	(34.0)	10	(32.3)
31,000-35,000	61	(21.4)	40	(24.7)	6	(19.4)
36,000-40,000	13	(4.6)	24	(14.8)	3	(9.7)
over 40,000	7	(2.5)	5	(3.1)	-	-
Total	285		162		31	

Additional analysis revealed that of the 478 faculty respondents reporting their salary ranges, 37.2% or 96 of the respondents with the academic rank of professor earned between \$26,000-\$30,000 for a 9 months' academic year appointment. While 80 or 46.2% of the respondents with the academic rank of associate professor earned between \$21,000-\$25,000, 67.5% or 27 of the respondents holding the rank of assistant professor were employed in the same salary range. Table XXIII presents respondents' salaries within the four academic ranks of the university system.

TABLE XXIII
SALARY INTERVAL DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY
RESPONDENTS BY ACADEMIC RANK

Salary Interval Dollars/9 months	Academic Rank							
	Professor		Associate Professor		Assistant Professor		Instructor/ Other	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
10,000-15,000	1	(0.4)	1	(0.6)	-	-	-	-
16,000-20,000	2	(0.8)	6	(3.5)	4	(10.0)	1	(1.0)
21,000-25,000	18	(7.0)	80	(46.2)	27	(67.5)	-	(2.0)
26,000-30,000	96	(37.2)	74	(42.8)	4	(10.0)	1	(1.0)
31,000-35,000	95	(36.8)	7	(4.0)	4	(10.0)	-	(1.0)
36,000-40,000	34	(13.2)	5	(2.9)	1	(2.5)	-	-
over 40,000	12	(4.7)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	258		173		40		2	

Institutional Influences

Introduction

The data for the second main area of the research instrument are presented to identify those contextual factors, either external or internal to a 4-year university system, which were perceived in 1983 to be an influencing factor in faculty respondents' decision to vote for a new institutional academic collective bargaining contract.

Those faculty respondents voting for a new institutional contract responded to 13 statements on the research instrument. The issues specific to each statement had the potential to affect the governance structure and functions of the institution. Using a 5-point Likert Scale, voting faculty respondents recorded their response to the 13 listed factors as an influencing or non-influencing factor in their decision to vote for a contract renewal.

A total presentation of the respondents' data specific to each of the 13 statements is illustrated by Table XXIV (See Appendix I). The frequency of response, as well as the percentage based upon the total number of responses for each statement, is presented.

The data can be further statistically analyzed to present additional important findings specific to each of four data subsets: (1) funding, (2) decision-making process/bodies, (3) organizational change, and (4) students. These findings are as follows:

(1) Funding - the impact that federal, state, or institutional funding had on the conduct of faculty research or program development in the subject institution formed questions 8, 9, 11 of the research instrument.

While 114 of the faculty members were in disagreement with statement 9, "Federal funds appropriated for research have been reduced," 111 of the 419 respondents were undecided about the statement as a contextual factor of significance to them in voting for contract renewal in 1983.

Statements 8 and 11, as shown in Table XXV, were reported as

significant contextual factors in the respondents' decision to vote for a contract renewal. At Southern Oregon State College, 42 of the total 90 respondents and 104 of the 261 respondents from Portland State University reported they strongly agree with statement 8, "State legislative funding was reduced for your institution." Furthermore, the importance of state funding as an influencing force is agreed upon by 104 of the Portland State University respondents and 33 of the 72 respondents from Western Oregon State College.

Statement 11, "Limited instructional funds have decreased the development of academic programs" was reported as a significant contextual factor for 177 of the 423 respondents voting in 1983 for a contract renewal. A further analysis of the statement by academic institution (See Table XXV) shows the statement was of significance to faculty members holding an academic appointment during the 1983-84 academic year, in each of the three unionized 4-year institutions in Oregon's system of higher education.

(2) Decision-Making Process/Bodies important to faculty members' governance and function within the academy were studied by questions 12 through 16 of the research instrument.

To statement 14, "The faculty senate/council has become less effective as governance bodies," and 16, "There was a reduced sense of collegiality among faculty," the investigator found respondents in each of the three unionized 4-year institutions agreed that these were significant contextual factors in their decision to vote for a contract renewal. As demonstrated in Table XXVI, 30 of the 70 Western Oregon

TABLE XXV
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
8 AND 11 OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT BY
THE EMPLOYING ACADEMIC SETTING

Institutional Influences Employing Academic Settings	Frequency					Total Population
	Strongly Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Undecided <u>N</u> (%)	Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	Strongly Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	
8. State legislative funding was reduced for your institution						
WOSC	11 (15.3%)	33 (45.8%)	8 (11.1%)	17 (23.6%)	3 (4.2%)	72
SOSC	42 (46.7%)	31 (34.4%)	4 (4.4%)	2 (2.2%)	1 (1.2%)	90
PSU	104 (39.9%)	104 (39.9%)	18 (6.9%)	21 (8.1%)	14 (5.4%)	261
11. Limited institu- tional funds have decreased the devel- opment of academic programs.						
WOSC	12 (16.7%)	34 (47.2%)	9 (12.5%)	14 (19.4%)	3 (4.2%)	72
SOSC	28 (31.1%)	41 (45.6%)	9 (10.0%)	2 (2.2%)	10 (11.1%)	90
PSU	85 (32.6%)	102 (39.1%)	29 (11.1%)	32 (12.3%)	13 (5.0%)	261

State College respondents, 26 of the 90 Southern Oregon State College respondents, and 93 of Portland State University's 260 respondents agreed with statement 14. In response to statement 16, the investigator found that 24 of the 70 Western Oregon State College respondents, 33 of the 90 Southern Oregon State College respondents and 91 of the Portland State University 260 respondents recorded agreement with the statement.

Statements 13 and 15 of the research instrument focused on the impact of the decision-making process, as related to the development of educational policy for the institutions at the state and departmental level of governance.

To statement 13, (See Table XXVII) "The educational policy decision-making rights of the central administration were controlled by the state education agency," 82 of Portland State University's total 259 respondents recorded agreement with the statement, as did 23 of the respondents from Southern Oregon State College. At Western Oregon State College only 19 of the 70 respondents agreed with the statement, while 28 or 34.3% disagreed that this statement was a significant contextual factor in their decision to vote for a new institutional academic collective bargaining contract.

As illustrated in Table XXVII, 82 of the 261 Portland State University respondents answered in agreement with statement 15; "There was a decline in the faculty members' influence in policy-making at the departmental level," while 80 respondents disagreed that the statement was a significant factor in their collective bargaining voting. Twenty-eight or 40.0% of the Western Oregon State College faculty

TABLE XXVI
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO QUESTIONS
14 AND 16 OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT BY
EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

Institutional Influences Employing Academic Settings	Frequency					Total Population
	Strongly Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Undecided <u>N</u> (%)	Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	Strongly Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	
14. The faculty academic senate/ council has become less effective as a governance body.						
WOSC	6 (8.6%)	30 (42.9%)	9 (12.9%)	19 (27.1%)	6 (8.6%)	70
SOSC	20 (22.2%)	26 (28.9%)	11 (12.2%)	21 (23.3%)	12 (13.3%)	90
PSU	33 (12.6%)	93 (35.6%)	56 (21.5%)	62 (23.8%)	17 (6.5%)	261
16. There was a reduced sense of collegiality among the faculty.						
WOSC	10 (13.9%)	24 (33.3%)	10 (13.9%)	21 (29.2%)	7 (9.7%)	72
SOSC	13 (14.4%)	33 (36.7%)	15 (16.7%)	16 (17.8%)	13 (14.4%)	90
PSU	49 (18.9%)	91 (35.0%)	36 (13.9%)	62 (23.9%)	22 (18.5%)	260

TABLE XXVII
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
13 AND 15 OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT BY
EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

		Frequency						
Institutional Influences Employing Academic Settings	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total		
	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	Population		
<hr/>								
13. The educational policy decision-making rights of the institution's central administration were controlled by the state educational agency.								
WOSC	4 (5.7%)	19 (27.1%)	14 (20.2%)	28 (34.3%)	12 (12.9%)	70		
SOSC	12 (13.3%)	23 (25.6%)	22 (24.4%)	22 (24.4%)	11 (12.1%)	90		
PSU	32 (12.4%)	82 (31.7%)	62 (23.9%)	61 (23.6%)	22 (8.5%)	259		
<hr/>								
15. There was a decline in the faculty members' influences on policy decision-making at the departmental level.								
WOSC	12 (17.1%)	28 (40.0%)	3 (4.3%)	20 (28.6%)	7 (10.0%)	70		
SOSC	10 (11.1%)	17 (18.9%)	15 (16.7%)	28 (31.1%)	20 (22.2%)	90		
PSU	49 (18.8%)	82 (31.4%)	23 (8.8%)	80 (30.7%)	27 (10.3%)	261		

recorded agreement with the statement, while 28 or 31.1% of the Southern Oregon State College respondents disagreed that the statement was of significance to their institution.

(3) Organizational changes -- statement(s) 10, 18 and 19 of the research instrument address those factors in the organizational structures and functions that can influence a faculty member to vote in support of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode for an institution. Specific data analysis of the questions reveals the following:

- (A) A substantive number of the institutional respondent subsample groups disagree with statement 10, "The structural size of the institution has grown rapidly during the preceding five years." As shown in Table XXVIII, 42 of the 68 Western Oregon State College respondents, 60 of the Southern Oregon State College 86 total respondents, as well as 149 of the 215 Portland State University respondents recorded a disagreement with the statement.
- (B) About half of the Portland State University respondents recorded disagreement with statements 18 and 19 (See Table XXVIII). However, statement 18, "The institution has developed and implemented a new mission and goal statement," was a significant contextual factor to respondents at Western Oregon State College where 34 of the 71 respondents were in agreement that a new mission and goal statement(s) had been developed and implemented in their university system.

TABLE XXVIII
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
10, 18, AND 19 OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT
BY EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

Institutional Influences Employing Academic Settings	Frequency					Total Population
	Strongly Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Undecided <u>N</u> (%)	Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	Strongly Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	
10. The structural size of the institution has grown rapidly during the preceding fiscal year.						
WOSC	2 (2.9%)	9 (19.1%)	16 (13.2%)	26 (38.2%)	16 (26.5%)	68
SOSC	6 (7.0%)	11 (12.8%)	9 (10.5%)	31 (36.1%)	29 (33.7%)	86
PSU	8 (3.1%)	38 (14.7%)	63 (24.4%)	95 (36.8%)	54 (20.9%)	258
18. The institution has developed and imple- mented new mission and goal statements.						
WOSC	4 (5.6%)	30 (42.3%)	12 (16.9%)	19 (26.8%)	6 (8.5%)	71
SOSC	4 (4.5%)	23 (25.8%)	26 (29.2%)	18 (20.2%)	18 (20.2%)	89
PSU	4 (1.5%)	43 (16.6%)	74 (28.6%)	98 (37.8%)	40 (15.4%)	259
19. The institution has de- signed and implemented a new organizational structure.						
WOSC	9 (12.9%)	39 (55.7%)	6 (8.6%)	13 (18.5%)	3 (4.3%)	70
SOSC	7 (7.9%)	26 (29.2%)	22 (24.7%)	17 (19.1%)	17 (19.1%)	89
PSU	9 (3.5%)	60 (23.2%)	74 (28.6%)	81 (31.3%)	35 (13.5%)	259

Furthermore, statement 19, "The institution has designed and implemented a new organizational structure," was identified as an influencing factor for 70 faculty members at Western Oregon State College, where 48 or 68.6% of the respondents recorded agreement with the statement. In addition, 33 of the total 89 respondents at Southern Oregon State College agreed that their decision to vote for contract renewal had been influenced by a new institutional organizational design and structure. However, 34 of the institution's respondents were in disagreement with the statement.

D. Students

Statements 7 and 17 on the questionnaire are specific to student issues, which could be perceived as influencing factors in a faculty member's decision to support academic collective bargaining.

While only 45 of 421 respondents agreed with statement 17, "Student power has increased on the campus," a decline in student enrollment was identified as an influencing factor by 40 or 55.5% of the total 72 respondents (See Table XXIX) from Western Oregon State College in their decision to vote for a renewal of the institutional bargaining contract.

Institutional Governance Information

Introduction

Academic institutional governance was the third area of inquiry for

TABLE XXIX
DISTRIBUTION OF FACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SEVEN
AND SEVENTEEN OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT BY
EMPLOYING ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

Institutional Influences Employing Academic Settings	Frequency					Total Population
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	
7. The institution was experiencing a de- cline in student enrollment.						
WOSC	8 (11.1%)	32 (44.4%)	4 (5.6%)	16 (22.2%)	12 (16.7%)	72
SOSC	2 (2.3%)	10 (11.4%)	15 (17.1%)	30 (34.1%)	31 (35.2%)	88
PSU	16 (3.2%)	67 (25.9%)	47 (18.2%)	86 (33.2%)	43 (16.6%)	259
17. Student power has increased on the campus.						
WOSC	2 (2.8%)	7 (9.9%)	13 (18.3%)	32 (45.1%)	17 (23.9%)	71
SOSC	0 (0.0%)	17 (18.9%)	7 (7.8%)	41 (45.6%)	25 (27.8%)	90
PSU	0 (0.0%)	19 (7.3%)	50 (19.7%)	125 (48.1%)	66 (25.9%)	260

this study. This process includes both the formal decision-making structures used within a university system, which have the potential to affect relationships, procedures and policies.

Four sub-sets of data are presented. (1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies specific to academic governance issues.

Professional Interests

The first subset of data specific to academic governance includes respondents' reported perceptions to the impact that academic collective bargaining had upon their professional prestige within the employing institution.

As shown in Table XXX (See Appendix J), the research instrument studied eight professional interest statements. As the data reveals, respondents were in disagreement or strong disagreement with seven statements (20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27) of the survey. In brief, the data suggest respondents do not agree that academic collective bargaining has provided them with:

- (1) An academic milieu supportive of the pursuit of scholarship.
- (2) A collegial relationship with administration.
- (3) A professional, rather than employee, status to their role in the institution.
- (4) An increased interest in the function and role of the faculty senate/council.
- (5) Involvement in the selection process for the appointment of an administrator to a central or departmental administration

position.

- (6) An influence in setting institutional standards for academic performance.
- (7) The right to participate in policy-making on educational issues that have the potential to affect public opinion about the institution.

However, to statement No. 22 (See Table XXXI), 226 of the 474 respondents agreed that academic collective bargaining has provided them with "a formalized structure and process for institutional decision-making" in their employing university system.

Economic Interests

The second subset of data specific to academic governance is respondents' reported perception to academic collective bargaining as a facilitator for institutional economic interests.

As illustrated in Table XXXII (see Appendix K), the data suggest that, as an aggregate, the respondents do not agree academic collective bargaining has: (1) provided the faculty with a higher public profile specific to budgetary issues in Oregon's system of higher education, (2) encouraged the university budgetary affairs committee to link budget planning to institutional academic goals, (3) provided for faculty input into the long-range budgeting planning modes of the institution, or (4) generated additional money for the faculty salary scale in Oregon's system of higher education.

However, additional analysis of the data (See Table XXXIII)

TABLE XXXI
FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE/PROCESS

Institutional Governance Information Employing Academic Setting	Frequency					Total Respondents
	Strongly Agree N (%)	Agree N (%)	Unde- cided N (%)	Dis- agree N (%)	Strongly Disagree N (%)	
22. A formalized structure and process for institutional decision-making						
WOSC	15 (19.2%)	32 (41.0%)	6 (7.7%)	31 (26.9%)	4 (5.1%)	78
SOSC	8 (8.3%)	36 (37.5%)	12 (12.5%)	24 (25.0%)	16 (16.7%)	96
PSU	29 (9.7%)	106 (35.3%)	60 (20.0%)	74 (24.7%)	31 (10.3%)	300
Total Responses	52	174	78	119	51	474

TABLE XXXIII
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS TO STATEMENTS
(29, 30, 31, 34 OR 36) ECONOMIC
INTEREST IN ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE

Institution	Economic Interest Statement	Frequency					Total Respondents
		Strongly Agree N (%)	Agree N (%)	Undecided N (%)	Disagree N (%)	Strongly Disagree N (%)	
Southern Oregon State College	29. Clarify the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education.	9 (9.3%)	44 (45.4%)	10 (10.3%)	16 (16.5%)	18 (18.6%)	97
	30. Increased the importance of budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and planning.	4 (4.1%)	39 (39.8%)	26 (26.5%)	19 (19.4%)	10 (10.2%)	98
	31. Strengthen your input into short-range university budget planning and decision-making.	4 (4.2%)	30 (39.6%)	19 (19.8%)	22 (22.9%)	13 (13.5%)	98
	34. Assisted the faculty and administration to present a united agreement to the state legislature.	7 (7.3%)	31 (32.0%)	28 (28.9%)	17 (17.5%)	14 (14.4%)	97
Portland State University	29. Clarify the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education.	32 (10.7%)	105 (35.2%)	42 (14.1%)	92 (30.9%)	27 (9.1%)	298
Western Oregon State College	30. Increased the importance of budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and planning.	3 (6.3%)	31 (25.3%)	10 (8.9%)	26 (34.2%)	9 (25.3%)	79

suggests that the academic collective bargaining process, for many Southern Oregon College respondents, is perceived as having (1) clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education, (2) increased the importance of the budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and planning, (3) assisted the faculty and administration to present a united agreement to the state legislature, and (4) increased their salary and fringe benefits for the system.

Furthermore, this analysis reveals that while 137 of the 298 Portland State University respondents agree with statement 29 of the research instrument, which states that "collective bargaining clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education," 119 respondents disagreed with the statement.

In addition, 35 of the 79 Western Oregon State College respondents agree that the collective bargaining process has provided an "increase in the importance of the budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and planning." However, 35 of the 79 respondents disagreed with the statement.

Educational Policies

The academic community has established a tradition to assure the academician's rights for active participation in determining the educational policies of a university system, as well as establishing those institutional procedures that govern the educational process: (1) teaching, (2) programs, or (3) students (Sands, 1971). This right for the academician may be further supported in the university setting

by the acceptance of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode.

In Oregon, data (See Table XXXIV) of this study suggest faculty respondents do not agree that it has been necessary to implement academic collective bargaining in order to assure the faculty members' right to determine educational policies and procedures in their institutions. Their perceptions are further supported by the following select respondents' comments: (1) "Collective Bargaining has had no effect here. Faculty participation remains the same," (2) "No effect," (3) "Collective Bargaining is only one factor, and a minor one," (4) "No difference now than before collective bargaining," (5) "We never have a problem in this area," (6) "To a large extent, these were already in place."

Academic and Personnel Policies

University educators have the primary governance authority for all matters related to faculty status (AAUP, 1984). This study investigated collective bargaining's impact in providing the opportunity for faculty members employed in Oregon's unionized institutions to participate in determining policies related to: (1) academic duties, (2) academic standards and personnel policies, and (3) support services. For this data subset, the respondents were requested to record their responses on a four-part scale: (1) always, (2) frequently, (3) infrequently, and (4) never.

As shown in Table XXXV, the responses to items 44, 45, and 46 of the research instrument indicate that the acceptance of collective

TABLE XXXIV
FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTION OF THE IMPACT OF ACADEMIC
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON EDUCATIONAL POLICY
DETERMINANTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

Institutional Grievance Educational Policies	Frequency					Total Respondents
	Strongly Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Unde- cided <u>N</u> (%)	Dis- agree <u>N</u> (%)	Strongly Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	
37. Academic Standards	1 (0.2%)	22 (4.6%)	88 (18.5%)	244 (51.3%)	121 (25.4%)	476
38. Curriculum Content	3 (0.6%)	39 (8.3%)	84 (17.7%)	226 (47.6%)	123 (25.9%)	475
39. Degree Requirements	1 (0.2%)	34 (7.2%)	91 (19.7%)	229 (48.2%)	120 (25.3%)	475
40. Grading Standards	1 (0.2%)	26 (5.5%)	94 (19.8%)	228 (48.0%)	126 (26.5%)	475
41. Standards for Student Conduct and Discipline	1 (0.2%)	24 (5.0%)	102 (21.4%)	229 (48.1%)	120 (25.2%)	476
42. Types of Degrees Offered	1 (0.2%)	26 (5.5%)	87 (18.4%)	229 (48.4%)	130 (27.5%)	473
43. Establishment of Educational Programs	3 (0.6%)	33 (7.0%)	105 (22.2%)	215 (45.4%)	118 (24.9%)	474

TABLE XXXV
FACULTY RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING'S IMPACT ON ACADEMIC AND PERSONNEL
POLICIES IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

Institutional Governance Academic and Personnel Policies	Frequency					Total Frequency
	Always <u>N</u> (%)	Frequently <u>N</u> (%)	Infrequently <u>N</u> (%)	Never <u>N</u> %		
Academic Duties						
44. Teaching Assignment	41 (9.2%)	80 (18.0%)	132 (29.7%)	191 (43.0%)	444	
45. Teaching Schedules	34 (7.7%)	83 (18.7%)	127 (28.6%)	200 (45.1%)	444	
46. Teaching Loads	29 (6.6%)	76 (17.2%)	151 (34.1%)	187 (42.2%)	443	
Academic Standards/Practices Policies for						
47. Faculty Recruitment	31 (7.1%)	78 (17.8%)	148 (33.7%)	182 (41.5%)	439	
48. Faculty Promotion	55 (12.4%)	135 (30.5%)	133 (29.0%)	120 (27.1%)	443	
49. Faculty Tenure	65 (14.5%)	137 (30.5%)	133 (29.6%)	114 (25.4%)	449	
50. Academic Freedom	64 (14.5%)	144 (32.5%)	123 (27.8%)	112 (25.3%)	443	
*51. Dismissal for Cause	74 (17.0%)	155 (35.6%)	123 (28.2%)	84 (19.3%)	436	
52. Salary Scale	42 (9.3%)	121 (26.8%)	151 (33.4%)	138 (30.5%)	452	
53. Fringe Benefits	49 (11.0%)	135 (30.2%)	152 (34.0%)	111 (24.8%)	447	
*54. Grievance Procedures	125 (27.8%)	180 (40.0%)	95 (21.1%)	50 (11.1%)	450	
Support Services						
55. Office Space	12 (2.7%)	32 (7.2%)	127 (28.7%)	271 (61.3%)	442	
56. Secretarial Help	10 (2.3%)	29 (6.6%)	127 (28.7%)	276 (62.4%)	442	

bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in the respondents' university system has not affected the faculty's opportunity to participate in the academic issues related to teaching: (1) assignment, (2) schedule, and (3) load. As respondents' comments suggest: (1) "Our collective bargaining has done very little that was not already being done. I believe that I have input into many academic and administrative decisions, but I had this without collective bargaining;" (2) "We had all of these prior to collective bargaining in my department;" (3) "These do not relate to collective bargaining on our campus, in my opinion;" and (4) "We do all of these, but not because of collective bargaining."

Academic standards and personnel policy issues were investigated by items 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54 (See Table XXXV). From the faculty respondents' perceptions, the implementation of collective bargaining has provided the opportunity for faculty to make policy decisions related to the issues of: (1) dismissal for cause, and (2) grievance procedures. However, respondents do not tend to perceive collective bargaining as providing the faculty members with an opportunity to determine departmental personnel policies related to "support or secretarial services."

Data Analysis Specific to The Four Dependent Variable Subsets

This section of Chapter IV was developed to present an analysis of the interaction(s) between select demographic data from Part I -

Respondent Information and data specific to the four dependent variable sets of the study: (1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies.

Sum Scores for the Dependent Variable Sets

From the survey data, the population values for the sum scores specific for the various sections of the research instrument are shown in Table XXXVI. This statistical information allows the investigator to characterize the respondents' total responses to each of the summed dependent variables. Furthermore the Cronbach's Alpha, a measure of internal consistency, was computed for four sections of the questionnaire. Coefficients at .90, .89, .96, and .93 were obtained for the sections on professional interests, economic interests, educational policies and academic/personnel policies. The high alpha values obtained indicated individuals tended to answer questions within each section consistently and supported the use of summed scores in subsequent analysis.

TABLE XXXVI
POPULATION VALUES FOR THE SUM SCORE

Variable	N	Mean	StDev	(.95 CI)	median	min	max
Professional Interest Issues	458	3.45	.882	(3.367,3.532)	3.50	1.13	5.00
Economic Interest Issues	459	3.36	.812	(3.284,3.436)	3.44	1.00	5.00
Educational Policy Issues	469	3.94	.764	(3.869,4.011)	4.00	2.00	5.00
Academic/Personnel Interest Issues	410	2.81	.741	(2.737,2.883)	2.82	1.00	4.00

The total respondents' sum-scores (see Table XXVII) for the two

dependent variable sets, professional and economic interests, can be characterized as undecided/disagree. The respondents are best described as in disagreement with the dependent variable concerned with educational policies. The fourth dependent variable of the study, academic/personnel policies, is characterized by the data as infrequent.

TABLE XXXVII
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE DEPENDENT
VARIABLE SUB-SETS ACCORDING
TO SUM-SCORES

Dependent Variable Sub-Set	Questions	Median Sum-Score	Characteristics of Responses
Professional Interests	20-27	3.50	Undecided/Disagree
Economic Interests	28-36	3.44	Undecided/Disagree
Educational Policies	37-43	4.00	Disagree
Academic/Personnel Policies	44-56	2.82	Infrequently

These sum variables, (1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/ personnel policies form the four hypotheses. Therefore, the sum-scores for each variable were further examined to statistically answer the research question, "Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education been supportive of the faculty members' rights for participation in institutional governance?"

Hypothesis Testing

In order to answer the research question, the four hypotheses of

the study were tested. The sum scores for the dependent variable set were studied using nine independent variables: (1) the number of teaching years in a 4-year institution of higher education, (2) AAUP membership, (3) salary, (4) governance, (5) age, (6) involvement in the institution's bargaining process, (7) academic rank, (8) institution of employment, and (9) departmental assignment. More precisely, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was used to identify those sub-groups of the respondents whose answers generated significantly different sum scores.

Two of the independent variables, academic rank and the number of full-time teaching years in a 4-year institution of higher education, generated no significant statistical differences for any of the sum variables. However, seven of the nine independent variables tested, (see Table XXXVIII) at the 0.05 level, generated a statistically significant difference for the summed dependent variables.

TABLE XXXVIII

 KRUSKAL-WALLIS STATISTIC P-VALUES
 FOR THE VARIABLES

Independent Variables	Summed Dependent Variable Set			
	Professional Interests (H:1)	Economic Interests (H:2)	Educational Policies (H:3)	Academic/Personnel Policies (H:4)
AAUP Membership	.0001	.0001	NS	NS
Salary	.0001	.0002	.0004	.0008
Governance Bodies	NS	NS	.005	NS
Age	NS	NS	NS	.03
Institutional Involvement With Bargaining	.0001	.0001	.003	.0001
Institution	.005	.007	NS	.0002
Department	NS	.03	.03	NS
"NS": p > 0.05				

Hypothesis One (H:1)

To further explore H:1, the collective bargaining process has affirmed the professional interests of the academician with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education, subgroup means were computed.

As a result of the one-way analysis of variance testing, no significant statistical differences were found between the independent variables, age, governance committee membership, or departmental assignment and the sum data for the dependent variable, professional interests. However, as illustrated in Table XXXIX, the sum variables and the demographic variables, AAUP membership, employing institution, salary and involvement in bargaining, exhibited statistically significant differences.

TABLE XXXIX

SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUB-GROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND PROFESSIONAL INTEREST ISSUES

Independent Variables	Professional Interests	
	N	Average Scores
(1) AAUP Membership		
(a) Yes	136	3.21*
(b) No	305	3.55*
(2) Employing Institution		
(a) Western Oregon State College	73	3.13++
(b) Southern Oregon State College	93	3.43*
(c) Portland State University	292	3.53++
(3) Salary for 9 mo. Contract		
(a) \$10,000-\$25,000	140	3.23*
(b) \$26,000-\$30,000	162	3.39*
(c) Over \$30,000	152	3.70*,+
(4) Involvement in Bargaining		
(a) No Involvement	284	3.67*
(b) Slightly Active	106	3.20*,+
(c) Active	40	3.01*
(d) Very Active	27	2.69*,+

Note: + = 0.05 level; ++ = 0.005, * = 0.001, ** = 0.0001

As previously indicated, the respondents' answers related to the sum variable, professional interests, were clearly skewed to the right side of the research instrument's 5-point Likert Scale, used by the faculty members to record their responses to each question:

(1) AAUP Membership - The respondents who are members of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) appear to be rather undecided about whether or not academic collective bargaining has provided support for their professional interests, whereas the respondents who are not members of the AAUP seem closer to disagreement that collective bargaining has provided such support. Although the AAUP nonmembers' mean score is 3.55, their responses are significantly closer to the "disagree" category on the 5-point Likert scale, Wilcoxon $z = 3.88$, $p = .0001$.

(2) Employing Institution - The average scores range from 3.13 to 3.53 for the respondents employed by the three subject unionized institutions. These respondents reported scores are between the "undecided" and "disagree" categories on the Likert scale. Respondents employed by Western Oregon State College appear statistically to be more undecided about the effects of the bargaining process in providing for their professional interests than is the faculty group from Southern Oregon State College and Portland State University. These latter groups' perception of the process, as the mean score shows, is statistically closer to disagreeing that the process has provided for their professional interests within the employing university system.

(3) Salary - The mean scores for faculty respondents who have a salary within the \$10,000 - \$25,000 range, as well as the \$26,000 - \$30,000 salary range, suggest that these groups lean significantly more toward being "undecided" about the association between the collective bargaining process and their professional interest rights as an academician, than does the group reporting salaries over \$30,000 for a 9 month academic year (Q 3.3, $p < 0.005$, Table B.14 in Zar, p. 568).

(4) Involvement In The Process - Faculty members reporting no involvement in the collective bargaining process perceptions are significantly closer to "disagreeing" that the process has been a facilitator of their professional interests in the employing university setting, than do respondents reporting involvement in the process.

Hypothesis Two (H:2)

To further study if the collective bargaining as implemented in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education has provided for the academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the economic interests of the institution, simultaneous comparisons of sub-group means were computed using the previously stated nine independent variable and the sum-variable economic interests.

As a result of the additional testing, a statistically significant relationship was identified (See Table XL) between the faculty respondents' perceptions of academic collective bargaining as providing for the institution's economic interests and five of the demographic variables: (1) departmental appointment, (2) AAUP membership,

(3) employing institution, (4) involvement in the institutional bargaining process, and (5) salary. No statistical association was shown between this sum-variable and the independent variables of age and membership in university or departmental governance committees.

TABLE XL

SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC INTEREST ISSUES

Independent Variables	Economic Interests	
	N	Average Scores
(1) Departmental Assignment		
(a) Liberal Arts/Sciences	267	3.29*
(b) Professional Schools	156	3.48*
(c) Others	32	3.41
(2) AAUP Membership		
(a) Yes	132	3.11+++
(b) No	310	3.46+++
(3) Employing Institution		
(a) Western Oregon State College	75	3.53*,+
(b) Southern Oregon State College	96	3.18+,*
(c) Portland State University	288	3.37*
(4) Involvement in the Bargaining Process		
(a) No Involvement	285	3.51*,**,++
(b) Slightly Active	108	3.18++
(c) Active	37	3.12+*,*
(d) Very Active	28	2.88**
(5) Salary		
(a) \$10,000-\$25,000	137	3.20++
(b) \$26,000-\$30,000	168	3.29+
(c) Over \$30,000	150	3.57+,++

*: 0.05, +: 0.01, **: 0.002, ++: 0.001, +++: 0.0001

(1) Departmental Appointment - A statistically significant difference was found at the $p < 0.05$ level between the departmental appointments of the Liberal Arts/Sciences and the Professional Schools

relative to the dependent variable "economic interests." Respondents with an appointment in a professional school disagree more about academic collective bargaining as a supplemental mode that has provided for the participation in these processes related to the institution's economic interests. While respondents in the third departmental sub-group "others" had no significant statistical relationship identified, their mean score of 3.41, like the other departmental groups, fell between the "undecided" and "disagree" categories on the Likert Scale.

(2) AAUP Membership - For both the respondent groups selecting/not selecting membership in the (AAUP) American Association of University Professors, a statistically significant assessment was found at the .0001 level. Although faculty members with membership seem to be "undecided" about the role that the bargaining process has provided for the nonmembers' participation in the institution's "economic interests," their mean-score of 3.55 is closer to the "disagree" category on the scale Wilcoxon $Z = 4.20$, $p < .0001$.

(3) Employing Institution - Faculty respondents at all three institutions seem to lie on the "disagree" side of the "undecided" category about academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode that has provided for the participation in those processes specific to "economic interests." The findings indicate that the respondents from Western Oregon State College and Portland State University lean more toward the "disagree" category on the scale than do the respondents employed at Southern Oregon State College.

(4) Involvement in Bargaining - The "no involvement" respondents appear to perceive the process in relationship to their participation in the issues related to the institution's "economic interests" nearer to the "disagree" category on the 5-point scale, with a mean score of 3.51, than do respondents indicating very active involvement.

(5) Salary - All three groups of faculty respondents, according to their salary range for the academic year, are "undecided" to "disagree" about the collective bargaining process as a facilitator for the "economic interests" of their university system. The respondents with an academic year income over \$30,000 are significantly closer to the "disagree" category than the two groups of respondents earning less for an academic year appointment.

Hypothesis Three (H:3)

As reported earlier in the chapter, the frequency distribution of the respondent answers to questions 37-43 of the research instrument seems to indicate faculty members "disagree" that collective bargaining has been necessary to provide for the opportunity to determine educational policies related to seven academic issues: (1) academic standards, (2) curricular content, (3) degree requirements, (4) grading standards, (5) standards for student conduct/discipline, (6) type of degrees offered, and (7) the establishment of educational programs. This position is further supported by the reported respondents' comments.

However, from the statistical information provided by the analysis

of subgroup means, (See Table XLI) a significant difference can be reported between the educators' perception of academic collective bargaining as providing an opportunity to determine institutional educational policy and the respondents' (1) membership on a university/departmental governance committee, (2) departmental assignment, (3) salary, and (4) amount of involvement with the bargaining process.

TABLE XLI

SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND EDUCATIONAL INTEREST ISSUES

Independent Variables	Educational Interests	
	N	Average Scores
(1) Governance Bodies		
(a) Faculty Academic Senate	74	4.09**
(b) Finance	12	4.12
(c) Rank & Tenure	64	3.68**
(d) Others	99	3.93
(2) Departmental Assignment		
(a) Liberal Arts/Sciences	278	3.90*
(b) Professional Schools	156	3.96
(c) Others	31	4.21*
(3) Salary		
(a) \$10,000-\$25,000	141	3.80++
(b) \$26,000-\$30,000	168	3.88+
(c) Over \$30,000	157	4.12+,++
(4) Involvement in the Bargaining Process		
(a) No Involvement	289	4.04+
(b) Slightly Active	110	3.77+
(c) Active	41	3.70
(d) Very Active	28	3.90

Note: *: 0.05; +: .02; **: 0.05, ++: 0.001

(1) Membership on Governance Committee - as shown in Table XLI, significant difference at the $p < .005$ level was found between those

respondents reporting membership in the Faculty Academic Senate and the Rank and Tenure Committee. While the respondents who hold membership on a Faculty Academic Senate appear to disagree that bargaining has provided them with the opportunity to participate in the institution's educational policy decisions, members of Rank and Tenure Committee scores lie significantly closer to the "undecided" category on the Likert Scale ($Q = 3.38$).

(2) Departmental Assignment - In the subject institutions, faculty respondents with an appointment in a Liberal Arts/Sciences department disagreed less about the bargaining process as a positive factor in providing for their opportunity to determine educational policy than those faculty members with appointments in "other" departments in the university system.

(3) Involvement With Bargaining - A statistical significance of $p < .02$ was found between the sum variable, educational policies, and the two classifications of slightly active and no involvement that faculty members can select for their involvement in the institution's collective bargaining process. The respondents reporting a "no involvement" on the Likert Scale produced a mean score indicating more disagreement than their colleagues indicating some degree of involvement in the institution collective bargaining process. This difference was significant only for the "slightly active" group ($Q = 3.09$).

(4) Salary - The respondents reporting their academic year salaries between \$10,000 - \$30,000 statistically appear to disagree somewhat (but significantly) less about the opportunities that the bargaining process

has provided for determining the institution's educational policies, than the over \$30,000 group.

Hypothesis Four (H:4)

To further explore H:4, collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment, differences in subgroup sum score means were analyzed.

As illustrated in Table XLII, significant statistical differences were identified within the independent variables of respondents'

(1) age, (2) employing institution, (3) involvement in bargaining, and (4) salary.

(1) Age - The 60 and over respondents appear to perceive a statistically significant less frequent opportunity to determine the academic/personnel policies of their employment than do those aged 40-49 years. The other age groups (30-39 years, 50-59 years) fall in between these groups and do not statistically differ from either of the extremes. Overall, though, even the respondents in the 40-49 year age range lean more to the "infrequently" category than to the "frequently" option.

(2) Employing Institution - Faculty respondents' perceptions of academic collective bargaining as a process to provide for them the opportunity to determine academic policies on the average lie between "frequently" and "infrequently" and somewhat closer to the latter

characterization. A statistically significant difference was identified

TABLE XLII

SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS OF SUBGROUP MEANS FOR FACULTY
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AND ACADEMIC/PERSONNEL INTEREST ISSUES

Independent Variables	Academic/Personnel Interests	
	N	Average Scores
(1) Age		
(a) 30-39 years	27	2.78
(b) 40-49 years	156	2.70*
(c) 50-59 years	169	2.84
(d) 60-over	58	3.02*
(2) Employing Institution		
(a) Western Oregon State College	68	2.49++
(b) Southern Oregon State College	87	2.74
(c) Portland State University	225	2.92++
(3) Involvement in the Bargaining Process		
(a) No Involvement	289	3.00**,++
(b) Slightly Active	110	2.65**
(c) Active	41	2.34++
(d) Very Active	28	2.22++
(4) Salary		
(a) \$10,000-\$25,000	121	2.63++
(b) \$26,000-\$30,000	147	2.80
(c) Over \$30,000	139	2.97++

Note: *: .005; **: 0.002; ++: 0.001

at the $p < .001$ level for two of the subject institutions, Western Oregon State College and Portland State University, and the sum variable, academic/personnel policies. While Portland State University respondents lean closer to the "infrequently" category of the scale with a mean-score of 2.92, (vs. 3.00 for "infrequently") those respondents from Western Oregon State College lie almost exactly midway between the "frequent" and the "infrequent" categories with a mean-score of 2.49. No statistically significant difference was found for the Southern

Oregon State College respondents. However, their mean-score of 2.74, like that of Portland State University respondents, is closer to the "infrequent" category.

(3) Involvement In Bargaining - Statistically significant differences were identified between the amounts of involvement that faculty respondents select to have in their institution's bargaining process. While there was no significant difference between groups indicating at least "slight activity," increased levels of activity corresponded to increasing perceptions of "frequent" opportunities to determine the academic/personnel policies of their employment (see Table XLII). For the respondents selecting "no involvement" in the process, however, the process is perceived as "infrequently" providing those faculty members employed in their institutions with the opportunity to determine academic/personnel policies. The difference between this level of inactivity and all the other levels of activity ("slight to very") is statistically significant ($p < .002$).

(4) Salary - A significant statistical finding at the $p < .001$ level (See Table XLII) was identified between the two extreme levels of respondents' salary range. Those respondents in the salary range of over \$30,000 seem to perceive that the process has more "infrequently" assisted them with the opportunity to determine policy than their colleagues with salaries between \$10,000-\$25,000. However, their mean-scores are toward the "infrequent" category on the scale. While no significant difference was found for the respondents receiving an academic salary of \$26,000 - \$30,000, their mean-score of 2.80, like

those of the other two groups, is closer to the "infrequent" category of the 4-point scale.

Chapter V

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter V presents a brief summary of the study, the conclusions suggested from the results of the findings, and recommendations for further research.

Summary of the Study

In the 1960s, the contemporary American university system emerged as a powerful societal force, with economic and political influences, as well as concentrated resources and a multipurpose capacity (Kerr, 1963). During this period, faculty members were committed to the concept of shared authority as the governance mode for the higher education enterprise. However, it was a brief golden age for the traditional academic governance mode (Garbarino, 1975).

The mid-1960s brought a combination of external and internal contextual factors to the university system, which impacted upon the governance structure and function of the academy (Garbarino, 1975). In 1966, one consequence of these events was the entry of collective bargaining into the university system. It was a process that was not intended as an alternative to the traditional governance mode of the academy, but rather a supplemental mode to support the advancement of faculty governance rights (Polishook, 1982).

A dynamic social process grounded in the labor movement dating from the industrial revolution, academic collective bargaining, amid hostile

concerns and myths, has made enormous gains as a supplemental governance mode in the 4-year private and public institutions of higher education (Polishook, 1982). It is a growth that has been assured by a well-defined legal environment, which has established laws as the basis for federal and state sector employee negotiations (Hedgepeth, 1974).

Academic collective bargaining, as the mode of governance adopted by academicians to impose or reinstate independence into their professional lives, has been confirmed by the scholarly works of such educational analysts as Aussieker, Garbarino, Baldrige and Lee (Schulman, 1979). As Barbara A. Lee wrote in 1979:

Faculty as a whole gained formal governance powers through the union contract. Even on campuses where faculty have enjoyed considerable decision-making power, the contract legitimized and in many cases broadened the scope of faculty governance rights (Lee, 1979).

Therefore, the research question arises: Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education supported faculty members' rights for participation in institutional governance?

The purpose of this survey was to study select faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education to evaluate whether or not they perceive the process of collective bargaining as supportive of faculty members' rights to participate in institutional governance. To achieve the stated purpose, the following problems were investigated:

1. Have the professional interests of those academicians with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education been affirmed through the collective bargaining process?
2. Has collective bargaining provided for the academicians' participation in financial planning and policy-making related to their economic interests as employees of an Oregon 4-year institution of higher education?
3. Do faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate in determining those institutional educational policies related to academic issues?
4. Has the collective bargaining process provided the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment?

The population of the study consisted of 694 faculty members holding an academic appointment in one of Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions during the spring of 1984. Those faculty members selected for the study must (1) have held a full-time faculty appointment during the academic year, (2) have been employed in the present institution for a minimum of five years, and (3) have or be on a tenure track appointment in the department.

Data for the study were collected from the population using a 56 item research instrument entitled "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining as a Process Adopted in Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of

Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance," in three major areas: (1) Respondent Information, (2) Institutional Information, and (3) Institutional Governance Information.

Conclusions of the Study

Respondent Information

From the findings of the study, the results suggest that of those respondents holding an appointment in an Oregon 4-year unionized institution during the 1983-84 academic year: (1) the largest sub-group have taught in a 4-year institution of higher education between 16 and 20 years; (2) the majority do not hold membership in the American Association of University Professors (AAUP); (3) a large number elect to have no involvement in their institution's collective bargaining process; (4) the greatest percentage were in the 40-49 year age range at Southern Oregon College and Portland State University, while the greatest number at Western Oregon State College reported their ages in the 50-59 range; and (5) the salary range of \$26,000-\$30,000 was reported by the majority at Southern Oregon State College and Portland State University, with a majority reporting a salary in the \$21,000-\$25,000 range at Western Oregon State College.

Institutional Influences

The research data suggest that contextual factors influenced respondents in all three subject institutions to vote for a contract renewal in 1983. Those contextual factors included (1) funding,

(2) decision making processes/bodies, and (3) organizational changes.

1. Funding -- At all three institutions, respondents reported reduced funding specific to: (a) state legislative funds, and (b) Instructional funding required for the development of academic programs was perceived as a significant factor in their decision to vote.
- (2) Decision-Making -- Processes and decision making bodies related to the development of institutional educational policy at the state and departmental level of governance were identified as significant contextual factors to respondents at Portland State University and Southern Oregon State College. Furthermore, the data suggest faculty respondents at Portland State University and Western Oregon State College perceived a decline in their participation in policy-making decisions at a departmental level as a significant factor in their collective bargaining vote.
- (3) Organizational Changes -- Two organizational changes: (a) a new mission and goal statement, and (b) a new organizational structure were perceived by Western Oregon State College respondents as a significant factor in their decision to vote for the renewal of the institutional bargaining contract.

Hypotheses of the Study

For this study, it was hypothesized that collective bargaining would support the rights of faculty members with academic appointments

in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education to participate in institutional governance.

The research instrument, "A Questionnaire to Study Collective Bargaining As a Process Adopted In Oregon's 4-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Provide for Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance," was used to measure the faculty members' perception of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in their university system, specific to four dependent variables:

(1) professional interests, (2) economic interests, (3) educational policies, and (4) academic/personnel policies.

The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was used to test each of the four hypotheses of the study:

H:1 The collective bargaining process has affirmed the professional interests of the academicians with an appointment in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education.

H:2 Collective bargaining, as implemented in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education, has provided for the academicians' participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the economic interests of the institution.

H:3 Faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education participate in determining the institution's educational policy on academic issues.

H:4 Collective bargaining has provided the faculty members in Oregon's 4-year institutions of higher education with the

opportunity to participate in determining the academic and personnel policies of their employment.

Although statistically significant differences were found within each dependent variable subset of data, the four hypotheses of the study as stated are rejected. However, the results of the study suggest the following general conclusions specific to each of the data subsets.

Professional Interests

Respondents in the three subject institutions did not appear to perceive academic collective bargaining as supportive of their "professional interests." However, the data suggest respondents in all three subject institutions tend to agree the collective bargaining process has provided them with "a formalized structure and process for institutional decision-making." This is a very important result of academic collective bargaining, as identified by the scholarly works of Lee, 1979, Nelson, 1982, and Baldrige, 1982.

Economic Interests

The aggregate data suggest that the greater number of respondents do not agree that academic collective bargaining has provided for their participation in the planning and policy-making process related to the institution's economic interests. This perception is quite different, however, when viewed from the respondents' data as related to specific subject institutions. These findings lend this investigator to conclude:

- (a) The collective bargaining process is viewed by the majority of

respondents at Western Oregon State College as having provided an "increase in the importance of the budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and planning;"

- (b) A substantial number of respondents at Portland State University appear to perceive that the bargaining process has "clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education" for their institution; and
- (c) Academic collective bargaining, according to the survey data, is perceived by the Southern Oregon State College respondents as a supplemental governance mode that has facilitated the issue of institutional "economic interests." Data from these respondents suggest that the process has: (1) clarified the low salary schedules for those faculty respondents in Oregon's system of higher education, (2) increased the importance of the budgetary/financial affairs committee's roles in their university budget analysis and planning, and (3) strengthened their input into short-range planning. These respondents also identified the process as having: (1) assisted the faculty and administration to present a united agreement to the state legislature and, more importantly, (2) increased their salary and fringe benefits.

Educational Policies

Respondents at the three subject institutions do not agree that

academic collective bargaining has been/is necessary to provide for their rights as a faculty member to determine institutional educational policies for the academic issues of: (1) teaching, (2) programs, or (3) students.

Moreover, the respondents of these institutions suggest that these rights have been provided by either administrative rules or a faculty constitution prior to the adoption of collective bargaining.

Academic And Personnel Policies

While the data indicate that collective bargaining has not provided the faculty members with opportunities to determine the policies related to the academic duties or standards of teaching (1) assignments, (2) schedules, or (3) loads, the process has provided the faculty with the opportunity to make policy decisions for the two important issues of (1) dismissal for cause, and (2) grievance procedures. For the Oregon academicians, this is an important result of the bargaining process, as Barbara Lee in 1979 concluded from her study: "The single most significant effort of unionization was the promulgation of a formal grievance procedure" (Lee, 1979).

Recommendations

Suggested Further Research

Since the 1969 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education report was published, educational analysts have researched the multidimensional complexities of academic collective bargaining. From these studies,

scholars have confirmed the causes, effects, as well as the major trends of the process, as adopted by the university system (Lee, 1979; Baldrige, 1982).

This investigator, like other educational scholars, is convinced that additional research must be conducted in order to empirically test those collective bargaining issues in academia that are still only reasonable hypotheses (Spinard, 1984). Therefore, the following academic bargaining issues specific to (1) the Oregon system of higher education; and (2) an expanded academic population are suggested for future research.

Oregon System of Higher Education

Within the 4-year institutions of Oregon's higher educational system, the following research appears to be warranted.

First, research could be conducted to evaluate the perception of those faculty members employed in the three subject institutions who (1) have taught less than five years in a university system, (2) lack tenure, and/or (3) hold a lower academic rank. The perceptions of this faculty population about institutional governance might show a considerable difference from that of the respondents of this study. As the early research of Ladd and Lipset found:

Faculty employed in the lower tier of academia -- in terms of scholarly benefits, financial resources, and economic benefits -- and those who are in the lower ranks, lack tenure, and who are younger are much more likely to favor organized collective

action (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).

Second, the aggregate data of the study showed the greater number of respondents in the three subject institutions elect nonparticipation in the institutional bargaining process. However, this study found statistically significant differences between the degree of the respondents' involvement in the process and their perceptions of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode. Therefore, a question for further research could be, "If academic collective bargaining has been selected by the faculty members as a supplemental governance mode for the institution, why do they not elect to be an active participant in the process?"

Third, a major trend of academic collective bargaining has been to serve the economic concerns of the faculty. In addition, it should provide for faculty involvement in budgeting decisions, which are critical to assure the establishment of academic goals consistent with academic values (Mason, 1982). A study could be conducted that would compare those faculty members employed in Oregon's three unionized institutions with the faculty of the five non-unionized 4-year institutions on economic issues. More precisely, this study would focus on those issues specific to (1) salary and (2) budgetary planning of the institutions.

Fourth, this research study suggests that the Southern Oregon State College respondents appear to have a positive attitude toward academic collective bargaining as a facilitator of their rights to participate in the governance process. Southern Oregon State College respondents,

unlike those at Western Oregon State College and Portland State University, are represented by an independent bargaining agent. Therefore, a research study could be designed to study the question, "Do respondents' attitudes toward their bargaining agent influence their perceptions of academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode?"

Fifth, and of particular interest to the investigator, would be a study to identify those contextual factors, as well as the academic governance structures and relations, which influenced the faculty members at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University, in 1977 and 1983 respectively, to defeat a union coalition.

An Expanded Population

The investigator has extensively reviewed the literature in order to identify the scope of research that has been conducted on academic collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode. This study, like many reviewed, limits the survey to a specific geographical population. Therefore, it is recommended that this study be replicated using a larger number of 4-year institutions of higher education, in order to have more generalized data about faculty members' perceptions of academic collective bargaining to answer the research questions of the study: Has the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode supported faculty members' rights for participation in institutional governance?

Closing Summary

This chapter has provided a summary of the study, a discussion of the conclusions suggested from the findings of the study, specific to the three major areas of the research study: (1) respondent information, (2) institutional influences, and (3) institutional governance information. In addition, recommendations were made for further research to answer the question, Has academic collective bargaining, as a supplemental governance mode, supported faculty members' rights for participation in institutional governance?

To sum up, this investigator concurs with the statement of Ernest Benjamin, the new American Association of University Professors General Secretary, that:

Bargaining is not a substitute for governance. Rather, collective bargaining provides a foundation for the defense of governance as the tightened academic market both lessens the bargaining power of individual faculty and increases the pressure on administration to subordinate academic and external priorities. Faculty will continue to pursue -- through agreement, litigation, or legislation -- the right to bargain (Benjamin, 1984).

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Lee, B. (1983, October) [Telephone Interview with Barbara Lee,
Assistant Professor], Rutgers University.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

A Questionnaire to Study
Collective Bargaining As
A Process Adopted In Oregon's
Four-Year Institutions Of Higher
Education to Support Faculty Members
Participation in Institutional Governance

A. Faculty Questionnaire

I. Respondent Information

Please read each statement carefully. Check the answer(s) for each item as it best applies to you as a full-time faculty member in your university system during the 1983-1984 academic year.

1. How many years have you taught full time in a four-year institution of higher education?

a. 1-4 years	[]
b. 5-10 years	[]
c. 11-15 years	[]
d. 16-20 years	[]
e. 21-25 years	[]
f. Over 25 years	[]

2. Are you a member of AAUP? .

a. Yes	[]
b. No	[]

3. For the 1983-84 academic year indicate the range below for your 9 months salary

a. \$10 000-\$15 000	[]	e. \$31 000-\$35 000	[]
b. \$16 000-\$20 000	[]	f. \$36 000-\$40 000	[]
c. \$21 000-\$25 000	[]	g. Over \$40 000	[]
d. \$26 000-\$30 000	[]		

4. During the 1983-1984 academic year are you serving as a member of one or more of the university/departmental academic governing bodies listed below?

a. Faculty Academic Senate	[]
b. Finance Committee	[]
c. Rank and Tenure Committee	[]
d. Other policy-making Committee	Specify _____ []

5. What is your age range?

a. 20-29	[]
b. 30-39	[]
c. 40-49	[]
d. 50-59	[]
e. 60 or above	[]

6. How involved have you been with the collective bargaining process in your institution?

a. Slightly active	[]
b. Active	[]
c. Very active	[]
d. No involvement	[]

II Institutional Influences

Listed below are factors that might influence a faculty member to select collective bargaining. Please read each statement carefully. Decide whether you strongly agree, agree, are undecided, disagree or strongly disagree that the factor raised below influenced you as a faculty member to vote for the renewal of the collective bargaining contract for your institution in June of 1983.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Unde- cided	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree
7 The institution was experiencing a decline in student enrollment	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
8. State legislature funding was reduced for your institution.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
9 Federal funds appropriated for research have been reduced.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
10 The structural size of the institution had grown rapidly during the preceding five years	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
11. Limited institutional funds have decreased the development of academic programs.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
12 The central administration had experienced a reduced autonomy in policy-making decisions for the institution.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
13 The educational policy decision-making rights of the institution's central administration were controlled by the state educational agency	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
14 The faculty academic senate/council has become less effective as a governance body	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
15 There was a decline in the faculty members influence on policy decision-making at the departmental level.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
16. There was a reduced sense of collegiality among the faculty	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
17 Student power has increased on the campus	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
18. The institution has developed and implemented a new mission and goal statements	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
19. The institution has designed and implemented a new organizational structure.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

III Institutional Governance InformationA Professional Interests

Please read each statement carefully. Decide whether you strongly agree, agree, are undecided, disagree or strongly disagree that academic collective bargaining has provided you with:

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Unde- cided	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree
20	An academic milieu supportive of the intellectual pursuit of scholarship	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
21	A collegial relationship with administration	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
22	A formalized structure and process for institutional decision-making	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
23	A professional rather than employee status to their role in the institution	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
24	An increased interest in the function and role of the faculty senate/council	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
25	An influence in setting institutional standards for academic performance	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
26	Involvement in the selection process for the appointment of an administrator to a central or departmental administrative position.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
27	The right to participation in policy making on educational issues that have the potential to affect public opinion about the institution	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

B Economic Interests

Please read each statement carefully. Decide if you strongly agree, agree, are undecided, disagree or strongly disagree that in your institution the collective bargaining process has:

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Unde- cided	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree
28	Provided you with a high public profile re- garding budgetary issues in Oregon's system of higher education.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
29	Clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
30	Increased the importance of the budgetary/ financial affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and planning	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
31	Strengthened your input into short-range uni- versity budget planning and decision-making	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
32	Provided for your input into the long-range budgetary planning model of the university	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
33	Encouraged the university budgetary affairs committee to link university budget planning to the identified institution's academic goals	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
34	Assisted the faculty and administration to present a united agreement to the state legis- lature	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
35	Generated additional money for the university faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
36	Increased your salary and fringe benefits package in the university system	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

C Educational Policies

Please decide if you strongly agree agree are undecided disagree or strongly disagree that collective bargaining has provided you with an opportunity to determine educational policies related to the following academic issues:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Unde- cided	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree
37. Admission Standards	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
38. Curriculum Content	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
39. Degree Requirements	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
40. Grading Standards	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
41. Standards for Student Conduct and Discipline	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
42. Types of Degrees Offered	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
43. Establishment of Educational Programs	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

D Academic and Personnel Policies

Listed below are academic and personnel policies which AAUP believes faculty members should govern. Please decide if collective bargaining has provided the faculty members employed in your institution with the opportunity to always frequently infrequently or never participate in determining policies related to the following issues:

1 Academic Duties

	Always	Frequently	Infrequently	Never
44. Teaching Assignment	[]	[]	[]	[]
45. Teaching Schedule	[]	[]	[]	[]
46. Teaching Loads	[]	[]	[]	[]

2 Academic Standards/Personnel Policies for

47. Faculty Recruitment	[]	[]	[]	[]
48. Faculty Promotion	[]	[]	[]	[]
49. Faculty Tenure	[]	[]	[]	[]
50. Academic Freedom	[]	[]	[]	[]
51. Dismissal for Cause (Just Cause)	[]	[]	[]	[]
52. Salary Scale	[]	[]	[]	[]
53. Fringe Benefits	[]	[]	[]	[]
54. Grievance Procedures	[]	[]	[]	[]

3 Support Services

55. Office Space	[]	[]	[]	[]
56. Secretarial Help	[]	[]	[]	[]

Thank you very much for participating in this research study. Would you like to receive an abstract of the study?

/ / Yes / / No

APPENDIX B

FINDINGS SPECIFIC TO THE 1969 CARNEGIE COMMISSION
ON HIGHER EDUCATION SURVEY

FACULTY ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND UNIONISM,
BY PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND REWARDS; AS
PERCENTAGES OF *n* (LADD AND LIPSET, 1973).

The 1969 Survey

	<i>Disagree, no place on campus for faculty collective bargaining</i>	<i>Agree, faculty strikes can be legitimate action</i>
<i>All faculty</i> (60,028 respondents)	59	47
<i>Quality of school at which professor teaches*</i>		
A (elite) (n = 19,089)	53	49
B (n = 25,224)	55	44
C (n = 13,110)	60	44
D (lowest tier) (n = 2,580)	67	52
<i>Type of institution</i>		
university (n = 44,871)	54	46
four-year college (n = 13,020)	61	46
two-year college (n = 2,133)	67	49
<i>Tenure</i>		
tenured faculty (n = 29,853)	54	41
untentured faculty (n = 26,766)	64	53
<i>Received research grants, last 12 months</i>		
yes [received grant(s)] (n = 27,966)	54	49
no (n = 29,778)	61	47
<i>Salary</i>		
over \$20,000 (n = 6,420)	45	38
\$14,000 - \$20,000 (n = 15,567)	52	42
\$10,000 - \$14,000 (n = 21,417)	59	47
under \$10,000 (n = 15,312)	66	51
<i>Age</i>		
60 years and older (n = 4,398)	45	30
50-59 (n = 9,408)	53	35
40-49 (n = 16,113)	57	44
30-39 (n = 20,580)	62	52
under 30 (n = 8,607)	68	60

APPENDIX C

HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REVIEW
COMMITTEE APPROVAL LETTER

HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REVIEW COMMITTEE
1982-83

TO: Patricia Chadwick - ED

FROM: Robert Holloway, Chairperson

In accordance with your request, the Human Subjects Research Review Committee has reviewed your proposal entitled, "Collective Bargaining: A Process Adopted by Oregon's Four-Year Institutions of Higher Education..." for compliance with DHEW policies and regulations on the protection of human subjects.

The committee is satisfied that your provisions for protecting the rights and welfare of all subjects participating in the research are adequate and therefore the project is approved. Any conditions relative to this approval are noted below.

Conditions: NONE

cc: Office of Graduate Studies and Research

APPENDIX D

DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION LETTER FROM THE OFFICE
OF INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH OFFICE AT
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY

May 17, 1984

PORTLAND
STATE
UNIVERSITY
p o box 751
portland, oregon
97207

office of
institutional
research
503. 229-3432

Pat Chadwick, Dean
School of Nursing
University of Portland
5000 N. Willamette Blvd.
Portland, Oregon 97203

Dear Dean Chadwick:

Attached are the lists of faculty from Portland State University, Southern Oregon State College, and Western Oregon State College, which you requested for use in gathering data for your doctoral dissertation. The criteria which were used in selecting faculty for the lists are as follows:

- Hire date (Personnel Data Base element #27) prior to 12/31/78
- Holds an academic appointment for FY 83-84 at a total FTE .50 or greater (PDB element #44)
- Is on an annual tenure (tenure-track) or indefinite tenure appointment (PDB element #56)

The data base used for selection was extracted from the November 8, 1983 payroll tapes for the subject institutions and is the same data base which was provided to those institutions for purposes of EEO-6 reporting for Fall 1983.

Please call me if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Mary F. Ricks
Research Assistant

MFR:gh

Enclosures

xc: James H. Beaird, Provost
Western Oregon State College

Ernest E. Ettlich, Dean of Acad. Affairs
Southern Oregon State College

Don E. Gardner, Director
Office of Institutional Research
Portland State University

APPENDIX E

INSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL LETTERS FOR DATA COLLECTION

WOSC

Office of the Provost

RECEIVED BY OFFICE OF
154

INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH

May 11, 1984

Mr. Don Gardner
Director
Office of Institutional Research
Portland State University
P. O. Box 751
Portland, OR 97207

Dear Mr. Gardner:

This will authorize you to select a sample of
WOSC faculty from institutional tapes for use by
Ms. Pat Chadwick in her doctoral dissertation regarding
collective bargaining.

Sincerely,

James H. Beaird
Provost

JHB/tn

Western Oregon State College
Monmouth, Oregon 97361
(503) 838-1220 Ext. 271

SOUTHERN OREGON
STATE COLLEGE

ASHLAND, OREGON 97520

RECEIVED BY OFFICE OF

155

MAY 4 1984

INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH
DEAN OF ACADEMIC AFFAIRS
(303) 422-4135

May 10, 1984

Mr. Don Gardner
Director of Institutional Research
Portland State University
302 University Services Building
Portland OR 97207

Dear Mr. Gardner:

Professor Walt Ellis called on May 9 asking permission for a random structured sample of our faculty to be drawn for a study being conducted in education. Pat Chadwick will be doing a dissertation under Professor Ellis which deals with faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining.

This letter is to grant permission for such a structured sample to be taken while protecting the confidential elements within the personnel files and tapes.

I would appreciate receiving a copy of the results of the study when Ms. Chadwick has completed it.

Cordially,

Ernest E. Ettlich
Dean of Academic Affairs

pkj

APPENDIX F

APPEAL LETTER TO SUBJECTS FOR WAVE
ONE OF THE DATA COLLECTION

PORTLAND
STATE
UNIVERSITY

157

P.O. BOX 751
PORTLAND, OREGON
97207

May 18, 1984

I am writing to request your participation in my doctoral dissertation research. The study has been approved by the University Human Subjects Research Review Committee and by my dissertation committee chaired by Dr. Walter G. Ellis, Professor of Public Administration.

The purpose of the research study is to evaluate whether or not the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of Oregon's four-year institutions of higher education has provided support for faculty members to participate in institutional governance. Selected faculty members with academic appointments at Portland State University, Southern Oregon State College, and Western Oregon State College are being asked to participate in the study.

Please take 15 minutes to complete and return the enclosed questionnaire by May 31, 1984, in the stamped, self-addressed envelope. All the information which you provide in response to the questionnaire, will be kept confidential and anonymous. The numbers on the upper right-hand corner of the questionnaire represent a code, which will be used only to enable a follow-up on unreturned questionnaires.

I realize that this is a very busy time in the academic year; however, your response will assist in my research and hopefully add to the evaluation of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in the Oregon university system of higher education.

If you have any questions or concerns about the questionnaire or the study, please call me at 283-7211. Thank you in advance for your time and assistance with this doctoral research study.

Sincerely,

Patricia L. Chadwick

Patricia L. Chadwick
Doctoral Candidate
School of Education

Walter G. Ellis
Walter G. Ellis, Ph.D.
Professor of Public Administration
Dissertation Committee Chairperson

PLC:bcbb Enclosure

APPENDIX G

FOLLOW-UP APPEAL MATERIAL TO SUBJECTS FOR WAVES
TWO AND THREE OF THE DATA COLLECTION

May 28, 1984

Dear Professor:

This past week , I wrote to request your participation in my doctoral dissertation research. The study is designed to evaluate collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode in the Oregon university system of higher education.

As you plan your week of May 28, 1984, will you please allow 15 minutes in your schedule to complete the questionnaire for the study? Thank you.

Patricia L. Chadwick
Doctoral Candidate
School of Education
Portland State University

PORTLAND
STATE
UNIVERSITY

160

P.O. BOX 751
PORTLAND, OREGON
97207

June 4, 1984

Dear

Two weeks ago, I wrote to request your participation in my doctoral dissertation research. The study has been designed to evaluate whether or not the adoption of collective bargaining as a supplemental governance mode by three of Oregon's four-year institutions of higher education has provided support for faculty members to participate in institutional governance.

To date, I have not received your completed questionnaire; therefore, I would like to once again appeal for your participation in my study.

For your convenience, I am sending a new copy of the questionnaire, as well as a stamped, self-addressed envelope. The questionnaire will take approximately 15 minutes of your time to complete. All the information which you provide in response to the questionnaire, will be kept confidential and anonymous.

If you have any questions about the study, please call me at 283-7211 or my dissertation committee chairperson, Dr. Walter G. Ellis, Professor of Public Administration at 229-3920.

Thank you for considering my request to participate in this doctoral research study.

Sincerely,

Patricia L. Chadwick
Patricia L. Chadwick
Doctoral Candidate
School of Education
Portland State University

PLC:bcbb

Enclosures

APPENDIX H

RESPONDENT CODEBOOK FOR THE (SPSS_X) DATA ANALYSIS

Respondent Codebook - Collective Bargaining As A Process Adopted
in Oregon's Four-Year Institutions of Higher Education to Support
Faculty Members' Participation in Institutional Governance

CARD	COLUMNS	QUESTION	VARIABLE	CODE
1	1	A		
	2-4	B	Respondent ID #	Put Number
	5	C	Institution	1...WOSC 2...SOSC 3...PSU
	6	D	School/Department of Appointment	1...Liberal Arts Department/College 2...College of Liberal Arts & Sciences 3...Professional School 4...Others
	7-8	E	Date of Response	Year - 84 9 - No Response
	9-10			Month - 05 May 06 June 07 July 08 August 9 - No Response
	11-12			Date - 01-31 9 - No Response
	13	F	Response Received With:	1...First Wave 2...Second Wave 3...Third Wave 4 - No Response
	14	G	Academic Rank	1...Professor 2...Associate Professor 3...Assistant Professor 4...Instructor 5...No Rank
	15	1	Full-Time Teaching	1...1-4 years 2...5-10 years 3...11-15 years 4...16-20 years 5...21-25 years 6...Over 25 years 9...No Response
	16	2	AAUP Membership	1...Yes 2...No 9...No Response
	17	3	1983-1984 Academic Year 9 mo. Salary	1...10,000-15,000 2...16,000-20,000 3...21,000-25,000 4...26,000-30,000 5...31,000-35,000 6...36,000-40,000 7...Over 40,000 9...No Response

CARD	COLUMNS	QUESTION	VARIABLE	CODE
1	18	4	1983-1984 Academic	1...Faculty Academic Senate 2...Finance 3...Rank & Tenure 4...Others 9...No Response
	19	5	Age Range	1...20-29 2...30-39 3...40-49 4...50-59 5...60 or above 9...No Response
	20	6	Involvement With Collective Bargaining	1...Slightly Active 2...Active 3...Very Active 4...No involvement 9...No Response
	21	7	Decline In Student Enrollment	1...Strongly Agree 2...Agree 3...Undecided 4...Disagree 5...Strongly Disagree 9...No Response
	22	8	Reduced State Funding	Code same as 7
	23	9	Reduced Federal Research Funding	Code same as 7
	24	10	Rapid Five-Year Institutional Growth	Code same as 7
	25	11	Decreased Development of Academic Programs Due to Funding	Code same as 7
	26	12	Reduced Central Admin- istration's Autonomy in Policy-Making	Code same as 7
	27	13	Increased Control of Educational Policy- Making by State Edu- cation Agency	Code same as 7
	28	14	Academic Senate/Council Governance Effective- ness	Code same as 7
	29	15	Reduced Faculty Members' Influence on Depart- mental Level Policy- Making	Code same as 7
	30	16	Reduced Faculty Colle- geality	Code same as 7
	31	17	Increased Student Power	Code same as 7
	32	18	New Instructional Mis- sion and Goal State- ments	Code same as 7

CARD	COLUMNS	QUESTION	VARIABLE	CODE
1	33	19	New Instructional Organizational Structure	Code same as 7
	34	20	Academic Milieu Supportive of Scholarship	Code same as 7
	35	21	Collegial Relationship with Administration	Code same as 7
	36	22	Formal Decision-Making Structure/Process	Code same as 7
	37	23	Professional Status Role	Code same as 7
	38	24	Increased Interest in the Faculty Senate/Council	Code same as 7
	39	25	Influence in Setting Standards for Academic Performance	Code same as 7
	40	26	Involvement in the Administrative Position Selection Process	Code same as 7
	41	27	Participation in Educational Policy Issues	Code same as 7
	42	28	High Public Profile Regarding Budgetary Issues	Code same as 7
	43	29	Clarification of Low Faculty Salary Schedule	1...Strongly Agree 2...Agree 3...Undecided 4...Disagree 5...Strongly Disagree 9...No Response
	44	30	Importance of a Budgetary/Financial Committee in University Analysis/Planning	Code same as 29
	45	31	Input into Short-Range Budgetary Planning	Code same as 29
	46	32	Input into the Long Range Budgetary Planning Model	Code same as 29
	47	33	Linkage of University Budgetary Planning to Academic Goals	Code same as 29
	48	34	United Faculty & Administration Budgetary Agreement to State Legislature	Code same as 29

CARD	COLUMNS	QUESTION	VARIABLE	CODE
1	49	35	Increased Funding for the Faculty Salary Schedule	Code same as 29
	50	36	Increased Faculty Salary and Fringe Benefit Packages	Code same as 29
	51	37	Admission Standards	Code same as 29
	52	38	Curriculum Content	Code same as 29
	53	39	Degree Requirements	Code same as 29
	54	40	Grading Standards	Code same as 29
	55	41	Standards for Student Conduct/Discipline	Code same as 29
	56	42	Types of Degrees Offered	Code same as 29
	57	43	Establishment of Edu- cational Program	Code same as 29
	58	44	Teaching Assignment	1...Always 2...Frequently 3...Infrequently 4...Never 9...No Response
	59	45	Teaching Schedule	Code same as 44
	60	46	Teaching Load	Code same as 44
	61	47	Faculty Recruitment	Code same as 44
	62	48	Faculty Promotion	Code same as 44
	63	49	Faculty Tenure	Code same as 44
	64	50	Academic Freedom	Code same as 44
	65	51	Dismissal for Just Cause	Code same as 44
	66	52	Salary Scale	Code same as 44
	67	53	Fringe Benefits	Code same as 44
	68	54	Grievance Procedures	Code same as 44
	69	55	Office Space	Code same as 44
	70	56	Secretarial Help	Code same as 44
	71	57	Abstract Request	1...Yes 2...No 9...No Response

APPENDIX I

TABLE XXIV: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL
INFLUENCES RELATED TO THE DECISION-MAKING TO
VOTE FOR A 1983 CONTRACT RENEWAL

TABLE XXIV
FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL
INFLUENCES RELATED TO THEIR DECISION-MAKING
TO VOTE FOR A 1983 CONTRACT RENEWAL

Institutional Influences	Frequency				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)	<u>N</u> (%)
Statements					
7. The institution was experiencing a decline in student enrollment.	26 (6.2%)	109 (26.0%)	66 (15.8%)	132 (31.5%)	86 (20.5%)
8. State legislative funding was reduced for your institution.	157 (37.1%)	168 (39.2%)	30 (7.1%)	40 (9.5%)	28 (6.6%)
9. Federal funding appropriated for research have been reduced.	32 (7.6%)	88 (21.0%)	111 (26.5%)	114 (27.2%)	74 (17.7%)
10. The structural size of the institution had grown rapidly during the preceding fiscal year.	16 (3.9%)	62 (15.1%)	81 (19.7%)	152 (36.9%)	101 (24.5%)
11. Limited institutional funds have decreased the development of academic programs.	125 (29.6%)	177 (41.8%)	47 (11.1%)	48 (11.4%)	26 (6.2%)
12. The central administration had experienced a reduced autonomy in policy-making decisions for the institution.	35 (8.4%)	93 (22.5%)	107 (25.7%)	118 (28.3%)	64 (15.4%)
13. The educational policy decision-making rights of the institution's central administration were controlled by the state educational agency.	48 (11.5%)	124 (29.6%)	98 (23.4%)	107 (25.5%)	42 (10.0%)
14. The faculty academic senate/council has become less effective as a governance body.	59 (14.0%)	149 (35.4%)	76 (18.1%)	102 (24.2%)	35 (8.3%)
15. There was a decline in the faculty members' influence on policy-making decisions at the departmental level.	71 (16.9%)	127 (30.2%)	41 (9.7%)	128 (30.4%)	54 (12.8%)
16. There was a reduced sense of collegiality among the faculty.	72 (17.1%)	148 (35.1%)	61 (14.5%)	99 (23.5%)	42 (10.0%)
17. Student power has increased on the campus.	2 (0.5%)	43 (10.2%)	70 (16.6%)	198 (47.0%)	108 (25.7%)

Table XXIV (continued)

Institutional Influences	Frequency				
	Strongly Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Undecided <u>N</u> (%)	Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	Strongly Disagree <u>N</u> (%)
Statements					
18. The institution has developed and implemented a new mission and goal statement.	12 (2.9%)	96 (22.9%)	112 (26.7%)	135 (32.2%)	61 (15.3%)
19. The institution has designed and implemented a new organizational structure.	25 (6.0%)	125 (29.9%)	102 (24.4%)	111 (26.6%)	55 (13.2%)

APPENDIX J

TABLE XXX: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON THEIR PROFESSIONAL
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

TABLE XXX

FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING'S IMPACT ON THEIR PROFESSIONAL
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

		Frequency					
Institutional Governance Professional Interests		Strongly Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Agree <u>N</u> (%)	Unde- cided <u>N</u> (%)	Dis- agree <u>N</u> (%)	Strongly Disagree <u>N</u> (%)	Total Respondents
20.	An academic milieu supportive of the intellectual pursuit of scholarship.	12 (2.5%)	87 (18.3%)	85 (17.9%)	184 (38.7%)	107 (22.5%)	475
21.	A collegial relationship with administration.	11 (2.3%)	80 (16.7%)	67 (14.0%)	202 (42.3%)	118 (24.7%)	478
22.	A formalized structure and process for institutional decision-making.	52 (11.0%)	174 (36.7%)	78 (16.5%)	119 (25.1%)	51 (10.8%)	474
23.	A professional, rather than employee, status to their role in the institution.	19 (4.1%)	93 (20.0%)	85 (18.3%)	145 (31.2%)	123 (26.5%)	465
24.	An increased interest in the function and role of the faculty senate/council.	14 (2.9%)	104 (21.9%)	81 (17.0%)	181 (38.0%)	96 (20.2%)	476
25.	An influence in setting institutional standards for academic performance.	18 (3.8%)	117 (24.5%)	87 (18.2%)	162 (34.0%)	93 (19.5%)	477
26.	Involvement in the selection process for the appointment of an administrator to a central or departmental administrative position.	21 (4.4%)	95 (20.0%)	81 (17.1%)	176 (37.1%)	101 (21.3%)	474
27.	The right to participation in policy making on educational issues that have the potential to affect public opinion about the institution.	28 (5.9%)	122 (25.6%)	90 (18.9%)	153 (32.1%)	84 (17.6%)	477

APPENDIX K

TABLE XXXII: FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT
OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON ECONOMIC
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

TABLE XXXII
FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING'S IMPACT ON ECONOMIC
INTERESTS IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

		Frequency					
Institutional Governance		Strongly Agree	Agree	Unde- cided	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree	Total Respondents
Economic Interests		N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	
28.	Provided you with a high public profile regarding budgetary issues in Oregon's system of higher education.	19 (4.0%)	107 (22.7%)	81 (17.2%)	193 (41.0%)	71 (15.1%)	476
29.	Clarified the problem of a low faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education.	46 (9.7%)	169 (35.7%)	59 (12.5%)	135 (28.5%)	65 (13.7%)	474
30.	Increased the importance of the budgetary/financial affairs committee's role in university budget analysis and planning.	16 (3.4%)	150 (31.8%)	137 (29.0%)	129 (27.3%)	40 (8.5%)	472
31.	Strengthened your input into short-range university budget planning and decision-making.	15 (3.2%)	116 (24.6%)	86 (18.2%)	183 (38.8%)	72 (15.3%)	472
32.	Provided for your input into the long-range budgetary planning model of the university.	12 (2.6%)	100 (21.2%)	116 (24.6%)	164 (34.8%)	79 (16.8%)	471
33.	Encouraged the university budgetary affairs committee to link university budget planning to the identified institution's academic goals.	13 (2.8%)	94 (20.1%)	158 (33.8%)	140 (29.9%)	63 (13.5%)	468
34.	Assisted the faculty and administration to present a united agreement to the state legislature.	23 (4.8%)	138 (20.1%)	119 (25.1%)	128 (27.0%)	67 (14.1%)	475
35.	Generated additional money for the university faculty salary schedule in Oregon's system of higher education.	8 (1.7%)	64 (13.5%)	73 (15.4%)	192 (40.6%)	136 (28.8%)	473
36.	Increased your salary and fringe benefits package in the university system.	18 (3.8%)	110 (23.2%)	73 (15.4%)	146 (30.8%)	127 (26.8%)	474