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De Gaulle and Franco-German relations, 1945-1965

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Mary Ann Shumway for the MAT in HISTORY
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Title DE GAULLE AND FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1945-1965

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The dismemberment and reparations policy France followed at the end of World War II as an occupying power in Germany was a traditional approach of the victor to the vanquished. The Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland were the borderlands long in dispute. One new element was the idea that while demanding these territories, an attempt at national rapprochement could be carried on through educational measures. For many Germans the University at Mainz did not balance the dismantled factories.

This postwar period was characterized by European economic ills. The 1947 Marshall Plan, an American approach to restore Europe to economic health through cooperative effort, was inaugurated. It stimulated the European integration movement which flourished during the 1950's. The 1948 Council of Europe had not lived up to expectations, in the eyes of European federalists, but the next try, the European Coal and Steel Community, (1952) proved a lusty

child of the functionalist movement. When the European Defense Community died, (1954) it embittered Franco-German relations for a while. The European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community completed the European Community in 1958. Through the organizations for economic integration, France and Germany have, in spite of disputes and crises, been able to compromise many divergent drives in the interest of restoring Europe to full economic capacity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (1949) which originated as a joint military defense and symbolized Western unity in the face of Soviet aggression, became a seedbed of discord between France and Germany.

When General de Gaulle became president in 1958, he pursued an active policy of rapprochement with Adenauer's Federal German Republic seeking to establish a Paris-Bonn axis on which to base French leadership in the European Community. As leader of a West European bloc independent of the United States, France would hold that place in the first rank of nations that de Gaulle believed she must have. Chancellor Adenauer cooperated with the French president because he believed a tightly knit European group would benefit German interests. The high point in Franco-German rapprochement occurred in 1962 during the summer exchange of state visits, but by the time the Treaty was signed and ratified, (1963) the tone of Franco-German relations had changed.

Disagreements on military policies in NATO, on political developments in the European Community, and on agricultural policies in EEC, all reached serious proportions at the time that Chancellor Erhard took office in 1963. The Erhard government's shift of emphasis from a Europe focused on France to the Atlantic alliance focused on the United States led President de Gaulle to consider a new policy to replace Franco-German rapprochement which had been his primary strategy until 1963. Franco-Russian relations became noticeably warmer after the extension of long term credits by France to the Soviet Union. Germany protested this new turn in French policy. A closer French-Russian relationship may add to the discord which cooled the Franco-German accord of 1962.

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DE GAULLE AND FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1945-1965

by

MARY ANN SHUMWAY

A THESIS

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degree of

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DE GAULLE AND FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1945-1965

I. INTRODUCTION

France and Germany are major pillars of Western European strength. Their relationship to each other is significant in determining the course of European history. France entrusted the guidance of that relationship to Charles de Gaulle when he became President of the Fifth French Republic in 1958. The seven years of his term in office saw major shifts in Franco-German relations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the developments that took place during this time in order to understand how and why this relationship progressed as it did.

However, no period in history is a self-contained unit. The events of the post World War II era were extremely influential in establishing de Gaulle's world. He had to deal with trends begun before he came to office. The organizations which promoted close contact with Germany were shaped under the Fourth Republic. The foreign policies which set the tone of Franco-German relations were formulated by his predecessors. The new president had to accept, adapt, or reject policies already in operation as well as originate his own.

II. POSTWAR YEARS: 1945-1958

At the end of World War II France was in a difficult position. The military defeat of 1940 had shown that she was unable to defend herself against German armies. The foreign occupation, endured until almost the end of the war, had exhausted the French economy. The relatively minor role France played in the allied victory did not reinstate her as a great power.¹ When Charles de Gaulle came to power briefly at the end of World War II, he set forth three goals for French foreign policy: military security, economic recovery, and great power status. Throughout most of the Fourth Republic, the first two goals were the main objectives of the French government.

To attain military security, the threat of Germany had to be destroyed. In August 1945, General de Gaulle told President Truman of the French demands for a dismembered and demilitarized Germany. The Saar was to become French property; the Ruhr was to be detached from Germany and put under international control, to be used to benefit Germany's neighbors. The Rhineland was to be prevented from ever becoming an invasion route to France; Germany would be demilitarized. In order to prevent the rise of another militant Germany, Nazi ideas were to be eliminated through the stressing of democratic principles in German schools.

¹Stanley Hoffman, In Search of France (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), 319.

The German government would be reorganized in a democratic form.¹

The political situation changed rapidly after de Gaulle made clear the French position regarding Germany. The cold war caused the United States and Britain to look on West Germany as a potential ally against the Soviet Union. They combined their occupation zones and began to plan what became the central governmental institutions of a future Germany. Throughout 1945 and 1946, France consistently rejected the trend toward centralization for Germany. She feared that accepting centralized institutions would also mean accepting the existing boundaries of Germany and thus force her to relinquish claims to the Saar and the Ruhr.² Centralization of German institutions would also mean interference in how France ran her zone of occupied Germany. Since France intended to achieve part of her economic security through exploitation of her occupation zone, she fought centralizing measures. In the search for French economic security, exploitation of the occupation zone was an expediency. Long range plans were aimed at bolstering the French economy through possession of the Saar's coal and access to the Ruhr and Rhineland industries.³

Unexpectedly, a basis for a Franco-German

¹F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 15.

²Ibid., 29. ³Ibid., 32.

rapprochement was laid in the French occupation zone at the same time that France was pursuing a policy of exploitation and reparations. This was the educational program instituted by France, ranging from reforms in the German primary schools to the foundation of the new University of Mainz. Youth programs of religious and political organizations were encouraged and many contacts between French and German youth were sponsored by the government to revive a German admiration for French civilization.¹

The third goal of French foreign policy set by de Gaulle in 1944 lay dormant during most of the Fourth Republic, being revived only during its later years. General de Gaulle had set the keynote of the search for a return to great power status for France when he said France must "resume a place in the first rank" and "maintain it." He had hoped to achieve this first rank through accord with the Soviet Union, but the opposition of the Soviet Union to French representation in the German occupation ended French hopes of a Franco-Russian alliance. Even the role of a third party mediator between East and West was precluded by the Russian attitude. France had refused to join her zone with those of Britain and the United States, had accepted Germany's Eastern frontiers, had included the Soviet Union on French plans for the internationalization of the Ruhr,

¹Ibid., 46. ²Hoffman, 335.

but all this failed to earn Russian gratitude and cooperation as the French had hoped. Britain and the United States indicated their willingness to cooperate with French designs, but the Soviet Union refused, though the French Communist Party supported France's program.¹ When French bids for great power status failed, and French hopes for economic and military security through exploitation of Germany faded, a new policy had to be developed.

American action provided direction for a new French approach to relations with Germany. On April 12, 1947, Walter Lippmann published an article, "Cassandra Speaking," in which he warned that "The truth is that political and economic measures for American aid to Europe on a scale which no responsible statesman has yet ventured to hint at will be needed in the next year or so."² As if in fulfillment of this prophecy, General George Marshall, in June 1947, proposed a plan for American aid to reconstruct Europe. Marshall Plan aid was to make France no longer dependent on the exploitation of Germany.³

Another factor which caused France to change her policy toward Germany was a growing apprehension of the Soviet Union.

¹Willis, 42.

²Herbert Luethy, France Against Herself (New York: Meridian Books Inc., 1955), 353.

³Willis, 29.

Some developments which indicated that prospective danger lay with Russia rather than Germany were the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and the Russian refusal of Marshall Plan aid. These events persuaded France to accept the London Agreements of July 1948. These agreements denied most of France's original claims in Germany. Instead of a permanently internationalized Ruhr, the temporary International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) was established; in place of a separate occupation zone, a delayed fusion with the combined British and American zones was arranged; and in lieu of a decentralized German government, a tight federation was provided. Although the French position on the Saar was recognized, no provision for the Rhineland was made.

The major problem facing the Fourth Republic was economic recovery. The Marshall Plan provided France with a new method to achieve this. Not only was money made available to reconstruct Europe's economy, but the Plan demanded that the European countries participating must practice close economic cooperation. In a speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, General Marshall insisted that economic recovery is "the business of the Europeans. The initiative . . . must come from Europe. . . . The program should be a joint one agreed to by a number, if not all European nations."

¹Ibid., 23.

²Eugene W. Castle, The Great Giveaway (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957), 4.

The Europeans were to work out production levels to be achieved for the next four years and decide how much would be needed to make up the difference between what could be earned by the European exports and what had to be expended for European economic recovery. The preamble of the congressional act which made General Marshall's proposal law stated specifically that the purpose of the act was to encourage European integration.¹ This American stimulus to European unity boosted the spirits of the "Europeans" who worked and hoped for a United States of Europe. By this means the focus of French foreign policy became European unification.

At first, the French had a very broad concept of the Europe which unification would encompass. The foreign ministers of Great Britain and France, Bevin and Bidault respectively, invited first Soviet foreign minister Molotov, and then every other European foreign minister to confer with them on the best way to grasp the initiative which General Marshall offered.² The refusal of the Soviet Union and of the other East European countries to accept Marshall Plan aid limited partners available for the European movement to the nations of Western Europe. The next call to European unity was an invitation issued by enthusiastic European federalists to the beneficiaries of the Marshall

¹Anthony Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 16.

²Ibid.

Plan to form the Council of Europe.

European federalists hoped thereby to start a political integration of Europe. The Council was to be the future parliament of a United States of Europe, but Britain vetoed any proposal that would make the Council anything stronger than a consultative body.¹ In doing so, she further narrowed the French choice of partners for a truly integrated Europe. The only other country of comparable size and resources with which France could align herself was West Germany.

Before France and Germany could form the hub of a unified Western Europe, old French demands had to be abandoned. However, many Frenchmen, even as late as November 1950, were not reconciled to the thought of relinquishing claims on the Saar or further reparations. France showed her reluctance by at first opposing the Petersberg Protocol which admitted Germany to the Council of Europe, diminished the dismantling of German factories, gave the Germans a voice in the IAR, and granted Germany Marshall Plan aid. Since most of the dismantling had been in the French zone for export to France, it is not surprising that French industrialists objected.² At the same time approximately that French businessmen and industrialists were required to accept the Petersberg Protocol, they were presented with a whole new outlook on France's relationship to Germany by French

¹Ibid., 26. ²Willis, 67.

functionalists. Functionalists aimed at attaining European unity by a step by step process in which limited functions are performed through supranational powers. Their new look for French industry was based on a realistic appraisal of Europe's need to destroy old barriers and a determination to open France's protected economy to freer trading.¹

The immediate economic factors that induced Jean Monnet and his colleagues to draw up the Schuman Plan were the situation of overproduction in coal and steel which Europe faced just before the Korean War and the necessity of better protection from the fluctuations of the business cycle, for both consumer and producer. The Schuman Plan founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to help solve European economic ills as well as provide the foundation for eventual political union. The greatest economic asset to France of ECSC was access to Ruhr coal, even though the inefficient mines in other parts of France were put out of business.³

For many the more important issue at stake in the Schuman Plan was political rather than economic. The executive branch of ECSC, called the High Authority, would be the key to a check on revitalized German industry: a veto to future German armaments industry, and thus to German ability to make war. The price of this check would be the

¹Luethy, 335. ²Willis, 84. ³Ibid., 104.

sacrifice of a certain amount of French sovereignty. On this issue the European integrationists took the stand that nationalism was passé for today's world. Their opponents maintained that nationalism was a legitimate viewpoint and that they saw no reason to regard a European nationalism as superior to French nationalism.¹ While some Frenchmen saw ECSC as a sacrifice of French sovereignty, Germans saw it in just the opposite light for themselves: an end to occupation. True, German opponents to West European supra-national integration complained of limited sovereignty, distrusted French competition in industry, suspected a French plan to dominate politically, and feared the effect on future German unification. In spite of these complaints, the overwhelming German desire to end occupation status left no real question of German acceptance of the Schuman Plan.² In 1952, after two years of planning and violent debate, the British rejected ECSC, but France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg accepted it.

The functionalists who designed ECSC built into it features that could be used to develop a very closely federated Europe. The foundation for a new European trend was securely laid. The organization of ECSC branches set a

¹Raymond Aron, France Steadfast and Changing (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 159.

²Willis, 112.

pattern readily adaptable to new additions to the European Community. The European Community as a whole is comprised of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC, usually called the Common Market). Each of the three components of the European Community (ECSC, EEC, and Euratom) has its own individual executive. The ECSC executive branch is called the High Authority; the EEC and Euratom designate theirs as Commissions. This Branch is to guard ECSC interests by initiating and advocating legislation to put treaty provisions into effect, by raising revenue to carry out its actions, by policing ECSC for respect to the treaty and High Authority rulings, by aiding agreements between members, and by stimulating further action in building the European Community.¹ There is also an ECSC Council of Ministers which acts as a decision making body. This Council consists of national representatives who have powers which, in some cases, are immediately binding on all members. On several issues there is no national veto, the decision being taken by majority vote. This body decides on specific proposals made by the executive branch. EEC and Euratom also have separate councils of ministers, but the same men usually

¹Richard J. Mayne, The Community of Europe. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1963), 22-24.

sit on all three councils.¹

The other branches of the European Community are shared in common by ECSC, EEC, and Euratom. The Court of Justice as judiciary, exercising the power of a supreme court. Its seven judges give final decisions on individuals and governments. The Court decides if the acts of the three components of the Community accord with the Rome Treaty which established them. The European Parliament could be considered the legislative branch of the European Community. This assembly consists of 142 delegates nominated by national parliaments. These delegates are not seated in national groups but in supranational political groups: Conservative from Italy, France, Germany and other member nations sit together as one group. The Parliament can force resignation of the executives (ECSC High Authority, EEC and Euratom Commissions) by a two-thirds vote of no confidence. It is consultative on certain matters and publishes its views on executive actions. Through the assembly's fifteen standing committees, it works toward the fusion of markets and examines budgets.²

Accredited ambassadors to the European Community from the national governments of member states make up a Committee of Permanent Representatives. This group processes detailed documents, determines national positions and acts

¹Ibid., 20. ²Ibid., 21.

as liason between the three Community executives and the member nations' governments. Representatives of various labor, industry, business, and professional groups make up the Economic and Social Committee. This Committee, which acts as a pressure group, is a consultative body attached to the Council of Ministers.¹

Thus through the machinery of the Community France changed from an economic policy of exploitation, with Germany in the role of victim to one of cooperation, with Germany as a partner. The attempt to extend the Community to cover a military policy toward Germany proved less successful. The European Defense Community (EDC) was a French effort to lessen the impact of a rearmed Germany.² This effort grew out of the events, beginning in 1948, which intensified the Cold War and created an atmosphere of fear in France, and elsewhere.³ The earliest reaction to this fear of Soviet aggression in Western Europe was the signing of the Atlantic Pact in April 1949, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In France's view, of course, Germany was excluded from NATO. In a session of the French National Assembly in 1949, Foreign Minister Schuman stated that Germany should never be able to rearm "except by a grave

¹Ibid., 127.

²E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr., The Government of France (2d ed; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963), 197.

³Luethy, 355.

error on the part of France."¹

Considering France's position on German rearmament, the outbreak of the Korean War precipitated a situation which placed a tremendous strain on Franco-German relations. East-West tensions reduced France's role in the Atlantic alliance because her commitments outside Europe meant she could not make a large military contribution to NATO. Germany, on the other hand, achieved a more active part in international affairs because of her military potential.² With American troops committed to the Korean War, additional United States forces for Europe were unlikely. Consequently Europe's military weakness was evident at a time when European tensions were also rising.³ The Council of Europe proposed a European army financed by European funds gathered from European taxes, but making no mention of German participation. The United States decided that German participation was necessary.⁴

When both the United States and the Council of Europe calling for European troops, René Pleven, the French premier, produced a plan for a European Defense Community. The Pleven Plan hoped to contain a rearmed Germany "by integrating continental European armed forces into one military

¹Alfred Grosser, "France and Germany in the Atlantic Community," International Organization, XVII (Summer, 1963, 554.

²Ibid., 555. ³Willis, 145. ⁴Ibid., 131.

establishment which would operate under a supranational political authority controlled by the governments of the participants."¹ Premier Plevin and supporters of the plan stressed these points: (1) Germany was not a member of the Atlantic Pact but did benefit from the Pact's protection; therefore she should share in the defense of Western Europe from possible attack; (2) the plan would further European integration; (3) Franco-German reconciliation would be promoted; and (4) Germany would be kept from having a national army.²

Debates over EDC were long and hard. French opponents protested that the supranational aspects of the plan required relinquishment of a certain degree of French sovereignty. For some, German rearmament in any form was unacceptable; others feared that such an army might provoke Russian intervention. French critics also pointed out that the original plan had been modified to allow national units, and that the French army, which had commitments in Africa and Asia, would be weakened by the supranational quality of EDC.³ Placing the Germans under a supranational authority meant that the Germans would be subject to that authority and not at the disposal of the German government. By the same token French troops committed to EDC would not be under the direction of the French government.

¹Ibid., 139. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., 144.

The bitterness engendered by the prolonged and heated debates over EDC has been compared to that of the Dreyfus Affair. Every French political group spelled out its stand on this issue, thus hardening attitudes toward it. The revived nationalism that appeared in both France and Germany was a set-back to Franco-German reconciliation.¹ Germany was particularly incensed because the Contractual Agreements, which were to restore German sovereignty, were tied to the acceptance of EDC. When the French, British and American foreign ministers met in Washington in September 1951, they decided German participation in EDC would mean the end of occupation status. Therefore, the agreements providing for an independent Federal Republic of Germany were negotiated simultaneously with the military arrangements. The Contractual Agreements could only become effective when Germany participated in EDC. Germany naturally saw a denial of German sovereignty in the French rejection of EDC.² German sovereignty and rearmament had to wait until the Western European Union was formed and attached to NATO shortly after the 1954 death of EDC.³ At that time West Germany renounced atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons, placed all her troops under NATO, and entrusted

¹There were also heated arguments in Germany. (Ibid., 157).

²Ibid., 137.

³Edgar Stephenson Furniss, Jr., France Troubled Ally (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 273.

West Berlin exclusively to American, British and French protection.¹

The effect of East-West tensions on the Franco-German rapprochement was accentuated inside NATO. Because Berlin is so totally dependent on American forces vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Germany found herself siding with the United States on issues dividing the United States and France. France's dissatisfaction with NATO stemmed primarily from her position as a nation having colonial commitments and from her stand on nuclear arms. French unhappiness was also linked to a renewed French interest in national prestige, which began about 1955.

The French argued that the Atlantic Pact required co-operation among its members throughout the world, even in Asia and Africa. Claiming to act as a democratic nation fighting communism in Vietnam and Algeria, France expected NATO to aid in carrying out that task.² Instead of aid, her NATO allies, including Germany, criticised France for being unwilling to terminate colonialism. France reacted by accusing NATO of not doing its job and of humiliating France with such criticism. The Fourth Republic's reluctance to relinquish French colonies can be attributed to motives of national prestige rather than economic reasons.³

¹Klaus Epstein, Germany After Adenauer (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1964), 63.

²Grosser, 558. ³Aron, 153.

The nationalism which occasioned the French stand on colonialism also promoted France's desire for a greater voice in the control of Nuclear arms. Possession of nuclear weapons became a necessary status symbol for a great power, a role France wished to play.¹ Discontented with the position that the United States allotted her NATO allies, France ultimately decided to establish an independent French nuclear force. Premier Mendès-France put the program into operation in 1954.² Since Euratom was to stimulate and co-ordinate nuclear research, France expected to use it to benefit her nuclear program.³ German insistence that all Euratom efforts be directed at purely peaceful purposes forced France to relinquish that hope; accordingly, diminished French interest deprived Euratom of much of its vitality.⁴

In contrast to the obscurity into which Euratom lapsed, its twin, the European Economic Community, experienced dramatic development. Both Euratom and EEC were the result of a renewed drive by the European functionalist movement. They were conceived at the Messina Conference in 1955 and took shape during two years of negotiations. The Treaty

¹Furniss, 246. ²Godfrey, 128.

³Euratom performs its functions through specific research contracts, a documentation pool, investment guidance and health and safety standards. (Robert Louis Heilbroner, Forging a United Europe: the Story of the European Community, New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1961), Mayne, 114).

⁴Ibid.

of Rome delivered the two additions to the European Community in 1957.¹ There could not have been a more auspicious time for their appearance on the European scene. Goodwill was high and Franco-German relations rapidly improved due to several circumstances. Prominent among these was the burial of the policy of German dismemberment, accomplished by the settlement of the competition over the Saar. A 1955 referendum by the Saarlanders rejected both France and Europeanization in favor of a return to Germany; in 1957 the Saar was officially reunited with the Federal Republic.² Another contribution to Franco-German accord which appeared in 1955 was a decline in the frictions which had developed in ECSC.³ The bitterness of the German feeling of rejection after the defeat of EDC abated with the acceptance of Germany into NATO. However, within NATO itself and soon within the EEC, issues evolved that acted as a wedge between France and Germany.

¹Willis, 251. ²Ibid., 208.

³France and Germany's major issues in dispute in ECSC were discriminatory freight rates, divergent tax systems, industrial enterprise agreements and ownership-management concentration, all of which the High Authority faced during the economic recession of 1953. F. Roy Willis treats these problems in detail in his chapter "Europeanism in Decline, 1954-1955" (France, Germany, and the New Europe).

III. THE DE GAULLE-ADENAUER YEARS: 1958-1963

When General de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 as President of the Fifth Republic, he decided to use the instruments of NATO and the European Community to further his goal of restoring France to a great power position. The Fourth Republic had made only partial advances toward fulfilling the objectives outlined by de Gaulle in 1945. Through the framework of the European Community it had provided the basis for French economic recovery, but had failed to supply France's military need, the barest beginning had been made to create a militarily independent France. Although Frenchmen had been among the leaders of the functionalist movement, the Fourth Republic's instability had not improved French standing in other nations' esteem. It remained for General de Gaulle to take action which would raise France to a position of world influence. Between 1958 and 1963 the Federal Republic of Germany figured vitally in French policies which aimed at recovering for France the status of a great power, fully independent, a leader among the nations of Europe.

In September 1958, President de Gaulle sent letters to Britain and the United States expressing his views on NATO and France's role in it. He saw NATO as *passé*, "a structure formed to meet conditions which no longer exist." to be

useful, modifications would have to be made.¹ De Gaulle made three criticisms of NATO: (1) that important decisions were all made by the United States and Great Britain, (2) that the geographic scope of NATO was too limited, and (3) that France did not receive a fair share of important positions in the command structure.² In short, to make NATO acceptable to de Gaulle, France would have to be fully recognized as a great power and treated as such. This would mean being consulted on all Western policies regarding any area of the world, receiving American aid in acquiring an atomic stockpile (at least to the extent of such aid to Britain), and being given more and better positions in NATO's command structure.¹ A revamped NATO, would have a directorate of the three states having worldwide responsibilities (United States, Great Britain, France), and each of these states would have a voice in the employment of nuclear weapons.²

French desires stated in the 1958 letters were rejected by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan and Germany, with the other NATO countries, joined in criticising France's stand.³ De Gaulle's desire to extend

¹Furniss, France Under de Gaulle, 10. ²Godfrey, 128.

³Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, The De Gaulle Republic (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1960), 326.

NATO's geographic scope was not shared by most Germans since Germany did not have France's commitments about the globe.¹ Moreover, de Gaulle's proposed directorate offered a position of equality to France, but not to Germany.² Such German opposition provided a source of discord which undermined efforts to achieve that Franco-German rapprochement so important to de Gaulle's strategy for European leadership.

Balked of attaining recognition as a great power within NATO, de Gaulle took several additional steps. Until an agreement could be reached on France's proposals for re-vamping NATO, France would host no missile bases, would join no unified air defense, and would remove its fleet from NATO control.³ The American reaction in turn was to place more emphasis on German contributions to NATO, eventually leading to the very disruptive multilateral nuclear force dispute between France and Germany. The more France withdrew from NATO, the stronger the military ties between the United States and Germany became. And certainly Germany's position as a divided nation, half-communist and half-democratic, guaranteed the loyalty of democratic West Germany to NATO.⁴ As German-American bonds tightened,

¹Grosser, 570. ²Ibid., 567.

³The Fourth Republic had also refused to unify their air defense. (Furniss, France Troubled Ally, 446).

⁴Grosser, 570.

Franco-German relations cooled. The fundamental German premise was that the security of Berlin is linked to the physical presence of American forces" on German soil; with American troops on the spot, any attack would immediately involve Americans and force the United States to prompt action.¹ Such a view is quite the opposite of the well known Gaullist desire to see Europe cleared of American forces.²

The military policies of France and Germany drifted further apart as de Gaulle continued the Fourth Republic's program of an independent nuclear force. On April 11, 1961 de Gaulle declared:

"It is both the right and duty of the continental European powers to have their own national defense. It is intolerable for a great state to have its destiny subject to decisions and acts of another state no matter how friendly it may be."³

Though Germany could not be any more sure than France that the United States would risk retaliation from the Soviet Union by using atomic weapons in defense of Europe, she did not follow de Gaulle's lead, nor could she. Germany seems

¹Ibid., 164.

²Raymond Aron makes the interesting point that de Gaulle accepts the fact that West Germany has to continue to trust in American security; thus he can count on Germany and other European allies to soothe American feelings, leaving him free to speak independently without fear of losing American protection. ("Reading de Gaulle's Mind," New Republic, CXLIII May 4, 1963, 1213).

³Hoffmann, 353.

to prefer dependence on the United States to dependence on France, if it comes to that choice.¹ Preferably she would not care to be forced to make that choice.²

Since de Gaulle's return to power the French have emphasized nuclear weapons, subordinating conventional forces to them. General Stohlin, Chief of the French Air Force, expressed the belief that a threat of nuclear weapons against conventional attack would cause a slow down or even a stopping of the attack.³ France criticized the growing German emphasis on conventional weapons and France has criticized this not only because it enlarged the German military establishment, but also because it represented a giving way to American pressure.⁴ The American-German-French triangle on the issue of military policy is a major stumbling block in Franco-German relations. Although de Gaulle has refused to compromise his stand on NATO, he does not wish Germany to think that he rejects the principle of the Atlantic alliance. In May 1962, at a press conference, he reaffirmed his belief in that principle, assuring his allies that:

"So long as the Soviets threaten the world, this alliance must be maintained. France is an integral part

¹Grosser, 568. ²Epstein, 58.

³Anthony Verrier, "French and West German Strategic Thinking," The World Today, XIX (June, 1963), 236.

⁴Ibid., 235.

of it. If the free world were attacked on the old or the new continent, France would take part in the common defense at the sides of her allies, with all the means she has."¹

De Gaulle views the rapprochement which he wishes to encourage between France and Germany primarily to further French national interests. The closer the Franco-German ties, the easier it is for France to check a rising German power. As early as 1957, Kurt Sieveking, president of the Bundesrat, declared:

It is evident that Germany will become ever more the natural nucleus of crystallization for Europe. . . . It must be made absolutely clear that . . . this . . . is 'the first servant of Europe.'

With German support France would be in a good position to lead the European Community along the paths of French policy. The Community would help France become a great industrial power. Industrial might was vital to placing France in the front rank of nations. If Bonn could be persuaded to accept French nuclear power in place of American, France could either force the NATO revisions she desired or effectively destroy NATO by walking out of NATO with Germany.

As the leader of Europe, France could claim the resources of almost half an industrial continent to help her stand as a third force between the two world power blocs. President

¹French Embassy, Press and Information Division, The First Five Years of the Fifth Republic of France, (New York: French Embassy, 1964), 17.

²Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 224.

de Gaulle openly declared this intention:

I intend to persuade the states to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc; to establish this organization between the Soviet and the Anglo-American camps.¹

A French oriented West Germany might even encourage East Europeans to loosen ties with the Soviet Union and be drawn westward because they would no longer fear an armed and united Germany.²

It was fortunate for President de Gaulle that the head of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chancellor Adenauer, also desired a rapprochement. Adenauer wished a reconciliation with France as part of his basic policy of establishing confidence in Germany by firmly allying her with the West.³ Through a position of power gained by aligning herself with the West, Germany would be in a position to negotiate for reunification. The burying of the longstanding Franco-German feud was to be the foundation of a new progressive Europe.⁴ Benefits for West Germany would include economic advantages through the Community and a useful alliance in case of an American-Soviet accord over the question of German unification.⁵

¹Hans Joachim Morgenthau, "Four Designs for Tomorrow's Europe", The New York Times Magazine (May 17, 1964), 18.

²Godfrey, 130. ³Aron, 164. ⁴Epstein, 58.

⁵Allan S. Nanes, "West German Policy in West Europe," Current History, XLIV (April, 1963), 215.

During the first years of de Gaulle's administration Franco-German accord progressed satisfactorily. The 1958 appointment of Maurice de Couve de Murville, then French ambassador to Germany, as Foreign Minister was an auspicious gesture. Adenauer took it as a good omen.¹ After the first meeting of Adenauer and de Gaulle, it became clear that the two heads of state shared mutual admiration for each other as well as an awareness of the advantages of Franco-German coöperation.² Economic integration advanced almost automatically. By 1958 the early disputes within ECSC were adjusted. Adenauer, a firm believer in the European movement, was reassured by de Gaulle's announcement of his intention to uphold the Treaty of Rome and implement the Common Market.³ Diplomatically, the French president's support of the German position in Berlin and his complimentary speeches publically praising Germany and Adenauer contributed to improving relations between the two countries.⁴ Their rapprochement was climaxed by an exchange of very successful state visits in 1962.

So successful were the 1962 state visits that French and German socialist parties became alarmed enough to issue a joint warning. They feared that the reconciliation was

¹Willis, 276. ²Hoffmann, 347.

³Walter Stahl (ed.), The Politics of Postwar Germany (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963).

⁴Willis, 294.

becoming an alliance between two nationalisms, aimed at a Paris-Bonn axis which would dominate an integrated Europe. In spite of Adenauer's heated denial, which appeared in Christ und Welt on September 14, 1962, de Gaulle's consistent rejection of supranationalism lent substance to the charge. Without the supra-national aspect, the Community would be limited to depending on traditional national cooperation.¹ The Franco-German Treaty of 1963 was criticized by some German opponents precisely on the grounds that it centered on a Bonn-Paris alliance instead of the unity of the Six.² It was to be the means of cementing the French-German relationship through close cooperation. The heads of government meet at least twice a year, the defense ministers every three months, the chiefs of staff every two months. These consultations cover foreign affairs, defense, economic efforts, youth and education.³ Reception of the treaty was divided. In France, the Communists called it "demagoguery", the Socialists claimed it was meaningless unless de Gaulle controlled both France and Germany, and the moderates deplored it as based on a break with Britain and the United States.⁴

¹Furniss, France Under de Gaulle, 49. ²Willis, 312.

³Maxim Fackler, "The Franco-German Treaty: the end of hereditary enmity," World Today, XXI (January, 1965), 28.

⁴Willis, 34.

Adenauer and the men who supported him were labeled German Gaullists. It was proof of the high priority that Adenauer placed on good French relations that he rated the treaty above Britain's entry into EEC. He looked on the accord as a means of preserving the rapprochement with France past the time when he would turn the office of chancellor over to someone else.¹ But the majority of German opinion was opposed. EEC Commission President Hallstein claimed it sabotaged the spirit of the Treaty of Rome by its bilateral nature rather than using the Community framework.² The French veto of Britain took place only a week before Adenauer's visit to Paris and the German chancellor received sharp criticism for signing the treaty in the face of France's rejection of Britain.³ The treaty was only ratified because it could be used as a model for multilateral cooperation with other countries.⁴ Before accepting it, the Germans added a preamble which called for close cooperation between the United States and Europe, common defense in NATO with integration of members' armed forces, and unification of Europe along Community lines, including the entrance of Great Britain. Thus the Bundesrat spelled

¹Fackler, 26. ²Willis, 312. ³Willis, 309.

⁴Alfred Grosser, The Federal Republic of Germany (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 120,

out the issues which divided France and Germany in the very opening lines of a treaty meant to symbolize close cooperation.¹

The terms of the treaty are being carried out. The foreign affairs conferences have taken place as prescribed but not much in the way of common policy has resulted. President de Gaulle's criticism of NATO has undermined chances of closer defense policy.² Only in the area of youth and education has there been what could be called success. One evidence of this success is the fact that in 1964 over 279,000 youths have crossed the frontiers both ways. But after six months, even de Gaulle, when speaking of the treaty, acknowledged that "this project, everyone knows, has not come to anything."³

The early years that held so much hope for Franco-German diplomacy looked just as encouraging for the European Economic Community. Living up to its early promise, the EEC acted as a stimulus to economic growth in France and Germany. Between 1958 and 1962 German industrial production climbed 35% and French 23%. French and German trade with Common Market partners doubled, while Franco-German trade almost tripled. Collaboration between French and German industry, taking the form of licensing agreements, marketing agreements,

¹Willis, 313. ²Fackler, 38. ³Willis, 314.

and joint subsidiaries, markedly increased.¹ German faith in French intentions to live up to the terms of the Treaty of Rome received a boost during EEC's first year by France's making sacrifices to meet the first tariff deadline. In order to meet the scheduled 10% tariff reduction for all EEC countries by January 1, 1959, radical economic reforms were required in France. De Gaulle met this need by devaluating the franc, removing quotas on 90% of France's imports from OEEC countries, increasing taxes, cutting expenditures, and lowering social security payments.² Indeed, adherence to the Common Market seemed to signify that France was ending a tradition of centering her international economic policies on domestic protectionism. Most of the opposition to EEC came from industries such as the French textile industry that feared competition with other Community nations after tariff reductions came into effect. Encourageingly, the EEC justified itself to the French textile industry by showing a jump in its production index from 95 in 1959 to 118 in 1963, using 1958 as a base year of 100.³

Although frictions in EEC existed from the start, they did not become evident until the community was well underway. Overt differences appeared on matters of tariff reduction, common agricultural policy, political union, and membership for Great Britain.⁴ Having been refused a free

¹Willis, 281. ²Ibid., 278. ³Ibid., 281. ⁴Ibid., 282.

zone with EEC members, Britain organized the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, and Switzerland to compete with EEC. To meet this challenge EEC decided to accelerate its tariff reductions. France favored this step; Germany, always seeking wider markets, opposed it; in the end, they compromised.¹ Had not the interior tariffs been reduced and a common exterior tariff been agreed upon, EFTA might have had a greater trading advantage to offer West Germany than the Community. In that situation the Federal Republic might well have been drawn to a closer accord with Britain. Instead France pushed forward the advancement of EEC at a rate fast enough to prevent Germany being led astray by Britain.²

The EFTA discord highlighted the different plans favored by France and Germany. The French endorsed careful planning and development within the Six, and opposed the complications brought on by increasing the size of the Community. Erhard, as spokesman of the German economic group, rejected tight planning as Communistic and because it shut British and American markets to German goods.³ He even used such terms as "European incest" and "economic absurdities" to describe the French marketing outlook.⁴

¹Ibid., 286. ²Furniss, France Troubled Ally, 457.

³Grosser, "France and Germany," 572.

⁴Wolfe W. Schmakel, "Germany and the Common Market," Current History, XLV (November, 1963), 285.

Probably the most difficult economic stumbling block in EEC was the common agricultural policy, the quest for which began in January 1962.¹ With East Germany (the natural producer of agricultural products for West Germany) cut off, France's surplus agricultural produce would find a natural market in food-deficient West Germany. But Germany's less efficient farm population enjoyed a protected position in the West German economy. This protection was due to the powerful voice of the farm vote. Both France and Germany had established elaborate subsidy systems delicately balanced in each country's internal economy. In order to enable EEC to begin its second stage on time in January 1962, Germany made major concessions in agriculture, doing away with quotas, government stockpiles, and national tariff barriers in cereals. Pork, eggs and poultry were to be protected by levies and a minimum price which were tied to the cereals agreement. Another agricultural sacrifice Germany made was an agreement to open quotas for wines to member states. The other members of EEC recognized the cost of the contributions which Germany was making and as a result they too were willing to make concessions which would ease the organization's progress.²

There were political differences as well as economic ones. Although the EEC had only begun functioning in 1958,

¹Ibid., 283. ²Willis, 283-292.

federalist groups soon urged a combination of the High Authority with the Commissions of Euratom and EEC and the direct election of the European Parliament.¹ In the face of this tendency the President of the Fifth Republic made clear he could not accept anything that would infringe on French national sovereignty. Instead, in October 1959, Premier Michel Debré suggested that the Six hold periodic conferences on political matters and establish a political secretariat in Paris. Although the EEC partners were suspicious of an attempt to undermine the Community's ultimate goal of "limited functions but real powers," they agreed to quarterly meetings of foreign ministers for consultation on foreign policy.²

The political issue was not an item of moment during the first stage of EEC (1958-1962), but there was no doubt of where de Gaulle stood regarding it. In a televised speech in May 1960, he called for a Western European union as an "imposing confederation" which would balance Eastern Europe and make possible a European entente, "from the Atlantic to the Urals." In June of that year, Debré explained that France did not consider merging the Community executives necessary, since only government cooperation was needed.³ The French government considered the present Community structure tight enough and any further cohesion

¹Ibid., 203. ²Ibid., 293., Mayne, 147, ³Willis, 294.

needed could come from regular government channels. A third time in the same year, at his September 5 press conference, de Gaulle made clear that his vision of united Europe was based on sovereign states, not a supranational community.¹

Nevertheless, in spite of de Gaulle's disapproval, various proposals for furthering political integration were made to the Study Commission established by EEC. As the Common Market moved into its second phase, concern over its development became more acute. The French government suggested the formation of a council of heads of state having powers which would reduce the role of the Community Assembly. Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium rejected this proposal and once more urged the merger of executives.² The issue ended in deadlock in the March 1962 meeting of foreign ministers.

Another difficult issue on the Study Commission's agenda was the problem of British membership in EEC.

In July 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced the opening of negotiations for British entry into EEC, which the EEC Commission greeted warmly. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy especially welcomed a potential counterbalance to a Bonn-Paris axis, and Germany was also pleased at the prospect of Britain joining EEC.

¹Ibid., 295. ²Ibid., 296-298.

It would be a further consolidation of the Western alliance and present a more solidly united western front to the Soviet Union.¹ Germany already had a considerable amount of trade with Britain and this move would enlarge that market even more. Competition with EFTA would end and most of its former members would become associate members of EEC thus providing yet wider markets.² France however was less enthusiastic since she was not interested in trade with the British Commonwealth and felt she had little to gain from accepting EFTA members as EEC associates. Nevertheless, as negotiations were about to begin, President de Gaulle stated that he had "always desired that others, and Great Britain in particular, accept the Treaty of Rome."³

By October 1961, as negotiations for British entry to EEC began to take form, the number of concessions needed to accommodate the problems of Commonwealth trade became apparent. Bargaining continued into May 1962 when the serious hurdle of the standards under which temperate foodstuffs would enter the Common Market, where they could compete with French produce, was tackled; this problem remained unsolved.⁴ From October to December 1962, negotiations dealing with direct British subsidies and guaranteed

¹Terence Prittie, "The Paris-Bonn Axis, New Republic, CXLIII (February, 1963), 9.

²Willis, 300. ³Ibid., 307. ⁴Ibid., 301.

prices in agriculture vis-à-vis the EEC common agricultural policy became deadlocked, which necessitated the appointment of a fact finding committee, but President de Gaulle put an end to the discussion when he announced to a press conference on January 14, 1963, that, in his view, Britain was not ready for entry into EEC and in fact did not fit into the European picture. A week later, France moved that negotiations for Britain's admittance to EEC be ended.¹

The French barring of Britain from EEC had a violent effect on Franco-German relations. Public opinion polls in Germany reflected the drastic change in German feelings. German reaction to French foreign policy dropped from 61% favorable in October 1962 to 38% in November 1963.² Germans felt insulted that the French president had not waited even one week, the time that the German chancellor would be in Paris to sign the Treaty of 1963, to consult him on a matter of such important mutual interest. There was bitter resentment against Adenauer for having signed a treaty in the face of de Gaulle's independent action which seemed a betrayal of the spirit of consultation the treaty was supposed to represent. Aside from the matter of national pride, German businessmen and industrialists believed that France had deprived them of the economic advantages of British and Commonwealth markets.

¹Willis, 302. ²Ibid., 318.

What caused de Gaulle to deal such a blow to his carefully nurtured Franco-German rapprochement? The safeguarding of French agricultural interests was not the only, not even the primary, reason for France's rejection of Britain. De Gaulle did not wish to see Great Britain in EEC because Britain would be a way for the United States to influence and possibly threaten European independence. His suspicions of American plans to use Britain as a Trojan horse were aroused by the assurance given by President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan that the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States would not be changed.¹ The United States thought that Britain would give EEC greater stability, an Atlantic outlook, and a position more in line with American views on major issues.² Press releases, such as the following, convincingly implied that the United States intended to use Britain as a media to dominate the Community:

A Europe organized without the United States would be a Europe organized against the United States. This is why we are pushing hard for joining the Common Market. . . . We need Britain as a broker and to ensure an open door.³

It is likely that de Gaulle did not want Britain to enter the Common Market as a full member during its formative

¹Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963), 101.

²Ibid. ³Ibid. 109.

political period. Only after France has been able to shape and set the form of EEC would British entrance be feasible for de Gaulle. Since the core of the West European unification was to be Bonn and Paris, de Gaulle would prefer not to have a competitor of equal strength to balance France within the community.¹

¹Fackler, 12.

IV. THE DE GAULLE-ERHARD YEARS: 1963-1965

Of course there were more factors in the cooling Franco-German relations than the French refusal to allow Britain to enter EEC. A new chancellor began leading the Federal German Republic policy and placing emphasis on other goals. Even greater divergencies of policy were developing in EEC and NATO. French nationalism found an echo in Germany, and Bonn and Paris developed different pictures of Moscow.

The first conference between President de Gaulle and Chancellor Erhard in July 1964 was not auspicious. The French president announced that they had spoken with "extreme frankness", and it was leaked to the press that de Gaulle criticised Erhard's support of the American policy in southeast Asia.¹ Considering Erhard's statements in the Bundesrat in October 1963, a coolness between the two heads of state was not surprising. "The security of the Federal German Republic can be guaranteed only through NATO, with the cooperation of our European and North American partners in both political and military fields," he had stated. Making even more definite West German commitment to the United States, Erhard declared that his government would continue "to decide all questions of common interest in close and friendly consultation with the American government;" he also wished to reopen negotiations for British

¹"Pincers on Erhard," The Economist, CCXII (July 11, 1964), 132.

Entry into EEC, and to work for a "wider Community."¹

Earlier differences within NATO had not abated by 1963, and it was made clear that France was in the process of withdrawal. De Gaulle predicted that, by 1969, "We shall end the subordination that is described as integration, which is provided for by NATO and which puts our destiny in the hands of foreigners."² To the contrary, the Federal German Republic renewed its loyalty to NATO and this added to the Franco-German rift. For example, Erhard accepted the MLF³ as a means to further German military integration into the Atlantic alliance, even though such integration was a direct blow to de Gaulle's vision of an independent Europe.⁴ It did not warm relations between their two countries when Erhard announced that while he "respects" the French nuclear force, he "feels more secure" under the American.⁵

As Bonn forged stronger bonds between West Germany and the United States by such links as MLF, de Gaulle decided to use EEC as one means of applying pressure on Erhard,

¹Willis, 316.

²"De Gaulle's Europe," America, CCIII (September 25, 1965), 308.

³MLF represents multilateral nuclear force, a fleet of surface ships armed with polaris missiles and operated by mixed-manned crews from NATO countries. (Willis, 327).

⁴"The General Picks His Battlefield," The Economist, CCXIII (November 7, 1964), 592.

⁵"I Told Him," The Economist, CCIX (December 7, 1963), 997.

particularly through the issue of grain prices.¹ Always a thorny problem, agricultural policy was the first major hitch in EEC after Erhard took office. De Gaulle wished to have a solid European agricultural front to present to the United States at the Kennedy Round of Tariff negotiations which was scheduled for spring 1964.² Progress on reaching EEC agreements on agricultural products was slow during the summer of 1963. In October 1963 a French ultimatum demanded that a decision be made or France would quit EEC. Finally in December 1963 some mutual concessions permitted a common policy to be drawn up in beef, milk products and rice, but cereal decisions were postponed until April 1964. The accord reached on beef and milk products is more significant when it is realized that products have more value and greater production than all the Common Market's metalworking industries, including shipbuilding and automobile manufacturing. January 1, 1970 was set as the target date by which all prices would be aligned. Arriving at a common price, a specific target date and the means to achieve that goal requires slow and painstaking negotiations. However, France issued another ultimatum in October 1964 threatening that unless the

¹"Diplomatic Manoeuvres, New Statesman, LXVII (November 1964), 684.

²Willis, 323.

agricultural common market developed on schedule, France would walk out.¹ In December, Germany conceded in part because the other EEC partners considered France's demands on cereal prices legitimate.

Though compromise and concession might work out difficult economic differences within EEC, political differences remained irreconcilable. The idea that de Gaulle would scuttle the Common Market over the political issue has been discounted by some. French economy had become deeply integrated into EEC during its first six years. The draft of the fifth French economic plan (1966-1970) was based on the assumption of EEC development. Half France's trade outside the franc area is carried on in EEC, and she was the greatest beneficiary of the Common Market's agricultural policy.² De Gaulle himself in April 1964 announced that "Little by little the European Common Market is becoming essential to our prosperity."³ On the other hand, de Gaulle has never indicated that he would sacrifice one of his major goals, national independence, for economic advantage.

Just as the issues of British membership and agricultural pricing had divided de Gaulle and Erhard, in 1965

¹"The General Picks His Battlefield," 591.

²Godfrey, 125.

³Willis, 314.

political development became the topic of debate. The third stage of EEC maturity was due to come into being in 1966 and hinged on major steps toward political integration. Majority voting, which would end national vetoes, ultimate parliamentary control of EEC funds, direct election of the Parliament, all these measures embodied the supranational nature of EEC that de Gaulle denied.¹

De Gaulle, as a counter move, proposed that the High Authority and the Commissions for Euratom and EEC be combined but with considerably less than supranational qualities. This proposal was rejected, and France created the most serious crisis the European Community has experienced to date.² June 30, 1965, the French government recalled M. Boegner, its ambassador to the European Community, thus effecting a French boycott by leaving an "empty chair." From July through December 1965 community efforts were deadlocked. The result of the December 1965 French election indicated an end to the boycott of EEC. On the first ballot 56% of the French voted against de Gaulle. This may have strengthened the display of community opposition

¹Peter Jenkins, "Europe's Freeze," (New Statesman, LXX (July 9, 1965), 37.

²Edgar Stephenson Furniss, Jr., "French Foreign Policy," Current History, L (April, 1966), 213.

to him.¹ De Gaulle himself may have felt a need to obtain greater support in France by rejoining EEC. At any rate, in January 1966 negotiations resumed, though they only resulted in agreeing to disagree, and structurally the EEC stalemate continued.²

In the last two or three years, some West Germans have become disillusioned with internationalism.³ Trade outside the Common Market is more important to Germany than to France. Was the EEC aim of a common economic policy really able to accommodate the best interests of both outward looking Germany and inward looking France? Some Germans began to wonder if EEC was not a drag on the Germany economy. For them EEC was meant to give Germany a path back to acceptance as a nation and once that was achieved, the appeal was greatly diminished.⁴ Germany in 1964 had the third largest gross national product in the world. It is no wonder that Willy Brandt has declared: "We West Germans cannot be an economic giant and a political dwarf at the same time."

To de Gaulle, who consistently maintained that Europe

¹"Has It Really Changed," Economist, CCCXVII (December 11, 1965), 1173.

²Furniss, "French Foreign Policy," 231.

³Henry C. Wolfe, "A Worried Look at West Germany," Saturday Review, XLIX (March 26, 1966), 22.

⁴Schmekel, 287. ⁵Wolfe, 48.

is made up of nation states, there was nothing unusual or unexpected in German nationalism coming to the fore. It always existed. German reunification was a point of this nationalistic drive. It was the desire for German reunification that led Adenauer to choose alliance with the West in order to be in a strong position for eventual negotiating with the soviet Union. Erhard continued that policy, but emphasized the importance of the United States, rather than European integration, to German reunification. During the Adenauer years, de Gaulle tried to establish West Germany's role as a divided state, controlled by the European Community, and as an effective ally in strengthening the West with a focus on France.¹ Erhard challenged this European view and did not consider independence from the United States in the best interest of the Federal Republic. De Gaulle had used the crises in EEC in an attempt to pressure Germany into loosening ties with the United States. His realization that West Germany was not going to play the role that he had set for her led de Gaulle to consider a new German policy.

If a divided Germany would not serve France's purpose, perhaps a reunified one would. At the February 4, 1965 press conference, President de Gaulle said that German reunification was an object of French foreign policy, and

¹Godfrey, 130.

that the price of German reunification was an agreement on armaments and frontiers. The most common interpretation put on de Gaulle's reference to armaments was that he meant no nuclear weapons for Germans; it was also assumed that when he spoke of frontiers he meant the Oder-Neisse line.¹ In addition, he demanded that Germany had to be an "assured factor for peace and progress." But how could Germany be kept assuredly peaceful within the boundaries containing East and West Germany as they existed in 1965? Eastern Europe had to be brought in to contain Germany in the east while France provided that service in the west. For this purpose an agreement with the Soviet Union was necessary.² Mutual Franco-Russian desire to see nuclear arms kept out of Germany and to see American troops leave Europe provided the basis for the hope that such an agreement could be reached. De Gaulle anticipated that disagreements between Peking and Moscow would make the Soviet Union more willing to seek the benefits to be derived from cooperation with France on a mutual German policy. De Gaulle based his design on two assumptions: One was that the Soviet Union would part with East Germany; the second was that Germany

¹"Gromyko Comes to Paris," The Economist, CCXIII (May 1, 1965), 510.

²Joseph Kraft, "What Does de Gaulle Want?" Current XXXV (May, 1966), 10.

would accept dominion by the rest of Europe for the sake of national reunion.¹

The necessary prerequisite to de Gaulle's new German policy was a Franco-Russian rapprochement. Khrushchev's successors, aware of Franco-German discord, published two messages and two editorials in Pravda and Izvestia laying the groundwork for more cordial relations between Moscow and Paris.² The first concrete action was a French grant of seven year credits to the Soviet Union in a Franco-Russian trade agreement in October 1964. Then de Gaulle's speech on German reunification in 1965 was followed up by a change of Russian ambassadors: the higher ranking Valerian Zorin replaced Sergey Vinogradov as ambassador to France, and this was taken to indicate Russian receptiveness to French approaches. On May 1, 1965 Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Paris, and Germany was the primary issue discussed during this visit. At about the same time there occurred an interesting indirect illustration of a possible rapprochement: the Soviet Union chose the French system of color television over those of West Germany and the United States, and most of Eastern Europe, including East Germany followed the Soviet's lead

¹"De Gaulle's Golden Gate," Economist, CCXIV (February 13, 1965), 654.

²"Friendly Breezes," Economist, CCXIII (October 31, 1964), 492.

in that choice. This meant that if West Germany followed through on its own system or on the American system, it would not be able to reach East German screens. In this way, France and the Soviet Union quickly showed West Germany how effectively they can work together.

Being in the middle, West Germany did not like the turn French policy took. West Germany was pleased when France approved the German proposal that the United States, Britain and France suggest to the Soviet Union the setting up of a permanent committee to study German reunification.² But later developments, beginning with the long term credits which France extended to the Soviet Union, aroused West German hostility.

¹ Herbert Luthy, "De Gaulle: Pose and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIII (July, 1965), 562.

² "Love in a Cold Climate," *Economist*, CCXIV (January 23, 1965), 328.

V. CONCLUSION

In spite of the changes that have taken place in his tactics, President de Gaulle's long range goals remained unchanged. Whether his words were uttered in 1946 or 1965, when de Gaulle spoke of France he insisted that her destiny was as a great and independent world power. To live this part, France must be securely protected militarily, soundly established economically, and sufficiently respected diplomatically. Any policy aimed at obtaining these French objectives had to consider Germany's position. French governments tried to keep Germany unarmed or in a subordinate position militarily through the demilitarization plans of the post war years, through the EDC efforts of the early 1950's, and through NATO limits in the 1960's. The last trend discernable in French policy, which became clear in 1964 and 1965, was the suggestion of a containment of Germany by France and Eastern Europe. Despite the efforts of French governments, however, Germany by 1965 had revived militarily as evidenced by a national army wholly committed to NATO and by involvement in the MLF project.

Economic dealings with West Germany were inevitable considering France and Germany's geographic position in the heart of Western Europe. The first postwar policy of exploitation of Germany ceased to be the only French

Approach when Marshall Plan aid became available. The most durable contribution to Franco-German relations was the establishment of the European Community. In spite of Technical difficulties and divergent viewpoints, the European Community had accomplished much in European industrial recovery. Even de Gaulle, who disagreed fundamentally with the integrationists aspects of the Community, continued French participation in EEC and worked to implement EEC in order to advance French economic interests. In particular in the field of agriculture there was French advantage in German cooperation in EEC.

France emerged from World War II as a power of second, not first rank. Her views regarding postwar Germany did not carry enough weight with her allies to be effective. When French functionalists placed France at the fore of the European unification movement, they took the first step toward restoring French prestige. Through leadership in the European Community France made her influence felt in Germany as well as in other parts of the world. But the Fourth Republic, for the most part, believed in a strong Atlantic alliance as a means of presenting a diplomatically unified front. When de Gaulle returned to leadership in France, he established, on the contrary, an independent French foreign policy which directly used the Community machinery to further French diplomatic aims. When he decided that the European balance of

power had changed, the French president formulated his own policy on how to deal with Germany, seeking neither advice or consent from France's allies. Whatever twists or turns relations with Germany may take, President de Gaulle established the tenet that French policy will be independence, and that Germany must serve that tenet, or Franco-German relations will not progress smoothly.

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