10-22-2010

A City Club Report on Ballot Measure 26-108

City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.)
CITY OF PORTLAND MEASURE 26-108:

Continues City Public Campaign Financing for Mayoral, Commissioner, Auditor Candidates

If approved, Ballot Measure 26-108 would continue the system of public funding of candidates for the offices of mayor, city commissioner and city auditor. The Portland City Council created the Campaign Finance Fund (CFF), which is available to candidates who choose to participate and who meet certain qualifying criteria, in May 2005.

Proponents of the measure argue that large campaign donations create, at the very least, the perception that contributors gain undue access to, and influence over, candidates once they are in office. For participating candidates, the CFF removes the potential influence of campaign donors. Proponents further contend that public funding tends to reduce overall campaign spending.

Opponents counter that perceptions are not facts and there is no evidence that Portland’s elected officials are beholden to those who finance their campaigns. The costs of the CFF are hard to bear in rough economic times, when declines in city revenue prevent full funding of core services. Opponents argue that the CFF is rife with potential for abuse and that it forces taxpayers to finance the political careers of candidates they may not support.

After three election cycles, the CFF has not generated sufficient data to allow your committee to draw definitive conclusions about its effects on the cost of campaigns, the influence of money on government or the competitiveness of races. However, the indicators have been sufficiently positive that your committee concludes voters should retain public funding. The CFF is well managed and encourages the candidacy of individuals who demonstrate broad community support. Participating candidates can offer meaningful opposition to incumbents who would otherwise face only nominal challenges to their incumbency. Candidates receiving public funding need not spend time “dialing for dollars” and as a result are able to devote more time to meeting potential voters.

Your committee concludes that, at a cost of about $1 per Portland resident per election, the CFF is an exercise in democracy worth retaining.

Your committee recommends a “YES” vote on Measure 26-108.
INTRODUCTION

Ballot Measure 26-108 will appear on the ballot as follows:

CONTINUES CITY PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING FOR MAYORAL, COMMISSIONER, AUDITOR CANDIDATES

RESULT OF “YES” VOTE: A “yes” vote on this measure would approve continuing the Campaign Finance Fund.

RESULT OF “NO” VOTE: A “no” vote on this measure would reject continuing the Campaign Finance Fund.

SUMMARY: Measure would amend City code to continue Portland’s public campaign financing program that otherwise ends after November 2010 election. Under program administered by City Auditor, candidates for Mayor, Commissioner, and Auditor would continue to be eligible to seek certification to receive public funds in primary, general, or special elections by collecting a certain number of $5.00 qualifying contributions and meeting other requirements. Public funds available to certified candidates would continue at these spending limits: $200,000 for Mayor, $150,000 for Commissioner and Auditor in primary elections; $250,000 for Mayor, $200,000 for Commissioner and Auditor in general elections. Certified candidates would continue to be eligible for limited matching funds if other candidates’ contributions or expenditures exceed certain thresholds. All City candidates would continue having more frequent campaign disclosure requirements. Program costs would depend on factors including the number of certified candidates. City would continue to limit the annual impact of the program on City funds to 0.2% without raising new taxes or fees. Would continue authorization of penalties for violations.

(The language of the summary was prepared by the city attorney.)

City Club’s Board of Governors chartered this study to review Measure 26-108 and to author a report to help Club members and the public to better understand the implications of the measure and to recommend a “yes” or “no” vote. The eleven members of your committee were screened for conflicts of interest and public positions on the subject of the measure. The study was conducted during August and September 2010. Committee members interviewed proponents and opponents of the measure and persons with professional knowledge about the issues raised by the measure. Your committee reviewed relevant articles, research reports, past City Club reports and other material.
BACKGROUND

EXPLANATION OF MEASURE
Ballot Measure 26-108 is an amendment to the City Code of Portland that would continue the Campaign Finance Fund (CFF), a public campaign financing program created by the City Council in City Ordinance No. 17925 in May 2005. Because the measure is a code amendment, the City Council is not bound by the measure if it is approved; the Council may change any part of the code implementing the CFF through a simple majority vote.

HISTORY AND FUNCTION
The Campaign Finance Fund provides candidates for the offices of city commissioner, mayor and auditor with public funds to run for office. Candidate participation is voluntary, but even non-participating candidates must adhere to the program’s requirements for reporting campaign expenses. To qualify for funding, candidates must gather signatures and $5 contributions from 1,000 registered voters for commission and auditor races or 1,500 signatures and $5 contributions for mayoral races.

The city auditor’s office administers the program, while Multnomah County certifies that every signature collected belongs to a person registered to vote in Portland.

Qualified candidates for city commissioner and auditor receive $150,000, while candidates for mayor receive $200,000 for the primary election. Candidates for commissioner and auditor who win a place in the general election receive $200,000, while mayoral candidates receive $250,000. Qualified candidates are eligible to receive a limited amount of matching funds if non-participating candidates spend more than the amount initially allocated to the qualified candidate.

Strict reporting requirements for both participating and non-participating candidates allow the auditor’s office to determine when candidates exceed spending limits or other spending violations occur.

When enacting the CFF, the City Council also created the all-volunteer Citizen Campaign Commission to evaluate the functioning of the CFF, report biennially on its impact in municipal elections and recommend changes for strengthening the administration and enforcement of the code implementing the CFF to the City Council.

The CFF has been in effect during three election cycles since 2005, with total disbursements of $1,755,091 to ten candidates and administrative expenditures of $219,893.1 Two of the ten candidates who received public funding have been elected to the City Council: Erik Sten in 2006 and Amanda Fritz in 2008.

On May 26, 2010, the City Council adopted Resolution 36789, referring City Code Chapter 2.10 (Campaign Finance Fund) to Portland voters for the November 2, 2010 General Election ballot. Before adopting the referral resolution, the council passed Ordinance 183838, adding a sunset clause to the city code which will terminate the CFF unless voters approve Measure 26-108.2
ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON

Your committee divided the arguments of proponents and opponents of Measure 26-108 into four principal areas: money, access and influence; competition and inclusion; administration; and cost. Your committee then analyzed these arguments and came to conclusions of its own.

MONEY, ACCESS AND INFLUENCE

Proponents and opponents of Measure 26-108 made the following arguments as they relate to the role of money, access and influence in city elections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>CON</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Public financing of candidates reduces the perceived influence of large money donors in government.</td>
<td>• The CFF is a solution searching for a problem. There is no evidence that campaign money unduly influences Portland’s elected officials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Public financing reduces overall campaign spending.</td>
<td>• State of Oregon campaign finance disclosure requirements provide sufficient information to the public about campaign contributions and expenditures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Privately funded candidates tend to raise a disproportionate amount of campaign money from a relatively small number of contributors.</td>
<td>• Campaign contributions are not the only way to gain access to a public official.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Given constitutional constraints under state and federal law, public financing represents one of the few means of controlling spending on elections.</td>
<td>• The right candidates can conduct a low-cost campaign and win without spending taxpayer dollars.</td>
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Analysis

Proponents argue that the bulk of campaign contributions come not from a cross-section of Portland residents, but from individuals and entities associated with the business sector. This, they say, creates the perception that these business interests have the most influence on the decision-making of elected officials.

Proponents of the CFF say the link between money and access may be illustrated by some donors’ dual giving. In the 2006 contest for City Council, for example, several contributors made large donations to both Sam Adams and Nick Fish in the general election.3 Proponents argue that dual donors appear to be more concerned about access to the winner of a race than who actually wins.

Opponents say, however, that there is no evidence that money equals influence. While there is reason to believe that a politician would make time to listen to a large campaign contributor, there is no evidence that a politician might not also find time to communicate with a campaign volunteer, or anyone with whom he or she had a personal connection.

Opponents argue that what matters is not whether a candidate receives a big contribution from a special interest group: what is important is how the candidate acts in response to the contribution. They suggest that with the full disclosure of campaign contributions required by state law, voters can decide for themselves whether a politician is under the influence of a large contributor.

A benefit of the CFF claimed by its supporters is that it has put normative pressure on nonparticipating candidates to cap their campaign spending at the level established for participating candidates. They argue that the effect of the CFF through three election cycles has been to reduce overall campaign spending and thereby to reduce the influence of big donors even on privately funded candidates.
While overall spending on campaigns for mayor, commissioner and auditor has dropped, political scientists consulted by the committee said that the three election cycles since 2005 have not generated enough data to determine whether the decrease augurs a long-term trend attributable to the CFF.

Opponents, for example, credit the pre-CFF campaign of former Mayor Tom Potter for the decline in campaign spending. In the 2004 mayoral race, when he opposed a rival who had an insurmountable fundraising lead, Potter decided to accept no contribution greater than $50. He won the election while spending less than a quarter of the $1 million spent by his opponent, Jim Francesconi.

By the time of the next mayoral election in 2008, the CFF was in place and the overall level of spending dropped. The winner of that race, Sam Adams, did not participate in the CFF, and, according to the state campaign reporting database, his campaign spent about $370,000 in 2008. His opponent, Sho Dozono, was also privately funded and spent about $265,000.

Opponents say these last two mayoral races show that Portlanders will reject big money candidates out of principle and that, for candidates like Potter who possess genuine community support, public funding is unnecessary. However, Potter himself has said that his circumstances were unique: Mayor Vera Katz was not running for reelection and as a former chief of police he had advantages such as name recognition and organizational support that allowed him to spend less than his opponent.

Finally, proponents argue that, given constitutional constraints, the CFF is one of the few means to control the influence of money in politics. Free speech protections in the U.S. Constitution and the Oregon Constitution bar involuntary limits on campaign spending and contributions, while voluntary limits such as those imposed by the CFF are constitutional and can control the influence of big donors.

**Conclusion**

Your committee concludes that there is a widespread perception that the role of money in politics is deleterious. In recent years, the largest contributors to political campaigns in Portland have been unions, businesses and individuals associated with businesses. Whether or not these big donors have outsize influence, it cannot be doubted that they have the ears of candidates who must spend time soliciting contributions from them.

The CFF can counter the perception that money equals access by allowing qualified candidates to run for office without relying on large private contributions.

While the records of contributions to any campaign in Oregon are accessible through the state’s mandatory ORESTAR reporting system, your committee believes that citizens generally lack the time and know-how to track the relationship, if any, between campaign contributions and the actions of elected officials. The CFF offers voters the option to vote for candidates who they know have received no big-money contributions.

While we cannot say with certainty that the decline in overall campaign spending observed in recent years is either a long-term trend or attributable to the CFF, your committee concludes that the spending limits placed on participating candidates may help constrain spending by non-participating candidates and reduce their reliance on big-money donors.

Given the constitutional prohibitions on laws limiting political contributions and expenditures, your committee concludes the CFF may be one of the few avenues available for encouraging voluntary restraint in campaign contributions and expenditures.
COMPETITION AND INCLUSION

Proponents and opponents of Measure 26-108 made the following arguments about the impact of the Campaign Finance Fund on the competitiveness and inclusiveness of city elections:

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<th>PRO</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Public financing may encourage the candidacy of individuals from under-represented groups within the city.</td>
<td>• There is insufficient evidence to conclude that individuals from under-represented groups will run for public office if public funding is available.</td>
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<td>• Public financing confers legitimacy on lesser-known candidates who challenge incumbents, ultimately forcing incumbents to engage in meaningful debate.</td>
<td>• Successful fundraising without taxpayer assistance can be an indicator of a candidate’s community support: if a publicly funded candidate cannot sell a message, should he or she be elected?</td>
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<td>• Public financing frees up candidates’ time, allowing them more contact with prospective voters.</td>
<td>• The 1,000 signature threshold does not necessarily reflect broad community support for a candidate.</td>
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Analysis

Both sides of the debate agree that a healthy democracy requires a diverse pool of competitive candidates, with broad and deep support from the many communities that make up the city.

Proponents argue that publicly funded campaigns enhance true competition, encouraging candidates from under-represented groups to enter the political process by lowering the fundraising barrier. In contrast, opponents point to limited objective evidence that public funding encourages candidates who would not otherwise have run.

Among the candidates who have received CFF funding to date, one – John Branam – is African-American and one – Amanda Fritz – is a woman.* By becoming only the seventh woman to be elected to the Portland City Council, Fritz, a community activist, has often been singled out as the kind of candidate the system was designed to encourage to run.

Indeed, Commissioner Fritz told your committee that she would not have run again for office after her first unsuccessful candidacy if not for public funding. She has pointed to her independence in office as a benefit of public funding. To date she is one of only two CFF

* Another female candidate, Emilie Boyles, qualified for funding in 2006, but was later disqualified and ordered to return public funds.
candidates who has been elected, the other being an incumbent, Erik Sten.

An assumption of the CFF program is that broad community support is ensured by the qualifying requirement of signatures and $5 donations from 1,000 voters. When interviewed by your committee, Commissioner Randy Leonard disputed that contention, observing that a candidate who can draw sufficient signatures from an organization with a large membership base need not appeal to the larger community. This, he asserted, means that a special interest can have as much influence in a publicly funded race as in a privately funded race.

Data from publicly funded campaigns tends to show that the CFF encourages candidates to draw support from a wide geographic area. In the 2006 election cycle, publicly financed candidates drew qualifying signatures and contributions from individuals with addresses widely distributed across the city. In contrast, privately funded candidates drew most of their contributions from individuals and entities grouped in the downtown and west side areas. This by itself suggests that publicly-funded candidates have been more likely to cast a broad geographic net in obtaining support and are more likely to listen to the concerns of people residing outside the city’s traditional centers of influence.

Even if a candidate qualifies for public funds through personal outreach, does this indicate the level of support necessary to pose a real challenge to incumbents? Opponents say it does not, pointing to the poor showing of publicly funded candidate Jesse Cornett against sitting Commissioner Dan Saltzman in 2010. In that election, Cornett received less than 10 percent of the vote.

However, as Cornett stated in an editorial in The Oregonian following his defeat, had he not been a candidate, Commissioner Saltzman would have faced no well-funded opposition. Despite his poor showing, Cornett argues that his publicly-funded campaign brought media attention to the race and forced the incumbent to defend his record to the public.

Incumbents have a natural advantage in running for re-election, including name recognition and access to individuals and entities that are willing to help fund a campaign. Data from states with public funding of legislative races shows that while the margin of victory for incumbents has shrunk, publicly funded challengers do not defeat incumbents more often than do privately funded challengers. That no CFF-funded candidate has unseated an incumbent does not defeat the program’s purpose, according to proponents. They argue that turning out incumbents was never the goal of the CFF; rather, the goal is to level the playing field and make campaigns against incumbents more competitive. To that extent they argue it has been a success.

Portland’s limited experience with public funding has not yielded enough data for political scientists to reach firm conclusions about the effect of CFF on competition and inclusion. But anecdotal evidence from participating candidates and data from other jurisdictions show that public funding has a beneficial impact on candidates’ interaction with voters. Studies of public funding of state legislative races in Arizona, Connecticut and Maine have shown that publicly funded candidates spend more time meeting and interacting with citizens than do privately funded candidates. Publicly funded candidates interviewed by your committee likewise cited their ability to spend time meeting potential voters instead of raising campaign funds as a benefit.

**Conclusion**

Your committee agrees with those who argue that public funding leads to “incumbent improvement.” When an incumbent runs for re-election, the CFF allows qualifying challengers to run a viable campaign and to raise issues that incumbents might otherwise hope to avoid. The benefit from public funding is not measured by the defeat of incumbents, but rather by the opening of a dialogue with incumbents that might not otherwise occur.

Your committee also concludes that the threshold to qualify for funds is sufficiently high to discourage frivolous candidates and low enough that candidates with no ties to special interest organizations can run a viable race. Your committee believes this makes it possible for a wider and more diverse pool of candidates to emerge, giving the electorate more — and possibly better — choices on their ballot.
ADMINISTRATION

Proponents and opponents of Measure 26-108 made the following arguments regarding the administration of the Campaign Finance Fund:

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<tr>
<td>Portland’s City Auditor and the Citizen Campaign Commission have continuously improved and adequately managed the CFF to protect public funds.</td>
<td>The program can be – and has been – abused: one publicly funded candidate still owes the city more than $90,000 in fines and repayment of funds used inappropriately.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The program is sufficiently flexible to address problems that arise; it evolves as changes are needed.</td>
<td>The rules can change in the middle of an election, putting a candidate who seeks public funding at a disadvantage.</td>
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Analysis
Every opponent of Measure 26-108 interviewed by your committee invoked the name of Emilie Boyles, a candidate for City Council who received public funding in 2006. Boyles made unauthorized expenditures with her CFF funds, including a payment of $12,500 to her 16-year-old daughter, and payment in full on a one-year lease of office space for her campaign headquarters. She was later disqualified as a participating candidate, penalized and ordered to return public funds. Vladimir Golovan, who collected qualifying signatures and donations for Boyles, was convicted of crimes relating to the submission of falsified signatures for another candidate.

While opponents consider this to be evidence that the system is subject to abuse and full of hidden administrative costs to the taxpayer, proponents say the system’s rules and administration have improved and that another Boyles incident is not likely to occur. For example, the county elections office now checks the validity of signatures gathered by candidates, making it impossible for candidates to qualify based on a set of fraudulent signatures.

Opponents argue that CFF administration is capricious and that rules or the interpretation of the rules can change in the middle of a campaign, seriously threatening the viability of a candidate who may suddenly lose public funding. For example, after Sho Dozono qualified for public funding in his campaign for mayor in 2008, other mayoral candidates challenged his qualification, contending that the cost of a public opinion poll conducted by supporters before he announced his candidacy exceeded the cap on in-kind contributions. Based on the challenges, Dozono was disqualified from the program. He decided to continue to run as a privately-funded candidate, ultimately losing to Sam Adams. Opponents say this changing interpretation of the rules was unfair to Dozono, and had he not been able to raise private funds to continue his campaign Adams would have been virtually unopposed.

Proponents argue that the CFF, with its built-in appeals process and reliance on administrative hearings, allows for quick resolution of disputes. They argue that the CFF provides a sufficiently transparent process, and that over time the rules have become more comprehensive and better understood by candidates and their advisors.

As for the Dozono incident, while it is undisputed that the applicable rules were unclear at the time, the hearings and appeals process built into the system provided Dozono and the public with a quick, fair resolution to the matter. The CFF was amended after the election to provide better guidance regarding in-kind contributions. The system, say proponents, corrects itself quickly and efficiently.

Conclusion
Your committee believes that the integrity of the system today cannot be judged based on events in 2006.
The system has improved over time, and your committee concludes that adjustments to the code and rules make it highly unlikely that misuse of public dollars, as seen in the Boyles incident, will recur.

The ongoing changes recommended by the Citizen Campaign Commission and adopted by the City Council continue to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and integrity of the CFF. The City Auditor’s office engages in extensive education of candidates who seek to participate in the CFF, while reviewing the propriety of publicly funded candidates’ spending on a continuing basis.

The auditor possesses enforcement tools available against misuse of funds, including disqualification and requiring the return of all public funds, sufficient to deter the most likely forms of fraud.

**COST**

Proponents and opponents of Measure 26-108 made the following arguments about the cost of the Campaign Finance Fund:

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<tr>
<td>• The cost of the Campaign Finance Fund represents a very small portion of the city budget and has not burdened city finances.</td>
<td>• Taxpayer-funded elections are a luxury Portland cannot afford, particularly given its current difficulty funding essential city services.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• It is unfair for taxpayers to finance the campaigns of candidates they do not support.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• CFF is funded as an overhead expenditure in the city budget and as long as it represents less than 0.2 percent of the city’s budget it is not subject to cuts as other budget items are.</td>
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**Analysis**

The CFF is funded as an overhead expenditure in the city budget, drawing a small amount from each department of city government. The City Code provides that the CFF’s cost cannot exceed 0.2 percent of the city budget unless the council creates a separate funding source such as new taxes or fees. The city has an annual budget of $2.58 billion; and the cost of the CFF, totaling about $2 million over five years, has been far below the 0.2 percent ceiling.

Opponents argue that taxpayer funded campaigns are an expensive luxury that Portland cannot afford, particularly at a time when even “core” city services are not fully funded. When asked whether they would object to the cost of the CFF if the city budget were flush, all witnesses opposed to the measure demurred and instead argued that the CFF is an inappropriate use of city funds.

Proponents respond that the CFF is expensive only if one assumes that privately funded campaigns have no cost to the taxpayer in terms of the influence of private
contributors on the governing decisions of elected officials. Proponents point to the intrinsic value of having candidates who are freed from even the perception that campaign contributions influence their decisions.

At a practical level, proponents say it is impossible to know exactly where CFF money might otherwise be allocated and that the wide distribution of $2 million over five years would have a minimal impact on any one budget line item.

Opponents object to the fact that the CFF is funded as an overhead expenditure whose cost is passed through to city agencies. Its cost is thus not balanced against that of other city programs at budgeting time. Former City Auditor Gary Blackmer pointed out that the treatment of the CFF as overhead is a vital component of the program, ensuring that CFF participants are allocated sufficient funds to launch viable campaigns.

Related to the cost of the CFF is the question of fairness. Opponents ask: is it fair to make taxpayers finance the political campaigns of candidates they do not support? Proponents answer that taxpayers currently pay their taxes, rates and fees regardless of their support for the individual programs they fund. The actual burden of the cost of the CFF since its inception has been minimal, and is a fair price for the benefits it provides to all taxpayers.

**Conclusion**

The total cost of CFF over three election cycles has been about $2 million. Given that the population of Portland is over 500,000, the cost of CFF over those three cycles is less than $4 per resident, or just about $1 per resident per election.* Your committee believes this minimal investment in clean government and robust democracy represents a good value for Portlanders.

While $2 million would be a great deal of money to any one budget line in a particular year, that same money distributed over five years to every program that has not been fully funded would likely have only a marginal impact on those programs.

The cost of the CFF has never approached its limit of 0.2 percent of the city’s budget for any fiscal year and, should it ever reach that limit, the Council may either identify a separate funding source or alter the program to lower its cost.

* According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Portland’s population in 2006 was estimated at 537,081.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In summary, your committee came to the following conclusions:

• There is insufficient data to allow your committee to draw definitive conclusions about the CFF’s effects on the cost of campaigns, the influence of money on government, or the competitiveness of races. But the indicators to date have been sufficiently positive that your committee concludes the CFF should be retained.

• The CFF can counter the perception that money equals access by allowing qualified candidates to run for office without relying on large private contributions.

• Spending limits placed on participating candidates might, in the long term, also help decrease spending by privately-funded candidates, reducing their dependence on large donors.

• Given the constitutional prohibitions on laws limiting political contributions and expenditures, your committee concludes the CFF may be one of the few avenues available to encourage voluntary restraint in campaign contributions and expenditures.

• Data from states with public funding of state legislative races shows that publicly funded candidates are able to spend more time meeting and interacting with prospective voters than are privately funded candidates.

• The benefit from public funding of elections is not measured by the defeat of incumbents but rather by the opening of a dialogue with incumbents that might not otherwise occur.

• The threshold to qualify for the CFF is sufficiently high to discourage frivolous candidates and low enough that candidates who do not have ties to any special interest organization can run a viable race. This makes it possible for a wider and more diverse pool of candidates to emerge, giving the electorate more, and perhaps better choices on their ballot.

• Adjustments to the CFF code and rules make it highly unlikely that misuse of public dollars like those that occurred in the first election cycle will occur again. The ongoing changes recommended by the Citizen Campaign Commission and adopted by the City Council continue to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Fund, while simultaneously protecting its integrity.

• The cost of the CFF does not have a significant impact on the city’s ability to pay for core services. At a total cost of less than $4 per resident to date, this minimal investment in clean government and robust democracy represents a good value for Portlanders.

RECOMMENDATION

Your committee recommends a “YES” vote on Measure 26-108.

Respectfully submitted,

Alan Brickley
Steven Carter
Jan Christensen
Patt Flynn
Bernie Giusto
Tom Karnes
Wendy Rahm
Henry Shapiro
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WITNESSES

Diane Betcher, Chief Deputy City Auditor, City of Portland
Gary Blackmer, Oregon Audits Director; and Former Auditor, City of Portland
Andrew Bryans, Executive Assistant to City Auditor, City of Portland
Robert Caldwell, Editorial Page Editor, The Oregonian
Andrew Carlstrom, Former City Elections Officer, City of Portland
Jon Coney, Spokesperson, Portlanders against Taxpayer Funded Campaigns
Jesse Cornett, Publicly Funded Candidate for City Council in 2008
Tim Crail, Policy Advisor to Commissioner Amanda Fritz, City of Portland
Andrew Frazier, Managing Partner, Frazier Hunnicutt Financial
Amanda Fritz, Commissioner, City of Portland
LaVonne Griffin-Valade, City Auditor, City of Portland
Anna Griffin, Metro Columnist, The Oregonian
Paul Gronke, Associate Professor of Political Science, Reed College
Leslie Hildula, Former Chair, Citizen Campaign Commission
Ryan Kinsella, Elections Officer, City of Portland
Randy Leonard, Commissioner, City of Portland
Charles Lewis, Director, Ethos Music Center; Former Publicly Funded Candidate for City Council in 2008
Dave Lister, Guest Columnist, The Oregonian; Candidate for City Council in 2006
Michael Miller, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Springfield
Brian Rohter, Co-Chair, Friends of Voter-Owned Elections
Erik Sten, Distinguished Urban Fellow, Living Cities; Former Commissioner, City of Portland
Heather Stuart, Campaign Manager, Friends of Voter-Owned Elections
Janice Thompson, Executive Director, Common Cause Oregon

CITATIONS

1 Testimony of Ryan Kinsella, Elections Officer, City of Portland, August 13, 2010
2 Portland City Council Resolution 183838.
6 Michael Miller, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Springfield, “Citizen Engagement and Voting Behavior in Publicly Funded Elections,” manuscript under review.
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The mission of City Club is to inform its members and the community in public matters and to arouse in them a realization of the obligations of citizenship.

Additional copies of this report are available online at www.pdxcityclub.org.

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