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Imprisoned Within the National Narrative: a Case Study of the Modern Chinese Move Toward Pragmatic Nationalism

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IMPRISONED WITHIN THE NATIONAL NARRATIVE:
A CASE STUDY OF THE MODERN CHINESE MOVE TOWARD PRAGMATIC
NATIONALISM

By
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An undergraduate honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This paper explains how the traumatic history narrative put forth through the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum has proven itself useful to the Chinese Communist Party in creating a narrative that not only fosters a sense of loyalty to the state, but can also be used as a political ace card. After closely examining the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum it has become evident that the Chinese push for pragmatic nationalism, which began in 1994 and continues to this day, coupled with a flamed fire against “Japanese aggression” are the most active ingredients in the museum as a “National Defense Education Demonstration Base.” The paper studies the history and curatorial design of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, along with a review of the modern East Asian Memory wars, in order to better understand how the museum contributes to the overall national narrative of patriotic heritage. Ultimately, the paper argues that the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is used to create and encourage a very specific narrative about China that influences a sense of identity for Chinese nationals.

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Imprisoned Within the National Narrative:

A Case Study of the Modern Chinese Move Toward Pragmatic Nationalism

I. Introduction

This study analyzes the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum in Dalian, China with the goal of understanding how a Chinese national identity and a sense of heritage have been curated following the Japanese Imperial occupation. (1905-1945) This project focuses on the idea of “difficult heritage” that uses painful and traumatic memories to shape the ways people remember history. “History is written by the winners,” or one might also say, by the authorities. With this in mind, I am interested in the ways museums can be used to create a tailored mass and individual identity and sense of heritage.

Why is this important? In a world alive with endless narratives that create mental maps with which people use to navigate life, understanding where the narratives are coming from and why people pick up on them can lead to a better understanding of the functioning society. Narratives and mental maps are quite complex and exist in a large variety of forms—personal, familial, cultural, national, global, etc. Thus, to try to understand any one narrative and its impacts is a daunting task to say the least. The aim of this paper is to closely examine the use of narrative, especially historical narrative, employed by the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum to encourage patriotic sentiments in Chinese nationals who view the exhibition. By looking at the support that has been given to the museum, the specific narratives that have been curated through the exhibitions, and how viewers have responded to the museum, a better understanding of Chinese heritage will emerge.

Why the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum? There are many reasons the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is a good lens through which to examine the formation of

heritage ideation. The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is one of China's many museums supported by the 1994 push for "pragmatic nationalism" in China. The push for pragmatic nationalism has been a response to the rapid modernization and growth of commercialization in China in recent years. In order to maintain the people's understanding of the state's legitimacy, China has shifted from a Marxist ideology approach to this state-centered patriotism. This might sound like moving from the catchphrase, "We are comrades!" to "I am a Chinese citizen!" Additionally, the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is rich in controversial history, and thus becomes a valuable window into the active memory wars that are taking place in East Asia over the past, particularly in regards to the Japanese Imperial occupation.

II. History

The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum was originally built as an active prison in 1902 by Russian forces. The site was taken over by Japanese colonial authorities in 1907 who continued use of the prison and developed its operations. After the end of WWII, the prison disintegrated and was seemingly left alone until 1970 when the Lüshun Revolutionary Committee decided to carry out a comprehensive restoration of it. Subsequent years saw the prison pass through a variety of local management until 1983 when it was handed over to the Dalian Municipal People's Government. Since then, the museum has been listed as a National Key Cultural Relics Protection Unit by State Council, approved by the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee to grant "national patriotism," and titled "National Defense Education Demonstration Base" by the Chinese National Defense Education Office in 2006.

Stretching from 1902 to present, the prison has gone through some of history's most tumultuous hallmarks, passing through the burgeoning process of modernization and the hands

of many rulers. In order to conduct a thorough analysis of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum itself, it is crucial to first understand the history from which it was created and that is now so central to the museum's existence. For the purpose of consistency and relevance, the historical overview will focus on the Lüshun area at the tip of the Liaoning peninsula and the major historical movements that impacted this area, and therefore the prison/museum.

a. The Construction of Lüshun Fortified Port by Qing Government

Late into the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) of China's last dynasty and five years before the start of the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) the Qing Dynasty governor of Hebei province and the minister of trade affairs of the Northern provinces "concluded that Lushunkou holds the pass to northern provinces and the door to the capital region"¹ as well as military significance. As a result, large-scale construction of the Lushun Fortified Port commenced "after gaining approval from the government" for the defense against invasion. By the winter of 1890, construction was complete on the Lushunkou shipyard, the Square Dashi Dock, nine factories for ship maintenance and repair, and ten-odd coastal fortresses. As one of the two bases and the sole major warship maintenance base in the Northern Fleet, according to The Spectacle of Lushunkou, the Port of Lüshun became known as the "First Fortified Port in East Asia" with its 15,000 stationed ground and navy soldiers.²

b. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Fall of Lüshun

Despite the esteemed reputation, the Port of Lüshun did not last long under the Qing rule. By 1894 China was at war with Japan over the Korean Peninsula, putting to test the effectiveness of the Qing dynasty's reforms. "Outdated equipment, insufficient munitions, and poorly trained officer corps doomed the Chinese to failure, and on 17 September 1894 Japan sent the majority

¹ The Spectacle of Lushunkou, Dalian Formal Museum Culture Communications Co., Ltd., 2002, p. 7.

² The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 7.

of the Beiyang [Qing] Fleet to the ocean floor.”³ Or as *The Spectacle of Lushunkou*, a Chinese publication on local tourism, recounts, “on September 17th, the Qing Northern Fleet suffered a setback.” The following winter, Japanese forces pressed through Korea into Manchuria advancing the battle lines. On November 21st, the Japanese overtook the Port of Lüshun followed by a four-day massacre in which twenty thousand Chinese civilians were killed.⁴ By April of 1895, the Qing court was ready to sue for peace.⁵

c. The Seven-year Tzarist-Russian Occupation of Lüshun

In March 1898, the Qing government signed two treaties with Tzarist-Russia entitled, “Treaty of the Lease of Luda” and “The Second Treaty of the Lease of Luda,” allowing the Russians to occupy the Lüshun/Dalian area for seven years. (“Luda” was the name used to refer to the combined cities of Lüshun and Dalian.) During that time, the Tzarist-Russian troops forced thousands of Chinese civilians to build railways, strongholds, forts, and other buildings, including the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison.⁶

d. The Russian-Japanese War in Lüshun

From 1904 to 1905 the Tzarist-Russian Empire engaged with the Japanese Empire in a battle, much like the Sino-Japanese War, over the Korean and Manchurian territories. Interestingly, Japan’s conquest over Russia marked a pinnacle moment in history as the first non-Western nation to defeat an imperial Western power, thus proving that the ability to modernize was not dependent on race. Following the defeat of Tzarist-Russia, Japan occupied Lüshun for forty years, until the fall of the Japanese Empire in 1945. During the occupation, Japan

³ David Kenley, *Modern Chinese History*, Association for Asian Studies, Inc., p. 33.

⁴ *The Spectacle of Lushunkou*, p. 8.

⁵ Kenley, p. 33.

⁶ *The Spectacle of Lushunkou*, p. 9.

developed vast infrastructure and industry in the colonies, Lüshun was no exception. One of the developments was the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison.

e. The Liberation of Lüshun in 1945

The year 1945 marks a major turning point in history for the world as the end of the Second World War. For Lüshun it was no less of an important day. The Japanese Imperial surrender meant that Manchuria—and therefore Lüshun—was no longer a Japanese colony. About a week after the surrender, the Soviet Red Army came to garrison Lüshun to disarm Japanese troops, and thus “Lüshun was returned to the motherland.” According to the “Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty” and the “Agreement on Lüshun,” the area of Lüshun would serve as the base of the Soviet Navy.⁷

The year 1950 saw more treaties signed between the two communist nations that eventually entailed the Soviet forces to end military control over the Luda region and assume garrison duties. In 1954, Chinese and Soviet leaders, including Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev, signed the “Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué Concerning the Withdrawal of the Soviet Troops from the Jointly-Utilized Lüshun Naval Base and the Return of it to the Government of the People’s Republic of China for Sole Administration.”⁸

f. The Transition of Lüshun to China

Early in 1955, under commission from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Third Formation of the Chinese People’s Volunteers returned from Korea to take charge of Lüshun’s defense. The Chinese Communist Party also sent Chinese forces from other departments to help garrison Lüshun who were met by the Soviet troops in Lüshun.⁹ The formal transition of defense between the Chinese and the Soviet troops took place in February 1955 and

⁷ The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 12.

⁸ The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 13.

⁹ The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 14.

by April that year, the People's Liberation Army was responsible for the defense of Lüshun. On May 26th, the last group of garrison, the senior generals and staff member of the command of the Soviet troops returned home by train, marking the success of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Lüshun.¹⁰ Lüshun was at long last returned to China where it has grown under the Chinese Community Party until present day.

III. Memory Wars

What are “memory wars” and how much of this paper intersects with this topic? Today, just short of seventy-five years after the end of World War II, there are still many people alive who remember the numerous atrocities that came with the war. Specifically, for most of North East China, this means there are folks who remember life lived under the colonial rule of Imperial Japan. Some of the memories might be pleasant, but it is the unpleasant ones that have largely lived on and grown in the lives of the survivors, their respective generations, and the general cultural aura around them. Much of this could very likely be a result of holding a sour grudge. However, there is much evidence that shows that anti-Japanese sentiments have been encouraged on a structural level, including forms such as marketing techniques, propaganda, and education so as to benefit the state in securing its authority over the people by means of loyalty via a strong sense of heritage. Scholar Zheng Wang examines this matter thoroughly in his book, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations.¹¹

At the 2004 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperate meeting Hu Jintao, the sixth president of the People's Republic of China, stated, “To treat history appropriately is the only way to

¹⁰ The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 16.

¹¹ Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, Columbia University Press, 2014.

translate historical burden into power of moving ahead.”¹² Hu Jintao proceeded to discuss “the root cause for the difficulties of bilateral political relations” between China and Japan—the disputed visit of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine. Hu Jintao’s speech is a glimpse into the ongoing historical memory war between the East Asian nations China, Japan, and Korea.

Difficulty reconciling the past between these nations, particularly regarding the Japanese Imperial legacy in East Asia during the modern period, has lead rise to international attention and domestic responses in a variety of forms. The so-called East Asian memory wars are one of the most vibrant historical memory wars of the contemporary era and often lead to conflict on political, social, and economic grounds. The conflict is often referred to by titles such as the “memory problem,” the “War of Resistance Against Japan,” “memory war,” and so on. For the purposes of this paper, the issue will henceforth be referred to as “memory war.” In order to better understand the complexities of the East Asian Memory Wars, a general understanding of “memory war” as a concept is due.

Beyond the psychological nature of how the human brain “remembers,” the phenomena of memory is a powerful force in personal, social, and political realms. Memory has the power to unite or divide, depending on how it is used. Memory and history are closely affiliated; one might even argue that history is a collection of memories. It has been stated that,

“History provides us with a vantage point, not for recovering or discovering the past but for entering into a dialogue with. Remembering in this sense conceives of history not as a constraint of the present but rather as a compelling moment for crucial viewpoints to be

¹² Bo Ram Yi. "The Memorialization of Historical Memories in East Asia." ProQuest, Dissertations and Theses, 2017. p.36.

constructed for critical purposes. History, therefore, becomes a source of imaginative power.”¹³

In their thesis titled, “The Memorialization of Historical Memories in East Asia,” Bo Ram Yi points out that scholars have recognized three main tracks for how history is used. “First, memory is utilized as a tool. [...] Secondly, the field appears to examine the relationship between memory and identity from national, regional, and supranational identities. Third, there is consideration of whether individuals and civil society members are aware of what is happening.”¹⁴ Keeping these three tracts in mind will be helpful as the author examines the use of historical narrative in the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, particularly how narrative helps formulate patriotic heritage.

a. Collective, Historical, and Official Memory

There are three prominent types of memory to consider: collective memory, historical memory, and official memory. To describe these in layman terms, one might compare collective memory to an inside joke—it only exists within the consciousness of those who can remember the joke as it originally occurred. As Bo Ram Yi states, “collective memory contends that the past is not about whether the truth is being recognized or remembered, but, rather, the recollection of a memory is socialized based on the group.”¹⁵ Collective memory is often tied to the socialization of a group bound together by a shared memory.

On the other hand, one might compare historical memory to a book of jokes—a recording that is not dependent on the one participating in the joke to have a personal memory of how it originally occurred. Better put, historical memory is “how we can participate in collective

¹³ Bo Ram Yi, p. 21.

¹⁴ Bo Ram Yi, pp. 21-22.

¹⁵ Bo Ram Yi, p. 14.

remembering of events we did not personally experience.”¹⁶ Where collective memory is related to a direct experience, historical memory often represents the culture of a current social community as a reflection of the community’s past. Finally official memory is that which is written by powers at hand. Official history can be understood as the status quo or establishment history. As Carol Gluck puts it, official memory “includes all official forms of national history, whether produced by the government, the educational bureaucracy, politicians invoking history as they saw fit, or public ceremony.” Gluck goes on to explain that, “in terms of hegemonic weight, this custodial group [those determining official memory] wielded the greatest institutional power.”¹⁷ Being that the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is an institution maintained by the Chinese government, it is undoubtedly predicated by official memory determined by the CCP, although it does also contain elements from all three types of memory.

How is the understanding of memory relevant to this paper? The simple answer is, history is political and it was largely politics that formulated the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum as a vessel for memory. Thus, an understanding of memory and politics will allow for a deeper understanding the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Although the contentious period of history involved more nations than just Japan, China and Korea, this paper focuses most closely on China, since the museum that the paper analyses is a Chinese museum.

b. Politics of Memory

Memories of the past in East Asia have evolved during multiple decades with a vivacity that draws attention from fascinated scholars and perplexed observers. The memory war’s persistence is historically rather unique, begging the question, why? It can be argued that the memory wars persist because they are being used for political and social leveraging. When

¹⁶ Bo Ram Yi, p. 18.

¹⁷ Gordon, Andrew, Post War Japan as History, University of California Press, 1993. From the chapter “The Past in the Present” by Carol Gluck, p. 71.

discussing the matter of “the clash of histories,” particularly in regards to traumatic events, Bo Ram Yi remarks,

“Asia [...] shows hyperawareness on this topic to this day. Although the region is facing numerous challenges, at the core it appears to be these historical events causing the problems. The past is significant in terms of its influence on the development of national identity and perception.”¹⁸

People in Japan, China, and Korea engage with their complex histories in ways that not only impact relations with neighbors, but also contributes, in no small way, to the formulation and retention of the individual nation’s patriotic identities. For example, South Korean and Chinese political leaders, as well as the peoples of those nations, scrutinize Japanese official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In moments of particular tension, diplomatic meetings often get cancelled and disrupted. Citizens of South Korea and China will often express their frustrations by means like boycotting Japanese brands and other such extremes.

Interestingly, the East Asian memory war might be functioning on more levels than just remembering history. The memory war also serves as a means to influence matters within the nations, certainly for China and South Korea, to represent history in such a way that shapes the interpretation of heritage and the formation of identity. There are many ways that the history is being maintained and serving these purposes. Scholars have identified language, infrastructure, and symbolism as some of the ways that this narrative of chosen glories and chosen traumas are being maintained in the heart and mind of the Chinese people.

The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is an interesting case study from the East Asia memory war because it employs all three of the above-mentioned ways to maintain the narrative. Infrastructurally, the site is both a historic relic from the war as well as an active

¹⁸ Bo Ram Yi, p. 23.

Chinese museum. Furthermore, the museum has been carefully curated so as to evoke patriotic sentiment through the language and symbolism used by and for the museum. Because the historical wars between Russia, Japan, and China are what produced the prison (which then became the museum,) naturally the exhibitions focus on the issues from the wartime history. If the on-going East Asian memory issue is a war, then the battlefields are museums and places of historical significance, and the weapons are propaganda, education, and narrative heritage. Simply put, real and painful memories from the war are being encouraged by the CCP to foster anti-Japanese sentiments (to a degree) for the cause of establishing loyalty to the state authority.

c. Maintaining the Narrative

If language, infrastructure, and symbolism are all ways that narrative is being maintained through the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, the questions of “who” and “why” remain. Considering that the museum is a state-run enterprise, a short answer to “who” is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Regarding the “why,” the memory wars are being used for political and social leveraging. The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, an artifact of the war itself and a state-sponsored entity, contributes to both the memory war as well as to the development of Chinese pragmatic nationalism.

Through the protection and promotion of significant items of China’s historical and cultural heritage, the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum has not only been preserved through the years, it has also been utilized as an impactful tool in promoting national heritage in the form of patriotism. Article twenty-two of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China reads:

The State promotes the development of art and literature, the press, radio and television broadcasting, publishing and distribution services, libraries,

museums, cultural centres and other cultural undertakings that serve the people and socialism, and it sponsors mass cultural activities. The State protects sites of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics and other significant items of China's historical and cultural heritage.¹⁹

The state “sponsors mass cultural activities” that “serve the people and socialism.” There are numerous examples of this including tourism, holidays, certain traditions, and even public broadcasting. Every year during the Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), China Central Television hosts a remarkable nation-wide program that nearly out-performs the 2008 Beijing Olympics Ceremony in terms of production. The core themes of the program are undoubtedly patriotic in sentiment and pointedly in support of “the people and socialism.”

However, in regards to this paper, the author is most interested in the section of the article supporting “sites of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics and other significant items of China's historical and cultural heritage.” Each of those clauses have been used to describe and justify the worth of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum by a variety of sources, including official Chinese sources such as the local municipal government.²⁰ It is helpful to consider the twenty-second article of the Chinese constitution in relation to the twenty-fourth article:

The State strengthens the building of a socialist society with an advanced culture and ideology by promoting education [...]. The State advocates the civic virtues of love of the motherland, of the people, of labour, of science and of socialism. It conducts education among the people in patriotism and collectivism, in internationalism and communism and

¹⁹ “Constitution of the People's Republic of China,” *State Council of the People's Republic of China*, (Article 22.)

²⁰ “Japan-Russia Former Prison Site Museum,” *Dalian Lushukou Municipal Government*, 2013.

in dialectical and historical materialism, to combat capitalist, feudal and other decadent ideas.²¹

The second half of this article is quite illuminating, as it testifies to the role of not only the museum, but also of memory (and most importantly the partnership between these) to promote loyalty to Chinese identity and against anything that is retrograde. Pragmatic nationalism can also be argued as an outworking of the Constitution's twenty-fourth clause. Indeed, in a speech to the National Conference of Museums, the Minister of Culture Sun Jiazheng stated, "When facing much fiercer competition in the cultural field worldwide, museums should intensify efforts to popularize patriotism and socialism."²² The worldwide competition mentioned might include challenges to China's official version of history. Noting what is (and what *isn't*) curated and exhibited in museums, implicitly or explicitly, informs the ways in which the museum interprets national history.

d. Pragmatic Nationalism Museum Movement

In June 1994, the national conference on education adopted a new set of 'Guidelines for Patriotic Education.' The new guidelines were the first major switch away from Marxist ideology toward pragmatic nationalism. The widespread embrace of nationalism was largely a response to the rapid modernization and growth of commercialization in China.²³ Immerging in tandem with the new 'Guidelines for Patriotic Education' was an Outline for Conducting Patriotic Education that was issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The education campaign was directed at:

²¹ "Constitution of the People's Republic of China,"(Article 24.)

²² "Report of speech by Minister of Culture Sun Jiazheng to the National Conference of Museums." *Xinhua*. October 2000.

²³ Edward Vickers, "Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China," *Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education*, vol. 37, no. 3, 2007, p. 368.

“Boosting the nation’s spirit, enhancing its cohesion, fostering its self-esteem, and sense of pride, consolidating and developing a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and directing and rallying the masses’ patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics [and] helping the motherland become unified, prosperous, and strong.”²⁴

One of the main outlets for patriotism and patriotic education came in the form of widespread official support for “sites of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics and other significant items of China’s historical and cultural heritage.”²⁵ The State Education Commission recognizes an ever-increasing number of sites as either ‘bases for patriotic education’ or ‘bases for training in patriotic education.’ Interestingly, a figure of ten million yuan has been given as the amount that was invested to protect sites specifically related to the Sino-Japanese War in Northeast China between the years 1992 and 1996.²⁶

The promotion of patriotism has resulted in dramatic support for museums, monuments, and holidays in China. As a result, former sites have been renovated and improved, new museums have arisen, and tourism has grown in prominence among national Chinese people, exposing visitors to carefully curated patriotic sentiments. Essentially, a rise in patriotic nationalism has increased participation in the very things that encourage/educate nationalistic sentiments. The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is one of China’s many museums supported by the 1994 push for “pragmatic nationalism.” In many ways, a sense of nationalism allows for a converging sense of belonging—an emotional participation in the identity and community of an ancient and modern world power. Scholar Edward Vickers even goes so far to

²⁴ Vickers, (quoting Zhao, Suisheng “A Nation-state Construction: dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism.”) p. 368.

²⁵ “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.” (Article 22.)

²⁶ Vickers, (quoting Zhao, Suisheng “A Nation-state Construction: dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism.”) p. 369.

draw an interesting comparison between nationalism and Confucianism as serving the same cause to create belonging among members of society, particularly educated members.²⁷

e. From Humiliation to Nationalism

Pragmatic nationalism arose in part as a response to the rapid modernization and growth of commercialization in China. However, another and possibly more significant cause for the rise of pragmatic nationalism was the vivid memories of humiliation that China faced in recent modern history. Some of the many movements of humiliation for China include the Opium Wars, the loss to Japan in the first Sino-Japanese war, the numerous unequal treaties established with other foreign powers, and the “carving of the melon” division of Chinese lands to foreign colonial powers. Facing an array of internal political unrest, China was unable to take a stand against the various circumstances of humiliation until the current regime came to power and finally brought the nation to a stable stance.

The pain of these circumstances has not been forgotten in China. In an attempt to best process the humiliation and stay a step ahead of the emotional response to such complex history, the CCP has employed pragmatic nationalism as a positive counter-emotion to the shame. Yet, the shame is not brushed under the rug, so to say, rather the CCP has inaugurated the political campaign “Never Forget: National Humiliation” as a means to engage the shameful memories as lessons for the future. In the words of Xi Jinping, current president of the PRC, “History is the best textbook, so studying it will teach us to understand the country and the party, and open the gates to a brighter future.”²⁸ President Xi has also expressed the *necessity to forgive* those responsible for the war as well as the need to *never forget* the past.

²⁷ Vickers, p. 368.

²⁸ Bo Ram Yi, p. 40.

It can be argued that China's humiliation has fueled the patriotic fire that is shaping much of the Chinese national—and individual—identity through forms of media, education, and social involvement. The “Never Forget” campaign is a wonderful example of how memory is used for political strategies. The campaign is also known as “The great war of resistance against Japanese aggression.” However, for all the vivacity with which the CCP has promoted memories of patriotic struggle for the use of nationalism, the State has been quite selective with the different chapters of history that it chooses to engage with and promote. To illustrate, memories that are revived and reinforce are predominantly memories from the patriotic struggle against Japanese aggression, yet there is no mention of movements from the Maoist era, such as The Great Leap Forward or The Cultural Revolution.

IV. The Exhibition

The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum provides a historical narrative. This formerly active prison, intersects with Russian, Japanese and Chinese history in Manchuria, and now plays an active role in shaping historical consciousness. It is valuable to investigate how the site was used under its respective authorities to understand what was left behind and what was carried through the different chapters in the prison/museum's lifetime. How does the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum perform as a heritage site that contributes to the patriotic narrative being curated in Chinese nationals? Two fundamental components of the museum's existence shall be analyzed: the physical museum and the written museum.

a. The physical museum:

Due to the rich history of the prison itself, growing from Russian, Japanese, and Chinese histories, the museum has been labeled by China as a National Key Cultural Relic Protection

Unit, among many other titles. Clearly, the museum plays an important role in the “Never Forget: National Humiliation” campaign to bolster patriotism among Chinese citizens.

Located in the Port Arthur district of Lüshun, Dalian, Liaoning Province, China, the museum is a prominent tourist attraction at the tip of the Liaoning peninsula. People travel near and far to come see the extensive exhibitions of a prison that has been largely unaltered since the time of its active prison usage. While in Lüshun, visitors might also visit the many other tourist attractions, most of which are other important locations that played their own parts in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and World War II. These include war bunkers, shipyards, buildings of former governing powers, and now posthumous commemoration locations. Most of these other attractions play equally important rolls in pragmatic nationalism and heritage education.

As was discussed in the history section of this paper, the prison first began as a Tsarist operation in 1902 during the Russian occupation of the region. After Japan defeated Russia in 1905, ending the yearlong Russo-Japanese war, the site was taken over by Japanese colonial authorities in 1907 who continued use of the prison and developed its operations. There are 275 prison cells total which can hold as many as 2,000 prisoners.

The museum consists of two main sections, the Old Scenic (site) Exhibition which are the general components of the historical prison, and the Special Exhibitions. The exhibitions available for viewing at the museum include: the panoramic sand table, the check room, the east side cell, the Anzhong root cell, the secret/dark prison, the guard lounge, the guarding department/ring guard, the torture room, the watch station, relics room, teaching room, west side cell, western check-in room, workshop, triangle, north gate, medical department, gallows, and the prison cemetery restoration exhibition.

The Special Exhibitions include *The Japan-Russia Invasion and Occupation Physical Evidence Exhibition*, which highlights the forty-year colonization of Dalian between Russia and Japan. Photographs and other physical materials “expose the sinful crimes committed by the two imperialist countries in Dalian.” (Lushun Japanese-Russian Prison Site, Baidu) *The Special Exhibition of Calligraphy in An Junggeun’s Prison* displays the work of a former inmate whose nationalistic spirit resisted the Japanese colonists, and is most well known for his assassination of the Japanese general, Ito Hirobumi in Harbin 1909. *The Hellfire Display* focuses on the inmate experience of the prison. This exhibition in particular utilizes the narrative technique of telling the stories of individuals. The last special exhibition is *The International Warriors Special Exhibition in Lushun*, which commends the deeds of Korean, American, and Japanese individuals who “promoted their revolutionary heroism”²⁹ by acts of resistance to Japan. One such example is the Korean activist An Jung-geun, who is most well known for his assassination of the Japanese general Ito Hirobumi on October 26, 1909 and was subsequently imprisoned in the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison.

In addition to the Old Scenic Exhibitions and the Special Exhibitions, the museum also hosts temporary exhibitions and a collection of cultural relics. Outside the prison walls there are kilns, farm grounds, orchards, and vegetable plots which were used for forced labor. As of 2016, the museum grounds were 26,000 square meters with 12,521 square meters of buildings.³⁰

A detailed account of the museum’s history is as follows. In 1902, Russia began construction of the buildings that were used between 1904-1905 as horse barracks and a field hospital during the Russo-Japanese War. After the Japanese defeat of Russian forces in 1907, Japanese colonial authorities began and developed use of the site under the title, “Kanto Dudufu

²⁹ “Lushun Japanese-Russian Prison Site Museum,” *Baidu*, 2019.

³⁰ *Baidu*, 2019.

Prison Service.” By 1920, Japanese authorities open a kiln, vegetable fields, farms, and guard training centers, as well as renamed the site to “Guandong Hall Prison.” Between 1926 and 1939 the prison was renamed three different times with the last title being “Lushun Criminal Office.” On August 15, 1945, the prison disintegrated with the end of the Japanese Colonial presence in Manchuria, marking the end of foreign imperial use of the prison facilities.

There is little to no information available regarding the status of the prison for the following twenty-five years after the end of the Japanese occupation, particularly whether or not the prison was used as an incarceration facility by the CCP before it was turned into a museum or if it was simply left vacant. The next recorded date available of the site is October 1970, when the Lushun Revolutionary Committee carried out a comprehensive restoration of the prison site. In July 1971, the Lushun Prison Exhibition Hall was officially opened to the public, however it was cancelled in March 1979 for an unknown (to the author) reason. In June 1983, the brigade handed over the former site of the Lushun Prison to the Dalian Municipal People’s Government and in August 1992, the site is renamed “the Lushun Japanese-Russian Prison Site Gallery” from the pre-existing name, “The Lushun Imperialist Invasion of China Remains” and again in May 2003, it was changed to the title, “The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Site Museum,” which remains to be the official name of the museum to this day. The site also maintains the title of “The Dalian Modern History Research Institute.”

This paper focuses on the ways this particular approach to history education—that is, heritage-centered education methods that result in a patriotic sentiment—has been and continues to be incorporated throughout the threads of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Perhaps a visual will help represent this idea more clearly. Imagine a scenario including an operator, a machine, raw material, and a final product. The operator places the raw material into

the machine, which then processes it and turns it into consumable products. This idea might seem a little harsh, but can prove helpful. If this is the case, then the operator is the Chinese State, who is in control of the narrative curated at the state-run museum. The raw material is “history,” the machine is the museum, and the final product is the sense of heritage created—in this case particularly, patriotism.

b. The Written Museum

Taking into account the variety of ways to consider memory, including the ideas of collective memory, historical memory, and official memory, this paper will now turn to a close analysis of the written components regarding Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Through the analysis, the author hopes to determine/gain an understanding of how the museum has selected specific components of history to exhibit and furthermore, how these selected histories impact museum viewers. To conduct this analysis, the paper will study the museum through two main factors: information written by, for, or about the museum; and photographs of the museum for visual analysis. The written sources and visual photographs are closely analyzed with the goal of understanding the museum’s selection and use of photographs, syntax and multiple languages to propagate a cultural narrative of Chinese patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiments.

Written information on the museum is studied in terms of internal and external information. Internal information is anything from the exhibition, pictures of the museum, as well as books from the museum. External information includes articles, reviews, and books written about museum, not by the museum. Unfortunately, the author is not able to visit the museum during the scope of this project, however accounts from multiple previous visits from when the author lived in Dalian will be drawn from along with current research to conduct the study. In order to have the most up-to-date information as possible, the photographs to be

examined were taken during the time of research—courtesy of the author’s mother, who lives near the museum.

Presently, there are portions of the museum that have been temporarily closed off for refurbishing. The main sections of the museum are still open and available to visitors, but the areas closed for refurbishing include the infirmary, the execution room, the room where experiments were conducted on prisoners, and an exhibition with murals about the killings and burials in the mountains. The photographs primarily focus on the museum’s exhibitions, information placards, and scenery.

Obviously, the best source of information on the museum is the museum itself. This includes the physical remnants of the prison: the buildings, artifacts, and remaining documents. In addition to the museum, there are numerous books, articles, and websites that are either about the museum or that discuss the museum and its history. Particularly interesting are the books that are sold at the museum as sources of information provided by the museum, about the museum. These sources are posed as official history and are therefore, fundamentally useful in analyzing the official narrative put forth by the authorities of the museum. However, before considering these books, the paper will first examine the information put forth directly by the museum as exhibition material. These exhibition materials (mostly in the form of placards placed throughout the museum) naturally become as much a part of the museum as the prison itself and are put forth as the official and absolute accounts of the prison’s stories. To analyze this source of information, the author will now turn to the photographs taken of the museum for the purpose of this study.

c. Analysis of photographs:

A close examination of the photographs taken of the museum has proven quite revealing. Online, there is little to no information available regarding the museum beyond travel reviews and government overviews. These sources of information are still valuable, and will also be considered. However, the main source of visual analysis for the museum comes from the photographs of the museum, and as such, they will be heavily relied upon. Undoubtedly, this method excludes certain components of information of the museum, such as atmospheres created for the viewers and their responses. Nonetheless, much can be learned from what the photographs do encapsulate.

The museum has been curated in such a way that visitors are able to walk through the prison, seeing the sights of the once-operational arm of Imperial Japan. Thus, the ways in which viewers physically experience the museum are through the buildings, cells, prison grounds and artifacts such as bowls, clothes, shoes and tools. Viewers also receive information from the museum via placards and the optional tour guide or digital audio tour. The placards provide the main source of information for the museum. This information seems to fit into a handful of different categories, mainly: overviews of different characters from the prison's history; testimonies from inmates or people involved with the prison; overviews of the different rooms and departments of the prison; diagrams and illustrations; images of certain documents, for example the statistics of the number of detainees; historical photographs; and other information, such as poems. All the written information of the exhibition is provided in the Chinese, Korean, and English languages. It is not clear if this choice of language was simply a result of the most common demographic of museum visitors, or if it were a more deliberate decision to exclude languages such as Japanese and Russian because of the adverse history the museum represents with these two nations.

Studying the exhibition materials of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is valuable because the information is directly a product from the governing powers of China. Thus, the information can be analyzed for its propaganda and core theme of fostering patriotism in the hearts of Chinese citizens, as they are reminded/educated on the atrocities committed against their people and fellow anti-Japanese sympathizers. The first, and possibly the best example of this propaganda is seen in the Preface to the museum plaque. (Fig. 1) It reads as the following:

“Lushun Japan-Russia Prison was built by Russia and Japan respectively at the beginning of the 20th century. It’s a fascist prison. The primary purpose of this prison was to massacre and imprison the anti-Japanese compatriots. The prison is the microcosm of modern imperialistic aggression to China.”³¹

The paragraph is an excellent example of the pragmatic approach to nationalism that is so central to present day Chinese governance. Language such as, “It’s a fascist prison” and “microcosm of modern imperialistic aggression to China” are rather loaded and immediately engage the viewer’s opinions on the matter, be it positive or negative. Nonetheless, there is a not-so-subtle agenda to the paragraph that subjectively tells the viewers how they are to perceive the prison—Japan is synonymous with evil and oppression, China is synonymous with the victim and, as will be shown through other exhibition materials, the hero.

The mentioned afore categories of information from the museum placards are valuable because they are the most direct source of information about the museum and give a sense of what the museum curators see as the most important aspects of the museum. Thus, a detailed

³¹ Photograph of Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, Preface plaque.

analysis of the various categories of placard information helps reveal the intent behind the museum exhibitions and the tailored narratives they propagate.

Structurally, the information placards play a natural role of introducing and explaining each component of the museum exhibitions. The most basic category of placards seems to be the overviews of the different rooms and departments of the prison. For example, when visiting the museum, one of the first rooms the visitors encounter is the “West Body Checking Room.” The placard for this room explains this to be where detainees were checked twice a day as they came and went from the workshops (Fig. 2.) Information placards for other rooms of the prison include the “Introduction to the First Workshop;” “the Torture Room,” (Fig. 3) which is a popular room of the museum for its particularly atrocious subject matter; the “Guard Department;” the “Guard Lounge;” the “Ward;” the “Dark Ward,” another particularly atrocious section of the museum and therefore a popularly marketed feature of the museum (Fig. 4); and another “Body Checking Room”—to name a few.

It is important to keep in mind that viewers encounter the rooms and sections of the prison museum together with the placards of information, and therefore in a sense, the information is as much a part of the exhibition as the rooms themselves. Thus the placards are closely intertwined with the prison itself and instruct the viewers how to feel as well as respond to the exhibitions. There is little space given to the viewers to assume a narrative separate from that put forth by the information placards. However, placards that correspond to exact locations of the prison are not the only type of information provided by the museum.

To supplement location specific information, there are also numerous overviews and testimonies from certain characters of the prison’s history, which provide more powerful anecdotes and stories for museum visitors to experience the history through. Some of these

figures include Tago Jiro, who was the last director of the prison; Guihara Satakichi, the first warden of the prison; and detainees' stories from their experiences in the Japanese prison. Two examples of personal testimonies that are given through these placards are those of the prison director Tago Jiro, who gave a "confession about hard labor in the factories" (Fig. 5) and inmate Sui Xuemin, who recounts some of his experiences being tortured. (Fig. 6) The testimony from Tago Jiro reads,

"I ordered my subordinates to prepare meal of putrid chaff and husked kaoliang [sorghum] with a lot of sand for the detained Chinese patriots and unarmed residents and force them to do strenuous labor at fifteen factories [...] for more than ten hours per day." (Fig. 5)

This testimony was clearly selected and exhibited by the museum curators to underscore the cruel treatment of the Chinese at the hand of the Japanese rulers. This testimony can be easily compared to another testimony exhibited, that of Sui Xuemin, a "victim" of the prison, who shares experiences of his tortures suffered while at the prison.

"In June 1937, the Japanese seized me because I had worked for the communist party and detained me to the Lushun Prison. Japanese guards tied me to the tiger bench and hit me with bamboo filled with lead until I lost my consciousness. They continued to do this on an every-other-day basis. This torture was named 'open the old wound.' I was imprisoned for three months, suffered one and a half months beating. So far, there are many scars on my body." (Fig. 6)

Other similar placards of personal testimonies exist throughout the museum. These personal testimonies of the harsh treatments experienced at the prison contribute to the overall narrative that the Chinese were victims of the violent and oppressive Japanese. The result is an

emotional response of pity for the prison victims and indignation toward the violent behaviors of the Japanese.

Similar to the personal testimonies are various poems that were written by people during their time in the prison. Each of the poetry placards are displayed as large signs with emotive red backgrounds and images of statues that embody the spirit of resistance, perseverance, and oppression, all of which synchronize well with the poetry content. One of the poems, for example, reads:

“Passion like a fire rises up,
Even after endless suffering.
There is no sorrow in death (for one’s own country,)
The will is as unconstrained/heroic as strong iron and bones.”

(Fig. 7, translation by the author)

The visual design and exhibition of the poetry placards were not made hap-hazardly. They were carefully designed with motives at hand. They represents yet another example of how the museum is curated to foster specific emotional responses to the Chinese and Japanese roles in the history of the prison.

Other types of information available to viewers of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum include diagrams and illustrations (Fig. 8,) images of certain documents pertaining to the prison (Fig. 9,) and multiple historical photographs from the wartime period (Fig. 10.) Although these sources of information are not always directly tied to specific aspects of the museum like the room descriptions or personal anecdotes, they still contribute to the museum narrative by adding layers of evidence that prove the harsh realities that were faced by prison detainees. For example, many of the photographs depict prisoners in the various forced labor

facilities of the museum. The diagrams and illustrations clarify certain principles of how the inmates were treated. The documents exhibited are useful to help viewers understand the realities of the prison operations. Two examples of this are the images of documents that state the total number of detainees (Fig.9) and a list of production income from 1906-1930 and 1940 (Fig. 11.)

The variety of information provided to viewers by the museum goes beyond the placards and visual exhibitions of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, such as guided tours and conversations with museum staff. However, the information discussed above gives a glimpse into the purposefully curated product that the museum puts forth to its visitors. The CCP uses the museum as propaganda to remind viewers of the brutal treatment suffered by Chinese citizens and anti-imperial sympathizers, as well as the victimhood of the Chinese people during the Japanese occupation in Lüshun.

As I was studying the photographs of the museum for this project, a certain photo slipped my attention numerous times before I realized a key detail hidden in the image. The photograph shows a simple scene of the prison grounds between some of the buildings. Aside from the bleak brick buildings and dry winter grass, there is not much to note of the photograph other than the contrasting sign to the right of the pathway. (Fig. 12) The sign shows stereo-typical Chinese communist propaganda imagery including the hammer and sickle, the Chinese flag flying dramatically over the forbidden palace and other iconic symbols of China. These propaganda signs are common around popular tourist sights in China so at first it almost blended in with the scenery. What caught my attention, however, was the slogan written in big text across the sign, which translated reads, “Don’t forget your heart, remember your mission.” Unfortunately, the photograph is not clear enough to make out the rest of the text under the slogan.

This phrase, “Don’t forget your heart, remember your mission” not only encapsulates the heart of the Chinese detainee of the prison, who is often portrayed as brave, loyal to China and treated unfairly at the prison, but is also quite reflective of the nation-wide anthem, “Never forget, national humiliation: Strengthen our national defense.” The sign underscores the pragmatic nationalist narrative that the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is so fundamental in representing. This seemingly random sign in the corridor of the museum is an interesting contrast to the other more “objectively” portrayed information of the museum, yet they both play an essential role in educating the viewer and creating an impactful experience of the museum and moreover the history encapsulated in the museum.

All of these sources of information are connected by the key theme of the Chinese response to recent history. “Never Forget, National Humiliation” is an easily recognizable slogan among China that thoroughly encapsulates the patriotic sentiment in response to the historical events of the Modern era. The second part of this slogan, equally important as the first, is “Strengthen Our National Defense.” Uncoincidentally, much of the historical events of this dramatic history occurred in or near to the Port of Lushun. As a result, the relationship between the landmarks and physical remnants of the war with that of the narrative are closely affiliated. From closely reading and analyzing information put forth as a formal narrative (official history) by the CCP, or organizations monitored by the CCP, some key elements have emerged.

First and foremost, the entire narrative put forth evolves around the understanding that China was a victim of the brutal imperial powers, particularly Tsarist Russia and Imperial Japan. Many of the books that were purchased at the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum propagate this perspective. One book in particular, a collection of photographs from the war-time period, states,

“innocent Chinese common people were killed by Japanese army as spies.”³² (Fig. 13) Ranging between the museum exhibitions, to books written about Lushun, and even to the general public response, it is evident that the war and occupation violence from the foreign empires have been canonized as the great oppression and embarrassment to China. However, that is not the end of the matter. Another reoccurring element of the narrative is a sense of China’s pride and bravery.

In a travel book about Lushun an account is given of the event on November 21st, 1894. The book was published by China Tourism Publishing and was purchased at the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Throughout the book, there are numerous accounts of the Japanese aggression on China. This account is another example of emotionally charged language that characterizes the Japanese “aggressors” as overly violent and the Chinese citizens as victimized heroes. “Japanese aggressing army had been successively slaughtering our common people of Port Lushun for four days from November 21st, 1894; then twenty thousand more people were miserably slaughtered. There were only thirty-six people left in the whole city.”³³ The Japanese invasion that cold November was no doubt brutal and many people suffered from the consequences of war, this is a certain reality.

Nonetheless, it is interesting to have a direct glimpse into the matter from a Chinese perspective from this book. The writing goes on to describe the tenacity of the Chinese people in response to the Japanese. “After the 1905 Russo-Japanese War the Japanese army occupied Lushun again, wanting to repeatedly destroy ‘Ten Thousand Martyrs’ [the location where the 1894 victims were burned and commemorated] but they had to give up because of the boycott of Lushun people. After liberation the Chinese government renovated it, alerting ‘never forget

³² Guo Fuchun, *Russo-Japanese LuDa Battle: Figures*, Jilin People’s Publishing House, 2002, p. 177.

³³ Lv Tongju, *Mysterious Lushun*, China Tourism Publishing House, 2009. p. 119

national shame.”³⁴ The writing portrays an image of the Chinese citizen as a fighter whose tenacity in boycotting redirected the actions of the Japanese forces. The fact that this passage mentions the phrase “never forget national shame” attests to the breadth with which the idea is spread throughout the narrative.

Another Lushun travel book entitled, *The Spectacle of Lushunkou*, also provides a fair amount of information that perfectly exemplifies the Chinese nationalistic narrative that is deeply rooted at the core of Lushun and its history. The book was published by China Photographic Publishing House and gives a thorough listing of all the main tourist attractions of the city, as well as a brief historical overview of modern and contemporary events in Lüshun. Many of the sites are places of historical significance pertaining to the first Sino-Japanese war, the Russo-Japanese war and the Imperial Japanese occupation in Manchuria. *The Spectacle of Lushunkou* is a valuable source because it is a clear example of the official state narrative that is portrayed and sold, quite literally, to the tourists who come to the city of Lushun and its popular tourist sites. For the purposes of this paper, the most significant sight that the book mentions is the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Much like the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum itself, this book is valuable for understanding how select photographs, languages (written in Chinese, Japanese, and English) and syntax are used by the book to propagate a cultural narrative of heritage.

In the book’s preface, readers are immediately inundated with descriptive and loaded language used to describe the port of Lushun, its location, ancient history, and “miseries of the frequent tramples of imperialist and big powers.” The preface concludes with the assertion, “the

³⁴ Lv, 2009, p. 119

port of Lushun consists of half the episode of the modern history”³⁵ because of the city’s prominence in modern history. Throughout the book, the language used to discuss the port’s history is clearly articulated so to foster sympathy and pride toward all things Chinese, and skepticism and blame toward the foreign imperialist powers that brought “ruin and devastation.” The book contains Chinese, Japanese, and English translations of each page. Following is the book’s description of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison:

“The site of the former Lüshun Prison. It was initiated by the Tzarist-Russian colonial authorities in 1902 and extended by the Japanese colonial authorities in 1907. It was the largest prison in the Northeast of China then. [...] Countless national and international anti-fascist fighters were murdered here. Now it is an exhibition hall. In 1988, it was approved to be the nation’s major cultural relics under the state protection. In 1955, it was designated as the national patriotic education base of the museum circles.”³⁶

Once again, the narrative and language put forth through this source of information thoroughly encapsulate the nationalistic narrative that has been taken on by the CCP in the years of humiliation that China suffered through. Today, it can easily be said that China has risen from the ashes to emerge as one of the world’s most powerful and quickly-rising powers. The Chinese economy is one of the biggest globally, second only to the United States, and their international presence is unavoidable. Not only is China a popular destination for travelers and ex-patriots living abroad, but growing numbers of Chinese citizens are also spreading throughout the world, increasing their international presence. In light of China’s undeniable success from the decades after the Japanese occupation, one cannot help but wonder why such a forward-moving nation remains so fixated on a past that is more or less past its expiration date.

³⁵ The Spectacle of Lushunkou, preface.

³⁶ The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 74.

V. Conclusion

This paper explains how the traumatic history narrative has proven itself useful to the CCP in creating a narrative that not only fosters a sense of loyalty to the state, but can also be used as a political ace card. After closely examining the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, it is clear that the push for pragmatic nationalism coupled with a flamed fire against “Japanese aggression” are the most active ingredients in the museum as a “National Defense Education Demonstration Base.” Many sources of official Chinese propaganda, including the museum, are used to create and encourage a very specific narrative about China that influences a sense of identity for Chinese nationals.

As revealing as this study has been, it is imperative to keep in mind that the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is not the only museum curated to propagate a political narrative. Yes, China is an authoritarian state that maintains absolute final say regarding the narratives put forth by museums, but they are not alone in creating and curating a narrative for their viewers. Museums across the board put forth specific narratives for specific reasons. There are numerous similar museums that are specific to war crimes and/or prisons, for example the Seodaemun Prison Museum in South Korea, and Holocaust museums around the world, etc. The invitation is to consider possible deeper motives behind any museum’s curated narrative.

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VII. List of Illustrations

Fig. 1: (Preface to the Museum, Placard)



Fig. 2: (The West Body Checking Room, Placard)




Fig. 3 (West Body Checking Room)



Fig. 4: (The Dark Ward, Placard)




Fig. 5: (Testimony of Tago Jiro)




Fig. 6: (Testimony of Sui Xuemin)




Fig. 7: (Poem)




Fig. 10: (Historical photograph)



Fig. 8: (Diagram/Illustration)



Fig. 9: (Documents about the prison)




Fig. 11 (Production list, document)




Fig. 12: (Propaganda sign)



(Heretofore all pictures of the museum courtesy of friends and family of the author.)

Fig. 13: (Guo Fuchun, Russo-Japanese LuDa Battle: Figures, p. 177)

