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Solidarity Divided: The Miike Strike of 1960 and Fractures within Japan's Labor Movement during the Cold War

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Solidarity Divided: The Miike Strike of 1960 and Fractures within Japan's Labor Movement
during the Cold War

by

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Abstract

One of the most famous episodes of labor seeking concessions from management in postwar Japan was the Miike strike of 1960 in Ōmuta, Fukuoka Prefecture. The goal of the striking coal miners was to pressure management of the Mitsui Mining Company to rescind over a thousand notices that would force those affected into “voluntary retirement,” most targeted union members who were hostile to management. However, there was a lack of unity among the strikers where the miners split between the “first union” and the “second union.” The first union was hostile to management and opposed such rationalization measures entirely. The second union was friendly to management and sought to obtain some concessions while allowing rationalization to occur. The result was a humiliating defeat for the strikers who were unable to rescind the layoffs, leading to its end on December 1, 1960. While it was a story of miners fighting for their livelihoods, Japan’s postwar labor movement coincided with geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan’s defeat in World War II ushered in an era where the United States exerted tremendous leverage on crafting Japanese economic and labor policy. This was also a time when the Truman Doctrine urged the containment of communist influence across the globe. Japan’s geopolitical importance meant the United States needed to dissuade Japanese labor from espousing supposed communist tendencies, and this was done through anticommunist campaigns targeting unions. Despite these efforts, there were growing concerns of militancy as the labor movement reacted to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru implementing anti-labor policies, the Red Purge, and debates on Japan’s neutrality in the Korean War. Simultaneously, labor organizations had concerns on the movement’s ideological shifts to the left, thereby permanently paralyzing attempts for labor unity.

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Table of Contents

Abstract	2
Acknowledgements	3
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations	5
Introduction	6
Chapter 1. The 1960 Strike at Miike	11
Chapter 2. The Cold War: A Labor Movement Compromised	23
Chapter 3. Division within Notions of Geopolitics	33
Conclusion	47
Bibliography	52
Appendix	54

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AFL	American Federation of Labor
Anpo	United States-Japan Security Treaty
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations
CLRB	Central Labor Relations Board
GHQ	General Headquarters
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
JPC	Japan Productivity Center
Keidanren	Federation of Economic Organizations
Mindō	Democratic Leagues
Minrōren	Democratic Labor Movement Liaison Council
Nikkeiren	Japan Federation of Employers' Organizations
NPSL	National Public Service Law
Sanbetsu	Japan Congress of Industrial Unions
Sankoren	Mitsui Coal Miners Federation
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
Shuntō	Spring Wage Struggles
Sōdōmei	General Federation of Trade Unions
Sōhyō	General Council of Trade Unions
Tanrō	National Federation of Coal Miners' Unions
Zaibetsu	Large companies

Introduction

In the late 1860s, the Meiji Restoration brought forth the modernization of government institutions, military apparatuses, and civil participation, and the Japanese leaders also pursued an empire. For instance, in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese established the South Manchurian Railway Company as its political, military, and business arm in what at the time was known as Manchuria (part of the modern-day People's Republic of China). This enterprise represented not only Japanese interests in the aforementioned fields but also eventually would bring Japan into conflict with rising Chinese nationalism.¹

This episode was the precursor to, as historian Sandra Wilson coined it, the Manchurian Crisis in 1931. Although politely termed a crisis, it was a military invasion in response to questions regarding commercial activity leading up to the Wanpaoshan Incident, a dispute between Chinese and Korean farmers in Manchuria over irrigation rights. Since the invasion, the Japanese were at odds with the Chinese, Koreans, and other groups living in the area. While economic interests were critical in understanding Japan's imperial ambitions, there was also a social element. With Manchuria under the realm of Japanese influence, the Japanese government established a program to encourage ordinary Japanese back home, especially farmers, to immigrate to the new lands. However, not many farmers were enthusiastic to leave everything behind and settle somewhere else, let alone outside of Japan.² The purpose of such endeavor was to construct a new society outside of Japan to demonstrate racial unity with the Japanese at the forefront. Hence, the government went to great efforts to provide Manchuria, including the

¹ Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–33* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 17.

² Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1998), 354.

supposedly independent state of Manchukuo, a positive image despite other issues plaguing the region.

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the isolationist United States entered World War II against not only Nazi Germany and Italy in Europe but with Japan in the Pacific. In Japan, there was a propaganda effort to convince its Korean subjects that they and metropolitan Japanese were of equal footing regardless of race and blood.³ In the United States, Japanese Americans were targeted for their perceived threat and blood connections with the enemy. Even though some internees served in the military to prove their loyalty to the United States, they were in segregated units. After tremendous fighting and the atomic bombs decimating Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 14, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced on radio Japan's unconditional surrender where Japan sought "to the dictates of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the [unavoidable] and suffering what is unsufferable [*sic*]."⁴

With Japan economically devastated, there was a rethinking among those in the postwar government and industry to formulate new economic and labor policies. At the same time, there was a growing awareness of developments in the international stage. Japan was under American occupation under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). The powers of SCAP and the General Headquarters (GHQ) were influential in reconstructing the Japanese economy. While SCAP supported political and

³ Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 300.

⁴ "Emperor Hirohito, Accepting the Potsdam Declaration, Radio Broadcast," trans. Domei, Mount Holyoke College, accessed March 9, 2022, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hirohito.htm>.

economic structural changes to the nation's current state the GHQ was worried about the possible communist radicalization of the working class during this time.⁵

Despite SCAP implementing policies that “liberalized” governance and the economy, limitations were apparent as to how far it would want to go in relinquishing industrial power in the hands of workers. The occupation occurred at a time when the Cold War was underway, with the Soviet Union and the United States vying for global influence economically and politically. This held true in the industrial stage when discussing labor-management relations. Historian Andrew Gordon noted, for example, that members of the Sanbetsu Federation (Japan Congress of Industrial Unions) had affiliations with the Japanese Communist Party and sought to provide a voice in labor negotiations with management. In the end, on recommendation of the GHQ, the Japanese government's Red Purge of 1950 brought down the federation.⁶ Labeling federations between acceptable labor unions and more unacceptable ones continued to be repeated throughout the Cold War, alleging that those affiliated with a certain party or ideology may have leverage in pressuring management.

The Cold War may have had a profound effect on delegitimizing organizations, but such setbacks did not deter the Japanese populace from participating in policy discussions. During discussions on Japan's labor policies, popular movements were emerging in response to other domestic and international policies. This was not to suggest the populace had no popular consciousness at all prior to the postwar period. For example, many people participated in celebrations as the Russo-Japanese War progressed in Hibiya Park. The park came to symbolize a meeting ground for popular movements, and its frequent usage for political gatherings made

⁵ John Price, *Japan Works: Power and Paradox in Postwar Industrial Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 59.

⁶ Andrew Gordon, “The Emergence of a Labor-Management Settlement in Japan, 1945–1960,” *International Labor and Working Class History*, no. 50 (Fall 1996): 134, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27672314>.

the police weary.⁷ Even when such movements were held for different occasions and contexts, participation for and against certain policies were nothing new. Another instance was the June 1960 protests against the United States-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) where ordinary citizens and the opposition parties expressed their frustration against Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's persistence for the revisions to be rapidly ratified without consultation from other parties.⁸ This episode highlighted the integral role of the populace in mobilizing against a foreign policy. Opposition parties in the National Diet did not necessarily mobilize the populace. Rather, the people mobilized themselves into "joint-struggle councils," established hierarchies from the local to the national level, and other organizations.

The mobilization of people, whether it would be for the emigration project to Manchuria or to protest a foreign policy measure, also played a crucial role in labor-management relations in postwar Japan. In order to understand the history of labor, worker mobilizations, negotiations with management, and reactions from the government, one must acknowledge how different players responded to domestic and international developments. Especially in the context of the Cold War and the fervor for open civic participation in politics in the immediate postwar years, on one side, Japanese workers fought for better working conditions, higher wages, and more bargaining power with varying successes. On the other, management fought to maintain the status quo, weaken workers' abilities to negotiate, and sustain their businesses in times of dire economic developments.

The most famous and intense case demonstrating these aspects in labor-management relations was the 1960 strike at Mitsui Mining Company's Miike coal mine in Ōmuta, Fukuoka

⁷ Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), xlix.

⁸ Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018): 18.

Prefecture, Japan's largest coal mine in the twentieth century. The Miike miners protested the dismissals of over a thousand miners, which the company used the term "voluntary retirement."⁹ While there was a mobilization campaign to protest against such dismissals, there were also internal divisions within the miner's union. It split into two: one faction was hostile to management and their plans for rationalization, while the other a more management-friendly union that welcomed any means to end the struggle (commonly referred to as the "second union"). The failure of the Miike strike was a byproduct of a compromised and heavily fractured labor movement. It sought to understand its role in the Japanese political and international climate, which permanently divided labor. The United States not only influenced Japanese labor policy in the postwar era but also discredited the labor movement for its supposed communist tendencies.

This essay is not a comprehensive survey of Japanese labor-management relations, conflicts, and sociopolitical and economic developments during the Cold War, but it addresses the most important case study shedding light on the successes and failures of the labor movement in postwar Japan. The first chapter will provide an overview of the 1960 Miike strike and the developments that occurred around that time, especially during a time of immense competition between two ideologies and its implications on the movement in general. The second chapter will discuss American influence in constructing labor policy and organization as well as promoting anticommunism to counteract supposed "radical" elements. The final chapter will discuss the ensuing divisions within the labor movement in the 1950s and the movement understood its position relative to the country's geopolitical significance.

⁹ Benjamin Martin, "Japanese Mining Labor: The Miike Strike," *Far Eastern Survey* 30, no. 2 (1961): 29, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3024261>.

Chapter 1. The 1960 Strike at Miike

The Miike strike of 1960 occurred at a point in Japan's history where political and ideological awareness among the populace flourished. The years following Japan's defeat witnessed workers beginning to realize their material and economic conditions in the midst of economic reconstruction. One of these developments was the organization of young workers seeking an identity for themselves within a new political environment. "The blue-collar unions thus formed were soon joined by white-collar...counterparts, frequently led by university graduates who had been 'Marx-boys' as students, before they learned to conform, sometimes to lip-serving, but more often...to enthusiastic and vociferous Japanism."¹⁰ Nascent workers' organizations were in the process of unifying workers from different industrial sectors to join the cause. Young workers, most of whom were recent university graduates, garnered inspiration from Marxist works and appealed to workers to rally this message. This was one of the first steps in shaping labor organization. However, the notion of Japanism, the idea to raise production in the service to the nation and gradually improve working conditions, placed the young Marxists at a difficult ideological position.¹¹ The Cold War was in its early years and the government's rhetoric was hostile to Marxist-influenced positions. Nevertheless, the labor movement grew and coalesced around the socialist and communist parties.

Miike, one of the largest coal mining operations in Japan was located in the Kyūshū region. While Miike's contribution to the economy ended in 1997, the year it permanently closed, the local economy at Ōmuta, Fukuoka Prefecture based around coal mining for more than a century. In 1960, 12,822 workers worked there and even after the strike, in 1965, 10,444

¹⁰ Ronald Dore, "Unions Between Class and Enterprise," *Industrielle Beziehungen / The German Journal of Industrial Relations* 3, no. 2 (1996): 157, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23275862>.

¹¹ Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy*, 142.

individuals still worked there.¹² These statistics demonstrated the size of the workforce at that mine despite the undesired outcome from the strike. The decline of workers before and after the infamous strike will be discussed later. For the coal mining industry, the number of employees indicated the extent in which it was an attractive place to work.

One of the attractions was, for the time, a generous welfare system, but it compromised labor solidarity. Coal miners were given company housing, which was crucial in controlling the “company’s production system.” The result of this was a low self-esteem among the coal miners where “each company had its own union, which inevitably weakened the negotiating position of workers.”¹³ The role of company housing was relevant because management often used it as a justification for controlling miners’ activities, including those in the union, within and outside the workplace in times of labor-management confrontation and negotiation. A low self-esteem indicated the limitations of miners’ labor activism. Since there were unions established in various industries, management saw this as a threat to their economic standing and was less inclined to provide concessions to miners. This factor became crucial in understanding the strategies the unions undertook prior to 1960.

The economic developments and policies in the 1950s set the stage for conflict to arise during the 1960 strike. The coal mining industry was in a comfortable situation when the postwar government initially enacted policies to favor the industry over oil as its main competitor. “Through these measures...the government hoped to give the coal industry a period to modernize, to concentrate production in large, efficient mines, and become competitive with oil. The opposite occurred...as mines proliferated, prices increased, and coal companies pocketed

¹² Tai Wei Lim *et al.*, *Coal Mining Communities and Gentrification in Japan* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 49.

¹³ Lim *et al.*, *Coal Mining Communities*, 41.

substantial profits.”¹⁴ The intended purpose of the government’s support for coal over oil was to modernize and optimize the industry in order to compete as Japan’s main energy source. The government’s preference of one industry over another suggested that the coal industry was in dire need beyond market forces. The fact that the government was paying close attention to the industry, urging its modernization and optimization to improve competitiveness suggested it was grappling with inefficient processes that did not generate much profit due to costs, particularly the cost of labor. To the government’s surprise, the industry was able to generate profits and increase production. This ensured coal mining was able to survive on the economic stage while also limiting competition from oil.

For companies buying coal, it was expensive. A recession occurred that placed coal buyers on edge over the affordability of coal. “When the Japanese economy went into a short recession in the late 1957, coal stockpiles began to rise but coal companies attempted to keep prices high, sparking an outcry from major coal consumers.”¹⁵ From the perspective of coal companies, it was possible to earn high profits since they knew the government would protect the industry at all costs from competition. They had no incentive to lower prices—which major coal consumers protested. However, the solution from coal consumers was not to force the coal industry to lower prices in the short term, but rather to collaborate with the industry to lower labor costs.

Coal consumers endorsed a confrontational approach in which coal companies were looking at dismissing miners influential in their unions. The Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) took the position that while the coal industry “should not be

¹⁴ John Price, “The 1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute: Turning Point for Adversarial Unionism in Japan?” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 23, no. 4 (1991): 32, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1991.10413141>.

¹⁵ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 32.

protected,” it was crucial to pressure the companies “to reduce their prices through massive layoffs.”¹⁶ The solution Keidanren proposed was to eliminate adversarial miners who sought to threaten the industry, the managerial power in labor-management affairs, and promote ideas compatible to Japan’s market economy.

The process of safeguarding the coal industry involved rationalization, a process in which both coal owners and the government had a stake on. Preferential treatment of the coal industry led to the National Diet passing the “scrap and build” law in May 1955. It was a policy that eliminated mines deemed as costly in order to “raise productivity via substantial investment.” Coal owners and the government had different interpretations on this policy. The former sought to reduce as much debt possible through favorable investment returns outside of the industry. The latter wanted to weaken the political radicalization of labor. Such concerns were able to manifest through rationalization plans in order to stabilize the market.¹⁷ The rationalization of coal mines was essential because it allowed the economically precarious industry the premise of raising productivity. Knowing that there was no incentive to lower coal prices, it incentivized profitability. The government was already aware workers had alleged Marxist tendencies that would destabilize economic activity within the industry, potentially spreading to other industries.

It was crucial for rationalization plans to be implemented to prevent economic destabilization. While rationalization was beneficial for the government and coal companies, this process took place even as Japan’s government officials and business leaders were accepting the inevitability of making oil the primary source of energy. With many mines closing throughout

¹⁶ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 35.

¹⁷ W. R. Garside, “A Very British Phenomenon? Industrial Politics and the Decline of the Japanese Coal Mining Industry Since the 1950s,” *Australian Economic History Review* 45, no. 2 (July 2005): 190, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8446.2005.00134.x>.

the country, it was unsurprising that local governments protested the “scrap and build” policy because they relied on the mines for their economies.¹⁸

With adversarial miners the targets in the minds of the business community and coal management, it was unsurprising the confrontation took on a political dimension. As noted previously, young workers who were recent university graduates were inspired from and affiliated with Marxist thought. The miners and labor organizations perceived to have Marxist tendencies, something that was a threat to the capitalist system. Economic motives from coal consumers and producers intertwined with political motives so that there would be a united front against the Miike union and their affiliated organizations, especially against the National Federation of Coal Miners’ Unions (Tanrō) and the General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō) on the national level.¹⁹

The support for the Miike union’s efforts rested on the Tanrō and the Sōhyō. Both organizations were nationally influential in their advocacy for labor rights, with the latter being the highest organization on the labor hierarchy. Seeing how there was a consolidation of influence from the labor movement, management and the business community deemed it necessary to ally themselves against labor. “Both miners and mine owners were thus able to exploit the political process to safeguard production and employment for more years than the free market would have permitted.”²⁰

Rationalization was an opportunity for the coal industries to get economic footing, but it also gave rise to labor-management conflict. Plans for rationalization intensified, with Miike miners suffering the most on the issue of dismissals. Mitsui management indicated to the Mitsui

¹⁸ Matthew Allen, *Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Working and Conflict in a Coalmining Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 65–67.

¹⁹ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 35.

²⁰ Garside, “A Very British Phenomenon?” 198.

Coal Miners Federation (Sankoren) that its proposal called for voluntary retirement of approximately 5,000 employees out of 35,000 employees, with more than 2,000 coming from Miike. Prior to the proposal, there was a 1953 agreement where one's family members was to replace an employee who retired. It covered all the Mitsui mines, but the union strictly enforced it at Miike, resulting in maintaining employment "at a disproportionately high level."²¹

Rationalization came in the form of dismissals, most of which were directed at the Miike miners. While management sought to dismiss a disproportionate number of miners from Miike compared to other mines, whether for economic (e.g. maintaining high productivity) or political reasons (e.g. the assumption of fewer Marxist tendencies from family members), employment at the mine sustained in accordance with the 1953 agreement. With the union strictly enforcing it and management seeking voluntary retirements, it was a conflict between preventing dismissals and rationalization.

Miike miners were not the only workers facing rationalization through dismissals in the coal industry. It was symbolic of national trends. An organization in the higher echelons of labor, Tanrō, convened a special convention on October 5, 1959 to discuss potential layoffs at Miike. Delegates there recognized that 100,000 coal mining jobs throughout the country were vulnerable, linking the Miike confrontation with the fate of Japanese coal miners overall.²² While business leaders from various industries were discussing the possibility of voluntary retirements of coal miners at the politically conservative and anti-labor Japan Federation of Employers' Organizations (Nikkeiren) convention, Tanrō was uneasy at the prospect of losing coal mining jobs throughout the country. For Tanrō and its delegates, it meant coal miners could be targeted based on their affiliations with left-wing ideologies and parties (e.g. the Socialist and

²¹ Martin, "Japanese Mining Labor," 28.

²² Price, "1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute," 35.

Communist parties), and rationalization efforts were not showing any signs of waning down. Those active in union activities or the labor movement without political affiliations were also targeted. The strategy that they came up with, in tandem with the Miike union, was a general strike to protest against the layoffs.

Mitsui management locked out the strikers from entering Miike on January 25, 1960, initiating the labor-management conflict. While the Miike union and Tanrō were planning on an indefinite strike, its progression was not smooth. Internal divisions within the striking workers were evident. In order to confront such divisions, Tanrō sought to capitalize on broader political discontent in Japan at the time of the Miike strike. Its Central Struggle Committee on February 26 saw decreasing coal stockpiles, increasing anti-Kishi sentiment on the ratification of the Anpo revisions, and the momentum from the Spring Wage Struggles (Shuntō) as increasingly favorable to the Miike strikers' cause.²³ These developments gave confidence to Tanrō and the Miike union to continue striking against the dismissals and grant legitimacy to their cause. If such situations were successful and brought in a new era of public participation, it was possible for the strike to achieve success through political discontent that was already accumulating. These developments motivated the strikers to continue with their cause.

The situation to counteract internal divisions intensified the fight against the strikers and company forces. The strike gained national publicity with the death of a union picketer. On March 29, Kubō Kiyoshi died in the hands of a pro-company squad, sparking outrage, and the Miike union received sympathy.²⁴ The *Asahi Shimbun's* March 31 editorial indicated how the death and the fight between the original and new unions questioned the legitimacy on Mitsui's

²³ Price, "1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute," 36.

²⁴ Price, *Japan Works*, 207.

part to restart production when they knew bodily harm was expected.²⁵ The death of the picketer brought into the national scene the precarious situation between the strikers and management. The involvement of a pro-company goon squad juxtaposed a power dynamic. Strikers and their affiliated organizations were suffering internal divisions while management was already consolidating their forces to defeat labor. But the publicity received from a national newspaper such as the *Asahi Shimbun* proved to be beneficial in garnering support nationally for the Miike union, blaming Mitsui for attempting to restart production while the situation was not yet resolved.

As the strike waged on, Sankoren indicated to Tanrō officers that there needed an immediate resolution. In April 1960, the officers called on the Central Labor Relations Board (CLRB) for the first time to mediate negotiations between the strikers and management. However, the mediation plan the CLRB had written up “upheld the company position.” While it changed “voluntary retirement” to “discharge,” the selection of 1,277 workers for dismissal remained the same.²⁶ The internal divisions stemmed from the disagreement about the duration of the strike. It was true that the Tanrō and Miike union members wanted an indefinite strike to retract the dismissals of the Miike miners. However, Sankoren believed it would be beneficial to find a quick resolution. The CLRB began negotiations on recommendation from Sankoren. The problem was there were minor changes to the plans. While it did seek to facilitate talks between the strikers and management, its support for the latter remained unchanged. From the perspective of the Tanrō and Miike union members, that was unsatisfactory.

Despite Tanrō seeing the current political circumstances positively, it was not enough to counteract internal divisions the organization suffered. Tanrō officers were inclined to accept the

²⁵ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 39.

²⁶ Martin, “Japanese Mining Labor,” 29.

CLRB's plan for the sake of organizational unity, but the Miike union pressured them to reject the plan while the Sankoren called for its acceptance. Disappointed by the vote to reject on April 8, Sankoren left Tanrō and negotiated with the company on their own prerogative, securing a voluntary retirement plan and a wage cut of about 3,000 yen.²⁷ It was a precarious situation for Tanrō and the officers acknowledged that. The Miike local was not willing to concede, but Sankoren was willing to negotiate for the sake of protecting some livelihoods, making labor solidarity unattainable. As a result, Miike management and Sankoren negotiated on a plan for voluntary retirement and wage cuts. It may not be an impressive feat from the perspective of the Miike local since the issue of dismissals of almost 2,000 miners was not resolved. But for Sankoren members, it was a victory because they were given a plan for voluntarily retirement and a wage cut which was better than achieving nothing at all.

The intervention of the CLRB signaled the beginning of government intervention and the increasing role of political maneuvering. With the strike continuing and the labor movement divided, Ikeda Hayato succeeded Kishi as Prime Minister in July 1960, with labor minister Ishida Hirohide then seeking an end to the conflict to avert a showdown. The CLRB was considering a mediation proposal that lessened the company's position. "Initially the Mitsui Mining executives were unwilling to agree as, in their estimation, a conclusive rout of the strikers was in the offing. However, too much was at stake for those who supported the ruling conservative party."²⁸ Acknowledging the CLRB was willing to take a softer approach on mediation and tame the company's hostilities, management was unwilling to agree because they believed the momentum of the strike was not dissipating despite the fractures within the movement. At the same time, management knew not agreeing would jeopardize Mitsui executives and their ties to the ruling

²⁷ Martin, "Japanese Mining Labor," 29.

²⁸ Martin, "Japanese Mining Labor," 29–30.

conservative Liberal Democratic Party for a favorable ruling. It would be detrimental for Mitsui to oppose the CLRB's proposal if they wanted to continue securing preferential treatment from the government.

While management reluctantly accepted the CLRB's August 10 proposal and government intervention in general, the labor movement had mixed reactions on this development. The Miike local, Tanrō, and Sohyō accepted the proposal. However, the Miike union picketers concentrated at the Mikawa hopper "...were exuberant about the government intervention, feeling that their perseverance had brought the fight to a standstill and that the government could not use force to rout the workers, given their numbers and determination."²⁹ Labor organizations were facing constraints on an already divided movement and the need to accept government intervention even if the rulings were unfavorable to them and the results somewhat satisfactory. This was true with picketers supporting intervention, signaling discontent between labor leadership and ordinary workers. They knew the strength of their movement was too large for the government to suppress outright. Government intervention meant the issue of dismissals could finally be resolved between labor and management. While labor organizations were attempting to understand the situation, this was an opportunity for the strikers to negotiate with management even if the results were not in their favor.

Government intervention for resolving the issues at hand indicated the waning power of the Miike labor movement. The odds of the labor movement turning the situation around in their favor were slim. In the end, the CLRB's mediation proposal was certainly a victory for management. "Almost all [of the Tanrō officials] agreed that the proposal was unjust and anti-labor, but the view that the union movement was unable to continue the struggle given the forces

²⁹ Price, "1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute," 40.

against it eventually won out.”³⁰ It was a somber moment where Tanrō was given no options but to accept reluctantly. Given Mitsui management was able to consolidate support and backing from Nikkeiren, the government, and some of their own union members, they had no choice but to concede. They knew they were facing opposition from the formerly allied Sankoren, workers were losing morale on a prolonged strike, and the government was backing Mitsui management. Not all of the Tanrō officials were willing to accept the proposal because it was “unjust and anti-labor.” The issue of dismissals and rationalization were still the focus of the movement in the first place, but the CLRB proposal stated, “The designated layoffs appeared unavoidable, and it was impossible at that stage to deal with each individual case to establish whether the layoff was justifiable.”³¹

After several months of striking to retract “voluntary retirements” or dismissals, the Miike strike ended on December 1, 1960 with Mitsui management claiming victory. It was a time of disarray for those who participated in the strike because they had obtained few or no concessions and changes. “The original union survived, scarred but resolute, and continued the struggle to preserve its autonomy. More than thirty years later, it remains active and defiant but no longer represents the majority of Miike miners.”³² While the original union continued to represent workers until the mine’s closure in the 1990s, the strike left a scar on its history for failing to unite the miners, including those who left for the company-backed Sankoren. The situation in the wake of the 1960 Anpo protests and the death of a picketer were not enough to salvage the labor movement and make amends to internal dissent.

³⁰ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 41.

³¹ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 41.

³² Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 41.

Nevertheless, they were determined to advocate for the miners and negotiate with management despite having to put their credibility as a labor advocacy group under scrutiny. The organization survived, but the perception was it did not represent all of the Miike miners. As an *Asahi Shimbun* journalist noted, ““When the CLRB mediation proposal was adopted, the 60 people from the Miike local who were crammed into the back of the Tanrō Convention remained silent, neither clapping nor speaking. They appeared stupefied.”³³

The aftermath of Japan’s most infamous strike was a time where labor organization and tactics employed were called into question. The Miike union was not the only labor organization that suffered a humiliating defeat. There was tremendous disarray in the upper echelons of labor organizing. The defeat signified an undermining for workshop struggles “within Sohyō and also weakened Sohyō’s organizational base in the private sector.” Since it was a failed strategy to demand concessions from management, private-sector unions “abandoned local dispute tactics and began to restrict their activities to joint consultation and collective bargaining over wages.”³⁴

Sohyō was under immense scrutiny from private-sector unions because of the tactics they used and promoted. The unions, although affiliated with Sohyō even after 1960, abandoned strikes and conflict altogether to voice concerns over employment, workplace conditions, and bargaining rights. Instead, they decided to negotiate through dialogue with management and focused on wages to avert more humiliating defeats and receive harsher deals. Not all workers were pleased with such developments. The original union at Miike was still determined to advocate for the miners, but with the odds of a successful strike stacked against them after 1960, it was inevitable that a reconsideration of tactics was necessary.

³³ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 41.

³⁴ Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 42.

Chapter 2. The Cold War: A Labor Movement Compromised

When assessing the Miike strike and understanding the sequence of events, it is important to acknowledge how the Japanese labor movement in the postwar era structured its compromised position resulting in the strike's outcome. The labor movement immediately after 1945 prioritized the reconstruction of Japan. The first labor conference was held on October 10 in Tōkyō over a month after Japan's surrender and in attendance were “prewar labor leaders” who formed the General Federation of Trade Unions (Sōdōmei). Its principles were to reconstruct the economy with improvements in wages and work conditions, industrial organizations, and to maintain autonomy from political affiliation.³⁵ Initially, Sōdōmei, along with similar organizations, was not an organization seeking to invigorate workers for improving wages and work conditions. It was one stressing cooperation with business representatives to assist in the country's economic reconstruction. The fact that “prewar labor leaders” attended and the organization desired political autonomy suggested the sole focus of movement's aims were economic but it may not have the infrastructure necessary for long-term advocacy.

Another development that coincided with the establishment of labor organizations took place across the Pacific, on American soil. While divisions from the prominent labor organizations in the United States existed, they had formulated a plan to influence the labor movement in Japan. “The International Affairs Departments of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)” indicated their intentions to “re-engineer Japan” and were willing to cooperate with SCAP in constructing labor policy.³⁶ For

³⁵ Chushichi Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825–1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 359.

³⁶ Christopher Gerteis, “Labor's Cold Warriors: The American Federation of Labor and ‘Free Trade Unionism’ in Cold War Japan,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 12, no. 3–4 (Fall–Winter 2003): 211, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23613230>.

these parties, it was an idealist undertaking that Japanese labor policy should mirror that of the United States. Hence, it sought to resemble—as historian Christopher Gerteis compared—President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal.” The developments in Japan regarding labor policies provided the basis for such organizations to construct what SCAP as well as the overseers back in Washington would deem as a tolerable labor movement.

While the postwar labor movement was in its nascent stage, it was unfair to assume its early days encountered failures. Railway workers, seamen, and “the communist-led Sanbetsu” garnered successes in the October 1946 strikes. They were able to secure increases “in wages for the workers in the private sector of industry.”³⁷ This symbolized one of the successes in which workers and politically-aligned organizations were able to lead successful strikes and have their demands met. In order to garner the same levels of mobilization and successes, organizers in Miike years later understood the need for both participation of miners within the coal industry and the backing of political organizations. As a result, this strategy would nationalize their cause to the populace and incorporated a political character, both running counter to Sōdōmei’s aforementioned principles.

Regardless of the necessity for mass participation and support for labor organizations, different political orientations complicated desires for solidarity in cases such as that of the Miike strike. With SCAP and American labor organizations exercising influence in Japan, it was important to ensure surveillance over those with communist tendencies. By fall 1947, the policy of SCAP’s Labor Division was to establish Democratic Leagues (Mindō), cells within Japanese unions that espoused anticommunist tendencies. Richard L. G. Deverall, SCAP’s Military Government Labor Officer for Miyagi Prefecture, indicated in a letter to the AFL’s foreign

³⁷ Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 360.

policy unit Free Trade Union Committee how this provided the opportunity to ““feed [unions] educational material and ideas”” in order to spread a progressive conscious of the Communists’ “totalitarian rule.””³⁸ As a fervent anticommunist and aware of labor’s successes, Deverall’s campaign of developing “anticommunist, pro-trade union factions” spread across Japan. Mindō embodied his mission within Japan’s union members to inform the undemocratic and unprogressive dangers of communism.

Deverall’s campaigns were anticommunist in nature and discussed what he thought were crucial elements to the business of labor union. Similar to the goals of the AFL and CIO, he wanted unions in Japan to emulate American labor policy and union practices. “[Deverall] discussed all manner of union operations, from the functions of administrative bureaucracy to the purpose and means of providing workers’ education programs.”³⁹ Deverall had limited communications in the Japanese language but he employed Nishio Kaneharu to translate. Deverall’s ultimate goal was to educate union members on the importance of a bureaucracy, or a governing structure of the union. The issue important to him was securing anticommunist leadership because the 1946 strikes succeeded in granting concessions to supposed communists within the labor rank-and-file. Once a functioning bureaucracy was established, education programs could be provided to disseminate labor policy and tactics. Such education opened a platform for the anticommunist bureaucracy to promote Deverall’s ideas and consolidating Mindō internally.

With Mindō, Deverall was a step closer toward formulating an ideal union in the image of an idealized American union. He urged Japanese unions to participate in collective bargaining

³⁸ Howard Schonberger, “American Labor’s Cold War in Occupied Japan,” *Diplomatic History* 3, no. 3 (Summer 1979): 257, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24910112>.

³⁹ Gerteis, “Labor’s Cold Warriors,” 214.

while simultaneously continuing to espouse his rhetoric. He believed that the unions should only be concerned on economic issues and dissuade themselves from partaking in any political struggle. It was not ideal for a union to engage in the latter, which was acceptable terrain for political parties.⁴⁰ Obviously, Deverall's work for anticommunism was politically itself motivated, and ironically, part of his strategy was claiming that it was essential to separate working conditions and labor concerns from politics. Acknowledging some union members' orientations in the strikes, he wanted to stress what a union should and should not be engaging in. One of this was avoiding any sort of political struggle, and it was certainly unacceptable when it involved the Communists. The labor movement should focus solely on achieving better wages and working conditions instead of pushing for political and economic instability.

Efforts to promote anticommunism halted temporarily once Japan's domestic situation experienced two crises. The trajectory of empowering the American-backed anticommunist forces in the unions halted temporarily amidst deteriorating economic conditions and resulting political upheaval. In 1947, the chief of SCAP's Labor Division, James Killen, noted unchecked inflation became the focal point for Japanese workers. At the same time, the government under socialist Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu had to compromise his party's program because he struggled to maintain support from the conservative parties in his coalition.⁴¹ With increasing concerns from a worsening economic conditions and a potentially divided government, the situation was ripe for labor unrest. Killen acknowledged the project had come to a halt. More importantly, he was concerned about the possibility of a resurgence of supposed communist tendencies, thereby practically undoing efforts to shift the balance of power to conservative and pro-trade forces.

⁴⁰ Gerteis, "Labor's Cold Warriors," 218.

⁴¹ Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War," 259.

Even if labor organizations were confident in their abilities to demand successfully better wages and working conditions from employers, the biggest obstacle they faced were business and government anxieties, from the American occupation forces in particular. William Draper, the undersecretary of the Army, shared a view with the Industrial Club of Japan that labor unrest was “the most serious impediment” to the country’s economic recovery.⁴² Like Deverall, Draper was keenly aware about the successes of the 1946 strikes and the current economic situation. The Japanese business community such as the members of the Industrial Club were also aware of the vitality of the labor movement. Hence, economic recovery provided a justification for the business community to oppose the strikers. A successful movement would hinder economic recovery regardless of its magnitude. As for Draper and members of the Occupation forces, it provided a geopolitical premise in which they sought to counter unwanted forces from within the country.

Geopolitics enabled the United States to prioritize its interests in Japan so that labor would not have the power to hinder economic recovery. In the minds of the Occupation forces, attacks on the labor movement, a politically motivated gesture, were justifiable on economic grounds. George Kennan, a Cold War strategist, indicated Japan’s vulnerability to “Soviet-aided communist subversion owing to her weak economy and unstable government.” The latter was making efforts to purge politicians who took part in World War II, decentralize the police, and deconcentrate large companies (*zaibatsu*).⁴³ The Occupation forces wanted to prevent the Soviet Union and communist forces from taking advantage of a country whose government was implementing policies that countered their interests. Such policies would further weaken Japan’s

⁴² Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 368.

⁴³ Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 370.

position to prevent its containment. They believed Japan could fall to the Soviet Bloc with a weak economy that solidified an environment favorable to the labor movement.

The odds of a successful labor movement were waning as the discussion focused on geopolitics and ideological paranoia. Such emphasis on economic recovery enabled Occupation forces to continue justifying their presence in Japan against the supposed threats from communism. Draper indicated that this program “was part of the [American] military and political strategy against world communism.” It was an assurance to the United States Congress of the growing need to assist Japan through recovery aid.⁴⁴ Draper recognized he needed to convince Congress to counteract communism with aid. Japan’s supposed economic vulnerability and proximity to the Soviet Union were crucial factors in the American strategy in East Asian geopolitics. The fact that the Japanese economy took on a geopolitical importance suggested American policy continued to sway Japanese economic policy. Furthermore, the counterforce against labor also continued to grow as the previously reformed-minded SCAP took the stance of business interests.⁴⁵

Eventually, the Red Purge would signal a growing conflict and paranoia against employees, particularly those in the public sector. The effects from policies seeking to prevent a supposed threat of communism were evident, especially the government’s vulnerability to communist elements. In May 1950, “MacArthur accused the Communist Party of being ‘the agent of international aggression’ ...the Red Purge involved many more journalists and also led to the dismissal of 11,000 employees in the private sector of the economy and of 12,000 public employees.”⁴⁶ While the Communist Party was the primary target of the purge, it was not limited

⁴⁴ Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 370.

⁴⁵ Price, *Japan Works*, 38.

⁴⁶ Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 374.

to politicians. Journalists and employees were also targets for their supposed tendencies of radicalism and communism. This demonstrated the government prioritized dismissing public employees because they constructed and implemented policies affecting economic recovery. For those in the media, journalism provided a valuable but vulnerable space to influence public opinion. It was necessary to prevent a weak government and the dissemination of communist ideas from falling under the strength of such supposed tendencies.

Considerations to curb the right to strike were present even when such policies ran counter with SCAP's wishes. With concerns of militant tendencies growing within the labor movement, there were contrasting opinions on granting labor rights in general. Blaine Hoover, the chief of the Civil Service Division of Government Section, proposed subjecting civil servants to the National Public Service Law (NPSL) rather than the Trade Union Law, with the latter curbing union rights.⁴⁷ While government workers had the liberty under the former law to strike, the revision of the latter law would outright strip such rights. It was critical for Hoover to suggest this because of the continued threat of political and economic instability. Taking lessons from the 1946 strikes and their militant tendencies, for anticommunists, it was a gamble not worth risking. At this point, his ideas ran counter to initial Occupation policy in allowing workers to strike despite SCAP making moves toward a pro-business stance.

Even though Hoover's plan received endorsements from MacArthur, it did not have fully support from other government officials. The move to reclassify civil servants to a more restrictive law raised questions on the viability of the anticommunist movement. In response to reclassifying communications workers, assistant labor secretary and former CIO organizer John W. Gibson viewed the move as "a travesty." He feared that it "would discredit Mindō leaders"

⁴⁷ Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War," 261.

and the communists would be able to regain control of the labor movement.⁴⁸ Coming from a labor background himself, Gibson was wary about curbing labor rights. He knew it was a move necessary to counter supposed communists in Japan's labor organizations. However, the move raised questions on the credibility of Mindō leaders, which would foster potential distrust among union members. In his view, this distrust would give the latter justifications for returning to or aligning themselves with the Communists, thereby discrediting the anticommunist mission.

Adding onto disagreements of curbing labor rights, the institution of civil service in Japan was debated. This was true on the aforementioned issue Hoover raised. "To Killen, Hoover was a narrow technician attempting to implement an American type of civil service without recognizing the peculiar conditions within Japan, particularly the greater role of the national government as employer."⁴⁹ With more familiarity with the Japanese political apparatus and labor relations, Killen criticized Hoover, even his basic credentials, for suggesting having a civil service modeled after the United States. The difference between them was Killen had more familiarity with Japan's civil service and the importance of government employment. However, it seemed Killen was unaware that the AFL, CIO, and Deverall sought to implement labor policies akin to American labor laws and union organization.

While public employees were being subjected to reconsiderations about their right to strike, anticommunists were intensifying their activities and influence within the movement. "The purges of the left-wing unionists were accompanied by SCAP and Japanese government promotion of Mindō and other anti-communists who thus were enabled to take over union leadership. Of course, the union movement was divided and weakened by these

⁴⁸ Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War," 264.

⁴⁹ Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War," 261.

developments.”⁵⁰ The influence of Mindō and anticommunist union factions were gaining traction during a time of economic and political uncertainty. Promotions of anticommunists in union leadership positions enabled a change of direction where cooperation with management was key, something that Sōdōmei sought.

The impact of technology on labor signified a company’s willingness to increase output, placing laborers at an impasse. One of the premises of having a labor movement in the first place was to counter in part the increasing use of industrial technologies in the workplace. Alongside industrial rationalization, laborers were at a disadvantage because technology was replacing them, thereby losing their “autonomous skill basis and shop-floor solidarity.”⁵¹ While the early 1950s preceded the economic boom, there was a sense of uncertainty for manual labor. The integration of technological practices in the workplace unburdened companies from utilizing labor resources in many areas to maximize output. It was indicative for management to consider new production strategies. It certainly benefited the company, but it also led to discontent among laborers whose livelihoods may depend solely on manual labor. Regardless of the company’s economic or political motivations, technological innovation was an ongoing trend that mobilized discontent and political upheaval among those affected.

Even for the same anticommunist members in the unions, militancy was still an issue. Despite anticommunists and American officials in Japan continuing to exert influence over labor affairs, it was not easy to control the unions, their members, and their activities entirely. Late 1949 and early 1950 saw a “resurgence of union militancy” from the anticommunist unions affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Japanese

⁵⁰ Schonberger, “American Labor’s Cold War,” 264.

⁵¹ Mahito Hayashi, “Democracy Against Labor Movement: Japan’s Anti-Labor Developmental State and Aftermaths,” *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 1 (2021): 47, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920520921216>.

left's more moderate Socialist Party. This raised alarm among SCAP and American labor leaders when there were suggestions about a proposed general strike in March 1950.⁵² The strategy of having anticommunist unions assuming the direction of the labor movement halted again. While Occupation authorities thought these groups would be friendly to Japan's business community, not to mention in alignment with the country's geopolitical significance in the Cold War, the resurgence of labor militancy was a concerning development that would destabilize Yoshida Shigeru's conservative government. However, to the relief of the authorities, this was thwarted with SCAP and the government intervening.⁵³

While the government sought to influence Sōhyō and promote anticommunist elements in the union, the political situation was precarious, especially with growing discontent with the government. The effort to influence Sōhyō as a force against communism and align itself with the ICFTU came at a standstill. With Yoshida's government implementing an increased amount of anti-labor policies, it provided the impetus for Sōhyō's left wing to lead the movement.⁵⁴ A growing disillusionment was taking place where the movement's left wing acknowledged that the government was not on its side. With the government curbing labor rights for civil servants, they saw the necessity to attempt to retake leadership of the movement from Mindō and anticommunists. Such anti-labor policies enabled union members in the private sector to be disillusioned with the possibility of having their rights curbed as well.

⁵² Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War," 268.

⁵³ Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War," 268.

⁵⁴ Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War," 270.

Chapter 3. Division within Notions of Geopolitics

The current political environment, with the government implementing anti-labor laws, forced the labor movement to reconsider its strategies. The recent events of the Red Purge required labor to propose new strategies and alter its messaging in order to avoid accusations of radical and communist tendencies. Labor radicals were in disarray while Sōhyō and the socialists were largely unaffected. Their campaigns for peace continued in the early 1950s when labor achieved stabilization, with the exception being “the unions in declining industries such as coal mining.”⁵⁵ For labor, stabilization meant nonviolent cooperation with management while demanding for better wages and working conditions. This signified a schism within the movement between those willing to cooperate and those who sought continued or other means of demanding the same goals. Since the movement took a political character in the aftermath of the 1946 strikes, it was essential for Sōhyō and other organizations such as Sōdōmei to distance themselves from those espousing “radical” elements.

While the Red Purge certainly placed the left-leaning union members on high alert, it was not immediately implemented. American influence on the anticommunist campaign further divided anticommunist and communist elements. The Red Purge enabled SCAP to endorse the anticommunist Sōhyō as an alternative for unions to align themselves instead of remaining with the Sanbetsu-dominant Zenrōren. Those who remained with the latter were vulnerable to the purges and labeled as “Communists.”⁵⁶ SCAP and the government gave unions such as those in the automobile and metals industries the opportunity to align themselves with Sōhyō. It is important to note the fluidity of “political identities” in the eyes of the government. They gave unions the opportunity to realign themselves, which were determinants as to how they would

⁵⁵ Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 375.

⁵⁶ Schonberger, “American Labor’s Cold War,” 268–9.

view them and their political tendencies. If they remained in the Zenrōren and continued to “identify” themselves as Communists, they were vulnerable to a purge.

The labor movement took on a geopolitical character that based on a particular view of Japan’s role in East Asia. The outbreak of the Korean War influenced the direction of Sōhyō when considering questions on American influence. Initially, Sōhyō was an organization established with the desire to have a Japanese organization affiliated with the ICFTU back in the United States. However, American dominance in Japan saw reluctance among union leaders to affiliate themselves with an organization supporting the conflict and a “partial peace treaty.”⁵⁷ The issue union leaders were debating was the organization potentially supporting American efforts in a conflict across the Sea of Japan. In turn, the question was on the independence of Sōhyō in the midst of American pressure. In regards to the peace treaty, union leaders pondered the effects on Japan of engaging in military combat, of being dragged into war by the United States, even after SCAP promulgated the pacifist constitution in 1947. Such militarization, according to their minds, ran counter to the constitution’s renunciation of war.

The issue of American hegemony became the basis for Sōhyō’s pacifist orientation. American influence on Japan in regards to policy, the economy, and the military concerned Sōhyō greatly. Sōhyō’s political orientation shifted to the left when, in its second convention held in March 1951, it adopted the “Four Principles of Peace.” The document included the desire for the country to promulgate an “overall peace treaty,” remain neutral at all costs, oppose military bases, and oppose rearming the Japanese military.⁵⁸ This demonstrated Sōhyō’s position

⁵⁷ Lonny E. Carlile, *Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 179.

⁵⁸ Koji Nakakita, “Incorporating Japanese labor into the Free World: Cold War diplomacy and economic interdependence, 1949–1964,” *Labor History* 49, no. 2 (May 2008): 204, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00236560801950972>.

as a political force, something Deverall and others had opposed. In the context of the Cold War, their pacifist stance was clear when the Korean War broke out. While Sōhyō was initially anticommunist, it realized how much influence American authorities were exerting and determining not just Japanese labor policies but foreign policies as well. Japan's militarization represented a change in direction in the geopolitical dynamics of the day, and the labor organization was fearful about what this meant for Japan and for themselves.

In early 1951, Sōhyō elected prominent labor leader Takano Minoru from the left-socialist wing as its general secretary. However, not all members accepted him immediately. Some Sōhyō members were suspicious of him because he frequently contacted officials at SCAP's Labor Division who sought to affiliate Sōhyō with the ICFTU and perceived him as "fundamentally pro-American in orientation."⁵⁹ Despite Takano's ideological credentials and experience in the labor movement, the skepticism from Sōhyō members of the newly elected general secretary presented members a sense uncertainty because of his connections with American authorities. For the ICFTU, it had been pushing for Sōhyō's affiliation with the organization. This would translate into a potential disregard for the "Four Principles of Peace," something that he took no part in such discussions. He eventually overcame such suspicions later on.

With the new positions Sōhyō maintained, it was clear unity would be difficult to achieve. While Sōhyō remained suspicious of Takano's ties to the United States, he sought to reiterate the organization's stance in regards to its place in a wider political context. The Peace Promotion People's Conference, established in 1951 and linked with the Socialist Party and other organizations in civil society, advocated for a "positive neutralist position." However, the issue

⁵⁹ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 180.

generating controversy was the participation of labor federations “as a unit or independently on a federation-by-federation basis.”⁶⁰ The problem Sōhyō faced was the question on organizational participation in maintaining a “positive neutralist position.” It is worth mentioning the continuing divisions in Sōhyō’s position in Japanese politics. Whether or not anticommunist forces had influence in the issue was uncertain. However, the fact that individual federations held conflicting opinions on the role of neutrality signified the ensuing precariousness of taking action as a collective.

Clearly, Takano needed a strategy to advance his endeavors within Sōhyō. While problems of unity did continue to plague the organization, it did not prevent Takano from aspiring to rally the organization and the labor movement in general. One initiative he undertook was to establish district councils in which he gained “access to a broader network independent of the system of industrial federations” that Sōhyō had relied on.⁶¹ He acknowledged industrial federations were extremely powerful in decision-making for their subordinate trade unions. Whenever he proposed something the organization should undertake, his main opposition would certainly come from these federations. Their power was far more influential than individual trade unions. For him, it was essential to establish district councils in order to directly appeal to the trade unions. Hence, it was an effort to sideline the intermediary. He hoped not only to speak to trade unions directly but also to integrate trade unions directly into the organization’s direction.

The idea of neutrality proved to be a precarious endeavor, especially during a time of war and the ongoing contest for ideological hegemony. While Takano was mobilizing Sōhyō and the neutralist line he promoted, divisions remained along not only ideological but also policy lines. Reestablished in July 1951, Sōdōmei became the opposing force to Sōhyō and advocated for a

⁶⁰ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 182.

⁶¹ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 184.

“‘partial’ peace treaty” and supported the security treaty with the United States as the only practical solution to Japan’s situation in the context of the international political situation at the time.”⁶² Those who were dissatisfied with Sōhyō’s line of thinking vis-à-vis foreign policy thought it would be necessary to call for organizational independence and support the status quo. In the context of the Cold War and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, it was crucial for Japan to support the United States in order to prevent the spread of communism. A “‘partial’ peace treaty” signified a potential for military mobilization while having the security treaty with the United States provide defense for Japan.

Even far-left Socialist union members with ties to the Communist Party were aware of the changing strategies. It was apparent that American officials in both Tōkyō and Washington were “appalled by Takano’s apparent hijacking of the anticommunist initiative.” The outbreak of the Korean War provided MacArthur justifications to “ban the Communist Party” and continue the crackdowns on leftist activists.⁶³ As Takano was leading the Sōhyō, he knew the purges specifically targeted those who the government deemed as “radical” and had ties to the Communist Party. It was an ironic situation where SCAP and the government were expecting leftist activists to advocate for militancy and espouse communist tendencies. Regardless of leftists distancing themselves from “radical” messaging, they and those affiliated with the Communist Party continued to be targeted through the start of the Korean War.

During the Occupation-era of American dominance of Japan, American officials sought to influence labor policy, activities, and sentiments of unions. The end of the Occupation era signified a turning point for the labor movement with a growing awareness of American geopolitics in the region. In 1952, President Harry S. Truman ended the Allied Occupation, and

⁶² Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 192.

⁶³ Gerteis, “Labor’s Cold Warriors,” 216.

Japan regained its independence as the result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Takano took advantage of the situation to “renew publication of propaganda criticizing American imperialist ambitions in East Asia.”⁶⁴ The end of the Occupation signified a potential end of American influence in the labor movement. This new environment provided a platform for Takano and like-minded leaders to further construct a geopolitical platform. Such a platform espoused anti-American sentiment, including protest against American geopolitical hegemony during a time of Cold War competition. For Takano, it was a sign of relief where they were not subject to purges and curbs on labor rights. While it was true Occupation ended, the anticommunist campaign left a legacy that weighed on the minds of labor for decades after.

The legacy of the Occupation era met with hostility, especially when the United States continued to exert its influence in East Asia. With the Americans out of Japan and the Korean War brewing, a new landscape emerged, placing the labor movement into the geopolitics and ethnic nationalism of the time. Kevin Doak, an East Asia scholar, argued that North Korea’s invasion of the South led the Japanese left to approach ethnic nationalism as a means to criticize capitalism in Japan and “cultural colonialism” of the United States’ imperialist ambitions in the midst of “anticommunist backlash.”⁶⁵ Due to perceived efforts by the United States to impose capitalism and “cultural colonialism” on the country, Japanese labor incorporated an ethnic nationalist character. Previously associated with Japanese colonial endeavors during World War II, it provided the basis for the left to criticize capitalism and American imperialism. The former was a reaction to worsening labor conditions as demonstrated in the 1946 strikes and early 1950s. The latter was aiming at the United States’ growing hegemony in the region despite Japan freed from its former adversary in World War II.

⁶⁴ Gerteis, “Labor’s Cold Warriors,” 217.

⁶⁵ Gerteis, “Labor’s Cold Warriors,” 219–220.

The issue of labor in the Cold War context remained fresh in the aftermath of the Occupation. The efforts of American authorities constructing Japan's labor relations put into question whether to transfer decision-making on the labor movement to Japanese hands. Deverall noted that the left was endangering "liberalized" labor-management relations and the economic gains it achieved. More importantly, it "threatened the independence of the ethnic-national essence of Japan."⁶⁶ While Deverall at this point had little influence and his ideas had little impact on the movement itself, he felt it was necessary to prevent the left from dictating union activities. In his view, labor-management relations were satisfactory because American authorities managed to "liberalize" Japan's economy. He knew very well that the left changed their messaging to include ethnic nationalism to discredit the efforts the United States had done for the country. Ironically, he constructed his concerns using a concept that had negative connotations during the wartime era and tied it to the positive developments of the postwar economy.

While Deverall would be disappointed in a potential dismantling of an American-influenced economy and labor relations, his belief was at odds with Japanese labor's desires for the country's neutrality. Sōhyō's political shift to the left continued and aligned itself with like-minded socialists outside of Japan. Under Takano, his attendance at the January 1953 Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon (present-day Yangon) signified "international legitimation for the anti-US neutralism that they were pursuing."⁶⁷ Adhering to the "Four Principles of Peace," Sōhyō sought to advocate for a neutral Japan in which the country will not be subjugated under American hegemony. On the international stage, Takano and his colleagues sought to position the organization as a beacon for peace independent of the Cold War's hegemonic powers. With

⁶⁶ Gerteis, "Labor's Cold Warriors," 221.

⁶⁷ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 186–7.

other socialists across the continent participating in the conference, there was another alternative to American geopolitical subjugation.

While neutrality was a crucial part in Sōhyō's debate on Japan's position on the global stage, it generated controversy in which countries were supposedly committed to peace. The aspiration for Japan to become neutral was short-lived, especially when Sōhyō had to deal with internal divisions that were to come. Within the Socialist Party, Takano urged a "peace force" which depicted the United States "as a warlike force and the Soviet Union and Communist China as forces of peace."⁶⁸ Despite continuing the rhetoric for peace deriving from Sōhyō's principles, he took a more assertive stance by naming which countries were "peaceful." Japanese labor's experiences under SCAP and the Yoshida government's adherence to American authorities motivated Takano to question the United States' commitment to peace. In the end, he identified the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as countries committed to peace. This assessment did not sit well with other members of Sōhyō.

Divisions not only linked to political matters but also the current direction was more concerning to others. Even as Takano was pursuing anti-American rhetoric during the Cold War, political divisions were still present. Younger social democrats in the textile workers', seamen's, broadcasting workers', and theater workers' unions published a manifesto arguing Sōhyō's "economic demands" were unattainable unless the economic structure was "in better shape than it was at the time." Furthermore, they argued Sōhyō's current direction made it more difficult to resolve labor disputes.⁶⁹ The point of contention within Sōhyō was the unviability of Sōhyō's "economic demands." In other words, it was the organizational structure and Takano's policies that received tremendous scrutiny. In the view of Takano's opponents, his focus on political

⁶⁸ Nakakita, "Incorporating Japanese labor," 206.

⁶⁹ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 193.

matters was ineffective in resolving labor disputes at home. Rather, the economic situation for workers and employees needed prioritization over political and ideological ambitions. Therefore, it was necessary to steer the direction towards economic matters, which Sōdōmei pursued.

The problem of Sōhyō as a political entity became the mainstream issue in organizational affairs. Internal pressure in Sōhyō intensified on questions of economic solutions and political engagement. Ōta Kaoru, the president of the synthetic chemical workers' union, issued a policy statement arguing Sōhyō's direction as an economic and political force posed a sense of confusion among the rank-and-file because the organization's original aims were supposed to focus on the former matters.⁷⁰ Ōta was disappointed in the fact that Takano prioritized political aims over advocating for ordinary workers and employees. Like the aforementioned younger social democrats, Sōhyō was supposed to be a force for the rank-and-file to advocate for better working conditions and wage increases. However, these developments obstructed the labor movement's cause because the Takano years had shifted the organization to become a political force. Ōta feared that Takano had taken Sōhyō in a wrong direction which would make the rank-and-file antagonistic to continue their membership.

A new strategy for the labor movement required consideration in order for bargaining to be effective in the midst of weakness. The divisions placed Sōhyō in a precarious situation where weakness took hold on bargaining rights and other labor issues. Shuntō, the comprehensive and coordinated spring bargaining by labor, was a strategy which was "designed to compensate for structural weakness of enterprise unions in wage bargaining." Its strategy was to impose uniformity "and a cross-firm and cross-industry referencing structure as a substitute for the organizational structure found in a bona fide industrial union."⁷¹ Labor leaders were frustrated

⁷⁰ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 214.

⁷¹ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 217.

with the ineffectiveness of Sōhyō in the area of bargaining. This was not to say labor leaders abandoned the organization outright. Rather, they hoped Shuntō would provide a hand for cross-industrial cooperation with a structure different from a typical industrial union. This also provided an opportunity to unite weaker enterprise unions, something not considered given the state of Sōhyō's internal divisions on strategy.

The premise of labor organizing and activism was a participatory movement that sought to strengthen the position of workers. The developments of the mid-1950s reflected change to the sociopolitical atmosphere with Shuntō. It was a national effort to coordinate “annual wage negotiations.” Most of the bargaining was done at an individual level, and Shuntō provided an opportunity to nationalize the labor movement, which the Japan scholar Ronald Dore coined the “‘brother should help brother’ ideology.” Unions were to capitalize on such activities in order to get an upper hand on negotiations with management to increase wages.⁷²

Internal divisions of Sōhyō enabled discussions on the inclusion of a new organizational force. The establishment of Zenrō, made up of right-wing unions, and its influence in the labor movement raised concerns on affiliation with the ICFTU. Martin Bolle, the ICFTU delegate to Japan, was skeptical about supporting Zenrō because it would hinder the ICFTU's attempts to have Sōhyō aligned with it. Others urged Zenrō to affiliate instead.⁷³ At the time, Zenrō membership was significantly smaller than Sōhyō, about a quarter of the latter. It was unsurprising that Bolle expressed concerns on shifting labor's national center to an organization that did not necessarily represent all union members. However, others saw Zenrō as an organization capable of shifting labor's political orientation away from the left and more to the

⁷² Dore, “Unions Between Class and Enterprise,” 158.

⁷³ Nakakita, “Incorporating Japanese labor,” 208.

business-friendly right. Nevertheless, the fact remained the position of a labor organization within the national movement proved to be critical for ICFTU.

The divisions within the labor movement were a liability in regards to the right to strike. Despite the ideological divisions within the labor movement, the ICFTU thought it would be crucial for the movement to unite. The ICFTU's Director of Organization Charles Millard indicated at a meeting with ICFTU-affiliated unions that he sought to promote unity among the trade unions. He argued it was the only solution "against government oppression and it would be essential to make the ICFTU's assistance effective."⁷⁴ The organization saw such developments as hindering its desire to make their assistance effective. In order to do so, Sōhyō and Zenrō needed to settle their ideological differences and resist government oppression. Whatever government oppression may mean for the ICFTU it was clear the task required unity of union members. Trade unions were struggling for their right to strike amidst the government curbing such in the previous years, and their opposition to the government would prove to be effective.

The ICFTU did not have to look far in convincing Sōhyō to align with it. Divisions within the labor movement provided Zenrō the opportunity to exert its influence in competition with Sōhyō. The former was able to cooperate with employers on advancing technical innovation and formed "second unions" against Sōhyō's "first unions;" the latter opposed productivity improvements.⁷⁵ Zenrō's influence seems reminiscent of the divisions that compromised the success of the Miike strikers years later. Zenrō was willing to cooperate with companies to ensure there were improvements in productivity and to some degree have an upper hand in labor negotiations. Technical innovation was something the organization was willing to agree with management, in contrast to Sōhyō. This development signified further fragmentation within the

⁷⁴ Nakakita, "Incorporating Japanese labor," 210.

⁷⁵ Nakakita, "Incorporating Japanese labor," 212.

movement in which the power dynamics shifted from a more hostile to a business-friendly organization. This aimed to increase opposition to Sōhyō.

While there was internal strife within the labor movement, Japanese executives came together to find ways to counteract unions. The issue of productivity was one that involved international connections, especially with Japan's former occupier. Between 1955 and 1961, the United States held "productivity tours" for Japanese corporate executives to participate. Lasting for a few weeks, these provided them opportunities to witness American technological innovation and "management methods."⁷⁶ These tours were designed for Japanese executives to discuss ways in which they would increase production without dealing with a hostile workforce back home. In the wake of the famous 1959 Kitchen Debate between Nikita Khrushchev and Richard Nixon—where the latter argued his country's technological ideal of a suburban home⁷⁷—it was crucial to demonstrate to the executives that technology and America's conceptions of management were the ideal. Hence, productivity rested on the ability to continue minimizing the use of labor despite labor's ensuing divisions.

The postwar era ushered an environment of organizational mergers, especially on the economic stage. Such developments saw strategies of mobilization should conflict arise. In the labor movement, "Sōhyō played a role in achieving socialist unity."⁷⁸ At the same time, business groups such as Nikkeiren, Keidanren, the Economic Fellowship Association, and the Japan Chamber of Commerce were advocating for politically conservative unity.⁷⁹ This marked a reorganization of forces that paved the way for competition in the fight for better wages and

⁷⁶ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 220.

⁷⁷ Beatriz Colomina, "Enclosed by Images: The Eameses' Multimedia Architecture," *Grey Room*, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 8, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1262540>.

⁷⁸ Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 379.

⁷⁹ Tsuzuki, *Pursuit of Power*, 379.

working conditions. While there was disunity in the ranks of labor, as mentioned above, it was pivotal for labor to unite other labor forces despite threats of the Red Purge lingering. For the business camp, calls for unity of their own were reactions to these developments. While the government had backed the business community to eliminate supposed radical elements in their respective sectors, they sought an even greater force to deal with labor.

Cooperation between business and government proved to be beneficial and able to prevent economic disruptions from hostile labor. A unified stand against militant labor unions was able to close whatever struggle existed. The mission of the American-tied Japan Productivity Center (JPC) was to assist management in improving worker productivity and labor-management relations. As a result, it was able to bridge cooperation between corporate managers and government bureaucrats for the sake of managing productivity. In the mid-1960s, labor leaders were working under the same Labor Ministry bureaucrats' guidelines.⁸⁰ At this point, the space for labor militancy was almost nonexistent. The 1960 strike failed, the credibility of the unions and their leaders deteriorated, and management was able to be the powerful force in labor-management relations. In regards to productivity, it was necessary for the JPC to continue uniting anti-labor forces to prevent labor an advantage, especially when the demand of coal continued on a decline.

The JPC was able to overshadow hopes for the labor movement to revamp its legitimacy. In tandem of removing the power of labor organizations and trade unions, it hoped to shift the power balance of labor-management relations, resulting in a less recalcitrant environment for cooperation. The JPC ran a campaign from its establishment on February 14, 1955 appealing trade unions to minimize unemployment in order to increase productivity, cooperate with

⁸⁰ Gerteis, "Labor's Cold Warriors," 223.

management to construct plans for such, and distribute any gains between “management, workers, and consumer.”⁸¹ Even though Sōhyō was very skeptical of the JPC, the fact remained that the 1960s provided little space for hostility. Prime Minister Ikeda’s “income doubling” policies sought to concentrate on economic growth and institute social welfare.⁸² The odds against Sōhyō were too much to bear. Zenrō and the JPC envisioned increased productivity as the solution in salvaging employment despite having to concede.

The developments to discredit Sōhyō and the labor movement accelerated as internal divisions became increasingly inevitable. Since decision-making regarding labor-management relations was situated at the enterprise level, enterprise unions had the liberty to disregard “directives from militant industrial federations and adopt a moderate stance.” This cannot be said for the reverse because militancy required industrial solidarity. Economic growth also favored moderate stances.⁸³ The program of economic growth was crucial in understanding the moderation of trade unions because the rank-and-file would not see the relevance of resorting to militancy. While the labor organizations continued to promote this idea despite the humiliating defeat of the Miike strike, trade unions thought it was crucial to cooperate with management in order to continue reaping the benefits of economic growth. This permanently fractured solidarity using militant means regardless of political will.

⁸¹ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 219.

⁸² Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 103.

⁸³ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 222.

Conclusion

The episode of the Miike strike of 1960 and Japan's labor movement in the postwar era demonstrated the extent of the fragmentation of Japan's labor movement. Featured in Hiroko Kumagai's documentary *Echoes from the Miike Mine* is Matsuo Keikō whose husband was involved in Miike's Sōhyō-backed first union. She reiterated the resentment she felt against the business-friendly second union, some of whom were her former friends. She was distraught that her husband received no compensation inflicted by the 1963 explosion at the mine for his respiratory injuries. Yamashita Kazuji, a member of the rival second union, described his reasoning for joining the union because he needed money for his family, and the first union threatened to prevent the miners' family members from employment.⁸⁴ Both participants in the labor movement showed the different reactions in solving mass dismissals of miners. While the Cold War and geopolitics certainly played a key role in undermining efforts in the labor movement prior to 1960, labor was not homogenous in strategy and belief. A sense of resentment lingered in the first union, as exemplified by Matsuo's views, while Esaki Hiroshi, a striker in the second union, had a different obligation to fellow miners who had different priorities.

A fundamental issue that unions faced was their involvement in politics. While the labor movement was successful in achieving demands in the 1946 strikes, it had varying levels of success in collective bargaining, demonstrating skepticism of its effectiveness in the long term. In a lecture by Takita Minoru, a union member in the textile industry, the social influence of unions was extremely limited and did not have the ability to change current policies. Instead, he suggested uniting private sector unions to achieve that.⁸⁵ The problem that persisted through

⁸⁴ *Echoes from the Miike Mine*, directed by Hiroko Kumagai (2005; Tōkyō: Siglo, Ltd, 2008), DVD.

⁸⁵ Minoru Takita, "Chapter 6: The Labor Conflict of the Ōmi Kenshi Silk Mills," in *The Human Face of Industrial Conflict in Post-War Japan*, ed. Hirosuke Kawanishi (London: Kegan Paul International, 1999), 198.

Japan's postwar experience in labor relations was the tremendous lack of unity. This was reasonable because not all trade unions in different industries had the same demands. Miike strikers had different demands than those in Takita's. The case in point was the skepticism of a union's influence on swaying management and labor policy in general. A more effective response to pressure management and government would be to unite private sector unions as a collective, something he criticized unions for failing to do.

Takita's assessment of disunity in the Miike strike was accurate. The problem that was in the minds of the first union strikers during Miike was the potential crackdown on them to end the strike. According to Ōta's analysis, strikers feared police intervention while the CLRC attempted to mediate. He acknowledged the worries of many strikers for their safety and the possibility of forcefully agreeing on mediation.⁸⁶ For many strikers, the action of striking was increasingly dangerous because Mitsui management and the police would use any means to discredit their demands and suppress their movement. Ōta knew that the CLRC were friendly with management and the government so he sought to minimize mediation as much as possible. However, he did recognize mediation was potentially the only option Sōhyō had because the situation was unattainable for labor. The labor movement only held a few strands of unity, and some of the rank-and-file felt there was no sense of solidarity to begin with.⁸⁷

The timing of the Miike strike coincided with the precariousness of the coal industry to be competitive against the oil industry. However, the issue of dismissals exposed an internal struggle in the labor movement in general. For instance, the Mitsui White Collar Employees Federation and another dissident faction were so dissatisfied with the Miike union that they

⁸⁶ Kaoru Ōta, "Chapter 7: The Labor Conflicts of the Mitsui-Miike Coal Mines, 1959–60," in *The Human Face of Industrial Conflict in Post-War Japan*, ed. Hirosuke Kawanishi (London: Kegan Paul International, 1999), 226.

⁸⁷ Ōta, "The Labor Conflicts," 235.

sought to bargain with management independently.⁸⁸ A strike may send a signal to management on the miners' dissatisfaction with labor practices, working conditions, or other issues. In this case, voluntary retirement was a misnomer for dismissals and the solution sought by labor was the rescinding of over a thousand notices. The problem was other miners did not see the relevance of planning an outright strike and sought other means to have management grant some concessions. This meant the power dynamics rested in favor of management and government forces.

Japan's defeat in World War II allowed a place for the United States to expand its sphere of influence, especially pertaining to Japan's labor policies. The failures of the Miike strike and the divisions within the movement were rooted in American efforts during the Occupation era to promote anticommunism. Despite Deverall's lack of comprehensive success in disseminating his campaign in Japanese, through his staff translator Shibata Michio, he reiterated to workers that Communists posed a threat to the free trade union movement as well as the country's democracy.⁸⁹ In a time of immense strife between Soviet and American hegemonic spheres, it was not surprising that the latter sought to construct Japan's labor policies and activities. Tying democracy to the free trade union movement ensured that anticommunism was a just cause. Not only did his campaign go through great strength to convince Japanese workers to disdain communism and supposed radical union members, it also brought division that would paralyze the labor movement in the aftermath of the Occupation.

With the Cold War in full force, Japanese labor leaders debated on the mission of the labor movement within this new geopolitical environment. The direction of Sōhyō and its place within East Asian geopolitics was a controversial move that further paralyzed its role in the labor

⁸⁸ Martin, "Japanese Mining Labor," 28.

⁸⁹ Gerteis, "Labor's Cold Warriors," 213.

movement. The Democratic Labor Movement Liaison Council (Minrōren) was an organization within Sōhyō that was dissatisfied with the approval of Takano's labor program tied to the Anpo, which shifted the organization away from labor issues. This represented "a brazen abnegation of fundamental principles of union organization and behavior."⁹⁰ Like Ōta, Minrōren felt Sōhyō's direction of solidarity among socialists in Asia was the wrong step. Not only was Sōhyō's original purpose as an advocate for labor rights questioned, Takano integrated a political component into its program. Existing divisions within the labor movement now solidified ideology, something that the rank-and-file and other like-minded leaders had no interest in.

The years following Japan's defeat in World War II generated a space for the war-torn economy to revive itself with initial help from its former adversary the United States. In the process, a labor movement was beginning to understand its role within this new context. However, the country was prone to hegemonic forces that became the cornerstone for the Cold War. The United States promoted anticommunism, which placed the "radically-minded" labor leaders on edge during the Red Purge.

There was a curbing of labor rights as in the case of the public sector where espousing "communist" tendencies was prohibited. The labor movement's position was one that had to adhere to Occupation authorities who initially were in favor of a flourishing movement. Even though Occupation ended in 1952, divisions in the labor movement proved to be a major threat to solidarity long thereafter, especially when a national organization such as Sōhyō became less of a labor organization than a political one.

The debates on strategies to unite the movement were unsuccessful as more workers and employees were increasingly frustrated, and divisions became inevitable overtime. While it was

⁹⁰ Carlile, *Divisions of Labor*, 194.


true that divisions led to the failure of the Miike strike, it was a time when labor attempted to understand their role within a fast-growing economy within the context of the Cold War. One must not underestimate how labor leaders desired to represent the workers and employees through advocating for increased wages, better working conditions, upholding labor rights, and bargaining with management.

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Appendix

Appendix 1:⁹¹

⁹¹ Nakakita, "Incorporating Japanese labor," 203.