Foreign policy decisions which led to United States military occupation of the Dominican Republic

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To achieve independence, the Dominican Republic had to first endure three centuries of heavy-handed Spanish rule and period of Haitian domination that lasted for twenty-two years. Fear of Haitian reconquest, however, convinced the leading Dominican politicians that the new nation could not long endure without foreign protection.

Encouraged by Dominican offers of a naval base, the United States toyed with the idea of expansion in the Caribbean as early as 1850, but civil war cut short these notions and allowed Spain to reassert control over her
former colony. Although Spanish occupation ended in failure the United States became more determined that the island Republic should never again be dominated by a European power.

Such a determination on the part of the United States to prevent European incursion led to an abortive annexationist attempt by the Grant administration in 1869 and to the establishment of a customs receivership in 1905, when unpaid foreign debts aroused the ire of European creditors.

It was hoped that the establishment of a customs receivership would usher in a period of peace and prosperity for the Dominicans, but by 1912 it became evident that such hopes were not to be realized. President Wilson adhered to the argument that foreign intervention in the Caribbean was not to be tolerated but broadened United States involvement in the domestic policies of the Dominican Republic by insisting on the establishment of a constitutional democracy, which he felt would establish domestic tranquility. When it became apparent that the internal conditions of the island Republic were not improving, Wilson reluctantly ordered in the United States Marines in the hopes that they would be able to educate the Dominicans to the ways of democracy.

By broadening the scope of United States involvement in the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic,
Wilson had produced an occupation that denied the Dominicans the inherent right of a nation to govern itself, a liberty which had been maintained against overwhelming odds during the preceding seventy-two years.
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WHICH LED TO UNITED STATES MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

by

BERT LEWIS JUNIOR FARRAR

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The island of Hispaniola was discovered in 1492 by Christopher Columbus who took possession in the name of the King and Queen of Spain. From this date forth the island was to be a victim of outside forces. For over half a century the island was the capital of the Spanish empire in the Americas. With the discovery of gold and silver in Mexico and Peru, however, her importance dwindled rapidly in the eyes of the Spanish Crown. By 1650 she had become an abused power in Spain's wars with France and England and in 1697 the western portion of the island was formally ceded to France.

Left to pursue her course in relative peace the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo experienced a brief cultural and economic revival by the middle of the eighteenth century. By the end of the century, however, she found herself emersed in the turmoil of the Haitian revolution and endured military occupations by the three great colonial powers of Spain, France, and England.

In 1821 a conspiracy led by José Nuñez de Cáceres expelled the Spanish authority and Santo Domingo was declared independent. Within a matter of weeks, however, President Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti declared the people of Santo Domingo to be subject to the laws of Haiti and occupied the
country with troops. Opposition steadily mounted and in 1844 the Haitian yoke was overturned and the Dominican Republic was established.

From 1844 to the end of the century three men dominated Dominican history. They were Pedro Santana, Buenaventura Báez, and Ulises Heureaux. Both Santana and Báez feared Haitian reconquest and sought the assistance of foreign powers in helping to maintain the Republic’s independence from Haiti. The pursuit of such policies led to the re-establishment of Spanish control from 1861 to 1865 and aroused a greater determination by the United States that the tiny Republic should never again be dominated by a foreign power. This attitude in turn produced an abortive annexationist attempt by the Grant administration in 1869.

During the 1870's the tiny Republic reeled under a series of revolts. Not until 1882 was political stability established under the rule of Ulises Heureaux. His seventeen years of dictatorial rule were characterized by a suppression of Constitutional liberties and the accumulation of a foreign debt that approximated thirty-two million dollars by the time of his assassination in 1899. Chaos followed Heureaux's death and the country went still deeper in debt. In order to stave off the possibility of a European intervention designed to collect money due their nationals, the United States government, on the request of
Dominican President Carlos F. Morales, took over the collection of import duties throughout the Republic.

Under President Ramón Cáceres (1906-1911) progress was made towards the liquidation of the foreign debt, political stability prevailed, constitutional reforms were introduced and the economy began to prosper. In 1911, however, Cáceres was assassinated and chaos returned. In 1914 the United States government intervened to insure an honest election and tried to persuade the new president, Juan Isidro Jiménez, to accept certain economic and political reforms. When Jiménez was ousted by a revolution in 1916 President Wilson sent in United States Marines to occupy the country. Although well intentioned, the occupation, which lasted until 1924, was ill received by the Dominicans who wanted freedom rather than reforms in education, sanitation and public works.
CHAPTER I

THE ANNEXATIONIST YEARS

In 1821, inspired by the efforts of Simón Bolívar, Dominicans succeeded in gaining their freedom from Spain. Within a few short weeks, however, they were conquered by neighboring Haiti who asserted her authority over them until 1844. From the outset the Republic's second period of independence was marked by political violence and insurrection. Added to her misery was the fact that from time to time the Haitians attempted to restore their authority by force. Living in constant fear of Haitian invasion Dominican politicians appealed abroad to the United States, France, Spain, and Great Britain for protection. While the United States was engaged in Civil War Spain reannexed her former colony only to withdraw in 1865 because of high occupation costs and the decimation of her army by native uprisings and yellow fever. Though short-lived, Spanish intrusion aroused a greater determination by the United States that the Dominican Republic should never again be dominated by a foreign power. Washington's interest in repeated Dominican offers of a treaty providing for annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States was spurred also by the fact that the fine harbor at Samaná Bay was poten-
ially one of the most strategic positions in the West Indies.

North American relations with the island of Hispaniola commenced in the first decades of the eighteenth century when Yankee skippers ventured forth into the Caribbean Sea in search of trade. This inter-imperial trade, made possible by the abundant productivity of the British colonies in America, was of course, illegal, but:

...so strong were these trading instincts and so rich were the rewards from this illicit commerce that differences of race, religion, and nationality were lightly regarded. Even the many wars that vexed old Europe failed to destroy these colonial connections.¹

With the waning of Spanish power in the seventeenth century, the French contrived to gain a foothold in the western extremity of Hispaniola; efforts made by Spain to dislodge them proved futile, and by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 the western third of the island was formally ceded to France. Through the efforts of the French planters, the colony of Saint-Domingue, as it was called, became one of the most fertile and productive regions in the New World, and the most precious overseas possession of France. Here was centered a rich plantation economy which provided sugar and coffee for European tables but which lacked a supply of salt meat, salt fish, and flour to feed the thousands of

Negro slaves who cultivated the valuable crops. France could not furnish the thriving colony with enough cheap meat, but the British North American colonists could. Soon Yankee traders were supplying the French planters with fish, salt meat, livestock, flour, rice and other provisions in return for sugar and molasses. French attempts to impose limitations on the trade repeatedly met with failure. The importance of this lucrative trade was stated by John Adams in 1783 when he declared that "so essential is this commerce to both parties that if the governments forbid it, it will be carried on clandestinely."²

In the first weeks of August 1791, several Negro leaders formulated plans for overthrowing the hated slave owners of Haiti. By September the revolt had spread throughout the colony. The United States government at first "extended assistance to the colonial administration in Haiti through payments upon the national debt owed to France,"³ but the whites, outnumbered eleven to one, were slaughtered in large numbers and were gradually forced from the island.

After a series of costly wars the Negro leader Tous-saint l'Overture led the blacks to victory in Haiti and by 1801 secured control over the whole of Hispaniola. His success, however, was only temporary. Napoleon, free from

³Tansill, op.cit., p.8.
entanglement in Europe, immediately organized a military expedition, under General Victor Le Clerc, to recover Santo Domingo. Toussaint was forced to surrender, and was later captured and imprisoned in France where he died within a year. The French, however, presently faced a new series of revolts led by the capable Negro commander, Jean Jacques Dessalines. The French position soon became a defensive one. By the end of 1802 yellow fever had ravaged the French army and killed its commander and when the Peace of Amiens was broken by warfare in 1803 Napoleon decided he could ill afford to dissipate his strength in quest of empire west of the Mississippi. An astute Thomas Jefferson, realizing that without Hispaniola as a cornerstone the proposed French Empire in the West was at best a shaky structure, sent James Monroe to aid the American Minister at Paris, Robert Livingston, in negotiating a sale of the Floridas and New Orleans.

Napoleon, realizing failure in Hispaniola, and knowing full well that England might land an army in Louisiana and hold the territory by right of conquest, endeavored to win the good will of the United States, and thereby keep her from forming an alliance with England, by selling the Louisiana Territory in its entirety to the United States government for fifteen million dollars.

The French were able to maintain themselves in Santo Domingo (the Spanish portion of the island) until 1809 when a national insurrection, aided by Spanish and English
troops succeeded in expelling them forever. The people of Santo Domingo then accepted the rule of Spain until 1821 when a Republic was proclaimed. Independence, however, lasted only the few weeks that it took the President of Haiti, Jean Pierre Boyer, to occupy the country.

Haitian rule (1822-44) was a period of social and economic retrogression for Dominicans. Every effort was made to Haitianize the country by extending the Haitian laws, and imposing Haitian administrators and governors who ruled with an iron hand. Through the systematic use of terror Spanish families were forced from the island and their lands resettled by Haitians. The University of Santo Domingo, one of the oldest in the Western Hemisphere, was closed. With the expulsion of all Spanish priests the clergy deteriorated and many churches were left without priests. Misery was widespread and "public spirit seems to have sunk so low that only rarely were any sporadic efforts made to raise the standard of a new rebellion." The following report submitted to the British Parliament in 1826 by the British Consul-General in Haiti provides a graphic description of the effects of Haitian rule:

The whole isle is divided into departments, arrondissements, and communes. These are all under the command of military men subject only

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to the control of the President, and to them is entrusted exclusively the execution of all laws whether affecting police, agriculture or finance. There is not a single civilian charged with an extensive authority . . . During the past two years trade has gradually fallen off and . . . it is supposed that it has decreased nearly one half . . . The most important code is the Code Rural, the chief character of which is the enforcing of labor. It is a modification of the old French regulations sanctioned by the Code Noire, with additional restrictions. The provisions are as despotic as those of any slave system that can be conceived. The laborer may almost be considered as "adscriptus glebe," he is deemed a vagrant and liable to punishment if he ventures to move from his dwelling or farm without license. He is prohibited from keeping a shop. No person can build a house in the country not connected with a farm. . . . The Code affixes the penalty or fine in some cases, and there is indefinite imprisonment at the option of the justice of the peace. Cultivation would not go on beyond that which daily necessities might require, except for the Code. The decrease in population in thirty-three years has been very nearly one-third of the whole population in 1793 . . . The Government has appropriated all the church property to its own use. The clergy rely wholly on the fees, two-thirds of which they are obliged to pay into the Treasury. . . . It is not a subject of surprise that morality should be in as low a stage . . . Marriage is scarcely thought of. . . .

Under Boyer, however, trade with the United States once again quickened so that by 1822 "the value of American exports [to the island of Hispaniola] was equivalent to the combined exports to Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark and . . ."

Ireland. Although lucrative commercial relations bound the United States to Hispaniola, the government in Washington refused to establish a diplomatic post. The main reason diplomatic recognition of Boyer's government was not forthcoming was because of the ticklish slavery question. Representatives from the South were particularly vehement in their denunciation of proposed Haitian recognition. Their position was well outlined by Senator Benton of Missouri in 1826 when he stated that:

> We purchase coffee from her, and pay for it; but we interchange no consuls or ministers. . . . And why? Because the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro insurrection to be exhibited among them. . . . It will not permit the fact to be seen, and told, that for the murder of their masters and mistresses, they are to find friends among the white people of these United States.\(^7\)

It was not until 1844, the year in which the Dominican Republic gained its independence from Haiti, that the United States entered into official diplomatic relations with the island of Hispaniola. After abortive attempts at seeking European assistance, Dominican President Pedro Santana,\(^8\) fearing an invasion attempt by General Charles Hérard of

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\(^6\)Niles' Register, XX, p. 49, quoted in Tansill, op. cit., p. 120.

\(^7\)Register of Debates in Congress, 19 Cong., 1 sess., p. 330, quoted in Tansill, op.cit., p. 122.

\(^8\)Santana was president three times. His terms were as follows: November 13, 1844-August 4, 1848; February 15, 1853-May 26, 1856; January 31, 1859-March 18, 1861.
Haiti and wishing to establish a treaty of friendship and commerce, sent Dr. José M. Caminero as special envoy to the United States to obtain recognition. Within six weeks' time Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, at the urging of President John Tyler, sent a special agent, John Hogan, to the Dominican Republic to obtain information concerning the resources and internal conditions of the island. In Hogan's opinion the island was of "inestimable value" and had "one of the most admirable positions which the world can exhibit for a commercial emporium." 9

The administration of James Polk, however, desired more information and in the spring of 1846 entrusted a fact finding mission to a young naval lieutenant, David D. Porter. Porter's observations were critical in many respects. He recognized the presence of valuable mineral deposits and delighted at the harbor potentialities of Samaná Bay but of the climate he remarked that "the air at night is filled with poisonous flies; and mosquitoes drive one almost mad," while as to the constitution of the Republic he believed that for the present, "it might as well never have been adopted, . . . because of flagrant abuses of power." 10

9Hogan to Buchanan, October 4, 1845, Special Agents Series, XIII, MS. Dept. of State, quoted in Tansill, op. cit., p. 126.

With the outbreak of the Mexican War in May, 1846, the United States paid scant attention until 1849 to the affairs of the Dominican Republic, with the result that the Dominicans, feeling slighted, turned to Europe for succor. By 1849, however, the Dominicans, faced with the threat of being conquered by President Faustin Soulouque of Haiti, once again pleaded with the United States government for a promise of protection or annexation. During this time an American observer described Santo Domingo as a city where:

Consternation and alarm prevail. The President of Haiti, Soulouque, is within two days' march of this city with 10,000 blacks. He declares extermination to all whites and mulattoes and has beaten the people of this Republic in every battle. My house is already filled with frightened females. . . . The Haitian army is almost upon us. Almost all of the foremost merchants have packed up their goods and shipped them to the neighboring islands before leaving with their families. The town is filled with women and children from the country and famine is to be apprehended. . . . The President has told me that it is his intention to set fire to the place in case they cannot hold out against the Haitians.\(^{11}\)

The American minister, Benjamin Green, while sympathetic to Dominican overtures, was forced to remain noncommittal, whereupon, "the Dominican government, on February 22, 1850, addressed identical notes to the representatives of the United States, France, and England, requesting joint inter-

\(^{11}\)Elliott to Buchanan, April 13, 1849, and April 24, 1849, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, pp. 89-90.
When Millard Fillmore became President as a result of President Zachary Taylor's sudden death in July 1850, he immediately appointed Daniel Webster to replace John M. Clayton as Secretary of State. Secretary Webster's sympathies were strongly enlisted on the side of the Dominicans and he decided early that "the only effective method for maintaining the stability of the Dominican Government lay in joining France and England in a joint mediation." Webster's nomination resulted in Robert M. Walsh's elevation as special agent to Santo Domingo and Haiti replacing Benjamin Green. Mr. Walsh set sail for Hispaniola on January 25, 1851 and upon arriving proceeded immediately to Port au Prince where he presented his credentials to the British and French consuls. In Webster's decision to join France and Britain in mediation to bring peace to the tiny republic he had instructed Walsh to resist any actions which might "trench upon the just rights of the Dominicans." While willing to jointly mediate the Dominican crisis, Washington still "looked with disfavor upon European intervention in the

12 Tansill, op.cit., p. 136.
13 Welles, op.cit., I, p. 112.
14 Webster to Walsh, January 18, 1851, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 113.
After presenting his credentials Mr. Walsh informed the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the govern­ment of the United States had decided to cooperate with the governments of England and France to secure Dominican sov­ereignty and that:

Any further prosecution of the war, therefore, is abhorrent to the dictates of humanity and reason and injurious to the interests of neutrals. . . . The principle is now fully established that the actual possession of independence for a reasonable time entitles a nation to be acknowledged as sovereign. This is a principle which the American world established as consecrated and must ever be upheld . . . The best interests of the Haitian Empire demand the recognition of Dominican independ­ence . . . In every point of view, therefore, the Government of the United States entertains the conviction that it is incumbent upon the Emperor [Faustin I] to recognize the independence of Santo Domingo.¹⁶

Previous to Mr. Walsh's arrival in Port au Prince, the French and British consuls, in conjunction with the Commer­cial Agent of the United States, had urged Soulouque, who had recently proclaimed himself Emperor Faustin I, to accept a definitive peace. When this proposal was turned down the mediating powers suggested a ten year truce. Walsh pushed


¹⁶Walsh to the Duke de Tiburon, Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs, February 7, 1851, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, pp. 116-17.
the latter idea strongly but the responses of the Haitian government remained negative. After four months of fruitless talks "the representatives of the three powers departed empty-handed except for the promise that hostilities would not be renewed without notification to their governments."¹⁷

Dominican President Buenaventura Báez,¹⁸ miffed at the governments of the United States, France, and Britain for their failure to guarantee protection from Haitian onslaught, in 1858 appealed to Spain to establish a protectorate over her former colony. Spain, however, was not anxious to annex a hornet's nest as "it feared that assumption of an active role might awaken the jealousy of the United States, and alienate the sympathies of the Cuban slaveholders."¹⁹ Once again the Dominicans, under a new President, Pedro Santana, looked to the United States for protection. On November 2, 1853 President Franklin Pierce's Secretary of State, William L. Marcy, instructed General William L. Cazneau to proceed as special agent to Santo Domingo. General Cazneau, an avowed expansionist, pressed for closer relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic. On the strength of


¹⁸Báez was president five times. His terms were as follows: September 24, 1849-February 15, 1853; October 8, 1856-July 7, 1857; December 8, 1865-May 28, 1866; May 2, 1868-December 31, 1873; December 27, 1876-March 2, 1878.

¹⁹Jones, op.cit., p. 80.
Cazneau's assurances that "President Santana's ruling policy is indubitably the creation of the Dominican Republic as an independent American power, preferably under the protection of the United States," coupled with his glowing description of the Republic's natural wealth, the Pierce administration released instructions on July 17, 1854 to Cazneau to negotiate a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, with the stipulation that Article 28 of the proposed treaty was to grant the United States a naval and coaling station at Samaná Bay.

Word of the negotiations leaked out, however, and France and Great Britain protested this attempt to secure special privileges of a military character in the Caribbean. When British and French warships, summoned by the two European representatives, Sir Robert Schomburgk and Maxime Raybaud, positioned themselves in Dominican waters Santana and Cazneau became convinced that force might be used to prevent ceding of Samana. Cazneau attempted to withdraw the treaty but "Schomburgk and Raybaud, in order to ensure defeat of the treaty in the United States Senate prevailed on the Dominican government to insert a clause to the effect that coloured Dominicans travelling in the United States would be

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accorded the same treatment as white Americans."\(^{22}\) Secretary of State Marcy realized such a proposal would meet with early defeat at the hands of Southern Senators and so did not submit the treaty for ratification.

In 1856 President Santana attempted once again to negotiate a treaty with the United States. The treaty contained only the standard stipulations of friendship and commerce but "rumors that the treaty included a secret convention leasing Samaná Bay to the United States stirred renewed activities by Schomburgk and Raybaud . . . \(^{[and]}\) Santana, realizing that he could no longer look to the United States for support, resigned on May 26, 1856."\(^{23}\) After a succession of chief executives Santana returned from exile to become President for the third time on January 31, 1859. Santana was still convinced that the survival of the Dominican Republic rested with its being annexed by a foreign power and so pressed for negotiations with his last remaining hope, Spain. By March of 1860 arrangements with Spain were nearly complete. Propagandists created sympathy among the people for the idea of Spanish annexation by claiming that Spain had regenerated herself into a modern nation. With ever-increasing enthusiasm it was explained that Spain possessed railways and steamships, encouraged popular education,

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 38.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 39.
and had repealed oppressive laws relating to industry and commerce.24

Spain watched the government of the United States drift toward Civil War and decided that the time was opportune to recapture the glory of a lost colonial possession. On March 18, 1861 the negotiations were made public and Santana addressed a letter to Isabella II, assuring her that:

The Dominican people, giving a free course to those sentiments of affection and loyalty which have been so long repressed, have unanimously and spontaneously proclaimed you as their Queen and Sovereign, and I, who have now the exalted and undeserved honor of being the organ of those sincere sentiments, lay at your Majesty's feet the keys of this lovely island.25

The Dominicans, however, were not long content under a Spanish hand that daily grew more repressive. Educated Dominicans chaffed under a Spanish administration that replaced local inhabitants in high positions with Spaniards. The long awaited economic rejuvenation also was not forthcoming, as tariffs were manipulated to favor Spanish exporters rather than local industry. By 1863 the Spanish army, already thinned by yellow fever, was faced with armed rebellion. Excesses committed by both sides only fanned the flames of hatred and wrought devastation throughout the land. By 1865 Spain judged the situation as hopeless and plans were

24Tansill, op.cit., p. 219.

25British Parliamentary Papers, 1861, LXV. Papers relating to Annexation of Santo Domingo, p. 28, quoted in Stuart, op.cit., p. 278.
submitted to the Spanish Cortes for evacuation. On May 1, 1865, Isabella was forced to sign a law revoking the annexation. Once more the Dominicans were independent.

After the emancipation of slaves in the United States and the defeat of the Confederacy the ticklish problem of recognition of Haiti and the Dominican Republic was at once resolved. Also the fact that Spain had entered the Caribbean and annexed the Dominican Republic "aroused a greater determination by the United States that the island should never again be dominated by a foreign power."\(^{26}\) A treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded with Haiti in 1864 and diplomatic recognition soon followed. Because of the Spanish occupancy and the chaotic conditions which followed the Dominican Republic was not recognized until September 17, 1866.

In 1866 the question of Samaná once more arose. Báez, now in his third term as president, made overtures to Secretary of State Seward, who was by now a staunch expansionist. Báez sought money and munitions to keep himself in power, but negotiations were barely under way when a successful revolt forced him into exile. His successor, José María Cabral, however, was equally enthused with the prospect of leasing certain keys and coal mines in Samana Bay in return for "a million dollars in the character of a loan on just, equitable

and reasonable conditions . . . [and] a number of pieces of heavy artillery.  

27 Cabral also secretly indicated a willingness to sell Samaná Bay if it would be more profitable to do so. This suggestion (like so many others in Dominican history) was one "made by a hard-pressed government which hoped through the aid requested to consolidate its position."  

Opposition in the Dominican cabinet, however, based on the constitutional amendment that forbade transfer of territory through sale to a foreign power, forced Cabral to renge on his previous offers.

Although President Cabral sought to renew negotiations a revolution which erupted in Monte Cristi on October 7, 1867 forced his administration from power on January 31, 1868 and placed the ever-durable Báez in the President's chair for the fourth time. Báez' return to power did not bring to a halt the plans regarding Samaná for he "was too sagacious a statesman to fail to recognize the value of American protection."  

Báez was barely inaugurated when a series of revolts broke out along the Haitian frontier. In order to maintain his administration he showed himself not only willing to support a lease convention, but went so far as to press for out-

27 García to Seward, November 8, 1866, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 323.

28 Jones, op.cit., p. 88.

right annexation, a policy that had led to his predecessor's exile. As his position grew more insecure Báez became desperate. Seeking to maintain himself in power he suggested that the United States government:

... publish a declaration placing the Dominican Republic under the protection of the United States, and sustain the proclamation by sending vessels of war to take possession of Samaná and Manzanilla bays, and in fact, any other points that a military necessity may require.30

Such a proposal surpassed even the flexible measures that Secretary of State Seward had been contemplating and he was forced in November of 1868 to convey to Báez the following statement:

The Congress of the United States is always disinclined to foreign military conquests, perhaps more so now than at any time heretofore. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Congress would entertain any other proposition for the annexation of Dominica than one which should originate with and have the sanction of the Dominican people, expressed in a regular Constitutional manner.31

On the Dominican question Seward had the full sympathy of President Andrew Johnson who stated in his fourth annual message to Congress in 1868 that:

I am satisfied that the time has arrived when even so direct a proceeding as a proposition for an annexation of the two Republics of the island


31Seward to Smith, November 17, 1868, quoted in Welles, op. cit., I, p. 352.
of Santo Domingo would not only receive the consent of the people interested but would also give satisfaction to all other foreign nations. Unhappily for Seward, President Johnson's relations with Congress were so strained that his influence was minimal. Annexationist ambitions in the Caribbean, therefore, lay in abeyance until the advent of the new Grant administration.

Under the Grant administration ideas of expansionism flourished as the ex-general of the Union Armies thought that "the imperative need of America was colonial expansion." Grant took note of the plight of the Negro in the United States and looked to the Dominican Republic as a place where the black man could secure the blessings of "meaningful" liberty. In his memoirs he states that "I took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race." With this idea in mind he instructed his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, to dispatch General Orville E. Babcock to Santo Domingo to obtain information regarding the conditions of the island.


33 Tansill, op.cit., p. 338.

and the disposition of government and people towards the United States. 35

When Babcock arrived in Santo Domingo in the early summer of 1869 he was immediately collared by William L. Cazneau and his partner in mischief, Colonel Joseph W. Fabens. These two schemers kept the General constantly in their company allowing him to see and hear only the pleasantness of the Republic. Especially did they keep him away from the resident American commercial agent, J. Somers Smith, who knew the true condition of the island and who frequently "expressed in his communiques to the Secretary of State a sharp suspicion of General Cazneau and Colonel Fabens." 36

Under the direction of Cazneau, Babcock became intimate with Baez and was soon a staunch supporter of the idea of annexation. Upon his return to the United States he urged President Grant to use his influence among members of Congress to popularize the idea of annexation. Grant, easily influenced by his friends, acceded to Babcock's desires. Babcock was then sent back to conclude the negotiations, which were to be signed by Raymond H. Perry, the recent replacement of Commercial agent J. Somers Smith, whose only fault had been his unwavering honesty.

Upon his return to Santo Domingo Babcock was once again

35Stuart, op.cit., p. 281.
36Tansill, op.cit., p. 372.
closely supervised by Cazneau and Fabens to insure success in negotiations with Baez. His instructions, given to him by Secretary of State Fish, directed him, in the event a treaty was concluded, as an officer of the Army of the United States:

... to carry out the agreement of the United States contained in said treaty to protect the people of that Republic against foreign interference while the nation is expressing its will and also to protect the interest and rights which the United States may obtain under such convention.37

In order to help Babcock in this task he was given a draft for $100,000 and the backing of the United States Navy if it became necessary to protect the Dominican Republic until the will of its people could be ascertained.

On November 29, 1869 negotiations were concluded between the two governments and two treaties were signed: one providing for annexation of the Dominican Republic as a territory of the United States, and the other (in case outright annexation was opposed in the Senate) providing for the right to lease Samaná Peninsula and its fine harbor within fifty years upon payment of $2,000,000.38 As soon as the documents were signed General Babcock turned over $150,000 in money and munitions to Baez and, accompanied by Generals Delos B. Sackett and Rufus Ingalls, sailed for Samaná Bay to hoist the American flag and take formal possession of the

37 Fish to Babcock, September 6, 1869, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 376.

38 Stuart, op.cit., p. 281.
newly acquired territory.

Báez, feeling his hold on power growing tenuous, appealed to Washington for help, this time with results. By the end of February 1870, seven American warships were stationed in Dominican waters, with orders from the Secretary of the Navy, instructing the squadron to direct their operations in accordance with the indications of President Báez. The influence of Báez, who feared interference from Haiti and Dominican revolutionaries based in Haiti, is mirrored in the message sent to President Nissage Saget of Haiti by the Commander of the United States Naval detachment. Saget was warned that "any interference or attack by vessels under the Haitian or any other flag upon the Dominicans during the pendency of negotiations will be considered an act of hostility to the flag of the United States and will provoke hostility in return." 39

Báez, now safely under the protection of American guns, decided the time was ripe for a plebiscite designed to demonstrate the desire of Dominicans to be united with the United States. Proclaiming the voting booths open in all the provinces, Báez stated on February 19, 1870, that "it is high time that the Government should take legal steps to assure itself that the desired purpose is in truth the real expres-

39 Poor to Nissage Saget, President of Haiti, February 10, 1870, quoted in Welles, op. cit., I, p. 384.
sion of the national will. Playing in large part on the old fears of Haitian attack the Government-directed newspaper, the Boletín Oficial, assured the people that "Santo Domingo gains everything and loses nothing . . . . Annexation means salvation because it will oblige Haiti to respect Dominican rights and to maintain a decent conduct and because it will persuade all Dominicans to renounce political disputes."41

Needless to say, there was no "real expression" of national will. That the voting was not free was evident to all. Through his police Baez intimidated opponents of annexation with threats of imprisonment and exile. Major Raymond H. Perry, the American Commercial Agent, stated in a communiqué to Secretary of State Fish that:

Baez has told me several times that if any man opposed annexation he would either shoot him or send him his passports. He also told me that it should be a free vote of the people but such was not the case. . . . I have seen Baez . . . shake his fist in the face of some of his nearest friends . . . . and tell them he would banish them from the island if they opposed annexation. . . . The prisons are filled with political prisoners.42

When the ballots were finally counted it was found that out of 16,000 votes cast only eleven were found to express

40Presidential decree of Baez issued on February 19, 1870, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 384.
42Perry to Fish, June 7, 1870, quoted in Welles, op. cit., I, p. 386.
opposition to annexation. The ever scholarly Sumner Welles mentions that these eleven dissenting votes "were recognized as having been cast at the President's instance by his agents in order to prevent the proceedings from appearing too farcical."\(^{43}\) The results were immediately reported to Washington by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who wrote that "the desire is great with which this country almost unanimously is burning to see the conclusion of its annexation to the United States."\(^{44}\)

The scene of activity now moves to Washington where the incoming information became a focal point of general discussion. The debate that followed in the Senate brought about a serious controversy between President Grant and Senator Charles Sumner, a longtime friend of the President. The President stood for annexation for reasons already stated. Sumner, however, felt the proposed treaty was a travesty of justice, and further felt it would allow the United States to adopt an aggressive policy toward Haiti which his abolitionist principles would not allow.\(^{45}\) Outside the Senate the people of America gave little support to the project and only a few newspapers came to the defense

\(^{43}\)Welles, op.cit., I, p. 386.
\(^{44}\)Gautier to Fish, March 18, 1870, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 387.
\(^{45}\)Jones, op.cit., p. 94.
of the proposed annexation. The Senate debates were bitter, but Sumner, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, wielded too much power and influence to be overcome. His arguments were also persuasive, chief among which are the following:

A. The proposed annexation would probably encourage further American acquisitions of Caribbean territory and would thus involve the United States in serious complications with other powers.

B. There is little likelihood of further intervention by European powers in the affairs of the Dominican Republic.

C. The United States, in the event of annexation would probably be saddled with a public debt much larger than had been anticipated.

D. Continued civil war and rebellions would be an aftermath of annexation.

E. Annexation would impair the predominance of the colored race in the West Indies and therefore would be unjust to it.

When the vote on Dominican annexation was finally taken on June 30, 1870, the treaty failed by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-eight; two-thirds being necessary for ratification. Sumner had emerged victorious. President Grant, however, still sought to keep the project alive and in his second annual message to Congress on December 5, 1870, he recommended that:

By joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress the Executive be authorized to appoint a commission.

46 Tansill, op.cit., p. 407.

to negotiate a treaty with the authorities of San Domingo for the annexation of that island and that an appropriation be made to defray the expenses of such a commission. 48

Although Senate opposition to annexation remained strong, tempers cooled enough to allow a proposal to be adopted which would permit three commissioners to inquire once more into the political and economic condition of the island. Sumner, who believed our policy should be one of "kindness, benevolence, assistance, aid, help, protection, and all that is implied in good neighborhood," 49 was ultimately ousted from his committee chairmanship for his dissenting views.

In line with the congressional proposal, President Grant entrusted the fact finding mission to three distinguished men: Benjamin F. Wade, Andrew D. White, and Samuel G. Howe. After an elaborate and painstaking survey the final view of the three investigators was that annexation would be most profitable to the United States. The Grant administration, however, scolded daily by opposition editorials and faced with numerous charges of corruption, was forced to reject further proposals aimed at annexation of the Dominican Republic. 50

48 Richardson, op.cit., IX, pp. 4054–85.
49 Quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 398.
50 Logan, op.cit., p. 46.
After the ill-favored efforts of Grant and Fish, the United States lost interest in further territorial expansion in the Caribbean region. When, in 1882, President Salomon of Haiti offered to cede the island of La Fortue to the United States, he was politely refused. At the time, Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen said that "the policy of this government ... has tended towards avoidance of possessions disconnected from the main continent." In 1884 the overture was extended once more, this time for either the bay of La Môle or the island of Tortuga, and once again the offer was refused. One last futile attempt was made to annex Samaná Bay in 1892, but negotiations were still in the infantile stage when President Benjamin Harrison decided not to go ahead with the plan.52

United States' insistence that the Dominican Republic must never be dominated by a foreign power had led to a policy of annexation by Washington leaders who favored United States expansion in the Caribbean. After the ill-favored efforts of the Grant administration, the United States lost interest in any further annexation attempts for a variety of reasons. Chief among them was a refusal by a majority of Congressional leaders to embrace the cause of expansion in the Caribbean. Popular support, while never great, dimin-

51 Stuart, op.cit., p. 283.
52 Jones, op.cit., p. 99.
ished even more with the announcement of the unsavory financial operations connected with the project. Indeed, in 1892, when Dominican overtures regarding the leasing of Samaná Bay were leaked to the press, popular agitation in the United States was so great that President Ulises Heureaux was forced to publish an official statement in the Gaceta Oficial denying that any such overture was made. He complained that:

The great difficulty is your American press. Whenever a Dominican editor writes anything objectionable or puts my picture in his paper as a caricature I put him in prison. That settles it. In the United States, the writers abuse their privileges and your ruling men do nothing. That article in the Gaceta Oficial [a denial that negotiations were in progress] will quiet the people. Then Mr. Blaine can send instructions. We can go to work some months in the future secretly. If we succeed it will be done before anybody can make any noise. If we obtain no good result, there will be no bad feeling.53

Although the United States had lost interest in further attempts at annexation, this "did not indicate by any means any lessening of United States interest in the Republics of Hispaniola,"54 for Washington was still insistent that the Dominican Republic must never be dominated by a foreign power.

54Mecham, op. cit., p. 281.
CHAPTER II

THE CUSTOMS RECEIVERSHIP

The Dominican Republic had weathered the turbulence and disorder brought about by Haitian and Spanish intrusion, and by United States' projects which aimed at annexation. By 1900, however, a series of foreign debts, totaling nearly forty million dollars, into which unscrupulous leaders like Buenaventura Baez and Ulises Heureaux had led the tiny nation, had placed the Dominican Republic in a position of debt peonage. Citizens of the United States and of seven European nations became engaged in a confused scramble for the contents of the Dominican treasury. The Dominican Republic was thus menaced with the possibility of foreign intervention which might lead to indefinite occupation.

By 1904 European creditors were actively urging their governments to intervene to secure payment on their bonds. Washington, however, was still insistent that no intervention by a European power in the Western Hemisphere was to be allowed, especially so close to American shores. In order to forestall any action which might lead to European intervention, President Theodore Roosevelt promulgated his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in which he asserted the right of the United States to act as an international policeman.
in those countries where chronic wrongdoing or impotence prevented them from meeting their international obligations. The following year saw the installment of the President’s policy on the summons of Dominican President Carlos P. Morales, who at the time was sorely menaced by domestic and foreign antagonists. Roosevelt established a customs receivership designed to control and direct Dominican revenues which he believed would bring peace to the island and satisfy clamoring foreign creditors. Unfortunately, the long awaited stability was not forthcoming and the plan that was admirable in its qualities became but the first of a series of steps that led to outright military intervention in 1916.

The year 1869 witnessed the genesis of the Dominican debt when Buenaventura Baez, confronted with depreciated currency and threatening revolutionaries, negotiated an advance of £757,700 from a group of English bankers headed by Hartmont & Co. The loan was typical of the exorbitant discount rates which poor and unstable countries had to pay. Sumner Welles comments that “the terms were of so onerous a character as to be almost incredible.”

As finally agreed upon, the loan was reduced to £420,000 by the Dominican Senate of which £100,000 was earmarked as a commission for Hartmont & Co. For the remaining £320,000

55Welles, op.cit., I, p. 359.
the Dominican government pledged itself to pay £38,900 annually for twenty-four years, a sum amounting to more than four times the face value of the loan. As security, the
Dominican government pledged the entire resources of the
Republic—specifically, the customs revenue and the revenues
from guano, coal, mahogany and other forest products. Hart-
mont & Co. sold bonds amounting to £757,700 to the public
at rates ranging from 50 to 70 per cent, but by reason of
neglect, fraud, or deliberate defalcation, only £38,095
was received and accounted for by the Dominican government.56
Báez and the Dominican Senate, realizing they were being
mercilessly fleeced, canceled the contract in 1870. Interest
on outstanding bonds was paid until August 1872, when the loan
went into default. The borrowed money was intended to pro-
mote roads and railways, but instead was used to crush Báez's
opponents and line the pockets of his supporters. Further
default under following administrations met increasing objec-
tion from the British government, which in retrospect aug-
ured poorly for the future.

Between 1872 and 1888 the story of the Dominican debt
is one of steady accumulation of floating indebtedness.
Salaries of civil servants were left unpaid, claims for
injuries suffered in the many revolutions were freely extended,

56 Jacob H. Hollander, "The Readjustment of San Domingo's
Finances," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXI, (May, 1907),
p. 405.
treasury bills were printed for the purchase of war material, and funds for current expenditure were borrowed from money lenders whose greed knew no bounds. The Hartmont fiasco had, for the time being, discouraged further bond issues, which placed the Dominican government at the mercy of the merchant lenders of the Republic whose interest rates were not infrequently as high as 10 per cent a month, compounded monthly. By 1888 the total bonded debt of the Republic had risen to $3,850,000.57

The last fifth of the nineteenth century was the period of another dictator, Ulises Heureaux, who became President on September 1, 1882. Apparently of illegitimate birth, Heureaux obtained the practical education of a soldier in the field. Fearless, cruel, sensual, and a leader of men, he dominated Dominican affairs until an assassin's bullet ended his tyranny in 1899. Of his administration, Professor Chester Lloyd Jones states that:

Heureaux' rule was to be one in which the Republic slid steadily from a bad to a worse position and one in which there developed abuses which made the Dominican Republic in the early years of the twentieth century the center of far-reaching international complications threatening the continued existence of the nation.58

Just as President Báez had done in 1869, so did President Heureaux in 1888, embarrassed by an empty treasury and

57 Ibid., p. 408.
58 Jones, op. cit., p. 95.
harassed by domestic and foreign creditors, turn to the foreign money markets as a solution for the Republic's financial ills. A contract was entered into with Westendorp & Co., of Amsterdam which provided for the issue of £770,000 thirty-year 6 per cent gold bonds. To placate British bankers and the British government, the sum of £42,860 was to be used to liquidate the Hartmont loan. Since the Dominican government had received only about $150,000 from Hartmont, it found itself paying back £1 for $1 when at the time the pound was worth $4.80. The small sum of £50,000 was earmarked to pay off the interior floating debt while Westendorp & Co. bought the remainder of the bonds at 78 per cent of their face value. For security, Westendorp & Co. was given a fresh lien on customs revenues, which were to be collected through a board of agents, the régie, who were to collect the amount necessary to service the loan charges and pay for collection expenses. The remaining revenue was to be turned over to the Dominican government.

In 1890 a second loan in the sum of £900,000, redeemable in fifty-six years at the rate of 6 per cent, was negotiated with Westendorp & Co., to secure funds for the construction of a railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago. Unhappily for Dominicans, Heureaux used most of the money to rid himself of fresh accumulations of floating indebted-

59Logan, op.cit., p. 50.
ness and squandered the rest on personal extravagances. In the meantime, Westendorp & Co. encountered government interference in the collection of customs duties. When Heureaux desired funds he would seize certain revenues and pledge them to local merchants to obtain whatever he needed. As a result, the régie was unable to service the bonds.

When Heureaux defaulted on the two Westendorp loans in 1892 the Amsterdam banking firm applied to two New York attorneys to negotiate a sale of the bonds to the United States government. Washington flatly refused the offer, but Secretary of State Foster suggested that an American firm take over the duties of Westendorp to forestall any transfer of interests to French or German bankers. Immediately the commissioned attorneys, Smith M. Weed and Charles W. Welles, organized the San Domingo Improvement Company of New York and acquired the rights and obligations of Westendorp & Co. By 1893 the San Domingo Improvement Co. had become the Dominican Republic's banker.

Fresh money was essential if Heureaux was to maintain his despotic control. The tyrant secured it in the form of two loans from the San Domingo Improvement Co., which agreed to extend a total of $3,285,000 to refund old obligations.

60 Schoenrich, op. cit., pp. 355-56.

and to meet new debts. The fifth, sixth, and seventh loans, totaling $4,250,000 were extended in 1893-95 for the purpose of discharging floating debts and quieting indemnity claims. Although not always harmonious, the working relations between Heureaux and the San Domingo Improvement Co. were close.

When, in 1895, France threatened to seize the Dominican custom houses because of the dictator's treatment of the French owned national bank, the San Domingo Improvement Co. came to his assistance and undertook to pay off the indemnity which France required and later bought the stock of the bank and operated it as its own property. In 1897, when the Dominican government once again defaulted on the payments of its foreign debt, the company carried through another refunding operation and undertook to float an eighth bond issue of $2,736,750 in bonds at 2 3/4 per cent and $1,500,000 in bonds at 4 per cent. The issue was designed to convert all previous bonds then outstanding and pay overdue interest while supplying the Dominican government with $1,000,000 in cash.

The San Domingo Improvement Co., however, was not able to carry out the contract to its fullest extent because of a lack of funds. Eventually the conversion of older bond issues was completed, but at enormous cost. Professor Jacob


63 Schoenrich, op.cit., p. 357.
H. Hollander reports of the transaction as one which:

... involved cut-throat terms, and unchecked procedure. Instead of the economical and orderly readjustment that was to put the financial household of Santo Domingo in order to re-establish her public credit, there resulted a swollen debit, loose in construction, suspicious in detail, and foredoomed to break down.64

During Heureaux' administration the San Domingo Improvement Co. paid the Dominican government from 30 to 43 per cent of the face value of the securities and in the main sold the bonds not to Americans, but to Europeans, mostly in Belgium and France. Deception of every type was practiced by the bond sellers as evidenced by the fact that a large number of the French holders of Dominican bonds were poor Catholic peasants in France who were told that they were buying securities of the Dominican religious order.65 Other investors were attracted by the supposed security afforded by the company's right to collect customs duties and the guarantee written into each loan contract that the company could ask the Dutch, Belgian, British, French, and United States governments to appoint a board of commissioners to collect customs in case of default.

The guarantees proved illusory, however, as the collection agents, who were Dominicans, practiced every type of fraud, which served only to reduce customs revenues to a

64 Hollander, op. cit., pp. 410-11.
65 Munro, op. cit., p. 81
trickle. Needless to say, though successive defaults occurred, no five power government board was set up to insure payment on the loans, partly because the various governments differed over the roles they would play, and partly because the San Domingo Improvement Co. felt they could always find more gullible investors to line their pockets with silver. By the turn of the century, however, it proved nearly impossible to sell any sizeable number of bonds, and the Republic was again in default when Heureaux was assassinated in July of 1899.

It was felt that Heureaux' passing might usher in a period of responsible government; but the huge foreign debt that saddled the Republic, coupled with the inability of political leaders to reconcile their differences, dashed all such hopes. In financial matters the worst features of Heureaux' administration were intensified. Each successive President, harried by political rivals, became a more reckless borrower, and each new loan was obtained upon harsher terms. Professor Hollander reports that "the nominal rate of interest upon public loans was rarely less than 2 per cent per month, and, with respect to funds or values actually received, several times that rate."66 Professor Hollander goes on to state that on the eve of the establishment of the Customs Receivership by the United States in

66Hollander, op.cit., p. 411.
1905 that Santo Domingo was found to be:

... a confessed bankrupt, whose public faith was discredited no less at home than in every financial market of the world, whose current debits were hawked about as little better than waste paper, whose people were crushed under a galling burden of taxation, whose natural resources were mortgaged in extravagant or semi-fraudulent concessions, whose legitimate creditors were left without compensation or redress, and whose political existence was threatened by contractual obligations and international agreements in the interest of foreign creditors.67

The position occupied by the San Domingo Improvement Co. was unsatisfactory to all involved parties. The company wished to terminate its responsibilities and the Dominican government, headed now by Juan Isidro Jiménez, sorely wanted to speed its withdrawal as the company was thoroughly hated by Dominicans because of its long association with Hureaux.68 The problem was finding security which would allow the company to withdraw without jeopardizing the interests of its owners.

In spite of hostile public opinion, President Jiménez in March of 1900 endorsed a plan which would have allowed the company to continue customs collections in return for financial concessions. French and Belgian bondholders, however, refused to agree to further concessions and the Belgian government notified the Dominican government that the company

67Ibid., p.412.

no longer represented its national's interest. Jiménez,
disgusted over his proposal being rejected, terminated the
San Domingo Improvement Co.'s right to collect customs,
although he set up a commission to withhold 46 per cent of
the customs receipts to insure payment to the bondholders.
What followed was financial confusion. Governments began
to act independently of the San Domingo Improvement Co. and
in support of their own citizens, and a confused scramble for
the contents of the Dominican treasury ensued.

In seeking a solution, President Jiménez entrusted
his Minister of Foreign Affairs with the task of making sepa-
rate arrangements with the French and Belgian bondholders
and with the Improvement Co. The negotiations proved suc-
cessful, but when the Dominican Congress approved the agree-
ment with the European bondholders and not with the Improve-
ment Co., new complications arose.

To this point, the United States State Department
had lent little support to the Improvement Co.'s plight;
their only suggestion being that the Dominican Republic
buy out the hated company. The obstacle encountered here,
of course, was Dominican opposition and the lack of funds
to carry through such an agreement. With the agreement
that gave the French and Belgian bondholders a lien on the
customs of Santo Domingo and San Pedro de Macoris, however,

69Ibid.
the State Department decided that American interests were not going to be simply dismissed. Secretary of State John Hay, disturbed over what he termed "discrimination against American companies" informed the Legation at Santo Domingo to inform the Dominicans that the American government was "not disposed to pass over unheeded the equities of the American companies" and that if all other methods of attempted settlement failed, the Dominican government should allow arbitration.70

Secretary Hay probably did not intend that the Legation vigorously support the Improvement Co.'s claim, but William F. Powell, Minister to Haiti, who carried out Hay's instructions in Santo Domingo, addressed a note to the Dominican government that demanded, in no uncertain terms, a settlement satisfactory to the San Domingo Improvement Co.71

The State Department reprimanded him for his overzealousness and his failure to make clear that the State Department was merely offering its good offices to affect a settlement. In spite of this reprimand, however, Powell was instructed to proceed with his efforts to persuade the Dominican government to enter into constructive negotiations with the Improvement Co.

Negotiations in 1901 came to nothing and were inter-

70 Hay to Powell, January 20, 1902, quoted in Munro, op.cit., p. 83.

ruptured in 1902 when a revolution ousted Jiménez and placed Horacio Vásquez in the President's chair. When discussions were once more interred into, the Improvement Co. stalemated progress with its refusal to submit its financial accounts for governmental inspection after it had agreed to accept $4,500,000 instead of the original $11,000,000 it had demanded. The State Department suggested the whole question be settled by arbitration but altered its position to urge arbitration on only how the sum should be paid.72 After much political bickering a protocol was signed on January 31, 1903, whereby the Dominican government agreed to pay the United States government, for the San Domingo Improvement Co., the sum of $4,500,000 in gold. The manner in which the money was to be paid and the conditions under which the Improvement Co. would relinquish its properties were to be ascertained by arbitration between the two governments. This brought about the end of private receivership and foreign creditors were now justified in looking to their governments for collection of debts.

The Dominican government, under President Vásquez, went ahead with plans to select an arbitral commission, but a succession of revolutionary uprisings succeeded in placing General Wos y Gil, a onetime lieutenant of Heureaux1 in the President's chair, who was opposed to the newly signed

72Munro, op.cit., p. 85.
protocol. It was not until December that the arbitral commission finally met. In its final decision the board fixed the interest rate at 4 per cent and stated that the monthly payments were to be $37,500 a month for two years, and $41,666 a month thereafter. In case of failure to pay from customs revenues secured on the northern coast, a financial agent of the United States was to take over the Puerto Plata customhouse and carry out the agreement.73

Unfortunately for Dominicans, a new series of revolutionary outbreaks occurred which disrupted the country and placed a new military leader, Carlos Morales, at the head of the government. In the face of such chaos, it was impossible for the Dominican government to make any payments on the foreign debts and, in compliance with the terms of the July award, an American financial agent took over the customhouse of Puerto Plata on October 21, 1904. In November Morales established himself as President, but civil strife continued unabated as the supporters of former President Jiménez continued to ravage the countryside. In the face of such utter breakdown in orderly government, the French, following the American example, threatened to take over the Santo Domingo customhouse, an action which would have paralyzed the government for lack of funds.

73 Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President to Congress, 1861–1904, pp.274-79. (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations.
In its relations with the Dominican Republic in 1902-1903 the State Department concerned itself primarily with settlement of American claims by insisting on arbitration, a normal part of its work. Roosevelt and Hay gave no indication that either wished to obtain control of the Republic's internal operations. Indeed, at a later date, Roosevelt stated that he thought the pressing of the San Domingo Improvement Co.'s claim had been a mistake which a critically ill Hay would not have allowed if he had been a well man.\textsuperscript{74} 

In the first months of 1904, however, Roosevelt's attitude changed as he began to see the need for policies which would prevent further incidents like the Venezuela blockade of 1902. In Roosevelt's opinion, the Latin American nation most susceptible to European intervention was the Dominican Republic. With alarm he noted that rivalries between creditor powers had placed the Dominican government in a most unfortunate position and that numerous revolutionary outbreaks had, in April of 1903, prompted a German warship to land 150 men to protect the German consulate. Italian and Dutch ships also entered the harbor.\textsuperscript{75} He also knew that complete anarchy had engulfed the nation in the Fall and American, French, Italian, Dutch, and German vessels.

\textsuperscript{74}Munro, op.cit., p. 87.
\textsuperscript{75}Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1903, p. 391
had landed military personnel to protect their respective foreign interests. In a letter to J.B. Bishop, dated February 23, 1904, Roosevelt expressed his attitude, stating:

I have been hoping and praying for three months that the Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have to act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to. If I possibly can, I want to do nothing to them. If it is absolutely necessary to do something, then I want to do as little as possible.

Roosevelt proceeded cautiously, however, as 1904 was an election year. In May, at a banquet commemorating the second anniversary of the independence of Cuba, a ballon d'essai was released. In a speech read by Elihu Root, he declared that the principle desire of the United States was "to see all neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous," and elaborated further that if a nation demonstrates that:

... it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and

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76 Tulio Manuel Cestero, Estados Unidos y las Antillas (Madrid, 1931), quoted in Jones, op.cit., p. 103.

in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty.78

After a decisive victory at the polls in November, Roosevelt, "convinced of the dangers inherent in the policy of negation and mediation," which he had pursued in the Venezuelan crisis, "embarked upon a course of positive action in the Dominican Republic in line with his own character."79 With encouragement from the Morales government, which had, for some time, desperately appealed for aid, Roosevelt restated his pronouncement of May the 20th in his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904, specifically declaring that:

Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.80

Following Roosevelt's address, Hay cabled the American Minister, Thomas C. Dawson, on December 30, 1904 and directed


80 House Document No. 1 (Fifty-eighth Congress, third session), quoted in Hill, op. cit., p. 149.
him to:

sound the President of Santo Domingo discreetly but earnestly and in a perfectly friendly spirit, touching the disquieting situation which is developing owing to the pressure of other governments having arbitral awards in their favor and who regard our award as conflicting with their rights.

... You will ascertain whether the Government of Santo Domingo would be disposed to request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribution of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Government and the several claimants.\(^{81}\)

To aid Dawson in negotiating a plan that would allow American representatives to administer customs collection, Roosevelt arranged for Commander Albert C. Dillingham, a naval officer possessing wide knowledge of the island, to assist the Minister in any way he could.

On January 20 an agreement known as the Dillingham-Sánchez protocol was signed, providing for a guaranty by the United States government of Dominican territorial integrity and for control of all Dominican customhouses by the United States. Debate over certain details, such as the clause guaranteeing Dominican territorial integrity, delayed the completion of negotiations until February 7, 1905, when a new protocol was signed which stipulated that the United States should turn over to the Dominican government 45 percent of all customs revenue while using the remaining 55 percent to service the Republic's foreign and domestic debt.

\(^{81}\)House Document No. 1 (Fifty-ninth Congress, first session), quoted in Hill, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 158-59.
It was also agreed that the United States would grant the Republic assistance in restoring the credit, preserving the order, and fostering material progress for the welfare of her citizens.\footnote{Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1905, p. 342.}

In submitting the protocol to the Senate on February 15, 1905, President Roosevelt urged its acceptance, saying that the United States government could:

\begin{quote}
... not with propriety say that it will protect its own citizens and interests on the one hand, and yet on the other hand refuse to allow other governments to protect their citizens and interests... \footnote{Ibid., p. 334.} \end{quote}

Encountering opposition within the Senate, even though the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended approval, Roosevelt, in a special message of March 6, 1905, stressed the point that:

\begin{quote}
Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful and friendly nation... She has asked for this aid, and the expressions of friendship repeatedly sanctioned by the people and Government of the United States warrant her in believing that it will not be withheld in the hour of her need.\footnote{Richardson, op.cit., XV, pp. 6950-51.}
\end{quote}

In an attempt to rally American opinion behind the treaty in a speech given at the Chautauqua in New York, he appealed, in the words of Professor J. Fred Rippy, "to the
mind and sentiments of the average man," and stated forthrightly that:

We cannot permanently adhere to the Monroe Doctrine unless we succeed in making it evident in the first place that we do not intend to treat it . . . as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the south of us; second, that we do not intend to permit it to be used by any of these republics as a shield to protect that republic from the consequences of its own misdeeds against foreign nations; third, that inasmuch as by this doctrine we prevent other nations from interfering on this side of the water, we shall ourselves in good faith try to help those of our sister republics, which need such help, upward toward peace and order. 85

Roosevelt's exhortations failed to convince the Senators, however, as they "were unmoved by benevolence, fear of European intervention, concern for vested interests, or expansionist impulses." 86 Seeing that the two-thirds majority needed for approval could not be obtained, Roosevelt allowed the matter to be set aside until the Senate opened its regular sessions in December. When, on March 18, the United States Senate adjourned without acting on the protocol, rumors of revolution spread throughout the capital and foreign creditors renewed their demands for payment of claims. To worsen the situation, an Italian cruiser anchored in Santo Domingo's harbor to lend support for Italian claims. A new crisis had arisen.


86Rippy, op. cit., p. 456.
In the face of impending disaster, the Dominican Min-
ister of Finance informed Dawson that he could continue in
his position only if a practical *modus vivendi* was adopted,
pending ratification of the treaty.\(^{87}\) Dawson sounded out
the claimants, and finding only the Improvement Co. unrecep-
tive, cabled the Dominican proposal to Washington. Roosevelt
approved the proposed arrangement, but made it clear that
all posts would be affected, which meant that the Improvement
Co. would lose its control of the northern customhouses. Of
the money collected, 45 per cent was earmarked for the Dom-
inican government while 55 per cent was to be placed in a
New York bank until the Senate ratified the treaty, in which
case it would then be distributed among the claimants in
proportion to their claims.

Roosevelt's proposals were accepted and the Morales'
government signed into effect the Receivership on March 31,
1905. Within a few weeks Roosevelt nominated, and Morales
appointed, Colonel George R. Colton, a long-time customs
collector in the Philippine Islands, as General Receiver and
Collector. Speaking later before the Senate, Roosevelt
justified the Receivership by saying that:

\[\ldots\] stability and order and all the benefits
of peace are at last coming to Santo Domingo, dan-
ger of foreign intervention has been suspended, and

there is at last a prospect that all creditors will get justice. 88

Roosevelt's actions touched off a torrent of abuse against him in the Senate. Following the lead of Senator Morgan of Alabama, who had served on the Committee on Foreign Relations since 1879, Senate critics denounced his cause as unconstitutional, saying that he had "put into execution a treaty which the Senate had refused to approve and that he had established a protectorate over Santo Domingo." 89 The modus vivendi, however, established financial order and the Dominican government received more from its 45 per cent share than it had from a previous 100 per cent; further, the American Receiver General, Colonel Colton, noted that during its twenty-eight months of operation, "not one single complaint nor line of criticism was received from the Dominican Government, nor from any consul or special representative." 90

The resounding success of the modus vivendi aided Roosevelt in securing approval by the Senate, and the executive agreement was replaced by a formal treaty which went into effect on July 8, 1907. The treaty contained the principal features of the 1905 agreement; omitted, however, was the agreement of the United States to respect the territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic (in deference to Senators

88 Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1905, p. 36.
89 Hill, op.cit., p. 161
90 Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1907, p. 323
who felt there was little difference between respecting and guaranteeing a nation's territorial integrity), and the clause which pledged assistance by the United States for the purpose of preserving order, which was objected to on grounds that "the provision would involve the United States in the internal affairs of Santo Domingo."91 It was also agreed that the Dominican government would not increase its public debt except by previous agreement with the United States until the full amount of its foreign obligations had been paid.92

By 1904 financial mismanagement had brought the Dominican Republic perilously close to European intervention. In an effort to stave off such a threat, which might have led to indefinite occupation close to American shores, Washington found herself once more deeply involved in Dominican affairs. President Roosevelt, with the promulgation of his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, moved quickly to establish a Customs Receivership, which satisfied the clamoring foreign creditors and erased the threat of foreign intervention.

It was believed that such an arrangement would also bring peace to the island, but recurring disorders within the island Republic demonstrated the weakness of such a hope.

91Hill, op.cit., p. 167.
In an attempt to end the recurring cycle of insurrections in the Dominican Republic the Wilson Administration broadened United States involvement, and Roosevelt's plan, which was so admirable in its qualities, became but the first of a series of steps that led ultimately to military occupation in 1916.
CHAPTER III

THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Since the Dominican Republic's inception as an independent nation in 1844, United States foreign policy had centered around the idea that the tiny island Republic must never be dominated by a foreign power. To forestall foreign incursion, this policy had led to attempts at annexation in the nineteenth century and to the establishment of a customs receivership in 1905. While the Wilson administration adhered to the established policy in respect to foreign incursion, President Wilson broadened United States involvement in the affairs of the Republic by insisting on the establishment of a constitutional democracy which, in his mind, was necessary to put an end to the recurring cycles of revolution. When it became evident that political and financial stability were not to be so easily obtained, Wilson reluctantly ordered the Republic occupied by the Marines, who were then to "instruct" the Dominicans in the ways of democracy.

In the years immediately following its establishment, the customs receivership established by Roosevelt was a financial success. Speaking of the advantages gained, the
Dominican Minister of Finance, Federico Velásquez, in his annual report for 1906, stated that:

The items of revenue during 1905 and those of 1906 speak clearly, with renewed eloquence, of figures, that for some time past we have been living in the public posts a life of order and honesty, where but a few years ago life with few exceptions within and without the national palace was one of shamelessness, dilapidation, cupidity, and permanent disgrace for the Republic, being the principal cause, if not the only one, why our weak state has felt itself more than once trembling on the brink of the abyss, and that for a long time we have found ourselves lacking in economic autonomy, overweighed by debts, unjustifiable for the greater part, suffering insults and humiliations. 93

Uninterrupted peace did not follow, but the American Minister Thomas C. Dawson reported to State Department officials that revolutionary plotting had abated because of the inability of revolutionaries to plunder the collection posts. He also reported that agriculture and cattle raising were again flourishing and that, for the first time, public officials were receiving their salaries on schedule. 94

Under Ramón Cáceres (President 1906-1911), relations with the United States were harmonious. Cáceres inspired trust in his administration by appointing able men and insisting on honesty in government. It was because of this, in part, that his presidency was one of the freest, most peaceful, and constructive in the Republic's history. But

93 *Foreign Relations, op.cit.,* 1907, p. 357.
at a time when the future seemed brightest, Dominicans were startled by the news of Caceres' assassination on November 19, 1911. The country then fell into the hands of General Alfredo M. Victoria, commander of the Republic's military. Being only twenty-six years old, he was not of constitutional age to be President, but intrigued to secure the election of his uncle, Eladio Victoria. The government was quickly converted into a stark military dictatorship and a number of leading political and military leaders raised the standard of revolt and occupied parts of the nation from which they refused to be dislodged. In Washington the disruption cast more than a little doubt upon the infallibility of the Rooseveltian prescription for maintaining the peace of the Caribbean, and "raised the question of whether the mere control of customs was a conclusive remedy for domestic disorder."95

Washington at first supported the de facto regime, warning the revolutionists that it was the practice of the United States "to refuse to recognize any government resulting from a revolution unless it appears to represent the will of the people."96 Revolutionary opposition, however, was too formidable for Washington to overlook, and when it became apparent after months of fighting that the struggle

96 Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1912, pp. 341-42.
was a deadlock, the United States government offered its good offices with a view of re-establishing peace and order in the troubled Republic. 97

Acting on the recommendations of the American Minister to Santo Domingo, William W. Russell, who was upset by the closure of interior customhouses by the fighting, 98 a special commission appointed by President Taft, consisting of General Frank McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department and Mr. W.T. Doyle, Chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department, arrived in Santo Domingo on October 2 to investigate the existing situation. They were also accompanied by 750 Marines, whose duty it was to protect the customhouses, if it became necessary to do so.

Upon their arrival in Santo Domingo, the Commissioners advised the President, Eladio Victoria, to declare a general amnesty and remove immediately his nephew, General Alfredo Victoria, from his duties as Minister of War and Interior, and to co-operate promptly with the American Minister Russell in re-establishing to working order the interior customhouses, and finally, "to make all other reforms needful for the protection of revenues and the restoration of

97Welles, op.cit., II, p. 697.
98Munro, op.cit., p. 261.
quiet and content throughout the Republic."\(^9\)

At first, Victoria seemed willing to assent to the "suggestions" of the Commissioners, but later proved recalcitrant. In the face of Victoria's stubbornness, "the response of the United States was that in view of misuse of funds in the past, instructions would be given to the General Receiver of Dominican Customs to cease all payments to the established government.\(^1\)\(^0\) In the same vein, no revenues were to be given to the rebels and any government established by them would not be recognized. Left virtually penniless, Victoria resigned on November 26, 1912 and the Dominican Congress settled down to electing a candidate acceptable to the warring factions.

On November 30, 1912 the Dominican Congress elected the portly Adolfo Nouel, Archbishop of Santo Domingo, as provisional president. The choice of the amiable Nouel brought an immediate cession of hostilities and the American Commissioners, accompanied by the 750 Marines, left for the United States with the situation apparently in hand. The good Archbishop, however, was not of forceful character, and after four months he retired to Europe, complaining of ill health. Friction between political factions continued to

\(^9\)Quoted in Welles, op.cit., II, pp. 695-96.

increase and by the end of March "the newly installed Wilson administration found an inextricable muddle on its hands, which Bryan, as Secretary of State, proceeded to complicate by the worst possible appointments." 101

Informed Dominicans hoped for a change in policy under the Wilson administration, as both Wilson and his Secretary of State Bryan were avowed "anti-imperialists." It seemed reasonable to expect such a change, as Wilson had announced that the policy of the United States toward Latin America would be one based on equality and that Washington wished to bring into existence a spirit of mutual identification and solidarity on the basis of mutual appreciation. As he himself expressed it:

What we desire to do, and what we shall do, is to show our neighbors to the south of us that their interests are identical with our interests; that we have no plans or any thoughts of our own exaltation, but have in view only the peace and the prosperity of the people in our hemisphere. 102

Indeed, when Wilson's administration assumed power "it would," in the words of Dana G. Munro, "have been hard to foresee that his administration would go farther than any of its predecessors in intervening in the internal affairs of several West Indian republics." 103

101 Knight, op.cit., p. 51
102 Quoted in Welles, op.cit., II, p. 714.
103 Munro, op.cit., p. 269.
In theory, Wilson's pronouncements were exceptional in view of past policies, and created a favourable impression throughout Latin America. In fact, however, what was later produced was a series of well-intentioned blunders that led ultimately to military occupation. A large share of the blame for early failure in the Dominican Republic must be placed on Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan's shoulders, as:

... the Secretary, while emotionally responsive to the idealism of the theories enunciated by President Wilson, was incapable of grasping intellectually the manner in which those theories might be transmuted into the daily routine of his Department. It was notorious that the great majority of the diplomatic appointees sent by the Wilson Administration to Latin America possessed no qualification for their task other than that of loyalty to the Democratic party. But nowhere ... was this ineptitude in the selection of agents to carry out the Wilson policy more lamentably demonstrated than in the appointments made to the Dominican Republic.\(^{104}\)

In defense of President Wilson it must be admitted, as Chester L. Jones notes, that "the problems which here, as elsewhere, confronted the Wilson administration involved peculiar difficulties which it is not by any means sure that a better-chosen set of officials could have overcome."\(^{105}\)

When Wilson took office he found the Dominican Republic in turmoil. On April 14, the Dominican Congress, after two tortuous weeks of deliberation, elected General José

\(^{104}\)Welles, *op.cit.*, II, p. 717.

\(^{105}\)Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 111.
Bordas Valdés as provisional president for one year. The new president, failing to inspire confidence among all political factions, was greeted by rebellion only one day after his inauguration. The situation continued to decay, and by September the revolt had reached major proportions. In the meantime, President Wilson, on Secretary of State Bryan's recommendation, appointed as Minister to the strife-ridden Republic, one James Mark Sullivan, whose only qualification was that he had been a loyal supporter of the Democratic Party.¹⁰⁶

After his appointment Sullivan was ordered to proceed immediately to Santo Domingo and was instructed by Secretary Bryan to inform the revolutionary leaders that the influence of the United States government:

... would be exerted for the support of lawful authorities in Santo Domingo, and for the discouragement of any and all insurrectionary methods ... [and] that this government would amply afford legitimate means to assist in the restoration of order and in the prevention of further insurrections, holding itself bound at all times to advise with the Government in behalf of those who feel that they have a grievance.¹⁰⁷

While en route to Santo Domingo, Mr. Sullivan received another communication from Secretary Bryan in which he was instructed to convey the following message to the rebel leaders in Puerto Plata. The message warned the revolu-

¹⁰⁶ *Knight, op.cit.*, pp. 35-54.
tionaries that, under the terms of the 1907 agreement, the United States would:

... not consent that the Dominican Government increase its debts for the purpose of paying the revolutionary expenses and claims. ... And should the revolution succeed, this Government would withhold recognition of the de facto government, and consequently withhold the portion of the customs collections belonging to Santo Domingo as long as an unrecognized de facto government should exist. 108

When the above threat, containing certain features that did not seem to be covered by the treaty of 1907, failed to end hostilities between the Bordas government and the insurrectionists, Secretary Bryan, acting on the recommendations of Minister Sullivan, sent three State Department officials and thirty assistants to supervise the Congressional elections in December to insure a fair election. This action, certainly not provided for by the 1907 treaty:

... constituted the first evidence of formal intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. ... [And showed an] increasing disregard for the sovereign rights inherent in the Dominican people which led inevitably to the military occupation of the Republic three years later. 109

The Wilson administration's efforts for peace, while questionable, had thus far been successful. Even critics of President Bordas had to admit that the December elections were orderly and fair. Yet the opposition was not satisfied,

and political and economic conditions within the island steadily worsened during the opening months of 1914. At the beginning of 1914 the Bordan government, through mismanagement of funds and because of large expenditures used to curtail revolutionary activity, owed $386,000 for back salaries and over $740,000 in claims. Congressional members threatened to cause chaos if their December salaries were not paid and it became clear to the State Department, after advancing the Bordan Administration $40,000, that it must once more give consideration to the Dominican government's need for a sizeable loan.

Secretary Bryan, showing a desire to exercise a degree of control over the internal affairs of the Republic, instructed Minister Sullivan to suggest to Bordan that $1,200,000 of the 1907 bonds, up to this time destined for expenditure in the area of public works, could be sold to pay back salaries and pressing claims, on the condition that alcohol and tobacco taxes be increased to reimburse the public works fund, and on the further stipulation that an American financial expert be sent to Santo Domingo to assist in matters of accounting and budgetary control with a view of helping officials to prevent a deficit. Bordan accepted this proposal when it was agreed that the sum would be increased to $1,600,000, but Bordan's enemies in Congress blocked the measure until April, in order to cause him financial embarrassment. It was finally arranged that the "financial expert" would be attached
to the customs receivership and that he would possess some
degree of power in connection with the government's finan-
cial administration. Charles M. Johnston, a competent
man with experience in Mexico and the West Indies, was
selected by President Wilson to fill the position.

By now Wilson was watching the deteriorating political
current with growing concern. In August he assumed more
direct control by applying to the Dominican Republic the
"Wilson Plan." Wilson's plan reaffirmed the altruistic pur-
poses of the United States but declared that if constructive
benefits were to accrue to the Dominican nation, the first
order of business was to halt all armed hostilities. This
done, he then suggested that the political leaders choose
a provisional president who would then arrange for elections
for both the Presidency and Congress. The elections would
be supervised by American observers to insure fairness and
Washington would then recognize the elected government as
one representing the people's wishes. Once the government
assumed office, no further revolutions would be permitted
by the United States. All changes were henceforth to be
made via the Constitutional route. Wilson's plan seemed
to follow and even exceed the earlier dictates of Secretary
Bryan, for the special commissioners appointed by President

Wilson to execute his plan in Santo Domingo were instructed thusly: "No opportunity for argument should be given to any person or faction. It is desired that you present the plan and see that it is complied with."\textsuperscript{112} According to the astute Sumner Welles:

President Wilson implied that the government of the United States possessed the right to assure itself of the continuance of orderly constitutional government in the Dominican Republic, and would "feel at liberty" to prevent all changes in the Government of the Dominican Republic other than those by the "peaceful processes" provided in the Dominican Constitution.\textsuperscript{113}

Wilson's commissioners, the former Governor of New Jersey, Franklin Fort, and Charles Smith, a New Hampshire attorney, secured acceptance of the Wilson Plan from all the principal leaders except Desiderio Arias. Thereupon, President Bordas resigned and a physician, Dr. Ramón Báez, a son of Buenaventura Báez, who had never actively engaged in politics, was elected Provisional President on August 27, 1914. Following his inauguration, President Báez, after consulting with the United States Commissioners, arranged for national elections for a President and a Congress to be held in six weeks. It was also agreed that the elections would be observed by American representatives to insure fairness.

The principal candidates were of the two historic

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., p. 247.

\textsuperscript{113}Welles, \textit{op.cit.}, II, p. 738.
parties, with Juan Isidro Jiménez representing the Jimenistas, and Horacio Vásquez the Horacistas. The elections took place on October 25 and resulted in a narrow victory for Jiménez. It must be noted, however, that the Jiménez forces made two important political deals which insured victory: one was with a third party candidate, Federico Velásquez, who was persuaded to throw his total support to Jiménez in return for control of 25 per cent of the jobs in the new government, and the other was with Desiderio Arias who, for his support, was promised a Cabinet position. Secretary Bryan, convinced the elections had represented the will of the people, declared on November 14, 1914 that:

The period of revolutions is past; law and order will be supported; necessary reforms will be urged through legislation. It is believed that under such a policy, peace will be followed by prosperity and progress.\(^\text{114}\)

For a fleeting moment, it seemed as if the tiny nation would enter upon an era of peace and prosperity, but the insistence of the State Department that Jiménez place the collection of internal revenues under the receivership and give Charles M. Johnston, the "financial expert," official recognition as controller, soon brought revolt once more to the Latin Republic. The State Department felt that domestic reforms were needed if democracy were to flourish and that the area which needed the most attention was the admin-

\(^{114}\text{Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1914, p. 256.}\)
istration of government finances. Such a proposal was not calculated to cause much furor as, during and after the elec­torial campaign, Washington had received assurances in writing from Jiménez and the other candidates that they were in favor of placing the internal revenues under the customs receivership.\textsuperscript{115}

That reform was needed cannot be denied. Earlier loans to Archbishop Nouel had been squandered in suppres­sing revolts, and short-term loans approved for various projects had been misused and interest payments were long overdue. To add to this financial misery, there were prac­tically no tax receipts available to the government as the Bordas administration had persuaded merchants and industri­alists to pay their taxes in advance in return for a reduced rate. President Jiménez was also confronted with an Arias dominated cabinet and "attempts at reform had no further result than to stimulate violent opposition."\textsuperscript{116} Sadly, President Jiménez, now aged and infirm, contributed to the deterioration of the situation through his lack of energy in adopting strong measures.

It was in February 1915, only a week after the Presi­dent's inauguration, that Secretary Bryan, seeking to enlarge in scope his ultimate policy of vesting the ultimate decision

\textsuperscript{115}Munro, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{116}Schoenrich, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 90.
regarding the domestic policies of the Dominican Government in the hands of representatives of the United States, informed President Jiménez that he was expected to extend formal recognition to Mr. Charles M. Johnston, Wilson's appointee as "financial expert," as Comptroller of the Finances of the Dominican Republic, and that his duties would be to:

... provide a budget for the Dominican Republic based upon his knowledge of income and probable expenditures, this budget to be rigidly adhered to; to approve and countersign any payments made by the Dominican Government, it being understood that no payments be valid unless countersigned by the Comptroller.\textsuperscript{117}

In addition, internal revenue was to be placed under the receivership and public works were to be put under an American, accountable only to the United States State Department. It was also suggested that United States assistance be obtained for organizing a constabulary officered by United States personnel that would replace the Dominican Army. The latter step was seen as one that would irrevocably put an end to political disturbance.

When Jiménez attempted to obtain the approval of the Dominican Congress to Secretary Bryan's proposed measures, he was greeted by stiff opposition from the Horacista Senators and from the cronies of Arias. Arias argued against following United States dictates, but it was generally recognized

\textsuperscript{117}\textit{Foreign Relations, op.cit.}, 1915, p. 297.
that his opposition:

... was due to the fact that the President was unable to increase the subsidy which he had already commensured to pay him and was unwilling to carry out all of Arias' desires with regard to governmental appointments.\textsuperscript{118}

Jiménez feebly pressed for acceptance of Washington's proposal that Johnston be given official recognition as controller, but when the Dominican Congress twice refused his request, he took the position that Johnston could have no legal authority. The State Department was determined to stand firm, however, and insisted that Johnston continue to countersign all checks covering governmental expenditures. As a result, "the status quo continued for some months, with constant friction between the controller and the President and with little beneficial effect on the Republic's financial situation."\textsuperscript{119}

State Department officials were also disappointed in their hope that a freely elected government would lead to a quieting of internal unrest, for simultaneous with Congressional unrest was the threat of an armed insurrection by Quirico Feliú, the Governor of Puerto Plata. Acting on reports that linked the scoundrel Arias with Feliú, Secretary of State Bryan instructed the American Minister Sullivan to assure Jiménez of continued support and to inform

\textsuperscript{118}Welles, \textit{op.cit.}, II, pp. 749-50.

\textsuperscript{119}Munro, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 297.
the dissident leaders that they would be held personally responsible for any attempt they might make to embarrass the government. In his cable to Sullivan, the Secretary of State further stated that:

This Government means what it said when it sent a commission there with a proposal looking to permanent peace and it will live up to the promises it has made. ... The changes advised [the reforms demanded] are the reforms necessary for the honest and efficient administration of the Government and the early and proper development of the country. There should be no unnecessary delay, therefore, in putting them into operation. ... A naval force will be sent whenever necessary. 120

Ultimately, the threatened revolt in Puerto Plata was headed off, but it need be noted that negotiations only became successful when the U.S.S. Castine anchored in the harbor off Puerto Plata with a large body of American Marines aboard.

A problem of a different nature arose in April when Sullivan reported that the Dominican Congress had initiated impeachment proceedings against President Jiménez for his failure to dismiss Johnston as controller. Congressional hostility toward Johnston was activated by his decision to suspend payment on a number of superfluous budgetary items submitted in March by the Dominican Senate and by the attempt of Clarence H. Baxter, the General Receiver, to set up a civil service system within the receivership. The need for the Dominican Government to live within its income was

apparent to informed observers, as was the need for a more orderly arrangement within the receivership; but Congress had twice refused Johnston's appointment and stood on firm Constitutional ground in its attack against Jiménez for his failure to follow Congressional dictates. Secretary of State Bryan, upon receiving word of the proceedings and the report that certain members of the Dominican Congress hoped to install Arias as Provisional President, immediately instructed Sullivan to inform those involved that Washington would not:

... permit any attack to be made upon President Jiménez for acting in good faith towards the United States . . . President Jiménez . . . is entitled to and will receive from this Government any assistance that will be necessary to compel respect for his Administration. This support will be given whether the attacks made upon him are direct or indirect, open or in secret.121

The Secretary of State's message had immediate effect on the Dominican Congress and impeachment proceedings against Jiménez were, for the time being, abandoned; but a dangerous course of policy had been set into motion, for Secretary Bryan had completely ignored the right of impeachment given the Dominican Congress by the Dominican Constitution and "had passed the stage when he considered that the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic were other than a matter for the sole determination of the Department of State.122

121Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1915, pp. 283-84.
122Welles, op.cit., II, p. 752.
The controversy which involved United States control over the appointment of all customs officials was settled more amicably by a Dominican commission which met with President Wilson and Secretary Bryan in the latter part of April. They were warmly greeted, and although the State Department stood firm in insisting on adherence to the original 1907 agreement which gave them ultimate power over the appointment of customs personnel, they:

... sought to meet the Dominican's objections to Johnston by transferring to the customs receivership most of the duties of the controller. Johnston himself was to have a post in the receivership, with an understanding that another customs official would act as financial adviser for the time being. 123

Not expecting success, the Dominican Commissioners were pleased with the new arrangement and sailed for Santo Domingo to celebrate one of their few diplomatic victories.

As the summer of 1915 approached there were significant changes made in State Department personnel. In May, Sullivan was compelled to resign and in June, Secretary of State Bryan turned over the reins of leadership to Robert Lansing. As early as December, 1914, President Wilson had been informed of certain improprieties on the part of Sullivan and had appointed Senator James D. Phelan of California to investigate the allegations. The press immediately began to explore the charges against Sullivan and

123 Munro, op.cit., p. 301.
so damaged his image that any credibility he might have had was soon lost. The coup de grâce was delivered when Senator Phelan released his findings on May 8, 1915. Summarizing his report, the Senator took into account an alleged bribe which was offered to a State Department official who had investigated Sullivan's improprieties:

I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sullivan fully realized the grossness of the impropriety of his proposition, but I am satisfied because of his proposition that he is not a proper person to hold the position that he does hold.124

Sullivan had remained at his post for over four months before his resignation, and one must agree with Dana G. Munro's statement that it was indeed "extraordinary that the American government should have attempted for several months to deal with so potentially dangerous a situation through a representative who was completely discredited."125

During the summer of 1915 the political atmosphere in the Dominican Republic once again became charged. Local rebellions by disaffected provincial leaders flared anew and by July an insurrection headed by General Zenón Ovando in the Province of San Pedro de Macoris threatened to engulf the tiny Republic in revolution. At this juncture, President Jiménez suffered a physical and mental breakdown and was obliged to turn the reins of governmental control over to his

124Quoted in Knight, op. cit., p. 65.
125Munro, op. cit., p. 301
sharply divided cabinet. Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Secretary Lansing instructed the American Charge d'Affaires on July 21 to inform those principally involved in the disturbances that if it became necessary to land American soldiers to establish order he would not hesitate to do so. General Horacio Vásquez, as leader of the opposition, quickly asserted his party's desire for peace, but in an open message to Lansing he declared that:

I believe that the peace of the country can be firmly established not by troops but through good and respected institutions. . . . Moreover, I do not believe that President Wilson has the right, under any pretext, to infringe the sovereignty of an independent people . . . I consider as indispensable both respect for public liberties and for the law on the part of the Government in order to attain the ends which we so much desire. 126

The situation remained touchy until the Fall months when Jiménez once again resumed his post and quieted the revolutionary leaders by distributing among them numerous road building contracts and appointments to positions within the government. Politically, the situation was, for the moment, in hand but such a "weak and temporizing policy" could only lead to future difficulties. 127

The changes in State Department personnel had, for a fleeting moment, given rise to speculation among Dominicans.

126 Quoted in Welles, op.cit., II, p. 756.
that American foreign policy might be softened to allow the Dominican government more leeway in her congressional activities and that the Convention of 1907 might be reinterpreted so as to give Dominicans more control over expenditures. Dominicans soon found out, however, that although a change had occurred in American representation, there was to be no change in American policy; indeed, Secretary of State Lansing sought "to reaffirm the policy gradually moulded by Secretary Bryan with the at least tacit approval of President Wilson, . . . [and undertook] to obtain for the United States an even greater measure of control." 128

Because of the continuing disorder within the Republic and the feeling among many State Department officials that financial direction of Dominican affairs was necessary to prevent recurring revolutions, Secretary Lansing in September instructed William W. Russell, the new American Minister, to inform the Dominican Government that it was increasing its public debt in violation of the 1907 Convention. Russell was also told to convey the fact to the Dominican Government that $7,000,000 dollars of public indebtedness had been contracted without United States approval and that if the original objects for which the Convention had been secured were to be upheld future violations of the Treaty could not be allowed. In connection with Secretary Lansing's statement

it must be remembered that in July the neighboring republic of Haiti had been placed under United States military occupation. The occupation of Haiti would have far reaching consequences for Dominicans for:

... the State Department's ideas of what ought to be done in the Dominican Republic took definite shape after the intervention in Haiti forced the American government to formulate a relatively definite program for that country. The provisions of the treaty with Haiti had their origin largely in the State Department's experience in Santo Domingo, and the main features of the treaty now became objectives of American policy in that country.\textsuperscript{129}

What Lansing hoped for was the adoption of a new convention which would be similar to the one recently concluded with Haiti, with provisions for a land survey to facilitate taxation, for a constabulary headed by Americans, for a core of American engineers to oversee public works and sanitation, and for the approval of a financial adviser who would have the ultimate decision in budgetary matters. If a new treaty could not be secured, Lansing instructed Russell to advise the Dominican government that under the terms of the 1907 Convention the United States had the legal right to: (1) compel the observation of Article III of the convention in the appointment of a financial adviser and, (2) to provide for the free course of customs by the creation of a constabulary.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{129} Munro, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 302.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Foreign Relations, op.cit.}, 1915, pp. 321-25.
Dominican governmental leaders almost unanimously rejected the thought of ratifying so odious an agreement as had been accepted by Haiti and protested vehemently against Washington's interpretation of the 1907 Convention. Lansing, for the time being, did not press for acceptance of a new treaty but did insist on Dominican acceptance of a financial adviser and the creation of a Constabulary. Under such circumstances Jiménez' position as President was particularly precarious. On the one side, Arias was constantly intriguing against the ailing executive in the hopes of replacing him as Provisional President, and although Jiménez did possess a coterie of loyal and able officials he needed financial assistance in the form of loans to maintain his administration. This the State Department was unwilling to allow unless their demands regarding the Convention of 1907 were met.

Events came to a head on April 14, 1916. With the aid of the Velásquez faction in his Cabinet, Jiménez committed himself to a course of action designed to lessen the influence of Arias, who at the time was Minister of War. General Cesareo Jiménez, Chief of the National Guard, and General Mauricio Jiménez, Commander of the forces stationed in the capital, were summoned to a small estate a few miles from the capital where they were arrested for disloyalty to the government and for venality in their
official duties. Arias was also summoned for an interview with Jiménez, but was alerted to the fact that his chief lieutenants were under arrest. Believing incarceration awaited him, he headed for the fortress in Santo Domingo where he shut himself up with troops loyal to his person. Within a short time the remainder of the army along with the major opposition parties declared for Arias. Hoping to head off a general rebellion, the American Minister Sullivan joined with Archbishop Nouel in an effort to reach some sort of compromise with Arias. Unfortunately for all parties concerned, no agreement was reached. By May 1, it was recognized that the break between Arias and Jiménez was a permanent one. Congressional allies of Arias impeached Jiménez, and he in turn dismissed Arias from his Cabinet position.

In a rare display of decisiveness, Jiménez collected about him 1500 troops which were supplied by Provincial governors still loyal to him and marched to the outskirts of Santo Domingo where he sent envoys to Arias demanding his immediate surrender. Fearing a possible seizure of the Presidency by the Germanophile Arias, Secretary Lansing urged Jiménez to request the assistance of United States Marines who had conveniently stationed themselves in Santo Domingo harbor aboard the U.S.S. Prairie and the U.S.S. Castine. The Dominican executive at first seemed willing to summon American Marines, but after considerable debate he concluded that the Dominican people would oppose foreign
troops on their soil and modified his position by asking only for arms and ammunition for his troops. In a decision which must be questioned, Lansing informed the American Minister that Jiménez must restrict himself to asking only for the support of American troops.

In the meantime, American Marines were landed ostensibly to protect the American Legation and the Haitian Legation, which was serving as a refuge for foreigners. Jiménez decided to press the attack, but a shortage of military supplies prevented his taking the capital. Now totally despondent, he asked the American forces to take the city for him, but within a matter of hours he withdrew this request and resigned.\textsuperscript{131} By resigning, he hoped to escape responsibility for the ever growing number of Marines being landed without his permission. In an address to the nation he announced that:

\begin{quote}
... I solemnly declare that I hold the sorrowful conviction that an armed encounter between my forces, those who are upholding the Constitution, and those which occupy the rebel stronghold of the Capital of Santo Domingo would inevitably bring as a result the humiliation of a North American intervention. ... since the authors of the coup \textit{d'\`{e}tat} ... were disposed to destroy the Nation rather than renounce their lust for power, the President was forced to select one of two alternatives: either to return to the Presidential Mansion among ruins to enjoy a power regained for him
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{131}Munro, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 306.
by foreign bullets, or his own immolation... with the whole country at my side... I withdraw to the serenity of a tranquil home. 132

Instead of preventing further American military intervention, Jiménez' resignation resulted in an increase in the number of troops stationed outside the capital. Congressional leaders loyal to Arias were alarmed at the presence of American forces so near the capital and sent the following message to President Wilson:

The transport Prairie has arrived with troops, but the Dominican people have confidence that these troops will not be used by any means to interfere with the free action of our institutions. The Legislative Power of this country is responsive to the needs of the whole country and claims full responsibility for its institutions and laws. 133

Other protests followed but were of no avail, as the number of Marines was increased still further with the arrival of Rear Admiral W.B. Caperton aboard the U.S.S. Dolphin.

Once Jiménez' resignation appeared final Secretary Lansing extended full control to Minister Russell as to what actions should be taken and as to how American troops were to be used. Constitutionally, executive power remained in the hands of the Cabinet until a new President was chosen; therefore, Russell decided to recognize its authority. In conjunction with his recognition of the Dominican Cabinet

132 Jiménez' proclamation of May 7, 1916 is quoted in Welles, op.cit., II, pp. 769-70.

133 Quoted in Welles, op.cit., II, p. 771.
Russell also resolved to clear the capital of the rebels under the command of Arias. He instructed Caperton to take the necessary action and on May 13th the Admiral advised Arias that the United States would support the constituted authority of the Republic and that if the revolutionaries had not surrendered Santo Domingo by six o'clock on the morning of the 15th, American forces would move to disarm the insurgents. Fortunately, Arias avoided bloodshed and on the night of May 14th moved his troops to the interior. The next morning Caperton's forces entered Santo Domingo and a military occupation was proclaimed. Proclaiming the capital occupied, Caperton addressed the following message to its citizens:

I. Owing to the conditions that have existed in and around this City in consequence of the fact that rebels in arms have taken possession of the City, excluding therefrom the Constitutional officials of the Government, and after all means to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the situation had been exhausted, it became necessary to have the City occupied by forces of the United States of America.

II. Notice is hereby given to the citizens of Santo Domingo that the forces of the United States of America have assumed control of this City.

III. All the inhabitants are requested to stay in the City and cooperate with me and my representatives in protecting life and property and maintaining order.

IV. All public officials are asked to remain at their posts and cooperate with me.134

Dominicans were naturally resentful of the American presence in Santo Domingo and became somewhat hostile when Caperton ordered the principal cities of the interior occupied as well.\textsuperscript{135} Little did Dominicans know that this was only the first step in an occupation that would last a full eight years.

In the eyes of many Dominicans, Arias had been discredited by his cowardly exit from Santo Domingo, but this did not keep the Congress from attempting to secure his election as President. With the troublesome interior almost occupied, the American Minister Russell decided the time was propitious to press for the reforms that the State Department had for so long advocated. To implement the long sought after reforms, however, Russell had first to block the election of Arias. He "suggested" to the Dominican Congress that they delay their choice of a Provisional President until more normal conditions prevailed within the Republic. The Dominican legislators, however, refused to adjourn, but being realists in an occupied country, they decided the election of Arias would be wholly unpractical and immediately started the search for a compromise candidate.

On May 23rd, both the House of Deputies and the Senate had agreed on the selection of Dr. Federico Henríquez y

\textsuperscript{135}Foreign Relations, op.cit., 1916, p. 227.
Carvajal as Provisional President. Russell and Caperton, however, moved to prevent final action on his nomination. They did so because of his friendship with Arias and because he refused to enter into any pre-election agreements which would guarantee Washington the latitude in policy which so many top ranking State Department officials were demanding. Russell suggested to Washington that some of the more militant Senators be placed under arrest in order to block the election of Henríquez. Washington vetoed Russell's suggestion and instructed him to inform the Congress that any unsatisfactory government would not be accorded recognition, and that no customs revenues would be released for its maintenance. Independently of Russell's action, the Council of Ministers, under the leadership of Valásquez, incarcerated seven of Arias' supporters in an attempt to stave off the election of an Horacista as President. Russell immediately obtained their release, but Henríquez thought the plot had been instigated by the United States to threaten the Dominican Congress. Henríquez was, however, shrewd enough to comprehend the fate which awaited him as President, and in a message to the people he declined the Presidential nomination and hurled abuses at the United States for interfering in Dominican politics.

With Henríquez out of the running, the Dominican Senate moved quickly to secure the election of Jacinto de Castro, an old follower of General Vásquez. The House of
Deputies, however, blocked his election because of his affiliation with the Horacista party, and once more a deadlock was produced. In the meantime, the occupation of the Cibao became complete with the surrender of Arias at Santiago on July 6th. In a message to the Dominican people Caperton declared that:

It is not the intention of the United States Government to acquire by conquest any territory in the Dominican Republic nor to attack its sovereignty, but our troops will remain here until all revolutionary movements have been stamped out and until such reforms as are deemed necessary to insure the future welfare of the country have been initiated and are in effective operation.136

By July's end the Dominican Congress agreed on the election of ex-President Archbishop Nouell. Nouell, however, even though assured of Russell's support, declined the nomination. By constitutional limitation Congress was due to adjourn on July 26th. Rather than leave the selection of a Provisional President to a Council of Ministers friendly to the United States, the legislators, without consulting Russell, elected Dr. Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, the brother of Dr. Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, as Provisional President for a period of five months. Henríquez had, for the past twelve years, isolated himself from Dominican politics by taking up residence in Cuba. Although his sympathies lay with the Jimenista party, Dominican leaders felt

136Foreign Relations, o-.cit., 1916, pp. 231-32.
he would be acceptable to Washington. Hope soon turned to dismay, however, as Russell, unable to obtain any pre-election promises, was instructed to withhold official recognition until the new President-elect consented to all of Washington's demands for reform.

Upon arriving in Santo Domingo, Henríquez was informed by Russell that the United States would not recognize his government unless he acquiesced in the interpretation of the Convention of 1907 as outlined in earlier notes to President Jiménez. Without any further attempt to resolve differences at the conference table, Russell received instructions to suspend all payment of Dominican revenues. Washington's actions in this matter, while reprehensible, were designed to demonstrate to Henríquez that the United States could and would assume and maintain a rigid posture until its demands were met. The immediate effect, however, was that Henríquez became intransigent and government employees and local merchants found it difficult to maintain themselves without funds. 137

Henríquez remained firm, arguing that the Dominican Constitution did not give him power to affirm agreements without the consent of the Dominican Congress. He was, however, willing to temporarily acquiesce in the collection and disbursement of receivership funds and consented to the

137 Munro, op.cit., p. 309.
reorganization of the Dominican Army if the United States would allow other Latin American nations to provide officers to assist in the overhaul. Washington, however, realized these agreements would be of a transitory nature and that a new treaty would have to be negotiated once Henríquez' government was accorded recognition. What the State Department wanted was an "iron-clad" agreement that would permit the creation of a constabulary and would assure United States fiscal control. Since Henríquez' proposals fell short of this mark, they were flatly refused.

After prolonged consultations with his advisers, Henríquez once more attempted to reach a compromise in late August. A treaty was proposed which would have given the United States complete control over the Republic's finances and would have employed American Army officers under four-year contracts to reorganize the Dominican army. The only point Henríquez stood firm on was that Dominican officers would continue to receive their appointments by the Dominican President. Admiral Pond, who had replaced Caperton in July, seems to have been impressed by these overtures, but the State Department remained intransigent and curtly refused further negotiations.

Early in October, Russell was called to Washington for a conference with Secretary Lansing to communicate his

138 Ibid., p. 310.
recommendations on future policies. The American Minister was for the presenting of a final ultimatum which, if rejected, would mean that the United States would have to "take charge" of the nation's affairs.139 Lansing apparently agreed with Russell, for an urgent plea from Henríquez that some solution be adopted which would not obliterate Dominican sovereignty went unnoticed.140

By November the State Department had lost all interest in any further attempts at negotiation. Washington had concluded that a formal military occupation was the only remedy for the ills which plagued the beleagured Republic. To a large degree it was influenced by the American occupation of Haiti where full military control had resulted in the adoption of a treaty that contained all the provisions for reform that Washington wanted. There were, however, other equally important considerations aside from the Haitian experience, which help explain Washington's decision to go ahead with a military occupation.

One of the principal reasons for State Department intransigence centered around the fact that the ultimate value of any agreement would depend on the attitude of the Dominican Congress and the President who would succeed Henríquez when his five month term expired. Prospects for

139 Russell to Lansing, September 25, 1916 quoted in Munro, op.cit., p. 311
140 Welles, op.cit., II, p. 790.
cooperation were anything but bright. When Henriquez was elected, Dominican politicians had reconvened the Constitutional Convention elected in 1914, with a view toward reforming the Constitution. From the start there was discord within the convention. To insure a quorum it was necessary for sixteen members to meet, but day after day the Jimenistas refused to attend. The only business accomplished was the adjournment procedure. In the absence of constitutional changes, the electoral colleges in several provinces met of their own volition and returned the electors of 1914, a majority of whom were Jimenistas. While this action was clearly illegal, what bothered the State Department was the fact that most of the members contemplated the election of Arias as President. The prospect that Arias might secure the Presidency was not contemplated with equanimity in Washington. Officials regarded him as a political and military bully who had extorted money from the Dominican Government for over a quarter of a century. Aside from his caudillo activities, he and many members of his party were outspokenly pro-German. In the minds of many, a government headed by such a man presented a security risk in the Caribbean; this Washington would not permit.

For a time, the United States had profited by the general friendliness exhibited toward Americans. By Novem-

141 Munro, op.cit., pp. 311-13.
ber the mood of the people had changed to one of open hostility. During the month of September, American Marines had gradually assumed many of the roles traditionally assigned to the Dominican police force. Armed patrols began making arrests of Dominican citizens. By October Russell complicated the situation further by ordering the arrest of several caudillos who had sacked the customhouse at La Romana the summer before. In an attempt to seize one of these men, Ramón Batista, a fight ensued which took the lives of two Marine officers. Two days later, on October 26th, an encounter with a drunken gunman in the capital resulted in the deaths of several innocent bystanders. American military personnel also attempted to impose a censorship on the more radical Dominican dailies. Such actions, while well intentioned on the military's part, understandably provoked the utmost resentment on the part of many Dominicans. Hostility toward Americans was also generated by the fact that for four months Washington had suspended all payments to the Dominican government. The suspension of salaries to governmental agencies and employees had brought about an intolerable economic situation which had left many Dominicans destitute.

By the middle of November, Secretary Lansing realized that the situation was fast approaching a crisis. On November 14, Henríquez had requested that the electoral colleges
choose new senators and deputies to replace those whose terms had expired. The State Department feared the election of Arias after evaluation of the situation, and decided that immediate action was necessary. On November 22, 1916, Secretary Lansing expressed his fear of "economic disaster" and "impending revolution" within the Republic, citing:

... the fact that the Provisional Government will not meet the views of the United States in regard to the establishment of financial control and the constabulary, brings the Government of the United States face to face with a serious problem... The withholding of the funds by the United States Government on account of the fact that recognition has not been granted to Henriquez has brought an economic crisis in the country which is daily growing worse and for which this Government would not wish to be placed in such a position that it would be held responsible. ... It is thought that the only solution of the difficulty would be the declaration of martial law and placing of Santo Domingo under military occupation, basing this on the interpretation which the United States has given to the Dominican Convention of 1907 and also upon the present unsettled conditions in the Republic... Captain Knapp is understood to have arrived today in Santo Domingo and it is believed that no time should be lost in instructing him to put into effect the proclamation declaring military control and to commence immediately the disbursement of funds under martial law.

When President Wilson replied to Lansing's memorandum on November 26, 1916, his thoughts were elsewhere. As Summer Welles points out:

The immense upheaval which had resulted from the outbreak of the World War, the constantly increasing

evidence that the United States might not be permitted to remain aloof, and the activities of his own electoral campaign, had made it increasingly difficult during the preceding year for President Wilson to devote much attention to the Dominican situation. The successive steps which had been taken during the summer months, while duly reported to him, had doubtless not impressed themselves upon him in their full gravity, since his mind had by now become engrossed with the European problem.143

In approving the military occupation, Wilson did, however, strike from the proclamation the sentence which would have authorized the officer in charge to remove any Dominican judge considered unfit. Wilson's reply to Secretary Lansing read as follows:

It is with the deepest reluctance that I approve and authorize the course here proposed, but I am convinced that it is the least of the evils in sight in this very perplexing situation. I therefore authorize you to issue the necessary instructions in the premises.

I have stricken out the sentence in the proposed proclamation which authorized the commanding officer to remove judges and others in certain circumstances. It may be necessary to resort to such extreme measures, but I do not deem it wise to put so arbitrary an announcement in the proclamation itself.144

Henriquez met with Captain H.S. Knapp, who had replaced Admiral Pond in November, in a final interview on November 28, 1916, but nothing was accomplished. The next day a military occupation was proclaimed, which in the words of

143Welles, op.cit., II, p. 792.
Sumner Welles:

... officially disregarded the existence of a Dominican Government established, in accordance with the Dominican Constitution, by the Dominican people, in the exercise of the rights inherent in them as a sovereign nation, a nation which had maintained its liberty and independence against every menace and against overwhelming odds during the preceding seventy-two years.¹⁴⁵

The official proclamation based the intervention on the Dominican government's violation of Article III of the 1907 Convention. It was stated that the occupation was undertaken "with no immediate or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic" but rather was designed "to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of the treaty aforesaid, and the obligations resting upon it as one of the family of nations."¹⁴⁶ Almost a week later, the Dominican Minister in Washington, Armando Pérez Perdomo, filed an official protest. At the time, Perdomo's protest received little attention, but as the last official act of an occupied nation, the words today carry a poignant message. He stated that:

A state of war which alone could have justified such a proceeding on the part of the Government of the United States toward the Dominican Republic has never existed between the two Nations.

And therefore by acting as it has with the Dominican Republic, Your Excellency's Government plainly

¹⁴⁵Welles, op.cit., II, p. 793.
violated in the first place, the fundamental principles of public international law which laid down as an invariable rule of public order for the nations the reciprocal respect of the sovereignty of each and every one of the other states of the civilized world, and in the second place, the principles which guide the doctrine of Pan-Americanism which hallow the inviolability of American nationalities; principles which may be said to have found their highest virtues in the many official declarations of the learned President of the United States. 147

147 Dominican Minister Armando Perez Perdomo's protest delivered on December 4, 1916 is quoted in Welles, op. cit., II, p. 796.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Drawn by the lucrative trade prospects of the Caribbean in the later part of the eighteenth century, the United States soon found herself playing an active role in the affairs of Hispaniola during the early years of the nineteenth century. United States involvement deepened with the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 when Washington committed herself to a policy designed to prevent European incursion into the Western Hemisphere.

Encouraged by Dominican politicians who feared Haitian conquest, the United States flirted with the idea of annexation during the 1850's. Civil War cut short these notions, but the Spanish occupation, although a failure, aroused a greater determination on the part of Washington that the island Republic should never again be dominated by a European power. This determination led to a policy of annexation by the Grant administration which favored United States expansion in the Caribbean. Congress, however, did not accept the argument that expansion was necessary to prevent European encroachment, and the proposals of President Grant were defeated.
Although expansionist projects were henceforth viewed with disfavor, Washington still insisted that European powers be excluded from the Caribbean. When Dominican indebtedness led to the threat of possible European intervention, President Theodore Roosevelt moved swiftly to block any expansionist designs European powers might have entertained. With the promulgation of his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, he was able to forestall any European advance in the Caribbean by establishing a customs receivership which satisfied foreign creditors and maintained the Dominican Republic's sovereignty.

Roosevelt had hoped his policies would bring peace to the Dominican Republic, but by 1912 it became evident that such hopes were not to be realized. President Wilson adhered to the established policy in regards to European expansion in the Caribbean but broadened the role of the United States in the domestic policies of the Dominican Republic by insisting on the establishment of a constitutional democracy, which in his mind was necessary to put an end to the endless cycle of revolution. If the Dominicans could but learn the ways of democracy, he reasoned, then the chaotic conditions which invited foreign encroachment would cease to exist. When it became apparent that democracy was not so easily induced, Wilson took the final step and sent United States Marines to occupy the Republic and instruct
the Dominicans in the ways of democracy.

In sum, United States insistence that the Dominican Republic must never be dominated by a European power encouraged a variety of foreign policy decisions designed to achieve this end. Depending on the ideological bent of the administration in power, these decisions ranged from attempts at outright annexation and financial control to a military occupation.
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

As the scope of this reading list is small, the concerned student who wishes to explore facets of Dominican history other than the one presented in this thesis would do well to consult other bibliographical aids, the most important of which are the following: Samuel F. Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921 (Washington, 1935, reprinted 1959), a scholarly compilation of staggering proportions. H.H.B. Meyer, List of References on the Monroe Doctrine (Washington, 1919) and Phillip Bradley, Bibliography of the Monroe Doctrine, 1919-29 (London, 1929) contain the more important materials up to that time. Materials of more recent date may be obtained by consulting J.P. Harrison, Guide to Materials on Latin America in the National Archives (Washington, 1961).

The student who wishes to peruse recently written materials on the Dominican Republic would do well to consult the Handbook of Latin American Studies (Cambridge and Gainesville, 1936-); Public Affairs Information Service (New York, 1915-); and the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature (New York, 1900-).

Dominican history has suffered neglect both within its borders and abroad. Censorship under a number of dictators, ranging from Baez to Trujillo, has reduced the number of worthwhile Dominican studies to a trickle, while materials written abroad by exiles are almost impossible to obtain. By far, the best history in English of the Dominican Republic covering the pre-Trujillo period is Summer Welles' Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 (2 vols, New York, 1928). Written by a justly famous diplomat, it contains much material obtained from Dominican writers as well as from the archives of the State Department of the United States. A sympathetic view of Dominican history is presented by Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country With a Future (New York, 1918). Readable surveys which include material on Trujillo are Selden Rodman, Quisqueya, a History of the Dominican Republic (Seattle, 1964); Rayford W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (New York, 1968); and John Edwin Fagg, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (Englewood Cliffs, 1965).

Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921* (Princeton, 1964) is a superior analysis of early twentieth century Dominican-United States relations. Its value is enhanced by the fact that Munro was given access to State Department files. Studies which rely in large part on printed material such as Welles' volume and *Foreign Relations* are Graham H. Stuart, *Latin America and The United States* (New York, 1943); Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, *The Caribbean Policy of the United States,*
1890–1920 (Baltimore, 1942); and Chester Lloyd Jones, *The Caribbean Since 1900* (New York, 1936).


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