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A Historic Review of Community Policing & the Implementation Issues We Have Faced

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A Historic Review of Community Policing & the Implementation Issues We Have Faced

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<u>Introduction</u>

Community policing is a policing concept that calls for better integration and cooperation between the police and the communities they serve. Operationally defining community policing is almost impossible, because one of the main ideas behind community policing is that it should be tailored to the specific needs of each community, and therefore, every community does it a bit differently. However, community policing does have some common themes, such as having police officers be assigned to only one community so that they can really get to know a community's problems, as well as pushing for more interaction between police and the community. The hope is that by encouraging positive interactions between police officers and community members, we can build trust and create a community that engages with police and works with them to keep their communities strong, healthy and safe.

Whenever there is social unrest or political protests stemming from negative interactions between the police and citizens, community policing gets dusted off and heralded as the answer. Many of the general components and philosophies behind community policing have been around for decades, since the 1960s when it was created in Scotland (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973), but we keep circling back around to it and trying to apply it to American Policing.

In the later 1960s, after the 1967 12th street riots in Detroit happened, President Lyndon B. Johnson created the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which then put out a report on the state of policing at the time. This report covers multiple areas, but also includes a section entirely devoted to Community Policing. It calls for widespread change in the nature of policing, and urges the government to provide funding so that community policing can be implemented country-wide (The President's Commission, 1967). Since the 1967 President's Commission report, community policing in America has evolved through multiple

iterations.

This paper is designed to give an overhead view of the history of community policing in America, and discuss why there have been so many iterations of the same thesis, and why none have managed to be crowned the perfect solution. Though this paper is not an exhaustive account or summary of everything that has ever been done in the name of community policing, it is a thorough crash course and primer to the subject. It gives context about the social unrest that catapulted community policing into the spotlight, briefly introduces each attempt at implementing community policing, and then offers commentary and suggestions for the future, based on what has previously gone wrong.

Social Unrest & Riots in the 1960s

Community policing usually gains traction and is most heavily pushed when there is political and social unrest, usually stemming from negative police-citizen interactions. In the 1940s, segregation was still raging, and there was a lot of tension, especially on the East Coast. In Detroit, tensions got so high over housing and employment that there was a race riot in 1943 where mobs of white residents and police officers attacked Black residents. The unrest was so bad the U.S. army occupied the city, and at least 25 African Americans and 9 White people died ("1. Civil Rights," n.d).

In December of 1960 and January of 1961, the Detroit Police Department (DPD) declared a war on crime and created a 'crash program' due to the street killing of two white women ("2. Sweep," n.d). The department had long used illegal and racist policies to solve crimes, and criminalize and detain innocent African Americans, however, this 'crash program' led to the

arrest of 1,500 innocent African American men on suspicion in the murders and the larger 'crime war' ("2. Sweep," n.d).

The African American community denounced the crackdowns as an illegal racial profiling operation and re-issued demands for a citizen review board to oversee police brutality and misconduct. The pushback from the community escalated as the crackdown continued into January of 1960 and more African Americans were unfairly interrogated, searched, arrested and beaten ("2. Sweep," n.d).

Years later, in 1967, tensions continued to rise in Detroit's predominantly African American neighborhood of Virginia Park. 60,000 low-income residents were jammed into the area's 460 acres, living in tiny, subdivided apartments ("History.com," 2017). The DPD, which had only about 50 officers of color, was viewed as an occupying army. Accusations of police brutality and racial profiling were flying, and the entire city was struggling. The automobile industry was crumbling and pulling out of the area, taking jobs and middle-class residents with it ("History.com," 2017).

An illegal club stood at the corner of 12th Street and Clairmount, and at 3:35 am on Sunday, July 23rd, the police raided it ("History.com," 2017), resulting in 85 patrons being removed, though it took a while and by the end, over 200 onlookers had gathered. A bottle crashed, seemingly ignored by police, but then more bottles came flying and one went through the window of a patrol car. A small riot erupted and police fled as people came pouring into the area. Looting began at 6:30 am on 12th street as a fire started and spread down the street. By midmorning, every fireman and police officer in Detroit was called to the scene. Firemen and police alike were attacked ("History.com," 2017).

The mayor called in the state police, but the extra 300 officers were not enough. The national guard arrived that evening. By the end of Sunday, despite over 1,000 arrests, the riots kept spreading and getting worse, leading to five deaths by the end of the night. On Monday, the rioting continued and 16 people were killed, mostly by police or guardsmen. Snipers reportedly shot at firemen, and fire hoses were slashed. The governor asked President Lyndon B. Johnson to send in military troops. Almost 2,000 army paratroopers arrived on Tuesday and began patrolling. Ten more people died on Tuesday, and 12 more on Wednesday ("History.com," 2017).

On Thursday, July 27th, order was finally restored. At least 43 people were killed over the four days of rioting, more than 7,000 people were arrested, nearly 1,400 buildings were burned, somewhere around 5,000 people were left homeless, and there was roughly $50 million in property damage. The 12th street riot was considered one of the worst riots in U.S history ("History.com," 2017).

President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement

The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice task force report on the police was published as a response to the political unrest of the 1960s, and has nine chapters that cover things such as the history and profile of the police, the police role, police organization, coordination and consolidation of police services, police personnel, police & the community, police integrity, implementation, and the community's role in law enforcement.

The section dedicated to community policing in the 1967 report is broken down into multiple sections, such as the importance of police-community relations, the effect of police-community relations on the police as an organization, police operations, individual

officers, community stability, police programs, police-community relations units, citizen advisory committees, selection standards for police personnel, minority representation in the organization, field practices, and ensuring fairness.

To begin, the Johnson Commission report presents data taken from national surveys about topics such as the attitudes of the general public toward the police, and the attitudes of minority communities towards the police on various subjects such as police effectiveness, police misconduct, police honesty, and the need for police protection.

They begin with a survey of the general public that asks the respondent if they think the police do an excellent, good, fair, or poor job of enforcing the laws, the results of which are shown below (p. 145).

Do police do an excellent, good, fair, or a poor job?	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
Percent	22%	45%	24%	8%

Another survey question asked the public, "How good a job do the police do on being respectful to people like yourself?" (p. 146).

How Good a Job do the Police do on Being Respectful to People Like Yourself?	Very Good	Pretty Good	Not So Good	No Opinion
Percent	59%	26%	4%	10%

These two surveys were both national surveys that were not targeted to any specific group of people however, and when compared to the results of more specific surveys, start to look a bit different.

According to the report: "The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) survey shows that nonwhites, particularly negroes[1], are significantly more negative than whites in evaluating police effectiveness in law enforcement" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 146). They also note that "These differences are not merely a function of greater poverty among nonwhites; they exist at all income levels and for both men and women" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 146). This is showcased in the responses to the same question asked above: "How good a job do the police do on being respectful to people like yourself?"

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[1]The author does not use this term to describe African American people, and community standards have changed regarding verbiage like this, but it is being used here and in other quotes from this source to show the accurate historical context of the times and be true to the text it came from.

			White Annual Income		Nonwhite Annual Income	
			$0 to $2,999	$6,000 to $9,000	$0 to $2,999	$6,000 to $9,000
Males						
Police Very Good			56%	67%	34%	31%
Police Not So Good			4%	4%	22%	6%
Females						
Police Very Good			62%	66%	28%	41%
Police Not so Good			3%	1%	12%	45%

As the responses show, Black respondents are more critical of the police's respectfulness, in both income brackets. Another survey asked Black participants about the existence of police brutality, as shown below.

Existence of Police Brutality	Total	Age		
		15 - 29	30 - 34	45+
A lot	22.2%	24.4%	25.0%	17.1%
A little	24.6%	35.6%	22.7%	14.3%
None at all	15.1%	17.8%	11.4%	14.3%

The report notes that "Of those who had answered 'a lot' and 'a little' approximately half claimed that they had witnessed it" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 147). It also notes that younger males were the most critical: "For example, 53 percent of young males reported they had been subjected to insulting language; 44 percent to a roust, frisk, or search without good reason; 22 percent to unnecessary force in being arrested; and 10 percent to being beaten up while in custody. Well over 90 percent of young males believed that these incidents occurred in the area and 45 to 63 percent claimed to have seen at least one of them" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 147).

This data showcases the divide that was evident between the police and the nonwhite community during the 1960s, especially the black community, that sparked the creation of this report and the flurry of community police efforts that followed. The report also states that "Negroes greatly desire better police protection" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 148) and uses that data to conclude that "...there is every reason to believe that relations between the police and Negroes can be substantially improved" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 148).

The report does recognize that the change will not happen without effort, however, noting that: "Modification of police procedures on the street, stronger internal discipline over officers, greatly enlarged and strengthened police-community relations units, improved procedures for handling citizen complaints, better screening to eliminate candidates for the police force who are biased, and many other measures deeply affecting police agencies and police work will be necessary" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 149).

The report goes into more detail about their expectations, offering such wisdom as the need for coordination: "Without a central unit to plan overall programs, conduct training, represent the force with citywide citizen groups, and supervise precinct-community relations efforts, the job will either not get done or will lack the expertise, coordination, and leadership which are needed", and the need for respect and authority "If community relations units are to be successful, they must clearly have prestige and authority" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 151). The report follows up on the idea of authority by noting that the community relations units utilized up to this point have not generally won the confidence of minority groups and that the officers from those units who have gained the respect of community members have obtained that respect because they see them as distinct from the department and having little departmental support (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 151). This is important because it demands that if we are to truly work on improving community relations, we need to put our full weight behind the idea and make sure that all officers, precincts, and units are seen as friendly, helpful, and community-minded, not just the dedicated community-relations officers.

The 1967 report continues with the idea of authority for community relations units by discussing that "In the administrative hierarchy, community relations units too often appear as an afterthought" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 151). Multiple examples are given, and

imbue little hope for the integration of these programs: "In one city, where the unit had been formed as a result of outside community pressures, the chief of police refused to make an announcement concerning the formation of the unit and did not invite its commander to a key departmental meeting concerning community relations. In another city, one district commander expressed resentment at being drafted into community discussion groups at the precinct level…A former Negro commander of a community relations unit said that few police top administrators "personally and honestly believe in [police-community relations]. It has been forced on them so they have to go along with it - just giving a lot of lip service and speeches and no meaningful action that will develop trust of the police in the Negro community" (The President's Commission, 1967, p. 152).

It was so bad that "In every police department visited, the Michigan State survey found problems relating to the support of community relations units by police chiefs, supervisors, or ordinary police officers, and often by all three. On close examination, this was found to be true even of departments where community relations programs have earned national respect". The unfortunate consequence of this pushback and resentment from officers and chiefs means that these programs were ineffective, and led to confusion, lack of cohesiveness, and many community policing units being looked upon as a "public relations grab", and not a respected, meaningful attempt to better serve the community (The President's Commission, 1967).

The key takeaways from the 1967 report are:

- Community Policing Units need to be respected, not cut off from the department. There also needs to be a commitment to change.
    - There needs to be a commitment by police chiefs and higher-ups to work to improve community relations, and policing in general. This commitment then has

to be held firmly enough that it trickles down and is enforced at all levels. We cannot allow community policing units to be isolated, looked down upon, diminished, unincorporated, and fractured by others in the Department. Police chiefs need to make it clear that community policing is a high priority, and that it should be implemented and woven into the job of every officer, not just those who are in specific units or full-time community policing officers. We began community policing by creating individual units inside of preexisting police departments, but we need to move towards integrating those units back into the general department. Community policing is not a one-unit job, it takes the cooperation and commitment of an entire department. Community policing is not about quickly fixing one instance of community divide, it is about redefining policing as a whole and moving towards a kinder, more transparent and accessible police force, and we need to change the way we approach community policing to reflect that.

- Community Policing needs to be implemented into policymaking:
  - Community policing cannot be an afterthought, or one-time actions and responses by police. To ensure that these policies continue to shine through and encourage police community relations, community policing ideals and policies need to be baked into policymaking. Not only at a departmental level, but at a citywide level, and even a statewide or national level. This will help make sure that social services connections are maintained, police departments are supported and given clear expectations, and that these changes do not fade out over time.
- Funding must be given - the entire burden cannot rest on police.

- ○ Government Funding:
    - ■ We cannot expect police departments to radically overhaul their procedures, policies, structure, hiring procedures, training procedures and duties by themselves. It is simply not possible. Local, state and federal governments need to support this change by providing funding, research and training opportunities, and partnerships with relevant organizations. Things like hiring grants, stipends for higher salaries to attract better candidates, technology grants, and funding events that partner the police and community are all wonderful steps to ensure that the police are not alone and floundering as they try to rework their entire system.
- ● Social Services Connections:
    - ○ The police also need access to a wide network of social services and connections. People come to the police with a wide variety of problems, and not all of them are problems that are the police's responsibility, or within their ability to solve. Partnering with social services such as mental health providers, housing providers, sanitation departments, fire departments, food banks, and other city-wide social services can ensure that people can get the help they need, even if the police are not able to provide that for them. Having a clear, efficient pipeline of social services available to police will help them safely and effectively redirect people who they do not possess the resources to help. Police are powerful problem solvers, but they cannot be expected to fulfill every role and provide every service, especially specialized services such as mental health care or things that are the city's responsibility, such as sanitation needs.

- Units need to work with community members:
  - Network with Civic Organizations and Leaders:
    - When trying to gain the respect and trust of neighborhoods, it is important to forge friendships and alliances with already respected organizations and leaders, such as churches, preachers, youth group leaders, food bank managers, school principals and any other trusted and respected community leaders. If people already trust and respect a community leader, they will be more likely to be willing to work with and help someone that the community leader endorses, such as neighborhood officers. On top of that, many of these connections can lead to wonderful programming opportunities. Churches can have officers help with drives and holidays, schools can create programming for officers and youths to positively interact, and food banks can help police understand their needs and abilities, as well as keep tabs on houseless people who might regularly attend.
  - School Programs:
    - Another avenue for police community relations is school programming. Youths need to have positive, nonthreatening interactions with the police to promote trust and friendship. Many young people do not even realize that police officers can and do engage in recreational and sports activities with kids: "[S]ometimes when you go down there you see polices there boxing…I didn't even know it was a police til somebody told me…I didn't even know police take up activity like that. I didn't think they care

for nothing like that. I just think they care for getting drunks and beating them in the head and all that kind of stuff" (The President's Commission, 1967).

- ○ Citizen Advisory Committees:
  - ■ Another important staple when working with communities is citizen advisory committees. These sounding boards can be an important opportunity for residents to ask questions, voice concerns, and get to know their local officers, as well as for the officers to get in tune with their communities.
  - ■ However, a big part of that is making sure that these committees are diverse, and a good sample of the community. If a committee is only white people over 40, that is not an accurate representation of the entire community, but just one part of it. To do this, officers should invite various leaders from subsections of the community, such as minority leaders, as well as youths, the elderly, single parents, LGBTQ+ people, and anyone else who is part of the community that might not be represented.
  - ■ Sometimes, this can be challenging. Often times, when these committees are newly established, few people show up, and those that do are not often the people the police are trying to reach, or those that are the target of police community relations efforts: "[A]ny time I've ever attended a community meeting…they're not the people you want to get it across to, because they're not the problem" (The President's Commission, 1967).

While the residents who show up do not necessarily need to be problem residents, they do need to be a diverse group, and a group who wants to promote real change in the community.

- ○ Community Relations Programs:
    - ■ Another important step in connecting with the community is creating programming that allows the community to interact with, learn about, and get comfortable with the police. These programs can be things such as public education programs that discuss what the police do and their policies, perhaps including tours of their precinct and ride alongs, which would foster transparency and citizen education. It is also important to create opportunities for youth and the police to interact, perhaps by having the police run youth sports teams, or run events like toys for tots that help the police connect with and bring joy to young kids.
    - ■ The police also need to embrace their expanding role and work on social service projects, such as suicide prevention, animal and human rescue missions, and missing persons cases. The community needs to see and understand that the police role does not stop at crime control anymore, the police are also involved in educating, protecting and saving their community, as well as keeping bad guys off the streets.
- ● There needs to be research done on the programs.
    - ○ We cannot just blindly test out new methods of policing, we need to be collecting data and doing research to learn what is effective and what is not. To do this, we can partner with outside organizations, or run internal research campaigns to

measure the effectiveness and success of new programs. If we do not know what works and what does not, we will waste time, money and resources on ineffective or potentially harmful programs. On the other hand, if we know what works and why it works, we can create programs that capitalize on that knowledge and ensure that our communities are benefiting from that knowledge.

- Police/Community Relations have an impact on city life and affects the police's ability to do their jobs.
  - If the community is not willing to work with the police in tandem to make the city safer and more effective, the police can only do so much. Combative residents and an unwillingness to work together will get us nowhere. The community can only do so much on their own without access to municipal resources, and the police can only do so much if people are refusing to call them when things happen, or refuse to cooperate when they respond to incidents. Community policing is not just about racial tension and connecting with residents, it is about ensuring that the city works together to maintain a safe, supportive and effective community to live and work in.
- There needs to be more training & screening to get good, trustworthy officers.
  - Screening:
    - We need to raise our standards for the candidates that apply to become our police officers. These people are the ones who will be embodying community policing standards and working closely with the community, and we need to ensure that they are reliable, unbiased and open minded. To do this, the report suggests raising the educational standards for

applicants, noting that "Studies support the proposition that well-educated persons are less prejudiced toward minority groups than the poorly educated" (The President's Commission, 1967). They suggest requiring two or four years of college, in the hope that better educated people will have a better appreciation of people with diverse backgrounds. (The President's Commission, 1967).

- Psychological Stability and Racial Bias:
  - The report also suggests testing applicants' psychological stability and whether they are racially biased. This screening would help remove candidates who are emotionally unstable and would have a high likelihood of verbally or physically abusing citizens.
  - The report does not have quite as much of a solid suggestion for racial bias testing. They note that attitudes are split on whether people can train out slight biases, or learn to control and reprogram them. They also note that finding someone who is completely unbiased seems impossible. Their suggestion is to implement training, discipline and supervision to overcome prejudice and bias in officers and recruits.
  - They also suggest character investigations through talking to friends, teachers and coworkers.
- It is also important to promote diversity when hiring. Minority officers can better relate to and empathize with minority communities that they serve, and the community members may feel safer or more respected when

interacting with a member of their own minority. It also promotes a wider

variety of thinking and problem solving, as well as introducing personal

experiences that can be learned from and used to influence policy

decisions.

- ○ Improved recruitment techniques:

    - ■ We need to change the way we recruit potential officers. Many hires are

        based on referrals from current officers, which can create an echo chamber

        of ideas and political views, as well as hamper diversity and create

        unwelcome alliances and biases. The report suggests having the recruiting

        team include minority members, and having those units go to high school

        and colleges. They also suggest advertising through posters, as well as

        asking community leaders, especially minority community leaders, to

        encourage people to apply.

- ○ Changing Selection Standards:

    - ■ Certain selection standards for applicants can lead to intentional or

        unintentional bias. For example, height restrictions often prevent Puerto

        Ricans, Mexican Americans and Asian Americans from applying or

        getting accepted. Other standards, such as eyesight or previous criminal

        record may also prevent people from applying. Many youths who grew up

        in disadvantaged communities or circumstances have an increased risk of

        having a criminal record, and many of the things on these records are

        minor, and mostly due to the reckless or impulsive behaviors common in

        adolescents, or getting caught up in an unfortunate circumstance. While

criminal records cannot be altogether ignored, greater scrutiny can allow

people who have non-violent, minor offenses to still correct their ways and

better their community.

- ○ Training:
  - ■ We need to overhaul our training process for not only new recruits, but
    also retroactively train current officers to keep up with evolving police
    practices. Training for new recruits should involve some basic community
    policing training, but the organization should also reserve some training
    for specialized units or officers, and offer recruits the chance to specialize
    in community policing efforts or other specialties.
  - ■ With the push for change, we need to remember that just because
    community policing training is standard now, does not mean it was
    standard when many senior officers were hired. We cannot forget to
    retroactively train and educate officers on not only community policing
    issues, but also other issues and training that may have been implemented
    after their hire date. This will help reduce confusion about current
    practices and expectations, which should also help provide a smoother
    transition for any officers who are resistant to change or do not understand
    why newer officers are engaging in certain practices.
  - ■ We need to create specialized training to address some of the issues that
    face officers today, such as polite communication, how to handle
    demonstrations and crowds, firearm use, mental health crises, hostage
    situations, houselessness, and other problems that are developing. While

we cannot expect police to replace trained professionals such as mental health workers or EMS, we can provide them with basic training that expands their understanding of these issues, what is expected (and not expected) of them in these situations, and what resources are available to them in these situations.

- Many of these training sessions are needed to make the rules and expectations clear about potentially dangerous or politically charged situations. If officers are specifically told what they can and cannot do in certain situations, and what the consequences are for breaking policy, it will help reduce confusion around their options and resources, as well as help them not panic during charged situations and make a decision they will regret. Some of these situations include training on use of force situations, field interrogation, and firearm usage. By engaging officers in training that exposes them to the expectations for their behavior in these situations, and allows them to practice what they would and should do in situations like these, it improves their knowledge of how to handle situations, and decreases stress by giving them a concrete understanding and checklist of what to do. It also prevents situations where officers feel like they did not know what procedure was, or did not know that their actions would have repercussions.

Team Policing

Despite the sudden interest and leaps forward in the world of community policing in the United States, the first noted variant of modern-day community policing, team policing, was not actually born in the United States. It was created in Aberdeen, Scotland to combat boredom and increase the morale of officers patrolling quiet streets (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973). This strategy created teams of five and ten officers, both on foot and in vehicles, to cover the assigned areas. These teams were dispatched by the concentration of crimes and calls for service, with the teams moved around the city as the workload needed.

Similarly, in 1966, "Unit Beat Policing" was created in Accrington, England (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973). The goal behind this program was to work through a shortage of police officers. With this system, officers were organized into beats that were tied to one area, instead of going wherever they were needed. The officers did not patrol together, but all worked together in a neighborhood and handed information back to a central organizer who compiled the information from the various officers. By utilizing this coordination, they were able to stretch resources further and cover more ground.

The 'Aberdeen' system had faded out in the United Kingdom by 1963, but by that time it had made its way over to the United States, where Tucson, Arizona, and a handful of other cities had implemented programs of a similar nature. By 1973, a large number of United States cities had tried a form of Team Policing. Generally, this looked like reorganizing the patrol force to have one or more quasi-autonomous teams, with the twofold goal of improving police services to the community and increasing job satisfaction among officers (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

However, despite the fact that the term 'Team Policing' was already surprisingly popular by the 1970s, there was no standard definition or common goal of team policing programs. Each program took team policing to mean something different and applied its funding and officers in

different ways. While part of this lack of coordination stems from the idea that each community will require something different from its officers, the lack of standardization remained an issue throughout the life of community policing iterations, as it makes implementation and measuring success hard (Renauer, 2001).

Despite this, when looking at case studies, such as the ones reviewed below, three common strategic themes of team policing appear: geographic stability of beats, increased communication between officer teams, and increased communication between the officers and the community (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973). These central themes then spawned certain operational elements, such as having both beat officers and one central officer be static, so that there was as little change as possible and the officers had a chance to learn and truly know and understand their area, their residents, and the issues of the area. Another operational element was lower-level flexibility in policy-making. This flexibility allowed officers of a beat to make decisions about their area, which extended into allowing these officers to control when and if specialized units would be called in, as well as a merging of patrol and investigative functions. This change followed the logic that these officers knew their areas the best and would therefore be the most effective at investigative functions (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

In 1973, a study was published by Lawrence W. Sherman, Catherine H. Milton, and Thomas V. Kelly that examined team-policing efforts in 7 cities in the United States. Data was collected over a two-year period from February to June of 1971, with each city studied for 2-6 days, with at least 16 hours of observed patrol time in each. Police officials of all levels were interviewed, as well as residents and community leaders. Follow-up data was obtained in the fall of 1972. The study was conducted to examine why team policing had worked well in certain areas and not as well in others. 7 cities were sampled; two small cities: Holyoke, Massachusetts

and Richmond, California, two middle-sized cities: Dayton, Ohio and Syracuse, New York, two large cities: Detroit, Michigan, and Los Angeles, California, and finally one 'super-city': New York City (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973). These case studies are not in-depth quantitative studies and were performed rather early on in team policing's history. Therefore, these studies are not controlled experiments and are not scientifically oriented.

In Dayton Ohio, the program was created and driven by a commitment by a newly elected police chief to overhaul the role of the police and improve police services, as well as a tense racial situation and a need to improve service with no added manpower. The city had a population (when written) of around 250,000, and is the center of a metropolitan area with 850,000 residents. Over 35% of the population is African American, and that number continued to rise (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

Due to the civil unrest of the 1960s, the Ohio National Guard was called in multiple times, and a large number of the population considered the unrest racial militance. While the Dayton Police department was held in relatively positive esteem (at least by the white community), the 1960s did put a bit of a stain on the department. While they were proud to note that each unrest was resolved without deaths, two of the issues had been precipitated by police violence, and the minority community held that police brutality was a serious issue (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

There was also little to no Black representation in the police force, with only one African American Sergeant in 1968 and 25 African American officers, totaling less than 6% of the force. The community felt that there was a gap as over 35% of the community was African American, and white officers were perceived as insensitive to African American community issues (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

The newly elected Police chief was Robert M. Igleburger, a 57-year-old white male. He reorganized the department, installed a new computer to analyze officer reports, increased patrol visibility, and established a citizen ride-along policy. Igleburger also changed the policy for new recruits, each recruit had to spend 4 weeks of training in multiple community agencies, such as a black high school, a welfare office, an Appalachian community center, a hospital, and an African American social service office, to learn about community life among other cultural groups (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

The neighborhood studied was known as Daytonview, with a heavily black south side, a totally black west side, and a white northern section, topped with an upper-class white neighborhood. These borders were created as a result of a federally-funded 'stabilization program', but did not help the tensions between African American residents and Appalachian residents (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

Their team policing program had three goals: To test the effectiveness of the generalist-specialist approach to police service delivery; to produce a community-oriented police structure that would be responsive to differing neighborhood lifestyles; and to alter the bureaucratic police structure away from the militaristic model toward a neighborhood-oriented professional model (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

To do this, 40 volunteer officers, 3 sergeants, and a team leader were assigned to the neighborhood. Each person was seen as a generalist-specialist, meaning he was qualified to deal with all routine problems. To complement this, people were also trained in a specialty, such as youth conflict resolution, family crisis work, and complex investigative work, however, specialists would only operate in the district if called in by a team member. They also utilized 'para-professionals' such as the existing Neighborhood Assistance Officers (NAOs) and other

pre-existing community leadership. Neighborhood Assistance Officers patrolled in their own cars, had their own uniforms to distinguish them from actual officers, and were told to stay away from serious situations (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

The training was community-based and was originally intended to include a live-in experience with a neighborhood family, but this portion was dropped as not enough African American families accepted, though the families would have been reimbursed for the time they shared their homes (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973). Preventative patrol was eliminated, and discretion was given to officers about uniforms, vehicle use, and scheduling. The team was headquartered in the basement of an old apartment building, with a large community room, kitchen facilities, and lots of moveable seating. While it was less formal than the standard police precinct, it still wasn't as accessible and inviting as a storefront headquarters (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

After two years, the program had 60+ officers divided into four platoons with a lieutenant as a team commander. The program did have some successes, such as establishing referral systems to social agencies which were actually used, and all police problems in the district were handled by the teams, so unified delivery of services was achieved. Lastly, the team members did manage to perform both patrol and investigative functions, which resulted in a more community-oriented structure being achieved (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

However, a number of the proposed program elements were never accomplished. There were no community live-in situations during the initial training, patrol officers were not really involved in the selection of their supervisors, although they could veto their sergeants and successfully had one removed, and the militaristic structure of the organization was not eliminated. They were understaffed constantly, and the concepts of rank and uniform did not

wither away as the chief had hoped. He urged officers to try new approaches to move away from these traditionally militaristic concepts, such as a looser dress code, but officers were resistant to change and preferred their uniforms because of their 'high visibility' (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

On top of those failures, there were also very few in-person team meetings, most communication was written, and in the beginning, the geographic stability of the beats was violated and the teams ignored the boundaries created in the area. This however was fixed (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

The reasoning behind their failure to accomplish program elements was largely credited to the fact that this program tried to fundamentally change the way the police force was organized and went about their business, and that was seen as threatening to officers and citizens. Igleburger's changes were perceived as left-wing liberal attempts to undermine law and order in the city, rather than sincere attempts to equip the department to better respond to the community during a period of social change (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973). This then was said to cause instability, and it was noted that this program might have done better if it had taken smaller steps and changed less at once.

When looking at why team policing did not last and make it into modern day policing, 4 categories appear.

1. A lack of understanding of what was expected of officers, and confusion surrounding what team policing was. Some saw team policing as a fad, and therefore did not put much stock or effort into embracing and learning about it.

2. The ideals and changes being presented as a part of team policing were very different from the militaristic, O.W Wilson model that was being used previously.

On top of that, there was a large volume of new ideas being introduced, which

may have been overwhelming and too much to sort through and establish.

3. Along with the high levels of racial and community tension, there was also an

ongoing fiscal crisis that meant a lack of resources and officers.

4. Team policing units were usually operationally distinct units, and were subject to

contempt, lack of faith, and a lack of support and resources. These units were

often shunned and not seen as a part of the larger police organization.

These categories encompass the main reasons that team policing ultimately did not

succeed or take off.

Starting at the top, there was mass confusion about the definition of team policing and

what officers, precincts and higher ups were being asked to do. Because this was a new theory of

policing, there was not much of a guidebook or specific policies to follow, precincts were given a

very broad definition of team policing and given a lot of discretion on how they applied team

policing to their units and their neighborhoods. Following with the newness of team policing,

many higher ups and officers saw it as a passing fad - just an attempt to cater to the tensions of

the times. Due to this lack of faith that it would continue to reshape policing, many officers and

precincts did not invest heavily in team policing and simply waited for it to fizzle out.

Some officers' unwillingness to change was also due to the fact that the principals, ideals

and operational elements proposed in team policing were radically different from the militaristic,

O.W Wilson style of policing that had dominated the industry since the 1960s. Team policing

called for an integration of police and the community that was not aligned with the anti-politics,

closed practices of O.W Wilson's era, and many officers did not want to shift back towards being

a public institution. Igleburger's policies specifically were seen as "...left-wing liberal attempts to

undermine law and order in the city," (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973), which is a good example of how more traditional police professionals felt about the attempted shift towards team policing.

Thirdly, along with the ongoing racial tensions that plagued the United States in the 1960s, there was also a fiscal crisis raging. Police departments were underfunded, understaffed, and stretched thin. Many police departments felt that they did not have the resources, manpower or time to integrate new programs, task forces and reorganize their beats. However, team policing was an efficient way to organize police resources, and the departments that did shift their beats and assignments did reap the benefits (Wilson, J.Q & Sadina, T, 1973).

Lastly, team policing units were operationally distinct units. They had different rules, responsibilities and roles than traditional beat officers, which meant that at times, team policing units could be cast aside, mocked or looked upon derisively. The officers in these units were sometimes seen as useless or public relations dummies, and the units were almost always looked upon as below normal units. This was a huge issue, as these officers and units were designed to be approachable, trustworthy, and cutting edge. The lack of support and cohesiveness set these units down a troubled path, for if their own institution would not support and embrace them, how could they expect the community to?

Kansas City Patrol Experiment

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a systemic effort by the federal government to provide funding to foster community policing programs around the country. This came after the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistant Agency (LEAA).

For eleven years, LEAA gave out more than $8 billion to state and local agencies to sponsor state planning to reduce crime and improve the function of the police and other criminal justice organizations, develop new approaches to control crime and social disorder at a local level, conduct research and identify innovative programs, adapting and utilizing new technology, training and educating law enforcement personnel, and more (Worral, 2003).

This effort created two community-based corrections programs in the state of Iowa that were replicated in another eight cities and counties across the nation, such as the implementation of better technology to catch robbers in Seattle, Washington (Whitcomb, 1979), a domestic violence reduction project (Hamlin, 1978), Minnesota's crime watch program, and LEAA itself.

Another major source of funding was the Police Foundation, also called the Ford Foundation, which gave $30 million for action-oriented research into new policing strategies and technology. The stated ambition of the Police Foundation: "...contribute significantly to the movement away from the centralized and quasi-military models of patrol operations to more flexible neighborhood-based patrol operations which are more responsive to varying community needs and values" (Collings, 2019).

This government funding allowed for the creation of all of these programs and initiatives, some of which we are still building off of and referencing today, such as the Kansas City Patrol Experiment.

In this experiment, 15 patrol beats were selected by researchers and a task force of officers. Five of those were control beats (they operated as normal), five were reactive beats (no routine patrol, only calls for service were answered, any other time was spent patrolling the edges of beats or other proactive beats), and the last five were proactive beats with 2 to 3 times the usual level of police visibility by means of extra patrol cars (Larson, 1975).

The experiment was run for one year, from October 1st, 1972 to September 30th, 1973, and while it is currently thought to be an unsuccessful experiment that yielded primarily negative results with few of the measured quantities (crime rates, response times, citizen perceptions) showing variation in a statistically significant way, it did showcase the benefit of partnering police programs with researchers who could test and analyze the effectiveness of those programs (Hansen, 2021).

However, despite the Kansas City Patrol Experiment not managing to decrease crime, it did reveal some useful information. It showed that police are able to experiment with patrol, pulling officers off of patrol to walk beats or go to community events or meetings and not suffer adverse effects, such as an increase in crime (Larson, 1975). It also showed that randomly patrolling cop cars is not an effective tactic, and is simply a waste of resources (Larson, 1975). Through these realizations, policing began to shift its focus from random patrol to patrolling problem areas and areas that generated many calls for service, which was the birth of problem-oriented policing, which is discussed later on.

Foot Patrol

After the Kansas City Patrol Experiment, other cities started experimenting with patrol as well. In the late 1970s, Flint Michigan was the first city in years to get officers out of their vehicles and implement a foot patrol. This was an attempt to move toward proactive policing and away from the industry standard of reactive policing. This was achieved by placing officers in accessible beats in the neighborhood to encourage citizen interaction and involvement. Their goals were to prevent and reduce crime, as well as increase citizen involvement to make people feel better about their community (Phegley, 1983).

This project was funded by the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation; however, it was not funded on its first application. The program was proposed to the Mott foundation in 1977 but rejected due to a lack of supporting research. The foundation requested they propose a study be done. A grant proposal was made and accepted in 1977 for that study. In 1978, the International Association of Chiefs of Police research team found that there was excellent potential and the proposal was re-submitted to the Motts foundation and accepted (Phegley, 1983).

When Police Chief Max Durbin was sworn in, one of his top goals was to learn what the citizens wanted and needed from the police. To do that he held 'listening sessions', and found that people focused less on violent crime and were more concerned about quality of life issues such as loose dogs, abandoned houses, juvenile delinquency, drugs, and burglary. To remedy these concerns, they created an officer who would not only be a law enforcement officer but also be a social services delivery person and a relay between citizens and social service outlets to coordinate efforts to improve quality of life (Phegley, 1983).

The study was designed around 14 police beat areas that were chosen, due to specific crime problems and the interest of the neighborhoods. The officers had bases in public access areas such as schools, churches, and fire stations, and officers were described as: '...not babysitters for community juvenile delinquents or are they night-watchmen. They are not security patrols or old-fashioned "beat cops". Foot patrol officers work with neighborhoods as partners in crime prevention. In essence, each officer is the Chief of Police of a small community; they assess the needs of the specific community and with resident participation attempt to fill those needs" (Phegley, 1983).

A typical day for one of these officers looks a bit like this: they begin their day by checking in at the base, checking their voicemail, looking at juvenile contact sheets that list kids

involved in criminal activity lately and contacting their families, followed by organizing a priority list for complaints and noting which complaints need to be outsourced. Once a month they write a short article for the community newsletter based on their observations. After the office tasks are completed they usually begin to walk their beat, go to security inspection appointments, follow up on written recorded complaints, make contact with residents, make referral contacts, work with the elderly, work with the youth, and review community resources to see what is needed to improve quality of life for residents (Phegley, 1983).

The program also wanted to take pre-existing social organizations such as block clubs or neighborhood watches and make them more 'action-oriented'. One of those organizations is the Police Athletic League, which is a youth organization that aims to develop good character, leadership, responsibility, and good citizenship in youth. It also works as a means of improving contact between officers and kids, as well as getting the community interested in supporting youth. To achieve these goals, they target 4 areas: sports, cultural activities, counseling, and education. Some of their programming includes boys and girls basketball, volleyball, kickball, floor hockey, bowling and golf, ski lessons for inner-city juveniles, an Explorer Scout close order and drill unit, boxing tournaments, and field trips for young people, with the Neighborhood Foot Patrol officers, to cultural and sporting events (Phegley, 1983).

As part of the agreement between the foundation and the city, Michigan State research teams were to evaluate the program on 10 goals:

1. To decrease actual or perceived criminal activity.

2. Increase citizens' perceptions of safety.

3. Deliver police service consistent with community needs and ideals of modern police practice.

4. Create community awareness of crime problems and methods of increasing law enforcement's ability to deal with actual or potential criminal activity effectively.

5. Develop citizen volunteer action in support of or under the direction of the police, aimed at various crimes.

6. Fix citizen apathy about crime reporting.

7. Increase protection for women, kids and the elderly.

8. Monitor foot patrol officers.

9. Measure interface between foot patrol officers and other units, as well as monitor referrals to other agencies.

10. Evaluate the impact of training on the officer's performance.

These ten goals were evaluated through the use of interviews and questionnaires with citizens/police, which were designed to provide data on things like experience with crime, crime reporting, evaluation of officers, recommendations for improvement, awareness of programs, awareness of the number of activities neighborhood foot patrol officers are involved in and knowledge of citizen leadership within the community. They also looked at crime statistics from 1978 (when there was no foot patrol) and compared it to 1981 (the final year of the evaluation), monitored the activities of officers by reading their daily, weekly and monthly reports randomly as well as monitoring officers' routines (Phegley, 1983).

The main goal of this monitoring of activity was to see if an officer was conscientiously walking their beat and making contact with the citizens (Phegley, 1983). To determine this, residents were asked about the activities of the officer. Community and school newsletters were examined for articles made by officers. Such articles are thought to be an important means of informing community members of crime prevention tactics and goings-on. Articles were viewed

to assess the degree to which residents were aware of crime problems in the area, and the preventative actions of the officers and community (Phegley, 1983).

At the end of the study, they claimed an 8.7% decrease in crime from 1979 to 1981. According to their research, almost 70% of citizens felt safer, and over 61% felt that protections for women, kids, and the elderly had been increased. Their findings also suggested that the program reduced citizen apathy around reporting crime and the department developing citizen assistance programs (Phegley, 1983).

However, multiple issues were found with this study, such as their sample pool being flawed. There were no responses recorded from children or the elderly, and no responses were taken from anyone who lived in any apartment complex. This is an issue because one of their original goals was to increase protection for women, children, and the elderly, but only one of those categories got to voice their concerns, opinions, or observations about the program. There was also the issue of the sample size being too small, it was only 84 people, which was .0013% of the survey population (Phegley, 1983).

People also complained that the surveys were too long, as most took around two hours to complete. The sample group also changed constantly, due to people dropping out, moving, or not wanting to take the two-hour surveys again (Phegley, 1983).

On the law enforcement side, there were also thoughts that the increased communication between officers and citizens may have resulted in an increase in reporting, which would have led to a false sense of higher crime rates. They also speculated that there could have been crime displacement because of the heightened police presence.

Lastly, because these officers got so embedded in their communities and knew the residents so well, often when they were called, they settled issues without a report being filed,

which tampered with the data surrounding the number of issues reported and dealt with (Phegley, 1983).

Problem Oriented Policing

The next major step in policing came in 1979, when a man named Herman Goldstein created a new method of policing called 'Problem Oriented Policing'. This style moved away from the idea of changing the structure or organization of the police force like so many other new programs were trying to do, but instead urged officers to look deeper into the issues they were tasked with handling, and try to re-work the way they categorized and handled such issues (Goldstein, H, 1979).

To achieve this, precincts were asked to identify problems in their areas, such as arson, burglary, vandalism, or murder. Once those issues were identified, they were pushed to dive deeper, define those issues and explore root causes, who is charged with handling such issues, if there are other organizations that could help, as well as the current police response, ideas for new responses, and methods of testing new responses (Goldstein, H, 1979).

The underlying goal of problem-oriented policing was to narrow down bigger problems. Sure, Police have categories that differentiate between types of crime and outline their response to dealing with such crimes, but this strategy argued that those categories were too big. The category of arson has no distinction between fires set to cover up evidence, fires set as a manifestation of a psychological problem, or fires set as insurance scams (Goldstein, H, 1979). You cannot simply fine a mentally ill person for starting a fire or throw them in jail for a year or two because 'that is the designated response for arson' - that does not fix that person's underlying motivation for setting the fire, and therefore, will not decrease that offender's rate of

recidivism. There needs to be a greater distinction between types of offenses and places where problems occur, and a greater range of options to deal with offenders and places so that their underlying motivations for offending or conditions for higher criminal activity are dealt with more directly than a one-size-fits-all solution or band-aid solution.

There is also the thought that if police rely on these categories of crimes to define what is and is not their responsibility, issues, and miscommunications happen (Goldstein, H, 1979). For example, it is argued that decriminalization would allow officer resources to be allotted to other, more important issues. However, if that did happen, people would still expect legally intoxicated persons and legally soliciting prostitutes to be taken off the streets, because they are seen as annoying and offensive. So whose job would it be? Not the police, for it is legal now, and they only pick up criminal offenders. The duty would fall on someone else, which would simply displace the problem instead of resolving it, and create the need to found and fund an organization to inherit the responsibility of dealing with these now-legal eyesores.

Another issue with relying on these categories is that they imply that police officers' roles end at arresting and prosecuting. However, police officers also play a social role such as telling people to lock up their homes better to prevent burglary, returning burglarized items, and counseling burglarized victims on how to avoid it in the future (Goldstein, H, 1979). Things have changed, and the role of the police needs to grow and change with it. For example, old school police policy on handing rape victimization was to show up, determine if there really was a sexual assault, and attempt to apprehend the offender. Nowadays, police will do all of that and also teach women how to avoid attacks, organize safe transit programs, and provide care and support to minimize psychological damage (Goldstein, H, 1979). Current police officer expectations go beyond simply arresting the suspected offender and calling it a day, they are

moving towards a much more holistic social service role, and the way that they categorize and respond to crime needs to reflect that.

To do this, we need to shadow officers, see how they currently handle issues and note what can be done to improve their responses and better serve the community and the offender. A large part of this is establishing and maintaining a referral system, where offenders and victims can be referred to other social service agencies that are better equipped to help them, such as mental health professionals and other specialized services so that the burden of helping these people does not rest on the police alone.

In order for problem-oriented policing to effectively shift the police role to a much broader social service agent for victims, offenders and communities, there also needs to be specialized training available to officers, such as more in-depth first aid training, mental health training, and conflict resolution training. Officers should not be expected to fully replace or imitate other trained professionals such as medical professionals, but they should be more equipped to handle specialty situations than they currently are, or at the very least to be able to recognize situations where someone requires outside assistance.

According to Goldstein, the shift to problem-oriented policing should come from the administrators of police precincts. It is a new way of looking at and addressing crimes, so administrators should change their departments' priorities, change and establish new training programs, and ask new questions to state legislatures, and the change would filter down through the organization. Because this does not directly change the structure or hierarchy of the police, unlike Team Policing, it was unlikely to be seen as a direct challenge to the pre-existing police establishment. It was also hailed as attractive because it is practical, concrete, and approachable (Goldstein, H, 1979).

Problem-oriented policing also spawned something known as the SARA model, which stands for scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (Peak, 2013). This is a tool to help implement problem-oriented policing by giving officers and precincts a checklist of things to do when applying problem-oriented policing. The first step is to scan to determine if the fear of this crime is an issue, whether it is increasing or decreasing, in what area is it worst, and what people suffer the most. Secondly, there was to be an analysis of the underlying causes or identified fear in the area, which was to be paired with the recognition that these might differ by area, change over time, and vary among categories of citizens. Third, there would be a response to the issue that was tailored to the area's fears and their causes. Lastly, there would be an assessment of the implemented response(s) to see if they are working as expected to combat the issue, and why they are or are not working (Peak, 2013).

An example of this in action would be Baltimore County, Maryland's Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement program, (COPE), which was done in the 1980s. The first step was to find areas to implement SARA. They used crime rates, suggestions from local leaders, and their own experience, but discovered this led to places where fear of crime was high, but there was no actual data that crime was in fact high, and they would need to follow up to make sure that people were actually in danger, not just afraid (Peak, 2013).

To verify this fear of crime they interviewed residents and leaders, and, if it looked like there was an actual issue, mass door-to-door canvassing was done. The point of this canvassing was to diagnose problems (Peak, 2013). Officers had a couple of standard questions they would ask each time but were encouraged to listen to what residents brought up as well. Through this method, they not only identified new issues but also received perspective on issues they were already aware of (Peak, 2013).

For example, officers thought that the elderly population stopped shopping at a nearby mall because of paint huffers who were often outside the entrance harassing people, but the decline in elderly patrons was actually because they did not want to cross the busy street in front of the mall, and did not like the panhandlers outside the mall (some of whom were also huffers). To fix this issue, police lengthened the allotted crossing time of crosswalks, increased visibility around the crosswalks, and worked on removing the panhandlers through increased laws and an info campaign to get shoppers to stop giving them money (Peak, 2013).

Here you can see that the SARA model was put to good use - they canvassed the area to find an issue, talked to the affected group to understand the underlying issue that prevented them from going to the mall, tailored their response to the information they learned, and then followed up with another round of canvassing when the changes were complete to understand the impact of their work.

Problem Oriented Policing struggled because:

- Social service connections are hard to maintain. To make POP work, there needs to be a solid network of service providers that police, mental health professionals, fire fighters, EMTs and other city workers can use to ensure that people are getting the help they need, and that the burden of helping people is not resting only on one institution. However, historically, communities have struggled to create and maintain this network. Some common challenges are finding enough space, time and resources to be able to treat everyone, getting agencies to cooperate with each other, and making sure that agencies are set up to handle referrals in a timely and polite manner.

However, despite the challenges it has faced, Problem Oriented Policing has managed to continue on throughout the years. It may never have completely revolutionized policing where all police agencies heavily invest in problem-solving practices, but it still maintains many adherents to its practice and benefits in both the law enforcement and academic world. For example, August 7th-9th, 2023, will constitute the 31st Problem Oriented Policing Conference, sponsored by the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing at Arizona State University. This annual conference is a gathering where police officers of all ranks as well as crime consultants and researchers from all over the world gather to discuss policing, attend workshops, and compete to win grants for their organizations and programs, including the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing (2023 POP).

There is a $525 registration fee, with a discount for 5+ people registering at once. The stated agenda for the 2023 conference lists topics such as policing homelessness-related problems, reimagining campus public safety, wildlife crime problem solving, stratified policing, an introduction to problem-oriented policing, improving the police response to active shootings, introduction to problem analysis, introduction to situational crime prevention, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), problem-based learning approaches to field training, building organizational support for POP, implications of online reporting for problem-oriented policing, avoiding responses likely to fail and the Goldstein Award finalists (2023 POP).

The Herman Goldstein Award honors the late professor Emeritus Herman Goldstein who birthed the theory of Problem-Oriented Policing. This award recognizes innovative and effective POP programs that have shown success in resolving recurring crime issues. Any employee of a policing agency worldwide is eligible, and agencies may submit as many projects as they desire. While POP projects often fall under the umbrella of community oriented policing, this award

does not tie itself directly to community policing and instead works to honor problem-oriented approaches to specific problems, and therefore requires the use of all four phases of the SARA model. Re-submissions of old entries that were non-finalists and non-winners are allowed, but there must be significant new development, as well as a summary of all changes, and an explanation of why the re-submission is warranted (Goldstein Awards, n.d).

The submissions are first screened by two judges who independently read and score each project. The award coordinator then tallies and ranks those scores, and those in the top cluster are submitted to the remaining judges for scoring. After the second round of scoring, the top cluster projects are designated as finalists and the teams are invited to present their projects at the ASU POP Conference to determine the winner. Conference attendees who view the presentations are invited to score them, with the average audience score creating the equivalent of two judges scores. Combining the audience and judge scores, the project with the highest score is deemed the winner. The remaining projects are deemed finalists, but are not ranked (Goldstein Awards, n.d).

Another modern policing initiative that is still actively working to bring research and law enforcement together is the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI). This is a collaborative effort that works to bring together the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), researchers, law enforcement agencies and training and technical assistance partners. It works to help agencies identify innovative and evidence-based solutions to eradicate chronic crime issues (Smart, n.d). With SPI's help, agencies collect and analyze data to create evidence-based solutions to crime problems, with the results documented and proven innovations shared with agencies nationwide.

SPI has five goals:

1. To create sustainable partnerships between law enforcement and researchers.

2. To use technology, intelligence and data in innovative ways.

3. To enhance collaboration within law enforcement agencies, with external partners and with their communities.

4. To promote evidence-based practices in law enforcement agencies.

5. And to advance science-based policing practices.

To reach these goals, SPI encourages their sites to engage in these five innovative practices:

1. Performance Measurement and Research Partnerships.

2. Strategic Targeting.

3. Making Better Use of Intelligence and Other Data and Information Systems.

4. Managing and Sustaining Organizational Change.

5. Outreach and Collaboration.

The first of these practices, Performance Measurement and Research Partnerships, focuses on partnering with researchers to expand what can be labeled as truly effective, which supports decision making about resource allocation (Smart, n.d). Strategic targeting requires that agencies analyze the small percentage of people and places that account for larger percentages of crime and victimization (Smart, n.d). This goal clearly showcases its roots in problem-oriented policing. SPI asks that their partners make better use of intelligence and other data systems, by combining research data, policing intelligence, and data from external sources such as hospitals and other justice agencies to develop crime reduction strategies (Smart, n.d). They also encourage their partners to manage and maintain organizational change, a big challenge that showcases SPI's dedication to integrating new innovative strategies and making sure that they stick around and foundationally change the institution of policing to improve their services

(Smart, n.d). Lastly, SPI encourages their partners to collaborate with outside agencies and sources such as community leaders and other social service agencies to promote the health and longevity of crime reduction initiatives (Smart, n.d).

Broken Windows Policing

Next, in 1982, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling created what is known as the 'Broken Windows' theory of policing. Their theory states that when people are afraid to be in public, it is not only due to a fear of crime, but also a fear of disorderly behavior. It also states that this disorderly behavior, such as graffiti, litter, and vandalism, is indirectly linked to crime at the community level. They use a broken window as a metaphor to show people that if that window is left broken and unrepaired, it indicates that no one cares, and social and physical disorder is allowed to fester. When this happens, it creates a breakdown of community control and order that then leads to crime (Peak, 2013).

This theory was born out of questioning how increased foot patrol made people feel safer, when, in reality, crime levels were unaffected. Their theory was that if officers made an effort to not only show their presence, but target smaller public disorder issues, such as vandalism and broken windows, it would assuage the communities' fear and help them feel in control of their neighborhood as well as prevent bigger issues from creeping in. However, this theory has had mixed results when people attempted to empirically test it, and critics argue that it encourages overly aggressive policing tactics, such as stop-and-frisk and other forms of harassment (Peak, 2013).

In fact, in 2013, a federal judge ruled the New York City police department's 'Stop-and-Frisk' policy unconstitutional (Thompson, 2013). The policy allowed officers to stop

people, interrogate them and then search them based only on the officer's 'reasonable suspicion' (Thompson, 2013). The judge ruled that this was in violation of the United States Constitution's fourth amendment, which protects Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Data collected about these stops shows that this policy is clearly utilized as a racial profiling tool. In 1999, African Americans and Latinos made up just 50% of New York's population, but a whopping 84% of the city's stop and frisk stops. These numbers have barely changed throughout the years, from 2004 to 2012, the police department made 4.4 million stops using the policy, and over 80% of those stops were minorities. Despite these numbers, the data shows that the minorities stopped were not usually doing anything wrong, or in possession of something they should not be: the likelihood a stop of an African-American New Yorker yielded a weapon was half that of White New Yorkers stopped, and the likelihood of finding contraband on an African American who was stopped was one-third that of White New Yorkers stopped (Thompson, 2013).

The ruling was fought by New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Ray Kelly, and the city's mayor, Michael Bloomberg. The city has also announced that it will appeal the decision (Thompson, 2013).

Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

The next major step forward came in 1994 when the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement act was passed by Bill Clinton. As part of that act, the Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) was established. Its primary tasks were to fund the addition of new community policing officers and programs, coordinate and supervise the

implementation of community policing, facilitate research activities, and educate police personnel in community policing strategies (Worral, 2003).

There were two ways to get access to this government funding: formula grants and competitive grants. To receive either one, agencies needed to demonstrate a need for the funding and also apply for the grants. These grants were given with the purpose of hiring new community policing officers and funding programs consistent with the goals of community policing (Worral, 2003).

This government funding was largely driven by the disenchantment of citizens with police that was occurring throughout the sixties and seventies. Citizens felt that officers were isolated from the community by their patrol cars, an over-reliance on technology, and the closed-door nature of the institution of the police (Worral, 2003). There was also the civil unrest of the 1960s, and the police were getting accused of human rights violations. Lastly, there were also selfish reasons that agencies jumped at the funding, such as to increase officer satisfaction, a desire to appear progressive, and fiscal constraints.

This federal funding helped support innovative new programs that otherwise would not have been funded due to a lack of funding or prior research. The fact that the funding came from the government also helped make it a systemic effort, not just a small-scale, localized impact.

While we cannot prove that COPS funding causes community policing initiatives, we can positively correlate places that have community policing programs with COPS funding, indicating that this funding enabled a lot of the programs we know and see today (Worral, 2003).

While not all of these programs, or theories of policing have made their way into the twenty-first century, there are definitely traces of them, and some, such as the COPs office itself, have continued to provide funding and services all these years later. We can even see traces of

older variants of community policing today, such as the Problem-Oriented Policing Conferences and Award Programs brought to us by the Arizona State University Center for Problem Oriented Policing, or the Herman Goldstein awards.

Though it has been 29 years since the COPS office was founded in 1994, they are still alive and well in 2023, and still giving out funding to police organizations. Since their founding, they have given out over $14 billion in funding in the name of community policing (CHP, n.d). They still have a targeted grant for hiring community policing officers, as well as a community policing development grant, but they have also set up awards for newer programs, such as the technology and equipment program, an active shooter training program, a Tribal resources grant program, a school violence prevention program, as well as an anti-methamphetamine program and an anti-heroin program (Grants, n.d).

Their COPS hiring grant for the year 2022 was an open solicitation award, meaning that any and all local, state and tribal law enforcement agencies that had a primary focus on law enforcement could apply. There were 711 applications from nearly every state and U.S territory, and out of those, 180 state, local and tribal agencies were awarded (25% of applications), with a total of $139,671,369 given out. That funding enabled the hiring of 973 full-time officers and deputies to further the community policing efforts of those agencies. The award decision was based on things such as problem focus areas, crime data, demonstrated financial need, and agencies' commitment to community policing, as well as other factors (CHP, n.d).

A breakdown of the awardee's spending plans tells us that 86 of them will use the funding to build legitimacy and trust, 30 will work on gun violence, 26 will focus on other types of violent crime, and 28 will focus on combating hate and domestic extremism or police-based responses to persons in crisis (CHP, n.d).

The 2022 Community Policing Development (CPD) funds are meant to guide law enforcement agencies through the implementation of community policing strategies, build knowledge about effective practices and promote new approaches to policing. It awarded $33.3 million, and any public governmental agency, for-profit and nonprofit institution, institution of higher education, community group, and faith-based organization was welcome to apply. The program funded projects that addressed things such as accreditation, de-escalation training, implementation of crisis intervention teams, recruitment and hiring innovations, and tolerance, diversity and anti-bias online training, among others (CPD, n.d).

Along with the more traditional community policing grants given out by the COPs office, they have also engineered new programs, such as the preparing for active shooter situations (PASS) program. This innovative new program gave away $9.8 million in 2022 to increase public safety by funding scenario based training that prepares officers and other first responders to safely and effectively handle active shooter situations and other violent threats (PASS, n.d).

This is an example of how the needs and demands of the communities have shifted and changed over time, and the institution of the police has adapted and changed to support and address those needs. Lately there have been more and more active shooter situations, and the COPs office funding has allowed us to adapt and provide more training and resources to our law enforcement agencies so that they can address this new challenge and keep us safe.

In summary, the COPS office was important because it not only distributed funding that went to funding many projects that would not have otherwise been funded due to lack of prior research, but also incentivized precincts to incorporate community policing into their everyday operations.

The funding that COPS gave out was instrumental to the creation of multiple different community policing efforts and organizations. In the early days of community policing, like we saw with the foot patrol efforts, backers were hesitant to fund innovative new policing efforts because there was no supporting research indicating that these programs would be successful and not a waste of time, money and resources. COPS was an amazing answer for this because the funding they gave out was to allow new programs without supporting research to come to fruition, so that we could later use these early programs as research opportunities that would educate how we spent later funding.

This funding also provided a carrot on a stick for police precincts to step out of their comfort zone and try something new. Everyone likes money, and the new tools and resources that it brings, so precincts were willing to try community policing efforts to receive grant funding. This helped ensure that community policing efforts were possible country-wide, instead of only in areas that could independently afford to try out community policing. It also helped combat stubborn police officials who did not want to try community policing, by not only giving them an incentive to do so, but removing fiscal and resource barriers.

While we did manage to track where the funding went, and what those precincts spent the money on, what we do not have any accountability for is the actual community policing programs that the money funded. We did not track if cities held community meetings, how many meetings and how often they were held if they did hold them, whether it was just one precinct that was engaging in community policing or the whole city, and many other variables.

As identified by the Police Community Interaction Project (PCIP), the five major community building processes that police often use are: (1) steps to improve neighborhood space; (2) steps to identify with neighborhoods; (3) steps to encourage resident effort; (4) steps

for resident participation; and (5) steps for coordinating organizations. These dimensions describe the ways in which the police can interact with community groups to improve community capacity to deal with crime and social order problems (Renauer, 2001). The PCIP also created three measurement instruments, a case study protocol, an annual survey, and regular observations of police-community meetings.

The PCIP states that in order to effectively measure community policing, we need to not only track and record funding payouts and what they are spent on, but also measure things such as steps taken, the people and organizations involved, and the resources used to identify and address neighborhood issues. Other information, such as how groups worked together, challenges they faced while working together, and their opinions of how things went are also important resources.

The PCIP states that we need to measure police-community building measures so that we can better understand the process of building police-community partnerships and applying those partnerships to issues facing the community, to scientifically link the police-neighborhood activities performed to the outcomes, so that we can confidently say that certain programs, actions or plans validly result in a certain outcome, or outcomes, and to increase strategic planning and encourage continual learning (Renauer, 2001).

Therefore, a shortcoming of COPS is that despite it managing to successfully track where the funding it gave out went, and what precincts spent it on, it did not encourage the measurement of actual police-community building efforts. We cannot allow the measurement of police-community building efforts to be lost in the shuffle, we need to track the impact of community policing efforts, so that we can empirically and scientifically learn what works and what does not.

<u>21st Century Policing</u>

In 2014, President Barack Obama signed executive order 13684 on December 18th, which created the Task Force on 21st Century Policing. This task force was created to "...build trust between citizens and their peace officers so that all…are treating one another fairly and justly and are invested in maintaining public safety in an atmosphere of mutual respect" (President's, 2015), because "When any part of the American family does not feel like it is being treated fairly…it means we're not as effective in fighting crime as we could be" (President's, 2015). The stated mission of the task force was to "...examine ways of fostering strong, collaborative relationships between local law enforcement and the communities they protect and to make recommendations to the President on ways policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust" (President's, 2015).

This task force then went on to create the 2015 Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing report, which is simply a modern version of the 1967 report, focusing on similar issues and echoing similar suggestions for improvement.

The report is broken up into six pillars, each representing a main topic:

1. Building Trust & Legitimacy.

2. Policy & Oversight.

3. Technology & Social Media.

4. Community Policing and Crime Reduction.

5. Training and Education.

6. Officer Wellness and Safety.

The report also has an implementation section that offers recommendations for policies and practices that can be implemented.

The first pillar, building trust and legitimacy, offers recommendations for ways to nurture trust and begin to close the divide between citizens and the police. They begin by noting that law enforcement should embrace a 'guardian' mentality rather than a 'warrior' mentality, as: "The public confers legitimacy only on those whom they believe are acting in procedurally just ways…law enforcement cannot build community trust if it is seen as an occupying force coming in from outside to impose control on the community" (President's, 2015). They also encourage law enforcement agencies to establish a culture of transparency and accountability, promote public trust by initiating positive non-enforcement activities, track and analyze the level of trust communities have in the police, and create a diverse workforce (President's, 2015).

The second pillar, Policy & Oversight focuses on the needed harmony between community needs and police policy and procedure. It begins by stating that law enforcement agencies should collaborate with communities, especially those disproportionately affected by crime, to develop strategies and policies that help effectively utilize resources that reduce crime by improving relationships, fostering cooperation, and increasing community engagement (President's, 2015).

To meet these goals, the report states that agencies need clear and full-bodied policies on things such as the use of force, de-escalation, mass demonstrations, consent before searches, gender identities, racial profiling, and performance measures (President's, 2015). They also state a need for external and independent investigations and prosecution of officer-involved shootings and use-of-force situations, as well as in-custody deaths. They also note that all of the agencies'

policies and aggregate data should be made public in an effort to increase and ensure

transparency (President's, 2015).

To combat issues of outdated policies and practices, the report notes that agencies should

periodically review their policies and practices, bring in civilian oversight to comment on their

practices, and conduct non-punitive peer reviews of critical incidents separate from criminal and

administrative investigations (President's, 2015).

Lastly, the report suggests that technical assistance and funding should be given to small

police agencies by the government so that they have the resources needed to engage in

interagency collaboration, shared services, and regional training (President's, 2015). The report

also suggests partnering with the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement

Standards and Training in order to expand the National Decertification Index to hopefully cover

all agencies within the United States and its territories (President's, 2015).

The third pillar, Technology and Social Media, discusses the need for ways to be able to

identify, assess and evaluate new technologies for adaptation by agencies. It suggests that the

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), in partnership with the law enforcement field, should create

national standards for the research and development of new technology (President's, 2015). The

report states that these standards should also address compatibility, interoperability, and

implementation needs. It also suggests model policies and practices so that agencies have a

guideline for their use and implementation of technology (President's, 2015).

Pillar four discusses community policing and crime reduction. It calls for law

enforcement agencies to develop and adopt policies that work towards the goal of community

engagement as a tool to manage public safety (President's, 2015). They also discuss that

everyone should be treated with dignity and respect, especially the most vulnerable populations,

such as children and youth. They note that law enforcement agencies should avoid using tactics that unnecessarily stigmatize youth and marginalize their participation in schools and their communities (President's, 2015). They also note that officers should have limited involvement in school discipline. It also calls on the community to affirm and recognize the voices of youth in community decision-making, encourage youth to participate in research and problem-solving, as well as develop and fund youth leadership training and life skills programs that encourage positive youth and police collaboration and interactions (President's, 2015).

Pillar five discusses the training and education of law enforcement personnel. It notes that as the times change, the role of law enforcement is changing alongside it, and there needs to be training so that officers can address the wide variety of challenges facing them in the modern world (President's, 2015). It asks agencies to engage with specialized community members to help with various kinds of training for officers, as well as provide leadership training to all personnel throughout their careers. It also asks the federal government to support training facilities across the country to ensure and maintain consistently high standards for training. It also encourages the creation of training innovation hubs that pair universities and police academies together so that researched and informed training is being utilized (President's, 2015). Lastly, it suggests that Peace Officer and Standards Training (POST) boards include required crisis intervention training (CIT) which would prepare officers to handle individuals in crisis, such as people struggling with addiction and mental health issues, and would also cover subjects such as implicit bias and cultural responsiveness, policing in a democratic society, and social interaction skills (President's, 2015).

The final pillar, pillar six, discusses officer wellness and safety. It suggests that the U.S DOJ should encourage and assist departments with the implementation of scientifically

supported shift lengths, and expand efforts to collect and analyze data on not just officer deaths, but also injuries and 'near misses' (President's, 2015). It also notes that every officer should be given a first aid kit, as well as a bulletproof vest, as well as enforcing policies that require officers to wear seat belts and their bulletproof vests and provide programming that highlights the consequences of failing to do so (President's, 2015). It also calls on the federal government to provide financial support that enables officers to continue to pursue educational opportunities. Lastly, it calls on congress to develop and implement peer-review error management legislation (President's, 2015).

The key takeaways from the 2014 report are:

- We need to foster trust and legitimacy:
  - Research supports the fact that people are more likely to cooperate with law enforcement and obey the law when they believe that those enforcing the law have authority that is perceived as legitimate. People confer legitimacy to those who they believe are acting in procedurally just ways. We need to act as guardians, not warriors, and encourage transparency. We need to track and analyze trust.
- We need to work with the community to create effective policies that are reviewed frequently:
  - We need clear and effective policies that are reviewed frequently to keep up with changes and ensure that the policies are effective and respectful. We also need to have citizen input on these policies.
- We need to include and be mindful of technology:

- ○ We need to create national standards for the research and development of helpful technology, as well as keep up with how quickly technology changes and evolves.
- We need to provide training and education:
  - ○ We need to train our officers for the ever expanding list of challenges they face is today's world. To do this, we need to partner with specialists, not only in law enforcement. We also need federal funding to ensure that we can partner with training facilities and resources.
- We need to promote officer wellness and safety:
  - ○ Officer safety is important not only to officers and their colleagues, but to public safety. We should encourage and assist departments in the implementation of scientifically backed shift lengths, and expand our data collection on incidents. We should also provide anti-ballistic gear, and train officers to use safety equipment available, such as seat belts.

Discussion & Conclusion

Clearly, some of these practices, institutions, and grants have survived through the years and are still encouraging the research and application of Community Policing, or have paved the way for innovative new programs and offices. However, despite this progress, we are still facing the same challenges we were in the 1960s. This is highlighted by comparing the 1967 report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which was created in response to the social unrest of the 1960s, and the 2015 Presidential Task Force on

21st Century Policing report, which was created as a result of number of incidents between law enforcement and the communities they serve.

When looking at these reports side by side, you can start to see the similarities. Both reports call for a more aggressive push towards positive police and community interactions, though the 1967 report focuses more on the respect and prestige that positive community interactions and support will bring to the establishment, and the 2015 report focuses more on strategies and pathways that can be implemented either during or after those community interactions, as well as calling for government funding.

Both reports also point out the divide between police and minority communities, through community interviews and questionnaires about their confidence in police, police interactions respondents have had, and their perceptions of the police. This is where the lack of progress is so clearly highlighted - minority communities' confidence in their police officers is still drastically lower than their white counterparts, despite there being 48 years in between the reports in which we were supposedly working on closing that divide between minority communities and the police that serve them.

For reference, here is the same table that is shown above in the 1967 report section that summarizes Black respondents (and only black respondents) belief in police brutality:

Existence of Police Brutality	Total	Age		
		15 - 29	30 - 34	45+
A lot	22.2%	24.4%	25.0%	17.1%
A little	24.6%	35.6%	22.7%	14.3%
None at all	15.1%	17.8%	11.4%	14.3%

And here are the results of a poll taken for the 2015 presidential report that asks respondents of all races how confident they are that their police officers do not use excessive force:

	A Great Deal/Fair Amount	**Just Some/Very Little**
White	74%	24%
Black	36%	59%
Hispanic	45%	54%

These numbers show that despite the 48 years between the two reports that we have had to take the 1967 report's suggestions into consideration and work towards a more respectful, less biased police force, we have not managed to make significant changes in closing the divide between minority communities and the police. Those communities still distrust and see aggressive behavior from officers, which means that we have not reached the goals set for

community policing in 1967, and have not successfully implemented the suggestions put forth in that report.

To bring the goals and objectives of these reports into reality, we need to take a look back at the history of community policing and learn from each attempt we have made. We need to recognize what each iteration taught us, and focus on what we can do to take those lessons and implement them in modern policing to continue to work towards the goals and ideals of community policing outlined in both reports.

Looking back, the key lessons learned from each iteration of community policing that we have seen this far are as follows:

<u>Team Policing:</u>

- Geographic stability of beats:
  - If officers are expected to get to know their communities and the issues that their communities are facing, they need to be engaged with that community at all times, they cannot be switching areas constantly. They should only be assigned to their communities, and should be the go-to liaison between that community and the police.
- Increased communication between police and community:
  - The officers need to dig in and get to know the community, they need to be available and willing to talk to residents. They need to be friendly, accessible, and we need to create opportunities for interactions between the officers and the community. These opportunities can be community meetings, fundraisers, meet

and greets, and other programming that encourages positive interactions between officers and community members.

- Generalist-specialist officers:
  - Officers need to be equipped to handle a wide variety of situations, as they are the point person for their community and know the community and its needs the best. Obviously there is no replacement for true professionals and specialists, but the more that our officers are equipped to deal with the better, as communities will have a pre-existing relationship with that officer, as opposed to needing to bring in a stranger.

Kansas City Patrol Experiment:

- We can experiment with patrol without suffering:
  - We can take officers off of certain beats and place them in others without suffering a significant increase in crime. This allows us to experiment and try out new methods of policing and patrol freely, without feeling that the service provided and the safety of a community is at risk.
- Random patrol is not effective:
  - Having patrol cars randomly roving about is not effective, we need to go where we know we are needed, or where we think we might be needed. We need to base our patrol paths off of data, not just random guesses or a route that aims for maximum coverage.
- Partnering with researchers:

- ○ If we partner with researchers to evaluate and test new methods of policing, we can learn what works and what does not, such as randomly roving patrol cars, so as to not waste resources, time and money.

Foot Patrol:

- Partnering with pre-existing social organizations:
  - ○ Officers can partner with pre-existing social organizations that are already respected beacons in the community in order to build trust and legitimacy within the community.
- Listening sessions:
  - ○ We should host community events and meetings where citizens can come to discuss their communities needs, voice their concerns and opinions, and have access to their local officers.
- Partnering with researchers:
  - ○ Like we learned in the KCPE, we need to partner with researchers to learn what works and what does not, such as the fact that foot patrol does not decrease crime, and that we need to collect responses from all subgroups of people when evaluating programs, so as to not waste resources, time and money.
- Community headquarters:
  - ○ We need to have officers located in a central location in the community that is easily accessible to citizens so that they know where to find officers, and have a safe, welcoming environment to engage with officers and express needs and

concerns. This also allows officers to get embedded in the community, as they are directly in the middle of it.

Problem Oriented Policing:

- Categories of crimes are too vague:
    - We need to narrow down our categories of crimes to better understand and treat people's underlying motivation for committing crimes. If we do not target someone's specific motivation for committing a crime, we cannot decrease their chance of recidivism. We need to tailor the punishment or treatment to the specific offender and their needs so that they do not need or want to commit the crime again. Punishment is not one-size-fits-all, and if we continue to assign the same punishment to everyone who commits a certain crime, despite each offender likely having different motivations, we will not see a decrease in recidivism rates.
- Social services networks:
    - Due to the increasing responsibilities of officers, we need to partner with other civic agencies to ensure that people are getting the help they need from qualified professionals, and that the burden of helping people does not rest solely on the police, especially if what a person needs is outside the scope of their training or abilities. Incarceration is not always the answer, and even if it is needed, it can be paired with therapy, support networks, case workers and other social services that can ensure the offender is getting the help they need.

- ○ Police and other social service, government, and business agencies need to coordinate together to solve problems. To be effective, they must overcome the distrust, territoriality, and bureaucracy that often makes inter-agency cooperation difficult.
- Hotspot policing:
  - ○ Random patrol is ineffective, and we need to use data to inform patrol locations. We need to focus on known problem areas, instead of wandering aimlessly and waiting to be called to an event.
- Change needs to come from higher ups:
  - ○ In order to completely overhaul the everyday workings of the police, change needs to be endorsed by and come from the higher ups. They need to support and embody any new changes, as well as ensure that officers are adhering to changes, even if officers do not feel inclined to do so.
- The SARA model:
  - ○ The SARA model is an amazing tool for policing that can help effectively target issues, however, in order for officers to effectively apply the SARA model they will need specialized training in how to identify problems, search for root causes, use the community to come up with innovative solutions, and how to analyze results.
- Need to collect data on the fear of crime:
  - ○ We need to collect data on people's fear of crime, not just actual crime statistics. We should not attempt to guess what people are afraid of instead of simply asking

them and collecting data, because as we saw above with the elderly example, if we guess, we may guess wrong.

Broken Windows:

- People want to see physical change, even on a small scale:
  - People want to be able to see change happening, and are often more concerned with small scale issues than larger crime issues.
- Stop and frisk:
  - Police policies can be unintentionally or intentionally biased, and we need to work to ensure that all police policies are fair, ethical and respectful.

COPS:

- Funding is important:
  - The more funding we provide to try new programs and policing methods, the more we can learn and grow. Funding is one of the biggest challenges when it comes to implementing new policies, and if we can lessen that challenge and allow more cities and precincts to try new strategies, we will be able to continue to learn what works, what does not, and what we need to focus on.
  - There is a need for more detailed measures of specifically how much (i.e. breadth and depth) of police-community building activities are in fact occurring in locales that claim to be doing community policing or receiving funding.

To realize the ideals of both of the reports, we need to truly listen to what they are saying, and change our methods of policing accordingly.

We need to commit to this shift towards community policing, and ensure that community policing is not seen as an offshoot of traditional policing, or as a distinct unit inside a precinct. We need to teach our officers that community policing should be worked into the foundation of policing, and change our policies in accordance. We also need to ensure that community policing guides policymaking, not only at a city-wide or state-wide level, but at a federal level.

We need to prioritize funding. Expecting such a massive change and overhaul of policing to be funded by individual precincts or even states themselves is simply impossible. We need to delegate federal funding to ensure that community policing policies, training and principles are enacted country-wide, as a non-negotiable baseline.

We need to build and maintain a network of social service connections, on both a state and national level to ensure that people are getting the help they need from qualified professionals, and that incarceration is not the only answer to arrests, as some people are arrested for things that incarceration cannot fix.

We need to give the communities a voice, and make sure that community members have a role in policymaking and policing techniques. To do that, we need to partner with community leaders, and make sure that our officers are working to connect with, listen to and respect their communities. We also need to create programming that brings the community and their officers together to foster trust, understanding and a mutual commitment to bettering the community.

We need to fund and employ research to learn what works and what does not, so that we do not waste time, money and resources on programs that are not effective, or are harmful to the community. We need to use the knowledge we gain from this research to guide the creation of new programs so that we can create effective programs, and use the knowledge we gain to support the testing of new programs so that we can continue to grow and learn.

We need to heighten our screening for potential officers, so that we can screen out bias, emotional instability, violent tendencies, and other harmful traits. We also need to re-evaluate some of the recruitment requirements to ensure that they are not biased, and encourage diversity when hiring. We also need to ensure that we have a range of recruitment techniques and are not hiring from referrals alone, which can create an echo chamber and decrease diversity.

We need to fund and implement more training for officers, not only for new challenges that have recently arisen, but also for the basics, and offer specialized training such as medical training, hostage training, de-escalation training and more. We also need to remember to retroactively train officers who may not have received certain types of training when they were originally hired. We also need to periodically review our training modules and ensure that they are up to date, not missing anything, and are easy to understand. We also need to partner with specialists and experts to train our officers, not only within the police organization, but also reaching out to civilian experts as well.

We need to foster trust and legitimacy. Citizens need to trust and respect the police in order for them to be able to do their jobs, and citizens only confer trust and respect to those they believe are acting respectfully and justly. We need to act as guardians, not warriors. We are on the same team as citizens, they are not our enemy.

We need to incorporate technology into the police practice, as well as fund training for any technology used. We also need to fund the research and creation of technological tools that can be used to advance policing. We also need to be aware of how quickly technology evolves and shifts though, and make sure we do not fall behind.

We need to promote officer wellness and safety. Officer safety is important not only to officers and their colleagues, but to public safety. We should encourage and assist departments in

the implementation of scientifically backed shift lengths, and expand our data collection on incidents. We should also provide anti-ballistic gear, and train officers to use safety equipment available, such as seat belts.

We need changes in uniform, and eventually an overhaul of the structure of the typical police precinct to help make officers look more friendly and approachable.

However, because things like the uniform and the structure of authority are so historical and deeply rooted, officers aren't always excited to let go of them and embrace change. We discussed this earlier, that in Dayton Ohio in the 1960s, when Chief Igleburger attempted to encourage officers to change their uniforms and restructure the department, it was met with resistance by officers who stated that they preferred their usual uniforms because of their 'high visibility' (Wilson, 1973).

Even today, we still see fully kitted-out officers roaming the streets, decked out with bulletproof vests, tasers or handguns, a utility belt, and other gadgets and gizmos said to help protect them and those they serve. However, these militaristic outfits can, accidentally, or not-so-accidentally, symbolize violence and authority in a way that is not symbiotic with current community engagement efforts (Segran, 2020).

If we are to put community policing efforts at the forefront of our policing efforts, we need to make police friendly and approachable looking - not scary and weaponized. Uniform changes shouldn't be made an option for community policing officers, they should be required to be as close to plainclothes as possible, or at the very least, take more themes from older, less militarized uniforms. Badges, officer names, and other identifying information should still be present, but body armor, headgear, and an array of harmful tools can all be left out of the 'friendly neighborhood officer's toolkit.

Above all, we need to show the American people that we are putting time, money, and effort into addressing their needs and equipping our police officers to do their job as respectfully and effectively as possible.

While we have made great strides in our implementation of community policing, we need to continue to push and work towards improving even further. We have checked off some boxes on our list, however there is still a lot of work to be done and it will not be achieved without funding, public support, officer support, and a continuing desire to make our law enforcement system as effective, respectful, and transparent as possible.

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