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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Farouk M. Taufik for the
Master of Arts in History presented May 15, 1973.

Title: History of Al-Hijaz (1520-1632)

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Jon Mandaville, Chairman

Jim Heath

Nouri Al-Khaledy

This thesis is an attempt to put together the history of Al-Hijaz, and to present a description of the political situation during the period from the year 1520 through the year 1632. The period starts three years after the submission of Sharif Barakat II of Mecca to the new Islamic power, the Ottomans. And it concludes with the restoration of order in Mecca in 1632.

In deciding to select this topic, I was inspired by the lack of a complete history of the Holy Lands during the period, the importance of the period, and the fact that most authors who dealt with the area, during or after the period, took sides either with the Ottomans or the Ashrafs of Mecca.

In looking for sources, I was unfortunate because I could not find any Ottoman Farman of the period, but I think the other sources, primary and secondary, helped me a lot, and without hesitation I could

recommend some of them to any interested student of the area or the period:

A) Primary sources: 1) Manayih Al-Karam Fi Akhbar Makkah Wa Wullat Al-Haram by Taj Al-Din Al-Khatib; 2) Smitt Al-Nojourn Al-'Awali Fi Anba' Al-Awa'il Wa Al-Tawali by Abdulmalik Al-Makki, and 3) Tarikh Makkah by Ahmad Al-Siba'i. Although this is not a primary source, the valuable information contained in it qualifies it to be on the same level as the above two.

B) Secondary sources: 1) The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs by George Stripling; 2) Rulers of Mecca by Gerald De Gaury, and 3) The Portuguese of the S. Arabian Coast by Robert Serjeant.

The conclusions of this thesis could be summarized by the following:

A) The continuous attempts by the Ashrafs of Mecca to establish a kingdom by sending expeditions into areas that the Ottomans were less interested in.

B) The unwise Ottoman and local administrations of the area which did not help to develop or improve conditions of Al-Hijaz.

C) The constant use of the word Islam by many figures in order to achieve their goals.

D) The important role that the Ottomans played in clearing the Red Sea.

E) The weak Ottoman policy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, which left the S. Arabian coast an easy target for European nations later.

F) Finally, the role of the Ashrafs in causing disturbances by the constant fighting among themselves which led to casualties and foreign intervention.

TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES:

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of
Farouk M. Taufik presented May 15, 1973.

Jon Mandaville, Chairman

Jim Heath

Nouri Al-Khaledy

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Jesse Gilmore, Head, Department of History

David T. Clark, Dean of Graduate Studies and Research

May 15, 1973.

HISTORY OF AL-HIJAZ

(1520-1632)

by

Farouk M. Taufik

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
HISTORY

Portland State University
1973

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to put together the history of Al-Hijaz from the year 1520 to 1632, in a chronological order. The paper covers Al-Hijaz since the Sharif of Mecca, Barakat II, declared his loyalty to the Ottomans after their conquest of Egypt in 1517, up to the year 1632, when Sharif Zaid took over the Sharifate in Mecca.

The writer of this thesis became interested in attempting to write a history of Al-Hijaz because of the following factors:

A) The books that were written about Al-Hijaz fell into the following categories: 1) books that dealt only with geography; 2) books that described religious sites and rites or ceremonies; 3) books that dealt with the political situation; 4) very few books that tried to give a complete picture by treating all aspects of life, and 5) non-Arabic books which dealt with Al-Hijaz in their attempts to discuss the Ottoman Empire, but did not go into enough detail because at the time of their writing, the interest was directed toward the Ottoman West, rather than the Ottoman East.

B) The Arab lands were passing through their dark ages. This was due to the following factors: 1) the non-Arab rulers, whose main interest was to keep their thrones as long as possible, without paying attention to their subjects' conditions; 2) the Europeans attempts, represented first by the Portuguese, to stop the advances of the Islamic forces, and to strangle them, by every available means, and 3) the new

masters, the Ottomans, also forgot about their Arab subjects and paid more attention to their European and Persian frontiers, and thus contributed heavily to the setback of the Arabic and Islamic civilizations.

In my attempts to find good primary sources, I was fortunate to find a few handwritten sources that were either written during the period, or some years after it. However, I could not find certain other primary sources that were mentioned in some of the books. I was unable to find in Saudi Arabia any Ottoman Farman (decrees) that dealt with Al-Hijaz during the period. In most of the sources, primary or secondary, the authors used Farman of later periods as models for the earlier ones.

In discussing the sources, there are some sources that are worth mentioning and describing, such as: 1) Tarikh Makkah by Ahmad Al-Siba'i. Although it is not a primary source, it is one of the leading printed books that treated the subject completely by giving the reader a clear, but not detailed political, historical, economical, social and religious picture. The book was supported by a valuable list of primary sources.

2) Manayih Al-Karam fi Akhbar Makkah Wa Wullat Al-Haram by Taj Al-Din Al-Khatib. It is one of the leading primary sources which deals with Mecca since the early time, and ends in the year 1125 H, the year in which the author died. The book, which is unprinted, goes into detail discussing the sixteenth and seventeenth century political picture in Mecca.

3) Smitt Al-Nojourn Al-'Awali fi Anba' Al-Awa'il Wa Al-Tawali by Abdulmalik Al-Makki. It is one of the leading printed primary sources that deals with the history of Mecca, and goes into more detail than the

book by Taj Al-Din Al-Khatib.

4) The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs by George Stripling. It is one of the leading non-Arabic books that deals with the Ottomans and Arab lands, including Al-Hijaz. The book deals also with commerce and the struggle in the Red Sea, and uses some of the primary sources that are mentioned in the bibliography of this thesis.

5) The Portuguese of the S. Arabian Coast by Robert Serjeant. It deals with the Portuguese activities in the East, as well as in the Red Sea. And it gives a good description of the Portuguese attack on Jeddah, which he quoted from the Chronology of Al-Haddrami.

6) Rulers of Mecca by Gerald De Gaury. The author presents to the reader the history of Mecca from its foundation up to the year 1881. It also includes pictures of some of the local customs and rites. The author's bibliography included some Arabic primary sources which he used by having a certain Arab employee at the British Embassy in Baghdad translate them into English. The author showed an unfavorable attitude toward the Turks, but this attitude could be the result of the fact that the author fought the Turks during World War I, as a British officer.

In reading this paper, the reader will find it mostly dealing with the history of Mecca and Medina, because the history of Al-Hijaz is so much tied to the history of the two holiest cities of Islam. As is mentioned before, the thesis is an attempt to put together the internal history of Al-Hijaz, and it will also treat the Portuguese threat in the Red Sea during the early part of the period. The paper will include some maps and illustrations that are needed to clarify the subject.

CHAPTER II

AL-HIJAZ

I. GEOGRAPHY

Al-Hijaz occupies most of the western part of the present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It runs along the eastern coast of the Red Sea. Al-Hijaz consists of two zones, a coastal plain, and a mountain area which are separated by the steep western slopes of the mountains.

The Arab geographers differed on where the name "Al-Hijaz" came from, but the most reasonable theory is the one that states that the name comes from the Arabic word "Hajiz", which means barrier. Judging from its geographical position, Al-Hijaz is actually a barrier between Syria and Yemen, and between the Red Sea and the Highlands of Nejd.

Al-Hijaz is the spiritual center for all Muslims in the world because it was the home of Prophet Mohamad. It is where he was born, where he received the revelation from God, and where he was buried. It also contains the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina.

II. PEOPLE

Most of its population are of the Sunni division. I was unable to find any information concerning the number of the population of Al-Hijaz during the period we are concerned with. Although it may be possible to get the needed information from the tax records, unfortunately it was impossible for me because they are located in Istanbul, Turkey.

The population was divided into two groups, the city people and the tribesmen. The city people were settled in established towns and took up such professions as merchants, carpenters, and other small professions. The tribesmen were the majority, and more influential. All through the history of the Arabs, we see the tribes associated with the political pattern of each Arab country. However, they had their own political pattern which continued up to the present time. They were always sources of trouble, and paid loyalty only to their Shaykhs. They would revolt if their interests clashed with that of the ruler, or if the ruler stopped or delayed their traditional payments, which were used to keep them quiet and under control. Their revolts caused casualties in lives and properties to the city population, and most important to the pilgrims. More than half of the tribes of Al-Hijaz are related to the big and important tribe of Harb or its allies.

III. IMPORTANT TOWNS

Mecca (Makkah) is located on the steep western slopes of the mountains in a narrow and deep valley. The hills and mountains around it provided Mecca with natural protection. This city was the birthplace of Prophet Mohamad, and it contains the Great Mosque and the sacred Al-Ka'ba. A Turkish fortress is located on the Mountain of Qubais. During the period of this paper, Mecca was the center of power in Al-Hijaz, because the Sharif resided in it.

Medina (Madinah) is the second holiest city in Islam because it contains the grave of the Prophet and his mosque. Medina served as the capital of the Prophet and his first three successors. In 1539, the Ottoman Sultan Suliman (the Magnificent) ordered the building of its

wall to protect it from tribal attacks.

Jeddah was established by the Caliph 'Uthman¹ in 647 AD, and soon became the port of Mecca. Within Jeddah, there is a grave believed to be the grave of Eve, the mother of all human beings.

Taif is one of the oldest towns in the Arabian Peninsula. It was the headquarters for the armies of Al-Hijaz governments. The Ottomans built its wall in 1799, and used to jail some of their political prisoners, such as the famous Medhat Pasha, in its fortress.

Yunbu' is the natural port of Medina, and it was from it that in 1200, Sharif Qitadah Bin Idris led an army to occupy Mecca, and to establish the second Emirate of Al-Ashraf. In 1666, a group of its Ashrafs left for Morocco to establish the present ruling dynasty. During the period we are concerned with, rebellious Ashrafs would leave Mecca to take refuge in Yunbu'.

¹'Abdul-Qudus Al-Ansari, Tarikh Jeddah (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: 1382 H), p. 7.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

I. THE PERIOD FROM 610-1200 AD

Before 610, the Arabian Peninsula never enjoyed having a strong united government. But by the year 632, when Prophet Mohamad died, the Arabian Peninsula was united under the control of the Prophet. His death was followed by a civil war ignited by tribal ambitions, but the first Orthodox Caliph, Abu-Bakr, succeeded in restoring law and order.

Under the first three Orthodox Caliphs, Abu-Bakr, 'Omar and 'Uthman, who kept Medina as a capital, the Muslims conquered a vast area, which brought great wealth back to Al-Hijaz. But those conquests caused Al-Hijaz to lose its best men. The disturbances toward the end of 'Uthman's period led to his murder, and the new Caliph, 'Ali, felt that Kufa in Iraq would be a safer capital for his struggle against the Umayyads in Syria. A few years later, 'Ali was killed and the Umayyad Mu'awiyah was proclaimed as the new Caliph in Damascus in 660 AD. By changing the capital from Medina to Kufa, and later to Damascus, Al-Hijaz lost its political power and kept its religious influence only.

This was a period of no significant political and commercial importance, and of increased isolation and disorder in Al-Hijaz. Mecca enjoyed sanctity, but had to depend on the annual pilgrimage for its prosperity, and on Egypt for its food supplies. Medina was less sacred, but was involved in a rivalry with Mecca, because it was nearer to the

capitals, Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo. This made it a more suitable residence for the Caliph's governor than Mecca.

Mecca became the center for learning, and the retreat of discontented men who did not like the Umayyads secular government. In 692, the Umayyad General Al-Hajaj besieged Mecca, and bombarded Al-Ka'ba, using catapults. The coming of 'Abbasids brought more prestige to Mecca and Medina because of the religious policy of the new dynasty. The 'Abbasids sent more money and separate governors to Mecca and Medina; however, revolts continued.

'Ali's descendants, who were numerous, and who had great influence in Mecca, Medina and Yambu', were opposed to any authority, but theirs, but they could not agree among themselves. They were favored by the beduins because they were the descendants of Husayn and Hasan, the grandsons of Prophet Mohamad. As the caliphate declined, their power increased. Their policy was to play off the Caliphates against each other, and to have good relations with the rulers of Yemen. The Hasanids who were descendants of 'Ali's son Al-Hasan, took control of Mecca, while the Husaynids, the descendants of 'Ali's second son, Al-Husayn, were in control of Medina.

In 930, the Shi'i Qaramittah sacked Mecca and carried away the sacred Black Stone, which they returned in 950. In 950, the Hasanid Sharif Ja'far Al-Mousawi attacked Mecca, established the first Sharifid Emirate and kept good relations with the Fatimids. In 1011, Ja'far's son Abu AlFutuh² had a quarrel with the fanatic Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim, so he declared himself a Caliph, but later he and his successors de-

²Ahmad Al-Siba'i, Tarikh Makkah (Mecca, Saudi Arabia: 1372 H), p. 209.

clared their loyalty to the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

Since 1061, a struggle between the Mousawids and the Husaynids' Al-Fatikis led to the seizure of Al-Ka'ba's treasures by the Shaibis, the hereditary keepers of Al-Ka'ba's keys. This led to the intervention of the Yemen ruler, 'Ali Al-Sulaihi³, who appointed Abu-Hashim Muhamad as the new Sharif. After Abu Hashim's death, the Ashrafs struggled among themselves, which led to disorder, plundering the pilgrims, imposing heavy taxes on pilgrims whose rulers could not protect them, and the looting of Mecca by the tribe of Hudhail.

In 1174, the Ayoubid Turan visited Mecca and appointed a Hasanid to the Sharifate of Mecca, and replaced the Zaidi Shi'i rite with the Sunni Shafi'i.

To summarize, this was a period in which Al-Hijaz enjoyed stability during the first forty years, but suffered from continuous revolts, either by the Ashrafs or the tribes, during the rest of the period. It was a period that saw interventions by outsiders, either to calm things down, or to impose their own men as the Sharifs. However, the different Caliphates continued sending money and supplies to the people of Mecca and Medina. By having the Sharifs declare their loyalty to them and mention their names as protectors of Islam in Al-Khuttba, a religious speech preceeding the Friday prayer, and at the end of it, the speaker thanks the ruler and calls upon God to help him.

II. THE PERIOD FROM 1200-1520

In the year 1200, the Ashrafs of Yunbu', led by Qitada, who was

³Ibid., p. 211.

displeased with the policy of his relatives in Mecca, attacked Mecca and established the second Sharifid Emirate. At the beginning he had good relations with both the 'Abbasids and Ayoubids, but later he caused trouble with the 'Abbasids. In the year 1212, Qitada did not receive the Ayoubid Caliph Al-'Adil well, which made Al-'Adil angry at Qitada.

In Al-Hijaz itself, Qitada extended his rule over the whole area except for Medina whose Husaynids ruler refused to submit, and fought Qitada several times. The historians⁴ differed on whether Qitada won Medina, but it seems that he did not since the Husaynids continued to rule Medina for several years after Qitada's death, which came at the hands of his son Hasan in the year 1220.

Hasan faced trouble from his brother Ragih, who conspired with the 'Abbasids, but Hasan defeated the 'Abbasids and his brother who fled to the Ayoubid ruler of Yemen, Mas'oud. In 1221, Mas'oud attacked Mecca, sacked it and appointed one of his generals as the governor. Hasan fled to the desert and tried to recover Mecca the following year. But he failed and fled to Baghdad, where he died.

From 1222 until 1249, Mecca was the victim of continued war between the Ayoubids of Yemen, and the Ayoubids of Egypt. During that period, the rule in Mecca changed eight times, and with the change of rule, the governors changed, and the population suffered the most. In 1225, the Husaynid Qasim of Medina tried to recover Mecca, but he could not.

In 1250, the Mamluks deposed the Ayoubids in Egypt. In 1258, Mogols led by Hulagu, took Baghdad and destroyed the 'Abbasids there.

⁴Ibid., p. 213.

The Mamluks invited the remaining 'Abbasids to Cairo to gain more religious influence. In Mecca, Qitada's descendants kept fighting among themselves, while the Husaynids controlled Medina.

In 1254, the Sharif of Mecca was Ghanim, the grandson of Qitada. But his rule did not last long because his cousin Idris and Sharif Abu Noumi I, attacked Mecca and ruled it together. In 1257, Abu Noumi I became the sole ruler, after he had a quarrel with his uncle, Idris, who fled the city and kept bothering him until he was killed.

In 1260, the Mamluk Sultan Baibars made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and decided to leave the internal affairs of Al-Hijaz in the hands of Abu Noumi I, because of his firmness. However, his long period (1254-1301) was marked with wars with the rulers of Medina, who in 1284 forced him to leave Mecca. But he succeeded in regaining control of the city after a short period. He also imposed high taxes on the pilgrims; it is reported that he asked for thirty dirhams from each pilgrim. His wars with the rulers of Medina caused his relation with the Mamluks to become bad, so in 1291, he declared loyalty to the Yemeni ruler, and started mentioning his name in Al-Khuttba until he died in 1301.

Following his death, his sons fought among themselves until his grandson 'Ajlan finally took control of the Sharifate in 1346, and ruled until 1375. However, his period was marked by political unrests, which bothered the Mamluk Sultan, who swore to exterminate all of the Ashrafs.⁵ He introduced the system of appointing his son and the future successor as a co-regent, hoping that this move could help to avoid family struggle before or after his death.

⁵Ibid., p. 215.

His successor, Hasan, tried successfully to extend his rule over all of Al-Hijaz, but had to try to avoid causing the interference of his Mamluk master in Egypt. In 1425, the Mamluks took charge of the customs in Jeddah, and maintained a small garrison at Mecca. The appointments of his successors had to be confirmed by the Mamluk Sultans. The period of Mohamad Bin Barakat I (1455-1496) was a period of stability because of his strong personality, and his ability to deal firmly with the tribes.

In its turn, the stability caused prosperity in Al-Hijaz. After his death, the Mamluk Sultan Kaithby appointed his son, Barakat II, as the new Sharif. But soon Barakat II faced opposition from his brothers Haza' and Ahamad Al-Jazani, who succeeded in forcing Barakat to leave Mecca. Barakat II stayed in Jeddah, and returned to Mecca with Amir Al-Haj Al-Masri (the prince, or the leader of the Egyptian pilgrims). He exiled his brother Haza' to Yunbu', but the latter gathered an army, defeated Barakat who had to flee to Al-Laith.

When Haza' died, Barakat returned to Mecca in time to receive from the Mamluk Sultan the Khul'ah (a cloak given by the Sultan to confirm the Sharif's appointment). Barakat had to accompany the Egyptian pilgrims to Yunbu' because his brother Al-Jazani looted the Syrian pilgrims. The war continued between the two brothers, and Mecca changed hands between them.

In 1502, an Egyptian force arrived and forced Al-Jazani to leave Mecca to his brother Barakat. However, Barakat hesitated to receive the Egyptian commander, who arrested Barakat. The commander took a bribe from Al-Jazani in order to support his rule in Mecca, and Barakat was taken to Egypt in chains.

Upon his arrival in Egypt, he was welcomed and supported by the 'Ulama there, until 1503 when he heard the news of Al-Jazani's assassination. He set out for Mecca, and the new Sharif, his brother Humaidah, fled the city when he heard of Barakat's advance. Barakat proclaimed himself the ruler of Al-Hijaz, and appointed his brother Kaitby and son 'Ali as the co-governors of Mecca.

At that time, the Muslims faced a new danger, represented by the Portuguese, who were threatening the Muslims' control of the Red Sea. The threat and the struggle that followed will be dealt with in a separate chapter later.

The threat to Jeddah forced the Mamluk Sultan Al-Ghouri to order the building of a fleet in Suez in 1506. The Ottoman Sultan Bayazid sent wood and men to help in building the fleet. Later the fleet was sent into the Red Sea to counter the Portuguese threat. The Commander Husayn Al-Kurdi arrived in Jeddah, and decided to build a wall to protect it. He ordered every able man to work, and ordered the demolishing of many houses to use their materials in building the wall. The wall was finished in less than a year, but the Portuguese main attack did not come until 1541.

In 1517, the Ottomans, who became the strongest Islamic power at that time, were led by Sultan Salim I. He defeated the Mamluks, conquered Syria and Egypt, and declared Al-Hijaz as part of the Ottoman Empire. Sharif Barakat II did not hesitate to send his son Abu Noumi II to Egypt, to declare his loyalty to the new master. Sultan Salim I received him well and confirmed his position in Al-Hijaz, with the Sharif's acknowledgment of the Ottoman supremacy.

Sharif Barakat ordered the mentioning of the name of the Ottoman

Sultan in Al-Khutbah, and tricked the Mamluk Commander Husayn Al-Kurdi into coming to Mecca. He executed him, but some of the Mamluks fled to Yemen, where they caused some trouble for the Ottomans. Sultan Salim I sent Husayn Al-Rumi (Al-Rais) as his representative in Jeddah.

CHAPTER IV

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION

SIXTEENTH CENTURY

According to the regulations of the Muslim state, the Ottoman Sultan was the absolute ruler, and was limited only by religious tenets. To administer his huge empire, the Sultan was assisted by the men in his Diwan (cabinet), who bore the title of Pasha, and who were headed by a Grand Vizir (Prime Minister). The treasury of the empire was left in charge of the two Defterdars (treasurers) of Rumelia and Anatolia, aided in the Arab lands by one of the lower rank residing at Aleppo. The judicial system was headed by the two Kazieskers of Rumelia and Anatolia, who received appeals and appointed all judges. The local judges of cities and towns were called Kadis, while the judges of villages were called Na'ibs, and the local authority controlled their appointments. The law was enforced by Muhtasibs, who were given soldiers to do so.

The administration of the state was organized in a military fashion, and rested on a system that resembled European feudalism, with the exception that "in the Turkish plan homage was not pledged"⁶. The sons of the vassals were not permitted to inherit their fathers' holdings, except under certain conditions. The administrators rose through the military ranks to hold administrative positions.

⁶George Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs (Illinois, USA: 1942), p. 60.

I. THE GENERAL OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION OF PROVINCES

Upon conquering a province, the Ottoman army would move in, and with it came land registrars who would count the towns and villages in that province. They divided them into fiefs in the following way:

1) small fiefs for the fighting soldeirs; 2) a number of large fiefs for the princes and generals, and 3) a number of large fiefs for the Sultan. However, the system of fiefs was not used in Egypt and Al-Hijaz.

"This system did not mean that the vassal would be the owner of all lands and villages in his fief"⁷, but he had the right to collect taxes from the owners in his fief. He also had to be ready to answer the Sultan's call for military campaigns by preparing an army whose number of soldiers was determined the following was: one soldier for each 5,000 Akce. So if the fief production was 10,000 Akce, it would have to prepare two soldiers.

The fiefs were divided into the following: 1) Timar: small fief whose production was less than 20,000 Akce. 2) Za'amat: larger than the Timar and its production was between 20,000-100,000 Akce. 3) Khas: A larger fief whose production was more than 100,000 Akce.⁸

The provinces were divided politically and militarily into "Iyalat" with each "Iyalah" divided into "Alwiyat" or "Sanjaks" and each "Liwa" had a number of Timars and Za'amats. Each "Iyalah" was ruled by a Pasha called "Bikr Biki", which means the Bek of Al-Bakawat. And his military rank was "Mir Miran", which means Amir ul-Umara. Each "Liwa"

⁷Satti' Al-Husari, Al-Bilad Al-'Arabiya Wa Al-Dowleh Al-'Uthmaniyah (Beirut, Lebanon: 1965), p. 29.

⁸Ibid., p. 30.

was ruled by a Bek called "Sinjak Bek", which means Bek Liwa, and his military rank was "Mir Liwa", which means Amir Liwa.

The Ottomans left the political and military powers of the provinces in the hands of the governor who was assisted by judges to administer justice, and a treasurer to take charge of taxes and other financial functions.

Generally, the tribes were left out of the administrative arrangements. With few exceptions, tribes were given fiefs to control and from whom to collect taxes. The tribes were administrated through their Shaykhs and Princes, whose authorities the Porte recognized. Each Shaykh had to get the Porte's approval upon taking over in his tribe.

"The population of the following areas were not asked to serve in the army: (1) Constantinople, (2) Crete, (3) Islands of the Mediterranean Sea, (4) Tripoli, (5) Yemen, (6) Al-Hijaz."⁹

II. THE OTTOMAN POLICY IN ARAB LANDS

The Ottoman Sultans did not rule or administrate the Arab lands directly, but they appointed a Wali for each province (Wilayah), except for Al-Hijaz, which was treated differently because of its sensitive religious position. The Walis had unlimited authority in their provinces, and were only interested in being on good terms with the Sultan and the high officials in Constantinople.

The term of each Wali was one year, after which the Wali could be dismissed and returned to his home town, appointed to another office, or his term renewed. The short term did not help to improve the conditions

⁹Ibid., p. 251

of the province, since the Wali's interest would be to get richer before his term expired, or he was dismissed by the Sultan.

Each Wali had a court consisting of 'Ulama, high judge, treasurer, nobels and the army officers. The latter group interfered a lot in the affairs of the province, causing disturbances, and sometimes revolting against the Wali.

The Ottoman policy was never to interfere in the people's life and customs, unless it was necessary, and as long as the subjects stayed loyal to the Sultan and paid the taxes.

It is no doubt that the Ottoman's policy had two sides. It helped the Arabs to keep their nationality and social and economic customs. It also gave freedom for each professional group to arrange and protect its interests. The policy also limited the function of the provincial government to collecting taxes and protecting the provinces, and never paid attention to other government functions such as education, economy, commerce and health. The Ottoman's policy of isolating the provinces from influence by the ideas of the European Renaissance forced the subjects many years backward.

III. THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION OF AL-HIJAZ

Al-Hijaz enjoyed greater autonomy than the other conquered Arab lands under the Ottomans, who upon defeating the Mamluks in 1517 received the Sharif of Mecca's acceptance of their superiority, and in return, the Ottoman Sultan Salim I kept him in his office and promised to keep the Sharifate in his family.

Politics in Al-Hijaz During the period we are concerned with, four

groups with different interests played a role in determining the politics of Al-Hijaz.

Sharif of Mecca, a Hasanide, was considered the ruler of all of Al-Hijaz, with the seat of his Sharifate in Mecca, and with Medina under his rule. After the death of a Sharif, the Ashrafs would elect a Sharif to assume the responsibilities and the new Sharif had to write to the Sultan to get his Khul'a and Farman of approval, which was to be read publicly in the Great Mosque.

The Sharif had to please and serve the interests of some groups such as the Ottoman officials, the Shaykhs of the tribes, and the Ashrafs. In attempting to do so, some Ashrafs were forced out by one of the groups, or by an alliance of two of them. In his attempts to secure his position, the Sharif of Mecca, as well as some of the influential Ashrafs had their own armies of slaves recruited mostly from Africa.

At the beginning, the Sharif enjoyed a free hand in dealing with the affairs of his Sharifate, and had only to deal with two Turkish officials, a judge and Muhtasib. He also enjoyed great income from receiving half of the custom dues of the port of Jeddah, but constant collision over the mentioned customs forced the Sultan to appoint a Turk to the new office of Shaykh Al-Harm Al-Makki, which worsened relations more. However, the Ottoman Sultans tried to improve their relations with the Sharif and sometimes ruled in favor of the Sharif in his disputes with Turkish officials.

Sharif of Medina, a Husaynid, was confirmed in his appointment by the Sharif of Mecca. However, both Sharifs had nominal authority in Medina, because "the real authority was in the hands of Shaykh Haram

Al-Madani, who was supposedly a Turkish 'Alim."¹⁰

The Turkish Officials' interest was to assert the Turkish authority, and to check the authority of the Sharif. Among the important Turkish officials were: 1) Wali of Jeddah, the first Ottoman official to be appointed in Al-Hijaz, and "he resided in Jeddah which became the seat of "Iyalat Al-Habash"¹¹, which included some ports on the African Coast, such as Musawa' and Sawakin. The Ottomans estimated the production of Iyalat Al-Habash at 180,000 Akçe, and made Jeddah the base from which expeditions were sent to Yemen and beyond. The Turkish Wali received his orders from the Wali of Egypt, and was assisted by the Sharif of Mecca's representative who had nominal authority.

2) Shaykh Al-Haram Al-Makki, was the post created when disputes increased between the Sharif and the Wali of Jeddah. The official was supposed to be a Turkish 'Alim who resided in Jeddah. The Shaykh's job was to be a spy on the Sharif, and to write directly to the Porte.

3) Shaykh Al-Haram Al-Madani was a Turkish 'Alim, who was actually the real governor of Medina, and contacted the Sultan directly. He was supposed to be over sixty-three years old, and his salary was equal to that of the Grand Vizir.¹² Shaykh Al-Haram Al-Madani held a meeting every Friday to discuss problems.¹³

4) Both judges of Mecca and Medina were supposed to be Turkish.

¹⁰ Ahmad Al-Khiyari, 'Umara' Al-Madinah Was Hukamah Min 'Ahd Al-Nowbouwah Hatta Al-Youm (Medina, Saudi Arabia: 1962), p. 19.

¹¹ Al-Husari, op. cit., p. 239.

¹² Al-Khiyari, op. cit., p. 20.

¹³ Ibid., p. 20.

They served one year terms, after which they would be moved.

5) The Muhtasib had to be Turkish. The job of this official was to enforce justice, and to serve as a treasurer.

6) Other Turkish officials of less importance were the Turkish representatives who assisted the Sharif's representatives in small towns.

The day-to-day confrontation between the local Ashrafs and the Turkish officials led to disturbances and disorders which will be discussed in the chapter dealing with the chronology of the Ashrafs of Mecca.

The Tribes were unlike the above groups which could be controlled and contained. The tribes, however, were hard to control and please. Generally, the tribes consider themselves free men, and refused to recognize any authority. The Ottomans did not assign fiefs to the tribes of Al-Hijaz, as they did with some tribes in Syria and Iraq. However, the tribes of Al-Hijaz had already established their own areas of interest earlier. They had control of the commercial routes, as well as the pilgrimage routes. Because of this control, and their continuous raids, the authority, Sharifite or Turkish, concluded agreements with them to keep order, and to use their manpower in military campaigns. The Ottomans and the Sharifs tried to please the tribes with payments, supplies and exemption from taxes.

Government in Al-Hijaz (Sixteenth Century) As was shown above, the two main authorities in Al-Hijaz were the Sharif of Mecca and the Turkish officials, and both exercised their authority in the towns only while the tribes were in control of the desert and land routes.

The functions of the government of Al-Hijaz were as follows:

1) Pilgrimage, the main function, and the most important. It was for the government to protect the pilgrims during the pilgrimage season, to make it easy for them to perform their religious duties and to provide them with the needed supplies of food and water. The most difficult part was to protect the pilgrims outside of towns from tribal attacks. In order to do so, the government assigned guards to each pilgrimage caravan, and established military posts on the pilgrimage routes.

2) Law and order, disturbances and disorders occurred in towns either by a criminal accident, or a fight between the slaves or men of some Sharifs. In the case of fights among the Ashrafs' men, "the Sharif of Mecca usually decided the punishment either by executing some of the participants or expelling the accused Sharif to some areas such as Jizan or Yunbu'." ¹⁴

In the case of criminal acts, the Turkish judges administered the justice, ordered the punishment, and ordered the Muhtasib to carry out the punishment.

There is no record of an existence of a city police, except for the Sharif's men who would tour the town. In keeping order at night, it is reported that the people of each section of the town organized guards called "Wajaks" to guard against thieves and criminals. ¹⁵

In order to keep order outside of towns, the government had to deal with the tough tribes, and the only way to punish them was either to master enough troops or to wait until the summer when the tribes usually settle in their areas of control. In order to protect the towns, walls

¹⁴ Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 279.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 280.

were built, such as the wall of Medina, which Sultan Suliman ordered to be built in 1532. It was completed in 1543.

3) Health, education and welfare are the responsibilities of a modern, or any responsible, government, it is clear. However, the government of Al-Hijaz played a small role, if any, in this area. However, this was the way earlier and later governments acted, until the twentieth century.

There is no record of hospitals or any governmental activities in the field of health. But records show that the Ottomans established a military hospital in Jizan toward the end of the seventeenth century. The annual pilgrimage season was, and still is, a season of diseases because of the diseases carried to the Holy lands by the pilgrims. The only medicine was the one prescribed by the beduins, or the self-called physicians, which did not help to improve the health situation. "It is reported that a knee disease appeared in Mecca in 1629-1630, and made some people unable to stand or to walk, and the local physicians prescribed lemon juice as a medicine for it."¹⁶

There is no record of any kind of a modern school system, but records show that "every mosque, large and small, had a primary or reading school where pupils studied reading, writing, Arabic and the Koran."¹⁷

"Some local Shaykhs established small schools called 'kuttab' which taught the same subjects and other subjects, such as grammar,

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁷ Sydney Fisher, The Middle East (New York, New York, USA: 1966), p. 214.

poetry and religious subjects."¹⁸ The four sects of the Sunni division-- Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi'i-- had regular meetings that were held in the Great Mosque in Mecca, and the Prophet's Mosque in Medina to teach religious subjects.

In the area of welfare, the government played a greater role than in the areas of health and education. Regular supplies were sent to the people of Mecca and Medina, and money was sent to be distributed among the poor. The Ottomans paid attention to the problem of water in Mecca, so water was dug from nearby wells and springs. In 1543, Sultan Suliman Al-Qanuni (the Magnificent) ordered the renewal of the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. In 1575, Sultan Selim II ordered the renewal of the Great Mosque in Mecca. In 1630, the hard rain caused damages to Al-Ka'ba, so Sultan Murad IV ordered the rebuilding of it.

To support, supply and finance the people of Mecca and Medina, there were two kinds of Waqf. 1) Awqaf Al-Haramin: These were properties in Egypt, as well as in other areas, that were made Awqaf by the Ottoman Sultan, and from its incomes, the people of the two holy cities were supported with goods and money. 2) Awqaf Ahliyah: These were properties that were made Awqaf by some wealthy people to serve the same purpose.

4) Defense was significant since the Ottomans paid great attention to protecting the Holy lands, especially with the presence of the Portuguese threat, which will be dealt with in a later chapter. A garrison was stationed in Jeddah, and much later in Mecca and Medina. The Ottoman fleet was very active and succeeded in clearing the Red Sea

¹⁸ Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 281.

from the Portuguese. The Sharif was able to gather a large army by calling for Jihad when the Portuguese threatened Jeddah in 1541.

5) Economy was based on import. Because of climatic reasons, Al-Hijaz is not, and was not, known for its agricultural production. It always had to import its basic supplies from the outside. Mecca depended completely on food supplies from Egypt, while Medina was able to satisfy the need of its population by its own agricultural production. After the Ottomans succeeded in making the Red Sea an Ottoman Lake, they tried to encourage trade through Jeddah by opening the port to European ships, on the condition that the ships never pass Jeddah, even if they carried goods for Egypt, and insisted on carrying those goods on ships owned by Muslims only.

The sources of the revenue were the pilgrims, the customs of the port in Jeddah, and the taxes. Unfortunately, I was not able to locate any records in Arabia. I was also unable to find any budget of Al-Hijaz during the period. However, the budget of Egypt of 1596-1597 provided me with a long list of interesting articles that concern Al-Hijaz.

FROM THE BUDGET OF EGYPT 1596-1597¹⁹

The Purpose	Amount of Paras
1. For the poor of Mecca and Medina	350,244
2. For the expenditures of Mecca and Medina	1,731,253
3. For the customary payment to provide for expenditures of the leader of the Holy Pilgrimage (1005 H)	400,000

¹⁹Stanford Shaw, The Budget of Ottoman Egypt (Paris, France: 1968), pp. 154-169.

The Purpose	Amount of Paras
4. For the customary payment to the messenger who brings the news of the pilgrim's departure from the Mount of 'Arafat	1,800
5. For the customary payment to provide for the banquet of the leader of the Holy Pilgrimage when he comes to Birket-ul Hac (1005 H)	14,000
6. For the equipment needed to guard the pilgrims while they go and come at Birket-ul Hac, provided by Za'im of Cairo	1,600
7. For the hire of camels to carry the money sent to Abdul-Halim Efendi, judge of Medina	1,640
8. For the hire of camels to carry the wheat sent as alms and the money for the people of the Holy Cities	320,210
9. For the hire of measures of the wheat sent as alms by the Sultan	4,000
10. For the offering sent to Sharif Hasan, Emir of Mecca	2,400
11. For the hire of camels to carry the money sent to Sayid Rakim, Emir of Yunbu', from Cairo to the port of Suez	4,800
12. For the hire of camels along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage in the name of the Evlad-i Azm (tribe) for the years 1005-1006 H	374,125
13. For the customary payment to the guides along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage	580
14. For the payment of freight on the ship Gulgani under the captainship of Mehmet Reis	13,400
15. For the price of wheat and barley for the Arab tribes along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage, for the year 1005 H	20,500
16. For the customary payment to the emin and scribe in charge of taking the money to the people of the Holy Cities (Emin-i Surre and Katib-i Surre)	2,000
17. For the price of bowls for the lamps in the sacred place of worship	1,205
18. For the pension of 'Abdul Karim Semhude, who is Khatib (preacher at Friday prayer) of Medina	3,166

The Purpose	Amount of Paras
19. For the hire of a tailor to sew the skins of the sable robe sent to Sharif Hasan, Emir of Mecca	041
20. For the customary payment of the Commander (Serdar) of the men of Gonullus and Tufenkcian-i Suwari Corps and others (who guard the pilgrimage) at the time of the pilgrims departure	5,000
21. For the supplies and foods for the poor and indigent (living) along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage, set aside by order of the governor of Egypt	12,300
22. For the pension of the commanders of the sweepers in Mecca	23,760
23. For the customary payment for Sharifs at the port of Jeddah	400
24. For the customary payment to provide provisions for the new ship assigned to carry the loads of the leader of the Pilgrimage to Jeddah	24,600
25. For supplies for the chief of the sweepers in the Prophet's Mosque	2,870
26. For the hire of camels to transport candles for the Holy Cities and to transport the Holy Curtain	4,305
27. For equipment needed to arrange the well at the fort Wejh on the road of the Pilgrimage	2,000
28. For the customary payment to the Ashrafs of Bani Husayn in Medina and for Beduins to keep security of the road of the pilgrimage, and for the learned and the orphans in the Holy Cities	197,225
29. For the customary payment to the tribe charged with keeping security at the well of the fort of Wejh	1,000
30. For the price of bees' wax to be sent to the Holy Cities	6,560
31. For the freight costs for the wheat alms sent by the Sultan and for the rations for the people of Mecca (for the year 1003 H)	3,075
32. For the tailor to sew the cloth and robes for the Beduins along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage	1,652

The Purpose	Amount of Paras
33. For supplies for the tent Beduins along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage.	1,310

The above articles of the budget of Egypt show something of what the Ottoman government used to send to Al-Hijaz, and it shows the vast interest given to the people of Mecca and Medina, and to keeping order on the roads of the pilgrimage. As it was indicated in the budget, most of the articles were paid or sent customarily.

CHAPTER V

THE RULERS OF AL-HIJAZ

1520-1632

The reader of this chapter on the rulers of Al-Hijaz during 1520-1632 will notice that it is a chronology of the Ashrafs of Mecca. The reason for that is that the Ottoman Sultans appointed them as rulers of Al-Hijaz; with the exception of Jeddah, and they used Mecca as their residence and seat of government.

I. SHARIF BARAKAT II (1496-1502, 1503-1524)

When the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (The Grim) conquered Egypt in 1517, Sharif Barakat II was the Sharif of Mecca for twenty-one years, disrupted only for a short period. After entering Cairo, "Sultan Selim I freed some Meccan nobles who were imprisoned by the Mamluk Sultan Al-Ghouri earlier"²⁰ and "was planning to send an army to the Arabian Peninsula to expel the Mamluks from Al-Hijaz and Yemen"²¹ and to occupy Mecca and Medina so he could claim the title "Hami Al-Haramin" or the Defender of the Two Mosques. But a Meccan judge named Salah Al-Din Bin Zuhairah²², who was freed by Sultan Selim I from Al-Ghouri's

²⁰ Mohamad Anis, Al-Dowleh Al-Uthmaniyah Wa Al-Mushriq Al-'Arabi 1514-1914 (Cairo, Egypt: 1923), p. 127

²¹ As'ad Ttlas, Tarikh Al-Ummah Al-'Arabiyah (Beirut, Lebanon: 1963), p. 131.

²² Qutb Al-Din Al-Hanafi, Tarikh Makkah (Mecca, Saudi Arabia: 1950), p. 241

jail, told the Sultan that Sharif Barakat II would be glad to declare his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, and the judge asked the Sultan to write to the Sharif.

Sharif Barakat II heard the news of the fall of the Mamluks and received a letter from the victorious Ottoman Sultan, and another letter from the judge advising him to join the Ottomans and to send his son Abu-Noumi II to the Ottoman Sultan in Cairo.

Sharif Barakat sent his thirteen year old son, Abu-Noumi II, to Cairo "where he was well received and well treated by Sultan Selim I, and was sent back to Mecca as the co-ruler with his father."²³ Sultan Selim I ordered that "half of the income of Mecca and Jeddah be paid to the two Sharifs every year".²⁴

Sharif Barakat II received an order from Sultan Selim I to kill the Mamluk Commander in Jeddah, Husayn Al-Kurdi, because of his ill-treatment of the population of Jeddah while building the Wall of Jeddah. "Sharif Barakat tricked Al-Kurdi into coming to Mecca where he was captured and sent back to Jeddah where he was drowned in the sea."²⁵

When the Ottoman representative arrived in Jeddah he found a large number of armed ships and an arsenal of arms which were left behind by the Mamluks. His mission was to expel the remaining Mamluks who fled to Yemen, so he decided to follow them. He obtained permission from the Wali of Egypt, and also a promise of assistance from Sharif

²³Ibid., p. 241.

²⁴Taj Al-Dini Al-Khatib, Manayih Al-Karam Fi Akhbar Makkah Wa Wullat Al-Haram (Mecca, Saudi Arabia: 1125 H), p. 51.

²⁵Anis, op. cit., p. 127.

Barakat II. The Wali of Egypt appointed the merchant Al-Khawaja Qasim Al-Sharwani to the post of Wali of Jeddah.

Sharif Barakat II maintained good relations with the Ottomans. In 1520 he received Al_Mahmal Al-Masri led by the Turkish Commander Muslih Bek, who after settling down, distributed among the people of Mecca, money and goods which were given away by Sultan Selim I. After the conclusion of the Pilgrimage ceremonies in Mecca, Muslih Bek left for Medina to distribute the same things among the population of Medina.

In 1520, Sultan Selim I died and was succeeded by his son Sultan Suliman Al-Qanuni (The Magnificent). Upon hearing the news, Sharif Barakat II sent a message to Sultan Suliman expressing his sorrow for Selim's death, and congratulating Suliman. The Sultan replied by confirming Barakat II and his son Abu-Noumi II in their posts in Al-Hijaz. In 1524, Sharif Barakat II died and was buried in Mecca. He died after ruling Mecca as a sole ruler and co-ruler with his father, brothers and son for fifty-three years.

II. SHARIF ABU-NOUMI II (1524-1566)

After the death of Barakat II, the Ashrafs of Mecca elected his son Abu-Noumi II, who was the co-ruler, to succeed his father to the Sharifate. The new Sharif "sent a message to the Ottoman, Sultan Suliman, informing him of his father's death and his election and the Sultan replied by confirming his election".²⁶

Sharif Abu-Noumi II is considered the great grandfather of the Banu Barakat branch of the Ashrafs.

²⁶Al-Khatib, op. cit., p. 56.

He limited the succession to the Sharifate of Mecca in his line of family. He also set up regulations for the relations between his descendants and punishments if someone of them broke out the regulations.²⁷

His regime was known for its stability because he was firm and feared by the tribesmen and respected by the Ottomans. In ruling Al-Hijaz, "Sharif Abu-Noumi II used as his co-rulers, one at a time, two of his sons -- Ahmad and Hasan".²⁸ Before the period of Abu-Noumi II, the Sharif of Mecca used to send his men to call upon the pilgrims to return to their countries after the end of the pilgrimage ceremonies, but Abu-Noumi II changed this policy and many pilgrims decided to stay in Mecca instead of going back to their home countries, which resulted in the increase of the population of Mecca. The reason for the change of policy could be that Abu-Noumi thought that those pilgrims who stayed would help the economic life by establishing trade ties with their home lands.

The first confrontation between the Ottomans and the local people took place less than two years after Abu-Noumi II took over. In 1526 Salman Reis²⁹ landed in Jeddah with four thousand Turkish soldiers on their way to Yemen. After landing, the soldiers began robbing the people, causing disturbances and demanding more supplies, which caused prices to rise. Some of the soldiers left for Mecca where they forced people from their houses. This angered the Beduins because the expelled owners were originally Beduins. The tribesmen began attacking and killing the soldiers outside of the towns. Abu-Noumi interfered and pre-

²⁷Al-Siba'i, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 239.

²⁹Al-Khatib, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

vented the Beduins from killing the soldiers. The people of Mecca complained to a certain Shaykh named Mohamad Bin 'Irak³⁰, who called the leaders of the soldiers to the Great Mosque and demanded an explanation of their behavior. The leaders claimed that they were going to leave after the Pilgrimage season. The Shaykh ordered them to leave Mecca to Mina, and to execute the soldiers causing the trouble. Then Commander Salman Reis took for himself the dues of the custom of Jeddah, which was reported to be "90,000 golden dinars in that year".³¹

During this period of disturbances, two uncles of Sharif Abu-Noumi II rebelled against his rule and sought the cooperation of Salman Reis, who refused. Abu-Noumi II sent a small expedition to arrest them, but a certain commander named Jouhar Al-Maghribi³² mediated and the rebellion ended peacefully. The Sharif did not make the pilgrimage that year, instead he kept a watchful eye to prevent fighting between the Beduins and Salman's forces. When the Pilgrimage ceremonies concluded, the Turkish forces left for Yemen. This period of disturbance "was long afterward remembered and called the 'year of Salman', the name of the Turkish Commander."³³

In 1537-1538, Abu-Noumi II led his army into Jizan, south of Al-Hijaz, occupied it and appointed his own ruler.³⁴ But in the following

³⁰Ibid., p. 57.

³¹Ibid., p. 58.

³²Ibid., p. 58.

³³Gerald De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca (London, Great Britain: 1951) p. 128.

³⁴Al-Khatib, op. cit., p. 59.

year, 1539, the Turkish Commander Suliman Pasha Al-Khadim passed through Jizan, returning from Yemen and forced the Sharif's representative out, and appointed a Turkish ruler. Al-Khadim and his troops camped in Jeddah and stayed waiting for the Pilgrimage season. During their stay, Al-Khadim and his forces behaved badly and showed little respect for the Holy City. After the conclusion of Pilgrimage ceremonies, Al-Khadim and his forces left for Istanbul, and with them went Abu-Noumi's son Ahmad who was well received by Sultan Suliman, and was appointed as a co-ruler with his father. Later Ahmad died, and the other son, Hasan, served as a co-ruler with Abu-Noumi II.

In the year 1541, the Portuguese attacks increased in the Red Sea, but failed to land at Jeddah because of its strong walls and defenders, although they

succeeded in landing at a small port called Abu Al-Dawa'ir near Jeddah. Abu-Noumi II left the Pilgrimage and called for Jihad (Holy War) among the people who answered in great numbers. After arming them, he led them to Abu Al-Dawa'ir and succeeded in expelling the Portuguese. Sultan Suliman reacted to the news by sending more bounty and confirmed the Sharif's right of half the custom dues of Jeddah.³⁵

In 1550, the Turkish "Amir Al-Haj" Mahmoud Pasha arrived in Mecca to lead the Pilgrims.

Because he was not well received by Abu-Noumi II a few years earlier, he started disturbances and called for the dethroning of Abu-Noumi. Fighting broke out between the Turkish forces and Abu-Noumi's in Mina. The Beduins took advantage of the situation and began attacking the pilgrims which disturbed the Pilgrimage Ceremonies. Abu-Noumi led his forces and defeated the Beduins and the Turkish forces.³⁶

³⁵Ibid., pp. 69-70.

³⁶Al-Siba'i, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

It is not clear how Sultan Suliman received the true facts of the incident, but it could be assumed that either the Turkish judge in Mecca or Shaykh Al-Haram Al-Makki reported to the Sultan. As a result it is reported that "the Sultan wrote to Sharif Abu-Noumi apologizing for Mahmoud Pasha's behavior and indicated that the Pasha was punished."³⁷

In 1552, the Sharif of Medina, Mani', stopped customary payments to some Ashrafs and tribes of the area around Medina, which made them angry and they decided to force the continuation of the payments. It is reported that

they waited until the pilgrims from Medina reached a small village called Al-Firaish on their way to Mecca and engaged them in a battle called the "Waqi'at of Al-Firaish." The Midinise included the Turkish Judge of Medina and Shaykh Al-Harem Al-Madani who mediated and promised the restoration of their payments. The outlaws let the Medinese continue to Mecca where they informed the Sharif of the incident. The Sharif sent strong guards to protect them on their way back to Medina.³⁸

Regarding the mentioned incidents, it can be noticed clearly that all of them occurred during the Pilgrimage season when Mecca usually would be overcrowded and it would be difficult to keep law and order. The religious duty of performing the pilgrimage was used by the Turks as a reason to stay and create problems in Mecca by seizing supplies or attacking people's properties. However, not all Turkish forces behaved this way. Some behaved well and showed greater respect to the Holy places. Such forces as the forces led by Sinan Pasha in 1569 were among these.

Besides trying to keep matters under control, Sharif Abu-Noumi II

³⁷ Ibid., p. 240.

³⁸ Ahmad Al-Baradi'i, Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah 'Ibr Al-Tarikh Al-Islami (Beirut, Lebanon: 1972), pp. 126-127.

devoted his time to improving the conditions in Mecca by building almshouses, pilgrim Khans, schools and courts, and water channels between the hills and Mecca. In order to do that he was greatly helped by the Sultan's bounty and his right to half of the custom dues of Jeddah.

"The Sharif's reputation for sanctity and good work grew and his style became the 'Star of Religion' or Najm Al-Din".³⁹

In 1566, because of old age and bad health, Sharif Abu-Noumi II asked the Sultan's permission to retire from his office and to appoint his son Hasan, then co-ruler, to become the Sharif. The Sultan agreed and Abu-Noumi II devoted his time to religious studies. His son, however, continued seeking his advice until Abu-Noumi II died in the year 1584, and was buried in Mecca.

III. SHARIF HASAN (1566-1602)

In 1566 Abu-Noumi II asked the Ottoman Sultan Suliman to replace him with his son Hasan and the Sultan agreed. Sharif Hasan received the customary Khil'a Al-Sultaniyah and the letter of confirmation was read in the Great Mosque, as was the custom.

Sharif Hasan's period was considered an extension of Abu-Noumi's. It was a period of stability and there is no record of disturbances such as the ones during Abu-Noumi's period. He showed a firmness in dealing with the Beduins and it is reported that the Beduins, because of their fear of Hasan "would swear falsely by anyone or anything except the name of Sharif Hasan."⁴⁰

³⁹De Gaury, op cit., p. 131.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 32.

However, Sharif Hasan was very stern with the Ashrafs who were trying to gain from their social position in the Meccan society. It is also reported that because of the established law and order, "commercial caravans traveled without being accompanied by a guard."⁴¹

In the year 1580, Sharif Hasan led his army of 10,000 men into the Highlands of Nejd and besieged Mi'kal in Nejd⁴². After a long successful expedition, he returned wealthier and accompanied by some captured chiefs. He kept the captured chiefs in his jail for a year and released them after they paid the money he wanted. He also appointed Mohamad Bin Al-Faddl⁴³ as their Amir (prince or chief). The Ottomans did not interfere or oppose the Sharif's expedition in Nejd, but continued to oppose any Sharif's advances into Jizan south of Taif without any given reason except that the Ottomans felt that they could control the coastal area but not the tribal-controlled inland areas.

As it became the custom of the Ashrafs, Sharif Hasan tried to gain recognition of his eldest son Mas'oud as his co-partner in ruling Mecca, but Hasan's brother, Thaqabah, opposed such a move because he wanted the position for himself. The problem was solved when the two, Mas'oud and Thaqabah, died and Sharif Hasan received confirmation from the Sultan to appoint his son Abu-Talib as the co-ruler.

In the year 1581, Sharif Hasan led his army into Nejd because the local chiefs broke down earlier agreements. He succeeded in defeating them and entered such towns and fortresses as Al-Kharj, Al-Badi', Al-

⁴¹Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 242.

⁴²Ibid., p. 243.

⁴³Ibid., p. 243.

Salmiyah and Al-Amamiyah and appointed his own men to rule them. "When his spies informed him that the Bani Khalid tribe of Al-Hasa was preparing to fight him, he marched to meet them midway between Nejd and Al-Hasa and defeated them."⁴⁴ Sharif Hasan also participated in other expeditions to other areas either to punish a chief or to expand his Sharifate.

In the year 1585, the keeper of Al-Ka'ba's key, Abdul-Wahid Al-Shaibi⁴⁵ opened Al-Ka'ba for the pilgrims and when he wanted to close it he did not find the golden key. The gates of the Great Mosque were ordered to be closed and the people were searched, but with no result. A few months later "Sinan Pasha, Governor of Yemen found the key with a Persian in Yemen, ordered him to be killed and returned the key to its keeper."⁴⁶ The Persian's action could be the result of the existing bad relation between the Sunni Ottoman and the Shi'i Safavids of Persia.

In the year 1601, Sharif Hasan appointed 'Abdul-Rahman Bin 'Atiq Al-Haddrami⁴⁷ as his vizir. There is no record of any vizir before the period of Sharif Hasan, so it could be assumed that he established this office, copying the Ottoman system to show that his position was equal to that of the Ottoman Sultans. His vizir, Al-Haddrami, did not prove

⁴⁴Abdulmalik Al-Makki, Smitt Al-Nojourn Al-'Awali Fi Anba' Al-Awa'l Wa Al-Tawali (Cairo, Egypt: no date), p. 370.

⁴⁵Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 243.

⁴⁶Al-Khatib, op. cit., p. 114.

⁴⁷Al-Makki, op. cit., p. 382.

to have the qualities and the characteristics of the important office he occupied. Al-Haddrami was unfair in treating the people and became busy in getting wealthier by using forged documents to take over the inheritances of dead people. The subjects could not complain to the Sharif Hasan because the Sharif was under the influence of his vizir. In 1602, Sharif Hasan left Mecca on his way to another expedition in Nejd, but he died in Nejd, and his body was brought back to Mecca to be buried.

IV. SHARIF ABU-TALIB (1602-1604)

When his father Hasan died, Abu-Talib was in Nejd. But he arrived in Mecca the same day the body of his father arrived. The first thing that he did after taking over was to arrest his father's vizir, Al-Haddrami, to try him for the criminal acts he committed. "Al-Haddrami committed suicide in jail and the people stoned him until his body was buried under stones."⁴⁸

Abu-Talib's reign was a short one and he tried to make the people forget Al-Haddrami's acts which blackened the history of his father's rule. Because of Al-Haddrami's story, Abu-Talib never trusted his vizir and dealt with his subjects directly. He treated the outlaws with firmness and became known for his justice. In the year 1604, when he was leading an expedition in the area of Bisha, Abu-Talib died and his body was sent back to Mecca for burial.

V. SHARIF IDRIS (1604-1624)

When Abu-Talib died in 1604 he did not leave any son to succeed

⁴⁸Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 245.

him, and the records do not show that he had a co-partner in ruling the Sharifate. To solve the problem in the customary way, the Ashrafs of Mecca met and elected Sharif Idris, the son of Hasan, to succeed his brother Abu-Talib. The Ashrafs also selected Idris' brother Fuhaid, and nephew Muhsin to act as co-rulers with Idris. The results of the election were sent to the Sultans who replied by sending the letter of confirmation, and the customary Khil'a Al-Sultaniyah.

The new Sharif was a strong one and had a large personal army of slaves and Beduins, but his brother Fuhaid had the same strength and soon occasional fighting broke out between the two groups. Earlier, Sharif Idris disagreed with his nephew Muhsin, so the latter left Mecca for Yemen. "Both brothers tried to put their men in the important positions such as the position of Al-Mufti".⁴⁹ They continued fighting, and disagreements between the two brothers influenced Sharif Idris to ask his nephew to come back as his co-partner. The return of Muhsin angered Fuhaid who left to Turkey where he died in 1612-1613.

After establishing his own control in Mecca, Sharif Idris started sending and leading expeditions into the Highlands of Nejd. It is also reported that "his armies reached near Al-Hasa, where the Turkish Wali invited them to accept his hospitality, but they declined and returned."⁵⁰

Back in Mecca, the Ashrafs became dissatisfied with Sharif Idris' rule for the following reasons:

1. Disagreements between Idris and Muhsin.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 247.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 247.

2. Idris' disrespect for Muhsin's opinion.
3. The increased demands of Idris' slaves.
4. The unfairness of Idris' vizir Ahmad Bin Younis.

As a result of the dissatisfaction, the Ashrafs led by Sharif Ahmad declared a revolt to depose Idris and appoint Muhsin, and fighting broke out in the streets of Mecca. The position of Sharif Idris became endangered because of the defeat of his men. However, he did not show signs of accepting the Ashrafs' demands, but "his sister persuaded him to accept and he agreed to leave Mecca in two months."⁵¹ He left Mecca for a place near the Mount of Shamar in Nejd, where he died two months later in 1624.

The revolt of the Ashrafs of Mecca was the first recorded of its kind during the period which led to the fall of a Sharif. As it was indicated, the reasons were to gain more personal advantages by stopping the growing influence and strength of Idris. The leader of the revolt, Sharif Ahmad was a very ambitious man whose aim was to gain the position for himself, which he did later. The incident also shows the important role of the Sharif's slaves to keep him in power or the opposite.

VI. SHARIF MUHSIN (1624-1628).

When Sharif Idris accepted the demands to step down from the Sharifates the Ashrafs of Mecca sent a letter to the Porte asking that the appointment of Muhsin be confirmed and the Porte agreed by sending the letter of confirmation and Al-Khil'a.

During the three years of his reign, Sharif Muhsin was under the

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 248.

influence of the leader of the revolt, Sharif Ahmad, who took control of the government and used Muhsin to achieve his goals. But the other Ashrafs warned Muhsin of Ahmad's intentions, so Muhsin took control of the government business which led to disagreement with Ahmad.

In 1627-1628, the new Governor Designate of Yemen, Ahmad Pasha, arrived in Jeddah. Because one of his ships with his personal luggage in it was wrecked on a reef near Jeddah, and sunk in deep water, the Pasha sent a message to Sharif Muhsin asking him to send two divers to recover his luggage. After several days of diving "nothing was recovered and Ahmad Pasha believed that Sharif Muhsin had ordered the divers not to recover the Pasha's luggage so the Pasha hanged the Sharif's representatives in Jeddah."⁵² It is also reported that Sharif Ahmad arrived in Jeddah at the time and was thought to have poisoned the Pasha's mind. In any case, the Pasha "arrested and executed both the Governor of Jeddah and the messenger between him and the Sharif of Mecca."⁵³ This was the first such incident of this kind and it showed the weakness of Sharif Muhsin and the beginning of the decline of the Sharifate's influence.

Sharif Ahmad wanted to take more advantage from the Pasha's anger and asked the Pasha for money and troops to depose Muhsin and the Pasha agreed. Suddenly the Pasha died in Jeddah, but Ahmad declared himself a Sharif in Jeddah and led Turkish troops to attack Muhsin in Mecca. Sharif Muhsin left Mecca with an army to meet Ahmad's army, "but upon hearing the news of an uprising in Mecca led by Sharif Mas'oud, the son

⁵²Ibid., p. 249.

⁵³De Gaury, op. cit., p. 133.

of Idris,"⁵⁴ Muhsin decided to return to Mecca. Muhsin's forces engaged Mas'oud's forces in Mecca, and Muhsin's men deserted him, so he fled to Yemen where he died in San'a in 1628.

VII. SHARIF AHMAD (1628-1629)

After the defeat of Sharif Muhsin's forces, Sharif Ahmad entered Mecca with his Turkish forces and declared himself the Sharif of Mecca. He sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan informing him of the changes and the Sultan replied by confirming him in the office.

The new Sharif's policy was to gain personal revenge from Sharif Muhsin by imprisoning, exiling and killing the supporters of Muhsin in Mecca. One of the Meccan personalities that Ahmad tortured in his jail was the Mufti of Mecca, Shaykh 'Abdul-Rahman Al-Murshidi. It is reported that Sharif Ahmad tortured the Mufti because the

Mufti unreasonably prevented his (Ahmad's) marriage to one Sultana Bint 'Ali Shihab and, moreover, during the ceremony of her marriage to another had referred to Ahmad as a devil: lastly, that Ahmad had found beneath a cushion on his predecessor's couch a Fatwa against him by the Mufti.⁵⁵

After a long torture in Ahmad's jail, and because of the news of the near arrival of Amir Al-Haj, Ahmad ordered his men to strangle the Mufti.

Ahmad's policy disturbed the peace in the desert where the tribesmen took advantage of the weak government and began attacking caravans and cutting inland routes. In Mecca itself the soldiers of Ahmad attacked people's houses, including the houses of some Ashrafs and some of the soldiers entered the Great Mosque with their shoes. At the same time,

⁵⁴Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 249.

⁵⁵De Gaury, op. cit., p. 133.

Sharif Ahmad turned against some of his supporters and began torturing them, which frightened Sharif Mas'oud, who earlier had helped Ahmad to dethrone Muhsin.

The news of the disturbances reached the Porte, which ordered the newly appointed Governor of Yemen, Qunsowh Pasha⁵⁶, who was on his way to Yemen, to stop at Mecca and punish Sharif Ahmad for the murder of the Mufti. The Pasha reached Mecca, pretending that he came to make the Pilgrimage, and camped outside of Mecca, where he was joined by Sharif Mas'oud, who feared for his life from Ahmad. After the conclusion of the Pilgrimage Ceremonies, Sharif Ahmad went to the Pasha's camp to pay his respect to the Pasha, and the Pasha persuaded him to enter one of his tents to play chess⁵⁷, where the Pasha's soldiers caught him. When the news of his arrest reached Ahmad's men, they revolted and fighting broke out between them and the Pasha's army. To stop the fighting, the Pasha ordered Ahmad to be beheaded, and he showed the head to Ahmad's men, who then surrendered.

VIII. SHARIF MAS'LOUD (1629)

While the fighting was going on between Ahmad's men and the Pasha's, Mas'oud returned to Mecca, took control of it, and declared himself the new Sharif. He was a weak and peace-minded Sharif, and Qunsowh Pasha took advantage of that and punished some Meccans, and took over their properties. The demands of his army caused prices to rise and goods to disappear in Mecca. The Pasha also "put his hands on the custom dues

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 133.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 135.

of Jeddah and added all of it to the Ottoman treasury, and thus prevented the Sharif from a much needed income".⁵⁸ Sharif Mas'oud's reign was a short one, and he died in early 1629.

IX. SHARIF 'ABDULLAH (1629-1630)

After the death of Mas'oud, the Ashrafs of Mecca met and elected the old Sharif 'Abdullah Bin Hasan to the Sharifate. The elected Sharif refused to accept at first, but he then agreed in order to prevent a war of succession, and the Ottoman Sultan confirmed his election in the customary way. His reign was marked by a stability that was needed after a period of bloodshed and disturbances. The new Sharif stayed in office for one year, and then decided to retire in favor of his son Muhamad with Zaid Bin Muhsin as his co-ruler.

X. SHARIF MUHAMAD (1630-1631)

When the Ottoman Sultan replied by confirming Sharif 'Abdullah's plan of appointing Muhamad and Zaid as co-rulers, 'Abdullah retired and turned the Sharifate over to them. The new Sharif Muhamad ordered the name of his father to be mentioned in the Khuttba⁵⁹. In 1630, "the people of the town of Taif revolted and killed their Sharif"⁶⁰ so Sharif Zaid (co-ruler) led an army which attacked Taif and put down the revolt.

The two co-rulers cooperated with each other, which bothered some

⁵⁸ Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 262.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 253.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 253-254.

of the Ashrafs, who thought that Zaid had no right to be a co-ruler. They tried to turn Muhammad against Zaid to dismiss him and appoint one of his brothers instead, but Sharif Muhammad refused, which cost him the loyalty of some of the Ashrafs such as Nami Bin 'Abdul-Muttalib.

At that time, the Ottomans were badly defeated in Yemen, and the remaining Turks fled Yemen to the north. When Nami heard of their arrival in Qunfudhah, he left Mecca for Qunfudhah, where he succeeded in persuading the soldiers to join him in attacking Mecca. The soldiers marched until they were a few miles from Mecca, and sent to the Sharif of Mecca that they should be permitted to enter Mecca. But the Sharif refused. The soldiers marched into Mecca and engaged the army of the Turkish Sinjuk of Jeddah⁶¹ and the Meccan army, led by the two co-rulers, in a battle which became known as Waqi'at Al-Jalaliyah. The fall of Sharif Muhammad in the battle led to the retreat of his army, and to the fall of Mecca into the hands of the Turkish soldiers and Nami. At the same time, the co-ruler Sharif Zaid fled to the village of Badr and later to Medina where he began preparations to regain Mecca.

XI. SHARIF NAMI (1631-1632)

Nami entered Mecca with the Turkish soldiers, proclaimed himself the Sharif of Mecca, and appointed his cousin, 'Abdul-Aziz Bin Idris, as the co-ruler. In the meantime, his friends the Turkish soldiers looted Mecca, seized food supplies, and it is reported

between them raped every virgin and every boy in the city, those of gentle birth being the first to be seized by the

⁶¹De Gaury, op. cit., p. 138.

lustier soldiers of lower grades. For a week they continued forcibly to make the young of both sexes drunk, so with greater facility to indulge their wantonness.⁶²

The tribes took advantage of the situation, and began to revolt and looted the caravans on the way to Mecca. Meanwhile, "Sharif Nami asked the Sinjuk of Jeddah, Dollar Agha, to surrender the port, but he refused."⁶³ Nami sent his Co-ruler 'Abdul-Aziz with an army which entered Jeddah, looted the houses and the stores, arrested Dollar Agha and expelled him from Jeddah after torturing him.

XII. SHARIF ZAID (1632-1667)

At the same time, Zaid in Medina sent his cousin with a report to the Governor of Egypt, and asked for help to regain Mecca. The report was sent to Sultan Murad IV, who ordered troops to be sent to assist Zaid, whom the Sultan appointed as the new Sharif. Sharif Zaid received Al-Khil'a Al-Sultaniyah in Medina and proceeded to Yunbu' to lead the Ottoman forces sent from Egypt.

Nami heard the news of the coming troops, so he sent some men to scout the troops, but the troops captured and killed some of them and the rest returned to Mecca and warned Nami. As a result of their warning, Nami left Mecca with his Turkish friends for Taraba. A local Sharif, Ahmad Bin Katadah, took control of Mecca and sent a message to Sharif Zaid declaring Mecca an open city, and welcoming the new Sharif. The following day, Zaid entered Mecca.

After the end of that year's pilgrimage season, Sharif Zaid sent

⁶²Ibid., p. 139.

⁶³Al-Siba'i, op. cit., p. 255.

an army to Taraba. The army besieged Taraba for a while, captured Nami and his brother, and brought them to Mecca. After interrogating them, the "Ulama gave a fatwa that the execution of Nami and his brother was permitted, so the Sharif ordered both of them to be hanged."⁶⁴

In this paper we are not concerned with the period of Sharif Zaid, who ruled until 1667. His period was a period of stability, and he succeeded in controlling the tribesmen because of his firmness and the Turkish troops that were under his command to establish law and order. He also succeeded in getting the approval of the Ottoman Sultan for returning to the Sharif the right to half the custom dues of Jeddah, which Qunsowh Pasha cancelled earlier.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 256.

CHAPTER VI

STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE RED SEA

SIXTEENTH CENTURY

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND BEFORE THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

For nearly a thousand years, the Muslims controlled the overland and sea trade between the Orient and Europe. Muslim-controlled ships loaded with products sailed from the Orient to the south of the Persian Gulf, and from there some ships sailed into the Persian Gulf up to Basra in Iraq, where products were transported on land to Syria, to be exchanged for products of the Middle East and of Europe. Some ships sailed through the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea, and unloaded either in Aden, Jeddah or Suez. Products unloaded in Aden or Jeddah would be exchanged there or carried overland to Syria to be exchanged there. The products unloaded in Suez would be carried on camels to Alexandria where they were exchanged. The trade between the Middle East and Europe was controlled by the Venetians.

The Muslim traders faced many difficulties such as: 1) The winds in the sea, which controlled the sailing and the loading or unloading ports.

2) The custom dues that the traders had to pay at each port at which they stopped.

3) The Beduins who forced their own fees for letting the products pass overland.

Toward the end of the fifteenth century, the importance of the

overland routes was reduced because of the following reasons: 1) The enmity between the Mamluks of Egypt and the Safavids in Persia. The continued threats of the Safavids, disturbed the land routes from Basra to Syria.

2) The weakness of the Mamluks, which gave the Beduins a chance to demand more money.

The Muslim traders faced the greatest threat in their monopoly in 1498 when the Portuguese Vasco da Gama succeeded in reaching India by the route of the Cape of Good Hope. And within a decade, the Portuguese took control of most of the trade that the Muslims controlled for a long time. The easy sea trade route by the Cape of Good Hope "permitted the Portuguese to sell the goods cheaper than the Muslim traders."⁶⁵

The rivalry of the Muslims and the Portuguese for the trade of the Orient was not the only reason for the unfriendly relations between them. Other important reasons were: 1) their different religions; 2) the Portuguese hate for the Arabs who ruled them for a long time; 3) the fall of Constantinople into the hands of the Muslims in 1453, and 4) the war waged against the Muslims in North Africa by Spain and Portugal.

II. THE RED SEA IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

In the year 1500, the Portuguese destroyed the ships of some Muslim merchants at the port of Calcutta. The following year, the King of Portugal decided to prevent the Muslims from getting spices from

⁶⁵Z. Al-Mahasini and M. Sharif, Dirasat Tarikhiyah fi Al-Nahddah Al-'Arabiyyeh Al-Hadithah (Cairo, Egypt: no date), p. 190.

India by either paying the Indians more for their goods, or by destroying Muslim ships. In 1502, Portuguese ships seized the port of Kilwa on the eastern coast of Africa, and in 1503, another Portuguese fleet was sent to block the entrance of the Red Sea to all Muslim ships.

These acts of war were challenges that the then defenders of Islam, the Mamluks were faced with. But they were in no good position at that time to answer because of the following reasons: 1) the Mamluks were soldiers not sailors; 2) the Mamluks did not have the needed wood to build a fleet; 3) the need to import the other needed materials and engineers, and 4) the existing ships of Muslim merchants were no match for the Portuguese's. Because of the above reasons, the Mamluks made no attempt to build a fleet.

The success of the Portuguese not only led to hostilities with the Muslims, but also led to the shift of power and wealth from the European countries on the Mediterranean Sea to the Western European countries. The shift affected the Venetians and the Italians which forced them to aid the Muslims in the early stages of the struggle, "by supplying the Mamluks with wood and engineers."⁶⁶

The Portuguese asked the Venetians to transfer their business from Egypt to Lisbon, but the Venetians found that such a transfer would be disastrous, so they refused. Instead they asked the Mamluk Sultan to incite the Indian Muslims and to reduce the dues paid in Egypt. The Sultan refused, and sent a messenger to Rome to "threaten he would destroy the Holy places in Jerusalem,"⁶⁷ if the Portuguese continued to threaten

⁶⁶Al-Ansari, op. cit., p. 127.

⁶⁷U.K. Admiralty, Western Arabia and the Red Sea (London, Great Britain: 1946), p. 258.

Muslim ships. In 1504, the Venetians advised the Mamluk Sultan to dig "a canal from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea."⁶⁸ Such a canal would have reduced the value of the Portuguese controlled Cape of Good Hope route, but the project never was done, although there are reports that some digging was going on in later times. The inability of the Mamluk Sultan to answer the Portuguese's threats forced the Venetians to withdraw their help gradually.

In 1505, the Portuguese sailed into the Red Sea and came up to Jeddah, the port of Mecca, but made no attempt to attack it. This incident alarmed the Mamluk Sultan Al-Ghouri that the holiest Islamic part was in danger, and so was his own prestige as the protector of Islam. Al-Ghouri ordered a fleet to be built, and the Venetians supplied him with the needed wood. At the same time, the Portuguese occupied some important islands and ports in the Indian Ocean, and tried to take Aden, but failed because of its strong defenses.

In 1507, the new Mamluk fleet sailed to Jeddah under the command of the new Governor of Jeddah, Husayn Al-Kurdi, who upon arrival at Jeddah built strong fortifications and a strong protecting wall. The Mamluk's fleet sailed to India and defeated the Portuguese fleet in the Port of Chaul in 1508. But the Mamluks were badly beaten by the Portuguese in the battle of Diu in 1509.

Al-Ghouri decided to build another fleet, but the Venetians refused to supply him with wood because "they were thinking of establishing a new land trade route through Persia and Turkey."⁶⁹ So he turned toward the Ottomans "who supplied him with the needed wood as well as

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 258.

⁶⁹Anis, op. cit., p. 121.

300 cannons."⁷⁰

In 1509, the Ethiopian Empress sent "a messenger to India to suggest to the Portuguese King's viceroy there an alliance against the Muslims."⁷¹ The Ethiopians needed a strong ally to help them against the Muslim states in Abyssinia who were aided by the Mamluks as well as by the Ashrafs of Mecca. The Ethiopian messenger gave the Portuguese information about the eastern coast of the Red Sea and returned home with a Portuguese diplomatic delegation.

In 1509, Albuquerque became the Governor of Portuguese territories in India and decided to take advantage of the new information obtained to penetrate the Red Sea since the Mamluks had no fleet to defend it then. To get the Portuguese King's approval of such an expedition he pointed out that: 1) the Muslim Indians were depending on the Mamluks to help them expel the Portuguese; 2) the Muslim Shah of Bijabour in India helped the Mamluks after their defeat in the battle of Diu, and 3) the importance of occupying Aden to close the entrance of the Red Sea against Muslim ships.

In 1513, Albuquerque attacked Aden but failed to take it, so he penetrated the Red Sea in an attempt to reach Jeddah, but he could not because of the winds. Instead he occupied the Island of Kamaran and attacked Aden again without success, so he sailed back to India.

In 1515, the new Mamluk fleet sailed from Suez under the Turkish commander Salman Al-Rais, with orders to attack the Portuguese possessions in India. In Jeddah, the Governor Al-Kurdi took over the duties

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 121.

⁷¹Mustafa Salim, Al-Fath Al-'Uthmani Al-Awal Lil-Yaman (Cairo, Egypt: 1969), p. 68.

of the commander of the expedition, and decided to use the fleet to establish defenses by occupying important islands in the Red Sea and ports on the Yemeni coast. The fleet failed to take Aden, but succeeded in taking the Island of Kamaran, and fortified it.

In 1517, the new Portuguese Governor, Lopo Soares, led a naval expedition which attacked Aden and forced its ruler to submit, but instead of landing in Aden, he sailed into the Red Sea and made the first serious Portuguese attempt to attack Jeddah. Soares' adventure was described in an interesting way in the chronology of Al-Haddrami, from which I quote because it gives an idea about the style of Muslim historians:

Year 923 H (AD 1517): In this year the Franks, God curse them, came from India to the port of Aden with thirty sailing vessels, consisting of grabs and galliots, making demonstrations of aid to the people of Aden against the Egyptians, and they destroyed nothing in the harbour. A party of them came ashore, then the Emir Mardjan met them on the coast and sent a splendid banquet to them at their ships. They demanded ship-captains (Rubbanin) to go with them to Jeddah, and the Emir Mardjan gave them a number of ship-captains, Syrians against the will of the (said) captains. All this is (indeed) enough (to show) the wickedness of the Franks. They then went on to Jeddah and moored in its harbour, but the Emir Salman was there at the head of an army of Turks and others. They had learned of his (the Frank's) coming to Jeddah and were ready to engage them. However, not one of the Franks landed on the coast at Jeddah; on the contrary, the Emir Salman sought them out in a grabe or two. When he got within range of them, he fired at them with his guns, destroying two or three out of their ships. Then the gunner (Madafi'i) put something in the powder (barut) so that the gun went out of the actions, and the fire burned part of the grabe where Salman was; it is said that the gunner was a Christian serving with Salman, but Salman executed the gunner and returned to Jeddah safe and sound. The Franks removed (tarafa') from the port of Jeddah, returning in the direction of the Yemen. Then Salman or one of his men followed them in a grabe to the vicinity of Luhaiyah (Loheia). Then they saved from the Franks a grabe containing a numver of Franks whom they brought back to Jeddah; then they set out with them to the Sultan, the Lord of the Rum. Some of the Franks went to the port of

Aden, and the Emir Mardjan gave them water that they required, and ransomed some of the prisoners from them. Then they returned, unsuccessful, to Hurmuz, may God abandon them.⁷²

In 1517, the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks, and as a result, they became involved in the struggle in the Red Sea. However, they were not active at the beginning because: 1) they were busy on other frontiers; 2) their nominal control of the Yemeni coast, which was important in forming a defense against the Portuguese, and 3) their main fleet was located in the Mediterranean Sea.

In 1519, at the request of Sharif Barakat II, "the Governor of Egypt sent a small fleet"⁷³ which was stationed in Jeddah, while preparations started in Suez to build a fleet. During the 1517-1520 period, the Portuguese paid more attention to extending their control in the Persian Gulf area, but they continued to send expeditions into the Red Sea to delay Ottoman naval preparations to gain supremacy in the Red Sea. In 1520, a fleet led by De Sequeira entered the Red Sea to land a diplomatic mission on the Ethiopian coast. After landing the mission, he sailed to attack Jeddah, but the winds and the military readiness in Jeddah forced him to change his mind and return to India.

In 1523, another expedition was sent to bring back the Portuguese mission in Ethiopia, and on its way back it stopped at Aden where the local Emir, who was reluctant to submit to Ottoman rule, "told Eiter da Silveira that he would pay tribute if helped against the Turks; a

⁷²Translated by Robert Serjeant, The Portuguese of the S. Arabian Coast (London, Great Britain: 1963), pp. 50-51.

⁷³Anis, op. cit., p. 120.

ship was left there to exact toll in the straits, but the Sheikh imprisoned the crew."⁷⁴

In 1526-1527, the Ottomans sent a fleet to occupy Yemen, but upon arriving in Yemen, a struggle for power took place between the leaders. This struggle caused a delay in the achievement of this goal. When the cooperation between the Portuguese and the Ethiopians threatened the Red Sea, the Turkish Commander Mustafa Birim sailed to the Island of Kamaran, fortified it, and sailed on to Aden in 1529. He besieged Aden, but was defeated by the combined Adani-Portuguese forces. He left Aden, and succeeded in reaching India, where he helped the local Shah to defend Diu, when the Portuguese forces attacked it in 1531.

In 1538, a large Ottoman fleet, under the command of Sulaiman Pasha Al-Khadim, sailed from Suez on its way to India. The Commander fortified the Yemeni coasts and the Island of Kamaran. Then he sailed to Aden, which he took by force. He hanged its Emir and burned the town. The Ottoman fleet left Aden and went to Diu, which it failed to take after a long siege. The fleet returned after suffering a defeat at the hands of the Portuguese.

In 1541, the last Portuguese expedition to the Red Sea left Goa under the leadership of Estevao da Gama. He landed troops at Musawa' and sailed to attack Jeddah, where he succeeded in landing some of his men at Abu Al-Dwa'ir, south of Jeddah. But the then Sharif Abu-Noumi II called for a Jihad (Crusade) and led a large army which forced the Portuguese to depart. After his unsuccessful attack on Jeddah, da Gama

⁷⁴Admiralty, op. cit., p. 260.

sailed as far as Tur, on the Gulf of Suez, but he did not meet the Ottoman fleet and returned to India.

In 1547, the Ottoman navigator Piri Rais led a fleet which recaptured Aden, where an Arab Shaykh had rebelled and asked for Portuguese help. In 1551, Piri Rais sailed again from Suez to expel the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf, but his expeditions suffered heavy losses, and he was blamed for the losses and executed. The withdrawal of the Portuguese from the Red Sea helped the Ottomans to strengthen their positions there, and when a religious civil war broke out in Ethiopia, the Ottomans seized the opportunity and took Musawa' and Sawakin in 1557. The Ottomans signed a treaty with "Emperor Fasilidas of Ethiopia who agreed to close Ethiopian ports to the Portuguese."⁷⁵

Since the 1550's, the Ottoman control of the Red Sea was firmly established, and Muslim ships carrying pilgrims and goods were able to reach Jeddah and Suez, inspite of the presence of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese concentrated their attention on the Persian Gulf area and India where they started facing competition from other Western European powers. With the disappearance of the Portuguese threat, the Ottomans relaxed their preparations and lost interest in the Indian Ocean.

In the late sixteenth century, the British became active in the Eastern trades against the Portuguese and Dutch. In 1608, a British fleet of the East India company, under the command of William Keeling, was ordered to reach Aden to establish a factory there, but the fleet gave up at Socotra and did not reach Aden. After making the Red Sea

⁷⁵Anis, op. cit., p. 131.

an Ottoman Lake, and because of pressure from European powers, British, French etc., the Ottomans agreed to let European ships sail into the Red Sea only up to Jeddah, where they were to unload their cargo, even if it was for Egypt. The cargo bound for Egypt was to be carried on ships owned and manned by Muslims. The Ottomans "refused permission for European ships to land at Suez, and transfer its passengers overland to Alexandria in Egypt."⁷⁶

There is no record of how the Ottomans enforced these regulations, because the Ottoman fleet was not strong enough to stop a combined European fleet. But it could be assumed that the European interest, especially the British, was not directed toward the Red Sea at that time, which permitted the Ottomans to set up these regulations. When the British became more interested in the Red Sea, they did not hesitate to attack Aden and occupy it in the early nineteenth century.

⁷⁶Al-Mahasini and Sharif, op. cit., p. 196.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCLUSION

Looking back at the period that lasted for 112 years, and through which the Holy lands of Islam passed through experiences, some of which were pleasing ones, but most of which were unhappy ones. Al-Hijaz, all through history was the target of any new Islamic dynasty because of its religious importance. Every dynasty was only interested in gaining the title Hami Al-Haramin (Protector of the two Mosques), and having the names of the ruler mentioned in Al-Khutba. The holder of the title not only gained the loyalty and respect of his Muslim subjects, but also the respect of the Muslims in areas that were not under his control.

The pre-Ottoman dynasties did not pay much attention to a strong defense of the Arabian Peninsula, and records show only small garrisons stationed here and there. If those dynasties whose kings or sultans were not Arabs, thought and managed to control the whole Peninsula and established strong forts, the Muslim world would have been able to keep control of the trade and to stop the Portuguese threat and other European threats which followed it later.

In the case of the Ottomans, their interest in the Middle East resulted from the successful Hungarian resistance which halted the Ottoman advances in Eastern and Central Europe, besides the rising Safavid threats in Persia. Helped by the weakness of the Mamluks, the Ottomans overran the Mamluk's Kingdom and quickly acquired the title of

the Protector of Islam, as a result of the submission of the local ruler of Mecca.

The Ottoman administration did not help to improve conditions of the Holy lands. By leaving matters to the local rulers, the Ottomans did not help to bring stability, because of the struggle for power among the members of the Ashrafs. The Ottomans did not spend enough to improve the internal conditions, and the amount they spent was used for religious reasons to lift the prestige of the Sultan, or to pay local leaders or tribes that the Ottomans failed completely to control only temporarily.

When the Ottomans interfered, they interfered to strengthen their position, not to improve conditions in the area. The period was full of terrible incidents in which Turkish generals and soldiers acted in a distasteful way that only showed disrespect for the Holy places and its local and superior rulers. The irregularity and the disrespect showed the weak regulations that controlled the Ottoman armies at that time.

I do not think that only the Ottomans could be blamed for that bad situation; the local rulers should share a part of the blame. As it was shown in the chapter on the local rulers, they personally enjoyed the revenues coming from the Ottoman Sultan, and from the custom dues of Jeddah. Everyone was interested in keeping himself in power and in increasing his revenue by raiding nearby areas. The unwise traditional system that each Sharif was to have his own army of slaves did not help to establish order, instead it caused disorders and bloodshed. We saw how the ambitions of Sharif Ahmad led to the fall of two Sharifs and the losing of innocent people's lives.

During most of the period, the Ottomans opposed Sharif's expan-

sion into the area south of Al-Hijaz, but did not interfere against expeditions into Nejd. This policy served the Ottomans enabling them to control the important and easily defended coastal area, while the difficult task of controlling the desert was left to the Ashrafs. At that same time, the Ashrafs' actions could be considered as attempts to establish a dynasty in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as to increase their own income.

As for the defense of the Holy lands against foreign powers, the Ottomans stationed small troops in Jeddah, and if it were not for the strong fortifications of Jeddah built earlier, the Portuguese would have succeeded in reaching the two Holy Cities. The Ottomans followed the same policy of not trying to control the whole Arabian Peninsula, although at that time a greater danger, represented by the Portuguese, existed.

But I do not think that anyone, or at least myself, can deny the important role the Ottomans played to protect the Holy lands when the danger arose. Although they employed a small power of theirs, they succeeded in ending the Portuguese threat, but they did not try to show enough force to stop the European threats in the South Arabian Coast and the Persian Gulf area.

The Holy lands continued to suffer from the same conditions of misuses of authorities by local rulers, from tribal raids and from bad behavior of Turkish officials, which helped to keep it in an unstable condition for a long period.

With the coming of the present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Holy lands began to enjoy a stability that they did not enjoy since the early period of Islam. For the first time, the inhabitants began to enjoy

having a responsible government whose interest is not to raise its prestige in the eyes of the Muslims, but also to improve the over all conditions. The increased and continuous activities of the Saudi government helped to establish law and to improve the economic, educational and social aspects of life in the Holy lands.

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