1971

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Dennis Brian Keenan
Portland State University

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Recommended Citation

Keenan, Dennis Brian, "Interorganizational Coalitional Decision-making: an Exploratory Investigation" (1971). *Dissertations and Theses*. Paper 1682.
<https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1681>

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(INTERORGANIZATIONAL COALITIONAL
DECISION-MAKING): AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION

by

DENNIS BRIAN KEENAN

A practicum report submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF
SOCIAL WORK

Portland State University

1972

Approved by

Gerald A. Frey

Sumner M. Sharpe

PREFACE

This study is one of four exploratory studies concerned with coalitions of organizations that are formed to plan and develop social welfare programs within the local community. Although each study was conducted independently, taken together, their major purpose was to develop some insights and knowledge into the behavior of organizations and the ways in which they interact as they work together to develop community programs. They are then, exploratory studies of interorganizational behavior.

Each of the studies had a different focus. One study attempted to identify the present areas of agreement and disagreement regarding interorganizational behavior by systematically reviewing the literature over the past ten years. Another focused on the stages of development of the coalition, attempting to determine if organizational coalitions seemed to follow similar developmental patterns as has been reported in the literature on small groups. Another focused on the decision-making patterns in the coalitions by first reviewing the literature and constructing a decision-making model and then "testing" the model against a set of case histories. The final study, following a grounded theory approach, simply tried to identify a set of common variables or analytical categories which seemed to be present in a number of coalitions. Al-

though each of these exploratory studies was conducted independently with a different emphasis and analytical focus, they each utilized the same data - a set of case histories of coalitions. Consequently, each of the studies utilized a common set of data but viewed the data from quite different analytical perspectives.

The particular focus of this study is upon the decision-making patterns in coalitions. In reviewing the literature, formulating an analytical model, and applying the same to the case studies, two principal areas of concern are focused upon: decision-making power analysis and decision-making process analysis. The literature provided essentially no material on coalitional decision-making as such. However, the broader category of organizational decision-making behavior did contain conceptual and theoretical notions which were applicable to coalitional decision-making by means of inference and extrapolation into hypothetical propositions around power and process issues. These 2 dimensions were then explored through the use of these hypothetical propositions by "testing" them against the case history data. The results were then assessed with subsequent modifications where conceptual weaknesses were evident. A final chapter was included to relate what the researcher learned, what other researchers might learn from that experience,,

and what Social Work could learn from the study about the area of coalitional decision-making.

There is nothing new about the concept of a coalition of organizations. Organizational coalitions have been formed and reformed ever since man began working through organizational structures. They are common, everyday occurrences, yet surprisingly little is known about them since much of the theoretical work has focused on coalitions of individuals or small groups or on the alliances and coalitions of political groups and nations. Surprisingly little work has been done specifically on organizational coalitions.

A coalition of organizations is an interorganizational structure. That is, a structure in which two or more organizations deliberately relate their behavior to each other as when several organizations jointly agree to plan some new program in the community. They are also unique structures in that each of the organizations maintains its own autonomy, but for a period of time they work together around some common issue or mutual problem.

Coalitions, in contrast to other types of interorganizational structures such as councils or federations, tend to be ad hoc and issue-oriented structures. That is, there is little permanence to the structure. A group of organizations join together around an issue, meet for a period of time, and simply

disband or dissolve once the issue is resolved. They are rather fluid and amorphous structures but they do represent one of the ways that organizations cooperate with each other.

Within recent years the coalition has been viewed as a possible means to coordinate disparate programs within the community. The Office of Economic Opportunity and the United Way of America have jointly sponsored a project to examine the use of coalition in the planning process. To some degree then, the coalition seems to be an increasingly important structure and one that needs to be fully understood by the planner if it is to be effectively utilized.

Consequently, an increased knowledge of organizational behavior, especially on the relationship between organizations, would not only aid the planner in his daily tasks but at the same time contribute to the limited knowledge of interorganizational behavior.

CHAPTER 1
Review Of The Literature

The literature reviewed was concerned with two primary areas of analysis of decision-making: power and process.

I. Power Analysis Of Decision-Making

While few of the works reviewed dealt primarily with interorganizational coalitions, most of them in some way were concerned with the issue of power and influence in the decision-making process, which often secondarily related to the issue of coalitions. These writings focused on matters of theory, structure, and exchange.

A. Theoretical:

Because of the general recognition of the significance of power and influence in decision-making, a review of methods of power analysis and theory was regarded to be helpful. Consequently, the perspectives of four scholars of power and influence analysis will be briefly summarized.

Interorganizational coalitions, being an informal, temporary coalescence of members from separate formal organizations with their own respective interests, the relevance of power theory is evident. Terry Clark summarizes the three analytical models which are most broadly used to ascertain the power structure of decision-making: "positional," "reputational," and "decisional." The "positional method" attempts to discover community "leaders" through compiling a list of the occupants of the top positions in significant "community organizations."¹

The "reputational method" gathers a panel of community mem-

bers and asks them about the leaders in the community; and, from this, a list of leaders is developed. A variation of this method is the "issue-specific reputational method." It asks informants to score or rank individual community leaders with regard to their power in "specific issue areas." ²

The "decisional method" follows the history of specific decisions or issue areas and seeks to identify the significant persons who were involved in the actual decisions and those whose recommendations were accepted. It does not deal with indirect influence and value bias influences. The decisional method can be refined further by taking into account the impact of past decisions upon current power structures. ³

Three writers, Banfield, Dahl, and Polsby attempt to devise theoretical models of power and influence analysis in more operational terms. The first of the authors, Edward Banfield, defines "influence" as the "ability to get others to act, think, or feel as one intends." Viewed within a social or political context of "concerted" decision-making and activity, Banfield asserts that "Any cooperative activity - and so any organization, formal or informal, ephemeral or lasting - may be viewed as a system of influence." ⁴ To obtain an overview of relevant material from Banfield, the study will examine his analytical model for studying influence and secondly, his propositions about the operations of influence.

The basic conceptual scheme used by Banfield to analyze "influence" in his case studies was constructed around four principal questions::

1. "Who has influence and who is subject to it?"
2. "How does influence work?"
3. "What are the terms upon which influence is expended?"
4. "How is action concerted by influence?" 5

From his analysis of casestudies through the use of the above model, Banfield derived certain basic propositions about the processes of influence. Among others, these included:

1. The wider the distribution of authority, the larger the stock of power that is required if proposals are to be adopted.
2. As the number of autonomous actors in a situation increases, the probability of adoptions decreases.
3. As the number of autonomous actors increases, control tends to become less structured.
4. The more power an actor has, the less he will be affected by uncertainty in his efforts to secure control.
5. The more kinds of power an actor has, the greater the probability that he can secure control in a given case.
6. The probability of adoptions (and the probability that there will not be much compromise) tends to increase as the correspondence improves between the kinds of power that powerholders have at their disposal and the kinds to which actors will respond.
7. The "economies of scale" that arise from controlling a structure and from having a large and varied "inventory" of power give a cumulative advantage to certain actors and thus may lead to structural centralization.
8. In situations where there is a shortage of power in relation to profitable opportunities for its exercise (i.e., a shortage of investment capital), there will be a tendency to kill some proposals and to compromise others in order to increase the supply of power.
9. When public-regarding power does not suffice to meet the needs of a system (either because there is not enough of it or because those over whom control is to be established will not respond to it) there will be a tendency to employ private-regarding power in its place. 6

The second writer, Robert Dahl also proposes a model for analyzing power and its use. For Dahl, power is the capacity of one actor to influence the other to the extent that the second does something he would not do otherwise. Dahl then delineates certain propositions about influence. He maintains that there are three essential concepts or propositions which serve to ex-

plain why some actors have more influence than others, as well as, demonstrating the difference between "potential" and "actual influence:

1. Some actors have more political resources at their disposal than others. Cr
2. Given the resources at their disposal, some actors use more of them to gain political influence. Cr
3. Given the resources at their disposal some actors use them more skillfully or effectively than others do. 7

He also asserts the existence of two basic types of influence: "coercive influence" (negative, positive; punishment, reward) and "reliable influence" (high probability of compliance). 8

A third writer, Nelson W. Polsby, is concerned with scrutinizing the existing power analysis approaches in terms of the questionable validity of their methodology. In his analysis, he defines power as "the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events." 9 There are three basic questions in the power analysis theories according to Polsby: "(1) the problem of identifying and characterizing participants in decision-making, (2) the problem of determining who gains and who loses from outcomes of decisions, (3) the problem of discovering what makes for successful participation in decision-making." 10

Polsby assumes a pluralist notion of society and community power. From studies utilizing the above analytical framework for investigation, Polsby has drawn some general propositions about power in decision-making. With respect to "who governs," he maintains that decision-making participants are usually specialized in certain "issue areas." He holds that this limits appli-

cability of an elitist model of power. In the area of "who gains" and "who loses," Polsby cautions the universality and reliability of these questions, because many value outcomes of community decisions are frequently distributed in "unintended, unanticipated ways" and the powerful often intentionally "distribute values to the nonpowerful." So, while useful for analyzing value distribution, the above inquiry is not useful in disclosing power structures. The issue of "who succeeds" is approached by the use of three indices: "when an actor initiates some community policy, meets with no opposition, and it is enacted; when an actor prevents the policy of some other actor from being enacted; and when an actor initiates a policy, meets with opposition, and the policy is enacted." ¹¹

One of the usual methods whereby actors assure their success for Polsby is through coalition formation. He has developed certain hypotheses about these coalitions. They are established by actors to increase their resources to pursue their own ends. Subsequently, actors with complementary resources often coalesce. Secondly, there needs to be compatibility of goals and strategies of members. Subsequently, the larger the coalition the more "fragile" it is and the more limited its goals and viewpoint. ¹²

Summary:

All of the authors above have concerned themselves with analyzing power in decision-making in terms of what can be called a "decisional model." It is one of the general methods described by Clark. In his terms, it consists of a history of specific

decisions and identification of those involved in the decisions and those who were successful. The other writers, Banfield, Dahl, and, to some extent, Polsby, utilize an analysis of decisions and their opponents and proponents to assess power and influence. They all define "influence" in terms of one actor being successful in imposing his decisions, intentions, and interests upon another actor. Polsby qualifies this phenomenon with the assertion that, while this may be true, it rarely occurs as a zero-sum result. Banfield, Dahl, and Polsby maintain that actors utilize their resources to attain their goals which means to increase their interests or domain. In terms of differences, Banfield tends to identify influence with the possession of power resources; Dahl identifies influence with not only the possession ("potential") of resources but with whether and how they are used ("actual"); Polsby identifies influence with the actual outcome of decisions which is usually coalitional sharing, instead of zero-sum vanquished or victor.

(B. Structural:

The structural element of a power analysis of decision-making is basically concerned with the internal and external operation and ordering of the power and decision-making relationships of the actors involved.

1. Internal

The internal structure of organizational power in decision-making will be reviewed first. The views of five writers, Long, Dror, Presthus, Lippett, and Lindblom will be considered.

In an article concerned more with intraorganizational decision-making, Norton E. Long analyzes decision and policy-making as a political system. He emphasizes that organizational distribution of labor fosters the proliferation of expertise in specific problem areas to specific individuals who become "virtual representatives of the problem area in the decisional process." Within organizations this leads to the departmentalization of interests with the formation of "extra-organizational constituencies." The "specialized" expert within the organization comes to rely upon this as a "political base" to support "his position in the internal decision-making process."¹³ The relevance of this political dynamic to interorganizational coalition members is evident in their preservation or promotion of what Warren calls organizational "domain." This "domain" is analogous to Long's departmentalized "interests" of expert organizational actors.

Some notions about internal structural decision-making variables of broader application are presented by Yehezkel Dror. Not all of Dror's propositions will be mentioned, because his primary interest is in developing an "Optimal Model" for decision-making and several assertions are not relevant to the purposes of this paper. Those generalizations which are relevant will be discussed according to Dror's arrangement of them in what he regards to be the basic units of systems of decision-making: "individual, small-group, and organizational."

Significant "individual" decision-making subunit characteristics and influences of each decider include their: (1) individual characteristics, (2) "emotional-physical state", (3) opin-

ion giving environment, (4) perception and availability of the data. ¹⁴

The only really significant and relevant "small-group" subunit decision-making characteristics and influences concern the group's "structure and history," the relationships among participants, group leadership, "the formal role-definitions of the group, and the nature of the issue to be decided." ¹⁵

Useful "organizational" decision-making subunit characteristics, processes, and structures include:

- (1) Few instances of "formal rules and doctrines."
- (2) Only a few "sophisticated officials" are conscious of and able to manipulate decision-shaping forces.
- (3) Organizational decision-making generally "follows semi-structures, that are mainly informal, channels and modes" of "traditions, power relations, and formal divisions of work."
- (4) Organizational decisions are the outcome of its many "sub-decision units."
- (5) "Bargaining and coalition formation."
- (6) Few "clear operational goals," "little data" and "limited search for alternatives." ¹⁶

Also concerned with the internal structure and dynamics of organizational decision-making is Robert V. Presthus. He is primarily interested in organizational authority on the level of interpersonal relationships in organizations. He defines authority as a "transactional process" of "interpersonal relationships." In this process authority is validated by legitimation based on four variables: "technical expertise; formal role or position in the organization's hierarchy; rapport with others; and individual psychological deference to authority."¹⁷ This approach fails to give consideration to many power variables.

Another psychological view of authority processes which is

deeply concerned with power relationships is given by Lippitt, et. al.:

- (1) In groups a real consensus upon who is powerful tends to occur;
- (2) A group member is more likely to accept direct attempts to influence him from a person he defines as powerful;
- (3) The average group member will tend to initiate deferential, approval-seeking behavior toward higher power choices.¹⁸

Charles E. Lindblom has analyzed decision-making on the level of policy formation in part in terms of authority and of informal systems of cooperation.

Lindblom's definition of authority includes that "if x can routinely exert power or influence over y because y accepts a rule that he obey, then x has authority over y." Authority is limited and specific. It is also a "concession" to obey by the "controlled" to the "controller." In situations "Where A lacks authority over B, he will use his authority elsewhere to achieve an influence on B." He further maintains that structural and rule changes tend to be revolutionary if they are of drastic proportions. Consequently, status quo influences usually remain predominant and changes are typically "incremental."¹⁹

Also related to decision-making for Lindblom is the significance of informal systems of cooperation. He principally is concerned with the process whereby policy makers adjust their interests and goals mutually through informal processes. The methods of adjustment include: (1) "negotiation," "mutual persuasion" or exchanging "threats and promises," (2) "creating and discharging obligations" - network of mutual "debts," (3) "third persons," (4) "direct manipulation," - use of authority to in-

fluence others, and (5) "adaptive adjustments" defer to those with higher knowledge and authority. 20

Summary: The internal structuring of organizational decision-making is essentially concerned with two issues: leadership and process. Long and Presthus both view expertise as a source of organizational decision-making authority. In addition, Presthus, as well as Lindblom, regard formal role and rule defining authority as another basis of leadership. Both Presthus and Lippett recognize the significance of individual deference to authority among the less powerful. Lippett maintains that authority also results from group consensus as to who is most powerful. In coalitions formal roles would tend to be minimized because of its usually being an informal group, and deference to power would be of minor impact due to the operation of the pursuit of self interest. This would tend to leave expertise and consensus as the most likely sources of authority.

Structures evident in decision-making processes are alluded to by Dror and Lindblom. They both regard the process to be highly informal and characterized by bargaining and manipulation. For Dror, the informality of structure extends to rules, roles, methods and operations in decision-making. These seem quite consistent with the concept of coalitions as ad hoc, informal entities.

2. External

The implications of external structures in the power analysis of coalitional decision-making will be considered next. The

writers reviewed who discussed this topic area included: Reid, Zald, and Dror.

William Reid deals with external relationships on the inter-organizational level. He identifies three possible "modes of organizational co-existence:" independence, interdependence, and conflict.

Organizations are independent of one another, when they do not need the resources of the other to achieve their goals and when the other is not interfering in their "goal achievement." Interdependence exists when organizations see their own goals to be more efficiently realized with the supplement of the resources of the other. Their goals need not be identical, but the perception of the organizational interdependence must be conscious. Conflict arises when the goal attainment of one or more organizations takes place at the cost of the goal attainment of others. 21

Mayer N. Zald discusses the conditions affecting whether formal organizations will be likely to co-ordinate and co-operate with each other. The greater the marginal profits of an organization and/or the greater the symbiotic relationship between agencies, the greater the likelihood of co-ordination. The greater an organization is committed to a set program and strategy, the less the likelihood of co-ordination. 22

He maintains that "Organizations, in attempting to achieve ends, form external alliances, curry favor, and conform to the requirements of agents having greater power." The extent to which these relations become stable for a member organization (focal)

is important, because:

First, the greater the sanction and resource control of the other party, or the coalitional alliance, the less the autonomy of the focal organization ...

Second, the more a focal organization is bound into a stable external political structure, the more areas of internal policy-setting are influenced by the coalition. ²³

Dror is concerned about the significance of coalitions for external policy execution. He maintains that coalitions are essential in this regard. Some of the points which he regards as relevant to policy-making include:

- (1) The probability of forming a coalition able to execute a policy depends upon the characteristics of the policy, power distribution, and the structure and tendency to form coalitions by the "involved social and political institutions."
- (2) Given number one, the formation of a policy is significantly shaped by the need for a strong enough execution coalition.
- (3) The need to form a coalition limits the possible alternatives but does not eliminate the "freedom of choice" of policy-makers.
- (4) Each potential coalition member decides whether to join based upon power gain and value system. ²⁴

Summary: While distinct in their approaches to the external structure of coalitional decision-making, there are definite links between the propositions of each author. The common elements divide into the basis or motivation for interorganizational co-ordination and into the implications for the autonomy of members in decision-making.

The commonly identified motive for coalition formation is self interest: either to expand or to protect one's domain.

Reid says that independence exists between organizations when they do not need the resources of others. On the other hand

Reid says that interdependence arises when organizational goals

are realized or, protected better with the assistance of the other's resources. In like manner, Zald sees co-ordination in instances of marginal profits where the resources of other organizations are desirable. Dror maintains that members join coalitions to gain power, promote their value system or better assure the successful execution of a policy.

The autonomy of coalition members, according to Zald, is limited relative to the coalition's control of resources and member involvement in a stable coalitional, political structure. Dror, on the other hand, looks at the limitations of alternatives the coalition can pursue as a whole, as the result of being composed of members of various interests.

C. Exchange:

The subject of exchange in power analysis of coalitional decision-making will be examined next. It provides a complex set of variables to be analyzed. Nuttall, Scheuch, and Gordon present broad conceptualizations of the conditions of influence and exchange. Adrian and Press present an analysis of cost, while Clark, Reid, and Blau discuss types of exchange situations.

1. Conditions:

The first model to be reviewed which analyzes the area of resources and exchange is done by Nuttal, Scheuch, and Gordon. Their model seeks a "conceptualization of conditions of influence." Their typology of influence is built upon two central dimensions of the actors: "(1) actual access to relevant re-

sources ... and, (2) whether or not others in the system credit him with this possession." 25

Some of the key concepts around resource access include sanction, resource, and authority. They define sanction as "anything which can be applied to a person, group or collectivity (an actor) which the given actor subjectively defines as rewarding or harmful." Resource is defined as "anything which allows one actor to control, provide, or apply a sanction (positive or negative) to another actor." The actual process of sanctioning is thus the "actual use of resources to reward or harm another." Within this scheme authority is "the legitimated 'right' of the certified incumbent of a position to make binding commitments regarding the collectivity's policies and resources, and to direct the activities of his subordinates." In the phenomenon of "influencing the outcome of decision-making," the resources of an actor are either direct (own) or indirect (through others) and the power (control) is "legitimated" (authority) or "not legitimated" (unauthorized, coercion or deterence). The strategies of influence which they identify are: (1) "persuasion," (2) "inducement" (3) "invoking obligation," (4) "structuring" (available alternatives), (5) "manipulating the perception of these alternatives," (6) "diverting the other's attention," (7) "coercion." Another key concept is "generality" of resource which "denotes the number of situations (or contexts) and actors for which the very same resource is effective in influencing." In an exchange of resources there are two actors: "one of whom possesses" and the other a "receptor." 26

In order to analyze a particular decision-making process it is important to consider: "(1) the types of resources each actor possesses, (2) the presence of receptors for them, and (3) the type or mode of resources which is crucial for the decision being made." Also the extent to which an actor can transform his resources into other types is basic to his influence. Furthermore, in analysis, the typology which these writers propose is constructed around two basic dimensions: "(1) the actual ability to apply a resource in sanctioning if payoff time comes, and (2) the belief of the other actors that the actor possesses or controls the resource which would allow him to sanction. The cross-cutting of these two dimensions results in four categories of influentials:

	PERCEIVED ACCESS TO RESOURCES	
	Yes	No
<u>ACTUAL ACCESS TO RESOURCES</u>	Yes	Manifest Influence
	No	Reputed Influence
		Potential Influence
		Without Influence

The authors then state hypotheses about each category of actor::

- (1) "Actors without Influence" ... "will try to change the mode or structure of a decision-making system."
- (2) "Actors with reputed influence" and who know it "will try to avoid a demand for pay-off sanctions." Also, in systems with many crises, few actors will have "reputed influence" while decision-making systems with few recent crises will have many actors with "reputed influence."
- (3) "Actors with potential influence" once they sanction usually are seen by others as having consumed their resource and become "without influence" or others believe it is consumed when it is not and the actor remains in a situation of "potential influence."
- (4) "Actors with manifest influence" will influence decisions

mostly by the "invocation of resources." Whether they use up a resource after a particular decision and how others view them will determine in which of the four categories they will be. ²⁸

Other key hypotheses include:

- (1) The order of readiness to sanction will be "potential," "manifest," "reputed."
- (2) Except for actors whose goal is to increase their influence, actors will avoid "pay-offs" unless they will lose influence if they do not. ²⁹

2. Costs:

The next writers, Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, are interested in "decision costs in coalitions." While the basis of the discussion is coalitions, the main focus is on the costs involved in the formation and decision-making of coalitions. The notion of coalition which they use is related to the notion of a subunit of a larger formal body. This subunit, however, is the dominant force in the formal group. They define a "winning coalition" as "any portion of the group that can decide to do or not to do something that is on the agenda of the group and over which it has competent authority." Once the formal rules decide what is needed for a winning coalition, the size and composition of the coalition is in theory set by the total of the "decision costs involved for participants." The "costs" are influenced primarily by three principles: (1) "unanimity principle" group pressure for unanimity (derived from small group theory), (2) "size principle" attempt to achieve "minimal winning coalitions" to maximize "payoffs," (3) "indispensible membership principle" deals with the situations in which certain powerful parties must

be included for it to succeed. 30

The authors next are interested in discussing the different types of "decision costs." These include: (1) "information costs," (2) "responsibility costs," (3) "intergame costs," (4) "division - of - payoffs costs," (5) "dissonance costs," (6) "inertia costs," (7) "pressure - of - time costs," (8) "persuasion costs." 31

3. Situations:

There are three authors who present somewhat differing views of the situation of exchange. Clark characterizes it by mutuality, while Reid and Blau contend that conflict and inequality are predominant in exchange situations.

For Clark the crucial stage of the formation and exercise of power occurs when "one actor is able to offer to others some kind of commodity which places them in his debt." In situations of mutual, reciprocal exchange, he has developed five possible relationships: (1) "reciprocation in kind," (2) "reciprocationof an entirely different sort," (3) "noblesse oblige," (4) institutionalized "altruism," and (5) "circular" "path" of exchanges. 32 He adds three qualifications of the exchange system: (1) "the more general the resource - ... utility ... diverse- the greater the potential for extension of the exchange system;" (2) "the larger the number of resources ...; the more direct, complex, and extensive exchanges in the system may become;" (3) "the greater the consensus among members of a social system on basic values ... the more extensive, complex, and

indirect may be the exchange relationships among members of the system." ³³ For Clark, there are three basic categories of exchange values of resources: "prestige value," "institutionalization importance," and "power value." ³⁴

Reid's notions of exchange are derived from his interpretation of inter-organizational conflict. The first type of conflict is the "competitive situation" wherein there is a struggle over acquiring scarce "resource inputs." The second type is the "bargaining situation" wherein disagreement occurs over what and how much of resources are to be contributed by whom in exchanges. The third type is the "legitimacy issue" concerned with disputes over "output of resources" by one organization as defeating the goals of another. If this is done, organizations can refuse to legitimate one another's goals and domains. ³⁵

Peter Blau's scheme assumes that inequalities in power exist and develop among actors. In instances of the exercise of power by a more powerful actor upon a less powerful actor, the exchange can be analyzed through the use of a model he has formulated. The key elements in this structure are: "alternatives to compliance" (choices to less powerful for noncompliance), "conditions of independence" (essentials to less powerful to be non-compliant), "requirements of power" (essentials for powerful to force compliance), and "structural implications" (areas involved that should be studied). The scheme is as follows:

Alternatives to Compliance	Conditions of Independence	Requirements of Power	Structural Implications
1. Supply inducements	Strategic resources	Indifference to what others offer	Exchange and distribution of resources.
2. Obtain elsewhere	Available alternatives	Monopoly over what others need	Competition and exchange rates.
3. Take by force	Coercive force	Law and Order	Organization and differentiation.
4. Do Without	Ideals lessening needs	Materialistic and other relevant values	Ideology formation

Summary: The section on exchange has had writings, which not so much disagree among themselves, as much as, they complement each other.

Nuttall, et. al. present a model which stresses the conditions of influence and exchange, which are basic to power analysis. The notions of perceived and actual influence are helpful to coalitional analysis, especially since coalitions in their early stages are characterized by a lack of inter-member familiarity, which, in turn, would initially base a great deal on appearances. A gamut of strategies could also be utilized. The three analytical questions pertaining to resources are useful tools

and directly pertain to the areas considered by the other "exchange" writers. These questions concern: (1) each actor's resources, (2) presence of receptors for them, (3) type of resources necessary for the decision being made.

Adrian and Press are concerned about the types of costs incurred by decisions, which in turn require resources to support them. They are concerned with the feasibility and consequences of coalitional decision costs and variables influencing them, such as, the unanimity and size principles and the impact of the indispensable member.

The only real area of disparity among the writers is found between Clark, and Reid and Blau. Clark characterizes exchange relationships as mutual exchange and co-operation and consensus, while Reid and Blau maintain that situations of exchange are based on inequality and conflict among members. In coalitional behavior, it is conceivable that either consensus or conflict relations could exist depending upon the level of scarcity of resources and interdependence or dependence of actors.

II. Process Analysis Of Decision-Making

The actual process of decision-making in coalitions will now be addressed. The literature reviewed was of a broad scope, and the authors did not specify coalitional dynamics for their principal focus of analysis. However, as with the writers reviewed for the section on power analysis, these writers secondarily covered issues relevant to coalitions. The two main areas discussed in these works are decision-making typologies and phases.

A. Typologies:

This section presents different schemes that have been developed to categorize decision-types. The authors who were reviewed were: Braybrooke and Lindblom, William J. Gore, and Harvey and Mills.

Braybrooke and Lindblom have formulated a typology that is constructed around two focal concepts: (1) degree of change brought by decision, (2) adequacy of information and understanding available to the decision-makers. Their decision types include:

(a) decisions that effect large change and are guided by adequate information and understanding; (b) decisions that effect large change but are not similarly guided - hence, at an extreme, blind or unpredictable decisions; (c) decisions that effect only small change and are guided by adequate information and understanding, and (d) decisions that effect small change but are not similarly guided, being therefore subject to constant reconsideration and redirection. 37

Expressed in a grid box it appears as follows:

		INFORMATION	
		adequate	inadequate
CHANGE	Large		
	Small		

William J. Gore attempts to develop a typological model which also addresses itself to the variable of "change." It is Gore's contention that "recurring" or "programmed" decisions have been the only types of decisions studied while "nonrecurring" and "nonprogrammed" decisions have been left unanalyzed. 38 He then delineates a typology which attempts to incorporate both main categories of decisions in a three element continuum:

1. "Routine decisions," "correspondence between the prefabricated response and the response required by the situation."
2. "Incremental change" and decisions, "to adjust to an anticipated state of affairs." Usually operates by way of informal procedures based on experience. It is more apt to concentrate upon "negotiation and development of new understandings," because it focuses upon problems and not tasks (routine decisions).
3. "Innovative decisions" concern a "major change in activity and operation which leads to a change in goals, purposes, or policies." 39

This model also incorporates an analytical position on the phases which these different decision types tend to follow. This will be presented under the following section on "phases."

Harvey and Mills have developed a typology of decision-making similar to Gore's. However, they refer to decisions as solutions. Their basic categories are routine and innovative solutions. In addition, they emphasize that while routine solutions tend to be used for routine problems and innovative solutions for innovative problems, routine solutions can be used for innovative problems and innovative solutions for routine problem.⁴⁰ They have also expressed this model in terms of phases which will be discussed later.

Summary: There are connecting factors which run through the concepts of each of the above writers. They are all concerned with the decision response in their typologies. There are other commonalities from author to author.

Braybrooke and Lindblom focus upon the variables of information and change. Information can be adequate or inadequate. Change can be large or small. Gore is also concerned with change. What Braybrooke and Lindblom refer to as "large change," Gore

calls "innovative." What they designate "small change" is comparable to Gore's category "incremental change," adjustment. What Gore calls "routine," they do not have a designation for, but conceivably it would be classified "no change."

While addressing the issue of change resulting from a decision, Gore does not discuss information, as do Braybrooke and Lindblom.

Harvey and Mills also are concerned with innovative and routine decisions or "solutions" but draw a further distinction which none of the other writers presented - innovative and routine problems. The other authors appear to have assumed a continuity between problems and solutions. In addition, Harvey and Mills' model does not refer to the variable of information.

Taking all of the authors together, there emerge three central variables: problem, information, and solution (decision). If the solution and problem types are expanded to 3 (routine, incremental, and innovative) and information to 2 (adequate and inadequate), then a rather extensive typological scheme results. It is feasible that coalitions being informal and transcient that all problems would tend to be innovative, but this is probably only the case during the initial phases of the group. Consequently, problem type remains a viable factor. If the variable "information" is introduced into a typology with the variables "problem" and "solution," the question arises as to which of the two, if not both, does adequate and inadequate information refer. Braybrooke and Lindblom appear to be referring only to the "change solution," since they do not even discuss the vari-

able "problem." However, whether actors have adequate knowledge about the problem with which they are confronted, as well as, the adequacy of the "decision solution" chosen, seem to both bare a significance in categorizing decision-making.

B. Phases:

This section concerns itself with models which depict possible stages through which coalitions pass in their decision-making process. Again, this material is of broader applicability than coalitions, but it will be assessed in terms of coalitions. Two writings referred to under the section on typologies have phase models built upon those typologies (Gore, and Harvey and Mills). Two other works focus on stages or phases of "rational" decision-making (Brim and Glass, and Simon).

Gore typifies the overall process and interaction of routine, incremental, and innovative decisions as a rhythmic movement. "The essential rhythm of organizational adjustment is from routine to adaptive to routine; or from routine to adaptive to innovative and back to adaptive and eventually to routine again." 41

Harvey and Mills have formulated a sequential "path-way" model to illustrate the stage process. Its phases include: "Issue-perception and formation of goals," "search and the use of expectations," "choice of solution," and "redefinition -" the attempt by others to "evade or modify such outcomes." 42 The attached illustrative flow chart will demonstrate these patterns. It should be mentioned that for both routine and innovative prob-

lem situations "Path 1" is usually chosen by well-established "low-threat" organizations, "Path 3" by precariously existing "high-threat" organizations and "Path 2" by organizations at an intermediate relation to threat. ⁴³

Brim, Glass, et. al, identify and discuss decision process phases which must be gone through rationally in situations and problem areas that are new and not suited to routinized organizational behavior. They then delineate six discernible phases which they emphasize are applicable to the analysis of any decision. They also mention that every decision need not necessarily involve all of the six phases if some of them have been adequately accounted for previously. The six phases in what Brim calls their customary "sequence" are;

- (1) identification of the problem;
- (2) obtaining necessary information;
- (3) production of possible solutions;
- (4) evaluation of such solutions;
- (5) selection of a strategy for performance; and
- (6) actual performance of an action or actions and subsequent learning and revision. ⁴⁵

The same six phases are recognized by Terry Clark. ⁴⁶

The second essentially rational model to be summarized is one by Herbert A. Simon. He is concerned with rationally accounting for the environment and consequences of decision-making. He concentrates on "means and ends," "alternatives and consequences," and "value and possibility." Simon cautions sophistication in dealing with the "means - end" issue. The directing principle is that "efficiency" demands "attainment of maximum values with limited ends." ⁴⁷

"Alternatives and consequences" involves speculating about "behavior alternatives." This includes: (1) listing of alternative strategies, (2) determining consequences that result from each strategy, and (3) comparative evaluation of these sets of consequences. The "time and behavior" variables can preclude

certain alternatives on the basis of time limitations and previous decisions. "Knowledge and behavior" concerns should include establishing sets of expectations for the consequences of different strategies. "Group behavior" involves getting to know the strategies of the other group members and determining whether their desired consequences are the same (cooperative situation) or in opposition (competitive situation) with one's own.⁴⁸

"Value and possibility" concerns making a determination of preferences among consequences: "valuation." This is done on values of "utility" (acquiring the best exchange rate) and/or the "relation of value, experience, behavior." This returns the issue to means and ends; "a means-end chain is a series of anticipations that connect a value with the situations realizing it, and these situations, in turn, with the behaviors that produce them." ⁴⁹

He concludes this approach with a definition of rationality in decision-making; "rationality is concerned with the selection of preferred behavior alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby the consequences of behavior can be evaluated." He then relates that the rationality is relative to whose system of values the goals are defined by. ⁵⁰

Summary: While Gore is basically devising a rhythmic movement of phases, Harvey and Mills' phases are concerned with representing the possible mixed combinations of innovative and routine problems and solutions and their reconsideration in the decision-making process. Gore's model much more closely approximates actually

distinct phases in decision-making.

The two rational models contain phases which are quite similar. It should be noted that Brim, Glass, et. al. consider the "rational" model to be applicable in nonroutinized decision situations. The Brim and Simon models both essentially contain the following phases: (1) Some review of information and alternatives, (2) determining possible solutions and consequences,, (3) comparative analysis of (2), (4) choice among them, (5) performance of actions. They differ in that Brim lists an initial step of problem identification, and Simon does not. Yet, Simon includes an analysis by each actor of the others' strategies and goals so the group can assess their situation as cooperative or competitive. Brim does not specifically mention this stage, however, it may be implied in the phases which determine and compare different possible strategies and solutions.

In coalitions, the internal situation (cooperation or competition) could greatly influence whether a rational model will at all be feasible in the group's decision-making process.

ANALYTICAL MODEL

This study will next present a theoretical model for analyzing the decision-making process in coalitions in light of the above readings. This model is not an hypothesis to be tested, but rather,, a scheme devised to ascertain its applicability to casestudies as a step in theory building and exploratory research in the area of coalitional interorganizational behavior. The above literature delineates what other writers consider to be the

process of decision-making and power in organizational and interorganizational behavior by way of observation and hypothesizing. This study will draw from these works to formulate a model that is regarded to be relevant to coalitional interorganizational decision-making.

The model will be presented according to categorical areas essentially the same as those utilized for structuring the material in the review of the literature: decision-making power analysis (theoretical, structural, exchange) and decision-making process analysis (typology, phases).

I. Decision-Making Power Analysis:

In analyzing power as related to the coalitional decision-making field, there are essentially three analytical areas of concern. These involve theoretical, structural, and exchange questions and issues.

A. Theoretical Issues:

In analyzing the casestudies, an eclectic approach will be taken to achieve a perspective on what constitutes the phenomena of power and influence and their exercise. Power will be defined as the ability to influence other actors to be in accord with one's own position and the extent to which an actor is able to subsequently have his position accepted. These decision victories will not be based on a zero-sum basis, but in terms of relative success of members as the result of coalitional decision arrangements.

Since this project is utilizing case studies (ex post facto interview data), the interpretations of those interviewed about all issues and actions may have been modified by memory loss, selective recall, "output" but not "input" and "process" viewpoints, individual interests and their outcomes, etc. The positional method generally lacks applicability to interorganizational coalitions, since they are characterized by minimal internal formal structures. Furthermore, since the life-span of coalitions is transient, reputational configurations resulting from internal decision-making outcomes will be minimal, especially in the early decisions of the coalition. Therefore, while positions and reputations of member units might be useful indices of power configurations, the "decisional," or historical, analysis of issue areas and decisions seems that it will be more appropriate to the type of data involved. Yet, in combining a modified positional model and a decisional model, the position which a unit representative holds in his "parent organization" and that in the coalition (if any) and his subsequent level of influence in the coalition's decision-making could be significant.

B. Structural Issues:

1. External:

There are certain questions which can be considered or "sought out" in the case material which could help extrapolate the power structure of the coalitions studied. Members (units)

are part of the coalition voluntarily as autonomous units who joined the coalition in order to expand or protect their domain (self-interest). This may also take the form of coalition membership based upon the need to share in the resources of fellow members. It appears that the autonomy of coalition members is lessened relative to the coalition's control of resources and sophistication of internal organization.

It appears probable that a considerable degree of the influence exercised by one unit upon another could be the consequence of extra-coalitional relations, as well as, the internal structure (minimal) of the coalition. Subsequently, it would be useful to compose a network illustration of member units' interrelationships both within and outside (and prior to) the coalition. It would seem probable, that since coalitions are concerned only secondarily with issues outside of each unit's crucial intra-organizational systems, that the preservation and promotion of unit interests (autonomous), including existing interorganizational relations, would be of primary concern for members of coalitions. This could be modified in instances where the issue before a coalition relates to the survival of one or more of its members.

2. Internal:

Some internal power structure issues need to be discussed. These should be of minimal significance, if, in fact, units of a coalition invest it with little authority, leadership, and formal structural elements. As a result, formal coalitional roles,

if they were established, would carry little real power. As mentioned earlier, it is important to determine where each unit stands within their own organization, because they might only be representing a specific interest and segment of that "parent organization." Special expertise on the part of certain members could give them additional authority and power in the group. Members of the coalition will tend to develop a consensus about who is more powerful in the group. This could change considerably over the life time of the coalition, since different issue areas will be considered in which different actors will have more influence. Also, if the actors are unfamiliar with each other together as a configuration of different interests with different degrees and types of influence, only the actual testing and sanctioning of power on issues will familiarize each unit as to the influence and power of each other unit, relative to one another. From the above and also since coalitions are informal and short term entities, it seems probable that a considerable degree of "testing" of one another's power will take place, especially early in the coalition's history. After this process, patterns of unequal influence within the coalition should more clearly emerge. If there is a single "leader" (formal or informal) in the coalition, it would indicate an "imbalance" of power hierarchically within the coalition. If there are several centers of group leadership, it would indicate a more "balanced" distribution of power among coalition members.

O. Exchange Issues

The dynamics of the power structure of coalitions is ascertainable from the actual systems and operations of exchange. Within the dynamics of exchange a resource is a commodity possessed and controlled by individual unit members or actually or potentially by the coalition as a whole, and it is valued (or sought) by the coalition units. Influence is the use of a resource of power by one unit (influencer) upon one or more other units (influencee) to alter the influencee's position or action so as to promote or favor the influencer's interests and goals.

Types of resources can include money, friendships, jobs, votes, information, group structural controls, etc. The more general a resource is, the greater the number of situations of influence in which it can be utilized. These resources can be operationalized by strategies toward other units of persuasion, obligation, inducement (reward or punishment), structuring of alternatives, manipulation of perception of alternatives, diversion of attention, and coercion.

The existence of a receptor is basic to the existence of influence, because it makes possible the control of one unit by another. The more units are dependent upon each other's resources for organizational unit goal attainment, the higher the level of co-ordination and the more frequent the exchange will be characterized by bargaining. The greater the co-ordination and interdependence, the more frequently relations will be characterized by mutual exchange. The greater the singular commitment to individual unit goals the lower the level of cooperation. The greater the competition for resources sought, the greater the group con-

flikt.- this includes existing resources and/or expansion of resources. The higher the relationship between resources available through membership in the coalition and unit goals sought, the higher the level of that unit's involvement in coalitional operations.

The analysis of the type or mode of resources necessary for the decision being made is a complex question. In terms of general composite coalitional resources, different issues often demand different types of resources to be exercised. The types of resource "costs" that can be incurred by a coalition unit, subgroup of units, or full coalitional group can include: (1) information, (2) responsibility (for taking a certain position), (3) intergame, (4) division of pay-offs, (5) dissonance, (6) inertia (internal restructuring of group), (7) pressure of time, and (8) persuasion to gain support of needed vote or resource. In addition, certain "decision cost" principles can alter the degree of cost incurred: size, unanimity, and indispensable member principles.

Units with fewer of the resources, which are necessary for a particular decision, than one or more other units can moderate their position of inability to influence a decision by overcoming the advantage of the more powerful. This can be achieved by altering in degrees the process of indebtedness and control, to a situation of reciprocation and equality. Where the more powerful do not need the resources of the weaker, the potential receptor(s) may possibly involve their other resource potentials as commodities for exchange. Where the more powerful control a re-

source needed by a potential receptor(s), the weaker unit may possibly seek out alternative resources aside from the stronger coalition member units. These are possible phenomena to be observed in analysis of exchange interactions.

Some more specific questions could include:

1. What were the power or influence resources of each unit?
2. What were the power or influence resources relevant to each decision issue?
3. Who exercised (or attempted to) influence upon whom in each decision issue?
4. What were the resources of each unit respective to the decision issue?
5. What was the outcome?
6. What position did each unit take on each decision issue as compared to the outcome of the decision-making process?
7. What were the goals of each unit in joining the coalition and what was the actual outcome in terms of these goals.

II. Decision-Making Process Analysis

The study will now turn to the development of a model for the analysis of the decision-making process in terms of typologies and phases for interorganizational coalitions.

A. Typological Issues

One possible typological scheme for analyzing decisional responses to problem situations is from gradations of organiza-

tional familiarity. Degrees of familiarity with problems and with solutions (or decisions) are conceivable within a continuum of routine, incremental and innovative. A routine problem or routine solution would both have a high familiarity rating and can be characterized by the term task oriented. Incremental has the connotation of being adjustment oriented, while innovative problems and solutions are change oriented. While routine problems are usually responded to with routine solutions, incremental or innovative solutions are also possible. The same is applicable to incremental and innovative problems and solutions.

If this model were to be expanded to include the variable of information and understanding (adequate or inadequate) as to the conditions of a problem situation and problem solution a far more complex scheme emerges. In this case adequacy would be defined as sufficient understanding of the demands of the problem situation and of the consequences of the problem solution for what they are: innovative, incremental, or routine. The model would take this form.

PROBLEM SOLUTION

Problem Situation	INFORMATION	ROUTINE		INCREMENTAL		INNOVATIVE	
		adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate
routine	adequate						
	inadequate						
incremental	adequate						
	inadequate						
innovative	adequate						
	inadequate						

The analytical usefulness and practical application of such a notion of "information adequacy" remains dubious, especially in terms of casestudy data. Another means of assessing adequacy would be whether a solution was successful in solving a problem situation, or if there arose many consequences with which the coalition apparently was not prepared to cope.

B. Phase Issues

The above typology indicates possible phases in application to interorganizational coalitions. It seems probable that nearly all problem situations and problem solutions will be innovatively oriented. This will be particularly true in the early stages of the operations of these groups. This is the case because every problem situation will be new to the coalition as a group and their response will be new for the group. Once certain procedural ground rules are established and the coalition gains experience, the other orientations will become involved. However, it is possible for any combination to result, but less probable.

Certain procedures or phases in decision-making seem to be relatively consistent in most situations where rationality (as well as unit group interest) is regarded as significant by the participants. These are decision-making steps or phases and should not be confused with group developmental stages or phases. One model for compartmentalizing this process as a rational development indicates the presence of these steps in decision-making:

1. Issue or Problem identification.

2. Information gathering.
3. Listing of alternative strategies and solutions.
4. Determination of consequences of each strategy or solution.
5. Comparative evaluation of findings.
6. Choice of strategies or solutions.
7. Enactment of strategy or solution.

The applicability of this model is probably relative to the degree of cooperation or conflict of goals and interests of the units comprising the interorganizational coalition. Unit biases should be expected to exist in decision-making. All seven of these phases should be examined (if possible) from the perspective of the make-up of the coalition. However, issue and interest agreement or disagreement among units are both compatible with the formation of a coalition.

CASESTUDY ANALYTICAL MODEL

Main Assertions

I. Decision-Making Power Analysis

A. Theoretical Issues:

1. Positional

a. Internal

b. External

2. Decisional - dynamics of exchange

B. Structural Issues:

1. External:

- a. Coalition members join in order to expand or protect their domain (self-interest).
 - 1) This may take the form of coalition membership based upon the need to share in the resources of fellow members.
 - 2) It appears that the autonomy of coalition members is lessened relative to the coalition's control of resources and sophistication of internal organization.
- b. It appears probable that a considerable degree of the influence exercised by one unit upon another could be the consequence of extra-coalitional relations, as well as, the internal structure (minimal) of the coalition.
- c. It would seem probable, that since coalitions are usually concerned with issues secondary to each unit's crucial intraorganizational systems, that the preservation and promotion of unit interests (autonomous), including existing interorganizational relations, would be of primary concern for members of coalitions.

2. Internal:

- a. Formal coalitional roles, if they are established, carry little real power.
- b. Each unit member may only be representing a specific segment or interest of its "parent organization."
- c. Members of the coalition will tend to develop a consensus about who is more powerful in the group.
 - 1) Different issue areas will be considered in which different actors will have more influence.
 - 2) It seems probable that a considerable degree of "testing" of one another's power will take place, especially early in the coalition's history.
- d. If there is a single "leader" (formal or informal) in the coalition, it would indicate an "imbalance" of power hierarchically within the coalition.
- e. If there are several centers of group leadership, it would indicate a more "balanced" distribution of power among coalition members.

C. Exchange Issues:

1. Conditions:

- a. The more general a resource is, the greater the number of situations of influence in which it can be utilized.
- b. The more units are dependent upon each other's resources for organizational unit goal attainment, the higher the level of coordination and the more frequently the exchanges will be characterized by bargaining.
 - 1) The greater the coordination and interdependence, the more frequently relations will be characterized by mutual exchange.
- c. The greater the singular commitment to individual unit goals, the lower the level of cooperation.
- d. The greater the competition for resources sought, the greater the group conflict - this includes existing resources and/or expansion of resources.
- e. The higher the relationship between resources available through membership in the coalition and unit goals sought, the higher the level of that unit's involvement in coalitional operations.

2. Costs:

- a. Different issues often demand different types of resources to be exercised.
- b. The types of "costs" that can be incurred by a coalitional unit, subgroup of units, or full coalitional group can include: (1) information, (2) responsibility, (3) intergame, (4) division of pay-offs, (5) dissonance, (6) inertia, (7) pressure of time, and (8) persuasion.
- c. Certain "decision cost" principles can alter the degree of cost incurred: size, unanimity, and indispensable member principle.

3. Situations:

- a. Where the more powerful do not need the resources of the weaker, the potential receptor(s) may possibly involve their other resource potentials as commodities for exchange.
- b. Where the more powerful control the resource needed by a potential receptor(s), the weaker unit may possibly seek out alternative resources aside from the stronger coalition member units.

D. Analytical Questions:

There are some specific questions which could be applied to the analysis of significant decisions of the coalition:

1. What were the power or influence resources of each unit?
2. What were the power or influence resources relevant to each decision issue?
3. Who exercised (or attempted to) influence upon whom in each decision issue?
4. What were the resources of each unit respective to the decision issue?
5. What was the outcome?
6. What position did each unit take on each decision issue as compared to the outcome of the decision-making process?
7. What were the goals of each unit in joining the coalition and what was the actual outcome in terms of these goals?

II. Decision-Making Process Analysis:

A. Typological Issues:

1. Degrees of familiarity with problem situations and solutions (or decisions) are conceivable within a continuum of routine, incremental, and innovative.
2. While routine problem situations are usually responded to with routine problem solutions, incremental or innovative solutions are possible. The same is applicable to incremental and innovative problems and solutions.

3. The variable of adequate or inadequate information is related to the sufficiency of understanding of the demands of the problem situation and of the consequences of the problem solution for what they are: innovative, incremental, or routine.

B. Phase Issues:

1. In application to interorganizational coalitions, it seems probable that nearly all problem situations and problem solutions will be innovatively oriented.
2. Once certain procedural ground rules are established and the coalition gains experience, the other orientations will become involved.
3. Certain procedures or phases in decision-making seem to be relatively consistent in most situations where rationality (as well as unit group interest) is regarded as significant by the participants.
 - a. The applicability of this model is probably relative to the degree of cooperation or conflict of goals and interests of the units comprising the interorganizational coalition.
4. In coalitions, strong unit biases should be expected to be operative in this process (decision-making phases).
5. Issue and interest agreement or disagreement among units are both compatible with the formation of a coalition.

CHAPTER 2

Summary of Casestudy *

"Child Advocacy Proposal"

The coalition was initiated by the Metropolitan Neighborhood Child Care Agency (MNCCA) executive committee through their executive director Mr. H. Mr. H. defined the goals of the meeting as determining (1) if local agencies wanted such a program, (2) the geographic target area, (3) the program proposal. The issue developed out of the interest and availability of federal funds for a child advocacy program. The 30 representatives present agreed on the importance of the issue and showed a general agreement with the target area of the city suggested by Mr. H. (South City). Mr. H. proposed that a "planning committee" be established to develop a proposal. Those who volunteered were people directly concerned with the geographic and/or program area involved with exception of perhaps two organizations which never became actively involved. The most significant members were Mr. H. from the MNCCA and the local citizen neighborhood poverty agency South City People's League (SCPL). This became the decision-making body.

There immediately developed a conflict over official sponsorship of the program with the two most powerful members, the child care agency and the neighborhood poverty agency, being the main contenders. No decision was made at this point, but a chairman was selected, Mr. J., who was an ally of the poverty agency.

* For purposes of confidentiality, all authentic personal and organizational names have been concealed in all casestudies used.

Mr. H. at one point attempted to include two more members of his agency in the planning process with apparent failure. He also tended to alienate the other "planning committee" members with his aggressive tactics of self interest. Two lesser members of the "committee" proposed an administration separate from the two main members, but this was rejected.

In the mean time, the child care agency board became hesitant about overextending its resources by becoming involved in the proposed project. Then in the absence of Mr. H. the "planning committee" selected a proposal which designated the neighborhood poverty agency as the formal grant agent. Mr. H.'s alternate, Mrs. S., voted to approve the proposal. The board of the poverty agency later officially endorsed the proposal, but it lacked the contact with the federal sponsoring body and had to rely upon the child care agency for liaison.

A meeting of the full coalition was called upon Mr. H's return from talking with the granting body. The motion was made for Mr. H. and the poverty agency to write the final draft, and it was approved. It was also agreed that the final draft be sent to the member organizations for their support and comment.

The next day the child care agency board met and endorsed the poverty agency as the grant sponsor. From this point on, Mr. H. ceased his participation and Mrs. S. represented the child care agency but, did not participate in writing the final draft of the proposal. The coalition never met again, and the proposal was submitted with the members' letters of support.

CASESTUDY ANALYSIS"Child Advocacy Proposal"I. Decision-Making Power Analysis:

A. Theoretical Issues: This casestudy is best analyzed in terms of internal and external positions of its influential members, as well as, the dynamics of the decision-making actors involved. The positional issues will be delineated under an analysis of internal and external structure, and the decisional variables will be scrutinized under exchange issues. The information available in the casestudy substantially limited analysis to the two principal actors - MNCCA and SCPL.

B. Structural Issues: MNCCA and SCPL.B.1. External:

B.1.a. Domain - the dimension of domain protection or advancement clearly appears to be a central factor in the involvement of the significant actors. In this instance, a maximum domain expansion of \$100,000 was available. Once the initial decision was made to restrict the potential receiving area to South City, those seriously involved lessened to units that have territorial or program domains within or encompassing that area. While representatives from another poverty group and the local college volunteered to work on the program, the casestudy indicates that they were not among the "core" committee members. It can be inferred that this is directly related to their unit's having had no self-interest gains which could result from their involvement.

B.1.a.1) Resource interdependence - MNCCA (Mr. H.) seems to have needed the involvement of other community agencies in the planning process in order to fulfill application procedures. It definitely attempted to ignore their input. Furthermore, the other member units, especially SCPL, depended upon MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) liaison with Washington, as well as, its position of established influence in the child care realm, especially Mr. H.'s position as local Executive Director for MNCCA.

B.1.a.2) Member autonomy - it appears that the coalition's control of the resources was unclear and that the actors tended to operate autonomously.

B.1.b. Extra-coalitional relations - Mr. J.'s previously existing position of relationship with SCPL seems to have established them as allies. MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) relationship with the funding agent was the key to his influence within the coalition.

B.1.c. Unit interests - the decision by the Board of Directors of MNCCA that their primary concerns and goals demanded all of their resources to maintain their operations and that the new proposal was too secondary is significant in its consistency with the analytical model.

B.2. Internal:

B.2.a. Formal roles - internal structural variables show considerable agreement with the model. The two formal positions in the coalition's history held no significant power in themselves independent of the personalities occupying them. Mr. H. briefly

(and self-appointedly) was "Chairman Pro Tem" and Mr. J. was the regular chairman by consensus.

B.2.b. Representativeness - Mr. H.'s inability to gain support for his "decision" from his own organizational unit indicates a clear instance of a coalition member's representing only a specific segment or interest of a "parent organization" and not it as a whole.

B.2.c. Consensus - it is quite apparent that coalitional members quickly came to consider MNCCA (Mr. H.) and SCPL to be the two most powerful group members.

B.2.c.1) Differential power - it became obvious after considerable testing that SCPL was more dominant when it came to gaining the support of fellow coalition members, except for MNCCA (Mr. H.), while MNCCA (Mr. H.) had a dominant position with respect to informational and organizational ties to the funding source.

B.2.c.2) Testing - the testing process was quite apparent especially in the early stages of the coalition.

B.2.d. and e. Single or multiple leadership - the emergence of two centers of real leadership within the coalition demonstrates a relatively "balanced distribution of power" between the main contestants.

C. Exchange Issues:

C.1. Conditions:

C.1.a. Resource generality - the two main actors, MNCCA (Mr. H.) and SCPL, had resources of relative generality which they frequently utilized. MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) main resources were information and program liaison controls. These resources were employed in particularly crucial decisions, e.g. the final vote of MNCCA's board. If the board had sanctioned Mr. H. with the full use of his potential resources, it appears that his influence could have been dominant.

SCPL, on the other hand, relied upon the resources of friendship and votes. Mr. J. was closely allied with SCPL, and the "planning committee" voted in SCPL's favor. These resources were relatively general and effective for internal coalitional decisions, but MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) external resources tended to at least be potentially decisive in that realm.

In addition, MNCCA (Mr. H.) had an established program domain in child care, while SCPL had established territorial domain in South City.

C.1.b. Resource dependency - the degree of mutual dependency among this coalition's members is somewhat vague in view of the above. SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. H.) appeared to be interdependent, especially SCPL vis a vis MNCCA (Mr. H.), yet the two were clearly in open conflict. If the assertion of the model is viable, it may require certain modifications to explain the dynamics of this casestudy. One possible solution is that SCPL and the other coalition members, excluding MNCCA (Mr. H.) functioned in an apparently consensus manner. This could be based upon

their mutual dependence for internal coalitional resources. On the other hand, MNCCA (Mr. H.) was self-sufficient in external resources and never attempted to bargain with the other members in terms of actually making the proposal application, other than pseudo consultation. MNCCA (Mr. H.) did not involve itself in the internal workings of the coalition, apparently viewing their resources as unessential to attainment of its interest goal. SCPL however, did attempt to bargain directly with the MNCCA board because of SCPL's position of considerable dependency in the area of external resources to effectively influence the attainment of its goal.

C.1.b.1) Mutual exchange - the greatest mutual exchange took place between SCPL and the other coalition members, except MNCCA (Mr. H.). While the mutuality of the interdependence might be questionable, there appeared to be a genuine mutual exchange between the MNCCA board and the "planning committee." The board endorsed SCPL, while the "planning committee" provided a vehicle whereby MNCCA would not over burden its own commitments and, at the same time, permitted it to promote community child care services.

C.1.c. Unit goals - SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. H.) both clearly demonstrated exclusive interests in attempting to expand their organizational domains, through seeking to obtain program control for each of their respective organizations. This resulted in a low level of cooperation. Two members with a lower degree of commitment, Mr. A. and Mr. B., attempted a cooperative compromise

of establishing a separate administration, but were uninfluential and unsuccessful.

C.1.d. Resource competition - Again, SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. H.) constituted the main contestants in competing for the potentially available resources, and this provided the principal basis of the conflict within the coalition.

C.1.e. Member profit - SCPL's main access to the program funding was initially through the coalition, and later with the MNCCA board, and SCPL's coalitional involvement was considerable. However, MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) best access to the resources was from outside of the group and, consequently, its actual involvement in the coalition's operations was minimal and often token.

C.2. Costs:

C.2.a. Differential resource issues - as indicated above, C.1.b., there appeared to be two principal areas of resource utilization in this casestudy - internal and external. Those decisions which were internally oriented, demanded the use of internal coalitional resources, and the member who had predominant assets in that area (SCPL) was most successful in those issue areas. On the other hand, external decisions required external resources and the dominant member in that dimension, MNCCA (Mr. H.), was mainly successful in those decisions (until Mr. H. lost his sanction to utilize those resources).

C.2.b. Costs incurred - the main "costs" incurred by MNCCA (Mr. H.)

were its "responsibility costs" and "intergame costs" for actions taken outside of the coalition itself, which quickly lost internal support for its position. SCPL's main "costs" were "information" and "inter-game" in its dependence upon MNCCA (Mr. H.) for access to the funding source.

C.2.c. Principles - the "unanimity principle" was operative in this coalition in that there ultimately was required group consensus about the proposal to be submitted. Furthermore, the "indispensible member principle" was apparent with respect to MNCCA and the position of its Board.

C.3. Situations:

C.3.a. Resource independence of powerful - while the information is insufficient from the casestudy, it could be speculated that the weaker coalition members sought to somehow influence the coalition's operations through the use of their main resource, votes, and did this by joining forces with the weaker of the two most powerful coalition members, SCPL, who was substantially dependent upon their resources, and whom they could more readily influence. At the same time, SCPL externally weaker than MNCCA (Mr. H.) utilized its main resources - control of coalition votes, friendship, and territorial domain - to match the resources of MNCCA (Mr. H.).

C.3.b. Resource control by powerful - where MNCCA (Mr. H.) controlled access to information and the funding body, SCPL attempted to go directly to the MNCCA board to usurp Mr. H.'s basis of

resource sanction. When the group chose SCPL to be the formal grant agent, it was suggested that SCPL's director be in contact with Washington, as well as, Mr. H. In the decision to choose a committee to work on the final draft, Mr. H. seems to have utilized the non-planning committee members to vote to include him (inferred from casestudy data). Also, after the meeting in which Mr. J. was selected chairman, Mr. H. took it upon himself to call another meeting and sent the notice to the "planning committee" and to two MNCCA officials - possibly an attempt to call upon more resources.

D. Analytical Questions:

D.1. Power resources:

MNCCA (Mr. H. and Mrs. S.)	SCPL	Others
Information	Friendship	Votes
Crucial external contacts	Territorial domain	Program domain
Program domain	Vote	
Vote	Control of votes	

D.2. Main coalition decision issues and relevant resources:

MAIN ISSUES	RELEVANT RESOURCES
1. Target area	Votes, information
2. Planning Committee	Votes, members, information, program domain, territorial domain
3. Chairman	Votes, friendship, control of votes
4. Separate administration	Votes, territorial domain, program domain, friendship
5. Formal grant agent	Votes, friendship, control of votes.

6. Final draft committee	Votes, information, crucial external contacts, control of votes, friendship
7. Distribution of final draft	Votes, program domain

D.3. Influencer(s) and Influencee(s):

DECISION ISSUE:	INFLUENCER(S)	INFLUENCEE(S)
1. Target area	MNCCA(Mr.H.) SCPL Others("planning committee")	Whole group Whole group Whole group
2. Planning Committee	MNCCA(Mr.H.) SCPL Others	Whole group Whole group Whole group
3. Chairman	MNCCA(Mr.H.) SCPL Others	SCPL and others MNCCA(Mr.H.) and others SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. H.)
4. Separate Administration	(Mr.A and Mr. B)	MNCCA(Mr.H.), SCPL, Others -2
5. Formal Grant Agent	SCDL	Others, MNCCA (Mrs.S)
6. Final Draft Committee	MNCCA(Mr.H.) SCPL Others	Whole group Whole group Whole group
7. Distribution of Final Draft	MNCCA(Mr.H.)	Whole group

D.4. Issues and relevant member resources:

DECISION ISSUE:	RELEVANT MEMBER	RESOURCES
1. Target Area	MNCCA(Mr.H.) SCPL Others Whole group(o-ther than above)	Vote, information Vote Votes Votes
2. Planning Committee	MNCCA(Mr.H.)	Vote, information, Program domain

	SCPL	Vote, territorial domain
	Others	Votes, program domain
3. Chairman	MNCCA(Mr.H.)	Vote
	SCPL	Vote, friendship, control of votes
	Others	Votes
4. Separate Administration	MNCCA(Mr.H.)	Vote, program domain
	SCPL	Vote, territorial domain, friendship
	Others-2	Votes, program domain
	(Mr.A. and Mr.B.)	Votes, program domain
5. Formal Grant Agent	SCPL	Vote, friendship, control of votes
	Others	Votes
	MNCCA(Mrs.S.)	Vote, Program Domain, crucial contacts
6. Final Draft Committee	MNCCA(Mr.H.)	Vote, information, crucial external contacts
	SCPL	Vote, control of votes, friendship
	Others	Votes
	Whole group	Votes
7. Distribution of Final Draft	MNCCA(Mr.H.)	Vote, program domain
	Whole group	Votes, program domain

D.5. Outcome:

DECISION ISSUES	DECISION CHOICE
1. Target Area	South City
2. Planning Committee	Volunteers
3. Chairman	Mr. J.
4. Separate Administration	Rejected
5. Formal Grant Agent	SCPL
6. Final Draft Committee	MNCCA(Mr.H.) and SCPL
7. Distribution of Final Draft	Whole Group

D.6. Member Position on Issues and Actual Outcome: + = in favor,

- = against, ? = not known.

DECISION CHOICE	MEMBER POSITION
1. South City	MNCCA(Mr.H.) +
	SCPL +
	Others +
	Whole group(o-ther than above) +
2. Volunteers	MNCCA(Mr.H.) +
	SCPL +
	Others +
	Whole group -
3. Mr. J.	MNCCA(Mr.H.) ?
	SCPL +
	Others +
4. Rejected	MNCCA(Mr.H.) +
	SCPL +

DECISION CHOICE	MEMBER POSITION
	Mr. A and Mr. B -
	Others +
5. 5. SCPL	MNCCA(Mrs.S.) +
	SCPL +
	Others +
6. MNCCA(Mr.H.) and SCPL	MNCCA(Mr.H.) +
	SCPL ?
	Others ?
	Whole group +
7. Distribution of Final Draft	MNCCA(Mr.H.) +
	All Others +

D.7. Member Goals Compared With Final Outcome:

MEMBER	GOALS	FINAL OUTCOME
MNCCA(Mr.H.)	MNCCA Grant Agent	SCPL Grant Agent
SCPL	SCPL Grant Agent	
Others	Not Known	
Whole Group	Not Known	

II. Decision-Making Process Analysis: in order to assess the case study in relation to typological and phase issues' assertions,, each main decision (using above sequential numbers) will be placed in a table and discussed later.

PROBLEM SOLUTION

BLEM UATION	Information	ROUTINE		INCREMENTAL		INNOVATIVE	
		adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate
TINE	adequate	7		3,6,5			
	inadequate						
REMEN-	adequate			2			
	inadequate						
OVA- e	adequate	4				1	
	inadequate						

EXPLANATION:

1. The choice of a target area was an entirely new problem for this group and the selection of South City was innovative, since that section of the city had never had such a program.

2. The establishment of a planning committee is a problem which developed (incremental) from the planning demands of a proposal. The solution was adaptive (incremental) based upon those becoming involved having a territorial and/or program interest.

3. Choosing a chairman is a routine occurrence of this group's process. The choice (Mr. J.) reflects an adaptation (incremental) to the interests of the core planning committee members.

4. The proposal for seeking a separate administration raised an innovative problem, which was dealt with in a routine manner (rejection) with respect to the clearly identified member interests and resources.

5. The problem of choosing a formal grant agent is a procedural (routinized) outcome of the planning process and the solution is an adaptation (incremental) of the formation of a subcoalitional voting and interest block - as well as an adaptive

response to Mr. H.'s absence and the position of the MNCCA board. There does seem to be a degree of informational inadequacy with respect to failing to know that the MNCCA board had not officially finalized their position. This inadequacy of information with respect to the problem situation and solution does appear to be marginal in this instance.

6. The problem of appointing persons to develop a final proposal draft tends to be a routine situation. The solution of selecting MNCCA (Mr. H.) and SCPL seems to be an outgrowth (incremental) of their mutually necessary resources for this task (information and contact, grant agent).

7. The problem of distributing a document is a routine matter, and deciding to include all parties concerned is a routine solution with there being an adequate recognition of both dimensions.

A. Typological Issues:

A.1. Problem familiarity - these categories seem to be relevant for classifying the above decisions and problems with the one condition that there needs to be a distinction with respect to whether degree of familiarity is to refer to each individual member unit or to the group as an entity.

A.2. Patterns - this casestudy appears to have a predominance of instances where incremental problems were responded to with incremental decisions, but only 3 out of 7 where situation and solution types were the same.

A.3. Informational adequacy - seems to be a relatively insignificant (and difficult to assess) variable in this case study.

B. Phase Issues:

B.1. Innovation - most of the problem situations were incremental, and the solutions were incremental.

B.2. Diversity - once the first major decision was made (innovative - innovative), the other orientations appeared to be exclusively involved.

B.3. Rational phases - the case study information is not adequate to determine to what extent rational decision-making steps were involved in each decision, while certain decisions do reflect some of the stages. The over-riding variable influencing decision-making appears to be self-interest and not rationality. In this sense, rationality could have probably determined calculated individual member decisions of self-interest, but there was not a rational, comprehensive review of alternatives in an unbiased manner by all members jointly.

B.3.a. Relative applicability - in consideration of the above mentioned lack of case study information, it is difficult to assess the impact of coalitional cooperation or conflict upon the utilization of rational decision-making steps, except that conflict did exist, while rationality was not very evident.

B.4. Unit bias - a constant variable in decision-making in all instances seems to be the member unit's bias of self-interest and domain protection and/or expansion. This seems to be especially the case with the decisions of the "core" planning committee that in-

volved the members with the greatest vested interests. To this extent, their decisions tended to be less rational in the objective sense, but quite rational in light of their own organization's interests.

B.5. Coalitional cohesiveness - issue and interest agreement and disagreement seem to be marginally compatible with coalition formation in this case. Those who essentially agreed were actively involved in the coalition (SCPL and Others). Yet, their main antagonist, MNCCA (Mr. H.), tended to be only peripherally involved with the coalition. This appears to be based upon where each of the two strongest members had the dominant resources: SCPL - internally, MNCCA (Mr. H.) - externally.

CRITIQUE: The analytical model seems to have had a general applicability to this casestudy. Generally speaking, the "Power Analysis" segment was more useful, while the "Process Analysis" portion tended to be difficult to apply, primarily because of its use of terms which require further operationalization and/or revision.

More specifically, there developed from this case a need to distinguish between internal and external coalitional resources, and who is most dominant in each and how this, in turn, affects the coalitional process. It also raises the question if this alters whether a coalitional group is of a consensus, bargaining, or dissensus orientation. Also, the role of conflict as deliberately utilized by coalition members is not fully accounted for in the model.

Also, the disparity between Mr. H.'s positions and that of his "parent organization," makes questionable whether a coalitional "parent organization" can be fully identified with its individual coal-

tional representative. If not,, this inconsistency needs to be observed and analyzed.

The eventual decision-making outcome (SCPL's being the grant agent with MNCCA endorsement) in this case study raises the question whether Polsby's notion of "plurality" is not more meaningful in this case than an elitist model. MNCCA did in fact agree not to fully employ its organizational resources of influence to broaden its domain, but rather, decided to advocate and promote a sharing of resources with a weaker organization (SCPL). This does not mean, however, that MNCCA did not profit from this sharing of resources. It is conceivable that it was necessary that they encourage such a project in order to maintain their position as the local promoter of child care in the eyes of the funding agent. At the same time, they could not afford to deploy any of their own resources to directly seek the resources to be funding agent themselves.

With respect to the "Process Analysis" model, the vagueness of term definitions and the tentative classification of decisions raises doubts as to whether coalitional problem situations and solutions are predominantly innovative (II.B.1.). The issues of internal and external resources and involvement (based upon case-study information) make questionable whether coalition formation is independent of issue and interest agreement or disagreement. (II.B.5).

CHAPTER 3

Summary of Casestudy

"Black Coalition"

This coalition of black organizations was the outcome of racial and subsequent police incidents at a metropolitan high school. The local War on Poverty citizen organization in the black community Equal Opportunity Now (EON) altered an already scheduled meeting to take up the school issue and invited parents of the school children and moderate and militant black organizations. This was the start of the coalition.

Eventually a chairman (black poverty organization representative) was selected by the coalition. They adopted the suggestion by the principal black militant group (Brothers) to boycott the schools and decided to establish an alternate school to be run by the same militant group and a black studies program from a local university. They also chose to hold a community rally to inform and unite the black community. At the rally, the earlier coalition decisions were approved by the 600 community people present.

The basic method of internal procedure was agreed to be as a unit, but with a division of labor. After awhile the chairman had to resign, because he was an employee of the school district and was under pressure. This also was the case with two other active coalition members, who were also employees of the local federally funded community action agency. The coalition's new chairman, Rev. C., was a representative of a ministerial organization United Christian Front (U.C.F.) and was selected because

of his personal image and ability to unite the coalition.

of his moderate image among blacks in a hope to unify the community. Two militant organizations claimed mutual leadership with the new chairman evidencing a widening internal rivalry.

The community school became immersed in problems. It lacked transportation, lunch, and teacher resources. The two main militant groups then attempted to conduct the teaching - alienating many parents.

The boycott was used by the coalition to make demands upon the school board. The board responded by setting up a counter group. Dissension set into the coalition with disagreements over what step to take next. The moderate chairman, under pressure from the main militant organization called for a citywide boycott. The strategy was to penalize the school its state aid money. The boycott and coalition were rapidly dying. Some members met secretly with the school superintendent without informing the rest of the coalition. The community school closed and several coalition members dropped out. Without informing the militant member, the boycott was called off by the chairman after it was about 2½ weeks old.

The main accomplishments of the boycott were an end to racial trouble at the high school, a changed curriculum, increased respect by white students, and the first effective unification of the black community.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

"The Black Coalition"

I. Decision-Making Power Analysis

A. Theoretical Issues:

The internal and external positions and structures of the members of the Black Coalition had considerable impact in this case study and an analysis of them would be useful. The decisional approach also has considerable analytical merit especially with respect to exchange and process issues.

B. Structural Issues:

B.1. External

B.1.a. Domain - all of the organizations involved in the coalition were based in a metropolitan black community and were concerned with protecting the interests of their people in the high school racial dispute and with protecting their organization's legitimacy in the black community. This was domain protection, but it was also domain expansion when it came to their list of demands which sought to expand, as well as protect, black influence in the metropolitan school system.

B.1.a.1) Resource interdependence - there was considerable interdependence among coalition members in face of the school system because of their position of relative weakness in resources as compared to their adversary. This external imperative seems to have necessitated a united front.

B.1.a.2) Member autonomy - once the coalition began to operate it revealed little internal control of the needed resources, which were most often based with external authorities e.g. com-

munity action agency's withdrawal of school buses because of a fear of suspension of its funds. Also the internal organization of the coalition was not sufficiently sophisticated to assure the group's autonomy. Instead, it was victimized by internal power struggles, which weakened the coalition in face of the relatively monolithic organizational authority structure.

B.1.b. Extra-coalitional relations - probably the three most influential coalition members were the UCF, the Brothers, and Simba. A considerable degree of their influence was based upon their extra-coalitional relations with different segments of the black community. UCF's constituency and image was moderate; the Brothers' and Simba's were militantly based. These were also the centers of the coalition's real leadership: Rev. C. (UCF) was coalition chairman; the Brothers and Simba conducted the community school.

B.1.c. Unit interests - the impact of coalition members attempting to protect and promote their extracoalitional and unit interests was an extremely crucial factor in this coalition. Some of the examples of how this greatly limited resources and crucial membership will be given. Mrs. S. had to assume a "behind the scenes" involvement, because she was employed by a federally funded program. The original chairman, Mr. L., had to resign that position, because he had been accused by the school system (his employer) of being in violation of his contract. Mr. D. also withdrew from active support (providing school buses), because he feared a loss of federal funding for the community action

agency, of which he was executive director. Many black teachers who were to teach in the community school did not, out of fear of losing their jobs.

B.2. Internal:

B.2.a. Formal roles - the few formal roles within the Black Coalition carried little real power in themselves. The group's first chairman, Mr. L. of EON, exercised little real power in the coalition. Yet, the second chairman, Rev. C. of the UCF, was quite influential. The organization and operation of the community school seems to have been delegated to the local university Black Studies Program, Simba, and Brothers. While each played a role, the Brothers were most influential in its operation. Consequently, the formal role was not as significant as the power and influence of the unit filling it.

B.2.b. Representativeness - most of the units appear to have represented accurately the interest of their "parent organization," with some exceptions. Mrs. S. and Mr. D., Community action agency, represented only a segment of their organization and its interests. This was largely responsible for their withdrawal from covert support. Rev. C., in deciding to expand the boycott, extended himself beyond the interests and support of his moderate organization.

B.2.c. Consensus - from an aggregation of many organizations, three emerged as being recognized as the most powerful and were delegated more formal and informal authority than the rest. Of these three - UCF, Simba, Brothers - the UCF and Brothers were

the most dominant.

B.2.c.1) Differential power - when it came to being able to appeal to broad community support, leadership by UCF personnel was more influential. However, when dealing with more conflictual issues - rallies, the rival school - the Brothers and Simba were more influential.

B.2.c.2) Testing - early in the coalition, EON's role as leader was eroded by its lack of genuine influence and power resources. While the UCF gained control of the chairman's position, the Brothers claimed they also lead the coalition. This challenging of each other's power by the two principal units continued throughout the coalition's history and was not confined to the initial period.

B.2.d. and e. Single or multiple leadership - the concentration of most of the power in essentially two members resulted in a partial balancing of power in the coalition between the moderate and militant overall factions.

C. Exchange Issues:

C.1. Conditions:

C.1.a. Resource generality -- the Brothers' and Simba's main resource was an emotional and ideological appeal. This resource was effective in stirring up support at rallies, but it was ineffective in organizing the community school. Their main resource was not general enough. The UCF had a moderate image

which gave it broader community appeal (its main resource), but it failed to be able to move the community to radical and unified militant, strike action in boycotting the schools and dealing with them with conflict tactics. Their main resource, consequently, was also too narrow.

C.1.b. Resource dependency - the member units were very much dependent upon each other's resources to achieve an effective boycott. This appeared to only partially and temporarily prompt the leaders of the two factions - UCF and the Brothers - to involve themselves in coordination and bargaining. The UCF took broad coalitions leadership, and the Brothers assumed authority over the community school. They both proved ineffective in their respective areas. Their ideologies were also alien to one another and made coordination basically impossible.

C.1.b.1) Mutual exchange - there was little coordination, much interdependence, and relatively inconsequential mutual exchange - the early dividing of authority between the UCF and the Brothers being the only real occurrence.

C.1.c. Unit goals - there was considerable commitment to individual unit goals and ideologies and a low level of cooperation.

C.1.d. Resource competition - there was considerable conflict between the UCF, and the Brothers and Simba to be recognized as the principal leader and spokesman for the black community and for the possible expanded role of control of the school system.

C.1.e. Member profit - there was a definite relationship between gaining control of the coalition's existing and potential re-

sources and power through membership in a unified black movement, and the goals of the two key units and factions to be the black community's spokesman, and the high level of involvement in the coalition's operations by the UCF and the Brothers.

C.2. Costs:

C.2.a. Differential resource issues - the decisions of the Black Coalition demanded different types of resources. In illustration, the issue of choosing a chairman required an internally noncontroversial figure acceptable to all members, if possible. The issue of conducting a rally required the resource capacity to emotionally stir the community to support the decision to boycott against a common adversary.

C.2.b. Costs incurred - the Brothers and Simba suffered the "responsibility costs" for the outcome (failure) of the community school, as did the UCF for their effort (failure) to forge and lead a viable black coalition. Some coalition members became involved in the school system's own committee and this resulted in heavy "intergame costs" for the coalition. Dividing up of the coalition's leadership functions - the administering of the community school and the chairing of the coalition - resulted in inefficient "division of pay-offs costs." Perhaps the main coalition decision costs were those incurred from its internal "dissonance."

C.2.c. Principles - because of the Black Coalition's position of weakness, relative to the school system, they needed to attain

a unanimously united front. The actual result was that this "decision cost principle" - essential to the coalition's potential success - was not attained.

C.3. Situations:

C.3.a. Resource independence of powerful - in terms of external issues, the school system did not need the Black Coalition's resources of emotional and ideological appeal and moderate black community support. However, through the boycott, the Black Coalition sought to undermine the fiscal support received by the school system for the number of students and the days they attend. By this, the coalition was utilizing alternate resources as commodities for exchange.

C.3.b. Resource control by powerful - the School System controlled the schools with their authority to teach and to graduate or not graduate students. The coalition sought to develop an alternate resource through its "community school."

D. Analytical Questions:

D.1. Power Resources:

United Christian Front
(and other moderate
units)

Brothers (and other militant
units)

Membership
Votes
Following of moderate segment of black community
Black parental support

Membership
Votes
Following of militant segment of black community
Contacts and rapport with high school and college black students

Consensus appeal
School transportation

Emotional appeal
Contact with (potential)
teachers.
Ability to identify enemy

D.2. Main Coalition Decision Issues and Relevant Resources:

<u>MAIN ISSUES</u>	<u>RELEVANT RESOURCES</u>
1. Choice of a chairman	Votes, broad (consensus) coalitional support.
2. Whether to boycott	Votes, membership, black parental and student support, consensus (internal) appeal and emotional appeal.
3. Children's education	Votes, membership, following of moderate segment of black community, black parental support, contact with potential alternate educational resources.
4. Inform and unite support of black community	Following of moderate and militant segments of black community, black parent and student support, membership, votes, consensus appeal, emotional appeal, and alternate educational resources.
5. Function of Rally	Same as issue 4 with much more emphasis upon emotional appeal and ability to identify enemy.
6. Internal Unit Operation	Consensus and compatibility of member units (consensus appeal).
7. Need for new chairman	Consensus (internal) appeal, votes, support of moderate and militant member units.
8. Extent of boycott	Same as issue 2 above.
9. Discontinuance (duration) of boycott	Same as issue 2 and 8 above.

D.3. Influencer(s) and Influencee(s):

<u>DECISION ISSUE</u>	<u>INFLUENCER(S)</u>	<u>INFLUENCEE(S)</u>
1. Choice of chairman	Not given in casestudy	
2. Whether to boycott	Brothers	Rest of Coalition
3. Children's education	No more given in casestudy (unanimity inferred).	
	Black parents	Rest of Coalition

DECISION ISSUE	INFLUENCER(S)	INFLUENCEE(S)
4. Inform and unite rest of black community	Not given in case study (unanimity inferred).	
5. Function of Rally	Black Coalition	Black community
6. Internal unit operation	Not given in case study (unanimity inferred).	
7. Need for new chairman	UCF (Not given in case study but, Brothers' opposition implied).	Coalition
8. Extent of boycott	Brothers Brothers Students	Coalition Black Coalition Black Coalition
9. Discontinuance (duration) of boycott	UCF	Coalition

D.4. Decision Issues and Relevant Member Resources:

DECISION ISSUES	RELEVANT MEMBER RESOURCES	
1. 1. Choice of chairman	UCF	Votes, consensus appeal
2. Whether to boycott	Brothers UCF	Votes Votes, membership, black parental support, consensus (internal) appeal.
	Brothers	Votes, members, black student support, emotional appeal.
3. Children's education	UCF	Votes, membership, following of moderate segment of black community, black parental support, school transportation.
	Brothers	Votes, membership, contact with potential teachers.

DECISION ISSUES	INFLUENCER(S)	INFLUENCEE(S)
4. Inform and unite rest of black community	UCF	Following of moderate segment of black community, black parental support, membership, votes, consensus appeal, school transportation.
	Brothers	Following of militant black community, black student support, membership, votes, emotional appeal, potential teachers.
5. Function of Rally	Same as issue 4 above but with much more significance to Panthers' resources of emotional appeal and ability to identify enemy.	
6. Internal unit operation	UCF	Consensus appeal
	Brothers	Militancy (liability)
7. Need for new chairman	UCF	Consensus (internal appeal, support of moderates, votes.
	Brothers	Support of militants, votes.
8. Extent of boycott	Same as issue 2 above	
9. Discontinuance (duration) of boycott.	Same as issue 2 above	

D.5. Outcome:

DECISION ISSUE	DECISION CHOICE
1. Choice of chairman	Mr. L.
2. Whether to boycott	Coalition affirmation to boycott
3. Children's education	Community school

DECISION ISSUE	DECISION CHOICE
4. Inform and unite rest of black community	Rally
5. Function of rally	Community endorsement of decisions 1-3.
6. Internal unit operation	Operate as a unit
7. Need for new chairman	Rev. C.
8. Extent of boycott	City wide boycott.
9. Discontinuance (duration) of boycott	Boycott termination

D.6. Member Position on Issues and Actual Outcome: + = in favor,
- = against, ? = not known.

DECISION CHOICE	MEMBER POSITION
1. MR.L.	? (unanimity inferred +)
2. Coalition affirmation to boycott	? (unanimity inferred +)
3. Community school	? (unanimity inferred +)
4. Rally	? (unanimity inferred +)
5. Community endorsement of decisions 1-3.	Black Coalition +
6. Internal unit operation	? (unanimity inferred +)
7. Rev.C.	UCF +
8. City wide boycott	UCF -
	Brothers +
9. Boycott termination	UCF +
	Brothers - (but not present for decision)

D.7. Member Goals Compared With Final Outcome:

MEMBER	GOALS	FINAL OUTCOME
UCF	Protect black students and expand own organization's influence in school system and community.	End of school trouble, curriculum changes, some new respect by white students of blacks, and first effective unity of blacks.

MEMBER	GOALS	FINAL OUTCOME
Brothers	Protect black students and expand own organization's influence in school system and community.	

II. Decision-Making Process Analysis: in order to assess the case-study in relation to typological and phase issues' assertions, each main decision (using above sequential numbers) will be placed in a table and discussed later.

PROBLEM SOLUTION

Problem uation tine	Information	Routine		Incremental		Innovative	
		adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate
	adequate				1		
	inadequate						
Incremental	adequate			5,7,9	6		8
	inadequate						
Innovative	adequate					4	
	inadequate						2,3

Explanation:

1. The need for a chairman seemed to be a procedural response (routine) to the group's emergence as a coalition seeking to organize.

The choice of Mr. L. appears to be a consequence of the coalition's need for broad support from the black community. Their assessment of the situation as requiring a chairman reflects adequate information, but their selection of Mr. L. seems to have been inadequately based in view of Mr. M.'s subsequent resignation because of his job's liability.

2. Considering and affirming the strategy and program of boycotting the high school was a definite departure from the usual grie-

vance processes. Their failure to recognize the community's internal dissension and lack of unity in carrying-out an effective boycott was not adequately recognized in the situation and solution assessments.

3. The situation of providing a satisfactory educational alternative and the development of a community school were innovative. As in number 2, the assessment of community resources was highly inadequate.

4. Using a rally (solution) to unite and inform the black community (situation) was unusual. The recognition of such a problem situation seemed valid and the choice of a rally as a means appears marginally adequate.

5. The function of this rally as a means to also gain community endorsement of the coalition's decisions seems to be an outcome of their recognition of the need for broad public support and public acceptance of their representativeness. The situation and solution seem to have been adequately appraised.

6. The situation of needing an internal structure for operating and the solution of doing this as a single unit are a consequence (incremental) of the group's development as an organization. The need is an adequate observation, the solution is inadequate if the nature of this group's members had been accurately recognized.

7. With the resignation of Mr. L. a new chairman needed to be

chosen to adapt (incremental) to this situation, and the selection of another moderate was a result of the earlier policy and a recognition of the coalition's need for unity. The situation and solution analysis seems perceptive.

8. The need for a new strategy developed (incremental) from the coalition's difficulties, but the solution of extending the boycott to city-wide was radical (innovative). Seeing that the situation required a new strategy was accurate (adequate), but, when the coalition was beginning to collapse from ineffectiveness, expanding its demands was an inappropriate assessment (inadequate) and response.

9. The subsequent failure of the new strategy necessitated (incremental) a reconsideration, and the solution of terminating the boycott seemed an appropriate consequence (incremental) to confirm formally what had already occurred in fact. These both reflect accurate analysis and adequate information.

A. Typological Issues:

A.1. Problem familiarity - the categories in the above table seem to be useful but require a degree of arbitrariness in application.

A.2. Patterns - seven of the nine main issue areas had identical problem situation and solution types.

A.3. Informational adequacy - the concepts of adequate and inadequate information added clarity in interpreting the main de-

cision issues and choices.

B. Phase Issues:

B.1. Innovation - only three out of nine of the main coalitional problem situations and solutions were innovatively oriented.

B.2. Diversity - of the main issues considered, none were regarded as routine. Decisions 2, and 3, and 4 were innovative, and the rest were incremental. There appears to be something of a trend from innovative to the other orientations.

B.3. Rational phases - this case study manifests little use of a rational decision-making model. This is reflected in poor assessment of alternatives and consequences of strategies and programs. Decisions were made without exploring whether the coalition had the resources necessary for successful decision execution. Two examples are the community school and the expansion of the boycott. There were other goals (e.g. changes in schools, uniting black community), however, which were achieved raising the issue of whether these were perhaps the main goals of a rationally used conflict strategy.

B.3.a. Relative applicability - this group was characterized by internal conflict and a lack of rational decision-making.

B.4. Unit bias - unit biases were apparent throughout this case study and were significant in the coalition's relative lack of success. The coalition process was marked by internal dissension, e.g. Brothers claimed the chairmanship along with the UCF even though the UCF's Rev.C. was the only elected officer.

B.5. Coalitional cohesiveness - the degree of interest agreement and disagreement varied with the issue, but the basic situation of internal disagreement tended to dissolve the coalition.

Critique: The analytical model's use of decisional analysis presented some limitations in the way it could be utilized with the casestudy available. This restricted the decisions to be analyzed to the main issues, and this did not lend itself to interpreting routine coalition problems. This is more of a limitation of the data than the model.

The casestudy reveals that there is no necessary connection between those in positions of formal and informal power. However, as the group developed, those with real power did in fact control actual formal authority (UCF and Brothers). It seems to have also been the case that when a formal leader was also an informal leader, then the formal role provided access to additional power (UCF and Brothers). However, when the formal leader had few informal power resources, then the formal leadership position had little power (Mr.L.).

Partially in exception to assertion (I.B.2.c.2), the member units were testing each other throughout the coalition's history.

Assertions I.B.2.d. and e. (leadership distribution) can possibly be combined in analyzing casestudies.

The findings seem to indicate that this coalition's main issue areas and decisions were not overwhelmingly innovatively oriented,, challenging assertion II.B.2.

The findings also appear to contradict assertion II.B.5.

in that substantial interest (and ideological) disagreement served to fragment and destroy the Black Coalition instead of being compatible with its existence. This did, however, provide for a testing of the positions of one another among members of the black community and of the use of a black coalition.

CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY OF CASESTUDY

"West End Community Mental Health Center Planning Project"

The West End Community Mental Health Project Coalition grew out of earlier unsuccessful attempts to find innovative alternatives to the present approach to mental health in a metropolitan area. There was also concern about the state's loss of federal funds in mental health, because of a lack of proposals.

The key leaders, "old steering committee," of this previous group eventually sought to initiate a proposal by community based agencies. They called together key West End agency executives who agreed on developing the proposal and to sending their own representatives to that undertaking. The "old steering committee" leaders, on their own, pre-selected a chairman and vice-chairman, who were later nominated and elected by the coalition. The deference of the new members to these leaders was also evident in their acceptance of their plan for proceeding, their working model, and their organizational format.

The coalition later chose to include the P. district in the project. They also agreed to the need and requirement to include community involvement, and set up a committee to evaluate this.

A crucial planning conference was selected as a means of organizing and preparing the project. There was a move by the

"old" leaders to restrict attendance, but the insistence of the other coalition members led to the opening of it to all members. The "old" leaders organized the tasks and the discussion groups for the conference, as well as, chairing all the discussion groups. The conference chose a set of goals and principles, on organizational structure, and a plan for community involvement.

There was later on an expansion of the executive committee from three of the "old steering committee" members to include "task force" leaders in the new group.

A final draft of the team plan was also submitted. It incorporated many of the principles agreed upon at the planning conference.

CASESTUDY ANALYSIS

"West End Community Mental Health Center Planning Project"

I. Decision-Making Power Analysis

A. Theoretical Issues:

Because of the apparent unanimity on most decision issues and the substantial use of formal internal structures, this case-study will require considerable emphasis upon positional analysis and structural issues. Decisional analysis and exchange dynamics, however, will also be of considerable analytical usefulness.

B. Structural Issues:

B.1. External

B.1.a. Domain - all of the members of the coalition were either based or involved in the West End section of a metropolitan area in the field of social service, especially mental health. All of these agencies had the possibility of acquiring additional staff members or funding through involvement in the proposed federally funded community mental health center project. The best way to assure their involvement would be through influencing the planning of the program. Not to be a part of such a program could even diminish their existing community role by their being outperformed by a more comprehensive and effective program.

B.1.a.1) Resource interdependence - the members of the coalition were unable to achieve the project's development, approval, and goal without the resources of the other members. The original "steering committee" planners (Mr. R., Mr. Y., Dr. S, Mr. M., etc.) had been unable in the past to develop a successful program, and they needed the resources, ideas, and commitment of "key" community (West End) agencies to establish this program. At the same time, the agencies did not have the background and contacts of the "steering committee," nor the individual resources (most members were narrowly specialized, e.g. residential treatment for disturbed children, visiting nursing care, etc) to sponsor a comprehensive community mental health program by themselves.

B.1.a.2) Member autonomy - the internal organization of the coalition was highly formal and sophisticated. It made consider-

able use of "task force" committees, marathon work sessions, and a very directive executive committee. This seemed to considerably lessen member autonomy. The coalition collectively controlled extensive community social resources with no apparently completely dominant or self sufficient (as regards the project) member or members. The potential resources of federal funding were completely attached to coalitional membership and activity..

B.1.b. Extra-coalitional relations - the relationships of the original "Steering Committee" group which existed prior to the West End coalition were crucial in determining the "core" of leaders in the actual coalition. Those in this previous, and continuing, relationship were: Mr. O. (Community Council), Mr. Y. (State M.H. Dept.), Mr. R. (County Mental Health Bureau), Dr. S. (State Medical Affairs Association), Mr. M. (Neighborhood Action Center - NAC), and Mr. G. (Metropolitan Child Care Clinic). Even during the crucial coalition planning meeting at the Sunray meeting grounds, these prior relationships continued - the planning group discussion leaders were: Dr. S., Mr. Y., Mr. G. and Mr. R. The extra-coalitional relations of the other organization members were not evident in the casestudy material, however such organizations as public welfare and Community Nurses are certain to have previously existing relationships, but to what extent these contacts had upon the coalition's process is not evident from the casestudy data.

B.1.c. Unit interests - there was evidence that at least some of the coalition's participants clearly regarded their involvement

as secondary to their unit interests. Charity Hospital was cautious in reviewing how their commitment to the program would relate to their over all program and goals. The chairman, Dr. S., appears to have regarded this coalition as a secondary matter to his own interests as indicated by his possible lessening of involvement upon his appointment to a new position with the State. Of more apparent evidence is the concern with the promotion of unit interests by the coalition's members. Probably the best and most comprehensive illustration of this was the pattern of volunteers for the committees on the areas of concern for the project. People volunteered for the committees which concerned their organization's interest, e.g. Mr. J., Alcoholism and Drug Services; Rev. N., Geriatric Services, etc. They were thus seeking to primarily promote and protect their organization's interests in lieu of a peripheral concern.

B.2. Internal:

B.2.a. Formal roles - the formal roles in this coalition were extremely important and influential. Dr. S.'s becoming chairman significantly influenced the power structure of the coalition. It was not only his formal position, however, but how he defined and utilized it ("directive" leadership) which resulted in its being a position of power. The vice-chairman, Mr. G., was in a similarly influential position, but of less impact. Their activities and positions with the "Steering Committee" enabled them to set up their own elections by the new coalition. They also determined the major initial input of members (letters by

participants). At the second meeting, it was their meeting plan and organizational format (committees to study program areas) which determined the course of action. Dr. S. also established the four main tasks to be achieved at the Sunray conference. Dr. S. and Mr. G. were also responsible for drafting the "community team" model to be completed by a special committee. They, along with a few others, were appointed to an executive committee that had the power to act between meetings in the program planning.

The other important formal coalitional positions were various committee chairmen and members. They significantly determined the components of the proposal. The entire process worked within a highly structured system of an executive committee and task force committees.

B.2.b. Representativeness - the "parent organization" of some members was somewhat nebulous, e.g. County Poverty Agency, County Mental Health Project, County Family Mental Health Bureau, and County Public Health Bureau. Whether their "parent organization" was the division, clinic, etc. or the county determines if these people represented the county as a whole (whatever that is) or that division, etc. The tendency would probably be to promote the interest of the lower level segment, but evidence is lacking in the casestudy to clarify this. There did seem to be a movement at Sunray to seek out the County's relationship with the project, including the possibility of its being the fiscal agent. For the coalition generally, there is no clear evidence

indicating unit representatives substantially digressing from "parent organization" interests.

B.2.c. Consensus - to the date that the casestudy covered, the most powerful members of the coalition tended to be recognized as those in formal coalitional roles, e.g. chairman, vice-chairman, and task force committee chairmen. This was especially the case with the chairman and vice-chairman. There was also the recognition of Charity Hospital as a powerful member, since it was required as the inpatient facility in the proposal.

B.2.c.1) Differential power - the structural and procedural issue areas were dominated by the two elected officials. The issue of agency inclusion in the planning process (committees and Sunray) were greatly influenced by all concerned coalition agency and citizen members.

B.2.c.2) Testing - since no substantive domain issues had as yet arisen, little testing had occurred within the coalition. One exception was the conflict over participation at the crucial Sunray planning session in which the "leaders" attempted to restrict attendance and coalition members sought an open meeting and won. There was also the conflict by the citizen based groups over citizen-input.

B.2.d. Single leadership - the formal coalitional leadership was essentially controlled by one (possibly two) person, Dr. S. He also controlled the process of the group in a directive manner. While the formal leadership was "imbalanced," the informal lead-

ership had not as yet emerged (hypothetically it might never emerge) - so the structure of that distribution of power had not yet become apparent. Some possibilities of other centers of power include Charity Hospital, the State, the County, Citizen participation organizations, residential and out-patient facilities. All of these members have substantial resources.

B.2.e. Multiple leadership - the formal group leadership is somewhat centralized and imbalanced, however the distribution of informal power resources among several participants indicates a possibility of the future development of several centers of group leadership.

C. Exchange Issues:

C.1. Conditions:

C.1.a. Resource generality - the resource of formal organizational control of the coalition was a very general resource frequently and effectively used by the formal coalition leaders. The applicability of this resource would probably tend to decrease once the stage of concrete proposal make-up and proposed project subcontracting was initiated. Informal power resources would then probably tend to be dominant. Coalition members with more specific resources with lower generality include Charity Hospital's control of the only viable inpatient facility, and its relative control of that portion of the proposal. Another illustration is the control of the citizen participation segment by those agencies and residents with that organizational and per-

sonal interest. There was also program and knowledge control by agencies specialized in certain problem areas.

C.1.b. Resource dependency - the process of this coalition has generally been characterized by cooperation. This has largely been determined by the pervasiveness of the project which requires the resources of a broad diversity of local West End community agencies. The result is that the members of the coalition need the resources of each other to successfully attain the overall proposal's acceptance which is constituted by program components concerned with member interests.

C.1.b.1) Mutual exchange - there appears to be a relatively high level of member co-ordination and interdependence, as well as, apparent mutual exchanges. These exchanges have occurred in task force committee deployment according to volunteers. This allowed those with special interests in certain program topic areas to help determine the outcome of that segment of the project. While structured by the leadership, the Sunray work conference did include all those interested - after members pressured that leadership. The leaders were still to determine the conference structure, while all members were allowed planning input. The product of that conference was also the result of a mutual exchange of ideas and interests. As part of its list of 13 priorities, 3 specifically protected the mutual role of involvement for existing West End community agencies. It also included provisions for and specifications of, "specialized services" which the community "teams" could draw upon. These included many of the program areas of member agencies, e.g. "inpatient services"

- Charity Hospital, "children's residential care" - Children's Home, but did not specify the contract agencies.

C.1.c. Unit goals - there appeared to be commitment to unit goals (degree to which not clear), but, to this point, attainment of those goals required cooperation as illustrated by the Sun-ray conference plan which broadly provided for the involvement of most of the concerns of the member agencies.

C.1.d. Resource competition - the coalition was not as yet highly characterized by considerable competition for resources and subsequent group conflict. This could be because the areas of resource competition and allocation were still latent and had not as yet become manifest.

C.1.e. Member profit - since the coalition is the vehicle for member participation and determination of resource distribution, they seem generally to be intimately involved in its process, especially in the planning portions which directly concern their agency's area of interest.

C.2. Costs:

C.2.a. Differential resource issues - this coalition gives evidence of different issues demanding different resources. Examples include Mr. Y.'s position with the State as providing him with the key resource of assembling the coalitional participants. Dr. S. and Mr. G.'s resource of program area familiarity and prior acceptance by old "steering committee" members greatly enabled them to secure the central formal leadership positions of

the coalition. The issue of who was to attend the Sunray conference was by no means a situation that control of the formal coalitional structure could determine; it required full involvement of all the community agencies with their respective crucial program resources. Subsequently, the conference was opened to all coalition members.

C.2.b. Costs incurred - some of the costs incurred by this coalition include "information," controlled by old "steering committee" members; "intergame," need to approach the County about issue of fiscal agent; "division of pay-offs," (somewhat potential) inclusion of provisions in proposal for services provided by coalition members; "dissonance," inclusion of all members in planning conference; and "pressure of time," October 1, deadline and other future deadlines.

C.2.c. Principles - certain "decision cost" principles seem to have been operative in this group. "Size" is a factor to the extent that the "minimum winning" member number is large, because of the requirements of the proposal. This large number of required participants, because of their crucial resources, seems to have demanded relative "unanimity" of group members. This also has meaning for an "indispensable member," since so many agency resources are crucial, e.g. "old steering committee" knowledge and crucial liaison, Charity Hospital control of only viable inpatient facility, etc.

C.3. Situations:

C.3.a. Resource independence of powerful - in this coalition

the weakness and strength of most members is relative to the situation at hand. The tendency seems to have been for the agencies to be most influential in areas of their own interest. So the outcome was essentially one of exchange among relatively equal members, by each having considerable control over their interest area through task force committees. In the instance of who was to participate in the Sunray conference, the leaders had control of arranging the conference and determining attendance. The reaction of the other coalition members, holding key program resources, forced reconsideration and eventual inclusion of them.

C.3.b. Resource control by powerful - alternative resources were sought by the members who did not hold formal leadership positions by going outside of that group, in essence, and mutually sought to change a tentative attendance decision for the conference.

D. Analytical Questions: because of the extremely large number of participants (approximately 50), the participants will be referred to in more collective terms unless the issue specifically involved a limited number of identifiable actors. The main categories will be "old steering committee and "agency representatives."

D.1. Power Resources:

"OLD STEERING COMMITTEE""AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES"

Crucial liaison with funding agents
 Knowledge of proposal requirements
 Control of formal coalitional positions
 Official standing of leadership and authority on a broad community or governmental base
 Votes
 Relative neutrality in possible agency funding
 Previous experience with project

Crucial proposal component resources, e.g. (1) staff, (2) facilities, (3) programs. Examples of (1), (2), and (3) include professional personnel, knowledgeable citizens, hospital, residential care facilities, homemaker programs, community participation functions, etc.
 Votes.

D.2. Main coalition decision issues and relevant resources:

<u>MAIN ISSUES</u>	<u>RELEVANT RESOURCES</u>
1. Need to coalesce main West End community resource agencies.	Prestige sufficient to assure a response from key community resource representatives.
2. Whether to proceed on a coordinated basis on a proposal.	Liaison with funding agents, knowledge of proposal requirements, crucial proposal component resources, votes.
3. Assurance of agency cooperation and influence on proposal.	Crucial proposal component resources, liaison with funding agents, knowledge of proposal requirements.
4. "Old steering committee" seeking to control coalition leadership.	Liaison with funding agents, knowledge of proposal requirements, relative neutrality in possible agency funding, previous experience with project, votes.
5. Coalition's need for formal leadership.	Liaison with funding agents, knowledge of proposal requirements, relative neutrality in possibly agency funding, previous experience with project, votes.
6. Need for proposal planning and initial organizational structure	Knowledge of proposal requirements, relative neutrality, previous experience with project, control of formal organizational positions.

7. Need to staff "task force" committees.	Crucial proposal component resources, control of formal organizational positions.
8. Whether to include P. district.	Crucial proposal component resources, knowledge of proposal requirements.
9. Need to develop effective community participation.	Crucial proposal component resources (citizen participation), knowledge of proposal requirements.
10. Attendance at crucial planning conference.	Crucial liaison with funding agents, knowledge of proposal requirements, control of formal coalitional positions, relative neutrality, previous experience with project, crucial proposal component resources.
11. Control of conference	Control of formal coalitional positions

Decision issues 12 - 14 were products of the planning conference.

12. Goals and operational principles.	Knowledge of proposal requirements, relative neutrality, previous experience with project, crucial proposal component resources, votes.
13. Organizational structure (Board, committees, fiscal agent, staff, Mental Health Team, additional services).	Same as number 12.
14. Community involvement.	Crucial proposal component resources (citizen participation), knowledge of proposal requirements.
15. Need for expanded leadership of coalition.	Knowledge and control of the coalition's crucial proposal components (new resource).

D.3. Influencer (s) and influencee (s):

DECISION ISSUE	INFLUENCER(S)	INFLUENCEE(S)
1. Need to coalesce main West End community resource agencies.	"Old steering committee"	Main West End community resource agencies

2. Whether to proceed on a coordinated basis on a proposal.	"Old steering committee"	Community resource agencies
3. Assurance of agency cooperation and influence on proposal.	"Old steering committee"	Agencies
4. "Old steering committee" seeking to control coalition leadership.	Individual agencies	Coalition
5. Coalition's need for formal leadership.	"Old steering committee"	Agencies
6. Need for proposal planning and initial organizational structure.	"Old steering committee" (especially c. and v.-c.)	Agencies
7. Need to staff "task force" committees.	Individual agencies "old steering committee" (esp. c. and v.-c.)	Coalition Agencies
8. Whether to include P. district.	Individual agencies with interests in P. (inferred)	Rest of Coalition
9. Need to develop effective community participation.	Neighborhood poverty program	Coalition
10. Attendance at crucial planning conference.	"Old steering committee" Agencies and residents	Agencies and residents "old steering committee"
11. Control of conference	"Old steering committee"	Coalition
12. Goals and operational principles.	Not given in casestudy	
13. Organizational structure (Board, committees, fiscal agent, staff, Mental Health Team, additional services).	Not given in casestudy	
14. Community involvement.	Neighborhood poverty programs (2) and residents Agencies	Rest of coalition Citizen advocates

15. Need for expanded leadership of coalition.

Not given in case study but inferred:

New leaders (committee chairmen)
Old leaders

Rest of coalition
Rest of coalition

D.4. Decision issues and relevant member resources:

DECISION ISSUES	RELEVANT MEMBER	RESOURCES
1. Need to coalesce main West End community resource agencies.	"Old steering committee"	Standing of leadership and authority on governmental base.
2. Whether to proceed on a coordinated basis on a proposal	"Old steering committee"	Liaison with funding agents, Knowledge of proposal requirements, votes.
	Community resource agencies	Crucial proposal component resources, votes.
3. Assurance of agency cooperation and influence on proposal.	"Old steering committee"	Liaison with funding agents, Knowledge of proposal requirements.
	Individual agencies	Crucial proposal component resources.
4. "Old steering committee" seeking to control coalition leadership.	"Old steering committee"	Liaison with funding agents, knowledge of proposal requirements, relative neutrality in possible agency funding, previous experience with project.
5. Coalition's need for formal leadership.	"Old steering committee"	Same as number 4.
6. Need for proposal planning and initial organizational structure.	"Old steering committee" (esp. v. and v.-c.)	Knowledge of proposal requirements, relative neutrality, previous experience with project, control of formal organizational positions.

DECISION ISSUES	RELEVANT MEMBER	RESOURCES
7. Need to staff "task force" committees.	Individual agencies	Crucial proposal component resources.
	"Old steering committee" (esp. c. and v.-c.).	Control of formal organizational positions.
8. Whether to include P. district.	Individual agencies with interests in P.	Crucial proposal component resources.
	"Old steering committee"	Knowledge of proposal requirements.
9. Need to develop effective community participation.	Neighborhood poverty program	Crucial proposal component resource (citizen participation).
10. Attendance at crucial planning conference.	"Old steering committee"	Knowledge of proposal requirements, crucial liaison with funding agents, control of formal coalitional positions, relative neutrality, previous experience with project, crucial proposal component resources.
11. Control of conference	"Old steering committee," (esp. c. and v.-c.)	Control of formal coalitional positions.
12. Goals and operational principles.	"Old steering committee"	Knowledge of proposal requirements, relative neutrality, previous experience with project, votes.
	Agencies	Crucial proposal component resources.
13. Organizational structure.	Same as number 12.	
14. Community involvement	Neighborhood poverty programs (2) and residents	Crucial proposal component resources (citizen participation),
	Agencies	Knowledge of proposal requirements, votes.
		Counter resources of control of component resources, and votes.
15. Need for expanded leadership of coalition	Existing leaders and main existing committee chairmen	Knowledge and control of the coalitions proposed components.

D.5. Outcome:

DECISION ISSUE	DECISION CHOICE
1. Need to coalesce main West End community resource agencies.	Calling of meeting by Mr. Y. of State M.H. Dept.
2. Whether to proceed on a coordinated basis on a proposal.	Proceed on a coordinated proposal.
3. Assurance of agency cooperation and influence on proposal.	Each agency to send one or two representatives.
4. "Old steering committee" seeking to control coalition leadership.	Pre-select Dr. S. chairman and Mr. G. vice-chairman.
5. Coalition's need for formal leadership.	Dr. S. and Mr. G. nominated and elected same as in number 4.
6. Need for proposal planning and initial organizational structure.	Acceptance of Dr. S. and Mr. G.'s plan of procedure, Dr. S.'s proposal model, and Mr. G.'s organizational format (task force committees).
7. Need to staff "task force" committees.	Volunteers from agency representatives to committees relevant to their knowledge and, above all, interest.
8. Whether to include P. district.	Inclusion of P. district.
9. Need to develop effective community participation.	Acceptance and appointment of an ad hoc committee to study (made up of citizen participation oriented program representatives). All members of coalition and residents.
10. Attendance at crucial planning conference.	
11. Control of conference.	"Old steering committee" members to lead discussion groups, chairman to determine agenda and tasks.
12. Goals and operational principles.	Approval of same, including 3 (numbers 1,7,8) which specifically involve serving the interests of the existing agencies.
13. Organizational structure.	Creation of: a board made up of 1/3 residents, 1/3 agency people, 1/3 "community-at-large;" standing operating committees; fiscal agent (non-profit corporation or the County); executive staff; neighborhood mental health team (at least one psychiatrist, plus

DECISION ISSUE

DECISION CHOICE

14. Community involvement.

15. Need for expanded leadership of coalition.

other professionals and para-professionals, additional specialized and extended services including many directly related to functions of coalition agencies, e.g. inpatient facility, residential treatment, alcoholic treatment, etc.).

1/3 of board members (not control), a "Community Review Committee" - advisory only.

Steering Committee formed from Old Executive Committee (Dr. S., Mr. G., Mr. Q., sec.) and "Team" Committee chairman Mr. E., Management Committee chairman Mr. T., and two poverty program personnel, one being chairman of Community Review Committee Mrs. L.

D.6. Member Position on Issues and Actual Outcome: + = in favor,

- = against, ? = not known

DECISION CHOICE	MEMBER	POSITION
1. Calling of meeting by Mr. Y. of State M.H. Dept.	?	(unanimity inferred +) "Old steering committee" members
2. Proceed on a coordinated proposal	?	(unanimity inferred +)
3. Each agency to send one or two representatives	?	(unanimity inferred +)
4. Pre-select Dr. S. chairman and Mr. G. vice-chairman	?	(unanimity inferred +) "Old steering committee" members
5. Dr. S. and Mr. G. nominated and elected the same as in number 4.	?	(unanimity inferred +) "Old steering committee" members
6. Acceptance of Dr. S. and Mr. G.'s plan of procedure, Dr. S.'s proposal model, and Mr. G.'s organizational format (task force committees).	?	(unanimity inferred +)
7. Volunteers from agency representatives to committees relevant to their knowledge and, above all, interest.	?	(unanimity inferred +)

DECISION CHOICE	MEMBER	POSITION
8. Inclusion of P. district.	?	(unanimity inferred +)
9. Acceptance and appointment of an ad hoc committee to study effective community participation (made up of citizen participation oriented program representatives).	?	(unanimity inferred +)
10. All members of coalition and residents	-	"Old steering committee"
11. "Old steering committee" members to lead discussion groups, chairman to determine agenda and tasks.	+	Agencies and residents
	?	(unanimity inferred +)
		"Old steering committee" members
12. Approval of goals and operational principles.	?	(unanimity inferred +)
13. Approval of organizational structure	?	(unanimity inferred +)
14. Approval of plan for community involvement.	?	(unanimity inferred,, after compromise +)
15. Expansion of executive committee	?	Unanimity inferred +)

The three most controversial and significant decisions had not as yet been made by the coalition: (1) specific fiscal agent,, (2) specific initial services, and (3) specific service subcontractors.

D.7. Member Goals Compared With Final Outcome:

MEMBER	GOALS	FINAL OUTCOME
"Old steering committee"	Development and funding of an innovative community mental health plan	Final outcome of this coalition was not as yet attained. It had completed an

MEMBER	GOALS	FINAL OUTCOME
Agencies	for West End of Metropolitan Area. Protection and promotion of own agency interest and domain including provisions for funding for these agencies, including, according to individual agency interest, residential treatment, alcoholic treatment, inpatient care, etc.	overall outline for an innovative community mental health plan for West End Metropolitan Area, with provisions covering and promoting essentially all of the member agency interests.

II. Decision-Making Process Analysis: in order to assess the case-study in relation to typological and phase issues' assertions, each main decision (using above sequential numbers) will be placed in a table and discussed later.

PROBLEM SOLUTION

Problem	Information	ROUTINE		INCREMENTAL		INNOVATIVE	
		adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate
uation	adequate	11		7,5,12,13,14			
time	inadequate						
emental	adequate	6,8,9		3, 10		4,15	
	inadequate						
vative	adequate					1,2	
	inadequate						

EXPLANATION:

1. The "old steering committee's" assessment of the situation as requiring an unprecedented move (innovative) of calling together all West End community mental health resources seemed to be an

adequate solution response to the situation.

2. The assessment of the situation as warranting a coordinated effort (given the level of agency interdependency) justified their affirmation of that solution. This situation and solution were very innovative for the social service agencies involved.

3. The realization of the need to assure coalition member cooperation and influence seemed to be a reasonable outgrowth (incremental) and assessment (adequate) of the situation. The decision to send representatives was also a reasonable decision and an accurate assessment.

4. The desire of the "old steering committee" to develop a plan to maintain leadership was an adaptation to the expansion of the coalition and an accurate realization from their perspective. The decision to apparently pre-plan the election was an innovative response to this situation and demonstrates a clear analysis of the group and the probability that their solution would be successful.

5. The coalition's recognition of a need for formal leadership was a procedural consequence (routine) of the need to organize the new coalition. The solution of electing the hand-picked "old steering committee" members was a logical solution and outcome, because of the new members' own lack of experience, liaison, etc. Their understanding of how the election was manipulated was apparently non-existent.

6. The coalition's realization of a need for a plan for procedure was a result (incremental) of their seeking to develop a proposal. Their response of deferring to the "old steering committee" plans had become somewhat routinized at this point, and reasonably so.

7. The recognition of the need to staff the committees, which were part of the plan accepted in decision 6, seemed routine and accurate. The decision to allow those to join the committees which they were "interested" and knowledgeable in seemed to be an adaptive and adequate response to the problem situation of needing to fill the positions and having people of matching interests in the group (also a good way to assure the saliency of the project to coalition members).

8. The fact that the P. district had not been automatically included in the project area, indicates that the problem of whether to include it was an outgrowth (incremental) of the effort to be comprehensive geographically, as well as, program wise. The recognition of the need to respond seemed to be accurate. The decision to include the P. district appears to be routine in view of the inclusion of other areas. This seemed to be an adequate analysis.

9. The information about the requirement of citizen participation was a result (incremental) of the coalition's application for federal funding (including their regulations), as well as, internal pressures. The establishment of an ad hoc committee seemed to be a routine response for this coalition, which already had es-

established this method as its basic procedural approach. The inclusion of citizen participation oriented committee members seemed reasonable.

10. The problem of whom to include at the "crucial planning conference" was a consequence (incremental) of the expanded agency involvement and influence. The coalition leaders did not recognize this; the agency members did. The final decision to include all coalition members was a reasonable way of adapting (incremental) to the new situation.

11. The situation of determining the leadership for the planning conference was a routine matter of having decided to hold the session, and there seems to be recognition of this. The deference to the "old steering committee" (especially the coalition's executive leaders) was a routinized solution for the coalition by now. This seemed a reasonable reaction.

12-14. Having entered a community planning and federal proposal writing project, there are certain routine, rational procedures which are required. The establishment of goals and operational principles, organizational structure, and community involvement provisions are routine procedures, while the manner and content of how this coalition solved these requirements was highly adaptive (incremental) to its peculiar organizational composition and its network of interests. Their observations and solutions seemed quite adequate and accurate.

15. The need for expanded leadership was an outgrowth (incremen-

tal) of the increased complexity of the project components and the division of labor. This was recognized in raising the issue of the need to expand the leadership. The decision to do so might seem incremental, but it was more probably incremental in view of the "old steering committee's" here-to-fore monopoly of formal coalitional leadership and the impact this could bring to the leadership of the group. The solution does seem to be a reasonable response to the demands of the changed situation.

A. Typological Issues:

A.1. Problem familiarity - the categories seemed to be helpful. There did seem to be an applicability of the decision types, without being overly arbitrary.

A.2. Patterns - seven out of the fifteen main decision issues had identical problem situation and solution types.

A.3. Informational adequacy - the applicability of the variable of adequacy of information seemed to be limited, because it was never really critically employed in analyzing this casestudy.

B. Phase Issues:

B.1. Innovation - there were only two instances out of fifteen main decision issues in which both the problem situation and problem solution were innovative. There were additional issues which had incremental situations and innovative solutions.

B.2. Diversity - the first two of the fifteen problem situations and solutions were both innovative, and after them both incre--

mental and routine (mixed) orientations entered into the process. These later instances did apparently occur in a random fashion from incremental, routine, and even innovative (solutions only). There were, after the first two innovative - innovative areas, two incremental - incremental, one routine - routine, three incremental (situation) - routine (solution), five routine - incremental, and two incremental - innovative.

B.3. Rational phases - there seems to have been a general use and reliance upon rationality in decision-making in this case-study, eventhough self interest was clearly operative. A tracing of the stages or phases of a rational process model in this casestudy in an overall perspective could include:

- (1) Issue or problem identification: need for improvement of community mental health through an innovative, comprehensive neighborhood program.
- (2) Information gathering: assignment of "task force" committees.
- (3) Listing of alternative strategies and solutions,
- (4) Determination of consequences,
- (5) Comparative evaluation, and
- (6) Choice of strategy or solution: the "crucial planning conference" allowed for this process.
- (7) Enactment of strategy and solution - not to date of case-study.

It should be noted that many individual decisions could be assessed in a similar format of the rational phase model.

B.3.a. Relative applicability - this coalition was marked by a high degree of cooperation and consensus, with definite instances of bargaining and exchange. It also used a rational process method.

B.4. Unit bias - unit biases were very much in evidence in this coalition from the pattern of volunteers for the "task force" committees relevant to a unit's interests to the interest laden proposal, model, which resulted from the planning conference. An illustration is the strong role taken by the citizen based poverty programs to be the chief advocates for citizen participation.

B.5. Coalitional cohesiveness - this coalition had members who had issue and interest differences and disagreements (relatively mild), but this did not preclude the possibility of forming a workable and working coalition.

Critique: The usefulness and applicability of the decisional method seemed to be of relatively lessened value, largely because of the lack of more specific casestudy data on alignment of members on issues, and the fact that the coalition had not as yet finalized its work.

A more specific criticism concerns assertion I.B.2.a., which maintains that formal coalitional roles carry little real power. The casestudy material indicates that the coalitional leadership positions of the "old steering committee" members were instruments of considerable influence. The coalitional "task force" committee chairmen also had considerable impact on the planning

process and this eventually assured them positions on the executive committee.

Another criticism is of assertion C.1.c., which maintains that the higher the commitment to individual unit goals, the less the cooperation. The casestudy implies a definite commitment by units to their goals, but cooperation did take place because of unit interdependence. This possibly indicates that interdependence may preclude at least blatant pursuit of self interest. Another possible motive for this degree of apparent cooperation could have been for external goals of coalition members. Being a member of the coalition in itself could have been a resource sought among other possible goals, e.g. enhancement of resources in another coalition or in the eyes of constituents.

While assertion II.A.2. maintains that problem situation and solution types are usually identical, the data from the casestudy revealed that only 6 out of 15 of the decision issues were of this type. Subsequently, they were not the usual case.

The variable of information adequacy II.A.3. was of little use in this casestudy. This, however, may be more attributable to the lack of casestudy data than to a defect in the model.

CHAPTER 5

Summary of Casestudy

"Project Rap"

This coalition was developed by representatives of social service agencies around the issue of establishing a preventive program for pre-alienated youth in a metropolitan area. The coalition arose from the merger of two previously separate attempts in the area. One was an attempt by a drop in center for alienated youth through the public schools (which rejected the proposal). The second group was initiated by Family Service Agency A., which involved three other Family Service agencies. This group then asked the Drop in Center representative to meet with them and later was asked to join the group.

The coalition eventually decided upon a focus for a proposal to the school system for setting up a preventive program for pre-alienated youth. The decision was made to divide the responsibility according to member interest: Drop in Center was to focus on drop in centers for youth and Family Service agencies on drop in centers for the parents. Initially, some concern about the consequences upon community support by including the controversial drop in center member was expressed by the Family Service members. However, it was soon recognized that the Family Service Agencies needed the Drop in Center's rapport with youth, and the Drop in Center needed the Family Service Agencies' rapport with other "established" agencies and their public image of respectability in order for the program to work.

The proposed plan was accepted by the coalition after each member's respective "parent organization" approved it. Family

Service Agency A. chaired the group and the Drop in Center representative largely wrote the proposal with assistance from a member of Agency A.

The proposal was rejected by the school board which was at the time facing a bond election, and whose superintendant was under public criticism for his proposed reorganization of the school district. One criticism raised by the board was the failure to involve school counselors in the project.

The coalition developed a six week, summer pilot project through the park department, which they decided was a failure because of its poor location and shortness of time.

The coalition then initiated an intensive lobbying effort with school board members. The controversial representative from the Drop in Center did not participate in this effort in order to avoid further his alienating of the school board members. Shortly after this, the proposal was resubmitted and was accepted by the board.

This was followed with the coalition's establishment of a decision-making executive board and an implementing project coordinator.

The members of the coalition felt that generally the group was cooperative. There was considerable discrepancy among resource contributions of the members. The Family Service Agency A., one of the other Family Service Agencies, and the Drop in Center contributed the most. The only area of internal conflict arose over the type of publicity and image given the project once it was under way. The Drop in Center representative and several

other coalition members felt the focus had been switched from education and prevention to problem cases. The contention was raised that this was a consequence of shifting program authority away from the professional agency staff to lay executive board members. This is challenged by the fact that the executive board members were the same people involved in the original planning committee.

CASESTUDY ANALYSIS

"Project Rap"

I. Decision-Making Power Analysis:

A. Theoretical Issues: This casestudy can be analyzed with reference to the internal and external positions of each of its members. This is especially evident in the external and internal structural issues of this coalition. The assessment of decisional dynamics also is significant and the nature of "exchange" appears to be directly influenced by the structural issues of this case.

B. Structural Issues:

B.1. External

B.1.a. Domain - both initial proposals (Drop in Center [Mr. A.] and the agency sponsored one) were concerned with expanding program domains into the area of "pre-alienated youth."

B.1.a.1) Resource interdependence - the internal resources of each of the two proposal groups was regarded to be inadequate without the inclusion of the other. The established agencies

needed the Drop in Center's (Mr. A.'s) rapport with alienated youth, staff time, and funds. The Drop in Center needed the agency resources of public respectability, staff time, and funds.

B.1.a.2) Member autonomy - the coalition does not seem to have restricted the usual operations of its members. The coalition itself utilized very limited internal and external resources and had no real organizational sanctions upon its members.

B.1.b. Extra-coalitional relations - a considerable degree of the influence exercised by the Drop in Center upon other coalition members was based upon its extra-coalitional relations with the metropolitan alienated youth. On the other hand, the established agencies based much of their influence in coalitional activity upon their extra-coalitional relations with the "established" community and as being a "respected" member of the community.

B.1.c. Unit interests - membership in the coalition does not appear to pose a threat to any existing interests and inter-organizational relations of its members. There is reference to some initial degree of concern by the established family service agency members about including a controversial program such as Drop in Center as a member. This was based upon the fear of losing community support from such an alliance.

B.2. Internal:

B.2.a. Formal roles - there did not appear to be considerable influence vested in formal coalitional roles. The real power seemed to reside in resource control and use. There was some influence

in that Family Service Agency A. controlled the position of chairman and was intimately concerned about the formation and direction of the project. The Drop in Center was also responsible for drafting the proposal with some assistance from Agency A.

B.2.b. Representativeness - the members involved appeared to be without internal conflicts with respect to accurately representing the over all interests of their "parent organizations" in this project.

B.2.c. Consensus - while this case is generally characterized by group consensus and cooperation, there developed a recognition of degrees of influence among coalition members.

B.2.c.1) Differential power - in the issue area of having contact with the client populations (prealienated youth and their parents), there was a recognition that Drop in Center had more influence with the former group and the family service agencies with the latter. In addition, the family service agencies clearly emerged as more influential overall by their capability of dealing with crucial external organizations (school board).

B.2.c.2) Testing --there was an early testing of member power and influence in the coalition around the issues of mutual dependence and resource capabilities in the main areas of decision influencing (B.2.c.1).

B.2.d. and e. Single or multiple leadership - the coalition is composed of several leaders of considerable internal influence.,

but the service agency grouping tends to be more frequently influential and dominant. The distribution of power appears to be balanced with respect to internal issues and influence and imbalanced with respect to external issues and influence. Drop in Center and the agencies are balanced in the former, and the agencies are dominant in the latter.

C. Exchange Issues:

C.1. Conditions:

C.1.a. Resource generality - all of the coalition's members shared the general resources of staff time and money. While these were committed with varying degrees by the coalition's members, they were at least potential resources for exchange. Another common resource was organizational endorsement. The more specific resources included community respectability and interagency contact by the service agencies and youth rapport by Drop in Center.

C.1.b. Resource dependency - the case study indicates that coalition members clearly and openly recognized their position of interdependence for resources needed for goal attainment. At the second meeting of the agency group, the case study notes "it was agreed that none of the agencies could provide an outreach program on its own, because of a lack of funds and staff." It was noted that later when Drop in Center became involved in the coalition, that it became apparent that it was identified with "drug users" and "street people." Furthermore, the family service a-

gencies were identified as part of the "establishment" by young people. The consequence was that these other coalition members had resources which could compensate for each other's deficiencies. The subsequent division of labor in their proposal indicates the result of bargaining: Drop in Center was responsible for youth drop in centers and the family agencies for a parents' drop in center.

C.1.b.1) Mutual exchange - the high degree of co-ordination and interdependence of the units seems to have been manifested in the mutuality of the exchange in the planning phase. However, when resources were actually committed only three of the coalition members contributed in any substantial way.

C.1.c. Unit goals - the goal of the coalition seems to have been directly related to the different units' main areas of concern, yet were an expansion of them. Furthermore, the two main factions, Drop in Center and the Family Service Agencies, sought to promote their areas of special interest within the broader coalitional goal. This, however, did not result in a situation of low cooperation. Actually, there was a high degree of compatibility, contrary to assertion C.1.c.

C.1.d. Resource competition - this coalition was not characterized by competition for resources, nor group conflict.

C.1.e. Member profit - there was definitely a discrepancy in degrees of involvement among some of the coalition's members, and this was directly related to the amount of resources contributed

by each member. Those who contributed more resources in this case, also gained more resources in that their staff were able to utilize public school facilities, as well as, the complementary resources (including reputations) of the other more active members. The members which also were active in leadership also contributed and shared in more of the benefits gained.

C.2. Costs:

C.2.a. Differential resource issues - this case study demonstrates how different issues often require different types of resources. The internal planning process reveals how the two main segments of the coalition utilized their special resources to obtain their particular goal's approval in the proposal. Drop in Center had the resource of rapport with youth and got a youth drop in center accepted. Family service agencies had the resource of community respectability and had an adult drop in center included in the proposal. They all had the common resources mentioned in C.1.b. In addition, the family service agencies lobbied the school board due to their good contacts with "established" agencies, while Drop in Center's Mr. A. temporarily dropped from activity.

C.2.b. Costs incurred - the group members incurred the "division of pay-offs" costs after the program had been divided up between Drop in Center and the service agencies and later when the program actually began. "Responsibility" costs were incurred by the Executive Board of "Rap" for their controversial publicity program. "Intergame" and "persuasion" costs resulted from the co-

alition's lobbying of the school board members.

C.2.c. Principles - functioning as a consensus type of group the "unanimity principle" seemed to be operative in attempting to maintain a moderate process. Drop in Center was an "indispensable member" to the service agencies and vice versa. As an external unit, the school board was clearly an "indispensable member." While the school board did not participate (nor was requested to do so) in the on-going coalitional process, its decision ultimately determined the fate of the group's program and goal. In this sense, the board's vote of approval was "indispensable."

C.3. Situations:

C.3.a. Resource independence of powerful - there are perhaps two apparent incidents of the more powerful not needing the resources of the weaker, and where the weaker employed other commodities for exchange. In the first example, the school board did not believe it needed the resources of the coalition (it was a threat), but the coalition changed its tactics and used their resource commodity of good public contacts and persuasion to achieve their goal. Another illustration is when Drop in Center's Mr. A. felt himself to be unable to deal with the school board, he reduced his status in front of the other members. Possibly to counteract this, Mr. A. raised the issue about publicity to regain a role of influence as an indispensable manager of how the work should be done.

C.3.b. Resource control by powerful - in this casestudy, the coalition remained within the process of attaining resources from stronger (school board) or essentially equal (active coalition members) units. One example of seeking alternate resources was the establishment of a summer program utilizing park department facilities after their proposal was first rejected by the school board.

D. Analytical Questions:

D.1. Power resources:

DROP IN CENTER

Staff time
Funds
Rapport with
youth
Vote(s)

FAMILY SERVICE AGENCIES

Staff time
Funds
Rapport with established agencies
Image of respectability
Votes

D.2. Main coalition decision issues and relevant resources:

MAIN ISSUES

1. Project goal and focus
2. Acceptance of proposal
3. Presentation of plan to school board (extra-coalitional decision)
4. Summer program
5. Presentation of plan to school board (extra-coalitional decision).

RELEVANT RESOURCES

- Votes, staff time, funds, rapport with youth, image of respectability.
- Votes and resources relevant to the plans make-up (not given in casestudy).
- Respectable image, inclusion of school board, information, staff time, funds, promote public image of schools rapport with schools.
- Votes, facility, staff, funds.
- Respectable image, inclusion of board, information, promote public image of schools, rapport with schools.

MAIN ISSUESRELEVANT RESOURCES

6. Program
structure

Votes, maintenance of coalition member in-put (resource and policy).

D.3. Influencer(s) and Influencee(s):

<u>DECISION ISSUE</u>	<u>INFLUENCER(S)</u>	<u>INFLUENCEE(S)</u>
1. Project goal	Drop in Center Agencies	Agencies Drop in Center
2. Acceptance of proposal	Not given in casestudy	
3. Presentation to school board	Coalition	School board
4. Summer program	Not given in casestudy	
5. Presentation to school board	Coalition (agency members only)	School board
6. Program structure	Not given in casestudy	

D.4. Decision issues and relevant member resources:

<u>DECISION ISSUES</u>	<u>RELEVANT MEMBER</u>	<u>RESOURCES</u>
1. Project goal	Drop in Center Agencies	Vote, funds, staff time, rapport with youth. Votes, funds, staff rapport with established agencies, image of respectability.
2. Acceptance of proposal	Not given in casestudy but above resources (1) would be relevant again.	
3. Presentation to school board	Coalition	Rapport with schools (partial exception - Drop in Center), funds, staff time.
4. Summer Program	Not given in casestudy but above resources (1) would be relevant again.	

DECISION ISSUES	RELEVANT MEMBER	RESCURCES
5. Presentation to school board	Coalition (agency members only)	Respectable image, staff time, funds, information, inclusion of Board, rapport with schools.
6. Program structure	Not given in case study but votes and maintenance of coalition member in-put (resource and policy).	

D.5. Outcome:

DECISION ISSUE	DECISION CHOICE
1. Project goal	Formation of drop in centers for pre--alienated youth and drop in centers for their parents.
2. Acceptance of proposal	Affirmative - drop in center plan.
3. Presentation to school board	Rejected
4. Summer program	Affirmative - park department facility and coalition staff and funds.
5. Presentation to school board	Affirmative - drop in center plan through the schools.
6. Program structure	Decision-making executive board and a project coordinator.

D.6. Member Position on Issues and Actual Outcome: + = in favor,,

- = against, ? = not known.

DECISION CHOICE	MEMBER	POSITION
1. Formation of drop in center plan	Drop in Center Agencies	+ +
2. Affirmation of plan	?	(unanimity inferred +)
3. Rejection by school board	Coalition School board	- +

DECISION CHOICE	MEMBER	POSITION
4. Affirmation of summer program	?	(unanimity inferred +)
5. Affirmation by school board of plan for drop in centers	Coalition School board	+ +
6. Executive board and project coordinator	?	(unanimity inferred +)

D.7. Member Goals Compared with Final Outcome:

MEMBER	GOALS	FINAL OUTCOME
Drop in Center	Formation of drop in centers in high-schools for "pre-alienated" youth with an educational focus.	Formation of drop in centers in highschools for (apparently) "pre-alienated" youth and their parents with a focus on problems.
Agencies	Formation of drop in centers in high schools for families of "pre-alienated" youth with an educational focus (latter point implied by casestudy).	

II. Decision-Making Process Analysis: in order to assess the case-study in relation to typological and phase issues' assertions,, each main decision (using above sequential numbers) will be placed in a table and discussed later.

		PROBLEM SOLUTION					
blem uation	Information	ROUTINE		INCREMENTAL		Innovative	
		adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate	adequate	inadequate
tine	adequate						
	inadequate						
remental	adequate		6	2.5			4
	inadequate						
novative	adequate					1	
	inadequate			3			

EXPLANATION:

1. The problem of dealing with, and providing social service for, "pre-alienated" youth and their families was a new area for all coalition members. The proposed solution, a plan for drop-in centers in high schools for this segment of the population, was an untried method in this area. Their overall information appeared to be adequate.

2. The problem of deciding on the written proposal was a natural outgrowth (incremental) of the overall group process. The solution was also an outcome (incremental) of an earlier consensus about the coalition's goal. The information seems adequate in light of the above.

3. For the coalition as a whole, except for Drop in Center which had already submitted a similar plan to the board, the situation of presenting the plan to the school board was a new (innovative) approach. Their lack of tactics and awareness of dealing with the school board indicates inadequate information and situation assessment on their part. The solution or choice of the board in rejecting the plan was an adaptation (incremental) to their

earlier decision on a similar plan and on adaptation to their political situation. Their information and assessment seems quite accurate and adequate.

4. The rejection of the plan by the board forced the coalition into a situation of having to adapt (incremental) to their alternatives. This seems to have been a correct (adequate) assessment. The solution of developing a pilot project through the park department and their own resources was a new (innovative) move by the group. The deployment and outcome of that plan was assessed as a failure, indicating a lack of information in the solution plan they developed.

5. The re-presentation of the plan to the school board, with considerable persuasive ground work, was an adaptation (incremental) of the earlier rejection and reflects an accurate assessment and view (adequate) of the situation. The board's solution of affirmation was a developmental result (incremental) of their changed political situation (also need for additional resources) and increased understanding (adequate information) of the program.

6. The need to establish a program governing structure is an adaptation (incremental) to the plan's acceptance and its need for implementation. The coalition seems to have been aware (adequate) of this. The actual composition of the executive board was merely a routine re-naming of the planning group. From the casestudy, several (especially Drop in Center) of the coalition members were not aware (inadequate) of the consequences of this

solution upon how the program would actually be conducted (publicity disagreement).

A. Typological Issues:

A.1. Problem familiarity - the categories of problem situation and solution tend to be applicable and provide greater clarity in analyzing the decisions. A distinction between total coalition membership and individual members would be helpful.

A.2. Patterns - there appeared to be no clear relationship between the type of problem situation and solution being the same. This was the case with 3 of the 6 main decisions analyzed.

A.3. Informational adequacy - information adequacy or inadequacy was useful in analyzing the coalition's decisions. This was especially the case in instances of inadequate information (problems 3,4,6), which helped make the process more understandable.

B. Phase Issues:

B.1. Innovation - only problem 1 was an innovative situation with an innovative solution. The most common problem situations (problems 2,4,5,6) and problem solutions (problems 2,3,5) were incrementally oriented with numbers 2 and 5 having both an incremental situation and solution.

B.2. Diversity - of the main issues, there was no gravitation toward routine orientations, but incremental orientations became

predominant after decision 1 (innovative - innovative).

B.3. Rational phases - the formation of the coalition seems to have followed rational phases in decision-making. Both of the principal coalitional segments identified the problem (rational model step 1) as "pre-alienated youth." There was an effort to gather information (step 2) from those involved about the problem. They then listed two possible alternative strategies and solutions (step 3), parental drop in centers and youth drop in centers. They determined the consequences of each (step 4), involve parents and family agencies only or involve youth and Drop in Center only. They made a comparative evaluation of the findings (Step 5), incomplete alone.. They then selected a solution (step 6), combining the two. They finally sought to enact the solution by (step 7) presenting it to the school board for approval.

This same process seems also to be evident in the coalition's decision and process of re-applying to the school board with an alternative strategy. The decisions based upon inadequate information (problems 3,4,6) indicate a lack of rational decision-making steps. Inadequate situation assessment (decision 3) indicates poor problem identification (rational step 1). Inadequate solution assessment (problems 4,6) indicates poor solution planning and enactment (rational steps 2-7).

B.3.a. Relative applicability - this coalition appears to have demonstrated the variables (in certain instances) of rational decision-making and internal cooperation and consensus in goals.

It should be noted, however, that those decisions which followed the rational model were the result of rational cooperation. In this casestudy the rational process was apparently the independent variable and cooperation the dependent variable. This is indicated by the fact that the coalition's irrational decisions (problems 3,4,6) were apparently unanimous decisions (cooperation and consensus) but did not follow rational decision-making steps. Cooperation does not necessarily cause a coalition to decide rationally. Rationality does apparently necessitate cooperation and consensus.

B.4. Unit bias - unit biases were evident in the decision-making process, especially in goal and program setting (decisions 1,2)) and the school board votes (decisions 3,5).

B.5. Coalitional cohesiveness - this casestudy's coalition was characterized predominantly by issue and interest agreement and consensus with slight variance of main focus between Drop in Center (youth) and the Family Agencies (family), but these were closely interrelated.

Critique: The analytical model generally was useful in interpreting the casestudy. There were, however, problems with some specific aspects of the model.

One difficulty arose from the need to analyze the role of the school board in the case. If it is an external unit, it is difficult to assess the transactions between it and coalition within the existing analytical model. The model fails to adequately take into account coalitional relations with extra-coali-

tional units, especially those crucial to goal attainment. If the Board were to be considered a coalition member, it is difficult to rationalize, since it was not involved in internal coalitional operations and policy decisions.

As mentioned above in the analysis of the "Rap" coalition, assertion I.C.1.c. appears to be contrary to the casestudy findings. There appears to have been a considerable degree of commitment to individual unit goals, as well as, a high level of coalitional cooperation, instead of low cooperation as I.C.1.c. contends would result.

Another model weakness is its inability to account for liabilities, as well as, resources. This issue arises from Drop in Center and the agencies' liabilities. In assessing the first decision of the school board, Drop in Center's controversial image was a liability, but the model makes no specific reference to the role of liabilities in analyzing decision-making.

An additional model deficiency develops from its emphasis upon main issues and decisions. This results in biasing a nearly exclusive analysis of innovative and incremental decisions. The outcome is a failure to analytically account for routine decision situations and solutions. This could be altered with a more detailed casestudy, however, and is not necessarily an inherently model based defect.

Also with respect to decision types, it would be helpful in classifying casestudy decisions if these decisions were analyzed for the entire coalition as an entity. Otherwise, confusion in classification could result from decisions like number 3,

where the situation was innovative for the coalition as a whole, but incremental for Drop in Center, which had once before gone that route. A possible deficiency also under "Typological Issues" is found with assertion II.A.2. The findings do not reveal that the matching of the same problem situation and solution types is necessarily the general rule.

Assertion II.B.3.a. seems to be inconsistent with the findings about the "Rap" coalition. Instead of cooperation determining whether rational decisions are possible, rationality appears to require cooperation in this case study. However, the latter is not necessarily valid, since all of the decisions were cooperation and consensus oriented, and no evidence is provided by this case as to whether rational decisions occur in conflict decision processes.

CHAPTER 6

Summary and Conclusions

Having applied the analytical model to four casestudies, an across casestudy assessment of the usefulness and relevancy of that model will be employed to give a broader evaluation and summarization. This will be done through the use of a scaling model applied to each assertion or proposition of the analytical model for each casestudy. Following this will be a summary statement on the findings for each of these assertions.

The terms used for scaling were chosen on the basis of expressing whether the findings were in keeping with assertions. In numerous assertions, a result contrary to the assertion is possible, so the scaling terms had to account for the possibility of that phenomenon. As a result, the basic terms "identical" and "opposite" were selected for scaling purposes. "Identical" refers to the sameness of the assertion, and what was found in the casestudy. "Opposite" refers to the contrariness of the assertion, and what was found in the casestudy. Both terms will be utilized on a scale increasing in degree from "slightly," to "essentially," to "very." "Ambiguous" will be used as a term intermediate of "identical" and "opposite," to express a lack of clarity or certainty about the scaling of a finding.

The assertions will be scaled according to the casestudy findings, and this will be followed by comments on individual assertions and then on the entire model and study.

Very Identical 3 Essentially Identical 2 Slightly Identical 1 Ambiguous 0

Slightly Opposite -1 Essentially Opposite -2 Very Opposite -3

CASESTUDY FINDINGS

Assertion	"Child Advocacy"	"Black Coalition"	"Mental Health"	"Project Rap"	Total	Mean
I.A.1.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.A.2.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.B.1.a.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.B.1.a.1)	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.B.1.a.2)	2	3	3	2	10	2.5
I.B.1. b.	3	3	2	3	11	2.75
I.B.1.c.	3	3	3	2	11	2.75
I.B.2.a.	2	1	-3	1	1	.25
I.B.2.b.	3	2	0	0	5	1.25
I.B.2.c.	3	3	3	1	10	2.5
I.B.2.c.1)	3	3	2	3	11	2.75
I.B.2.c.2)	2	2	-1	2	5	1.25
I.B.2.d.	2	0	2	1	5	1.25
I.B.2.e.	2	2	2	2	8	2
I.C.1.a.	2	3	3	3	11	2.75
I.C.1.b.	3	-2	3	3	7	1.75
I.C.1.b.1)	2	0	3	2	7	1.75
I.C.1.c.	3	3	-3	-3	0	0
I.C.1.d.	3	3	1	0	7	1.75
I.C.1.e.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.C.2.a.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.C.2.b.	2	3	3	3	11	2.75
I.C.2.c.	2	1	3	2	8	2
I.C.3.a.	2	2	2	2	8	2
I.C.3.b.	3	2	2	2	9	2.25
I.D.1.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.D.2.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.D.3.	3	2	3	2	10	2.5
I.D.4.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.D.5.	3	3	3	3	12	3
I.D.6.	3	2	1	2	7	2.50
I.D.7.	3	3	2	3	11	2.75
II.A.1.	2	2	2	2	8	2
II.A.2.	1	3	-1	0	3	.75
II.A.3.	0	3	0	3	6	1.5
II.B.1.	-3	-3	-3	-3	-12	-3
II.B.2.	2	1	1	1	5	1.25
II.B.3.	1	0	3	3	7	1.75
II.B.3.a.	2	2	3	-1	6	1.5
II.B.4.	3	3	3	3	12	3
II.B.5	1	0	2	2	5	1.25
TOTAL	95	85	75	75	330	82.5

	"Child Advocacy"	"Black Coalition"	"Mental Health"	"Project Rap"	Total	131 Mean
MEAN	2.32	2.07	1.83	1.83	8.1	2.01

Comments on Casestudy Findings

I.A.1. The assertion that a positional analysis would be a viable method of assessing the power and influence of coalition members in decision-making was very useful in the casestudies reviewed. The data in the casestudies was generally adequate in enabling the effective use of this analytical method. Problems did exist in that there were data gaps because the case studies were not compiled originally for, nor according to the needs of, this model.

I.A.2. The assertion advocating that a decisional analysis was a revealing and useful method of assessing coalitional decision-making was basically substantiated in this study. This was especially the instance with "exchange issues" and also with the "analytical questions," except that the casestudy data was frequently insufficient to fully utilize the potential of the analytical questions. The deficiencies were clearly more in the lack of data than in the questions.

I.B.1.a. This assertion was highly substantiated by the findings of this study. "Domain" protection and expansion is a significant coalitional analytical variable.

I.B.1.a.1) Interdependency as an organizational motive for forming and joining coalitions to promote domain protection or expansion is a salient dynamic of coalitional behavior.

I.B.1.a.2) The assertion that the autonomy of coalitional members is relative to the degree of coalitional control of resources and sophistication of internal organization was a useful proposition.

in analyzing the casestudies. The use of the notion of member autonomy should be clarified as referring to member coalitional behavior - behavior with respect to coalitional activities and concerns.

I.B.1.b. The assertion that the extra-coalitional relations of coalition members can be a source of a considerable amount of their influence within the coalition is strongly indicated to be the situation in the four casestudies assessed. Probably, a related assertion would be useful with respect to the extra-coalitional relations of the coalition as a unit as being a significant factor in the coalition's degree of influence in achieving its goal or program.

I.B.1.c. The proposition that since coalitions are usually concerned only with issues secondary to each unit's interests, that these unit's primary concern within the coalition will be to protect and promote its primary interests is substantiated in the casestudy material. This phenomenon was apparent in two forms: (1) curtailment or abstension from certain or all coalitional operations when a conflict between unit and coalitional activities arose and (2) involvement in coalitional areas which were specifically relevant to member unit interests.

I.B.2.a. The assertion that formal coalitional roles carry little real power was not clearly substantiated by the casestudy data. It is possible that it could have increased the external influence of individual members. At best, the result is ambiguous. The scoring system may have added some confusion since 3 of the 4 casestudies rated the assertion as related to the data, but the 1 exception was a strongly different result. Since no clear result is apparent, this assertion requires additional testing and perhaps a reassessment.

off data material.

I.B.2.b. The proposition that member units may only be representing a segment of its "parent organization" seemed to have only slight value. In its statement it excludes the possibility of an opposite finding by use of the word "may." It only asserts that there is the possibility that some unit members may not fully represent their "parent organization."

I.B.2.c.1) The assertion that different actors will be more dominant in different issue areas was very well supported by the data. This appears to have a clear relationship with the issue of member interdependency - units join together to benefit from the resources of each other. It may also have detrimental effects relative to the weaker unit(s) in certain of these instances.

I.B.2.c.2) The assertion that a considerable amount of testing of one another's power resources will occur, especially early in a coalition's operation was only partially substantiated by the analysis of the case studies. This is somewhat misleading in that 3 out of the 4 cases demonstrated this phenomenon, while one, "Mental Health," revealed a small degree of testing, and this occurred relatively late in the coalition's operations. This group had not as yet entered truly conflictual issues which were to arise. Up to the point of when the case was written, it had operated predominantly as a consensus coalition, which seems to have minimized testing. It is also possible that prior external relations among members made member power resources known.

I.B.2.d. The assertion that if a single leader (formal or informal) emerges in a coalition, that this indicates a hierarchical "imbalance" within the coalition was slightly evident in the case study material. This assertion is similar to I.B.2.b., in that it has no opposite, since its conditions are internal, i.e. when there is a single leader, there is imbalance.

I.B.2.e. The assertion that if there are several coalition leaders, this indicates a "balanced" distribution of power resources, seemed to be in keeping with the findings. This assertion is like I.B.2.b. and I.B.2.d. in its internal validity, i.e. if there are several leaders, this indicates "balanced" power. Assertions I.B.2.d. and I.B.2.e. could be combined in that a coalition's leadership will be either singular or distributed, and this is indicative of imbalanced or balanced control of resources respectively. This should also be assessed separately for formal and informal leadership and resources and then possibly together as an overall view of the coalition's leadership structure. Part of the confusion with the findings for these two propositions was that coalitions could have both balanced and imbalanced leadership and resource distribution depending upon whether the reference point was formal or informal leadership and resources.

I.C.1.a. The proposition that the more general a resource is, the broader its applicability was well supported by the case study data. This is somewhat an indisputable assertion, but serves well the function of highlighting a significant variable

of power analysis of coalitional behavior.

I.C.2.b. The proposition that resource dependency fosters coordination and exchange by means of bargaining was essentially substantiated by the data. There was one marked exception, "Black Coalition," which had a high degree of internal conflict. It could be argued that this was essentially an ideological conflict which was impervious to pragmatic resource dependency. It was also the case that neither leading member had resources sufficient for its own tasks thus resulting in a loss of leadership confidence in each other, which would also undermine supposed dependency. It is also possible that their goal was coordinated by the use of conflict tactics.

I.C.1.b.1) The assertion that the greater the coordination and interdependence, the more relations will take the form of mutual exchange was well supported by the research findings. The only exception was the "Black Coalition" to which assertion I.C.1.b.1) is not really relevant, because it was characterized by little coordination and considerable conflict. The "Child Advocacy" case also had elements of conflict and lack of cooperation.

I.C.1.c. The proposition that the greater the commitment to unit goals, the lower the level of cooperation was not substantiated nor refuted by the casestudy data. Ambiguity was the outcome. There seems to be a more basic issue involved for which this assertion fails to account. The real issue is whether a unit's goals are consistent with those of the coalition. If they are, and the unit is highly committed to its interest in those goals, then the member will be highly cooperative, e.g. the "Mental Health Center" and "Project Rap" casestudies. If a unit's goals

are contrary to the coalition's goals and the unit is highly committed to its own, then the member will engage in a low level of cooperation (possibly even conflict).

I.C.1.d. The assertion that the greater the competition for resources, the greater the conflict was substantiated by the case-study material. This assertion is basically concerned with correlating resource competition and conflict, and where they did occur it was relevant, but where they did not, nothing was established nor refuted.

I.C.1.e. The proposition that the greater the relationship between the resources available through coalitional membership and the unit's goals, the higher the level of the unit's involvement in the coalition was well established by the casestudy data. This exchange assertion is closely related to the external structural issue assertion, I.B.1.a., which deals with domain concerns as prompting unit coalitional membership.

I.C.2.a. The assertion that different issues often require the exercise of different resources is well supported by the case-study data. This has clear implications for the relative influence among those who control these resources.

I.C.2.b. The proposition that there are different types of costs which can be incurred by a coalitional unit, subgroup, or full coalition (and the types of costs suggested) was well sustained by the casestudy material. Of all of the "cost" types found in the data, three were most common: "responsibility," "inter-game,"

and "division of pay-offs."

I.C.2.c. The assertion that there are certain "decision cost" principles which can alter the degree of the cost incurred (size, unanimity, and indispensable member) was substantiated by the analysis of the cases. The frequency of each principle in all four cases was size (1), unanimity (4), and indispensable member (3).

I.C.3.a. The proposition that in cases where the more powerful do not need the resources of the weaker, the potential receptor(s), the weaker, may employ its other resource potentials, including external, as commodities for exchange was upheld by the results. This was clearly a possible response which was resorted to by weaker coalition members in at least two instances in each casestudy.

I.C.3.b. The proposition that in instances where the more powerful control the resources needed by a potential receptor(s), the weaker unit may try to develop alternative resources aside from the stronger unit was sustained by casestudy evidence. This was a power strategy that was present in each casestudy.

It is conceivable that assertions I.C.3.a. and b. could be listed under "conditions" instead of "situations," since they constitute basically exchange "conditions" of inequality. Another possibility would be to reclassify some of the assertions currently under "conditions" which are describing situations of interdependency and mutual exchange and categorize them under "situations."

I.D. The I.D. series of seven "analytical questions" will be rated on the same scale as the rest of the material but with the altered meaning of the terms "identical" and "opposite" to refer to the degree of continuity between the question and the degree of relevant material in the casestudy. If the question is relevant and useful for analysis, then there is an identicalness of the question and the material.

I.D.1.-7. There was considerable case material available for all of the analytical questions. The two questions which had the least data were 3 ("who exercised or attempted to influence whom in each decision issue?") and 6 ("What position did each unit take on each decision issue as compared to the outcome of the decision-making process?") Both of these questions were highly useful analytically when the data was available. The problem was in the occasional lack of casestudy data, not in the analytical questions. These questions explicated the data and key decisional and power issues so clearly that it would be more productive to have them proceed section I.C. "Exchange Issues" instead of following it. This would help clarify the data to be assessed by the "exchange" assertions.

II.A.1. The assertion that the degrees of familiarity with problems and with solutions are conceivable within a continuum of routine, incremental, and innovative was supported by the case-study results. It should be clarified that in this assertion the familiarity of the coalition as an entity is what is being measured, not that of each unit member. The application of this

assertion does require a certain arbitrariness, but it should be done with cautious rationality.

II.A.2. The assertion that problem situation and solution types are usually identical was slightly supported by the data. In fact, one case indicates the opposite; while one case indicate the two variables as identical; and yet two cases are ambiguous. A broader sampling may be necessary to further assess the basis for this discrepancy, but it does appear that a more viable assertion might be "while problem situation and solution types may be identical, any combination of types can, and frequently does occur."

II.A.3. The assertion that the variable of informational adequacy was useful as related to the sufficiency of understanding of the demands of the problem situation and of the consequences of the problem solution for what they are: innovative, incremental, or routine had mixed support from the casestudy material. It was very helpful in the cases where obvious inadequacy existed in problem situations and solutions, and the concept helped clarify the case material. In the cases where no lack of information was apparent, the notion seemed to be of no obvious value. Actually, its value could have been that it specified that the information was adequate. This notion does seem to have analytical value.

II.B.1. The assertion that in application to interorganizational coalitions, it is probable that nearly all problem situations and solutions will be innovatively oriented was overwhelmingly un-

substantiated by the casestudy data. Out of all of the 37 case-study decision issues classified, only 8 were consistent with the assertion and 7 of these occurred quite early in coalitional operations. This indicates either a faulty application of the assertion, or inadequate and/or inaccurate casestudy material, or an invalid assertion. These concepts tend to be difficult to apply, but the extensiveness of the data's refutation of the assertion as it is stated makes its validity highly questionable in the least. The assertion seems to have failed to account for the predominance of routinized and adaptive dimensions of a coalition's decision issues. A coalition appears to quickly acquire its own modus operandi and purpose as an organization.

II.B.2. The proposition that once basic ground rules are established and the coalition gains experience, the other orientations (incremental and routine) will become operative was slightly supported by the analysis of the data. The results were "slight" in their confirmation of the assertion; because, while the extremely early decision(s) of each coalition was innovative-innovative,, very few innovative-innovative instances took place and an insignificant number of routine decisions. The latter is, however, probably the result of the analytical model's bias of assessing "main decisions" which tends to preclude routine problems. In addition the case material tended to be cursory, which failed to relate minor details and routine occurrences. The assertion, subsequently, seems to have viability and relevance, but additional analysis of it would be helpful.

II.B.3. The proposition that certain procedures or phases in decision-making seem to be relatively consistent in most situations where rationality is regarded as significant by the participants was relatively well substantiated by the data. The relativeness of the substantiation is the result of the fact that those cases in which participants valued rationality did demonstrate consistent phases or steps in decision-making. At the same time, those two cases which indicated low participant valuation of rationality could indicate nothing about the validity of an assertion which only assesses instances of a rational process.

II.B.3.a. The assertion that the applicability of the rational model is probably relative to the degree of cooperation or conflict of goals and interests of the units comprising the inter-organizational coalition was supported by the casestudy findings. The evidence indicates that interest and goal cooperation and conflict are conditions, but not the causes, of whether rational decision-making takes place or not. This is indicated by one casestudy which was a predominantly consensus operation, but which in several instances used irrational decision-making procedures. While cooperation existed it did not necessitate or cause rationality, it just made it possible. Interest and goal conflict tend to make the rational decision-making phases impossible, because coalition alternatives are viewed with minimal objectivity. This does not mean, however, that an individual unit's goals are not rational in terms of its self interest in a rational sense.

II.B.4. The assertion that in coalitions, strong unit biases should be expected to be operative in the decision-making phases was extremely well supported in the casestudy results. This is

not inconsistent with the findings related to assertion II.B.3.a., because units can be seeking to protect and promote their domain and bias, but can achieve this in a rational process under conditions of cooperation and interdependency.

II.B.5. The proposition that issue and interest agreement or disagreement among units are both compatible with the formation of a coalition was only "slightly" confirmed by the casestudy data. The problem is primarily; that, while both interest and issue agreement and disagreement are compatible with coalition formation, serious and fundamental disagreement may not be compatible with the maintenance of the coalition. This ambiguity needs to be clarified and can be with the addition of the assertion (II.B.5.a.): "fundamental and serious issue and interest disagreement tends to be incompatible with the maintenance and continued existence of coalitional membership, especially if it is in conflict with the member's goals."

Cummulative Mean Scores - indicate a significant degree of consistency and identity between the analytical model and the casestudy findings.

Summary of Recommended

Analytical Model Modifications

These recommendations are the result of the casestudy findings and comments upon them, which identified several model propositions that were deficient in whole or in part and several instances of needed model restructuring. Since the criticisms were listed in the above comments, only the affected assertions

will be given here with their suggested alterations:

I.B.1.a.2) It appears that the autonomy, within the coalition, of coalition members is lessened relative to the coalition's control of resources and sophistication of internal organization.

I.B.1.b.1) It is probable that in certain instances the extra-coalitional relations of the coalition as an entity could significantly influence its decisions and actions.

I.B.1.d. While a single formal leader in a coalition indicates an imbalance of formal power within the coalition, several formal leaders in a coalition indicates a balance of formal power within the coalition.

I.B.1.e. While a single informal leader in a coalition indicates an imbalance of informal power within the coalition, several informal leaders in a coalition indicates a balance of formal power within the coalition.

I.B.1.f. While a single leader (formally and informally) in a coalition indicates an imbalance of overall power within the coalition, several leaders (formally and/or informally) in a coalition indicates a balance of overall power within the coalition.

I.B.2.a. Formal coalitional roles, if they are established, usually carry little real power, internally.

I.B.2.a.1) When formal coalitional roles do carry real power, it usually is the consequence of those in formal leadership also concurrently controlling significant informal power resources.

I.D.1-7. Analytical Questions to go before I.C. Exchange Issues.

I.C.1.c. Unit goals and unit cooperativeness -

I.C.1.c.1) If a unit's goals are consistent with the coalition's, and the unit is highly committed to its interest in those goals, the higher the level of cooperation of that member.

I.C.1.c.2) If a unit's goals are contrary to the coalition's and the unit is highly committed to its interest in those goals, the lower the level of cooperation of that member (disruptive, conflictual behavior is quite possible).

I.C.3.a. and b. should be placed in between assertions I.C.1.d. and e. and the category "Situations" under "Exchange Issues" should be eliminated under I.C.3. and the section I.C.1. should read: "Conditions and Situations."

II.A.1. Degrees of coalitional familiarity with problem situations and solutions (or decisions) are conceivable within a continuum of routine, incremental, and innovative.

II.A.2. While problem situation and solution types may frequently be identical, any combination of types also can, and frequently does, occur.

II.B.1. Among the early main decisions of a coalition, there usually are one or more problem situations and solutions which are both innovatively oriented (innovative-innovative).

II.B.3.b. While cooperation does not necessitate rational decision-making, it tends to be situationally conducive for its occur-

rence; while conflict tends to have the opposite result.

II.B.5.a. Fundamental and seriously overt issue and interest disagreement tends to be incompatible with the maintenance and continued existence of coalitional membership, especially if it is in conflict with the member's goals.

CONCLUSION

The development and testing of these decision-making power and process assertions to the four casestudies helped to focus the theoretically analytical onto the empirically testable. The result of this was a general substantiation of the proposed assertions with the specific revision of certain of the propositions. The model did provide a useful scheme for clarifying and explicating the decision-making of the coalitions. A broader application of the model to additional casestudies could further the testing and revising of it in order to develop a more reliable instrument for assessment.

The study sought to expand the body of knowledge of inter-organizational behavior in the specific area of coalitional decision-making. This study has advanced that understanding and helped relate the theories and methods of social science to it. The purpose of the study was not to establish "the analytical model but to help initiate the inquiry into the field of inter-organizational decision-making behavior with a set of assertions that might help to assess that phenomenon and to test those assertions. This was done and, revisions were made in what appeared to be a relatively salient analytical model. Additional testing

and the development of different and alternate assertions and models would further help analyze the little studied and understood context and content of interorganizational behavior. Toward this goal, a further review and assessment of the literature given in Chapter 1, and additional relevant writings, would assist in providing subsequent analytical modifications and alternatives to the model developed in this study..

The whole concept of a practicum emphasizes the value of the learning process to the student in doing research. Because "practice learning" was so central to this project, it would be remiss not to assess what was learned from the experience. This concern will be viewed from three perspectives: (1) what the researcher learned,, (2) what others might do in light of this,, and (3) what the profession of Social Work might learn.

What the researcher learned.

Perhaps the most significant learning of the whole process was the realization of the limitations of any method of research. There tends to be a myth about the irrefutability of the scientific method. From this experience it is clear that this was not the case here. This is not completely the fault of scientific analysis,, it is also because of the limitations of any single application of this method. The constructive aspect of this realization is that frequently many of the flaws in a research method and design can be minimized once its limitations are recognized.

With specific reference to this research project,, there are several weaknesses in the model which later became apparent. These weaknesses are significant not only for their impact on the study but also upon what the researcher learned about social science research.

One of these realizations concerned how the research was initiated. The method of identifying key concepts and variables for the analytical model was through a review of pertinent material in the literature. This focus was maintained until the model was fully formulated before the case-studies were referred to by the researcher. This resulted in a conceptual distance between the model and the data. This was especially evident in two areas: (1) unclear concepts,, and (2) too narrow a focus upon the model.

With respect to point (1), there were several concepts which were

either insufficiently delineated or were too broad or too narrow in meaning and application. Rationality was one such term. It was meant to refer to "objectivity" in an impartial assessment of goals and alternatives. This, however, referred to the coalition as a whole and did not account for the variable of rationality which describes the behavior of goal and alternative assessment and choice by individual, member units, according to their best self interest, which could be considered quite irrational from the view point of the total coalition yet quite rational from the member's perspective. Another difficulty with rationality also stems from the peculiar strategy which a coalition might pursue. Cooperation tends to appear to be more rational, while conflict tends to appear to be more random and unplanned, yet both can be equally as rational in pursuit of a coalitional goal. This is particularly evident in the "Black Coalition" case study, which appeared highly irrational in many of its subgoal decisions (community school, boycott, etc.) but which was rather successful in attaining its basic goals (changes and more influence in the school system and greater unification of the black community).

Another inadequately developed part of the conceptual structure of the model concerned the notions of conflict and cooperation. These terms were used to refer to the internal operations of the coalition among its own member units. Of equal significance, but left undeveloped, were these same concepts as applied to the strategy of the coalition as a whole toward its external target, and the significance of this, in turn, upon the internal operations of the coalition. Even with respect to internal dynamics, what appeared to be cooperation could easily have been a situation of conflict. An example is the "Child Advocacy" case which had elements of cooperation, but which was also characterized by consider-

able conflict of interests and goals,, but which also required operation in order to attain the goal of acquiring project funds.

Another variable which was defined and analyzed too narrowly was external resources. It was accounted for with respect to influencing the relative position of strength of members within the coalition, but a unit's belonging to the coalition was not seen, in turn, as being used by members for the purpose of increasing their external strength. This awareness could have given a different interpretation to some of the members' coalitional behavior - especially the less significant members.

The failure to more broadly apply some of these variables is also related to point (2): too narrow a focus upon the model. This resulted in an attempt to make the data fit the model, when frequently it was of a different or broader meaning. As a result, some of these variables (e.g. conflict, coalition membership for external gain,, rationality,, etc.) were ignored. The model, from the theoretical views upon which it was constructed, was biased toward more of a strictly rational, consensus perspective, ignoring conflict theory and analysis. This sticking to the model resulted in a too limited data analysis and, therefore limited what was learned for "exploratory" purposes.

This all points toward the need for the development and use of a broader and more flexible model. If the researcher had used this approach, his learning would have been considerably greater and probably more productive.

What others might do in light of this.

If anyone were to undertake a study of the same topic area or were to use a similar design and method of research, it would be helpful to correct,, or at least avoid,, some of the problems that resulted in this study.

In order to compensate for the limitations of developing an analytical model from the literature, it would greatly lessen the conceptual distance between that model and the data, if the researcher were to pre-test that model. This should be done before the model is finalized and applied to material similar to that which will be assessed in the research. Realistic modifications can then be made in the concepts and theoretical framework of the model before fully undertaking the study.

This would help to develop a more adequate set of concepts. However, to more fully correct this weakness, it would be helpful to retain a position of theoretical flexibility while gathering and analyzing the data. This would also respond to the problem of utilizing a model too narrowly. This could also be remedied with the initial use of a model which was more comprehensive. In this instance, a model which could account for both cooperation and conflict would have allowed greater analytical flexibility. It would also be more productive if a researcher were to concentrate on what does not fit the model and why, rather than forcing the data to fit.

Some of the problems of this study could have been minimized, if a more concise and internally and theoretically consistent model had been utilized. This would have allowed for greater concentration on the more significant variables and possible alternatives to them.

What the profession of Social Work might learn.

As was mentioned in the preface to this study, coalitional behavior is a common but little understood phenomenon. Coalitions are also frequently utilized in the social work, community organization, milieu. This is clearly evident when considering the four casestudies in this project. Each one involved social welfare issues and actors. It seems obvious

that any practice skills, as well as theoretical knowledge, which could be extracted from this study would be of use to social workers in coalitional situations. This, however, was not the central purpose of this study and will mostly be left to inference or to further analysis. There are certain general points, however, which should be commented upon in order to avoid being negligent.

Probably the most important point to be learned by the social worker from this study is that he or she needs to be aware of the interorganizational field in order to best promote his goals and interests within coalitions. The data emphasized the significance of self interest in these coalitions. Social workers tend to recede from situations of manipulation, conflict, or anything that fails to uphold the value dominance of altruism. However, in coalitional behavior, it is crucial to be aware of the goals, "hidden agendas," and resource manipulations that usually characterize the interorganizational field. Not to engage in such calculation of the tactics of others, and the use of the same, is tantamount to outright concession of one's own interest.

The next issue is whether in fact the interest of social workers merits the above type tactics and behavior. For within the coalitional field, being aware of the vulnerability of others is not so much to remedy them (casework therapy) as it is to manipulate the same for one's own interests and goals. This is not solely without altruistic or humanistic value, in that it will be up to the moral discretion of the individual involved. Furthermore, the welfare of the public, especially the poor, is often the least considered interest in many policy and program decisions, and social workers can assume their role as an effective advocate for these people only if calculated and realistic coalitional practices are employed. From the findings of the study, this would in-

clude deliberate assessment and use of tactics dealing with such things as recognizing each member's domain and the implications of that to this particular coalition and its goal and possible resources. It would be important to know the external resources and relationships of other members, including other ties among member units and the importance of their membership in the coalition to their interests external to the coalition. Who is more influential on which issues and where to most effectively use one's own influence is a key problem. It is also crucial to know what other units value for exchange purposes. The role and use of conflict and cooperation by others and oneself in terms of when they are appropriate and what they mean when they occur are of considerable value to the practitioner, as well as are other numerous aspects of coalition-al behavior which have been examined by this and other studies.

It is hoped that this study will stimulate further exploration and analysis of interorganizational coalitions. It is also hoped that it has raised as many, if not more, questions and issues as it has attempted to consider and answer. What has been learned, as mentioned above, should not be overlooked in future inquiries and practice.

FOOTNOTES

¹Terry N. Clark, "The Concept of Power," Community Structure and Decision-Making, ed. Terry N. Clark (San Francisco: 1968), pp. 73-74.

²Ibid., pp. 74-78.

³Ibid., pp. 78-80.

⁴Edward Banfield, Political Influence (New York: 1961), p.3.

⁵Ibid., pp. 4-6.

⁶Ibid., pp. 318-322.

⁷Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: 1963), p. 40.

⁸Ibid., pp. 50-51.

⁹Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: 1965), p. 5.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 123.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 124-136.

¹²Ibid., p. 137.

¹³Norton E. Long, "The Administrative Organization as a Political System," Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior, ed. Sidney Mailick (Englewood Cliffs: 1962), pp. 113-115.

¹⁴Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Process (San Francisco: 1968), pp. 78-79.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 81-82.

¹⁷Robert V. Presthus, "Authority in Organizations," Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior, ed. Sidney Mailick (Englewood Cliffs: 1962), pp. 135-136.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 124.

¹⁹Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (New York: 1967), pp. 37-42.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 93-99.

²¹William J. Reid, "Inter-organizational Coordination in Social Welfare," Readings in Community Organization Practice, ed. Ralph M. Kramer and Harry Specht (Englewood Cliffs: 1969), pp. 178-181.

²²Mayer N. Zald, "Organizations as Politics," Readings in Community Organization Practice, ed. Ralph Mr. Kramer and Harry Specht (Englewood Cliffs: 1969), pp. 152-153.

²³Mayer N. Zald, "Political Economy," Power in Organizations, ed. Mayer N. Zald (Nashville: 1970), pp. 231-232.

²⁴Dror, op. cit., pp. 188-191.

²⁵Ronald L. Nuttall, Erwin K. Scheuch, and Chad Gordon, "On the Structure of Influence," Community Structure and Decision-Making, ed. Terry N. Clark (San Francisco: 1968), pp. 349-350.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 352-356.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 358-359.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 360-364.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 364-365.

³⁰Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs in Coalition Formation," The American Political Science Review, LXII, No. 2 (June, 1968), pp. 556-557.

³¹Ibid., p. 562.

³²Clark op. cit., pp. 49-52.

³³Ibid., pp. 53-54.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 62-63.

³⁵Reid, op. cit., pp. 182-184.

³⁶Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: 1964), p. 124.

³⁷David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: 1967), p. 66.

³⁸William Gore, "Decision-Making Research: Some Prospects and Limitations," Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior, ed. Sidney Maillick (Englewood Cliffs: 1962), pp. 52-53.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 55-58.

⁴⁰Edward Harvey and Russell Mills, "Patterns of Organization-

al Adaptation: A Politic Perspective," Power in Organizations, ed. Mayer N. Zald (Nashville, 1970), p. 190.

⁴¹Gore, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴²Harvey op. cit., pp. 194-198.

⁴³Ibid., p. 199.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 200-101.

⁴⁵Orville G. Brim, Jr., David C. Glass, et. al., Personality and Decision Processes (Stanford: 1962), pp. 9-10.

⁴⁶Terry N. Clark, "The Concept of Power," Community Structure and Decision-Making, ed. Terry N. Clark (San Francisco: 1968), p. 65.

⁴⁷Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: 1961), pp. 65-66.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 66-73.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 73-74.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 75-76.

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