Social Action as Social Change Through a Process of Insulation

Leonard Siegfred Nelson
Portland State University

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Other Religion Commons, and the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation

10.15760/etd.2044

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Title: Social Action as Social Change Through a Process of Insulation.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Jan Hajda, Chairman

Leonard Cain

Wilson Record

This study has attempted to investigate the radical change in the Greater Portland Council of Churches' (GPCC's) organizational goals and actions--from its relative uninvolvevement over to its preoccupation with local social, political and economic issues. In the past, classical sociological theory of religion has placed great emphasis on religion's integrative, or conservative functions in society. Empirical studies have documented the conservative socio-political views of the majority of Protestant parishioners. Knowing this, I expected to find a significant
conservative reaction swelling up from the lay parishioners of the GPCC's member congregations. A preliminary investigation revealed this assumption to be invalid. The study's sociological problem then became: (1) What was the true character of the GPCC's member reaction to the organization's abrupt change to liberal action goals? (2) If there was a minimum of conservative reaction, as indicated, what are the sociological reasons for this unexpected condition?

Further investigation showed that in the later 1960's, as the GPCC's social action involvements reached a climax, the GPCC also publicly reinstituted older, congregational-centered programs that have been neglected for several years. This dual action suggested the study's hypothesis: An investigation of the relationship between the GPCC's change to liberal action involvements and its attempts to neutralize lay members' conservative reactions would shed light upon the GPCC's self-insulation from conservative opposition.

Three basic strategies were used to gather data: (1) organizational records, (2) observation, and (3) personal, in-depth interviews. Files and records were used largely to confirm and amplify interview data. I observed the GPCC and three of the church Community Action Programs by regularly attending their meetings for approximately two years, 1969-1971. The largest amount of data was secured from interviewing, conducted on a representative sample of 20 active participants in the GPCC. Since the sample was not to be a random one, it was carefully pre-constructed to be representative of the organization's informal structure, i.e., active participants and leadership. When the data revealed the interviewees' unexpectedly mild negative reaction to the GPCC's deep involvement in very controversial socio-political issues,
the sample was doubled to a total of 41 actual interviews for the purpose of checking the original results. A content analysis was used to analyze the data.

In order to find out why there was such a lack of internal conservative reaction, the investigation was turned to an extensive organizational analysis of the GPCC's power and authority structures. Seven categories of social insulation were found to provide protection and organizational legitimation for the GPCC's socio-political involvements and its CAP's programs. The insulation categories are: (1) The apathy of the large number of GPCC lay members: Robert Michel's category of membership apathy in democratic organizations is especially applicable to the GPCC, due to member churches' primary loyalty to their own goals, finances and denominations. (2) The oligarchic take-over of the GPCC's governing process: Because the GPCC's formal structure did not define executive authority, a vacuum of power existed. The executive leaders informally, but pragmatically, grasped the authority and guided the GPCC toward its new course of social action. (3) The lack of communication with the uninvolved member congregations: The leaders developed a filtering system in the inter-organizational communications, which reinterpreted their social actions into positive propaganda, and absorbed members' critical feedback. (4) The financial independence of the GPCC's action programs: Independent foundations, individuals and national-regional church bodies became interested in social action in the mid-1960's. They made the CAP's financially independent for a time. (5) The church CAP's semi-autonomous relationship to the GPCC made laymen's attempts to criticize the CAP's social actions very difficult, because they were unable to focus on the GPCC as the responsible agent.
(6) The secularization of an increasing number of parish pastors within member congregations: "Secularization" does not mean being more materialistic, but being more sympathetic with social change through the churches' involvement in social action. (7) The GPCC's ambivalent policies simultaneously presented to lay members and the public both an avowed conservative posture, while devoting its greatest efforts to liberal social actions. The various forms of insulation effectively turned away critical challenges from the GPCC's conservative parish laymen.

As the GPCC's social action activities had the effect of de-alienating, some of the city's most "established" institutions, i.e., local government (e.g., law enforcement), School Board (through advocacy of school busing for racial equality), local businesses (through support of secondary local grape boycott), the GPCC's actions had the latent effect of relativizing them. The study indicates there were definite negative reactions within the organization's general membership, but the insulation processes sufficiently muffled the challenges to prevent an uprising. The leaders sensed the muted reactions. By covering up their increasing commitment to social action efforts with generous amounts of propaganda about their promoting a few old, conservative-pleasing programs, the leaders largely maintained the appearance that the GPCC was not rejecting its traditional goals for radical ones. This ambivalent appearance was an important aspect of the GPCC's support of social change in the community.
SOCIAL ACTION AS SOCIAL CHANGE
THROUGH A PROCESS OF INSULATION

by

LEONARD SIEGFRED NELSON

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
SOCIOLOGY

Portland State University
1974
TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH:

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Leonard Siegfred Nelson presented February 20, 1974.

Jan Hajda, Chairman

Leonard Cain

Wilson Record

APPROVED:

Don C. Gibbons, Head, Department of Sociology

David T. Clark, Dean of Graduate Studies and Research
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the extended process of developing the material for this thesis, I have found myself in much greater debt to more people than I could have imagined when I first set out on the project. I sincerely wish to thank all the officers and staff of the Greater Portland Council of Churches, who originally made the decision to open up their files and archive records, as well as graciously allowing me a continuing passport to their many different officers' meetings, especially the GPCC's Board of Directors, the three Commissions, various committees and impromptu office meetings. Separate thanks go to the helpfulness of the directors and officers of the three church Community Action Programs studied. Throughout various parts of the GPCC's organization, individual people candidly endured lengthy interviews, reinterviews and sometimes more interviews. I wish to give special thanks to William Cate, Executive Director of the GPCC while I conducted the study, without whose enthusiastic cooperation and support the organizational information would not have been available. My greatest debt is to Professor Jan Hajda for his patient guidance, criticism and encouragement in constructing the methodology and theory. Appreciation is also extended to my teachers of the graduate sociology courses at Portland State University. Special thanks is due to Roslyn MacDonald for her excellent typing and attention to detail.

L.S.N.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I  Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Reaction in the Local Churches</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II  Methodology</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Gathering Methods</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Content Analysis</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A New Strategy</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III A Comparison of Some Classical Theories of Religion's Role in</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society: A Paradoxical Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV  Motives for Social Involvement</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V  Stifled Reaction in the First Community Action Program</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI  A One Man Reaction</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Hub-CAP: Downtown Involvement and Public Reaction</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the Hub-CAP Program and Its Theoretical Meaning</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII The Grape Boycott Challenge</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX Authority and Power in the GPCC</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oligarchy and Insulation</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Test of Authority</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Power and Authority</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL INSULATION</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSULATION--PREVENTION IN THE PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Theories of Legitimation</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Paradigm of Structural Insulation</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Do the Individual Categories of Insulation Legitimate Such a Precarious, New Social Action?</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulation--the Process of Prevention</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A MORPHOGENESIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1958's and Early 1960's</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Period from 1963 to 1968</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Period from 1968 to 1970</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Analysis of 41 Interviews</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inner City Map of CAP's Areas</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GPCC's Organizational Chart</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>Sources of Authority and Communication, Late 1950's-Early 1960's</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Sources of Authority and Communication, 1963-1968</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>Sources of Authority and Communication, 1969-1970</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The year 1963 was distinguished by the most intense, massive protests against racial discrimination that had ever taken place throughout the United States. Although Portland was far removed from the center of the civil rights movement in the South and East, the huge non-violent demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, in the face of violent police treatment set off a chain reaction of large racial protests across the country--Tallahassee, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit and elsewhere. President Kennedy was caught up in the struggle when he federalized the Alabama National Guard to open Alabama schools to black students. He addressed the nation on TV, saying the United States faced a moral crisis as a result of Negro discontent. He sent a special message to Congress, requesting enactment of broad civil rights legislation. In August, 1963, Portland and the nation watched on TV the largest civil rights demonstration--over 200,000 people--ever to have taken place in Washington, D. C., and heard Martin Luther King's call to fulfill the American dream. Black civil rights leader, Medgar Evers, and William L. Moore, a white integration crusader, were both shot to death. Although not directly connected to civil rights, a great sobering effect was left by the assassination of President J. F. Kennedy on November 22.

Three weeks later, December 13, 1963, the Greater Portland Council of Churches' (GPCC) Board of Directors voted to administer a new program
that was radically different from any organized effort the local Council of Churches had before attempted. The GPCC's Board decided at that time to be the "sponsoring agent" for conducting a social action type of work in the heart of the city's black community. No specific goals for "social action" were specified in the resolution, other than that the project was to deal with the black people's socio-economic difficulties.

By April, 1964, a full-time salaried head for the social action project was signed, and in July the new leader had set up an office in a store-front within the main business area of Portland's black community. Almost everything about this new effort was different from all the previous programs the local Council of Churches had administered. For local councils of churches generally, as well as the National Council, the stated primary purpose was to increase the amount of cooperative programs among the churches, but in the 1960's most churches and local councils understood this cooperativeness to be within very restricted limits. The limits are, of course, determined theologically by doctrinal differences; however, sociologically, the real limits are determined by the constant pressures of a highly competitive market. In fact, most congregations are in a constant life and death struggle for survival. Each congregation is daily competing for people. Although on the publicized face of things, each church is primarily trying to reach the unchurched, underneath this facade is the unabiding rivalry to obtain advantage over other congregations in order to increase its own constituency. The rationale behind this intense competition is that each church body teaches its congregations that its own form of beliefs and practices is closest to the biblical faith. Each congregation operates on the premise that it offers something superior to all other neighbor-
hood forms of the church.

The individual who feels the competitive strain most is the local clergyman, whose success is measured in terms of increased members. Increased membership of the congregation eventually means increased monetary income and community influence for the congregation and clergyman. This success, or lack of it, is usually compared to the relative success of the competitive neighborhood churches.

The limits of the cooperativeness of the local congregations within the local council of churches is usually circumscribed by the amount each congregation (or clergyman) feels that the council can contribute to his competitive task—to obtain members. Therefore, the programs which the Greater Portland Council of Churches had administered from 1919 until 1964 were the kind which increased in some way the ability of each congregation to attract more members and still allowed the congregations to participate cooperatively—without being threatened.

The cooperative versus the competitive purposes of the congregations forced the GPCC to place its biggest efforts on an annual Sunday school, or church school, teacher-training program. This program lasted several weeks and enrolled over 1,200 trainees each year from 1958 to 1964. Also in the church education field was a very successful released-time church school once a week throughout the school year for a wide number of public grade schools. Other annual cooperative efforts included a big, one day youth rally, a cooperative Easter service, and a two day theological seminar, led by a "name" theologian or churchman. Prior to 1964, the GPCC program closest to social action was the chaplaincy program to local jails and juvenile detention homes. The prescribed limits of cooperation by the congregations strictly disallowed,
therefore, any kind of program which would contend with the power structures of the local (city) community. Because of possible controversy and negative reaction, such a cooperative goal might very well detract from the individual congregation's ability to compete for members.

It is not difficult to understand why the GPCC's decision to take on the social action project in the black community was such a radical departure from its previous policy. The end result of the GPCC's new program was not designed to increase cooperatively the ability of its own member congregations to strengthen (obtain new members) themselves as separate institutions in a competitive market. If the GPCC's new Community Action Program was not going to increase the ability of each member congregation to meet its own competitive problems, the question forcefully presents itself: Why did the GPCC take this unprecedented step into the community's arena of conflicting power structures? Why did the member churches vote to allow their local cooperative association (GPCC) to intentionally move into the middle of the local civil rights controversy?

The main purpose of this study is to explore and describe, rather than to test, a possible theory for verification. The preliminary answer was a "working" hypothesis, which stated: By understanding the shift in the built-in conservative or liberal tendencies of many Portland churches, we will be able to obtain more sociological light on the social change taking place in the Greater Portland Council of Churches. Although the worldwide process of contemporary secularization is carrying liberalization of old practices to most American churches, only a few of the long-established Protestant denominations have enacted liberal social policies into their official documents. These churches are most active
in the ecumenical movement, locally and nationally. Yet, a latent conservativism continues within these same churches. Much of their nineteenth century heritage was conservative, and it is not yet erased. The two social tendencies of social conservativism and secularization remain within the churches in a very ambivalent situation. The above hypothesis tries to take this into account. It refers to the "shifting" from conservative policies to liberal social involvement, followed by reactionary changes back toward conservativism. My purpose was to document those sociological factors which were crucial to the GPCC's change in its organizational goals.

It is a paradoxical situation. I knew theoretically that this situation applied to the GPCC, and my theory was further strengthened by the evidence I had observed previous to commencing the study. Wide publicity had been given to the conservative reaction from the city against both the GPCC's Youth Ministry program in the downtown area and the Black Summer Crisis program in the Albina area. I knew from both recent research (see Chapter 1) and experience about the generally conservative nature of many Protestant churches. Yet, ever since the southern "sit-in" movement in the early 1960's and the Selma, Alabama, Freedom March, I was aware of the increasing socio-political involvements by several church groups, especially ecumenical groups. The civil rights movement was reflected in the GPCC's specific change-over to social action policies in the city. From the time of the preliminary preparations for the study, several kinds of clues came across that local churches in the city were quite ambivalent toward the GPCC's direct work within two of the city's most difficult social problem areas, Albina and downtown, S.W.
It was in this frame of reference that the original working hypothesis was constructed. However, as I continued my struggle for methodological direction during the research, I concluded that my working hypothesis was not adequate. The data from my interviews were consistently turning out to refute my subconscious expectation that there would be a strong conservative reaction within the GPCC. I was forced to examine and face my unstated assumptions. I decided that I needed a new hypothesis which stated more clearly the paradoxical movement of both the liberal and conservative social forces present in the GPCC. As the GPCC increased its involvement in liberal social action policies, it also publicly reemphasized its older, conservative programs. This suggests the study's hypothesis: By understanding the relationship between the GPCC's change to liberal action involvements and its attempts to neutralize lay members' conservative reactions, sociological light will be shed upon the GPCC's processes of insulating itself from conservative opposition.

I came to see that in the early stages of this research I was doing two things, methodologically, which could be called "errors." First, I had mentally redefined both the independent and dependent variables during the first stages of interviewing, without realizing it and without stating the change on paper. In trying to analyze it, I think it gradually began during the early interviews, as I tried to explain my opening questions to interviewees. I had unconsciously narrowed the definition for the independent variable down to the "conservativism of the GPCC's membership" and the definition for the dependent variable simply to their "conservative reaction" within the GPCC. Unintentionally, I had set up a testable hypothesis with an expected cause-effect
relationship between these unstated variables. I had failed to remain open during the first half of the research to the other side of the working hypothesis—that the independent variable could also reveal itself to be a "liberal" constituency in the GPCC and that the dependent variable could also be a strong support for the GPCC's liberal changes, as well as a reaction against it.

Since the largest number of published sociological investigations are conducted on the basis of hypotheses that are to be tested and verified by the evidence turned up by the study, this "error" I admit to is not usually considered a poor research method. However, because I had come to assume there was an automatic cause-effect chain between the variables—between the GPCC's liberal social actions and the church conservatives' reaction—I now feel that that assumption was a mistake.

Herbert Blumer criticizes several aspects of the "variables' analyses." He says that too many researchers choose variables that do not have real generic values, outside of local areas of study. Further, he says empirical methodology often assumes that the observed change in the dependent variable (all other variables apparently held constant) is an automatic result of the action by the independent variable. However, such cause-effect relationship does not take into account what has happened in between the two variables. It does not account for the changing interpretative processes which go on by people and institutions in defining and attaching meaning to intervening social activities, relationships, situations, etc. Such intervening activities bring about the changes in the definitions (meanings) of social objects, and thereby play a central part in the changes of social practices—the way people act. To ignore the intervening interpretative
process is to fail to take into account the more essential reasons why
the change took place between the independent and dependent variables.

Blumer's criticism was apropos to the way I had labeled the
independent variable in my expectations--by my over-emphasizing the
possible influence of a conservative constituency in the GPCC and
deemphasizing the possibility of a powerful liberal group being able to
control the power and authority of the organization. There is no doubt
that early in the research I had an expectation that the GPCC's involve­
ment in controversial social actions would set off conservative reaction
within the organization. What I did not allow for was the GPCC's inter­
vening organizational ability to control the interpretative process of
its own members, and thereby change their reaction toward a threatening
situation. The interviews, the records and observation at meetings
convinced me that I had developed a wrong assumption. After much intro­
spection and analysis of the research procedure, I finally realized that
I had unconsciously changed the hypothesis to a one-sided, cause-effect
assumption. Such terminology and reasoning were not only bordering
upon doctrinaire dialectic, but also had become an a priori judgment,
apart from a specific set of events. My assumption was wrong. I finally
had to let go of it, and restate the hypothesis in terms more affirmative
to the dialectic process between both the conservative and liberal forces
within the GPCC.

The second methodological error I had been making was, simply, that
I was not obtaining a representative interview sample of the whole
organization. When I realized that, even though I doubled the interview
sample, the data continued to support the non-reactionary attitude
within the GPCC toward their involvement in controversial social actions,
I was forced into answering the question "Why?" After wrestling at length with the problem—at both the levels of sociological theory and methodology—I discovered that I had also excluded the one group other recent researchers have found to be generally conservative in the main-line Protestant churches: the laity. Although I had made a specific (and successful) effort to obtain in the sample a proportionate number of laymen, as against clergymen, that sample still failed to be representative of the general church laymen. Why was this so?

In hindsight, I found that my difficulty with an unrepresentative sample arose from my failure to observe the sociological differentiation between the informal and formal structure of an organization. I had not adequately defined my unit of study and the population in it. As soon described, much of this study was forced to turn to investigating the GPCC's organizational structure and its practical source of power and authority. This latter part of the investigation demonstrated that those people who came to be "elected" to the Board of Directors, and important Commissions and Committees were largely hand-picked by the Executive staff. In reality, the uninitiated delegates to the annual meetings had nothing to say about nominations, and consequently, no true choice in their voting for officers. Because of this control by the Executive over who would serve in the top leadership, the "elected" officers were largely of one mind: liberal. Since the Executive Director was personally committed to the church's social involvement, most of those people whom he ratified for nomination to those bodies of leadership in the GPCC had a fairly liberal attitude toward social involvement. The GPCC's leadership, although elected from the member churches, was not representative of the general laity of the total member
congregations. As mentioned previously, recent research has shown that the majority of mainline Protestant laymen are conservative and much more conservative than their clergymen. Because the conservative laymen were generally excluded from the "inside" groups of leaders, so were their conservative opinions eliminated from my interview sample.

The validity of this study heavily depends upon what is defined as the organizational boundary of the GPCC. If the organization is defined according to its formal constitutional statements, this study has viewed only the upper power structure of the GPCC. However, if the GPCC is defined sociologically in terms of its informal structure, then this study's sampling of interviews and the accompanying organizational study are adequate methodological tools for the investigation. Because I believe the informal structure of the GPCC is, in fact (or pragmatically), the sum and substance of this organization, I am convinced that the GPCC's meetings, decisions and programs exist relatively apart from its member churches. The organization itself is connected to the congregations only by those persons who have sufficient individual motivation to volunteer for the activities of the GPCC, or by an activist pastor who takes a personal interest in the GPCC's type of social involvement.

This study, therefore, does not pretend to represent the opinion of all the GPCC's member churches and their individual members, but the study does show what the informal organization of tightly-knit volunteers actually did during 1960-70 in order to protect itself and carry out its liberal policies. Consequently, to correct my second methodological mistake, I am defining my unit of study as the GPCC's informal, organizational structure of power, authority and program implementors, as distinct from the nominal, uninvolved member churches and their general
lay membership. Since this more specific definition of the organization is limited to the active participants in the GPCC--its leaders and volunteer program participants--I no longer consider the interview sample as being unrepresentative of the total group. The study does not examine the GPCC as defined by its own formal statements, but as that social entity of people who make the policy decisions and those who actively implement their programs and decisions.

Definition of Terms

The independent variable for this study's hypothesis is: "the relationship between the GPCC's change to liberal action involvements and its attempts to neutralize lay members' conservative reactions."

In order to prevent any false cause-effect assumptions from developing between the two ends of the liberal-conservative continuum, which makes up this one variable, it is extremely important to clarify the definitions of "liberal" and "conservative." As discussed above, early in this research I had failed to recognize the independent variable as a single whole, the possibility of a liberal reaction, as well as a conservative reaction. It is imperative to define what kind of church member reaction is conservative and what is liberal.

Depending on the context in which the terms are used, they may denote social, psychological, economic, political, as well as religious, categories. Represented in the GPCC is a wide variety of religious denominations, each carrying its own social views, along with its own religious doctrines. The problem is similar to generalizing about potential life. Knowing that some Democratic congressmen consistently vote more conservatively than some Republican congressmen, it would be
impossible to place all Republicans and Democrats in Congress into their respective conservative-liberal cubicles.

Due to the vast religious pluralism in the United States, there are several possible standards by which to determine the religious conservatives. William G. McLoughlin suggests five definitions. The first is really theological. This measurement continuum places the liberals with the scholarly, or intellectual method of dealing with religious doctrine. Conservatives are biblically literalistic, unsophisticated, and emphasize, usually, a set of "fundamentals" for membership conformity. The critical criteria for measurement is, however, the literalistic interpretation of Scriptures. In actual analysis, this method is not too clear cut, because certain doctrines (millenialism, perfectionism, etc.) are equated with the conservative view. At the same time, some sophisticated theologians sometimes become very dogmatic about their doctrines (Virgin Birth, Trinity, Infallibility, etc.).

A second measurement of conservatism is the psychological aspects of religious experience and worship. The liberal attitude is defined on a continuum that begins with the individual asserting only a bare intellectual assent to belief and experiences almost no emotional contact with the deity whom he worships. At the conservative end of the continuum is the ecstatic, highly emotional worship of the pentecostal or holiness groups in which individuals experience direct, personal encounters with the Deity so that worshippers lose themselves and express themselves physically in the power of the Holy Spirit. This form of measurement has much unclear overlapping with such practices as those of mystics. For instance, the Thoreauvian transcendentalist's mystical experience of the Over-Soul alone in the woods is a case of emotional-
spiritual possession, yet much more intellectualized than pentecostalists. So is the highly liturgical worship practices of some churches, which, although completely ritualized, emphasize the sensuous with robes, candles, incense, images, etc.

The third measurement attempts a kind of sociological standard. On the one side of the continuum is the upper-class, in-group allegiance to the establishment church, and on the other side is the lower-class, out-group allegiance to the "sect" group of alienated people. The criteria here is in socio-economic terms primarily, along with stratification terms: status, prestige, wealth, power-security, etc. This formulation is similar to Troeltsch's sect-church distinction. In America, however, the sect-church designation is not clear, because status and socio-economic measurements vary in denominations and more extreme groups, or "sects," vary from one geographical area to another. Compare, for example, the status of Mormons and Congregationalists in New England with the Far Western states.

A fourth form of measurement is stated in terms of church polity and a parallel social outlook. The criterion here has hierarchical church polity (bishops, archbishops and supreme head) as favoring a monarchy or autocracy in socio-political life. On the other end of this continuum are the churches with a congregational polity operating from the concept of the priesthood of all believers, which are more apt to be supportive of a democratic social system. If this criterion is applied, then the Catholic Church typifies the conservatives; the Baptists represent the liberals; and the Calvinist churches (Reformed, Presbyterian, etc.) with a presbyterian polity fall in the middle as being supportive of a republican form of government. In actual practice, obviously, all
three of these forms of churches have contradicted the above stereotypes for socio-political affiliations.

McLoughlin gives a fifth measurement, which he thinks is more realistically applicable to the United States' past and present. He defines it within an historical framework: America's four Great Religious Awakenings. In each new Awakening there were those who espoused the new, spirited evangelicalism, and after a generation of institutionalization, the new evangelicals reformulated the old orthodoxy into a new consensus. They became the new orthodoxy in religion, and accommodated their Christian doctrine to conservatively "fit" the new problems of a changing order. Based on this historical analysis, the Liberals are on the other end of the historical continuum. The Liberals today are products of the historical events of the early 1900's when the great exponents of the Social Gospel began that great movement within Protestantism. The Social Gospelers wanted the churches to talk less about doing good deeds and actually to participate in alleviating the great social ills of that time, of the industrial revolution--unjust working conditions, malnutrition, poverty, political injustices, etc. The Fundamentalist movement within the largest, traditional Protestant denominations during this time was a direct reaction to the Social Gospel movement. Today's Liberals are updated Social Gospelers. Theologically, they are more orthodox, but their over-riding consensus is socio-political involvement.

As each pietistic movement swept through the churches, many in the traditional churches were attracted to the movement, and joined in criticising the older denominations. The last Great Awakening took place during the late 1800's and early 1900's, partly as a reaction against the Social Gospel movement and partly as a reaction against the intellectuals'
"form criticism" of the Bible that undermined the literalistic infallibility of Scripture. McLoughlin describes the current Awakening as beginning in the 1950's and continuing through the Sixties. It was a reaction against the great uncertainty of liberal theology and the times following World War II. Out of this situation came Billy Graham's revival crusades and the neo-fundamentalist federation, the National Association of Evangelicals.

Far exceeding the limits of neo-fundamentalists, however, America's present conservatives are a new combination of pietistic Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Their most common characteristic today, according to McLoughlin, is that they are either politically reactionary, or completely apolitical. The ultra-conservatives--the dissident fringe groups--are the "apoliticals." They are against all forms of political involvement.

The preceding definitions of terms, especially that of conservative, have an inherent problem. On the one hand, I have reemphasized the importance of the hypothesis' openness to both sides of the contradictory currents--both conservative and liberal--flowing through the American churches today. As the study progressed, I made a renewed effort to remain open to any data which would indicate the conservative retrenchment of the older values of individualism, laissez-faire economy, hard work, thrift, piety, sobriety, all those qualities described in Weber's Protestant ethic, as well as data indicating the liberalization of the pietistic values outward to more socio-political involvements. On the other hand, because the above definition of "conservative" is keyed to the term, "politically reactionary," it may be that such a definition forces the data presented here to conform to categories which themselves
assume a cause-effect relationship. That is, do the definitions of the hypothesis' two key terms become determinants of a theoretical assumption? Does the concept of "reaction" in McLoughlin's definition of "conservative" smack at doctrinaire dialectical materialism when used as a basis for analysis of my research data? As used herein, is the definition of conservative an a priori judgment that has theoretically forced my recording of in-depth interview data into pre-determined kinds of conclusions? Were the analytic conclusions predefined by the concept of conservative "reaction?"

My answer is "No" on all accounts. My best refutation of this possible methodological trap is the actual results of the interview data and the actual analysis of them. Instead of this definition coercing the data to show "reactionary" opinions among the interviewees, I recorded their responses and found them conclusively to refute that the GPCC was predominantly conservative, contrary to my expectations.

Abraham Kaplan points out that hypotheses, principles, rules, axioms, laws, etc., become tautological because vagueness allows them to be always true no matter what is the case in their application to the world of facts. In other words, the hypothesis' practical meaning is not sufficiently specific—that is, applicable to explicit situations—so as to subject it to some sort of empirical control. Kaplan adds, though, that few laws, even in the physical sciences, are stated so explicitly that their meanings, functionally, always exclude ambiguity. The sociological methodologist finds it even easier to state his hypothesis in a manner removed from everyday, empirical problems, reconstructing it to be so "analytically" logical that it is very difficult for others to retest it. It merely argues repetitiously in a circle—
tautologically. Kaplan's point is important for this research. He says that when the methodologist's theory takes over and imposes its own logic—cause and effect—upon the data, then the theory does not allow the raw data, the historical events being studied, to determine their own relationship. They are then being theoretically coerced.

While trying objectively to reinspect my methodology, I have not found my mere use of the term "reaction" in the definition automatically to have imputed into the definition an a priori assumption of any theory, neither of historical materialism, nor of any "reconstructed logic." Certainly such an assumption was not "defined into" the collected data. Rather than my assuming anything in the word "reaction," I was trying to form a degree of precision for describing the attitudes that may have fit the definition. Ultimately, the word was used as a concept that would more accurately measure the hypothesis' dependent variables' indicators. In retrospect, I think that any assumption of a cause-effect relationship would have to be between the variables, and consequently, within the total hypothesis itself. That is where the problem really lies, and I have diligently retraced my steps over the earlier procedures in the study to strip away my assumption that there was a strong conservative reaction present within the GPCC. I feel that this was accomplished, since the evidence and analysis disconfirmed any such assumed conservatism.

At the beginning of this research, I did not follow sufficiently what Marx called the principle of historical specificity. In applying this principle, C. Wright Mills has said:

There is, I believe, no "law" stated by any social scientist that is trans-historical, that must not be understood as having to do with the specific structure of some period. Other "laws" turn
out to be empty abstractions or quite confused tautologies. The only meaning of "social laws" or even of "social regularities" is such "principia media" (Karl Mannheim's application of the mechanisms of change within Marx's principle of historical specificity) as we may discover, or if you wish, construct, for social structure within an historically specific era. We do not know any universal principles of historical change; the mechanisms of change we do know vary with the social structure we are examining.\(^6\) (Parenthetical insert mine.)

After thoroughly allowing the data to disconfirm my own unconsciously held prejudice that Durkheim's theory (that religion integrates and conserves society's established order) was substantially applicable to all of the GPCC's liberal activities in its local community, I realized I had not been permitting the very social change to be recorded and analyzed which my hypothesis called for.\(^7\) As C. W. Mills says above, each cultural setting has its own specific kind of change. The social change which the GPCC had organizationally promoted through its specialized use of social insulation must be understood within the historical context of its community and the peculiarities of this local ecumenical group. I have tried to view openly the GPCC's own time, place and social forces of change; therefore, I am not here trying to generalize the GPCC's own form of change (through social insulation) to any other social worlds. As an aside, however, some form of social insulation appears to me often to have been operative when non-parish clergymen and religious groups participated in the civil rights activities during the Sixties throughout the country--Selma, Cleveland, Chicago, Delano (California), and many other places.
Conservative Reaction in the Local Churches

Historically, U. S. churches have been products of strong pietistic traditions, evident in our four great Pietistic Awakenings, viz., Chapter 2. Documentation of the great revivals reveals that pietism usually went hand in hand with conservative politics. S. M. Lipset states in a study that the conservative pietist tradition in the United States has demonstrated a strong correlation with the new conservative politics of former, low-status liberalism of U. S. Catholics, as they have become established, middle-class conservatives. Lipset concludes that a politically conservative attitude has run through the whole of our religious history.

Several other studies reflect the more recent conservative attitude toward churches' involvement in socio-political problems. Jeffrey Hadden reports the data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center's Amalgam Survey, constituting a representative national sample of 1504 respondents. As an abstract statement, 82 per cent of the American public agreed with the statement: "Clergymen have a responsibility to speak out as the moral conscience of this nation." However, those polled have restricted ideas as to what this means. Forty-nine per cent said that clergy should not speak out on social, economic, and political matters. Seventy-two per cent agreed with the statement: "Clergymen who participate in demonstrations and picketing do more harm than good for the cause they support." Another statement in this series read, "Martin Luther King, Jr., is an outstanding example of making Christianity relevant and meaningful for our day." Only 29 per cent of the sample agreed with this statement. The response adds to the evidence that the
American public will applaud the ideal of equality for black people, while rejecting any real effort to change the actual conditions which place the black man in a disadvantaged position. Church attenders, as well as the general public, do not view the church as an institution for social change. Twenty-seven per cent of the Protestants agreed with Martin Luther King; 30 per cent of the Catholics agreed; and 59 per cent of the Jews agreed with King. In other words, the proportion of the Jews who felt that King's efforts were a relevant and meaningful expression of Christianity was twice that of the Christians. The survey shows that approximately 70 per cent of our church population reject the different ways in which clergy have been involved in civil rights activities.

The same attitudes are corroborated by a similar survey published in September, 1969, by the National Opinion Research Center for the National Council of Churches. It was also a representative, religious cross-section (1,481) of United States' adult population. The important finding of the survey for our purposes was that a majority, 58.5 per cent of the sample, disapproved of church involvement, and only 36.7 per cent favored such action by the churches. In an apparent contradiction, 54.9 per cent approved of the NCC's work, while 22 per cent disapproved and 22.8 per cent had no opinion. Also, 60.3 per cent said they had heard of the NCC, which is composed of 33 Protestant and Orthodox Churches. In both surveys, the public said, i.e., clergymen and churches should not "interfere" with the political and social problems of the real world.

During the 1959 desegregation crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas, Campbell and Pettigrew reported that out of 15 ministers who signed a public statement protesting Gov. Faubus' calling out troops to prevent
compliance with the Supreme Court order, at least nine clergymen had left their churches "as a reasonably direct result of the integration conflict." In January, 1963, following James Meredith's stormy entry into the University of Mississippi, 28 native-born, Mississippi Methodist clergymen signed a statement publicly declaring their Christian belief against race discrimination. Only two of the 28 remained in the same congregation as they had at the time they signed the statement, and only nine remained in the state of Mississippi by 1965. In 1964 at Cleveland, 46 per cent of the white clergy (221 Protestant and 10 Jewish rabbis) joined an ad hoc group which supported the desegregation of black children through busing, and some ministers began to participate in pickets. J. K. Hadden's study of the ministers' participation in the Cleveland desegregation incidents has shown that of the most active ministers, at least 12 soon were forced to leave their congregations, and six left the ministry altogether.

In 1965 a new role pattern began to develop within the groups of participating clergy activists, who turned up at civil rights protests. Most were non-parish clergy. An examination of the Selma Freedom March in 1965 showed that out of several hundred clergymen who flew South to Selma (estimated at 650), a large majority were: staff members of national church bodies, campus ministers and ministers to specialized areas (depressed areas) not dependent upon a congregation for support. During 1966 in Delano, California, J. K. Hadden observed the National Council of Churches' Migrant Ministry's participation in the grape workers' strike against the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation and others. He said the data he collected indicated "that the large majority were not parish pastors. They came from the National Council of Churches, state
and national denominational staffs, colleges and seminaries" (emphasis mine).15

The above national surveys and local studies give broad support to the contention that the lay churchmen's prevailing attitude has been and continues to be decidedly conservative toward their churches' socio-political involvements. The studies also point to the conservative reaction of most lay church members as being focused upon the local parish pastor. Non-parish ministers have recently assumed the role of being the church's activists in controversial social issues. In the light of the strong conservative reaction demonstrated by laymen against their activist pastors in other areas, why was there an apparent mild reaction against the GCPC's direct involvement in several controversial issues?
CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

From both the newspapers and word of mouth, I had heard about the Greater Portland Council of Churches' new venture into starting a full-time staffed community action program within the city's area of black residences, the Albina area. Later I also read about the Council of Churches' downtown community action "Youth Ministry" program being accused by the city police of aiding the youth drug traffic and the young runaways in the downtown area. With a few preliminary interviews into the organization itself, I found that the GPCC had, indeed, made a significant change in its practical goals--from relative uninvolved over to highly direct involvement in social action activities. Some active members of the organization agreed that a perceptible social change had occurred in the organization during the first part of the Sixties. During this preliminary inquiry, most of those with whom I discussed the topic agreed heartily with the idea of the GPCC's new effort, but a surprising number also said they knew there was already a growing reaction in the churches against the GPCC's community action involvement. This evidence of the churches' reaction convinced me that a study of the GPCC's organizational change would serve as a worthwhile research project. From this cursory examination, I felt that change in organizational goals could be well documented and reasonably verified by the events and reaction developing in the GPCC.
When I drew up my research proposal, I decided that the purpose of the research would be primarily exploratory, rather than verifying an hypothesis.

**Data Gathering Methods**

My plans for gathering information included three basic strategies: (1) records--current and historical, (2) observation, and (3) personal interviews. First, the records. Since good rapport with the GPCC's Executive Director developed early, almost complete access was granted to the official files in the GPCC's main office. They included the minutes of many committees and planning commissions, together with the very important records of the GPCC's Board of Directors' meetings. The files also contained all the annual and semi-annual reports, which are mimeographed and presented to each delegate to the annual and semi-annual General Assembly meetings. The annual report is extensive, including reports from all major commissions and committees, and thereby comprises the organization's official accountability report to its member congregations. In practice, however, only those congregations which are vitally interested in the GPCC make the effort to attend these meetings and obtain their reports. The same goes for the semi-annual meeting in September. The Executive Committee usually met each month, just a few days before the Board of Directors' meeting. This group of GPCC officers and executive staff is relatively small, powerful and exclusive. As might be expected, I was not able to attend any of its meetings, although its minutes were usually made available to the Board members. Often the Executive Committee's report to the Board included a strong recommendation to the Board for the adoption of a new policy or program.
Although the directors of the three CAP's granted me the privilege of examining their own brief records, I found little need to do so. Except for the verification of some data about two or three meetings of Albina's C-CAP and the downtown Hub-CAP, I found much more productive information about the CAP's several crises from re-interviewing key informants or seeking out new informants who were personally involved.

The second strategy was observation. I asked permission from the director of each Church-CAP, along with the GPCC's Executive Director, to attend board meetings and observe their programs in action. I observed (a) the three CAP's--their leadership and staff, their programs and their meetings; and (b) the GPCC itself--staff and officers, their meetings and their methods of relating to the member congregations and to the CAP's. With the permission of the Executive Director, I regularly attended the monthly meetings of the GPCC's Board of Directors and the meetings of the General Assembly--for two and a half years. I also attended some of the Church-CAP's annual meetings and a few of their specially called crises meetings.

The third but primary source of data was in-depth interviewing. I conducted several preliminary, but lengthy interviews. Most of these were with the GPCC's executive staff and CAP directors, and also a few member laymen and clergymen.

For the formal interviews, I decided to use twenty respondents from the active, or formerly active, members of the GPCC, who gave a balanced representation of both conservatives and liberals. I wanted the list to meet these requirements: (a) at least as many laymen as clergymen; (b) a few delegates to the General Assembly, who are not on the Board of Directors; (c) some former members of the Board of Directors from the
early 1960's, as well as present Board members; (d) a representative number of active members or officers from each of the three Church-CAP's studied; (e) an equal number of liberals and conservatives--supporters and critics of the GPCC's recent social actions. I obtained the suggestions for names from the Executive Director and the organizer of the three Church-CAP's (then on leave of absence). I made up my list from their suggestions, and then consulted with the most experienced secretary in the GPCC's main office. I found that she had a broader knowledge of the membership of the GPCC and was possibly more objective about the members than anyone else that knew the people in the GPCC. With her suggestion, I made one change in the list of twenty.

Experience soon showed me that being objective as an interviewer was a job of constant vigilance against my own inclinations to read things into the respondents' statements, especially if they were not clear to me. It is difficult to clarify all sides of the respondents' view on controversial issues in one sitting. More and more, I made a conscious effort to draw my respondents out, but at the same time, not to lead them into making conclusions, pro or con, about the GPCC's crucial activities. Knowing my own prejudices, I tried to "bend over backwards" to let any conservative opinions emerge.

When I began my formal interviewing of the original list of twenty respondents, I had already done several preliminary interviews of GPCC staff members, and therefore, became quite well aware of the organization's "official" line on its policies and current problems. I had drawn up what I thought were the major controversial issues that had faced the three inner-city Church CAP's: (1) the initial opposition within the GPCC against sponsoring the first CAP in Albina; (2) the reaction against
the S.W. downtown Hub-CAP program, its Youth Ministry to runaways and drug users through Charix coffee house and its medical drop-in center, the Outside In; and (3) the reaction against the E-CAP's efforts to help provide low-income housing through its Interfaith Housing Corporation.

I built my first few interviews upon my knowledge of these three issues. It was not long before I found that the first and third were not really issues. The research, or at least the interviewing, was turned against my basic assumption about conservative reaction existing from the very start. This period became very confusing and difficult. I had to go back and do much more homework, by talking to some more of the staff members out in the CAP's, etc. Yet, I found that my more unbiased information, although less complete, was coming from those on the sample. Consequently, I was also forced back to interviewing as well.

I began each interview with an opening statement that explained in general terms what my study was about. "As you know," I said, "the GPCC became directly involved in social action types of activities quite abruptly in 1964 when the Council hired Paul Schulze to start the first Church CAP in Albina. Also, as you know, the GPCC's Church CAP's have proliferated into seven separate CAP's scattered throughout the city. As far as I can tell, before 1964 the GPCC's only direct involvement in social action was helping to support the chaplaincy program to the city and county jails, along with coordinating other band-aid types of help, such as Christmas baskets, etc. It seems to me that taking on the CAP's represents a very real social change within the organization of the GPCC. This social change is what I want to know about. How did it come about? First, what were the elements that went into making the change possible in the GPCC? Second, I want to know about the contro-
versy surrounding the decision by the GPCC's Board to sponsor the first CAP in Albina. What pressures were exerted for or against this important change of policy? This opening statement usually gave a satisfactory frame of reference to the interviewee of what my study was "really" about, and the two questions at the end of the general description helped to focus the interviewee's first attempts to relate his own interpretation of what happened in the first months of the new Church CAP's beginning.

Depending upon the answers I received, the specificity with which the interviewee described the process of the change, the number of people he named and identified as being for or against the new program, the degree to which he volunteered his own opinion about what had taken place—all these things determined how I would follow up with further questions. Because I was so interested, I always inquired sometime during the interview about the interviewee's own "attitude" toward each issue being discussed. If necessary I would ask if he could remember who on the Board, or in the GPCC's power structure, had opposed an issue about the new changes to social action. I would point out to the interviewee that I needed all the information I could get on each issue, or on any new controversial points which may have been stimulated by the new social action policies or activities. To pursue this, I asked a broad question in one form or another: "Were there any other events or programs that involved social action and that you noticed resulted in some kind of negative reaction from within the GPCC? Out of this form of question came most of my other issues which are assessed in the content analysis. As my knowledge of issues broadened, so did my specific questions increase during the interviews. In this way the interviews became
less and less open-ended and more focused in style. Each reference to a controversy I had not known of before needed to be checked, then fit into the total pattern of other social involvements, and compared with conservative reactions from other controversies.

As a growing number of controversial issues came to light, I tried to check them out in the organizational files and minutes for their seriousness in the context of a total conservative reaction. I found that the organization's written records gave little important information about such controversies, as mentioned below. Observation at some meetings about issues which were still current helped me substantiate the fact that very controversial issues were either minimized or almost unreported when I read the minutes of the same meetings later. My best sources for rechecking leads to new issues was to go back to previous respondents whom I knew were especially knowledgeable about a particular phase of the GPCC's work. When necessary, questions about the new issue also became a part of future interviews. In connection with rechecking new information, I found that the GPCC was becoming diversified into enough different kinds of social action programs in different geographical areas so that very active volunteers working in one or more programs often had a limited knowledge of the GPCC's total social action work. I also found that some Board members greatly minimized internal controversies, especially evidence of current serious disagreements within the organization.
A Content Analysis

Soon after beginning the interviews in my original sample group of twenty, it became apparent to me that the three topics I had proposed to use as the most important social action issues for the GPCC then were actually inaccurate. I had to discard two of those proposed topics as issues and more accurately define the third. In order to find out what the most significant social action issues had been, I began to do a brief content analysis upon the interview notes I had gathered from each formal interview. In this manner, I was able to obtain a growing list of the most important topics related to the GPCC's change to social action goals as my informants reported them. At the same time, my confident sociological understanding of what was happening inside the GPCC's "obvious" change to social action goals was jolted into confusion. During this search for clarity, the application of a mini-content analysis to each interview became the instrument for pinning down what were the real controversies at issue between conservatives and liberals. In the process, I discarded dead-wood topics, which had previously seemed to be important issues to the GPCC's change. The nine topics finally settled upon as the key issues went through a constant metamorphosis of redefining, till they were winnowed down to the definitions used in the enclosed analysis.

In an attempt to evaluate the total interview sample, I have applied a relatively simple form of a content analysis to the interviews compiled together. However, as an instrument for scientific evaluation of the whole sample, the content analysis used here is not without some problems. First is the problem of representativeness in the sample. The
original sample of twenty was not as representative a sample as I had planned it to be. (Although in Chapter 1 I have discussed this same problem more on a theoretical level in relation to the hypothesis, its variables and their definitions, I pursue it further here to explain the specific difficulties of the sample's representativeness.) Since it was not to be a random sample, but a stratified one, I wanted it to be a representative of as many strata of the GPCC as possible. When I discovered the lack of conservative opinion within the sample, I soon thought that I had fallen into a great methodological hole by failing to obtain a fair representation of the conservatives I was quite certain were present. As discussed before, I doubled the interview sample to get a better representativeness, going out of my way to find several known conservatives who had served on the GPCC's Board of Directors. The increased sample combined with the earlier one still showed a great disproportion of liberal opinions in the total sample. I finally realized that the kind of equality between conservative and liberal opinion I had wanted represented in the sample would not be an accurate sample, simply because the actual population was not so divided. My sample was from the leaders and active, volunteer participants of the GPCC, which largely excluded those church laymen who are generally the conservatives of the mainline denominations.

When I recognized the study was focused on that group of people who actively worked in the political structure of the organization, together with those who voluntarily and professionally worked in carrying out the social action programs, instead of on the formally defined total membership, which included all the lay members of the GPCC's member churches, then the results of my sample started to make sense. As I
finally understood this reality, the large number of forty-one in-depth interviews became very adequate for their stratified representativeness. I interviewed 25 present and former members of the Board of Directors. As discussed in Chapter 9, 35 people held 38 of the GPCC's elective positions for 84 per cent of the time over the ten year period studied, and 30 others held the rest of those offices one term or less during the ten years. The study's interview sample amounts to 38 per cent of the total number of people who served on the Board at different intervals during the ten years. Further, the overall sample of 41 had a balance between clergy and laymen, as well as a good representation of people who had served on the Board at different intervals during the ten years, going back before 1959. The sample also contained a representative number (nine) from the three Church-Community Action Programs studied, both professional staff and volunteer laymen. I also interviewed two lay delegates to the General Assembly who were not in the "inner circle" of decisions (Board, Commissions or key committees) and not active volunteers. Seven women were in the total sample; four of them were elected lay officers, and three were professional staff people.

As far as trying to obtain a representative group for its conservative opinion in my supplemental sample, I asked several staff members and active officers for suggestions about some people who would be good representatives of the conservative view in the GPCC. Through this effort, I located five very staunch conservatives for the extra sample, making the total sample consist of ten confirmed conservative viewpoints. I am now certain that this number with strong conservative views is overly representative of that view out of the total population of active participants. Yet, I now think that extra minority representation is
helpful to the study's understanding of what actually went on between the conservatives and liberals in the light of the extremely liberal nature of the rest of the informants.

As can be seen from the content analysis, Table 1, the same portion discussed above did not include the GPCC's professional staff people. (At this point, I am only discussing the representativeness of the first 29 respondents indicated on the analysis table.) It seems to me that this sample is adequately stratified and representative. With such a high proportion (38 per cent) of the organization's active participants being in the sample, it fits Coleman's (1959) definition of a "dense" sample, in which data are gathered from a large number of members of the relevant structure (informal organization).

Included in the total, expanded sample were twelve staff members from the GPCC's own executive offices, together with staff from the Church-CAP's and other program divisions. Not counting secretaries, the accountant and audio-visual librarian, all but two of all professional staff members were in this part of the sample. (When all, or almost all, members of the relevant social structure are surveyed, Coleman calls the procedure a "saturation" sample.)

The second problem with the content analysis has to do with the very purpose for which I used the analysis. Early in the study as I tried to interpret the interviewing data, I began to use the analytic tool to "prove" there was some conservative reaction present within the GPCC. I found I was in the process of placing an increasing importance upon quantifying my data (through the use of the content analysis) in order to verify the casual relationship which I had been unintentionally transposing into the hypothesis. It now appears that I was trying to
verify that causal relationship in order to justify my transformed hypothesis, but the hypothesis really did not say that.

Of course, the original intent of the hypothesis was not to verify a theory, but to explore and "shed sociological light" upon what had taken place in the GPCC's organization when it abruptly broke into social action involvement. The intended purpose of the content analysis was not to establish strict quantitative accuracy for verification, but primarily to decipher the major categories of controversial social issues--on the basis of the negative reaction each one generated. That is to say, accurate quantitateness applied to the content analysis here is not to be despised, but on the other hand, I need not have become as preoccupied as I did with that analytic method's degree of quantitateness. I was much too concerned with the standard of "scientificness" it added to the study.

This unnecessary emphasis upon quantitative measurement is illustrated in the essentially non-directive style of interviewing used. Because I used this interviewing method as much as possible, there was a great unevenness to the quality of information obtained. Subject material varied; reliability and accuracy varied; language and style varied. However, as my information grew more specific about the different issues and their importance, so did the directness of my questions about those issues. It worked out, therefore, that the interviews slowly changed from non-directive to more focused interviews. Yet, if analysis Table 1 were to begin to approach some statistical accuracy, the data fed into it from the start would have had to come out of a structured interview questionnaire, universally administered. Many of the early informants were not given a chance to express their attitude about all of the nine
issues ultimately defined as the most substantive for the comparative analysis. Although I did go back to several of those early interviewees to obtain their opinions about previously undefined and unmentioned issues, the overall analysis was not as uniformly applied as a fully scientific instrument should be. On the contrary, however, the original and, hopefully, recovered purpose of the study is not to verify a theory, but explore the sociological reasons behind the GPCC's abrupt social change.

Another illustration of the difficulty with this method's less scientific analysis is that each interviewee's response was subjectively interpreted by the researcher in classifying the responses. It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply some form of objective criteria to measure on a sliding scale the degrees between liberalness and conservativeness. In the exploratory interview, a wide latitude of freedom must be allowed informants to communicate their own experiences and subjective views, especially about deep-felt insecurities stemming from politico-religious problems. Although the data were not gathered by a structured questionnaire, administered to achieve quantifiable statistics, the analysis also lacks a high degree of quantification.

Content analyses have been used most frequently to analyze mass media, or various kinds of recorded material: newspapers, magazines, specialized articles, radio-TV, historical journals and documents, etc. In so doing, specific indices can be adopted for coding the material, such as: the number of times a word appears; amount of prominence given to a subject in headlines or prime viewing time; the style of the author-phrases and wording. By focusing on such specific references, a high
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>19 Informants from Sample of 20 Pre-Constructed for Representatives</th>
<th>Extra Informants Conservative Opinions</th>
<th>Extra Informants Specialized Knowledge</th>
<th>Staff Informants: GPCC, CAP's, Social Action Program</th>
<th>Percentage of conservative opinion on the nine issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GPCC's Decision To Begin First C-CAP</td>
<td>L L N L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C. R. M. R. N. J. V. S. J. G. L. T. H. L. H.</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Albina)</td>
<td>N L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB1307 (1965) R. Pamplin's Reaction</td>
<td>L L N L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church CAP's Relation to GPCC</td>
<td>L L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-CAP &amp; Its Programs</td>
<td>L L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grape Boycott (1968) GPCC's Support</td>
<td>L L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downtown Youth Ministry &amp; Charix House</td>
<td>L L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-CAP's Black Summer Crises' Programs</td>
<td>L L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute: C-CAP's Use of Funds: Black</td>
<td>L L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genesis Financial Campaign Failure</td>
<td>L L L L L L L L L L L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C: Conservative  N: Neutral—no opinion  L: Liberal  U: Undecided

Table 1
Content Analysis of 41 Interviews
level of systematic analyses have been confirmed in these studies. In this study, however, personal spontaneity had to take precedence over limitation (quantification) of the subject material. Consequently, analysis of the material only allowed for the researcher's relatively subjective interpretation of the interviewee's subjective views into simple, codified symbols. In order to prevent over-subjective interpretations at this point of analysis, two simple categories are used: "C" - conservative, and "L" - liberal. Two additional categories--"N" - neutral (due to lack of information or personal involvement in the issue) and "U" - undecided--helped to eliminate much prejudicial speculation in interpreting unclear answers.

The final problem is the list of issues itself. The nine issues may be considered as not necessarily exhaustive of all possible controversial social issues engaged in by the GPCC, as reflected by informants. Since a thorough content analysis should classify and analyze as much relevant material as possible, I made a special effort to include all such significant issues faced by the GPCC in the ten year span. For instance, there were two issues I did not include in the analysis which were on the border line. The first one was the GPCC's vigorous leadership in the 1965 state legislative fight against capital punishment. GPCC leaders had actively lobbied for such a bill in the legislature and then led a state-wide campaign to pass the public referendum to abolish capital punishment. Mostly because only four informants said that this issue had raised a mild reaction within the GPCC, and two were not too sure of that much reaction, I did not include it.

Another issue not included in the list but seriously considered was the GPCC's active participation in the peace movement against the war in
Vietnam. It was mentioned spontaneously by about six respondents. Almost always, however, it was mentioned as a comparative issue in relation to some other one. In retrospect, though, I think this may have been due to the fact that at the beginning of interviews, I emphasized I was interested in the GPCC's abrupt movement into social action through the Church CAP's. When I pursued further questions about this issue if it was mentioned, respondents most often answered that the GPCC did finally take a stand against U.S. participation in the Vietnam conflict, but only in general terms. It never did call for United States withdrawal of its armed forces, nor did it sanction participation in an anti-war demonstration. Two respondents (one clergyman) say they had participated in such demonstrations in downtown Portland, and had incurred negative reactions from church members for their personal activities. They also said several other active GPCC members (about 10) took part in some of their anti-war activities in Portland. These same respondents added that the GPCC's Board still had too many people who were "on the fence" about the GPCC's "right," as a church organization, to take a political stand about such a controversial issue. Minutes of the Board of Directors have indicated that the issue was debated several times, but gave little more information; yet, there is no indication that the GPCC forced the issue into the public eye. No significant public controversy appeared to have arisen about the issue against the GPCC. Because of the few respondents who spontaneously reported the issue and the lack of conservative reaction to the issue, I did not include it in the content analysis.

The question naturally arises--what were the specific criteria for determining those issues that were used in the analysis? The most
important standard was that which has been discussed at length previ­
ously—the degree of conservative reaction generated by the issue. I
weighed the amount of reaction by: (1) the number of people who spontane­
ously mentioned a particular issue, (2) the importance or degree of con­
troversialness which the respondents placed on each issue they described,
(3) the amount of debate, time and importance each issue appeared to be
given in the organizational records, and (4) how well the descriptions
of the issues' controversialness fit with the information about the other
issues.

The technique I used in applying these four criteria goes back to
the method I used to analyze my interview notes. Following each inter­
view, I tried immediately to rewrite and fill in my brief notations.
Usually it was during the interviews themselves that I first detected
new properties, which hinted at newer, separate categories for contro­
ersial issues. In the post-interview writing, the new properties were
separated out and noted.

First, I coded the new properties with abbreviations in the margin.
Second, I searched for similar kinds of references, and compared the
newer properties for possible emerging categories of controversial
issues. Third, I made special notes of the number of similar refer­
ences and their possible connections with new issues. The third step
was essentially a process of evaluating and combining the new properties
into new, relevant categories, which applied the four criteria above by
measuring the members' degree of conservative reaction, generated by the
GPCC's involvement in the new issue. This is my own version of what
B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss have called "the constant comparative
method of qualitative analysis."2
Of course, the pragmatic application of this three step procedure of constant comparison was not always smooth. An example of the difficulties in assembling enough valid properties to construct an important category is illustrated in the events leading to my discovery of the GPCC's dispute over House Bill 1307 (1965, to equalize educational opportunities through busing), and the following reaction, led by Robert Pamplin (viz. Chapter 6). I had heard two or three slight references to this controversy during the first seven or eight interviews. Each of the early references to the dispute were so vague that I did not grasp that the references were to the same issue until much later. When I interviewed the most active Roman Catholic priest in the GPCC, Father Griffin, he said that he did not know the details of the fight, since it was well before his time, but he had discovered more latent strong feelings about the "Pamplin affair" than any other event in the GPCC's past. Griffin knew only the bare outline of the issue--that it had to do with the GPCC's activity in lobbying the legislature over an issue and that it developed into a larger dispute about the GPCC's rightness in taking sides on political issues. He said he had heard that Pamplin had quit the GPCC's Board over the disagreement with the Board. Consequently, that one interview from a relatively new participant in the GPCC led me to pursue the issue in further interviews, and forced me to do much back-tracking by reinterviewing previous respondents and re-examining further records. I found through this effort that the earlier controversy was the real crisis point in the GPCC's process of changing to social action involvement. I had come close to missing this major turning-point controversy.
Since classification into categories of the content to be analyzed must have clear definitions in order to compare, analyze and test them in the future, a brief definition of each of the nine issues used in our content analysis now follows. The first issue on the content analysis in Table 1 is the GPCC's original decision to sponsor the first Church CAP in the Albina area. As the table indicates, there was less negative reaction against this social action move than against all other nine issues.

The second issue was the dispute over House Bill 1307 (1965), which called for busing of disadvantaged school children, mostly black, to qualified schools where classes in music, art, theater and other cultural subjects were offered. One of the Board of Directors, R. Pamplin, vigorously opposed the GPCC taking an active part in lobbying the legislature for this bill. When it was passed, Pamplin became even more adamant about the GPCC's own organizational means of deciding to become involved in a controversy over a "political" matter. He accused the Executive and Social Concerns Committees of by-passing the Board of Directors.

The third issue was the GPCC's undefined and loose organizational authority over the CAP's. Ultimately, who was to have authority over the CAP's: the CAP's own local Boards and staff, or the GPCC? It was never really resolved until the financial squeeze of the Seventies dictated practical answers.

The fourth issue was East-CAP and its aid to the S.E. Portland poor, especially its low-cost housing programs. Of the three Church CAP's, it carried on, by far, the least controversial social action program.
The fifth issue was the local Grape Boycott, which was a "secondary" boycott, supporting the United Farm Workers' strike, led by Cesar Chavez. The GPCC's Board never voted to support the Boycott directly, but did vote to affirm, publicly, the farm workers' right to organize, bargain collectively and strike. This liberal vote caused great dissension within the Board.

The sixth issue was the downtown "Youth Ministry," centered in a coffee house, The Charix, and a 24-hour drop-in medical center, the Outside-In. The program sympathetically assisted runaways and other youth in all kinds of trouble. Because the city police accused the Youth Ministry program of harboring runaways and allowing drugs to be exchanged at the coffee house, the "youth ministry" made front page headlines and motivated immediate public reaction.

The seventh issue was C-CAP's (Albina area, 1968) special summer program of varied social actions for the black people to meet the "black crisis" following Martin Luther King's assassination. A young, controversial black leader, Colden Brown, who was accused in the press of being a revolutionary, was hired to oversee the program.

The eighth issue was the internal reaction, led by a new Treasurer of the GPCC, against the over-use of funds in the 1968 Summer Crisis programs, chiefly in Albina's C-CAP. This led to further conflicts between C-CAP and the Executive Director.

The ninth issue was the relative failure of a financial funding campaign in 1969. The GPCC badly needed income to meet the large deficit still hanging from the Summer Crisis programs. A professional financial campaign company was hired to lead it, but less than one-sixth of the total $250,000 was achieved. It led to a lawsuit with the campaign
company and the feeling of some members that it was a reaction against the GPCC's recent over-involvement in social actions.

To what purpose does the content analysis serve the investigation? Although it has difficulties of exactness, the analysis permits an overview of the conservative-liberal spectrum within the GPCC's internal organization. It lays out with fair objectivity the pattern of attitudes which the organization's core group had toward community action involvement. The analysis serves to give some concrete, empirical evidence that, unlike the general membership of most mainline Protestant churches, the GPCC, as an organization, was consistently supportive and directly involved with socio-political issues.

The purpose of the overall content analysis is to determine the relative amount of conservative reaction each of the nine controversial issues developed. The proportion of the conservative attitude toward each issue is compared to the relative degree of liberal support each issue received. By comparing the results of each issue, I was originally attempting to find some sociological pattern in the different conservative reactions. However, it is easily seen that no issue came close to generating a significantly large conservative opinion. Looking at the column for conservative opinions' percentages, all but two issues are similar in size. The first issue, the GPCC's decision to begin the first Church CAP, is significant in its extremely low degree (2 per cent) of conservative reaction. The fourth issue, East-CAP's activities, is also relatively low at 10 per cent, compared to the others at 15 to 20 per cent.

The real variations are seen in the other two percentage columns, the liberal opinion and the undecided-no opinion columns. Most of the
issues' high percentages of liberal support may be more instructive than the conservative percentages. It is noteworthy that the eighth issue, the downtown youth ministry to the drug scene, runaways, etc., received the highest proportion (71 per cent) of liberal support. It coincides with the largest amount of coverage given any issue by the press and with the opinion of many respondents that this issue generated the most public reaction. Three more issues had a high (66) percentage of liberal support: the first, third and seventh issues. In connection with the first issue, the sixth issue, the 1968 Black Summer Crisis program in Albina, reached its apex at the same time as the downtown Youth Ministry, and received some press coverage along with it. It also stirred extra public reaction, because of such publicity. The strong liberal support for the third issue, the organizational difficulties between the CAP's and the GPCC's main office, probably reflects the internal tension that was still unresolved at the time of the interviews.

The last important point to note on the analysis table is the 51 per cent recorded for the second issue's undecided--no opinion. The second issue was the 1965 controversy over HB 1307, which led to whether the GPCC properly should be involved in socio-political matters at all. Over half of the interviewees either did not have first hand knowledge about the issue, or had forgotten the bitterness of the fight and its importance. It seems that the distance of time and the turn-over of personnel had made the difference in this issue's significance.
A New Strategy

What follows is a brief description of the where and how a basic alteration in my research procedure took place—from straight data gathering about variables over to deciphering the intervening influences between independent and dependent variables. As noted before, I found my expectations for conservative reactions from interviews taken in the GPCC's higher structure were largely refuted. I thought that there would have been a good dispute among the GPCC's Board members over their starting a community action program in the city's black residential area. In preparing the study's proposal, I had interviewed the Rev. Paul Schulze two times. He was the GPCC's first organizer and administrator of the first three Church-CAP's. Now later in the research I was plagued by the question, "Why?" Why no dispute? Why didn't the Board at least have a vigorous debate about such a radical decision to become directly involved in social action work? So I went back to Schulze and asked him. In a very concise statement, Schulze answered: "Three things were involved. First was an ad hoc committee of mostly white churchmen, calling themselves the Albina 'Community Concerns Council.' They were trying to organize some kind of local social action. Second was the United Methodist Church Women of Oregon, interested in social causes and with about $10,000 to spend. Third was the Greater Portland Council of Churches. William Cate (Executive Secretary of the GPCC) got all three together and performed a three-way marriage."

Schulze's analysis became the key for my understanding the multiple, interacting elements that went into making that originally uncontested, but ultimately radical, change of goals for the GPCC. Schulze gave me
names of others who could fill in more details about the Board's first decision to go into Albina—people from the United Methodist Church Women and the former Albina Community Concerns Council. With these extra interviews, I concluded there were five distinct organizational elements that prevented any serious criticisms by conservatives on the Board. (1. The United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference—their progressive effort and large sums of money; 2. The Community Concerns Council of Albina; 3. The GPCC's Social Concerns Committee; 4. William Cate, Executive Director of the GPCC; and 5. The pervading "secularized" attitude of the majority active member churches of the GPCC. See Chapter 9.) Out of these five organizational elements came the properties which later became the sociological categories that are the theoretical keys to the whole research, viz., Chapter 11. The first and most important category to emerge and unlock the other categories was organizational oligarchy. It became the key, because it opened up the way to my seeing the other categories and seeing them in a sociological whole—together. More and more bits of information added to my conclusion that the GPCC leaders usurped and continued to use more and more authority than was formally constituted in their offices. In the process they increasingly avoided challenges from within the organization to change its goals. The insight led to an originally unproposed investigation of the GPCC's organizational structure-process.

As I continued my planned research, I found a minimum of negative reaction within the GPCC against those issues derived from the GPCC's three Church CAP's activities. Although I found a larger proportionate reaction was stimulated by the CAP's controversial activities than by the
Board's initial, December, 1963, decision, the later negative reactions toward the CAP's were still much less than I expected. Of course, it was during this time my investigation intensified on answering the why for this low degree of reaction against the CAP's social action programs. Why were my data continuing to show a minimal reaction? Not realizing it at the time, I was then attempting to interpret what was going on between the variables. Retrospectively, I see my searching them to make sense out of the clues which pointed to some kind of interruption of those normal reactions by conservatives within the overall organization. Since the same muted reaction by conservatives followed each succeeding controversial issue examined, an increasing number of the same accompanying social patterns--relevant categories--became more uniform in my analysis of the growing data.

Before starting this paper, I had read 'some of Glaser and Strauss' book, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY, but at that time I did not have enough practical research "hooks" on which to hang new charts for later methodological storms. During much of the work on this study, therefore, I did not make the association of my own problem back to Glaser and Strauss' "grounded theory" method. Because of the indefiniteness of nondirective interviewing, I was more plagued by the real accuracy of my own data, rather than generating some new theory. Glaser and Strauss maintain that instead of verifying someone else's theories, more sociological research should be aimed at generating theory. Obviously, in order to verify theory, emphasis must be on accurate quantitative data. Because the generation of theory forces the researcher to evaluate what goes on between the variables, qualitative data becomes much more important. Yet, Glaser and Strauss say:
Our position in this book is as follows: there is no fundamental clash between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and quantitative methods or data. What clash there is concerns the primacy of emphasis on verification or generation of theory—to which heated discussion on qualitative versus quantitative data have been linked historically. We believe that each form of data is useful for both verification and generation of theory, whatever the primacy of emphasis. Primacy depends only on the circumstances of research, on the interests and training of the researcher, and on the kinds of material he needs for his theory.

Glaser and Strauss employ a form of comparative analysis as the foundation of their method for generating theory. They recommend the constant comparing of information taken from many contrasting social groups, data and conclusions from parallel and contrasting studies—all to gain the patterns of their similarities and differences. In this way, more and more abstract categories and their properties emerge from the data. Essentially, hypotheses are generated in the same manner, moving from the tentative, substantive to more formal, abstract hypotheses. By comparing the differences and similarities between emerging categories, the general relationships between the categories soon appear. Multiple relationships, and therefore, multiple, suggested hypotheses are often pursued simultaneously. The researcher must constantly analyze his new field data by comparing them with his previously gathered data and with material from studies by other sociologists. Glaser and Strauss emphasize the need to be open to seeing while in the act of field work the "real life" relationships of social "things," occurrences, people, data, etc.

In the beginning, one's hypotheses may seem unrelated, but as categories and properties emerge, develop in abstraction, and become related, their accumulating interrelations form an integrated central theoretical framework—the core of the emerging theory. The core becomes a theoretical guide to the further collection and analysis of data.

Applied to my own effort to answer the evaluative question, "Why no reaction to the GPCC's real controversial activities?", I look back and see I
was comparing and putting together many lists of properties and categories to try to come up with a plausible social pattern for an answer. My organizational analysis of the GPCC was the beginning of my own "comparative analysis" of reasons I found for the lack of conservative reaction. When I reread Glaser and Strauss' book, I realized their method was a systematic treatment of what I was fumbling to do in my search for a method—in my attempt to evaluate or interpret the data I was getting. By comparing the several major controversial issues immersing the GPCC during the 1960's, I found that the properties, categories and concepts emerged slowly into a whole, which served as an "answer," or a tentative theory for this particular group, for this particular time and place.

I have mentioned before that the organizational analysis I was "forced" into resulted in my conclusion about the oligarchic nature of the GPCC's governing process. When I compared its particular form of oligarchy with Paul Harrison's study of the Southern Baptist Convention, I found that constitutionally the organizations were very similar and led to the same legal powerlessness in the leadership of both organizations. This condition in both groups, combined with membership apathy, William Cate's special qualities and ex-officio membership on all committees (viz., Chapter 9), allowed Cate and executives of the Southern Baptists both to take strong practical control of their respective organizations. Through this comparison, it was apparent that the GPCC's oligarchy simulated Harrison's description of "grasped," or rational-pragmatic authority. This added set of properties, illuminated by Harrison's grasped authority, further defined my first category of a developing theory, and opened the way for my seeing most of the other six major categories of the social insulation theory.
In fact, at the conclusion of my organizational analysis, I thought I had found the fundamental answer to my overall qualitative question. I felt then that the special form of the GPCC's rational-pragmatic oligarchy was the basic sociological reason for the GPCC's ability to control its own reactionary critics. Although it was a "logical" independent variable by itself, it was not a historically sufficient one when I looked into some of the later GPCC controversies. Instead of becoming the answer in itself, oligarchy became one of the major categories of the paper's inclusive theoretical answer--social insulation.

The discussion about the GPCC's organizational processes (Chapter 9) largely describes the emergence of other major categories. Membership apathy became so visible and important to make the organization function as an insulator that I listed it as the first form, or category, of the GPCC's insulation. Another category which appeared at the same time during the working out of the analysis was the necessity of an adequate source of money to implement the new social action programs. The data showed the basic power of conservative reactionaries against liberal religious organizations is the withholding of finances. This becomes more evident when compared with all highly voluntary organizations.

Together with oligarchy, the above two categories first appeared to me as indicators of a dependent variable, which I was visualizing as "causing" the low-level reaction. Another category that also emerged during this same time of analysis was "structural insulation." However as I compared the concept of the "structural" quality of insulation with the other categories, I realized that insulation was much more than a static set of organizational forms, but a dynamic process. I found that the process of managed communication between insider-leader-activitists
and the rest of the organization was the constitutive category of insulation. From there the other categories began to fit together into a part of the larger process of social insulation. Insulation was more than a category. It embraced all of the other categories. It was a dialectic process in which the leaders (notably, Cate and Schulze) used their peculiar grasp of organizational authority to focus a major movement within Western religion--secularization--into local social activism.
CHAPTER III

A COMPARISON OF SOME CLASSICAL THEORIES
OF RELIGION'S ROLE IN SOCIETY:
A PARADOXICAL IMPACT

In developing a working hypothesis for this study, two separate points of view are considered. The first views religion as being predominantly a conservative influence upon society. The second also views religion as being conservative in some instances, but at the same time, an important prodder and stimulator toward social change—a liberalizing influence. For the first view, several outstanding writers in the sociology of religion have said that religion contributes more to the conservation of the social status quo than it encourages social change. Some of the best known people who have expressed this point of view are Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx and more recently, Kingsley Davis and Will Herberg. Obviously, all these people have not stated this point simply and categorically in the same manner, but each one has concluded with some form of this view, accompanied with their evidence supporting religion's conservative influence.

Emile Durkheim's sociology of knowledge greatly determined his view of religion. He was convinced that knowledge is mediated most fundamentally by social categories. All "collective representations" are appropriated by men through their common social relationships and social structures. Social consciousness or conformity is developed within moral and logical categories through the social representations. Durkheim,
consequently, went back to the "primitive" religion of the Australian aborigines to find out how their collective life style helped form the collective representations of religion.

Because of his strong disagreement with the socialistic theory of the inevitability of class conflict, Durkheim continued to base even his view of religion upon "organic solidarity." Durkheim feared the political and social conflicts of his time as a general moral breakdown related to the breakdown of religion. Religion's purpose, as he viewed it, was to solidify and conserve the order of its society. He concluded that all societies since the primitives have had religions and divided their society into distinct "sacred and profane" realms. Religion and the sacred are absolutely necessary to the profane part of society to give it unity, or solidarity. Religion, then, plays a very important role in conserving each society's own social order by binding the members of society together in a collective interaction that is qualitatively different from that of daily life. Religion becomes a necessary and permanent part of society, because it performs this necessary conservative function for society--the solidifying, or integrating, of society.

Max Weber wrote a long essay, which in substance agreed very much with Durkheim's view of the conservative role of religion.2 Weber's thesis was that religion in general, but especially Christianity, placates those people who are frustrated and disappointed by their plight in this world. The same concept of religion's social function is the basis of Karl Marx's conclusion that religion helps to stymy "class consciousness" and social revolution by being an opiate of the people. Kingsley Davis' views on religion also closely parallel Weber's essay on the conservative function of religion.3
Without denying his analysis of religion's overall conservative role, Weber, however, took an opposing view in his THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM. In this work, he tried to show that the Calvinist Church of the eighteenth century (not Calvin's own teachings) promoted the idea that economic success, hard work and frugality were proof of divine election, i.e., predestined salvation. 4 Directly due to this motivation, Weber argued, Protestant asceticism sanctioned profit making as a moral duty. As Weber's defenders have since pointed out, he was not trying to depict the Protestant Reformation to have been the "cause" of modern capitalism. Rather, Weber was demonstrating the strong correlation between Calvinism's new ethical norms and the psychological requirements of the new economic system. In other words, Weber saw that Calvinism was not providing the lower classes with any comfort to assuage their problems, but complimenting the successful.

In two separate works, Weber presented arguments on both sides of the question, whether religion has a conservative or liberal influence upon society. In his PROTESTANT ETHIC, however, it seems that Weber is presenting Calvinism as an exception to a more general rule for world religions. Weber, indirectly then, suggests the insight that religions play an ambivalent role in society. To supplement this idea, S. N. Eisenstadt in a recent essay defends Weber's Protestant Ethic theory and amplifies it by showing Protestantism's more conservative influences upon society. Eisenstadt shows how the new Protestantism had various kinds of effects in different cultures and countries. Depending upon their style of government and cultural background, his findings illustrate the ambivalent influence Protestantism has had upon its varying socio-economic environment. 5 In some cases, its religious influence has been
toward changing the old order into new patterns, which corroborates Weber's idea that the Protestant Ethic stimulated the new capitalist economics. In other cases, Eisenstadt holds, contrary to Weber, that Protestantism has had a conservative influence to maintain the social status quo in certain areas.

On the progressive side, Eisenstadt says Protestantism has had a "transformative capacity to legitimize, in religious or ideological terms, the development of new motivations, activities and new institutions which were not encompassed by their original impulses and views." Eisenstadt defines "transformative capacities" in terms of three aspects of Protestantism: (1) a combination of "this-worldliness" and transcendentalism; (2) emphasis on individual activism and responsibility; and (3) direct relationship of the individual to the sacred, minimizing the institutions. When these three characteristics interacted with those conducive socio-political conditions which freed the transforming capacities of Protestantism, significant social changes resulted.

Eisenstadt says the key condition was autonomy in cultural, political and economic institutions, which was present more in some Western Europe countries than others, e.g., Spain and France. Protestantism's transforming powers varied in degree and quality from country to country, depending upon the different area's ability to absorb the religious transformative ideology.

Eisenstadt admits Weber did not pay too much attention to Protestantism's transformative effect upon the political sphere, but says it was one of the most important, because it substituted the idea of covenant and contract as a new view of "natural" law. It freed natural law from magical concepts and capricious gods. It made nature and men's
own interrelationships subject to rational order. In contrast to countries which remained predominantly Roman Catholic, Protestant rulers had to find new sources of legitimation other than the church. This caused their developing new, independent symbols for national identity and the restructuring of central legal institutions. Consequently, when there already existed a potential openness or flexibility in the political and cultural centers of a country, their interactions with the religious innovations of the new Protestant groups allowed various degrees of institutionalizing of the new socio-economic forms.

Protestantism's transformative capacities were smallest where Protestant groups attained full powers--hence, restrictive, legalistic attitudes were activated, e.g., the Geneva experiment--and paradoxically, also where Protestants became the "downtrodden minorities" of a country. In between the extremes of this socio-economic continuum, in some countries Protestants came to occupy in sufficient numbers the social category of "secondary elites" (close to but not identified with the central elites), so that they had the greatest ability to influence the social movement toward new social changes. Similarly, Protestant groups were also successful insofar as they were integrated into wider national communities that had an autonomy, which had developed out of prior estates. These young autonomous groups, saturated by Protestant secondary elites, developed without attaining full political powers.

As Eisenstadt describes it, Protestantism's influence upon Western society was an ambivalent one. It may be made more graphic by mapping it out upon a simple continuum.
PROTESTANTISM’S TRANSFORMATIVE CAPACITIES

Smallest  Greatest  Smallest

(Where and when Protestants became):

Controllers of Power  Secondary Elites  Downtrodden Minorities

Protestantism had the greatest influence to bring about social changes where it became close to, but not identified with, the central elites of its society. This influence diminished where the Protestants climbed, or declined too far on the socio-politico-economic ladder.

Eisenstadt gives several illustrations of the paradoxically similar, along with contradictory, results that came out of Protestantism’s interaction with whatever socio-political structures which existed in each area. South Africa is an example where the Calvinist influence became extremely powerful, and at the same time, extremely inhibiting to the socio-political life of the country. Protestant transformative capacities have been minimal in this country. Lutheranism, for another example, has also had different effects on different countries. In those German principalities where the rulers were autocratic and became Lutheran, religious practices were more conservative and more restrictive on the growth of socio-economic institutions. In Scandinavia, Eisenstadt says, there was greater prior autonomy in the Estates, and Lutheranism was integrated into these wider national communities. Sweden’s political development was subsequently in a more pluralistic direction than other European states. Political, economic and social freedom developed faster and earlier in those moderately strong Protestant European states.

Eisenstadt's analysis deals specifically with Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis. As mentioned above, Weber later wrote an essay, "Religious
Rejections of the World and their Directions," pointing out the socially conservative nature of world religions in general. Eisenstadt has tried to show how Protestantism itself has been a conservative agent in certain societies, as well as a liberalizing force, demonstrated by Weber. Eisenstadt's research is greatly broadened and up-dated by the inclusion of examinations into newer emerging states in varying geographical areas throughout the globe.

However, it must be remembered that Max Weber also later did a great amount of sociological research into the religions of China, India, and ancient Israel. In these writings, Weber reported both sides of these religion's social influences--both their conservativism and liberating influence for change. Particularly in his study of Judaism's ancient prophets, Weber found in their charismatic leadership the ingredients which were so important to bringing about the socio-political changes that made Judaism such a distinctive religion.

Weber classified world religions into two groups: (1) the religions of ritual, or legal pursuits, and (2) the religions of conviction, which are actively oriented toward salvation. The first kind places great emphasis on traditional, conventional order and laws. The law is "sacred" and must be obeyed in its greatest details. It is often characterized by a bureaucratic form of morality, as it progressively loses its concept of transcendence. The religions of salvation, according to Weber, are controlled by sacred conviction--or faith--instead of sacred law. Inner tension develops in the believer due to the dissatisfaction with worldly manners of life and his intensive search for a transcendent meaning to this world. Out of this radical separation between religion's transcendent standards, as against worldly standards,
came the charismatic prophets, who came into direct conflict with economic and political life.

Weber described the charismatic leader as one who seizes leadership by reason of his own conviction that he is an agent of a higher moral authority than that of the present order. He always leads in a break with the established normative order. The break is legitimated and given rational support by appealing to a higher moral order.

The greatest contribution of the prophets, according to Weber, was their rationalization of all areas of life, due to their efforts to bring about the "disenchantment of the world." Because of the prophets' unending war against magical and orgiastic practices, they emptied the Israelites' natural world of magic, demons and mythological powers. They said God is the God of all of life, and therefore he is completely dependable. This made life rationally sensible. The prophets over and over pointed to what God had accomplished for them as a people, taking them out of bondage from Egypt, giving them their land and consistently giving them victory over their enemies. God's actions were rationalizing, because they called for a rational response to serve and worship their God of action. The prophets' rationalization was a direct attack upon others' efforts to coerce and please a fickle god or pantheon built around vague promises. Their God had already acted. He had already delivered them out of bondage, and time and again given them victory over their enemies. This rational relationship created an ethical obligation that bound the whole Jewish people as a "secular" society to their God.

The purpose of this chapter is to expose the strong theoretical support for both sides of the dilemma in which Western religion has
played its dual roles. During the greater amount of time, the religious institutions have lent their support to upholding the social status quo, but at other times in some societies, these same religious groups have been critical and creative in forcing changes in their own social worlds. In the first paragraphs of this chapter, Durkheim's fear for the fragility of his society's moral standards is described as being based on his great perception that social order and interrelationships are determined by each society's own representation collective. He discovered that the standards and patterns of each society have their sources in the human group, and because of this, he was aware of the tentativeness of all moral standards. As noted before, he was fearful of the breakup of Western morality, along with Western religion, which upheld that morality. For this reason, religion was to him most necessary to conserve the social solidarity. Although Durkheim did not see the role of religion to be the critic of established social and moral practices, he identified the source of all social order as being constructed by human beings, collectively.

This is at base what Weber wrote was the effect of the ancient prophetic effort to "disenchant" nature and the world of humanly constructed myths and magic, in order to let God be completely God over all aspects of society. By applying its transcendent law, the prophetic tradition became iconoclastic of each of Israel's new rulerships which tried to deify itself. Weber showed that this kind of rationalism in Western religion periodically relativized its humanly constructed social norms when it has held up the prophetic, transcendent values against current social practices. Using Weber's Protestant ethic thesis, S. N. Eisenstadt has amplified it to show that Protestantism has worked
both ways in different social contexts. As described above, Protestantism in some cases did criticize and transform its own social order (when Protestants became the secondary elites), and in other cases, it accommodated itself to the socio-political status quo (when Protestants became either the dominant controllers of power, or the downtrodden minorities).

In the last analysis, this paper also intends to demonstrate that within the context of the GPCC and its community, this religious group has, simultaneously, played both roles. The GPCC has paradoxically given support to traditional practices of the city government and the local business community, while at the same time, it turned to become a leader in severely contradicting the norms and values of these power structures with its own social action programs.
CHAPTER IV

MOTIVES FOR SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT

Because a fundamental change in the GPCC's organizational direction and structure occurred within a relatively brief period, the question immediately presents itself: What social conditions were present to prod the unusual initial change from relative uninvolve ment to a full-time, direct social action program? What were the initial motivating factors that overcame the traditionally conservative posture of a recognized religious group? This chapter attempts to answer that question.

Before the Greater Portland Council of Churches made its big jump to a community action program, it was carrying on some limited social service type of work such as helping to fund the chaplins at the city-county jails, juvenile detention homes and specialized hospital chaplaincy. Founded in 1919, the history of the GPCC's pre-1960's was written in conventional cooperative church work such as the widely known (1,200 attendance) joint, annual two-week school to prepare Sunday school teachers, as well as the cooperative, released-time church education program with the Portland grade schools. A typical help-the-congregations type of program was the GPCC's broadly supported, city-wide church membership census in 1960. However, the GPCC had remained uninvolved from the controversial social problems of local poverty, racial inequities, and other social injustices. It was in this context that the GPCC departed from all its previous policies and voted to hire a full-time man to begin
in 1964 a "community action program" within the black residential area of Albina.

What brought about this momentous decision, which was later to change the direction of the GPCC's main stream? In actual fact, it appears that the decision which the GPCC's Board of Directors made was not fought out by two sides of strong or angry opposition. No conservative group, indeed, no individual, raised any real opposition to the proposal of this social action project within the city's black community. This researcher anticipated that the beginning efforts of the GPCC to move in this totally new direction should have been marked by conservative resistance within the GPCC's membership against such a liberal move. None of the interviewees could recall anyone who had openly opposed the decision. According to three respondents, many Portland people outside of the GPCC gave vocal support to the decision: "Finally our churches are going to do something constructive in our community ..." Another respondent mentioned that the GPCC's first year in Albina with a full-time, salaried worker was given strong popular support by member churches of the GPCC, as well as by many parts of the city. Why?

The reasons behind this smooth transition have their foundation in the overall change which had its roots in the Social Gospel movement in the America of the 1800's, and before that in the European theological liberalism of the late 1700's, exemplified by Friedrich Schleiermacher. Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch gave fervent expression to the Social Gospel in the United States, which strongly influenced the social thinking of the Federal Council of Churches in its famous "social creed of the churches" of 1908. Following World War I, the neo-orthodox movement overshadowed the Social Gospel, but also incorporated much of
it. The present National Council of Churches is a reformulation of the old Federal Council, and most of the mainline Protestant Churches which belonged to the first are now members of the National Council, as well as of the GPCC. These are the same church bodies, mostly, who have had a strong theological heritage of the liberal movement and the Social Gospel. These local congregations of the GPCC, especially parts of the Congregational, Methodist and Presbyterian bodies, were expressing a basic assumption of the Social Gospel—that the church should be "involved" in social, economic and political sectors of the "world." The conservative tendencies of these churches to maintain the status quo were there, but were diminishing beside a growing concern for the secular problems of their city. Ironically, the clergy led in this secular concern.

The GPCC's December, 1963, decision to take on social action full time was not, then, a cataclysmic event, but a kind of "natural" turn to make. The change was almost uneventful. Apparently, the GPCC membership did not foresee the long-range difference it would make in their own goals, philosophy and practice as an organization. There were several other important factors which preceded the December, 1963, decision: (1) The United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference, (2) The "Community Concerns Council" of Albina, (3) The GPCC's Social Concerns Committee, (4) William Cate, Executive Director of the GPCC, and (5) the above-mentioned pervading attitude of the majority member churches of the GPCC.

Chronologically, the United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference, became seriously interested in performing some kind of social action in the Albina area about the same time that the local group of Albina churches organized into the Community Concerns Council, the Fall of 1961.
However, well before that time, the United Methodist Women had seriously discussed their desire to use their own funds on a social action project somewhere in Oregon. They were looking for a worthy place to spend their money in this fashion, because they were convinced that social action on their home ground was the proper work of the church. Mrs. Elizabeth Watson, who lives on the edge of the Albina area, was president of the United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference. Early in 1962, the Rev. Courtland, a black pastor of Cambrick Methodist Church in Albina, called Mrs. E. Watson, and asked her if the United Methodist Women would consider sponsoring a "community center" in Albina. Mrs. Watson related the series of events following. She brought this proposal before the governing board of her state-wide group. A committee of four, with Mrs. Watson as chairman, was formed to study Albina's socio-economic problems and the feasibility of utilizing the Methodist Women's assets to meet these problems. The Women's study committee thoroughly analyzed the great changes which had taken place in Albina, economically and socially, over the preceding fifteen years. The committee concluded that the need for socio-economic aid was so great that it was too big for their group to administer. Yet, they wanted the administration of their financial aid to be done by a religiously based group. During this time, her acquaintance with the GPCC's Executive Secretary, William Cate, a fellow Methodist, led Mrs. Watson to discuss her committee's findings and conclusion with Cate. Cate told her how much he wanted the GPCC to become involved in social action work within a local area with just such great needs. Through this contact, the committee decided to ask the GPCC to administer a community action type of project in Albina, using the Methodist Women's funds of ten to fifteen thousand dollars, over a three-
year period.

From their investigation, the committee concluded that, as a black community, Albina had no voice, no center of power or authority, that could speak to the white groups of the city and be taken seriously by the white power structures of Portland. Albina's prosperous Union Avenue business area had been destroyed fifteen years before when the Interstate 5 Freeway was constructed through one side of Albina, together with the construction of the Lloyd's Shopping Center and the Portland Civic Center. These major construction sites had involved the permanent removal of hundreds of homes and business buildings. Albina's Union Avenue business area was dissected into pieces and separated. The committee saw that there were already several church sponsored, social-help type of programs going on in Albina. However, none of these church action programs was aimed at the real problem. These church programs were all small: Menonite playground program, a Roman Catholic nursery for welfare mothers and a small fundamentalist church's day-nursery. The Portland Urban League set up an office in Albina for three or four months, but pulled out to place it somewhere else. Even the Oregon Welfare Department did not have an office within Albina. None of these little "help" programs, church or secular sponsored, was geared to the more basic need of the black people. Both Mrs. Watson and Schulze emphasized that no group was physically situated inside the community to help the black people organize themselves into an on-going, self-help organization that would have a representative "voice," respected and heard by the power structures of the larger city. Probably because fundamentalist churches are exclusive by the nature of their strict legalistic morality and high-pitched emotional worship practices, the fundamentalist, black clergymen
in Albina were so strongly individualistic that they at that time were mutually exclusive socially. Usually, fundamentalists consider social, economic and political problems outside of religion's prerogative. This religiously conservative view automatically conserves and legitimates those established "outside" structures. Therefore, the black fundamentalist churches in Albina did not serve as a rallying point to organize into an effective organization. The Methodist Women's committee decided its social action job in Albina would be organizationally too big for their resources. The GPCC appeared to be an excellent vehicle to develop Albina's needed voice.

The second factor which led up to the GPCC's decision to sponsor the action program in Albina was the Albina "Community Concerns Council" (CCC). In 1961 the Rev. Jack Engermalls, a white Baptist pastor in Albina, invited all the Albina churches to form an informal group to discuss and plan some kind of community action work in Albina. Engermalls had just returned from a Baptist conference about church social action programs and their practical methods in local communities. He was convinced that the black and white congregations in Albina could and should organize an independent group of pastors and laymen to plan and begin some form of community action effort which would deal with Albina's own problems. According to common testimony, the "CCC" met almost monthly for over two years, but never moved beyond the talking stage. The group was never able to consummate any plans for specific actions.

According to those interviewed who attended the Albina "Community Concerns Council," the purpose of their group was eventually to develop a program to alleviate Albina's racial and poverty problems. Mr. Robert
Nelson, who participated in this Council from the start, said that about 25 local congregations were invited to send their interested laymen and pastors to meet with the group. Since Engermalls and the other leaders of the ad hoc "CCC" group were aiming at non-religious goals for the group, the group's secular purposes had a negative effect on the five black churches which responded to the invitation. Because of their fundamentalist background, the five participating black churches soon dwindled to two. It can be seen from this beginning of the local churches to be directly involved in social action within Albina, the black churches generally would not ally themselves with social action purposes. This fact becomes more and more important in the evolvement of the GPCC's CAP's, as we shall soon witness.

A third factor was the small group of people within the GPCC's own policy-making structure. It was the GPCC's elite Social Concerns Commission. Members of the Commission were elected at the annual meetings by congregations' delegates, but it became an elite group because it developed so much independent power under its aggressive chairman, the Rev. Dr. Robert Bonthius. He was the pastor of one of the large urban Presbyterian Churches, and strongly dedicated to the whole church's involvement in social action. Bonthius encouraged and led his sub-committees under his Commission into investigating the social implications of many bills before the state legislature and proposals before the City Council. Consistently, this group of people introduced social action plans and statements on socio-economic policies to the Executive Committee alone, or to the Board of Directors, to be approved. Most often these statements would be approved, and then presented to the public as the "position" of the GPCC. A very few times the Social Concerns Commis-
sion's recommended statements drew some real reaction from the Board of Directors, resulting in vigorous debate and counter moves. (The major reaction of this kind will be taken up in a separate chapter, Chapter 6.) Immediately following the approval of several of the "position statements" by the Bonthius Commission in the early 1960's, members of the Commission went down to the State Legislature, and lobbied in the GPCC's name for and against specific legislative bills. During that time, for instance, the Commission rallied the whole GPCC to put great pressure on the legislators to eliminate the death penalty. Shortly after, the Commission met much internal reaction to its support of a bill to finance busing of economically disadvantaged children to suburban schools.

This researcher has never met Bonthius, since he left Portland for another parish before this research began. Several respondents characterized Bonthius as a successful, appealing pastor; however, three of my conservative respondents considered his activities and words in the interest of social action for the GPCC as too aggressive, even abrasive. There was a broad consensus among respondents that Bonthius had spoken forcefully at some meetings for his Commission's suggested social actions. Some thought that Bonthius had done a disservice by alienating some moderates on the GPCC Board. Yet, one Episcopalian member of the GPCC Board (an Oxonian Ph.D.) attested that at one meeting concerning the race and school busing issue, Bonthius and himself sat near each other, joking and kidding each other that they were soon to make strong opposing presentations to the meeting. This respondent said that he knew that some GPCC people were offended by Bonthius' strong liberal views, but the respondent thought it was not Bonthius' abrasive manner as much as the threat Bonthius represented to their conservative inability to understand
his liberal proposals. Apparently, then, for Bonthius, and others, the new Social Concerns Commission, which was created in the GPCC's 1961 reorganization and consolidation of a wide variety of committees into ten "commissions," became an excellent vehicle to marshal the prestige of a larger church organization behind their socio-economic convictions. It allowed them as churchmen to bring a new style of power to bear upon the leaders of city and state.

Two other respondents who had served with Bonthius on this commission and were economically upper-middle class, still defended the public stands their commission and the GPCC had taken. They were proud of their public participation in recent struggles to win acceptance of several controversial issues: the state's death penalty was eliminated in 1961, school busing for the disadvantaged was adopted in 1964, GPCC members participated in the peace march on city hall, the grape boycott had been successful in 1968, etc. Both respondents claimed to have supported the liberal side of these issues on religious grounds. One woman respondent, who had held several offices of national importance in her conservative Baptist denomination, said that she gave her support to these GPCC liberal efforts, knowing that her church was not yet in accord with them.

According to the minutes of the GPCC's Board meetings, the Social Concerns Commission regularly submitted proposals for social issues to be considered, leading to proposed actions. This Commission began to play an increasingly important role in the activities of the GPCC from the time it was created in 1961. In the late 1960's, by far the majority of the business and actions of the GPCC were proposed by this same Commission to the Board of Directors. The Commission played a decisive
role in formulating the GPCC's major concerns and strong activity in social issues, many of which were politically controversial in the city and state. It is significant that this group of people within the structure of the GPCC was the source of the ideas and motivation which led to most of the GPCC's involvement in its socio-political activities during the sixties. All of the members of this committee, both laymen and clergy, were middle and upper-middle class, economically. With the possible exception of Bonthius, of the three respondents who had served on the Social Concerns Commission, none had previously taken any active part in social or political action types of programs--neither in other organizations, nor individually. Some other respondents thought that one or two of the women on the Commission had been somewhat active in the League of Women Voters. By and large, however, the members of the Commission were not normally activists, nor especially political activists. Yet, within the setting of the GPCC and the Social Concerns Commission, it appears that these church oriented, non-activist people have taken on new roles and new social action purposes.

The reason for the innovations in their roles and socio-political activities seemed obvious to me. The vast movement of secularization de-aliens, or removes religion's symbols, institutions and taboos from society, including their new roles. Through the GPCC, the strength of this liberal movement was being focused upon them as individuals and strengthened by the new group action of the GPCC. The question, however, that was beginning to force itself out of these innovations was why they could do these activities in their own locale without incurring negative reactions.
What part, then, did the GPCC's Social Concerns Commission play in bringing about the positive decision of the GPCC to sponsor the first CAP in Albina? Bonthius was important at this point, because he was close friends with several activists in the Albina, ad hoc Community Concerns Council during the two years of its existence before the GPCC's 1963 decision to go into Albina with its CAP. Bonthius had visited the Albina group's meetings, and he had become interested in having the GPCC help them get some kind of concrete social action program going. He furthered this cause by inviting his own Social Concerns Commission to visit the meetings of the Albina group. With this kind of convincing preparation, Bonthius and his Commission became a strong positive force in preparing the GPCC Board of Directors for their acceptance of the new CAP venture in Albina.

The fourth factor is the Executive Secretary of the GPCC, William Cate. He is an ordained Methodist minister and Ph.D. from Boston University, School of Theology. Over a period of several interviews and discussions, Cate mentioned more than once that he deliberately stayed out of the limelight of the GPCC's growing new programs. He felt it important that he work behind the scenes during the first few years of his office since 1959 at the GPCC. His method, he said, was to work through the GPCC's Commissions, the elected officers and Board of Directors, and let them take the center stage... and the credit. It was during this time that he was trying to convey his own personal concept of the goals the GPCC should be seeking. Cate said he had two main goals for the GPCC: (1) To get the ecumenical concept into the life and actions of individual congregations. (2) To get the individual congregations out of their own provincial "boxes" to become "involved" with their wider community.
Cate's proposed means to achieve these two goals was the application of social action, but the first goal would still remain ecumenics. Cate said he dealt with these two questions in his Ph.D. dissertation, "Practical and Theoretical Aspects of Ecumenical Communication." In summary, it is "church social action looking for a methodology." Cate said that the different CAP's, developed and now located in various geographical areas of the city by the GPCC, became the "method" which turned out to be the "key that unlocked the door" to his own basic goal-questions. In Portland, the CAP's became the method to both ecumenics and local involvement. Cate kept emphasizing the local congregations. He said, "The CAP's gave the means (method) to the congregations to help themselves to help their own communities together ..."

William Cate's great importance was as a "mid-wife" in the giving of birth to the new Church CAP's under the GPCC. However, as mentioned above, Cate's contribution was within the context of the interaction between sympathetic leaders and activists in the various leadership posts of the GPCC and church related groups, viz., Elizabeth Watson of the United Methodist Women, etc. Since he knew that he was dealing with an essentially conservative element of society, Cate said that he "went slow" and did not "push" these church people. Rather, he tried to communicate his views and encouragement for service in the GPCC to a relative few potential leaders, especially laymen. He found and cultivated those churchmen who were interested in both ecumenical work and social action. Then his method was to work with and through them, letting them become the center stage advocates in the GPCC for social action. Close associates of Cate agree that he worked for social action goals from the moment he arrived to take over his job at the GPCC. However, Cate readily
admitted that preceding the GPCC original decision to take on the first CAP in Albina, there were many other people, inside and out of the GPCC, who laid the foundation and worked for the Church's new Community Action Program. Cate gave special credit to the United Methodist Women of Oregon and the Albina Community Concerns Council, as well as many particular individuals. Yet, it was Cate himself who used his influence and the power of his executive position to guide local individuals onto the GPCC Board of Directors and onto key "elected" GPCC offices. (Please refer to Chapter 9 on organization, apathy and oligarchy in the GPCC.)

From the above account, it is evident William Cate was liberal in his own goals and practical application of the kind of work he wanted the GPCC to be doing as a portion of the "Church." On the other hand, three respondents--intimate but liberal friends of his--referred to Cate's very conservative background and that he demonstrated it in many ways through his administration of the GPCC. Cate was insistent on his defense of the institutional church and its structure, and he consistently demanded that the GPCC's social action be tied to the local traditional congregations. Cate himself made a point out of telling me that he was--and practiced--a moderate-conservative theology and view of the church. He said that he was raised in a very conservative Methodist family in a small, rural, southern Idaho town, and he attended a church-supported college, Willamette University, Salem, Oregon. Therefore, he admits, his emotional ties are to conservative economics and politics. However, intellectually, he changed and is committed to the liberal application of "the Christian social ethic to dislodge the ingrained social injustices." He emphasized that the people who are "casualties of society cannot speak for themselves ... because of their lack of power, and the
churches' social action must stand behind these people and give them a new dimension of their own power."

The fifth factor was a growing attitude, fostered by many of the larger, mainline Protestant theological seminaries, among these churches that they should be "involved" in the socio-economic problems of their local communities. This idea had been slowly filtering down to the laymen over the past two decades since World War II. The pastors of the more liberal denominations, therefore, have been more in the forefront of leading their congregations into social involvements. Significantly, the local congregations of these mainline, liberal denominations make up the bulk of the member congregations of the GPCC. The people from these congregations are the most active in the GPCC, and hold the key committee posts. It is important to note in connection with this factor that when the initial proposal was presented to the Board of Directors to become directly involved in social action work, no one of all those I interviewed could remember anyone else seriously opposing the GPCC's becoming the sponsor of the Albina community action program.

This chapter and those following through Chapter 8 are somewhat historio-graphical in reviewing those actual events most crucial to the birth and life of the GPCC's new commitment to social action. However, it is necessary to examine the "raw" historical evidence before interpreting it in terms of the hypothesis. The evidence presented attempts to expose the dialectic tension between the conservative and liberal forces within the GPCC, and thereby throw more sociological light upon the organization's radical transformation. In the later chapters, I propose that enough evidence focuses on "social insulation" to interpret it as the theoretical means by which the GPCC neutralized the conservatives'
negative reaction.
CHAPTER V

STIFLED REACTION IN THE FIRST
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

This chapter deals directly with two major controversies which developed in the original C-CAP in Albina. The first dispute was over C-CAP's 1968 Black Summer Crisis program. The second was the conservatives' strong criticism of the over-expenditure of funds for the Black Summer Crisis and the failure of their big funding campaign which shortly followed, the "Genesis Campaign." The chapter's purpose is to document both sides of the conservative--liberal interaction, which was represented in the two controversies. The question constantly asked here is: What was the quality and degree of the conservative reaction that C-CAP's activities stimulated, and how did the reaction affect their Community Action Program?

After Paul Schulze moved his family into the Albina area, he began to talk with as many black people as he was able to contact, especially all kinds of organizational and community leaders. Of course, the black churches, as well as the area's white congregations, were his primary contacts, at first. Schulze operated out of an Albina realtor's office, and used his phone for the first six months. Even though Schulze asked the local churches' cooperation, generally the black clergymen gave him and his project a cool reception. They were being threatened by an "outside" organization, a "white" organization, i.e., an organization the
blacks could not control. Schulze arranged several meetings with local church leaders to make contact and interest laymen. Two of my respondents told of how the black pastors responded to Schulze's presence by working harder than ever to develop their own kinds of evangelistic efforts to reach out into their own black constituency.

As mentioned before, there was already something of a base of support established in this community: the Albina Community Concerns Council. However, it was first organized by a white Baptist clergyman, and the group never did succeed in enlisting a popular support of black people, let alone black clergy. There were two or three black people who attended somewhat regularly, but by this time the group had met for two years without resulting in any kind of community actions. The main black pastor, T. X. Graham, who had taken a leading part in the "Commission," had recently been transferred to another town by his A.M.E. Church body. This ad hoc "Commission" was dwindling; yet, the small group had been in on the planning of the "N.E. Project" with the GPCC from the beginning. The new Project was achieving their goals anyway, so they were loyal and helpful to Schulze. It was out of this group that Schulze was able to obtain several people to begin a "steering committee" for their "Church-Community Action Program," as Schulze then renamed it.

Schulze and others reiterated that the "how" of the new program was left completely up to Schulze. There was no precedent or known program to follow for a church-backed social action effort. However, the GPCC and Schulze agreed upon some basic goals. First and most basically, the black people of Albina had no access to a platform from which they could speak and be taken seriously by the power structures of their own immediate (Albina area) community, city or state. C-CAP was to provide
this platform. The program was ultimately to be the black people's own program. Secondly and more practically, Schulze was to begin by identifying the more specific problems of the black community which could be dealt with by their kind of social action effort. Thirdly, Schulze was to enlist black individuals and churches into their project and give them a responsible part. Finally, Schulze was to organize some specific social action actions.

In dealing with the final goal, Schulze lost no time in recruiting help from the black neighborhood. Many respondents commented on Schulze's ability to identify with the black people, to understand them, to win their confidence, and most of all, to recruit able black people to work in his program. The first person Schulze recruited into the C-CAP work was a black woman, who worked at a menial job at the nearby hospital, but who soon proved to be a very capable teacher and able leader. In the Fall of 1964, with the help of the same woman, Mrs. Jessie Varner, Schulze started a pre-school program, free of charge, in a black Episcopal church basement. Soon their program was expanded to fill the education rooms of two other local black churches, a Methodist and a Baptist church. The program continued for two years. The second year, some federal authorities learned of their pre-school program, and asked Mrs. Varner to demonstrate their methods to teachers and the school board members. The federal education program wanted to begin a model Head Start Program in Oregon, and saw this C-CAP pre-school program as a ready-made effort. Consequently, their pre-school program was then taken over by the Head Start program.

About this same time in 1966, Mrs. Varner and Schulze decided to start a school for retarded children of low income families in the Albina
area. The C-CAP staff noted that many Albina low income families with retarded children had no access to training for their children. Mrs. Varner said that three and four college age Vista Volunteers worked for two full years with C-CAP's pre-school and school for the retarded. The C-CAP Children's School (for retarded) still operates with some trained teachers and a professional director in the basement of the Hughes Memorial Methodist Church in Albina.

For the first six months of her time with C-CAP, Mrs. Varner volunteered her time freely, but then Schulze hired her as the first staff person on C-CAP beside himself. Early in 1966, Schulze was able to get the Portland Juvenile Court to assign one of its black counselors to work full time with C-CAP in Albina, but his salary was paid by the court. The counselor, Mr. Frank Fair, was in his 20's and had a college degree. Schulze convinced the court that this man should be on the streets of Albina as a street worker. Schulze wanted to meet and counsel and develop a means of helping the black, "deviant" youth before they were apprehended and taken to court. Mr. Fair worked for three months at C-CAP under the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction. C-CAP then hired Fair as a full-time staff member to continue the "street ministry" which he had begun: This second C-CAP program, Operation Contact, had Mr. Fair on the streets, contacting the black, hard-core, high school drop-out youth. Schulze and Fair also devised a constructive side to their rehabilitation program with a small monetary profit to the youth. The first project was to cut up logs donated by a local church member, and sell this firewood to the local neighborhoods. Later, C-CAP obtained use of trucks, etc., for the youth to do local moving jobs and other odd jobs. From these jobs the first work-study courses emerged. Three or
four capable teachers were obtained, and courses were offered to the dropouts each half-day in basic high school studies: English, math, history, etc. Although taught in the C-CAP's own store-front facilities, after a few months of operation, the work-study courses were tied into the local high school. Some PSU seniors helped teach, and later two certified teachers from Jefferson High School were added to the staff. Full high school credit was given to the courses. The Operation Contact was renamed the Opportunity School, and still functions with seven certified teachers, counselors, and work administrators. Portland School District No. 1 now partially supports this specialized school at $20,000 per year. Most of their courses are now accredited high school courses, and it is a regular occurrence for Opportunity School (dropout) students to move back into one of the local high schools.

In the Summer of 1965, C-CAP staff members recalled that they had been aware of a growing, outspoken dissatisfaction in Albina. During this time, the black people were being especially affected by the lack of jobs due to the mild economic recession. With the summer came the extra free time without employment for black teenagers. Large numbers of these young people, as well as white teenagers, gathered in bunches on the streets and around hamburger stands. The city police were also becoming increasingly uneasy. What appeared to amplify the tension was the news of the riots in other large cities, Detroit (1967), and Newark (1967). The Watts riots were in 1965.

Schulze's awareness of the blacks' economic situation motivated him to speak with many black business men and leaders. Schulze became the prime organizer of the Albina Citizens' Committee, which appealed for a federally funded Title Four "War on Poverty" program for Albina. The
government made the grant to them, and out of this local Citizens' Commis-

tee came the administrative leaders for their own new agency. Schulze

and C-CAP had aided their Albina community's people to come up with

their own leaders and speak for themselves.

In the following Summer of 1966, the same economic and social ten-
sion remained in Albina. In response to this situation, the C-CAP staff
planned and organized a series of weekly summer dances on the "black-
top" of Irving Park. The dances were free and accompanied by live,
black bands in a park which is central to the Albina area. The dances
attracted large crowds, but were peaceful and considered successful in
providing a social and emotional outlet for the black youth. Both black
and white observers who were our respondents agreed that these dances
helped to defuse the situation that summer.

For C-CAP, however, there was a negative reaction. The black
churches were critical of C-CAP for sponsoring the Irving Park dances.
Because most of the local black churches are fundamentalistic and there-
fore very conservative, the black pastors could not understand how a
church-supported organization such as C-CAP could sponsor public dances.
The Irving Park dances confirmed the alienation of the black churches
from C-CAP.

Ever since Schulze had hired Frank Fair to be a permanent staff
member, the local black pastors were very critical of the fact that Mr.
Fair was not a church member. They pointed out to Schulze that this
person's non-church status demonstrated the further fact that C-CAP was
not really a "church centered" program. These conservative churchmen
said that Mr. Fair's work with the black youth would not be helpful to
the youth in ultimately bringing them back to the churches. The C-CAP's
staff workers should be church oriented if any of their programs were to be supported by the black churches. The black churchmen felt that the C-CAP goals were not the same as their "spiritual" church goals, but purely social and economic goals.

To offset this criticism and to begin to restore some grass-roots support of C-CAP, Schulze looked for and found a man who was a strong churchman, yet interested in working on the streets with youth and people outside of the churches. He hired Sam Johnson, who was in his 30's and the pastor of a small, black fundamentalist church. Johnson was working full time then as part of the Urban League staff in Albina, and he took care of his pastoral duties in his spare time. With his previous experience in the Urban League work, Johnson was hired to assist Frank Fair in the same programs in which Fair was involved: "the street ministry," counseling, Opportunity School, job placement, etc. The following spring, Johnson went out to attend a session of the Urban Training School of Chicago. When he returned at the beginning of the summer, all of the positions at the Opportunity School and C-CAP were filled. He soon found a job with the white Highland United Church of Christ, which hired him to conduct a summer recreation program that would be especially directed to reach the black youth in the area. Since this congregation's white pastor had recently left, the congregation hired Mr. Johnson temporarily to fill the pulpit. Johnson set up both a recreational and educational program, geared to the lower income, unchurched children. It attracted a large number of children, both black and white, throughout the summer. The congregation decided they would like to continue the program through the rest of the year. Johnson asked C-CAP and the GPCC for financial help. The GPCC allocated funds, and Johnson's continuing
program of education and recreation was renamed the Highland Center. So the Center then became part of the C-CAP program. Shortly thereafter, the congregation called Johnson to be their permanent pastor.

In the next couple of years, Johnson expanded the Highland Center's program to include adult education. Out of the sewing classes has come a small garment industry, now named "Highland Fashion Enterprises, Inc." The nationally known, locally based Jantzen Co. has given several of their large, reconditioned industrial sewing machines to the new garment company. Some of the city's large, downtown department stores market the young company's garments; the company has grown enough to rent its own building. Another small company, Highland Center Industries, was formed to sub-contract the packaging of specialized electronic equipment for another large, local company, Tektronics, Inc. The Highland Center Industries employs seven men and women, and rents its own separate building. On a different level, the Highland Center has maintained a large house with "foster parents" for boys under 18, who are delinquent or wards of the court. By 1972 eight youth had completed their probation ("rehabilitation") through the Highland Boys' Home, and regularly there are about six who are in residence. In a parallel work under the Center's administration, a second home for 18 to 22 year olds now operates on a completely self-sufficient basis. It is called the Highland Young Men's Home, and its residents are in job retraining or school. The Highland Center's widely varied program now provides some strongly established social actions for the Albina black people.

In 1966 the Executive Secretary of the GPCC spent the summer touring Europe and the Holy Land. During this time, Schulze, in consultation with Robert Menzel, a college instructor and clergyman, laid the plans
for two "spin-off" CAP programs in different geographical parts of the city. They were later organized and called East-CAP and Hub-CAP. When the GPCC Executive, Dr. William Cate, returned to the city, he heartily approved of the plans for the new action programs under the GPCC, and he promised to support the work to organize them through the GPCC. Schulze helped the local churches in each of the two areas get their steering committees working and helped organize the two new CAP's. Following, in agreement with C-CAP, each of the two new CAP's purchased some of Schulze's time, and he split his time three ways, directing the two new CAP's in their first months of programing. In the next couple of years, more church-CAP's were added, under the GPCC's guidance. Now there are seven CAP's in the larger city area, started under the GPCC.

On January 1, 1968, the Portland City Council hired Paul Schulze to be the first director of Portland's new, federally funded Model Cities Program. Since Schulze had been splitting his time with some other CAP's, the black C-CAP staff members were given partial administrative responsibilities. With Schulze's recommendation, the GPCC's Board of Directors chose Mrs. Jessie Varner to be the new C-CAP director. C-CAP had its first black leader. (With the difficulties in America's predominance of matriarchial black families, this decision portended some later problems.) Then two months later, the GPCC's Board hired Mr. Robert Nelson to be Mrs. Varner's assistant. Mrs. Varner said she soon found out that Mr. Nelson's salary was $300 a month more than hers, even though Nelson was her "assistant." She said she never mentioned it to Dr. Cate, nor to anyone at the GPCC, but she always understood the implications. A white person was needed to watch over the real problems of C-CAP's administration. After Mrs. Varner resigned a year later,
neither C-CAP nor the GPCC was able to recruit a male, black director for C-CAP. Mr. Nelson became the "interim director" after Mrs. Varner resigned in February, 1969, and he still holds that post. Although Mr. Nelson is white, he is strongly committed to the black people, to understand their culture, to work for them, but, as he says, "not be paternalistic." Ironically, Mr. Nelson was a real estate dealer in Albina, but he was also one of the original members of the "Albina Community Concerns Council" and the original C-CAP Board of Directors.

On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King was assassinated. This event was the trigger to set in motion the GPCC and C-CAP to attempt a special summer program for Albina's black people. William Cate, head of the GPCC, was strongly convinced that King's assassination would likely precipitate some violent black reactions in Portland. On the other hand, Cate also saw the effect of King's violent death as the opportunity to capitalize on building an energetic C-CAP summer program for Albina. The GPCC leaders sensed there was a lot of "white guilt" in the wake of King's assassination, and therein might be enough momentum to motivate a large funding campaign for C-CAP's special summer work, if not for the whole GPCC's budget.

The proposed Albina summer program was tabbed the "Black Summer Crisis" program. Cate and the C-CAP staff decided they should have a special leader for the Crisis program, who would be able to communicate with the more militant and revolutionary blacks. Mr. Colden Brown, originally from New York and then a student at Reed College, was known to be a mild revolutionary. Mr. Brown had given some lectures at the C-CAP Opportunity School, and Schulze and Cate felt that Brown was an unusually capable leader, but moderate enough to lead their proposed
Brown consented to take the job, but Scholze and Cate had to make more than one persuasive presentation on Brown's behalf before the GPCC's Board approved Mr. Brown as the special director of the Black Summer Crisis. Brown was hired that spring.

In the following months, an extensive campaign of speakers from C-CAP and the GPCC, led by Cate, Schulze, and Brown, went to all the community organizations and churches which would listen to their pleas for the "Summer Crisis" funds. One respondent described Brown as a master at building fear and apprehension in his white audiences and then reassuring them he would be able to handle the "Black Crisis." On one day during that campaign, Brown and some cohorts walked through the downtown and college area park blocks with guns on their shoulders. Brown succeeded in making the white "establishment" uneasy, and, in effect, stimulated awareness of the "crisis" and the need for a "Black Crisis" program. Brown was an excellent speaker, and his efforts obtained cash gifts. In the next few months, about $48,000 poured into the GPCC's Black Summer Crisis fund from churches, individuals, businesses and groups. The national publicity of King's assassination and the sympathetic feelings throughout the country had, in a way, "paid off."

That Summer of 1968, the "program" which Colden Brown conducted for the Black Summer Crisis was not well coordinated, but a loosely related series of classes and black cultural demonstrations and entertainment. One young black junior high school teacher, Paul Dixon, did not like Colden Brown and what appeared to him as Brown's arrogance. However, after working on the Crisis program with Brown, Dixon said, "I found out I was black." Dixon came to respect his own black cultural heritage. Dixon was thus motivated to teach a summer-long course on
handicraft and its black cultural roots to grade schoolers in the Iris Court housing development. Also a recognized local black artist, Issac (Allen) Nomo, taught some adult art classes. Many other black culture courses were taught, which included black history, literature, art and accomplishments in science. Two day long "Black Festivals" during the summer presented plays, art and dances, and attracted much of the Albina community. Mrs. Varner, then head of C-CAP, said that before then the black people of Albina had not even talked about being black, nor wanted to be black. It was just not discussed, because the assumption was that trying to be "white" was better. Mrs. Varner said, "Colden Brown at least taught us to begin having some self-respect."

As far as the GPCC was concerned, the result of the Black Summer in Albina was a different story. Although he worked out of the C-CAP office, Colden Brown soon found out that the purse strings to C-CAP and the Black Summer Crisis were held by William Cate at the GPCC's office. So whenever Brown wanted to add on another member to the Summer Crisis staff, rent a building, purchase more materials, etc., Brown would drive across the river to the GPCC office and obtain the money from Cate. Mrs. Varner commented that Brown built the paid staff for the Black Crisis program into fifteen people, besides the regular C-CAP staff. Several other respondents confirmed this fact. By the end of the summer, most of the $48,000 given to the GPCC in earlier months had been expended by the Summer Crisis program. By that winter (January, 1969) most of the money in the overall joint CAP's accounts was exhausted. Consequently, the GPCC's Board of Directors became angry at C-CAP in Albina for its wholesale use of, what many Board members considered, a nice nest egg. Several respondents, both inside and outside Albina, said that
the GPCC was disturbed because they thought Colden Brown's Summer Crisis and its lavish spending had not accomplished any significant goals. The stated purpose of the Crisis program, when sold to the GPCC, churches, etc., was to avert "trouble and violence" in Albina. The Crisis program was to keep the black community "cool." The result was successful by this standard. There had not been the slightest black provocation of incidents, nor violence. Yet, many church people felt that there was a gross misuse of funds, because they could not see anything accomplished at the end of the summer. Some (white) people in the GPCC Board openly doubted if there really had been any threat of black militancy or trouble. Other respondents have said that Colden Brown's program may have succeeded "too well."

The further reaction in the GPCC's Board of Directors resulted in its vigorous demands for a more concise and consistent accounting of the joint CAP's money each month--and how each CAP spends its money. In retaliation at the following GPCC Board meeting, Mr. Nelson, then interim director of C-CAP, got up and asked if the GPCC was now going to "run" C-CAP. Following this experience, the GPCC's Board soon decided to devise a whole new method of allocating and spending funds given and designated for the different CAP's programs.

Certainly this was a documentable internal "reaction" to the C-CAP "Summer Crisis" effort for the people of Albina, and indirectly, for the people of Portland. However, this limited reaction to C-CAP's use of finances was not a conservative negativism against the social actions program, per se. There is inconclusive evidence in five of the respondents' statements, who were, or still are, on the GPCC's Board, that they have some real misgivings about the validity of C-CAP's social actions
for the black people in Albina. Out of 24 respondents who were actual
GPCC Board members, however, only two respondents outwardly stated such
misgivings. Apparently the GPCC's real criticism was directed at
C-CAP's liberal use of funds, not at its over-zealous social action
efforts. Many (eight) respondents of the GPCC Board mentioned this
concern about the glibness of the printed--and lack of printed--
financial reports for the CAP's fiscal accounting at the GPCC's regular
Board meetings. Several respondents openly questioned Cate's extremely
free use of the money allowed Summer Crisis programs at C-CAP and Hub-
CAP. Yet, they hastened to say, they did not question or imply Cate's
own use, or misuse, of funds.

An Analysis of C-CAP Activities

In the foregoing pages, some of the major C-CAP activities in the
Albina area are recounted. There were some conservative reverberations
throughout the city in response to these "church sponsored" action pro-
grams, but the unexpected result of the more daring programs was a
minimal amount of reaction from the GPCC's member churches themselves.
The efforts of Paul Schulze and his black staff members were "liberal"
in that the C-CAP programs were not designed to uphold white, middle-
class, or Protestant ethic values.

An important aspect of the C-CAP educational programs and job find-
ing service was its effort to provide these services "free" of charge to
the Albina people. One pastor, who had been an officer of the GPCC's
Board, but had dropped out of the GPCC membership, complained about
Schulze's appearance at the church-sponsored hospital, which lies within
the black Albina area. Schulze had come to the hospital's governing
board meeting in 1967 to "demand" that the hospital hire forty black people as a fair representative proportion of their working force. The pastor referred to the former C-CAP leader as a "rabble rouser" for acting in this and other offensive manners. The respondent did not like a church-sponsored organization placing economic pressures upon any part of society, let alone a church-sponsored hospital. The same pastor also said that black people should be hired on their merits to hold a job, "just like everyone else." The pastor was, therefore, complaining about C-CAP fostering in its black constituency a "something for nothing" attitude.

Another respondent, who is a business man and still a GPCC Board member, criticized the C-CAP program on similar grounds. He said that the C-CAP treatment of the black people has often given them too much. He said, "C-CAP and the other CAP's are directed toward poverty, and we should help these people get jobs. But we shouldn't give things to them free. . . . Other cultures have family ties, but Negroes don't. They don't have self-pride." This respondent thought that the Black Summer Crisis program and some of C-CAP's other "give-away" projects to the blacks had caused a negative reaction in the GPCC. He said, "Paul Schulze was and still is out of touch with the GPCC. They (GPCC members) don't want the tired, welfare-style of over-involvement with poverty problems. We don't want to keep giving everything free to these people."

Both of the above GPCC respondents have reacted conservatively to the C-CAP methods. Their criticism is based on the familiar Protestant ethic--laissez faire theme: When everyone has a free and equal chance to education and to buy, sell and own property, as opposed to birth into feudal slavery, then work and the individual industry of each person
will lead to the good of all. The free enterprise system and honest work lead to wonderful rewards, as concluded in Ben Franklin's words: "Early to bed and early to rise/Make a man healthy, wealthy and wise . . ."

Two other respondents expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the C-CAP work, along with the above two criticisms. Consequently, four out of 33 respondents (interviewed up to this point) gave critical or conservative reactions to C-CAP. Approximately one-eighth of the interviewed sample is not a significant amount of conservativism within the GPCC itself.

However, the GPCC did record a definite, specialized, internal reaction to the executive leaders' "lavish" use of the special fund of about $48,000, collected specifically for the Summer Crisis programs in 1968. (This reaction is discussed extensively in Chapters 7 and 9.) But a few conservative GPCC Board members carried their criticisms further, saying that the 1968 Summer Crisis had not achieved any visible goals at the end of the summer. The leaders' stated goal of the Crisis program was to keep the black community "cool" (peaceful) in the wake of Martin Luther King's assassination. Cate and other GPCC leaders maintained that the Black Summer Crisis had successfully fulfilled its goal of preventing any racially motivated riots with destructive violence reminiscent of Watts, Detroit. Because of the invisibility of accomplishing this goal after the summer was over, the GPCC was not able to appreciate in "hind-sight" what the large expenditures for the Summer Crisis had purchased.

The man who had become treasurer of the GPCC during the Summer Crisis reacted very negatively to the manner in which the GPCC Executive Director had permitted C-CAP and the Crisis program to tap freely the
CAP's funds. This respondent, the treasurer, is an insurance executive, which is reflected in his demand for a precise accounting. He said there was no realistic budget submitted by C-CAP, nor by the other CAP's. But he placed the blame on the Executive Director, as much as on C-CAP, because, he said, the Director had used his complete authority to delegate the monies without restraint. "The end was used to justify the means," he said. Apparently many members of the GPCC's Board were uneasy about the vague financial reports given out at meetings during this time. Several of the respondents mentioned this fact. The GPCC treasurer said that the Board members saw, finally, that C-CAP had greatly over-used its account during and following the Summer Crisis. He, therefore, thought there was at that time a definite loss of respect for C-CAP by many on the GPCC's Board and other groups which give regular financial support. However, I think that the reason the treasurer included monetary givers among those reacting against Summer Crisis programs was due to the fact that at the time I was interviewing the then former treasurer, Mr. Lowell Steen, he was looking back at events with the benefit of seeing the failure of the funding campaign, the "Genesis Campaign," which had followed in 1969. If the conclusion of the majority of knowledgeable respondents is right, the Summer Crisis programs and associated events did not have a dominant effect on the failure of that campaign. It was due more to other factors. (See Chapter 9 for further discussion.)

From several other respondents who had served on the GPCC Board during the Summer Crisis, they gave evidence of a growing dissatisfaction specifically with the excessively free use of finances by C-CAP and Colden Brown for the Black Summer Crisis projects. Also, it must be
admitted that although the GPCC hired a professional fund-raising company to lead the Genesis Campaign, by the end of 1969, the Campaign had gathered pledges and gifts totalling only $46,500 out of an expected goal of $250,000. However, since then, executive staff members have maintained that the regular, committed supporters of the GPCC—churches, denominations, groups, individuals, businesses, etc.—have continued their monetary support, and some had increased their regular giving in 1969.

The former treasurer, Lowell Steen, based his judgment that there was a definite reaction against the GPCC upon the failure of the Genesis Campaign. Yet, only three other respondents gave similar views about the meaning of the Genesis Campaign. As the researcher, I was personally very anxious to find as "hard" evidence as possible to support reasons on either side of the question—why the funding campaign had failed. Was its failure an authentic sign of strong negative reaction against the GPCC's program in the preceding Black Summer Crisis and its "irresponsible" use of money? Eleven respondents, three of them very conservative, gave specific, positive answers to my question about the meaning of the Genesis Campaign's failure. They all agreed that its failure was not the result of a significant reaction. The most common answer given was that the professional funding company, Campaigns West, had told the leaders of the GPCC that the great untapped reservoir of money in the city for the GPCC was the large, big businesses, represented in downtown Portland. When the results were in, no new large big businesses or companies pledged any significant amount of money to the campaign. In other words, the professional funders had directed the campaign at the wrong clientele, and they were unacquainted with the realities of church giving, according
to the same respondents. (Immediately following this campaign, the funding company collapsed, declaring bankruptcy. At the same time, the company accused the GPCC of refusing to reimburse it adequately for services rendered, and sued the GPCC. Later, a compromise settlement for a small amount of money was made out of court.) Along with this reason, the same respondents described the professional funding company as having done a very minimal job of organizing the campaign, "expecting the printing of the one brochure of propaganda about the GPCC's good social services to work magic among the business people" (prospective givers). Other reasons given for the non-reaction theory about lack of contributions include: the special funding campaign (for same essential purpose) of the previous summer had preceded too closely to the Genesis Campaign, and the recent economic recession had cut the margin of gratuities from downtown businesses.

In both the disputes about the Black Summer Crisis program itself and the financial criticisms associated with the over-spending for the Crisis program together with failure of the Genesis funding campaign, the overall conservative reaction recorded from the interviewees was very minimal. Three points stand out: (1) Although several respondents were articulate in their strong criticisms of the C-CAP program, especially the Black Summer Crisis, the majority (66 percent) were quite complimentary of the C-CAP's total effort. (2) There was a relatively small proportion of respondents (20 percent) who reacted negatively to C-CAP's excessive use of finances for the Crisis program. (3) The question arises more sharply: Why is there a minimal conservative reaction over these unusually controversial activities in the GPCC?
CHAPTER VI
A ONE MAN REACTION

Early in 1965 a lay member of the Board of Directors became very unhappy with the GPCC's liberal policies and how they were arrived at. Soon he made two proposals for serious changes, specifically directed at cancelling new policies and practices of the GPCC's leaders. First, he challenged the very validity of their social involvement policies. Second, he challenged the organizational methods used to obtain controversial policy decisions. As described below, this challenge was concentrated in the vigor and influence of one man. Considering the general acceptance of the leaders' increasing liberal changes in the organization, why was one man able to lead such a significant conservative rebellion against the new values and practices? More important, why was this religious group rejecting traditional conservative values? On the first point, the events reveal that the essential nature of the "elected" Board of Directors and its officers was cast into a liberal majority by 1965. The second part of the events demonstrates that the leaders used an oligarchic method to by-pass normal procedures for policy decision making. However, we find the liberal leaders do overcome this aggressive conservative challenge, initiated from within by members of the organization. Because it firmly determined the liberal course of the GPCC's future, the successful defeat of the primary part of the conservative challenges was an enormous turning point for the GPCC. The liberal leaders won the essential part of the overall battle.
Paul Schulze called it a "one man tour de force." The series of events which led to this "showdown" revolved around a powerful, Presbyterian layman, Mr. Robert Pamplin. He is the executive president and chairman of the board of the Georgia-Pacific Co., one of the largest lumber and paper companies in the United States. Cate knew of Pamplin's conservative leaning, but did not realize how strong his religious conservatism was. Cate told how Pamplin was invited to become active in the GPCC. Paul Wright, Pamplin's pastor at the prestigious, downtown First Presbyterian Church, together with Cate went to see Pamplin in 1963 to ask him to head a financing campaign for the proposed Inter-Church Center building. Their plans for the building were not small. It would house offices for the GPCC, the Oregon Council of Churches, rentable office space to several other church groups, various sized meeting rooms, visual aids rooms, etc. Pamplin consented to be chairman of the building campaign. For his work, Cate heaped praises upon Pamplin. Cate said, "We knew of his unusual executive ability, and he certainly exhibited it during that campaign. With typical efficiency, Mr. Pamplin carried out the job with great dispatch." He also contributed a large sum of his own money to the new building, and now the building's largest meeting room carries his name, The Pamplin Room. The next year Pamplin was elected to the GPCC's Board of Directors.

Early in 1965 during Oregon's biennial legislative session, the legislature was considering a bill to remove capital punishment from the state's penal code. The GPCC's Social Concerns Commission prepared a strong "position paper" against the death penalty and in support of the bill. Without sending it to the Board of Directors, it was adopted as GPCC policy by the Executive Committee. Stating this GPCC position,
letters were sent and Social Concerns Committee members actively lobbied members of the legislature at the state house for passage of the bill. When Pamplin found out how the position paper was established as policy for the whole GPCC by action of the small Executive Committee, he became very upset.

The legislature did pass the bill to repeal capital punishment that year, and the GPCC received a good share of the credit for its passage. Robert Pamplin, however, was unalterably opposed to the GPCC having anything to do with the passage or defeat of this, or any, legislative bill.

Shortly thereafter, another bill was introduced in the legislature that would increase the quality of education in those public schools situated in depressed and poverty areas. Its purpose was to rectify the racial, as well as economic, inequities steadily multiplying in Portland. Portland's Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Barnes, had chaired the committee which drew up the bill, recommending over one million dollars for enactment of the "compensatory" education. Although the GPCC's Social Concerns Committee agreed that the bill, HB 1307, was good in its intent, it was much too soft on racial equality in cultural education—music, art, drama, etc. The bill plainly did not have any safeguard to provide "equal" educational opportunities for black children. The bill did not go far enough. It could easily circumvent the inequities to the black children. The GPCC's group felt that HB 1307 did not live up to the guidelines set down in the previous year's extensive study on equal education in Portland. A special committee, appointed by Multnomah School District No. 1 (Portland), and chaired by Judge Herbert Schwab, specifically reported that Portland's black and white children
living in the poorer areas were receiving the use of inferior educational facilities and inferior education generally. The "Schwab Report" strongly recommended that children in the depressed areas have the quality of their education raised to be equal with that of the suburban schools. More specifically, the Report outlines some new, effective desegregation policies to be implemented in Portland schools to insure equal educational opportunities. When the Schwab Report was revealed the year before, the GPCC had highly endorsed it.

The Social Concerns Committee again chose the same route to obtain support for its recommendation that the GPCC be opposed to HB 1307's insufficient "equal" education. Instead of submitting their recommendation to the Board of Directors to oppose HB 1307, the Social Concerns Committee gave it to the Executive Committee, which quickly adopted it—on behalf of the GPCC. The Executive Committee's adoption also included that GPCC members would actively lobby the legislature against the bill.

Pamplin told this researcher that he received a phone call from a legislator at that time. The legislator had received a letter from the GPCC, with Pamplin's name on the letterhead as a GPCC Board member. The legislator wanted to know if Pamplin supported the letter's criticism of the inequities in HB 1307's compensatory education. Since the GPCC's Board had never made any policy decisions about the bill, and especially because he, himself, did not believe the GPCC should be involved with trying to influence the passage of the bill one way or the other, he became incensed about the issue. Pamplin then began a campaign in the GPCC's Board of Directors against the Executive Committee's policy decision about the bill, and he also attacked the very right of the Executive
Committee to speak for the GPCC without the Board's own consideration and vote on an issue. In this first round, Pamplin won. On March 10, 1965, the Board voted to reverse the Executive Committee's decision, and not oppose HB 1307.

The center of this dispute over HB 1307 climaxed at a special meeting of the Board of Directors, which Cate called at the request of Robert Bonthius, Social Concerns Commission chairman. Pamplin said that he received a phoned message in the morning, notifying him of the special meeting to reconsider HB 1307 that same evening at the African Methodist Episcopal Church in Albina. Pamplin said that he thought that "something was up" for this hastily called meeting, so he broke his appointment for the evening to attend the special Board meeting. He also immediately phoned Dr. Melvin Barnes, Portland Superintendent of Schools, and Dr. Martha Shauil, a city school administrator, to be present at the meeting to defend the bill as written. As he expected, Pamplin continued, the special meeting was packed with black "preachers" and others against the bill, whom Bonthius had invited.

According to Father Robert Greenfield, Oxonian Ph.D., several clergy spoke very harshly against the arguments of Pamplin and others supporting the bill as it stood. However, he said, the Rev. John Jackson, a black pastor, gave a rational and very effective speech against the bill. Greenfield added, "The tension (at the meeting) became terrific. Most of the opposition tuned out Pamplin and his guests." Similarly, Pamplin said that both the black and white clergy acted badly, and did not want to listen to their arguments. The main issue boiled down to whether there should be funds for busing of students, both black and white, to make for "equal education" in this Model School program. The
black pastors' position was that HB 1307 was only tokenism, and it was better not to have the bill at all unless real steps were taken toward desegregation in the schools. Greenfield said that he was for the bill, because the legislature was then anti-education anyway. He wanted to get what they could as a beginning effort to help the disadvantaged schools. Greenfield felt it was "a foot in the door" for more educational benefits for the disadvantaged later on.

The vote by the Board members at the end of the meeting was close, but Bonthius and his Commission had swung enough votes to reverse again the previous decision of the Board. This time, however, they voted to work for the amendment of the bill, trying to keep the funding intact for the disadvantaged area schools. They voted to lobby for three kinds of provisions for more equal education (instead of "compensatory" education): (1) busing of black children from schools where blacks outnumbered whites by more than 50 percent to other schools, (2) the exchange of teachers, especially for cultural type of courses (music, art, etc.), which were not offered in the populated black schools, and (3) the changing of school boundaries to reduce the black student concentrations.

Clay Myers was on the GPCC Board and present at the meeting at the AME Church in Albina that evening. He told the writer that he and other Board and staff members personally and quietly began to contact legislators, urging them to include in HB 1307 several provisions (suggested at that heated Board meeting) which would insure greater equality of public education--busing of children for special courses at other schools, exchange or adding on specialized instructors, and the changing of school boundaries. When HB 1307 was passed in May, it included the first two provisions, along with implementing funds of $1,750,000 over the following
two years.

The action of the Board and the amendments of HB 1307 were a double defeat for Pamplin. However, he soon was mounting a broad attack upon the whole general policy of the GPCC's direct involvement with secular society, politics and business. Pamplin criticized the undemocratic method of the Social Concerns Commission in its by-passing the Board of Directors to get quick "rubber stamp" decisions from the exclusive Executive Committee. He said that no policy statements or position papers should be issued in the name of the GPCC without the consideration and vote of the full Board of Directors. Policy statements should not come out of hastily called, unrepresentative meetings.

The second prong to Pamplin's attack was the fundamental propriety of the GPCC's involvement with the secular, socio-political world. Pamplin's heritage was in the southern Presbyterian Church—in the fundamentalist tradition of the church's southern, conservative wing. Pamplin told the writer that neither a clergyman nor anyone else who claims to speak for a church organization has the right to take a position before the public on political, or any secular issues, because those fields are outside of the church's spiritual competency. "Churches," he said, "should only speak to those issues which are clearly spiritual or moral problems. Clergymen are not competent in the specialized responsibilities of government." When the GPCC was trying directly to influence the legislature, it was, to Pamplin, a violation of the principle of separation between church and state. In a formal proposal to the Board of Directors, Pamplin asked that: (1) no policy statements be made in the name of the GPCC without a fully representative meeting of the Board of Directors; (2) the GPCC remove itself from all social and political issues,
except in clear religious and moral problems.

Because Pamplin is such a powerful person, his proposal represented a major challenge to the social action goals toward which the new leadership was turning the GPCC. To make an independent study of both points in Pamplin's proposal, the Board of Directors appointed a special blue ribbon committee, as Cate referred to it. It consisted of about ten outstanding local laymen and clergy, chaired by Clay Myers, presently Oregon's Secretary of State.

Early in the legislative session that year, 1965, Pamplin and a few other church laymen, whom I have been unable to identify, had already begun vocally to criticize the GPCC's Social Concerns Committee's lobbying activities at the State Legislature concerning other current legislation. In defense, the Social Concerns Committee, led by Bonthius, mimeographed a five page, carefully worded defense of the principles upon which the Church and GPCC carried on its activities toward the legislative process. The Study Committee was instructed to examine this statement, as well as all the political and social statements issued by the Social Concerns Committee. It was to look at the whole principle behind the GPCC's relationships with social and political life, and then submit its recommendations to the GPCC in answer to Pamplin's double proposal.

After deliberating through the Summer of 1965, the Study Committee mailed its one page recommendation to the Board of Directors. On September 5, 1965, a public panel debate about the Pamplin proposal and the Study Committee's recommendations was held at the downtown First Christian Church. On the platform representing the two sides of the question were Pamplin and two colleagues, opposed by Bonthius and his two colleagues. On September 8, at the Board of Directors' regular meet-
ing, the Study Committee's recommendations were adopted in total, except for changes of a few clarifying words. Consequently, the Study Committee and the Board disagreed with Pamplin on what the GPCC's leadership knew was the crucial issue—whether the GPCC had a "right" to speak to public social issues, or not. The recommendation states that the GPCC should "speak to our member churches and to the public about the Christian implications of contemporary social, economic and political issues." On Pamplin's second point, the Committee's statement agrees that the GPCC's former procedures must be reformed, and lays out four specific points of procedure.

Myers said he thoroughly agreed with Pamplin's second criticism. The GPCC's procedure of by-passing the Board and having short notice special meetings were methods that did not allow both sides of policy questions a fair hearing. It was unrepresentative and undemocratic. Myers wanted this practice changed to insure future representative discussion within the Board. During the Committee's hearings, as chairman, Myers said that he made special effort, as chairman, to have the Committee hear people representing both sides—from both within the GPCC and from without. Myers did not want the unrepresentative manner in which the GPCC had previously developed policies to be repeated by the Study Committee. He said, "Both the 'Pamlins' and the 'Bonthiuses' must be heard and not alienated; it was an extremely sensitive thing to decide."

After hearing everyone out, Myers said he told the Committee: "The Church is not going to be what you or I say it is going to be, but it is going to continue being and acting relevantly to its society... The church has always spoken to current social issues, and it will continue to speak out."

Myers emphasized that his Committee was "substantially" in favor of the
policy recommendations they submitted to the Board.

When asked about how the GPCC responded to his requests for policy changes, Pamplin answered, "We reached a compromise on those proposals I made to the Board." Although the adopted Study Committee report was a compromise, the crucial issue at stake—whether the GPCC was to be directly involved in its own society—was decided favorably on the side of the progressives and against Pamplin. After the Board adopted the report, Pamplin attended only one or two meetings, and submitted his resignation prior to the annual meeting. Through this series of challenges, debates and decision, the GPCC affirmed its new, liberal direction, and at the same time, eliminated Pamplin's conservative influence from within the Board of Directors.

Robert Pamplin's reaction against the GPCC's efforts to influence the legislative powers of government apparently is a classic example of the conservative opinion held by the "silent majority" in mainline Protestant churches. Testifying to the majority attitude of present church members against their churches' and their leaders' active involvement with socio-political issues are two national polls and several other studies, quoted in Chapter 10. What is not typical of Pamplin's reaction within the GPCC is that he reacted overtly almost single handedly. He had a relatively small amount of support from within the GPCC's Board, and ultimately the Board defeated his most important proposal—to return the GPCC to conservative uninvolvevement.

From the Pamplin episode, it appears that the opinion of the GPCC's Board members did not coincide with the national majority of lay church members. If this were true of the selected Board members here, was it also true of the GPCC's member churches and their majority of lay
members? From the way the Board of Directors finally handled the Pamplin challenge, the evidence seems to indicate that the people on this Board are untypical in relation to the organization's general membership. If this is also true, how to explain the liberal attitude expressed in the vote by the Board of Directors?

Knowing the procedures used by the GPCC's leaders to push through quick policy decisions, the same leaders may have used oligarchic methods to predetermine somewhat the climate of opinion within the Board. This possibility will be further investigated in Chapter 9.

In the continuing conflict between conservative members and the liberal leaders' efforts to reform the GPCC into a socio-political activist organization, the liberals demonstrated the ability to overcome strong opposition from conservative lay members with high social status and economic power. The liberals' crucial victory (1965) discussed above was undoubtedly the turning point, which allowed the leaders ultimately to guide the GPCC into changing its formal statement of purpose in the new (1969) constitution to include social action.

With powerful leadership supplied them by Robert Pamplin, however, why were the conservatives in the GPCC soundly defeated on this far-reaching issue? It is more and more evident that the large percentage of lay conservatives in the member churches have little influence or communication with the GPCC's policy makers.
CHAPTER VII

HUB-CAP: DOWNTOWN INVOLVEMENT

AND PUBLIC REACTION

Hub-CAP's Youth Ministry-Charix Coffee House worked with runaways and those in the drug culture in S. W. downtown Portland. This activity stimulated a greater amount of public reaction than any other single GPCC action program. Yet, there was a relatively minor reaction from the GPCC's own member churches. Since churches tend to be one of the most conservative groups in society, this evidence defies the general social pattern. Why had the GPCC's churches reacted so mildly in the face of strong public reaction? This chapter explores the facts of the discrepancy.

Hub-CAP, the second of the GPCC's community action programs to be started, had its real beginning in the initial action taken by the strong, downtown First Presbyterian Church. In the Spring of 1966, this congregation's Session (Board of Directors) decided they should finally take action to meet the pressing downtown social problems, which they had discussed during many previous meetings. The pastor of the church said they were motivated by their growing awareness that their own church should be "involved in the mission to the world immediately around them." Their Session called a special meeting of the congregation to consider what and how much social action the congregation should take on. They started the meeting by listening to the presentations of several community authorities on the needs of the downtown area. So large were the problems
presented that the congregation decided that they should begin the tasks, but that the social actions needed were too great for one congregation to undertake alone. Shortly, the First Presbyterian invited seventeen downtown congregations, including a Roman Catholic Church, to participate in an experimental community action program to the Southwest downtown section of Portland.

Of the seventeen churches invited, six congregations joined together to take the first steps toward real social action. In order to narrow down the important social problems of the inner city within the purview of these congregations, and to discover which problems they could adequately handle, the congregations started a laymen's volunteer listening ministry. It was to last six months, after which the cooperating churches would decide whether to continue their work. Their "listening" convinced the six churches that there were, indeed, some urgent needs for their social action, as a group. The pastor of First Presbyterian listed the "needs" they discovered most demanding: the "homeless" men on skid row; many elderly people living in the area, often in poverty; runaway children and youth; inadequate child care; inadequate education and inadequate recreation for all ages.

During this time of assessment and "listening," Paul Wright, the First Presbyterian pastor, constantly consulted with Paul Schulze. Wright and Schulze had become close friends since the time Schulze was hired to initiate the GPCC's social action project in Albina. Soon after C-CAP began, Wright and Schulze began discussing the needs and possibilities of a similar CAP in the Southwest downtown area (where Wright's church is). Wright said that he had long been convinced of the "social Gospel" and that the churches should apply it. He had been a leader in the GPCC for
many years, serving as president of the GPCC during the 1950's and 1960's. Wright was an early backer of the idea that the GPCC should begin a community action program in Albina, and was most instrumental in obtaining the Presbyterians' first grant of $10,000 for C-CAP.

Although the GPCC's Executive Secretary, William Cate, was on an extended vacation in Europe during the Summer of 1966, Schulze was writing out plans for more church-CAP's possible to operate in other problem areas of the city. The downtown churches' initiative for such a CAP in their own area provided Schulze and those churches an excellent opportunity to coordinate their plans. Many of the respondents who spoke of Schulze concurred on one of his many abilities as being a "dreamer," an "originator," of ideas about methods for churches' social involvement. According to Schulze's close friend, Robert Menzel, he and Schulze worked out the final details in writing (on Schulze's front room coffee table) of the organization for two new church-CAP's during that summer. One was to be the new downtown CAP and the other was to be in the old Southeast business district. The downtown churches involved agreed that their own social action project be under the administrative wing of the GPCC. It was soon called Hub-CAP. Upon returning from Europe, William Cate fully supported Schulze's plans for the two new CAP's to be incorporated into the GPCC's "sponsorship" of community action work. The GPCC's Board of Directors soon adopted with little opposition the proposal for adding two new CAP's to the GPCC. In the Fall of 1966, Robert Menzel was appointed to be the head of Hub-CAP, effective June, 1967. At that time, Menzel was an instructor in a small, private college and a Lutheran clergyman.

The new Hub-CAP began to develop as an organization with several specific programs for its own area. Although Menzel was still teaching,
both he and Schulze, Pastor Wright and some interested laymen of downtown churches gave much time to help organize the new project. From 1966 through 1969, Hub-CAP developed a variety of social action services to its own inner city environment: several programs for children, one for elderly, one for the "homeless" men on skid row, a divorce counseling program and the best known of all Hub-CAP services--the downtown Street Youth Ministry and the Charix Coffee House for youth.

Two separate children's programs, called the "After School Program," served on two sides of the downtown. Both were designed to reach children from the first through the eighth grades. Both programs were run almost completely by volunteers from their local churches. Some of the directors have been paid professionals. Handicraft is provided for the young, and photography, woodwork and cooking are taught to the older children. In 1969 the After School Program handled 80 children in the Terwilliger area and 45 in the Couch area.

In 1968 Hub-CAP set up a four-week summer program for the children in the same two areas as the After School Program. It was called "The Best Days of the Week," and operated each summer through 1972. The same low-income family children were being served in this summer program as the school time program. It was in 1968 that five Roman Catholic parishes joined the GPCC, and so from the beginning of the Best Days of the Week, Roman Catholic nuns and seminarians have been the directors and teachers, along with volunteers. Classes were non-religiously oriented, teaching arts and crafts, and providing recreating and educational field trips.

One of the main Hub-CAP concerns since its beginning are the "homeless" men in the Burnside, skid row area. The "Homeless Men's Committee"
has tried to provide a detoxification center, where men can get medical assistance as an alternative to a stay in jail.

In 1969, Hub-CAP began a summer series of meetings for low-income, elderly people to aid them in their particularly pressing problems: recreation, leisure time (boredom), legal aid, medicare, nutrition and housing. Hub-CAP called the program "Summer Spokes." Nuns, pastors and volunteers planned and carried it out, and the meetings averaged 55 in attendance the first year and 95 in 1970. This effort is considered one of the more "successful" so far.

In past years, Hub-CAP has provided a community service project to help people face divorce or separation. It has sponsored an Education Action Committee, devoted to the integration of city schools and its early implementation. Hub-CAP also has a Housing Committee, which has worked as a lobby to the City Council for low-income families and been on the Interfaith Housing Commission.

Most of the separate programs under Hub-CAP have changed format frequently. Some have been completely disbanded, some drastically changed, some merely modified. The reasons were reflected in the extreme volunteer nature of these church-CAP's: (1) new and unusual problems--experimental programming for the drug users; (2) loose organizational commitment by supporting churches to such liberalism of programming; (3) uncertainty of financial support; (4) uncertainty of maintaining qualified staff in volunteer programming; and (5) the other organizational problems that also accompany more conservative volunteer groups.

In February, 1969, Robert Menzel, the first full-time director of Hub-CAP, resigned to teach at an out-of-state college. Three months later, Father Gil Lulay, pastor of the Roman Catholic Downtown Chapel,
was hired on a half-time basis to coordinate the Hub-CAP activities. A "staff council" of pastors from the Hub-CAP churches supplied guidance to the individual Hub-CAP programs. The Roman Catholics bought the old Burnside Hotel, and in November, 1969, opened it to provide a longer term detoxification center, along with food and medical help. Father Gil Lulay directed the Hotel and overall program for the homeless men. Volunteers from the Hub-CAP churches helped the Hotel's program, but resident men of the Hotel supplied most of the cleaning, laundry work, maintenance and cooking. Hub-CAP churches, individuals and community agencies gave financial support to the Hotel's detoxification center.

In March, 1970, a large, one-room Drop-In Center was opened in the same block as the Hotel. Essentially, it provided a place for men temporarily to get inside, off the street and have coffee or milk. It was open twenty-four hours a day, and staffed by some of the more permanent Burnside Hotel residents.

In recounting the above events and programs which have developed in the history of Hub-CAP since 1966, the account has deliberately left out the program which held Hub-CAP's center of attention from 1967 through 1969. This was the ministry to Portland's alienated youth colony. None of the Hub-CAP programs previously discussed here has caused any significant change in the social structures of the community—religiously, politically or culturally. None has threatened the established community. The one Hub-CAP program that did, however, was the Youth Ministry.

When Hub-CAP began to organize in 1966, one of the downtown churches which strongly supported the formation of the new CAP, First Congregational Church, was already involved in developing a youth style coffee
house. In 1966 a Congregational seminary student, John Randledt, was employed by First Congregational Church. The pastor of the congregation said that Randledt was hired to develop a coffee house in the basement of their church building "to update our congregation's youth ministry." That first summer the coffee house was called the "Catacombs." It was considered successful for the first summer, but the Congregational basement was not suited to the purpose and Randledt had gone back to school. The Congregational youth committee asked other downtown churches to take part in running the new coffee house. A few other churches close by, also involved in organizing the new Hub-CAP, accepted the invitation. The coffee house was moved to the more adequate facilities of the First Unitarian Church near Portland State University, and renamed the "Charix House."

About this time, Hub-CAP was in its first months of organizational life. Robert Menzel was just coming on as the first director of Hub-CAP. The relationship of the Charix Coffee House, as one part of the several Hub-CAP "programs," was one of relative freedom given it by the Board of Directors of Hub-CAP, which is made up of representatives from Hub-CAP churches. Although concerned about what was going on at the Charix in its early stages, the GPCC's Youth Commission and Hub-CAP Board members apparently (according to respondents) saw the need for a certain amount of freedom of expression in music, skits, presentations, programing, etc. Smoking was allowed by youth (juveniles under 18), even though against Oregon State Law. Miss Margo Maris was hired as director of the Charix and its programing. She was convinced that a certain amount of "openness" to the kinds and conditions of youth who would frequent the coffee house was needed, in order to reach those youth who
really needed such a place. Menzel was not immediately responsible for the Charix, and was then developing the administration of other Hub-CAP projects. However, Menzel kept a close eye on the Charix, and was in sympathy with Miss Maris' approach to the Charix.

In February, 1967, the GPCC, through its Youth Ministry Committee, hired a young layman, Mr. Eugene Horn, to carry on a "street ministry" to youth in the downtown area, especially around the Charix. Mr. Horn was hired separately from the Hub-CAP's Charix, and paid separately by the GPCC. He was directly responsible to the GPCC's Youth Ministry Committee; however, Horn was instructed to work in conjunction with Hub-CAP under Robert Menzel. Horn was to coordinate his work with the Charix, and report regularly to Menzel and the Hub-CAP Board.

The GPCC's Youth Ministry Committee had become well aware of the growing number of runaway, or "alienated," teenagers hanging out in this same part of downtown. Horn was directed to make contact with as many of the runaways and other youth "dropping out" of society as he was able to counsel and help. Horn rented a street level room for an office near the Charix. It became a drop-in place for runaway juveniles, varying widely in age. Many of the young people were seriously sick from poor food, exposure and--sometimes--drugs. Menzel reported that Horn deserves the credit for contacting the University Medical School and obtaining the free services of interns and other interested doctors to the youth "drop-in center." The demand for the free medical aid increased steadily, so that a separate set of rooms was rented for a medical drop-in center, named the "Outside-In." A private medical doctor, Charles Spray, M. D., voluntarily took the directorship of Outside-In. The medical drop-in center came to be open all week, with twenty-four hour emergency
service.

On August 16, 1968, the Charix Coffee House and Horn's "street worker ministry" broke onto the newspapers' front pages. At a regular meeting of the City Council the night before, the head of the city police's Women's Protective Division, Capt. Elizabeth Mumford, accused the GPCC youth ministry and Gene Horn of "harboring" runaways (and therefore delinquent) children. Capt. Mumford's second charge was that the Charix was the site of regular and heavy exchange of drugs. She charged, "... youngsters find easy access to narcotics at the Charix Coffee House." It turned out that "undercover" agents, working for the Narcotics Division of the city's Police Bureau, posed as "hippie type" young people, and found out many of the places (parks) where drugs were exchanged in Portland. One of the places where the agents claimed easiest access to narcotics was at the Charix.

Newspaper articles in the following days carried the strong rebuttals to Capt. Mumford's accusations from William Cate and Robert Menzel, as well as from the elected officers of the GPCC and Hub-CAP. Cate and Menzel both lauded the police and the Women's Protective Division, and both told the press that the GPCC and its Youth Ministry tried to work in cooperation with the law at all times. At the Charix, they said, there were stringent rules against narcotics use or possession, and that staff members and volunteers enforce rules "diligently." However, both Cate and Menzel, along with Horn and the president of the Hub-CAP Board, Robert C. Shoemaker (also an Attorney) agreed with Mumford's accusations to a certain extent. They conceded that there undoubtedly was a certain amount of drugs passed at the coffee house, but no more so than any other public gathering place for youth, such as any Portland
high school. They pointed out that drugs were available almost any place where youth are free to gather. Horn contended that if he spent too much effort excluding possible pot smokers and other drug users from the Charix, it would "eliminate most of the young people we are trying to reach." William Cate, Robert Menzel and attorney Shoemaker defended Gene Horn and the Charix's program of trying to reach the alienated young people.

On Capt. Mumford's first charge that the GPCC's youth ministry program was opposing her Women's Protective Division by "harboring" runaways, Horn, Cate, Menzel and others connected with the GPCC program specifically denied the charge. Dr. Cate revealed that early in the summer a new set of guidelines was worked out with the Multnomah County's Juvenile Court and the Multnomah County Welfare Department. Due to an oversight, the city police's Women's Protective Division was supposed to be called in on the earlier consultation, but was not. The Court and Welfare Department had approved the GPCC's alternate program for helping runaways. Horn said the new program required that parents must give their permission for a runaway to be placed in the program's care. Horn explained, "When a kid comes into my office, he has to call his parents and tell them he's all right. Then I get on the phone and tell the parents who I am and what the program is all about. If the parents approve, we take responsibility and go on from there." Horn said that some of the runaways are referred to welfare caseworkers who counsel with them and their parents. Some others went to one of the fifteen private volunteer homes, which had agreed to be part of the program and had been approved by the GPCC's Youth Ministry Committee. If a young person would refuse any of these alternatives, Horn was free to allow the
youth to leave without being put into custody. In some cases, the latter had happened. The Women's Protective Division had come in contact with a few of those youth who had left the Youth Ministry program as known runaways. Capt. Mumford had cited the case of one fifteen year old girl from Washington State whom their Protective Division had found in a local park late at night, "high on drugs and in the company of four older males." Understandably, Capt. Mumford's accusations, illustrated by the case of the fifteen year old girl, had aroused the immediate anger of some City Council members.

In the months that followed the 1968 Summer Crisis Program for youth in downtown Portland, an internal struggle began within Hub-CAP and the GPCC's Board—whether the Charix should be further supported financially, and whether it should continue at all, at least with the same program format. Behind all the problems at the Charix, of course, was the principal problem: narcotics. The question was how to maintain a coffee house, which would reach the "alienated" youth, and yet provide a climate which was free from the presence of drugs. How as the Charix going to continue with a program of freedom, without catering to the "hard-core" drugs users? In September, 1968, Robert Menzel said that he informed the Charix staff that it would have to go off financial support from Hub-CAP, because the Charix was already incurring a large debt. Menzel said that Hub-CAP did not have the income to maintain the Charix at the expense of Hub-CAP's other programs. The Hub-CAP Board did not, however, cut the Charix off immediately. It was not until April 3, 1969, that the Hub-CAP Board authorized the formation of a separate Board of Directors for Charix with the full responsibility of supplying its own financial resources. During the six months between April and September,
1969, the Charix continued on a more restricted schedule. The Hub-CAP Board and the Charix staff experimented with different modifications of the wide-open, loud music coffee house of the summer before. It is obvious that the wide public reaction to the "explosive" publicity about the drug scene at the Charix was having a tremendous negative impact on the Hub-CAP Board and the Hub-CAP congregations which supported the program and the GPCC's Board.

In a memorandum dated September 9, 1969, from Robert C. Shoemaker, Jr., then chairman of the Hub-CAP Board, to "all interested persons" (widely distributed to Hub-CAP churches, GPCC Board members and CAP's, Charix staff and young people, etc.), Mr. Shoemaker draws up a list of "points of consensus" which developed out of a meeting of interested Charix people six days before. The first point is that the Charix should not continue as presently operating. Shoemaker says, "It has developed into little more than an acid rock dance hall and has probably become fairly ineffective in serving its original goals." In the next section, entitled "Goals," Mr. Shoemaker lists five revised goals under which a new Charix should operate: "(a) . . . provide . . . relaxation in an environment . . . with a minimum of harmful elements present. (b) . . . outlet for creative expression . . . as a substitute for the release now offered by drugs. (c) . . . a window to the community to the problems of alienated youth--and what the youth are trying to say to the community. (d) . . . a place where kids in trouble may seek help and where help may seek kids in trouble. (e) . . . a representation and assurance to young people that all of society is not opposed to them and that many 'square' elements of society care about their welfare."
In the face of all the criticism about the Charix, Shoemaker's version of the suggested new goals still appears to be a strong statement of faith in the possibilities—even necessities—of a continued coffee house for "alienated" youth. Despite the fact that Shoemaker was calling for the closure of the Charix, he also said that the established society of this community can benefit from the "window" it provides society to see "the problems of alienated youth—and what the youth are trying to say to the community." He said it was not only a place where society can see and hear, but also a place where "straight" (conservative) society can meet the alienated youth and actually help them.

In the following months, many great changes took place in the Hub-CAP staff, its Board of Directors, in the Charix and in the Youth Ministry. Under pressure from Cate and GPCC officers, Gene Horn resigned from the Youth Ministry directorship. Two months later, February, 1969, Robert Menzel resigned as director of Hub-CAP to take a teaching position. Nine members of the Hub-CAP Board resigned, three of them officers of its Board, including Robert Shoemaker, during the following spring and summer. Five alternates on the Hub-CAP Board also resigned and were replaced. That number amounted to the major part of the Board. On June 15, 1969, Father Gil Lulay was hired as "Staff Council Coordinator" for Hub-CAP, which amounted to a half-time replacement for Menzel's job. The big change formally took place for Charix on April 3, 1969. A separate Board of Directors for Charix was set up at that time. It consisted of over 50 people from the community at large. This Board became responsible for the supervision of Charix, as well as for its financial support. Later, however, Father Lulay said that Hub-CAP always remained the legal entity responsible for the Charix. In July of 1969 the two
Boards of Directors of the Youth Ministry of the GPCC and the Charix were merged into one Board and into one program, the Charix-Youth Ministry program. After Menzel resigned at Hub-CAP, Gene Horn was hired as director of Charix. Six months later in July, following the merger of the Charix and the Youth Ministry programs, both Gene Horn at Charix and Margo Maris Horn (married the previous winter) resigned their directorships, effective August 1, 1969.

August through December, 1969, marked the last phase of the Charix-Youth Ministry. Since the programs had been consolidated organizationally under its own governing Board of Directors, the program was then completely on its own, financially. From then on, the new Board was unable to generate any consistent sources of new money income. Soon after the Horns left, the several pastors to Portland State University students (Portland Campus Christian Ministry) at the nearby Koinonia House offered to take on the direction of the C-YM program for four months—until the end of 1969. It was agreed that a complete evaluation of the program and finances of the C-YM would be carried out during those four months. Hired for this task was Mr. Lewis Durham, consultant for the Urban Young Adult Action, Incorporated, and the Glide Foundation of San Francisco. Following the evaluative study, the decision was reached that there were insufficient resources and motivation in the downtown churches to provide an adequate service for such a fast changing youth culture. The Charix was closed in early 1970, and the Youth Ministry also ceased to exist then.

Two of the former Hub-CAP Board members who resigned during 1969 were interviewed for this study. Both are still very much committed to the idea of the churches' CAP's—the necessity of the churches' actual
involvement in social actions. Both respondents defended the past work and accomplishments of Hub-CAP. They had each served on the Board for over two years, through Hub-CAP's most tumultuous years, and they had grown weary of the enormous amount of time and energy it took from them to maintain the on-going administrative life of their Community Action Program. "Each Board meeting night, which was almost every week, was a battle," one respondent said. Significantly, both men spoke spontaneously at some point during their interviews about the possibilities of accomplishing social change through the Hub-CAP. (Both interviews were conducted separately and without the knowledge of the other taking part. The similarity of their views may be due to their being good friends, although one is an active Roman Catholic, and the other is an active Presbyterian.) Because the two men felt that the time had come in 1969 when the actual chances of accomplishing some social change through Hub-CAP had greatly declined, each realized he had become ineffective, and so each decided to quit.

One of these two respondents, Mr. Withycombe, said that Hub-CAP had the potential of becoming more than a "band-aid" operation on the downtown social problems. He felt that their CAP could have become a catalyst to open the way for other social structures-business and government--to begin to take part in making positive changes. The fact was that Hub-CAP had lost its effectiveness in his view. He said that the Charix could have been an illuminating "window to alienated youth," but due to mismanagement and over-permissiveness, Charix had become bogged down in unnecessary problems. It began to take too much time and energy to make it go, he said.

The other former Hub-CAP Board member, Mr. Niebergall, said in
effect that the churches and their individual members had lost their willingness to continue to support such a radical program as the Charix and Youth Ministry. He said that he had found so many of his own church people and those of other Hub-CAP churches who were deeply repelled by the idea of their church getting down and participating in the actual programs to help alienated youth. Mr. Niebergall was very specific in stating that the rejection of the "success ethic" by this youth culture itself causes strong reactions among middle-class, church people. He defended the Charix as presenting a valid program much of the time, but, he said, it was extremely difficult to keep out the presence of hard drugs and still reach those who needed the Charix. It needed stronger management and surveillance, but that took more money and people, which depended on the churches. The churches were backing out, because they were afraid to take the chance of repeating the Charix experience—leading to another explosive reaction from the community. The middle-class churches of Hub-CAP were afraid of the consequences of failing again with such an action program for "different youth."

What becomes apparent from the above two interviews is the subtle effect of the reaction within the great number of members of the congregations which make up downtown churches and support the Hub-CAP programs. It is important to note that one of the above two respondents said that there was no noticeable drop in money contributed by those congregations which make up the Hub-CAP membership. One congregation later did withdraw in protest to the Hub-CAP over-involvement, but its contribution was small and offset by the addition of three more congregations into Hub-CAP. The concrete measurement of negative reaction, therefore, by financial giving, or congregational participation, would seem to say
that there was little or no reaction from the churches involved to the
Hub-CAP program. On the other hand, there was a real and significant
reaction, which was registered in the Hub-CAP Board and their unwillingness to continue to carry on some kind or progressive ministry to
"alienated" youth. Mr. Niebergall said that after Robert Menzel had
left as Hub-CAP director and some of the key Hub-CAP Board members had
resigned, the philosophy of Hub-CAP's purpose even changed. A form of
public pressure was exerted by the church members upon the Board mem-
bers. The conservative reaction by the unhappy church members resulted
in "battles" at the Board meetings, which resulted in inaction by the
Board. After the withdrawal of nine Board members, five alternative
members, the Executive Director and some members of the staff, the
"threatening" youth program was ultimately dropped. This evidence
strongly suggests that the negative reactive of church members had a
negative relationship (if not negative effect) upon the Hub-CAP's actions.

Mr. Withycombe thought that the purpose of the Hub-CAP and its kind
of program was to be a "forerunner" of the church in that the CAP would
help the church to understand the social needs of the community. Then
the church could also act. But, he said, the CAP would have to be free
of the inhibition of conservative church people's reaction. In order to
accomplish this freedom, the CAP's would have to become "ad hoc commit-
tees . . . so that they could take the necessary social and political
actions . . . without the stigma of church oriented and church organized
programs . . . " Mr. Niebergall had earlier said that Hub-CAP also tried
to perform an educational function for the people in its own member
churches. Hub-CAP had tried to inform them about the churches' rationale
for its particular social action approach to helping the youth in the
downtown, along with explaining some of the problems within the new "youth culture." Mr. Niebergall said that not enough of their regular church members understood the theological reasons behind their church social actions through Hub-CAP. But, he said, they (Hub-CAP Board) had not started early enough.

Robert Menzel emphasized that Schulze strongly believed that he could convince reluctant churches of the need and effectiveness of Community Action Program methods—if only he could be permitted to demonstrate them. Schulze thought the best way was first to put a CAP into action, and then the local churches would see and respond with their backing. Four years before, Menzel related, Schulze had done exactly this by demonstrating the success of C-CAP in Albina, and the churches backed the other church-CAP's. Menzel said that that tactic doesn't work anymore, because the congregations have now been through this thing, and they have experienced the conservative reactions from some of their influential people. Menzel said his experience since (he now lives in another state) has shown that conservative reaction to local social action has spread to churches and communities where active social action programs have not yet been tried.

Analysis of the Hub-CAP Program and Its Theoretical Meaning

In analyzing all of the 41 respondents' statements from interviews conducted specifically for this study, only 14 people did not spontaneously mention something about the churches' conservative reaction to the Charix-Youth Ministry program. Eighteen respondents, who would definitely be classified as "liberals" on the churches' social action involvement, gave fairly detailed accounts of how their own congregation, or some other
congregations, had reacted negatively to Hub-CAP's alienated youth program. Out of the total number of respondents, only seven expressed their own disagreement with the youth program, or displeasure with its purpose. (Many interviewees working on separate GPCC programs or CAP's, especially at different points in time during the 1960's, did not know factual information about other GPCC programs, because the social actions were so disconnected. Yet, in several non-directive interviews, I found several who spoke spontaneously about GPCC social action issues or programs other than in their own expertise, revealing their ignorance of facts. I am sure some specific interviewees gave opinions about Hub-CAP based on hearsay, without personal experience. However, their opinions are included in this data.) Without doubt, the evidence for the strongest negative reaction to all the GPCC's social action programs was recorded here against the Charix-Youth Ministry program. More congregations were defined by respondents as having an element of outspoken, critical reaction to that action program than any other GPCC social action work. On the other hand, seven respondents out of the 41 interviewed is not a large proportion (17 per cent) within the GPCC itself to be considered a significant negative reaction on such a sensitive social issue.

Although the conservative reaction brought to bear upon the Hub-CAP Board by the individual church members of its constituent churches was quiet and even difficult to pin-point, it was so effectively negative that the Charix and Youth Ministry program dwindled steadily from lack of support, until fifteen months later the Hub-CAP Board admitted the program was dead.

The evidence presented here about reaction against the GPCC's work in the downtown Youth Ministry is not hard evidence, but very subtle.
The Charix-Youth Ministry survived the first great public outcry about its involvement in drugs quite well, but as time went on, the GPCC and the congregations most directly involved organizationally and geographically did not want to take the future risk of being held responsible before the public for managing such a difficult program. The GPCC literally washed its hands of the program, and threw it back into the hands of the congregations sponsoring Hub-CAP. After a difficult struggle of assessing and again reassessing the program, the Hub-CAP Board of Directors finally voted in 1970 not to continue either Charix or the Youth Ministry. The Board gave as its reason for suspending the downtown youth work: not enough money to provide the kind of quality ministry needed to meet such a difficult job. Father Gil Lulay, part-time director of Hub-CAP at that time, as well as two other Hub-CAP Board members, admitted that their members were afraid of not being able to control the use of drugs by the kind of youth they were faced with helping, and that the public's sensitivity to this problem presented too great a probability of conservative reaction backfiring. Translated, that meant for this researcher, the sponsoring church people had come to realize now the great breadth of difficulties accompanying their assistance of the youth sub-cultures into the drug scene, and they were now wise enough to foresee further bad publicity and public criticism. They felt, as congregations, they could not withstand the price of the accompanying negative reaction.

It is my estimation that William Cate and other GPCC leaders did not want to pursue this aspect of social action after the initial bad drug publicity the Charix-Youth Ministry received in the Summer Crisis of 1968. Cate advised the GPCC's Board of Directors to give the program
solely to Hub-CAP, thereby disassociating the GPCC from it. Cate was more concerned about the GPCC's overall future for its social action program. He did not want to endanger the GPCC's organizational change-over to social action goals. At that very time in 1968, the GPCC's committee to rewrite a new constitution had reconstructed the organization chiefly around three working divisions with social action purposes, and was getting ready to present the new constitution to their members. Cate certainly did not want to endanger the adoption of the new constitution because of some high pitched public reaction aimed at the GPCC's social action programs.

Also, at this point in my research I was seriously asking the further question, "Why?" Why had the downtown Youth Ministry program incurred such a long lasting public reaction? It appears to me that the answer lies within the process of legitimation; which religion normally performs for the socially constructed world. The conservative elements in the member churches of Hub-CAP thought the downtown Youth Ministry was causing a serious threat to their well-established social meanings, which their churches normally acted to legitimate. Because of new methods based on unusually applied values, such as disregarding punitive treatment for these deviant youth in exchange for sympathetic therapy and assistance, conservatives felt their church-legitimated values were threatened. When the press' headlines gave public notoriety to the local law enforcement's attack upon the Charix-Youth Ministry's program, then the conservative church members of Hub-CAP had their fears and criticisms confirmed. In other words, institutional religion, as represented by the GPCC, had stepped outside of its traditional role of legitimating the local government and law and order.
In the past, churches usually supported the police's crackdown on juvenile delinquents. In contrast, the GPCC's Youth Ministry openly opposed the police's legalistic and depersonalized method of dealing with such deviant youth. The churches' program was challenging government's law enforcement with a completely different set of values, saying the police's treatment was dehumanizing.
CHAPTER VIII

THE GRAPE BOYCOTT CHALLENGE.

Although neither the GPCC, nor any of its action groups, actually participated in the 1968 national Grape Boycott, the GPCC did publish an official statement supporting both the United Farm Workers' right to strike and the consumers' boycott of local sales. By giving its verbal support to this Boycott, the content analysis shows the respondents gave one of the highest disapproval rates (20 per cent) and their second lowest rate of approval (39 per cent) from among the loyal group of activitists.

Why did this issue result in the high degree of increased tension between the liberals and conservatives in proportion to the time and effort the GPCC committed to the problem? Did the financial-economic context of the issue have a deciding effect on the conservatives' reaction? This chapter faces these questions and the facts surrounding the Grape Boycott situation.

In 1968, the Rev. Robert Burtner took over as chairman of the Social Concerns Commission, following Robert Bonthius' move to another city. Under Burtner, the Social Concerns group has continued to be aggressive on state legislation and local politico-economic issues. 1968 was the time of the GPCC's "big summer," the Summer Crisis in the youth drug scene in Southwest Portland and the Black Summer Crisis in Albina. Under Burtner that September the Commission drafted a strong statement condemning the United States' uninvolve...
invasion of Checkoslovakia, which was returned by the Board to the Commission for redrafting and toning down. In August, 1968, the Social Concerns Commission also had issued to the Board members a statement defending the nation-wide Grape Boycott, organized by the United Farm Workers, AFL-CIO of Delano, California. At the Board meeting on September 11, 1968, the Board members also referred the Boycott statement back to the Social Concerns Commission for rewriting.

Proceeding and during this time, the Social Concerns Commission asked the Board members to go hear Cesar Chavez, the union leader of the Farm Workers, speak at Portland State University. The Commission also set up special hearings of representatives from both sides, workers and growers, for the Board. A representative of the Farm Workers Union and local organizer of the Boycott appeared at a special Board hearing, as well as with the local secretary of the Independent Growers Association. Because the local boycott involved secondary picketing at local supermarkets, the Social Concerns Commission set up a meeting with the local grocers through the Grocers' Association representative. The meeting was at the Roman Catholic Chancery office building, but only one Grocers' Association representative showed up to defend their position against local picketing. Burtner said that for those churchmen, lay and clergy, who were at the meeting, "it was a real flub for the grocers." Burtner said that the Grocers' Association representative was at a loss to explain why no other supermarkets felt it necessary to attend the meeting.

The Social Concerns Commission then called a special meeting of the GPCC's Board for September 23, 1968, at 4:00 p.m., to reconsider a new
GPCC statement on the grape boycott. All those present, including Monsignor Tobin, representing the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, voted to adopt a favorable statement, defending the farm workers and their strike—with the abstention of Lowell Steen, the Treasurer. The GPCC's Executive Director, William Cate, said that the statement they adopted did not support the boycott itself, but defended the workers' right to organize and bargain collectively. However, the actual statement, which follows, does support the boycott, at least locally.

Whereas, the right to organize and bargain collectively long has been recognized as an important part of American workers, the farm workers of the U. S. A. have been denied this right under the National Labor Relations Act. For nearly two years now, the farm workers of California, under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, have been engaged in a certified strike with Delano, Coachella Valley and South Kern County grape growers. The issue is simply whether or not farm workers can legally organize themselves into a union, and bargain collectively with their employers.

We hereby record our support for the Delano grape strikers in their consumer boycott of California table grapes.

Cesar Chavez has specifically sought the support of the churches to help them in their non-violent efforts, for justice among farm workers. We heed his call, and urge others to refrain from the purchase of all California table grapes in Portland stores.

William Cate said in an interview in 1970 that he considered the GPCC's support of the grape boycott had caused the greatest reaction among church people against the GPCC itself, second only to the reaction over the Youth Ministry and Charix House treatment of runaways and drug users. Cate said more people called or wrote to complain and threaten their withdrawal of financial support to the GPCC for its "unwarranted" support of the boycott and the farm workers, than any other social action by the Council, except the Youth Ministry.

In one of the early interviews conducted for this research, the
respondent, who is the pastor of a strong urban congregation, said that he had formally resigned from his office as a GPCC Board member for several reasons, but the main reason was the GPCC's support of the Grape Boycott. The respondent, the Rev. Johnston, said that he had been personally connected with the GPCC—on its Board, or committees—for 14 years until his recent resignation. He said that, generally, the GPCC had become much too unbalanced toward social action concerns. The Council should also maintain the other side, evangelism. Johnston also emphasized that the GPCC should assist the congregations in their local work, rather than the congregations spending so much of their means to assist the GPCC in programs which are so controversial that they detract from the congregation's local neighborhood work. He thought that his own congregation and others in their own local area would accomplish more if they set up their own youth, low-income housing, senior citizens, and similar programs.

Following this interview, two other respondents referred to Johnston's resignation from the Board as an indication of their own strong feelings against what the Council had been doing recently. Both of these respondents are clergy, and having been on the GPCC Board in past years, they knew Johnston very well. Both criticized the same GPCC's preoccupation with social actions as Johnston did. The Grape Boycott stand had caused reactions within their own congregations, they said. One of these men also resigned from the GPCC, following Johnston, but his chief reason was his reaction to the Youth Ministry in Southwest Portland. His reaction is probably due to the fact that his congregation is situated only a couple of blocks from where the Charix House was
located. The other pastor did not resign; however, he does not personally support the GPCC in his large Presbyterian congregation, situation across town. Yet, some of the lay supporters of the GPCC in his congregation have continued successfully to pressure the congregation to give its annual $1,000 gift to the GPCC. The Presbyterian pastor said that "two very influential men," who regularly gave large contributions to the congregation, told him they wanted their congregation not to support the GPCC any longer, due to the Council's support of the Grape Boycott.

In the interview, Johnston also expressed strong disagreement with the GPCC's "condoning the use of drugs" in the Charix House. He said the Chief of Police had told him personally that the City Council would not give the word to the Police Department to close down the Charix, because "there were too many important, politically influential people supporting the GPCC's Charix and downtown Youth Ministry.

Johnston's second criticism of the GPCC was the CAP's financial irresponsibility to the GPCC itself. He said that he asked the Board in September, 1968, if the CAP's were responsible to report their use of funds and if the GPCC had a veto power over the CAP's financial actions.

The Board discussed it at length then, but could not decide. Johnston felt that the financial drain by the CAP's was the direct cause of having to withdraw support for the chaplains to the Juvenile Delinquency Home and for the jails. Johnston pointed out that these chaplains had partial support from the GPCC since the late fifties, but were now in danger of being withdrawn from their posts because of lack of support.

Johnston admitted, however, that his decision to resign was affected mostly by his dissatisfaction with the Board's support for the boycott of
grapes. He felt strongly that the Social Concerns Commission "forced" the Board into this position, because the special Board meeting (September 23, 1968), which favorably adopted the boycott stand had only ten members of the Board present to vote. The old GPCC records happened to contain Johnston's letter of resignation, to which he appended his reasons for leaving the GPCC's Board. It is obvious that Johnston's most specific reaction is to the Grape Boycott approval. He also confided that several of his own church members had complained about the Council's action on this, but one local businessman said he wanted the congregation also to stop contributing to the GPCC.

In his resignation letter, Johnston mentions that he had recently made two trips to the California grape growing area around Delano, California. He told the researcher that before he had studied for the ministry, he had been in business himself, running a plant nursery in the San Joaquin Valley. He said he knew the problems of the grape growers, most of whom are small growers. Johnston also said the Union was "forcing" the workers into the Union against their will, in many cases. It is interesting to note that in the information published by Chavez' United Farm Workers, they give figures directly contradicting Johnston: "In California small family farms are NOT the issue! Six percent of the landowners own 75 percent of the farmland--gigantic agribusiness corporations."

The Grape Boycott issue was the one dispute in which the GPCC came into direct conflict with the city's business community. Some respondents used terms such as "meddling in business peoples' affairs" to describe their criticisms of the GPCC. Other respondents critical of the
GPCC's participation said that the "secondary" boycott of local stores was unfair and unjustified; the GPCC should not have "stuck its nose into a problem they did not know all the facts about . . . ."

The GPCC was challenging strong economic forces within its own community. Inevitably, numerous local lay members of churches which belonged to the GPCC had large invested interests in the supermarket being picketed and hurt by the Boycott. Because the pragmatic intensity of the issue directly affected their economic well-being, many of its own members vigorously questioned the GPCC's stand.
CHAPTER IX

AUTHORITY AND POWER IN THE GPCC

The GPCC's formal organizational structure is patterned after the Protestant, congregational centered structure of the national church bodies. Protestantism in the United States has traditionally placed primary emphasis on the local congregation's purpose of preaching the Word and administering the Sacraments. Constitutionally, in national church bodies, the congregation has been the real locus of organizational power and authority. However, a broad tendency in Protestantism has been the rise of informal control of the denominations by the different departments and special agencies within each denomination. Formally, all the parts of the structure and efforts of the denomination continue to be instrumental to the local purpose of the congregations. Informally, the power of the organization is in the hands of a few leaders, and the congregations are instrumental to the organization.

Max Weber's definition of authority, as against power, is necessary at this point. Authority is the legitimate right (of the organization) to exercise power. Weber described three ways in which a leader may gain authority. The first type of legitimation of authority Weber called "rational-legal" authority. A specific office of leadership possesses it because the group has established laws or rules which specify that the office legally embraces certain specific authority. It is based on the belief in rationally established laws. The second type is "traditional authority." Certain rights and powers come to be associated with an
office after a period of time. A tradition builds up around the leadership position. The office holder takes on authority more and more, because traditionally the holder of that office has assumed authority with respect to specific tasks. The third type of authority is called "charismatic." Because an individual leader possesses traits which inspire confidence and willingness in his own group to follow his leadership, apart from any legal definitions or traditions, then that person has "charismatic authority." In contrast to the other two definitions, charisma applies to the individual and not to the office of authority.

However, a fourth type of authority, which especially applies to the Protestant, congregational form of organization, is described by Paul Harrison in his study of the American Baptist Convention. He calls it rational-pragmatic authority. Unlike "rational-legal" authority, it is organizational power that is not legitimately authorized. Harrison says, rather, that it is "power grasped," since there is an undefined vacuum about key offices in relation to many other parts of the organization. Because of this "vacuum" the office holder is able to exercise power, although not legally authorized. As Weber points out, these forms of authority are only "ideal-types," and not necessarily mutually exclusive. They often overlap, or are only partly present in some organizational positions.

The GPCC is a voluntary organization. In a sense it is a double voluntary organization, since participation in the decision-making Assembly, Board of Directors, or Commissions precludes the person's membership in and appointment by a congregation. Because of the inherent nature of a voluntary organization, it tends not to develop a strong rational-legal authority form of government. It tends not to have a
highly elaborated system of legalistic specifications for performance and standards of production. Paul Harrison describes the great difference between the theory and practice of the American Baptist Convention. The denomination's theory calls for the decision-making power to be in the hands of the laymen and the local congregation. In reality, the laity and congregation participate in the decision-making process in only a few perfunctory ways. The same is largely true for the GPCC. Among the American Baptists, the real power of the national body rests in the hands of church executives, usually clergy, who have little legal authority but have enormous pragmatic influence. Until the adoption of the new constitution in 1969, the same could be said about the GPCC. The GPCC's new constitution is still unspecific about the real powers of employed staff personnel, especially the Executive Secretary. Although the new constitution spells out in some general terms the working relationship of the three new major social action arms to the GPCC (Community Action Programs, Center for Urban Encounter and the Metropolitan Ministries; viz., chart on last page of this chapter), almost nothing is said about the specific powers and responsibilities of the employed staff heads of these divisions, nor of the elected chairmen of the three Commissions.

Oligarchy and Insulation

In analyzing the development of authority in the GPCC during the sixties, the most important place of authority is the office of Executive Secretary. Yet, the authority of the Executive Secretary cannot be understood without considering it within the context of the GPCC's constitutional, or formal, sources of authority. In the eleven years since William Cate took over as the Executive Secretary (1959), the GPCC's goals
have changed radically. From its beginning in 1919 till about 1960, the GPCC primarily served to reinforce traditional goals of congregations. It was a cooperative group of congregations, working to achieve common, congregational goals, like evangelism, education, youth programs (for their own youth), etc. The GPCC was centered in the congregations.

Because the goals did begin to change shortly after Cate arrived at the GPCC, and continued to change throughout his tenure, the inevitable question arises about the amount of influence Cate exerted on the GPCC to make this change possible. Does Paul Harrison's description of a large church organization and the executives' development of "rational-pragmatic" authority apply to the GPCC and its Executive Secretary?

Under the old constitution (adopted 1959, revised 1960), the Executive Secretary's responsibility was defined as the "supervision of the activities of the Council ..." The new 1969 constitution adopts the same broad definition. There is no real authority assigned to the Executive office in those words. It does not say he has authority over anyone or any other offices. It is more a statement of responsibility. Authority here is undefined, but wide responsibilities imply wide authority. This constitutional statement is the first source of undefined power. The Director is thus given the vast power to make everyday polity interpretations. This power to interpret goals into practical decisions allows the Director actually to make new policy—when he is interested in reinterpreting organizational goals.

A second source of undefined authority is the constitutional provision which allows the Board to "authorize any officer or officers, agent or agents to enter into any contract ...", and to write checks on behalf of the Council (Art. XI, Sec. 1 & 3). So the Executive Secretary
is able to control large sums of money from day to day as instruments of
his decisions.

The Executive's third level of informal authority is his ex-officio
membership--without vote--in "all bodies of the Council" (Art. X).
Through his ever-present influence, the Executive permeates the total
power structure with his interpretation of the organization's purpose.
In the case of William Cate's interpretation of goals for the GPCC, it is
known that he came to Portland with a very specifically defined philoso-
phy of purpose for local church councils. Cate's Ph.D. dissertation
dealt with this very problem: kinds of "methodologies" for social action
by local councils of churches. While in Portland, Cate wrote a short
book, published in 1965, on this same theme, using illustrations from the
GPCC. Of the 41 respondents interviewed by this researcher, 22, or over
half, made some reference to Cate's positive ability to illuminate the
possibilities of the new social action proposals for the GPCC and the
theological-moral necessity to be involved in social action. In the
period of four lengthy interviews with Cate and several informal discus-
sions with him, he repeated his deliberate efforts to try to influence
both laymen and pastors--informally, behind the scenes--to support the
local churches' increased involvement in social action. Cate said that
he worked slowly in his first five years at the GPCC to "convert and
train many key people in a wide number of local congregations to become
personally involved in social action work." He said, "People rally to
your side if you are able to get them involved--to act on the idea. Many
of the people who are now supporting our (GPCC) community action in the
city have developed a commitment to it in the years before . . ."
This third informal, undefined source of authority for the Executive Secretary (changed to Executive Director in 1968) through his ex-officio presence on all committees, etc., has allowed him greatly to influence "key people" and help encourage these and other people to allow their names to be nominated for more politically important committees, commissions or the Board of Directors.

It is a recognition of the Director's use of undefined authority by his very presence--his personal, charismatic dedication to social action goals, and by the authority inherent in the status of his executive office. It is illustrated in Cate's statement that he worked about five years to "convert and train many key people..." to become more involved in GPCC social action projects. In other words, by Cate's constitutional presence on all bodies of the GPCC, he was constantly presenting his views before the people who were interpreting and deciding the administrative goals of the GPCC. Cate's executive status, together with his expertise and commitment to social action goals became a pervasive influence upon the committee members, especially the laymen. Working in such small groups and on a one-to-one basis before and after such committee meetings, Cate's "behind the scenes" efforts began to accumulate in numbers on the Board and committees.

The fourth undefined source of the Executive Director's organizational authority is due to the GPCC's process of electing members of the Board of Directors and other officers. A slate of nominees is carefully prepared by the Nominations Committee well in advance of the annual meeting of the General Assembly. Of course, the Executive Director is present on the Nominating Committee, exerting the informal authority of his office and person. But even more significant in this process is the
lack of democratic procedure by the delegates from the member congregations to the annual meeting. Rarely, if ever, do delegates nominate from the floor of the meeting any opposition candidates against the pre-nominated slate of officers. Without opposition, the pre-determined candidates are, in effect, hand picked successors to carry on the prevailing policies approved by those already in office.

An illustration of this breach of democratic procedure within the organization comes from an unusual participant observer, a Roman Catholic priest, who had not before been a part of any extra-Catholic, ecumenical group. In 1966 he began to participate in Hub-CAP activities without his parish becoming official member of that CAP program. His interest and activity in the GPCC's CAP was to become the precursor of five Roman Catholic parishes officially joining the GPCC in 1968. At that time he was elected a member of the GPCC's Board of Directors. In a formal interview and in other discussions with this respondent, he said that while in Rome for special studies during the Vatican II, Ecumenical Council, he had become very interested in the possibilities of new ecumenical relations at local, practical levels. Many Catholics, he said, were then extolling the democratic practices of the Protestant churches. However, when he first witnessed the GPCC's elections at the annual meetings and saw no opposition nominations, nor open discussion of nominations from the Assembly floor, as a new, outside observer, he was particularly struck by the absence of the democratic process there. He emphasized his amazement at his first experience within an essentially Protestant organization that there was no real contesting groups or arguments presented against the established group's nominations.
The General Assembly, according to both the 1954 and 1968 constitutions, is "the supreme governing body of the Council," and the 1968 version further states that the General Assembly "shall have final jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the Council" (Art. VI). The Assembly is also the GPCC's fully representative body of delegates from all the member congregations, which has this ultimate authority over all GPCC matters. Constitutionally, then, the congregations and their delegates are intended to be in direct contact with the governing process of the GPCC. Both the old and new constitutions have kept intact the widely held Protestant principle that the individual person is the locus of authority, because he is personally responsible to God through his own faith. Since the individual receives the Word and Sacraments in the local congregation and renews his faith in God there, the congregation is the center of the individual's religious life and faith. The individual and the congregation are the source of authority and power, and the GPCC's constitution recognizes this principle. As the first paragraph of this chapter stated, the principle of congregational authority governs the formal structure of the GPCC. The appearance that the delegates have the decision-making process in their hands is given to the congregations' delegates assembled at the two Assembly meetings each year. In reality, however, the General Assembly's annual and semi-annual meetings play little or no part in conducting the policy decisions for the GPCC. Through the GPCC's informal structure, the actual working authority for decision making resides, first, in the small (7 voting members, plus 4 ex-officio) Executive Committee and then in the Board of Directors.

Throughout the 1960's, the election of officers and new Board members was the sum total of the "decision-making" by delegates at the
General Assembly's annual meetings, officers, entertainment and a special program, or "outside" speaker. For the past eleven years, the annual meetings' printed agendas indicate that no provision was made for discussion or decisions about any special, or pressing problems facing the GPCC. Given to the delegates at the beginning of the meetings is a bulletin of mimeographed reports from most of the committees, commissions, the President, the Executive Director, together with a financial report from the past year. The General Assembly's business meeting has never included, according to the bulletins of reports of the past eleven years, the approval of a proposed budget for the coming year. Although the constitution provides for it, no one in the GPCC could remember the General Assembly ever being called into special session between regular meetings during the year to rule upon some critical issue facing the GPCC.

Because the mechanics of arranging the agendas for the two semi-annual meetings fall into the hands of the Executive staff, subject to approval of the elected officers, the control of what the representative delegates shall be allowed formally to consider and vote upon in their Assembly meetings is largely determined by the Executive staff. Asked why there was no provision for a real business meeting on the agenda of the Assembly's annual meeting, a staff member conjectured that it had probably become "traditional" a long time ago, because the delegates do not know enough about the issues to make good decisions, and because the meetings would get much too long. The staff respondent said that he had never heard anyone question the practice of having a brief business meeting at the annual Assembly anyway.

Although Robert Michels was dealing primarily with large voluntary organizations, his political theory, which he called "the iron law of
"oligarchy," has wide applications to the GPCC. Michels concluded that the very nature of a large organization gives its leaders control over the organization's machinery, which in turn gives them the necessary resources to exercise monopolistic power within the organization. "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy." The size of the organization definitely has a great deal to do with its propensity toward oligarchy. Lipset, Trow and Coleman state that democratic procedure is usually directly proportionate to the smallness in size of the political association.

Increased size necessarily involves the delegation of political power to professional rulers and the growth of bureaucratic institutions. The translation of this proposition to the level of private government is clear: The smaller the association or unit, the greater membership control. There can be little doubt that this is true in the trade-union movement.

The GPCC would not be considered a large organization by the standards of most international trade unions, professional and business societies, cooperatives, and other national voluntary organizations. Yet, the GPCC takes on the aspects of largeness when the total number of individual people who are represented to the Council are counted. In 1969 there were 130 member congregations. The new 1968 constitution gets around the limitations to GPCC "membership" for certain churches--without holding to statements of belief in the GPCC preamble, such as Jewish synagogues, etc.--by allowing "participation" in the GPCC through membership in a local church-community action program (CAP). In this way it is possible for a member of a synagogue to be a voting member of the Board of Directors, if he is elected the chairman of one of the local
CAP's board. According to the new constitution, each CAP must have a minimum of five congregations as members, but none of the congregations need be members of the GPCC itself. As members of a CAP, local congregations are in a working relationship to the GPCC. The GPCC coordinates the CAP's programs so as not to compete, but assist each other in social action throughout the city. The GPCC has also received into membership one more Roman Catholic parish (adding to the first five Catholic parishes received in 1968) and the Reformed Latter Day Saints denomination, plus several of their local congregations. The GPCC has significantly expanded in the last decade, and continues to expand its representation of new denominations and new congregations, adding many new individual people.

Of more consequence than numbers and size in the GPCC is the principle of "double voluntarism." A local church is a voluntary organization to which a person must belong as a prerequisite to being elected or appointed as a delegate to the GPCC. The congregation itself then volunteers to become a member of the GPCC, and appoints delegates, together with the pastor, to represent it to the GPCC's General Assembly. The congregation has higher loyalties to its own national denomination, so the GPCC is usually a secondary concern for most pastors and laymen. (It appears that laymen develop prior loyalties to the GPCC easier than pastors, probably because laymen have not had the seminary experience in which to internalize primary loyalties to a denomination.) But it is at the in-between level--between the congregations and the GPCC--that the congregation's delegates to the General Assembly become a layer of insulation, separating the church people from the inner circle of power within the GPCC. The GPCC's informal decision makers--William Cate,
Paul Schulze (who returned to the Center for Urban Encounter) and a few elected officials—amount to about five people who really create and mold policy decisions. The formal power structure of the GPCC is still made up of a relatively small number of people who represent over 130 congregations, or conservatively 35,000 to 45,000 people. The formal decision makers are 24 Board members, four officers, plus chairmen of three committees and three commissions. Taking into consideration that 35 people held 38 elective positions for 84 per cent of the time over a ten year period, 1959-1968, and 30 other people held some of the offices one term or less during the ten years, the great majority of the congregations' delegates do not break into the core group, which makes GPCC policies.

These delegates and common church people never really learn the inside vocabulary of the GPCC’s decision making about ecumenical and social action work. Again, the Nominating Committee chooses people whom they feel will work for the goals they generally value—social involvement goals. From an interview with one of the members of this Committee, he agreed that the nominees are screened to obtain Board members who are "somewhat sympathetic" toward more liberal social involvement goals.

When they are nominated, the nominees are also virtually assured of being elected, since Assembly delegates have never nominated from the floor opposing candidates to the pre-nominated slate. Because delegates from member churches seldom know the candidates and their views, and because there is no opposition to the official slate, there is no floor discussion, nor information given, to enlighten the Assembly about the nominees' important views. The staff says it couldn't be done, because it would be "politicizing," "awkward," "embarrassing" . . . In effect, church delegates become pawns—through their own apathy—for installing
hand-picked Board members.

The "insulation," or barrier between the congregation and the GPCC's Board is with the delegates, because the General Assembly's delegates are representatives to perfunctory meetings and perfunctory responsibilities. This particular process is a classical example of one factor which Michels described as a consistent threat to organizational democracy: apathy in membership participation. The double bureaucratic authority which effectively separates the congregation's delegates from the GPCC's governing process has the same effect that largeness does in national organizations. Michels demonstrated that largeness tends to make for increased bureaucracy and, therefore, for increased delegation of powers to a relatively few professional, technical experts. In the GPCC, the delegation of governing powers is also handed over to a small group, and ultimately, to the professional staff--the Executive Director and Directors of the Commissions for Urban Encounter and Church-Community Action Programs. Although the GPCC is smaller in size, compared to political parties and labor unions, it is not small in its representation of total membership, about 35 to 45 thousand (before Roman Catholic and Reformed Mormon parishes entered). However, the GPCC's double voluntarism and double bureaucratic layers also remove its authority, and heighten member apathy.

Of course, the delegates are not alone to blame for their minimal participation as responsible representatives. The GPCC's bureaucratic barrier works against democratic procedure in more ways than one. The lack of informative communication to all members is another protective obstacle. Communication out from the GPCC about the general work of CAP's and, recently, CUE (new Center for Urban Encounter) to delegates and
churches does exist in the form of an extensive monthly newsletter. However, most of the information is promotional material, telling of the GPCC's programs and good works—along with their financial needs. Information about GPCC activities communicated to members strictly avoids discussing the different church factions, whether conservative or liberal, and the issues they differ over. When open conflicts began to saturate the GPCC's Board meetings from 1964 onward, the real significance of the disagreements was just not communicated to member churches. An example are the minutes from the specially called Board meeting for the evening of March 30, 1965, to reconsider the GPCC's stand on House Bill 1307. The meeting was held in the Bethel AME (African Methodist Episcopal) Church. According to common testimony, the discussion was extremely tense and often times harsh; yet, the minutes are completely devoid of the true verbal exchange and, therefore, the true degree of conflict over the issue, HB 1307, "compensatory education," within the GPCC. In this case, as in others, members and congregations were not being told what was the state of the crucial issues currently being "hammered" out in the GPCC. The word of mouth communication by some Board members to friends within a few congregations undoubtedly filtered down, e.g., the Board's intense discussions of the issues during the 1968 Summer Crisis programs in the downtown Youth Ministry and in Albina. Relatively few congregations, however, have their own personal representative leaking information back to them. I have noticed a willingness among the GPCC's professional staff members to discuss with me the important internal conflicts which had taken place in the GPCC's past years, but a strong reluctance, even complete mootness, about current disagreements on issues touching real conservative-liberal conflict. In
such cases, the Executive Director and Board have consistently referred
to the GPCC's ecumenical purpose: to be a "meeting ground for friendly
dialogue and cooperation on common problems . . ." Because excessive
conflict violates the "ecumenical spirit," any open conflict becomes
embarrassing. The GPCC avoids it. In so doing, the GPCC ecumenical
function pragmatically becomes a posture of not antagonizing its surround-
ing secular powers. By fearing conflict and refusing to challenge power
structures, the GPCC's passive attitude conserves society's status quo.

A Test of Authority

The relationship between the GPCC and its several Community Action
Programs has shifted progressively from year to year since the first
CAP was begun in 1964. When Paul Schulze began his work in Albina, the
CAP which he developed there was largely a product of his own conception.
As was pointed out in the chapter on C-CAP, Schulze was almost given a
carta blanca in Albina, because there were no real models available at
that time for church action programs to follow. The character he gave
to C-CAP was largely due to his own experimental efforts at several kinds
of "secular" projects. Schulze intentionally directed the C-CAP program
toward the socio-economic needs of the black people, especially the
youth, in Albina. As pointed out in the C-CAP chapter, from the start,
Schulze pointed the programs specifically at the "alienated" black youth,
disregarding their church background, or lack of it. No "strings" were
attached, such as church-joining, or attending as a condition to enjoying
the program's benefits. It was the momentum of this "secularized" direc-
tion in which Schulze launched the Albina program that made the long-
lasting difference in C-CAP and the following CAP's under the GPCC.
Schulze's overall style of CAP ministry was the same. C-CAP sponsored dances in Irving Park, and Schulze hired a black, non-church member to be his "street worker"--to make contact with the drop-out, black youth. This liberal approach to community action was an affront to the very conservative, Albina black churches. The result was that the C-CAP program was not grounded in the local churches--a fact that was to plague C-CAP till the present.

What significance does C-CAP's "style of ministry" have to do with the organizational structure of the GPCC? Its significance directly affects the relationship of C-CAP to the GPCC in the following way. In progressive steps, C-CAP came more and more under control of non-church oriented people, until late 1968 and early 1969, when the GPCC faced a monetary crisis. Uncharacteristically, the Board of Directors began to hold the Executive Director, Cate, accountable for this state of fiscal imbalance. Cate determined that it was C-CAP's great over-use of funds that was uncontrollably draining the GPCC's money. When Cate tried to take control of C-CAP by firing the interim director of C-CAP, he was staunchly rebuffed by the C-CAP's own Board of Directors. It was, in effect, a show-down of organizational power--in the face of unconstituted authority by the Executive Director over C-CAP. The Albina C-CAP has maintained its "interim director" until 1972. The GPCC's Executive staff was forced to spend much effort in 1969 and 1970, finding effective ways to bring the Albina CAP back under control. An effective method of "control," however, was never found, but a way of circumventing C-CAP was finally worked out.

Structurally, what the above progression of events illustrates is the organizational dilemma which Paul Harrison identifies in the American
Baptist Convention, and is endemic to some degree in most Protestant denominations. Formal authority is constitutionally vested in the congregations, and the rest of the denominations' organizational structure is supposedly devoted to serving the needs of the individual congregations. There is little or no authority formally empowering the officers and staff. So it is with the GPCC. Cate's authority was a kind of "grasped power" over the CAP's in the absence of any constitutional definition of authority. The test of authority over C-CAP also illustrates, therefore, the previously common practice of the GPCC's executives to operate with oligarchic power.

The organizational problem which the CAP's present to the GPCC is founded on the very premise of Protestant freedom and spontaneous voluntarism. Like Harrison's description of the American Baptist's organization, the local congregations are literally laws unto themselves, and constitutionally, are not accountable to any denominational organization over them. Until 1968, the church CAP's were operated without any constitutional provision to authorize the structural addition of the CAP's. Schulze set up C-CAP's own Board of Directors in Albina, and made that local CAP Board of Directors a pattern for the rest of those seven CAP's which were to follow. Each CAP Board of Directors was to have its own local "responsibility" for its own special kind of programs. Both Cate and Schulze admitted that neither thought of the GPCC's formal organizational structure during the first two years of C-CAP's beginning, but they were primarily concerned with the practical effectiveness of its new "style of ministry." When asked about the degree of the CAP's present autonomy from the GPCC, Schulze answered that each CAP is "just about autonomous in practice right now." He felt that the
GPCC's role should not be to control or administer each CAP, but rather to assist and help coordinate assistance to the CAP's. Schulze granted that he had never foreseen the GPCC as more than a coordinating agency for the CAP's, because he wanted the CAP's to be a kind of midwife to an essential change in the local congregations' "style of ministering to their local neighborhoods." Both Schulze and Cate wanted those congregations to develop into a new style of congregation, blending their separate efforts into a united ministry to their whole area. Special coordination of community action would come from the GPCC. Schulze wanted to develop a new concept called "parish clusters." Schulze wrote an introduction to the new GPCC constitution, soon to be submitted at the annual 1968 meeting. Schulze there described the "parish cluster" concept:

The Church-CAP programs are the early stage formulations of what may eventually become smaller parish clusters working together even more unitedly on a total ministry to a neighborhood. Here, several parishes may well become one operational unit combining many of their efforts, making more economical use of their facilities. While maintaining individual worship traditions, they could nevertheless do much together in education and community service. Some of their building resources could well be released for secular community use. (. . .) It is essential that heavy emphasis continue on local initiative, planning and support of geographical area project ministries. Where additional funds are needed, they should be sought through the over-all supervisory structure.

Although the church CAP programs must continue to maintain initiative and primary responsibility for ministry for their respective areas, there is need for coordination through an effective and creative Commission. Many of the communities' problems are similar to those in other areas; hence, general evaluation and coordination is important in church-CAP planning. The church-CAP structure allows the churches to become the agent of community development in neighborhoods. 9

It is interesting to note a comment by the chairman of the committee which wrote the new 1968 constitution, the priest who initiated the Catholic Churches' participation in the GPCC. He said: "A lot of people
carried out. Mrs. Varner resigned in February, 1969, and Mr. Nelson was assigned to be the "interim director" of C-CAP. In the following months, Nelson hired another person to the C-CAP staff, without consulting William Cate over at the GPCC.

It was in late 1968 that a new treasurer, Mr. Lowell Steen, took over for the GPCC. Mr. Steen was aghast at the great expenditures through the previous summer and fall for the Black Summer Crisis in relation to the income for 1968. (Part of the Summer Crisis program and expenditure was focused on the Youth Ministry and Charix Coffee House for "alienated" youth. Note chapter on Hub-CAP. But by far the largest outlay was for the work in Albina.) In an interview with Steen, he said that the GPCC's work in community action had had several beneficial effects, and he named three specifically: demonstrated to the city that the GPCC was truly acting to benefit the community; demonstrated to the church people of Portland what needs to be yet done; and it took some of the pressure off individual churches which could not have handled the action projects individually. After paying these compliments, Steen said: "The financial situation of the GPCC was in a mess when I was elected Treasurer. The administration of the Council was deplorable, starting with Bill Cate! As far as the money of the Council was concerned, Cate was irresponsible. Cate didn't know how much money was in the Council's account, but he authorized spending it to the point of a great deficit ... Cate could do this because Bill Cate really was the GPCC. (Cate had announced his resignation by the time of this interview, and Steen remained treasurer only through 1969.) The churches have a tendency to do this ... to not put ministers on the spot and hold them financially responsible." Later on in the inter-
view, Mr. Steen said that, as the financial officer of the GPCC, it was extremely difficult to deal with the CAP's, because "we could never get a realistic, itemized budget of their planned expenditures for the coming months, or year from most of the CAP's." Steen thought that a part of the irresponsible use of the money was due to the CAP's over-use of that extra amount that had poured into the GPCC for the Summer Crisis. Yet, Steen still maintained that Cate himself allowed the situation to get out of hand.

When telling about the events during the Black Summer Crisis at C-CAP, Mrs. Varner said that Colden Brown, the special leader for the Black Crisis program, found out early in his stay with C-CAP that Cate held the purse-strings for anything connected with the Summer Crises programing. Mrs. Varner said that Brown had convinced Cate that just about everything he (Brown) would undertake was an immediate necessity. She said that to everybody's amazement at C-CAP, Brown would come away from Cate's office with a check for whatever he wanted. Other respondents corroborated this story, saying that Brown scared every minister who was connected with the Black Crisis events into believing that if his programs didn't go off immediately, as planned, the black community would reach the feared exploding point, and there would be "real trouble" (violence). Robert Nelson said that Colden Brown had, step by step, hired 15 black people as his special staff for the Black Crisis programs. Few expenditures were spared--if Brown advocated the need for the expense, according to the respondents.

The special amount of money received by the GPCC for the Summer Crisis program at C-CAP and Hub-CAP totaled approximately $48,000. Most of this sum went to the Black Summer Crisis in Albina, and according
to Mr. Steen the books showed a large 1968 deficit of about $10,000. This deficit increased at a rate over $1,000 a month when Steen was first taking over as Treasurer. Later on Cate said that the CAP's deficit had reached $25,000 by the middle of 1969, when the GPCC was starting its new funding effort, the "Genesis Campaign." In retrospect, it is easy to understand the sudden pressure which the new Treasurer exerted upon the Executive Director and the GPCC's Board of Directors. At the Board meetings, Mr. Steen relentlessly pursued the necessity for economizing and balancing the budget—in the early months of 1969. Cate advised all the CAP's about their empty bank accounts, especially C-CAP and its "interim director," Robert Nelson.

It was in this situation that Mr. Nelson hired an extra assistant at C-CAP, without contacting Cate or his own C-CAP Board. Apparently, this new drain on the CAP's limited funds seemed to Cate a willful defiance of his own authority by Mr. Nelson. This happened soon after the time Mrs. Varner resigned at the end of February, 1969, and Mr. Nelson began to operate in the capacity of "interim director." According to Mrs. Varner, Cate phoned her, inviting her to meet with him, the GPCC President, the Rev. Royald Caldwell, and another GPCC officer, to discuss finding a permanent C-CAP director to follow Mrs. Varner. The meeting was set at a nearby, Albina, Roman Catholic settlement house, and Mrs. Varner became suspicious of the meeting's purpose. On her own volition, she called Mr. Nelson, and invited him to go to the meeting with her. As she suspected, Dr. Cate was surprised to see Mr. Nelson arrive at that meeting. Cate's purpose was to discuss the possibility of Mrs. Varner's taking the action of "dismissing" Mr. Nelson—in her official capacity. If her guess was right, she wanted Cate himself to
say he wanted to fire Nelson. Mrs. Varner said, "I figured that if they (GPCC) wanted to get rid of Bob (Nelson), he must be getting in their (white establishment's) craw, and if so Bob is worth keeping at C-CAP working for us." She described Cate as becoming very angry; the only time she had ever seen Cate "blow his cool." She quoted Cate as telling Mr. Nelson, "You have blocked everything I have tried to do through our program for the Albina area . . . ."

Schulze and other respondents, including Nelson himself, described Mr. Nelson as a strong churchman, and a good friend of Cate during the early days of the GPCC's involvement in Albina. The longer Mr. Nelson became active in the C-CAP Board of Directors, and worked directly with and for many black people along with Schulze, he progressively became more militant for the black cause.

Soon after this meeting with Mrs. Varner and Mr. Nelson, Cate asked the President of the GPCC, the Rev. Royald Caldwell, to write a letter to Mr. Nelson, terminating his services with C-CAP, because of the CAP's financial troubles. Robert Nelson was determined to fight Cate and the GPCC's authority over C-CAP to be the decision maker for dismissing and employing the CAP's staff members. Nelson knew he had the sympathy of most of the black people on the C-CAP's Board of Directors, so he informed the C-CAP Board that they no longer had to take a back seat to the GPCC. Nelson asked the C-CAP Board to decide whether he should be fired, or whether they (C-CAP) could find a solution to their financial problems themselves. In an interview with Robert Nelson about a month after the President of the GPCC had written the letter to C-CAP's Board chairman, demanding Nelson's dismissal as "interim director," Nelson gave to the writer the four mimeographed copies of the corres-
respondence between the GPCC and C-CAP concerning Nelson's dismissal. As noted above, however, Nelson remained "interim director" until 1972.

Mr. Nelson told the researcher that the C-CAP Board had discussed in its recent meetings the possibility of leaving the jurisdiction of the GPCC. The Board members, he said, felt they now had access to sources of financial funds, both in and out of Albina, and that C-CAP could make it on its own from then on. Nelson said he discouraged them from parting from the GPCC, because he thought it more important to remain in contact with the rest of the churches in Portland. The churches would be of great help in developing their ideas of urban responsibility, as well as receiving financial help from the churches in the long run. However, Nelson strongly stated that C-CAP was now taking the steps necessary to obtain their autonomy to become more politically active.

The obvious problem which C-CAP has always had is the lack of financial resources within its own constituency. Those few black churches which were members of C-CAP, together with individual black people taking interest in the program, had little money to contribute. By itself, C-CAP had little leverage to obtain national church funds or federal grants. C-CAP was largely financially dependent upon the GPCC. This hard fact was no deterrent, however, in C-CAP's willingness to challenge the GPCC's authority over them. From the time of Cate's aborted attempt to fire Nelson, there was a different relationship between the GPCC--especially the Executive Director, William Cate--and the C-CAP group. Tension grew steadily. Robert Nelson and the C-CAP staff became more militantly active. For instance, on June 2, 1969, a "rumble" at an Albina hamburger drive-in brought a great number of Portland City Police, followed by a large number of arrests of the black people within the area.
At that time, the city's Chief of Police was out of town at a conference. Because of the "explosive situation in Albina," the Deputy Chief of Police, Pat Carr, decided to make a "show of force" by the police. Following the event, Robert Nelson and his staff were extremely indignant at the indiscriminate mass arrests and police violence against so many black on-lookers in the vicinity. Nelson's staff decided to coordinate a petition effort to recall the Deputy Police Chief, who made the decision to "show force." This type of political activity was not consonant with Cate's concept of church-CAP business. Cate said that Robert Nelson has been "abrasive" to churches in the GPCC, and that he has "swiped our program" (from the GPCC) by moving C-CAP away from a "church-centered" CAP.

When C-CAP's own Board of Directors acted as its own organization and rebuffed the authoritarian command from Cate through the GPCC's President, Caldwell, that Robert Nelson be fired from C-CAP, it amounted to C-CAP's declaration of independence from the GPCC. That act also affected the other CAP's intimate relationship to the GPCC. It became a tenuous business relationship. From then on, C-CAP's main connection to the GPCC was reduced to finances.

Evaluation of Power and Authority

As the first pages of this chapter discussed, the GPCC follows most Protestant denominations in America by placing its highest formal value upon the autonomy of the local unit and the freedom of the individual. Constitutionally, the GPCC's organization is anything but hierarchical. Max Weber's categories of authority are primarily applicable to authoritarian and hierarchical organizations. Weber's models for studying
organizations are, therefore, difficult to apply to much of America's religious organizations, and to the GPCC. The pietistic movements from Europe, particularly the Calvinistic groups, ostensibly feared old-world ecclesiastical authority and excessive civil power. Largely out of this cradle of religious struggle and thought has come the American ideology for democratic government. Because American religions have emphasized the suspicion of authority, these voluntary organizations—in formal structure—are the epitome of participatory democracy.

However, as Paul Harrison has shown, voluntary associations of all kinds in America, as well as religious denominations, have developed into complex organizations which have striking similarities to the highly centralized structures of government and corporations. Contrary to their formal statements, the churches and other voluntary associations have become corporate types in their centralized structures. The national officers and staff have obtained a significant degree of influence over the activities and policies of the local units and congregations. However, they have not obtained power by constitutional authority. Max Weber's social organization theory emphasizes the necessity of legitimacy for those offices of authority. The people holding the offices are given the authority to make decisions and act by the "legal," or constitutional sanctions of that organized social system. Because a social system cannot operate for long on the basis of the leader's own power alone, the leaders must find a kind of sanction which will give them a legitimate right to exercise their power. As mentioned before, Paul Harrison called this sanction rational-pragmatic authority in contrast to Weber's rational-legal authority.

During his first two years, 1959-1962, the new Executive Secretary,
William Cate, departed little from the traditional type of ecumenical programs common to local councils of churches. The GPCC was then forty years old. Many established procedures maintained its accepted traditional, annual programs. "Institutionalization" had turned the organization away from developing new avenues of cooperative church projects. However, evidence indicates the time was ripe for Cate's kind of progressive leadership in the GPCC. The process of secularization had helped to bring several capable and vigorous liberal ministers to some of the larger congregations in Portland. The same pervasive, liberal influence was also loosening the moderately conservative attitude of many other clergymen in member congregations. On the other hand, when several ministers thought the GPCC's liberal actions had adversely affected their congregation, they moved in the opposite direction during the 1960's. Two ministers officially withdrew their congregations from the GPCC in 1969, and many more gradually reduced their financial support.

A former president of the GPCC and member of the search committee when Cate was interviewed for the Executive's job became very critical of the "over-emphasis" during the 1960's on social action by the GPCC. He said that they were then looking for a man with new ideas for organizational management, but not too liberal. His impression from their interviewing Cate indicated that Cate held such moderate views of ecumenical church goals and activities. This well-known Portland minister said that he had no idea that Cate would turn out to be so liberal as to go "over-board for political involvements, secular community actions . . . condoning actions by the Youth Ministry which obstructed the city's police work . . ." He added, "There isn't one congregation in the GPCC that hasn't paid dearly for something the
Council had done to disrupt the law and alienate a lot of people in the city. In 1969 this respondent withdrew his congregation from GPCC membership in protest to the GPCC's actions.

One of the most important points this chapter makes is the wide breadth of the authority, although undefined (rational-pragmatic), that Cate had obtained. The chapter points out how he methodically nurtured individuals' support of social action goals. He gave them his personal attention. Several respondents have spontaneously described the loyalty Cate generated in this way. To a degree it is charismatic.

This chapter has examined the oligarchic structure of power developed within the GPCC and the strength of Cate's "grasped authority." Primarily William Cate, Paul Schulze and other liberal GPCC leaders used their rational-pragmatic authority to attain their ultimate dual goal: social action in the context of church cooperation, or ecumenism. Pragmatically, the classic meaning of ecumenics is the people's willingness, or spirit for cooperative, democratic church actions. Consequently, the GPCC's leaders' form of compelling their liberal interpretation of church programing into social actions stands in contrast to the relatively reluctant, conservative lay church members in Portland's churches.

Important also to note is that Cate used "coercive", or oligarchic means to install his style of ecumenical efforts involving a wider range of "secular" life. That is to say, Cate developed the oligarchic powers of a few leaders in the GPCC to accomplish more secularly involved, social action goals. "Congregational authority," the formal governing principle of the GPCC, was overcome by the informal, practical way of getting things done through the existing organization. It
allowed the real decision making to fall into the hands of the Executive Director and a relatively few Executive staff members, together with an elite group of the elected Board and officers. However, on the informal, pragmatic power level, it was the Executive Director who held the ultimate direction of decision making.

Secondly, attached to the leaders' oligarchic control of the organization was the layer of organizational insulation between the effective leaders and the large number of lay church members. The most important ingredient to this layer of insulation was the apathy of the congregations' delegates to the GPCC's two Assembly meetings a year. Apathy was also fostered by the clergymen of the member churches, because they largely influenced the attitude and commitment to the GPCC. This chapter pointed out that the same relatively few delegates had held most of the elected offices of the GPCC during the 1960's.

Because clergymen's livelihood depends on the "success" of their own congregations, few local clergymen can afford to encourage their most capable lay members to be "ecumenically" active in the GPCC at the expense of their own congregations. Pastors of struggling congregations, or congregations which feel threatened by the liberalness of the GPCC, therefore, avoid the GPCC by not attending themselves and not sending delegates. Those delegates who do attend the annual meetings do not challenge the GPCC's pre-prepared slate of officers, etc.

Also, the GPCC published information about its more liberal action programs, harmonized and filtered of the details which would be too offensive to the great number of apathetic member congregations. The news-letters minimized the controversial issues, and maximized unity and cooperation--through social action. Cate, Schulze, Bonthius, Wright,
Menzel and others made extra efforts, mentioned by several respondents, to publish a dearth of "theological study papers" as the basis of new "position papers," which were adopted by the Board of Directors. The congregations, however, were almost always left out of the preparation and circulation of these papers—until they were firmly adopted.

By the unchallenged pre-selection of Board members and the controlling of information, a bureaucratic layer of insulation was built up by the more permanent, hired staff leaders, and extended to encompass their new structural appendages, the CAP's. The leaders consistently stressed the new action programs' religious orthodoxy and ecumenical "need." Apparently to a great degree they kept the image of the new programs relatively conservative, until the Summer of 1968.

In Part III of this chapter, the power-authority relationship between the CAP's, specifically the Albina C-CAP, is discussed in the context of the 1968-1969 dispute over C-CAP's excessive use of the CAP's total funds. At C-CAP the special director for the Black Summer Crisis program, Colden Brown, had been able to convince William Cate to allow him, Brown, to spend greater and greater amounts on their Crisis program, till there was a large deficit. However, that fall the new Treasurer, L. Steen, placed heavy pressure upon Cate to reduce the overspending following the Summer Crisis programs. Soon after Steen had bluntly made the accusation at a GPCC Board meeting, Cate took action to fire Robert Nelson at C-CAP. As the chapter points out, Nelson resisted with the aid of the C-CAP Board of Directors, of whom very few were church members. According to Cate, C-CAP had become so non-church oriented and was continuing to spend money on new, non-church oriented staff members, he felt urgent tactics were needed. Several of the C-CAP
Board, Mrs. Varner told the researcher, consisted of black activists, but not of Black Panthers, as Cate charged. When Cate could not get rid of Nelson and his association with the black "radicals," Cate moved quickly to remove the GPGC as a major source of money for C-CAP.

William Cate's interaction with the few conservatives on his Board of Directors over the use of funds for the 1968 Summer Crisis programs reveals that Cate reacted with his own brand of conservatism. However, Cate's reaction toward the criticism directed at himself was his own effort to restore the confidence of his Board in the Community Action Programs, as well as in his management of them.

Theoretically, the sharp criticism by the new Treasurer about Cate's loose financial management represented a significant tear in the canopy of insulation constructed around the CAP's. In order to repair that hole, Cate had to restore the appearance of the CAP's religious orthodoxy and social conservatism. Cate himself, therefore, reacted conservatively. Since Cate knew the GPCC's social action practices had to maintain a degree of visible conservativism to appease their more conservative members, he acted swiftly to rejuvenate that appearance.

Another very important factor contributed to Cate's stimulation to restore the CAP's good image. A committee to rewrite the GPCC constitution was at that time sending out its final draft for the first adoption reading in the April annual meeting. This constitution completely reorganized the GPCC's working organization around three main social action divisions. One of the new divisions is CUE, the Center for Urban Encounter. Its purpose is to offer a variety of means to educate the laymen of the member congregations about social action: its theological meaning, its goals and its practical applications. Both Cate and Schulze
have told me that they consider CUE the most important vehicle by which they would be able to convey social action goals into the GPCC's future. The adoption of this constitution, therefore, was extremely important to Cate, Schulze and all the liberal leaders. It was a crucial time. Cate did not want to jeopardize its adoption with a last-minute conservative reaction, erupting out of the Board and mushrooming in a chain reaction throughout the general membership. It would have destroyed the liberal goals of the GPCC to which these men were so committed.

In other words, Cate knew the GPCC had to maintain a paradoxical posture: a traditional, conservative appearance—an inherent part of the liberals' protective insulation—while at the same time, more seriously pursuing liberal social action goals.
CONGREGATIONS

COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

DENOMINATIONS

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CAP Presidents (7)

27 members elected by General Assembly

Denomination Reps. (9)

Executive Committee: (3 Members at large)

Chairmen of Commissions, Auxiliaries and Operational Committees

CENTER FOR URBAN ENCOUNTER

Chairman, by General Assembly

12 members from Board of Dir.

6 members at large

Representative from each CAP

Chairmen of Divisions

Ex-officio: Exec. Secretary Director

AUXILIARIES

Church Women United

Youth Concerns

COMMUNITY ACTION COMMISSION

Chairman, by General Assembly

12 members from Board

CAP Presidents

6 members at large

Ex-officio:

Exec. Secretary Director

CAP Directors

OPERATIONAL COMMITTEES

Finance

Membership

Nominations

Public Relations

TRAINING

(Christian Education)

RESEARCH

(Faith and Order)

COMMUNICATIONS

(Worship and Arts)

(Radio and TV)

METROPOLITAN MINISTRIES

Chairman, by Gen. Assembly

12 members from Board

6 members at large

Chairmen of Committees

Ex-officio:

Exec. Secretary Director

CAP Directors

CAP Directors

C_CAP

East-CAP

Hub-CAP

North-CAP

Snow-CAP South

Snow-CAP East

Snow-CAP North

Chaplaincies

Metropolitan Housing

FISH Volunteer Services

Community Organization

Metropolitan Action
CHAPTER X

SOCIAL INSULATION

In many church bodies and in their various structural divisions, evidence (viz., Chapter 1) confirms that an increasing number of the activist ministers involved in controversial issues have positions within the churches' organizations which are organizationally insulated from the lay members. Beginning with the "Selma Freedom March" in 1965, the greater proportion of clergymen taking part in protests, civil rights organizations, etc., has been non-parish pastors, such as campus pastors and specialized divisions of the national body. The many departments of the National Council of Churches and the ecumenical councils of the larger cities in the United States have also supplied more and more of the clergymen to the social activist ranks. These non-parish ministers are protected, that is, they are insulated by the independent, specialized departments within many of the larger church organizations throughout the country. The local congregation is kept at a distance, organizationally, so that it does not have much restrictive leverage upon the activist clergymen in higher structural levels. This is also true in denominational groups without hierarchical polity—-that is, without formal authority. As part of the larger organizational structures, these liberal clergymen do not need to fear the laymen's displeasure against their own social action involvements.

Throughout the preceding chapters, we have wrestled with the fact that within the GPCC's membership there was barely a perceptible reaction
to the GPCC's new social action policies and activities. In the light of the conservative reactions described from studies listed earlier in the previous chapter, the question "why" the relatively mild reaction to the GPCC's actions and leaders now leads this study to the conclusion of its central question. Theoretically, the sociological answer for the unexpected mild reaction within the GPCC can be termed the process of insulation. The emphasis on the social process, or interaction of people and groups is deliberate. To be sure, the GPCC's organization provides much of the GPCC's leaders and activist staff members with structural insulation, but the "structure" of the GPCC between the leaders and congregational laymen is primarily informal organization. The Executive Director has led in the insulation process by maneuvering the constitutionally powerless Board of Directors through his own dynamic informal authority. This change of organizational impotence into a formidable social force within the community was also dependent on the conditions predetermined by the dialectic process of secularization.

The study has found seven separate forms, or aspects, of social insulation surrounding the GPCC's social action programs. They are: (1) the apathy of the large number of GPCC members; (2) the oligarchic take-over of the GPCC's governing process; (3) the lack of communication with the uninvolved member congregations; (4) the financial independence of the GPCC's action programs; (5) the church-CAP's semi-autonomous relationship to the GPCC, which made laymen's criticisms of CAP social action difficult to focus on the GPCC as the responsible agent; (6) the secularization of an increasing number of parish pastors within member congregations; (7) the GPCC's ambivalent posture before laymen and the public, holding to conservative policies while acting very liberally.
The first form of insulation is member apathy. As Michels has informed us, the problem of membership apathy plagues almost every volunteer organization. However, in this loose religious organization, there is what we have previously termed, double volunteerism. The active lay church member is asked to give loyalty to a second religious group, the GPCC, which is not a part of his own church background. However, the local congregation usually has socialized its better members into a primary loyalty for its own goals, doctrine and denomination. For the local church member's religious dedication, the GPCC seldom runs more than a distant second, third or fourth.

The precariousness of the layman's loyalty to the GPCC easily comes to a separating point, because the local pastor will not encourage, but subtly discourage, his layman's participation in the GPCC, if the pastor must choose between building the strength of his own congregation, as against the life of the GPCC. The local congregation can never escape its competitive situation, and the local pastor is judged primarily by its success under his leadership. If the pastor's laymen are participating actively in GPCC committees, or on the GPCC's Board of Directors, etc., at the expense of participating in the life of the congregation, and if the congregation is struggling to stay solvent, then the pastor will usually not hesitate to discourage his layman's participation in the GPCC. The GPCC would have to be contributing a great deal to the local smaller congregation's survival solutions to demand even a strong secondary loyalty from such pastors and laymen. Consequently, in the case of many smaller congregations, the GPCC is looked upon as a competitive religious organization, even though the GPCC's first goal is to reduce competition and aid cooperation between congregations. Obviously,
the tendency to look upon the GPCC as a competitor of the local congregation for its own talent and money is much more prevalent among the more conservative congregations.

As the GPCC's efforts became more and more slanted toward social action programs, the more conservative congregations took a decreasing interest in the GPCC's semi-annual meetings. Of course, the most conservative congregations refused to attend at all, following the GPCC's multiplication of its church CAP's. Instead of negative reaction, their protest amounted to self-elimination.

The second form of insulation was the oligarchic assumption of informal power primarily by William Cate and, secondly, by Paul Schulze. One or two elected officers may be considered loosely to have been in this category of grasped authority, namely Robert Bonthius and Paul Wright. Because there was a vacuum of power at the Executive staff level for accomplishing the new courses toward social action, the aggressive personalities of Cate and Schulze quickly filled the opening. Since the Executive Director's (Cate's) legal authority is almost completely undefined, to accomplish the goals of a strong, determined leader, the new Executive "grasped" his authority in the presence of that constitutional vacuum. Due to his ex-officio membership on all committees, including the Nominating Committee, within his first three or four years at the GPCC, William Cate had established a Board of Directors which was sympathetic to the liberal views of church practice, if not committed to social action. The traditional practice of not nominating anyone to the Board of Directors from the floor of the Annual Meeting has remained consistent throughout the 1960's, and has virtually assured Cate of a friendly Board of Directors.
In the opinion of the writer, Cate's use of a peculiar combination of leadership qualities gave him, to some degree, the charismatic character necessary to accomplish a significant—almost radical—change in the GPCC. Cate's charisma was limited to the degree that he most often tried to influence people on a personal, one-to-one basis. His approach was low key and gradual, and consciously directed to a few important laymen of as many of the larger or important congregations as he could reach. Cate built up a personal following, a commitment, to social action principles in a group of laymen who were willing to work and serve on the GPCC's committees, etc.

Although Cate's control of the Board of Directors was only informal, it was powerful in the area of promoting social action kinds of policies. Because of this broadly based social action consensus on the Board, which Cate had methodically established, the Board of Directors especially, as well as the Commissions' chairmen and the Executive staff, became an oligarchic, protective covering between the church CAP's innovative social involvements and the critical church members of the GPCC. If there is a "structural" insulation in the GPCC, the informal, oligarchic control by the Executive and staff and the Board of Directors is it.

The third form of insulation was the lack of communication in both directions between the GPCC's leadership and the uninvolved congregations (in social action). In this case, the Executive Director and his staff, together with the Board of Directors, acted not so much as a barrier to communication from the congregations, but rather as a filtering system, which absorbed the criticism directed at some of the CAP programs or other social action leaders. The filtering process worked in the other
direction also. The GPCC's Executive staff has long put out a monthly news letter, which interpreted the work of the separate CAP's by toning down any "radical" actions by the CAP's, always trying to place the action within the context of solid theology, if not conservative theological reasoning. Interviewees have noted that Cate in his personal appearances to dissident congregations was a "master" at reinterpreting the GPCC's controversial social policies and dispelling the conservatives' criticisms.

The fourth aspect of insulation was the independent sources of money generously given directly to the social action programs, apart from the support of the local congregations. As previously mentioned, the national and regional levels of several denominations—the Oregon District of the United Methodist Women, the Presbyterian Church, USA's Board of Social Ministry, the Lutheran Church in America's Social Ministry and more—have contributed large annual grants to the GPCC's church CAP's and other social action work, such as the GPCC's new Center for Urban Encounter (CUE). Portland's United Good Neighbors' fund had also put C-CAP and East-CAP on their budget. Seldom were Cate and the Board forced to go to the local congregations for special hand-outs to finance the new social action goals. Since the independent sources of money released the Board from the necessity constantly to report to the congregations how well the money was being utilized in any exact manner, the independent grants also released the Board from the conservative restraints of the majority of the member congregations. In fact, accurately detailed accounts of the specific use of monies by the church-CAP's was largely withheld from the Board of Directors itself.

The fifth kind of insulation for the GPCC's leadership and CAP's
action programs was their lack of accessibility provided by the social distance inherent in the undefined organizational relationship of the church CAP's to the GPCC. When Paul Schulze took over the first church CAP in Albina, he knew that there was no constitutional provision for the CAP's in the GPCC's structure. Schulze had almost a completely independent hand in developing the first CAP's, so he began to create the CAP's in the image of his ideal "parish clusters." Schulze--always in consultation with Cate--decided to develop a local board of administration for each local CAP, made up of delegates from those local area congregations actively involved in the work of that particular CAP. Each local board was eventually to make the individual CAP's increasingly autonomous from the GPCC's leadership. The degree of independence was determined by the amount of local, independent financial income each local CAP had. For instance, Hub-CAP had access from within its own area to special contributions by several of the largest downtown congregations in the city. The special grants to CAP's programs from denominational foundations were most often given to the GPCC to divide, as it saw fit, among the CAP's. This financial control gave the GPCC leadership a greater control over some of the CAP's than over those more financially independent.

Because the GPCC published more frequently in the later Sixties that each local church CAP had its own action program specialized for its own area and guided by its own board of directors, apart from the GPCC, the city's conservative congregations were increasingly unable to identify the GPCC itself as the target for their reactions. Because the CAP's never were a constitutional part of the GPCC until 1969, the amount of unofficial authority the GPCC staff exerted over each individual CAP's policies was largely a mystery, even to members of the Board. The
undefined, semi-bureaucratic relationship of the CAP's to the GPCC's executives served to blur the CAP's responsibilities for their own liberal activities. Therefore, the quasi-autonomous distance separating the CAP's from the GPCC confused most members outside of the executive circle, and became a source of bureaucratic insulation against local church reactions.

The sixth aspect of insulation within the GPCC is the increased secularization of pastors serving local parishes among a wider number and variety of church denominations. Applied to the ministry, "secularization" does not mean that these men are less "spiritual," or more materialistic, but that they are more sympathetic with social change through the church's involvement in social action. Several of the studies of clergy, mentioned in Chapter 1, in the first part of this chapter give a perspective about those ministers who are, or were, in parishes and took active parts in controversial social actions. However, there are also indications that a growing number of ministers who do not become activists are becoming more sympathetic with the church's social actions.

In his 1967 national survey of 7,441 Protestant clergy, Hadden found that regardless of theology, conservative or liberal, clergymen were "overwhelmingly" sympathetic to the Negroes' right to achieve complete social justice in America. However, those of conservative theological background continued to be more conservative on social issues. Hadden asked three questions. The first, "I basically disapprove of the civil rights movement in America," was almost completely rejected in every denomination. From a low of four per cent of Presbyterians to a high of eight per cent of Methodists and Missouri
Synod Lutherans agreed with the statement.

The second question of the survey was, "For the most part, the churches have been woefully inadequate in facing up to the civil rights issue." Agreement to the statement was at a high of 77 per cent among American Baptists to a low of 69 per cent among Missouri Synod Lutherans. When the "probably agree" responses are added, the over-all proportion rises to 85 per cent.

The third question was, "Many whites pretend to be very Christian while in reality their racial attitudes demonstrate their lack of or misunderstanding of Christianity." Agreement with the third statement ranged from 78 per cent by Missouri Synod Lutherans to 83 per cent for American Baptists and Presbyterians. The "probably agree" responses raise the total sympathetic group to at least 90 per cent in every denomination.

This cross-section of American Protestant clergy, most of whom are serving parishes, demonstrates that more parish pastors are now concerned about real social changes within civil rights issues, even though a minority of those serving parishes become outspoken and personally involved. The broad spectrum of parish pastors' favorable attitude toward the church, i.e., the GPCC as the church ecumenical participating in the local social action work, has helped to moderate the irate reactions of conservative parishioners. In many ways since the GPCC's progressive social involvement, moderately "secularized" pastors of member congregations have absorbed their laymen's critical reactions by personally giving a constructive explanation of the GPCC's programming. By calming reactionary laymen, instead of siding with their con-
servativism, many parish pastors have become part of the insulation process which protects the GPCC.

The seventh form of insulation is the GPCC's ambivalence in presenting simultaneously to the public both an avowed conservative posture, while devoting its greatest efforts to liberal social actions. Because it pervades and influences all the other insulative forms, this contradictory word against action is probably the most important aspect of insulation. It was to this "game" of playing it both ways that William Cate studiously styled his administrative efforts. Cate deliberately avoided antagonizing conservative churchmen from the time he arrived. Cate was a tireless spokesman to a wide variety of church meetings throughout the city, reassuring the apprehensive congregations that the GPCC's new Community Action Programs were not taking over the GPCC's primary goals. Cate also minimized the increasing social involvement by reinterpreting it into conservative ("solid") theological terms. Paul Schulze and Robert Menzel (Hub-CAP), both of whom were ministers in the very conservative Missouri Synod Lutheran Church, were of a great aid to Cate and the GPCC in preparing "position" papers on sticky issues, giving the theological justification for the proposed GPCC action, or social stand.

Internally, then, the GPCC worked fiercely to increase the effectiveness of its social action programs, while externally the GPCC was widely propagandizing to the conservative churchmen and public that it was still using the more traditional programs that honored the status quo values of the local congregations. On the one hand, the GPCC leadership forcefully committed the organization to social action goals; while on the other hand, they revived many of the older programs that assisted
the local congregation in achieving their own self-preservation goals
CHAPTER XI

INSULATION--PREVENTION IN THE PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION

Two Theories of Legitimation

Although fewer liberal parish pastors are willing to risk the reactionary consequences from their own aroused laymen by becoming active in socio-political causes, another "brand" of minister has become socially active--the non-parish minister. Examples of such activist, non-parish ministers are exemplified in the GPCC's church CAP's, such as Paul Schulze and Robert Menzel. Apparently this pattern developed because of the insulation a non-parish church organization provides these activist-ministers. If this is true, how does the insulation of the larger organization legitimate these ministers' controversial activities?

The key question becomes "what is legitimation?" Max Weber conceived of legitimacy in terms of sociology of politics, and therefore, in the context of the relationship between command and obedience, power and authority. Weber asked the question, "How is political leadership established--that is, legitimated?" He has given a classical description of the three ways by which a leader's authority may be legitimated: rational-legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority. They are described in Chapter 9 relative to authority.

In his study of the American Baptist Convention, Paul Harrison has found a fourth type of authority, which stands alone in its own style of
legitimation. He calls it "rational-pragmatic" authority. (This definition is also briefly discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of authority.) The power that comes to this office holder is not legally authorized by the organization, or its constitution. Usually such an office is given a certain amount of responsibilities, but very little legitimate authority over other parts of the organization. In order to "get things done" and carry out responsibilities, the office holder begins to exercise power in the vacuum where no power was legally authorized. Harrison called it "power grasped." Harrison's study points out that voluntary organizations are less likely to develop elaborate enough constitutions to spell out specifications of "rational-legal" authority, rational-pragmatic authority. The power he grasps is legitimated by its very use. As Berger and Luckmann would say, it is "objectivated" into a facticity. Weber said that authority is legitimated power. Harrison shows that new power is acquired by a leader often because he has the temerity to "grasp" and exercise new power. Because he gets away with it, the power is changed into authority, and it becomes a "fact."

More recent writers in the sociology of knowledge interpret "legitimation" as a much more comprehensive process—a process that explains and justifies our whole social order. All socially objectivated "knowledge" is legitimating. An "objectivation" is any human activity attaining a "reality that confronts its original producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves."

Legitimation is essentially processual, because any "knowledge" that is socially objectivated into practical life is legitimating. Language names and evaluates social objects, and thereby places them into a social order. Then in return, language imposes its own order upon
social things to the point that it builds up a cognitive and normative structure, which becomes the knowledge of its particular society. ² In a processual dialectic, man creates his society and its order, principally through language, and society's order, in turn, recreates the people who first produced that pattern of society.

I have noted before that by the continual outpouring of himself, physically and mentally, man externalizes his inner person to society. Some of these products of his social interaction become objectivated, or factually real. These social objects confront men as real natural objects, as being separate from man's own production. (This may also be seen as the process of institutionalization.) Finally, the internalization of social objects is man's transformation, or appropriation, of his own objectivated social structures into his own subjective consciousness. The total interaction process of man with his own socially constructed world is dialectic, since although he is the constructor of his own social structures, the same structures turn back upon man and coerce him into new positions (physically, mentally and socially) within the social order. The social objects, or institutions, in effect, create and recreate men. The process of legitimation is the knowledge of these objectivated social structures, which is constantly used to explain and stabilize the already established social order. More specifically, legitimation is the continual re-telling and re-explaining the meanings of the social "facts" already accepted—but now weakening.³ Legitimation is the process of continued social maintenance.

In the light of this dialectic process, it becomes clearer that the objectivity of a social order is, at first, self-legitimating. By
simply being there, an established institution habitualizes its own acceptance into being self-evident. But on a further level, this self-legitimating facticity is never complete. The taken-for-granted objectivity of an institution is periodically challenged by the up-coming generation, the new under-classmen, or new members of a group. During those times when events lead to a crisis, which forces the members of the group to question the reasons as to why the institution, or why its norms are followed, again and again the old legitimating formula must be repeated. It is precisely during crises when strong challenges occur and when strong legitimating reasons must be offered. So the objectivations within a social group—the institutions, norms, the whole social order—are self-legitimating as long as there are no serious challenges. The GPCC's leaders tried to do just that—prevent serious challenges to the new social action programs.

A Paradigm of Structural Insulation

From a sociology of knowledge point of view, the intensity with which a group needs to maintain its particular social order depends upon the intensity of the questions and challenges directed at its ordered practices. The actions that a social group undertakes to maintain its own social constructions are the processes of legitimation. In order to contrast the Weberian-based structural-functionalist understanding of how churches maintain, or legitimate, their authority as against the interactionist's "knowledge" theory interprets it, I will use a recent study by James R. Wood as an illustration. Wood discusses how insulation fits into legitimating a church body's authority, but he views it through a structural interpretation. What is the relation of "social
insulation" to legitimation?

Most church laymen have little or no contact with their national church body. Few laymen know or understand the relationships and workings of the national agencies, departments and high offices of their church denominations. Yet, this social distance does not always insulate the national church's high, policy-making leaders from the local laymen's negative reactions. In a recent study, James R. Wood compares the degree of formal authority built into different denominations' polity and how this degree of hierarchical authority affects the willingness of local congregations to carry out the liberal racial integration policies of the larger church body. Wood's hypothesis stated: "The strength of racial integration policy varies directly with the degree to which leader control is legitimated by denominational polity." Wood argues that when a sufficiently controversial policy is made by a denomination and it acts upon the policy (civil rights actions, etc.) through congregations, then the members will be aroused from their apathy. The laity will then challenge the authority of the leaders. In these cases, Wood reasoned, membership apathy would no longer protect the policy makers, and the determining factor supporting the policy makers' controversial policy would be formal authority from the organization.

In his findings, Wood concludes that when members are aroused from their apathy to challenge leadership policy, informal power deteriorates, but formal authority becomes the crucial determinant of policy control. Leaders are more likely to press for policy in controversial areas when they have formal authority insulating them from member resistance.
Data from 28 major religious bodies supported this logic. The association between denominational polity and strength of policy in the highly controversial area of racial integration failed to disappear even when theology, regional membership, and size were held constant. Furthermore, the relationship was strongest in those circumstances (fundamentalism, Southern membership and small size) where disturbance of apathy would appear to make policymakers most vulnerable.

Viewed in the light of previous studies indicating that officials in congregational bodies normally have control over policy comparable to that of hierarchical officials, these findings suggest that the "iron law of oligarchy" is not a law at all but an empirical generalization which does not hold in such circumstances as extreme controversy. When there is controversy, leaders tend to retrench their control of policy to that level which is anchored in the mandate of their offices. This retrenchment leads to an important differentiation of power based on the degree of authority. As hinted earlier, hierarchical leaders can better face controversy for at least two reasons: (1) While hierarchical leaders may use their most powerful sanctions as little as possible (because of their alienating character), such sanctions are significant as a backdrop for persuasive efforts, and they may be used when necessary. For example, in most hierarchical denominations a rebellious congregation must surrender its property upon withdrawal (or expulsion) from the parent body. Knowledge of this fact often tempers rebellion. (2) Even in a voluntary association to which an individual is free to belong or not to belong, a member is not free to reject the authority exercised by other individuals in accordance with the norms of the association (Bierstedt, 1954:81). Hierarchical leaders have a solid resource in the norms of due process and orderliness inherent in their polity.

Wood's study is a good example of how organizational insulation works to protect the clergy who are in the higher echelons of a church organization. Wood does not include the parish pastor as a member of the "leaders" of the denomination, who are protected by the formal authority of the organizational structure. So it is in the larger organization, succeeding the local congregation, which gives the organizational insulation to the denomination's policy makers. Wood does not claim that the national church body's formal authority serves to insulate the local pastor from lay reprisals. Wood's study does not consider the local pastor as a "leader" in the national organization.

Wood's independent variable was polity. He contrasted the "formal
authority" of hierarchical church bodies against the "local autonomy" of congregational governed bodies. The results of Wood's investigation demonstrated that the hierarchical organizations give the policy makers the legitimate power to make policies which are controversial and to insist the congregations enact such policies. On the other hand, he found those church bodies with a congregational type of polity did not press for controversial policies such as civil rights enactments. Wood's findings should demonstrate that the GPCC is unable to take a stand on civil rights, and certainly not be able to carry out any long-term civil rights activities. In contrast to hierarchical denominations, the GPCC's polity is radically congregational. Its leaders are without formal authority over its members. The fact is, however, the GPCC has taken a strong stand on civil rights and enacted several, vigorous Community Action Programs for minority groups. The difference is that the GPCC has not tried to compel its congregations individually to take liberal stands, nor even participate. Instead, the GPCC used several methods to avoid directly challenging the laymen's conservative, socio-religious ideas.

Wood emphasized the "formal" authority of the organization's (hierarchical) structure. The GPCC has no formal authority over congregations. However, GPCC leaders have developed a limited informal authority over their own bureaucracy--church-CAP's, GPCC commissions and committees.

It is well known that most religious and voluntary kinds of organizations exercise control over their members primarily through normative power. The leaders appeal to the high ideals and religious standards to bring the deviant members under control. However, among the large church
bodies with strong hierarchical polity, the formal authority entrusted to the policy-making leaders can be significant when exerted against deviating congregations. J. R. Wood points out that the hierarchical churches possess some very real coercive sanctions, such as: (1) confiscation of property if the congregation tries to withdraw from the church body, and (2) strong order lines inherent in the polity, which gives due process. The rest is normative power, but it is deeply compelling for those who have been socialized into those normative ideals since childhood. Hierarchical church leaders possess, then, a combination of coercive-normative power over their constituency. In contrast, the GPCC has no formal authority and its normative powers are circumscribed on every side where one church body member may differ significantly with another member church. As previously noted, the GPCC is extreme in its volunteer character.

In his study of different churches' authority to enforce racial integration policies, J. R. Wood clearly concludes that hierarchical "leaders are more likely to press for policy in controversial areas when they have formal authority insulating them from member resistance." More specifically, he says, the degree to which church leaders press for controversial policies (racial integration) varies directly with the degree of the leaders' authority. Apparently viewing it from a structural-functional point of view, Wood consistently equates "formal structure of the organization with "hierarchical authority" of the leaders. His view of insulation is one of "structural insulation." Wood says, "Authority is important not only because it legitimates certain formal sanctions to be used against resisters, but also, and possibly more important, it gives the policymakers the support of persons who dis-
agree with their policies but uphold the political structure giving them the right to make such policies. 9

Wood's use of the term "insulation" poses a basic difference from my view of insulation, as applied to the GPCC. First, the protective covering which the insulation provides in the GPCC is much more of a covering of the whole program of liberal social actions, rather than a protection of the liberal leaders who decided upon it and enacted it. In other words, the insulation for the GPCC is not to legitimate the authority of the leaders of the GPCC so that the leaders' authoritative orders would have the power of the organization's structure behind it to give it coercive impact. Rather, the insulation in the GPCC provided legitimation for the social action policies and programs, in contrast to legitimating the people as leaders (Cate, Schulze, etc.), who are to have the legal authority to impose the action programs. Certainly it is impossible to divorce the people, as authority figures, from the liberal action programs, but there is a significant difference between the GPCC's action programs, which are removed from the laymen, and Wood's hierarchical organizations, which impose their racial integration programs.

The practical difference between the GPCC's civil rights (integration) actions as against the hierarchical denominations is that the GPCC did not try to pressure, or enforce, its member congregations individually to enact any particular policies of liberal social action. On the contrary, the GPCC's leaders avoided directly challenging their laymen's conservative views, religiously and socially. This was accomplished through their own process of insulation.

In contrast to the "structural insulation" of Wood's study, I view the GPCC's insulation as essentially processual in nature. Wood views
the insulation, provided by the formal structure of the organization, as legitimacy of the authority of the hierarchical church leaders. Legitimation is already built into the formal organization of the hierarchical structure, which in turn gives to its leaders the rational-legal authority of potential coercive power to enact the integration program at the laymen's level. The GPCC's social action programs, on the other hand, were not enacted by formal authority, but by the combination of several interacting groups and social conditions, which combined to insulate the social action programs from conservative reaction. These several interacting "factors" of insulation worked together to be the legitimating process for the GPCC's new, liberal program. The leaders, Cate, Schulze, etc., never sought, nor obtained, coercive power—at least, over the member congregations. In the hierarchical organization there is no real process of legitimation operative in the insulation around the leaders, since the formal structure's power to force compliance insures the leaders' new program.

How Do the Individual Categories of Insulation Legitimate Such a Precarious, New Social Action?

Taken individually, the seven forms of insulation did not act to legitimize the GPCC's social involvement policy. Taken together as an interacting whole, however, they have, for a short period of years, legitimated new and unorthodox programs. The separate definitions of the individual insulation forms in Chapter 10 imply that some of the forms are controlled or manipulated by the leaders, while some of the others are inert parts of the organization's social system. The categories of (1) members' apathy, (5) the semi-autonomous relationship of the CAP's
to the GPCC, and (6) the general secularization of many parish pastors are obviously not categories of leaders' deliberate manipulation of the organization, but are more a part of the organization's given social environment. It is certainly a valid interpretation of the leaders' oligarchic methods that they have manipulated the intercommunication systems in the GPCC deliberately to exert "control" or guide the values and practices of the organization. While agreeing to this point, it is not to say that the specific goal-seeking actions of the leaders involved should be interpreted as being functionaries of "structural" power and authority. No one leader in the GPCC wielded the kind of authority as "legitimated power" that would make him the causal determinant of the GPCC's new policies. No significant authoritative coercion was exerted to accomplish goals. The power inherent in organizational constraints of reward and punishment were minimal, because they were so unavailable to the executives.

Instead of the leaders' built-in mechanisms of control, the GPCC's new social involvement policy emerged out of the interrelations and interactions of their legitimating elements--insulation--with the actors who most influence them.

For example, the first insulation category described earlier is membership apathy. If legitimation is the process of maintaining a social order's objectivity, then membership apathy neatly fits into promoting legitimation. Because it mitigates against those criticisms and embarrassing questions, which the GPCC's "radical" new policies engendered, apathy automatically reduces the number of people who could become offended by the new social involvement. Since a large percentage of members' apathy allowed the discrepancy to continue between the leaders'
goal-seeking, as against the traditional, non-activist goals, new social action experiments began to result in the remapping and reorganizing of the GPCC's total program and goals. The increased apathy was correlated with leaders' lack of organizational dedication to older definitions of goals, and conversely, the less democratic (representative) pressure brought to bear on the officers, the easier the officers found it to manipulate the definitions of organizational norms and goals.

On the other hand, the second and third categories of insulation, listed before as (2) the leaders' oligarchic methods and (3) the lack of inter-organizational communication, need further explanation as "manipulated" categories. Considering oligarchic methods first, it could be argued that Cate did obtain such a high degree of informal authority over the GPCC, his rational-pragmatic authority may have contained more coercive power than that of church leaders in hierarchical denominations who operate with rational-legal authority. Paul Harrison noted this in the concluding pages of his study of the American Baptist Convention.

But no group can function without (formally defined) leadership, and it has been argued that when leaders are divested of authority they will necessarily seek and gain power in order to meet their responsibilities; the power they acquire may exceed that which ordinarily accrues to leaders in non-totalitarian, hierarchical institutions.10

In one sense Harrison's analysis does fit the GPCC, since there is some question whether Cate could have accomplished the radical turn-around to liberal goals without individually taking over informal, personal power. It is true that Cate gradually grasped an inordinate amount of informal authority within the GPCC to influence its adoption of his policies of social involvement. However, there is no evidence that Cate used coercive power on members of the Board to impose his will upon their decision
making. In the area of administration, in the case of the CAP's, Chapter 5 revealed Cate did use a heavy hand in trying to "take over" the C-CAP in Albina (from Robert Nelson) after the 1968 Black Crisis program.

Yet, in determining the goals of the organization, no sanctions nor other forms of naked power were evident. Cate did not need this alienating approach. His methodical groundwork had laid a strong foundation for great personal and informal authority. Through his control of the Nominating Committee and through the apathy of the great majority of member congregations, Cate developed an oligarchic Board of Directors which was sympathetic ideologically toward liberalizing the GPCC's goals. These Board members usually supported Cate in his proposals, largely because they believed in him so thoroughly. Without much doubt, Cate had solidified his organizational strength through personal charismatic authority. (Cate also came to lean on Schulze for his social action expertise, for his practical management ability to make ideas work, and for his ability to translate social action problems into acceptable conservative theology. In the process, Schulze also attracted a large amount of personal admiration from within the GPCC.)

Probably the best example of Cate's organizational charisma is the fact that not one of the 19 Board members who were interviewed for this study knew what the organizational relationship of the CAP's was to the GPCC. They did not know what kind, nor degree, of authority the Board had over the CAP's. With three or four exceptions, they implicitly trusted Cate and Schulze to know and administer this fuzzy, semi-autonomous relationship.

Instead of coercive sanctions wielded from the power structure of
his office upon those who would oppose his ideas, Cate relied on slowly building his social involvement concepts into the dominant majority of people--key people--who controlled the policy-making body, the Board of Directors. The strength radically to change goals did not derive from the power inherent in the organization's structure, per se, but from an interaction of people and events which changed the attitude and expectations of enough policy makers to change what the organization stood for--its very meaning. First, in 1963-1964 they adopted and put into application the practical change in action programs, and by 1969 these policy makers recognized that the change to social action goals was accepted enough--legitimated--by members so that the organization's constitution was rewritten around the new goals.

Talcott Parsons' classical functionalist concept of power as force--"the control of the use and organization of force relative to territory is always a crucial focus of the political power system . . ."--went hand in hand with his Weberian concept of authority. "Authority to bind and to coerce a member of the collectivity is, in this respect, of the same fundamental character as authority to assume a treaty obligation." In other words, authority is society's legal right to use coercive power. (I realize Parsons later modified his definition of power to emphasize "collective goals" as motivation of social control and thereby deemphasized authority as legalized force. However, I think his original commitment to the Weberian definition of authority still stands.) Authority must be understood as legitimated power; however, without force, there is no authority. Much the same as Paul Harrison said above, Parsons later stated that authority in the political system is the "power . . . to get things done . . . for . . . the . . . collectivity . . ."
In trying to dispel the functionalists' concepts of "systemic necessities," "societal forces," etc., Walter Buckley comes close to saying that power is changed into authority, not through coercion, but through willing consent of the governed. What Buckley ends up saying is that power and authority are relational: "inasmuch as power and authority are relational concepts, what may be a system of authority to some actors may be a system of power to others." However, he gets hung up on what is the difference between "willing consent" to authority and the "legitimation" of it. He states that the real meaning of legitimation for authority is "voluntary compliance."

I certainly agree with Buckley that power and authority have a "relational and hence relative nature" and that for legitimation of authority to take place there must be something of a practical compliance. However, the way I have tried to present legitimation in these pages is not as "willing" consent, or "consensus," by the working majority, but rather, it is the lack of successful or serious challenges to the powers that be—"to the way things are done around here."

William Cate, Paul Schulze and others "grasped authority," but never obtained, nor used enough coercive power to change GPCC goals. The leaders did not change organizational goals. It was due to several forces, a larger process. The more gradual process that changed the organization's goals was the dialectic of legitimation, vacillating between challenge-resistance-retrenchment-reestablishment and challenge-reconsideration of possible changes-change.

The third category of insulation—filtered or lack of communication—is also an example of the leaders' partial ability to impose ("control") the legitimation of their own goals upon the organization. In this case,
they controlled it by managing the inter-organizational communication system. The leaders did it by suppressing or greatly minimizing any actions in the new CAP's which would be considered too controversial. Organizationally, the CAP's are removed from out of view and out of influence of the congregations and laymen. The leaders controlled the communications system by filtering it in both directions. Since the CAP's are bureaucratically related to the GPCC's head offices, member churches are forced largely to rely on the GPCC's own public relations' interpretations of the CAP's more controversial activities. This reinterpretation of questionable social action activities into more conservative acceptability may be viewed as a regular part of the GPCC's "structural" system. In Parsonian terms, the executives' action of filtering the organization's communication between the organization's working units where the controversial actions take place (CAP's) and the organization's member churches is fulfilling the "need" to attain maximum organizational equilibrium through "tension management" in order to achieve the collective goals.

There was certainly more to the effectiveness of insulation as part of an overall process of legitimation than merely a coercively imposed break in communications. The leaders' manipulation of inter-communications was not an outgrowth of their authority, but it was the other way around. Consequently, the constant use of communications as public relations was done quite subtly. The information going out to the constituents in the churches was generally self-complimentary about the CAP's and avoided stating in detail their work with controversial issues. Neither was negative feedback from members authoritatively cut off. Rather, conservative reaction was often nipped close to the grass roots
by liberal pastors and laymen, who placated angry conservatives in their own congregations with the defensive arguments learned from the GPCC's theological "position papers." Feedback was filtered through the interactive forms of insulation. Outgoing propaganda reinterpreted and minimized the radicalness of their action programs.

Generally, the GPCC was not characterized by authoritative structuring of its people in the organization with a regimented system of roles, norms, status, authorities, etc. These social orders are present in the GPCC, as in any social organization, but they are loosely present as the conditions which shape the context of interactions between the units--people. Controls of communication, for instance, are between the core group of "actives," as against the inactive member churches. Within the internal organization, the looseness of the inter-relationships of active participants permitted their dialectic interaction to create and recreate new meanings and goals for the organization. Consequently, the stream of new situations which arose out of the GPCC's change to community action efforts brought on further unstructured and unregularized conditions within their organization. These were the changes that, although constructive to some, appeared threatening to conservative members.

Insulation--the Process of Prevention

At first by not requesting extra money for the churches, and by not bringing the issue of sponsorship of the new community action program before the General Assembly, the Executive Director and other leaders did not arouse the conservative membership. By minimizing the liberal nature of the new church CAP's through minimum exposure before the gen-
eral membership, and by maintaining the central importance of the old, conservative goal of helping to preserve the existence of the member congregations (as a facade), the leaders began the process of eliminating challenges to their programing, and i.e., to their change-over to liberal goals. The GPCC's long-range effort to meet and eliminate challenges to its social actions I have chosen to call the process of insulation. By preventing questions and criticisms to become serious challenges to the new church-CAP's themselves, the insulation process prevented the fledgling social action programs from being fatally disrupted. It is important to note here that because the insulation was primarily a preventive agent, acting to maintain the objective reality of the new programing, it was essentially a negative form of legitimation. Although the seven forms of insulation acted in various capacities to protect the GPCC's new policies, some more positively than others, their over-riding purpose was to prevent and protect, rather than to promote and educate. The insulation process may be described as the GPCC's multiple defense line (for its new objectivated "knowledge") against the forces of conservative reaction.

The prevention of strong external criticism to focus too intensely upon the new liberal action programs was also the objective meaning of legitimation. There is both an objective and subjective aspect to legitimation. As long as the member churches accepted, without challenging, the GPCC's new policies, merely by the fact that they were there, being performed as a legitimate part of the GPCC, the new activities became an objectively real part of the institution. They worked. They remained and grew. They were self-legitimating. The new policies became more and more equated with the GPCC; therefore, they became objectivated "know-
However, it is not at all certain whether the new style of organization has been internalized and accepted as subjectively real by the greater proportion of the GPCC's member churches. Complete and effective legitimation has a good balance between both objective and subjective definitions of the new reality. Before the GPCC's new social action program could be accepted internally by members, it had to be explained as being the "correct" interpretation of what the church organization's purpose really was. In a word, it had to be objectivated first. Religions usually remain above the large proportion of day-to-day criticism for the very reason that their institutional orders are presented as unchangeable, as part and parcel of divine manifestation, existent from the beginning of time. Because the sacred is immutable, or objective, by its very definition, religious institutions and their goals are equated with this objectivity. The almost imperceptible change in the interpretation of a religion's practical goals (which takes place in all religions if they are to maintain their relevance in their changing societies) are reinterpreted as having been the "real" meaning of its goals from the beginning. In other words, a religious institution constantly legitimates itself and other necessary groups by defining their goals within a sacred, cosmic reference, which transcends history and man. Change in religious organizations, objective and subjective, is understandably difficult and slow. Consequently, leaders of the GPCC, as a religiously based group, who would have tried to engineer a relatively quick change in their general member's subjective understanding of their group's specific goals, almost certainly would have faced defeat. This is exactly what William Cate and his fellow
leaders worked to avoid. They took advantage of the GPCC's divided constituency—its membership's "split personality." Instead of attempting to reach the GPCC's generally inactive membership of churches, they concentrated on the inner core of active participants. At the level of selected, loyal worker-leaders, an unhurried, but intensive socialization into social action goals was directed at this core group. These people were allowed to internalize the new goals. During the first half of the 1960's, Cate, Schulze, Menzel and other leaders answered the objections of the Board members, and explained how direct social action worked by enthusiastically demonstrating it at C-CAP. Because a great percentage of this group did internalize the changed interpretations, the organization was able to act forcefully during the last half of the Sixties.

After the core group had subjectively made the social action goals their own, things began to happen in the GPCC. As soon as the first CAP was established in Albina, the effort to legitimate the program's objective reality went into operation. Challenges were prevented essentially by one general means: the minimization, if not prevention, of communication between the conservative congregations and the activist leaders in the GPCC, especially the Board of Directors. The impression must not be given that the GPCC's leadership made no effort to carry out a positive campaign to propagandize and sell the general membership on accepting the new organizational goals. However, the abundant regular mailings and all other forms of public relations accomplished it in the manner best described by the modern political term, "managed news." The GPCC's communications with the Board membership and public did an excellent job of presenting to mass media a positive view of its social action
accomplishments. The internal turmoil and criticisms were well contained within the Board of Directors, and often even kept from the Board. This management of the communications was the foundation of the process of insulation. Seven various forms of insulation have been listed earlier. Three of these forms, as noted before, are grounded in the GPCC's social environment: four are due to the individual efforts of a few, aggressive leaders. The effect, however, of all seven of the insulation processes have been the same: to legitimate the GPCC's social action efforts by pacifying the criticisms of the more conservative members. The insulation dampened the negative feedback so that no important challenges were mounted against the GPCC's liberal policies. The criticisms were usually unpublicized and kept within a relatively small group of leaders. The liberal Board of Directors seldom considered any of these conservative complaints worthy of their meetings' discussion time. There were three major exceptions: (1) City Hall's vehement attack in 1968 upon the GPCC's downtown Youth Ministry program; (2) the 1965 dispute over the GPCC's support of HB 1307, which called for busing disadvantaged children to other schools with better programs; (3) the 1968-1969 internal conflict about the over-use of funds for the preceding Summer Crisis programs. As pointed out in Chapter 9, the Board of Directors generally sustained William Cate's policies and the CAP's progressive action programs, i.e., Robert Menzel in the downtown Youth Ministry and Golden Brown with the Black Crisis in Albina. The Board, which had control of both the output and feedback mechanisms to and from the members, was able to manage to placate most serious criticisms coming from the broad number of congregations. Within the Board of Directors it was a different story in each of the above three
instances. There was serious internal reaction and conflict in each case, but also in each case, Cate had a core group of very strong and able supporters on the Board, which stood by Cate and his progressive social action policies. With the challenges stifled within the Board, the process of self-legitimation continued. The organization's social action programs were reaffirmed, and thus objectivated as legitimate policy. The different forms of insulation had done their work in the process of legitimation—to the degree that it preserved the new programs, policies and goal of community action involvement.
CHAPTER XII

A MORPHOGENESIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

A certain kind of organizational morphogenesis took place within the GPCC between 1960 and 1970. As the goals of the organization changed from assisting its members in meeting their competitive demands for self-preservation over to the goal of social action, so a change took place within the structure's inter-relationship between the voluntary members and the leadership. The change was essentially in communication between its member congregations and the organization's center of authority. As the GPCC became more oligarchic, with authority more firmly in the hands of the Executive Director and Board of Directors, it also became more communicative with those congregations involved with social action and less so with those congregations not involved. Those congregations, whose goals and practices did not change to match the changing goals and practices of the GPCC's new social action orientation, were those congregations which lost communication with those in authority at the GPCC.

As documented previously, before the 1960's the GPCC's conservative goals were obviously uninvolved, socio-politically. The GPCC's programs were studiously non-controversial, but rather, geared to offer adequate rewards to the local congregations so as to insure their continued support of the GPCC. Due to religious pluralism, the exclusively defined plausibility structures of individual churches were being torn asunder, so Portland's various religious marketing agencies have found
that their "product" needed to be standardized for mutual protection. Before the 1960's, survival demands forced many congregations to support the GPCC in exchange for the reward that the GPCC help each congregation satisfy consumers' (prospective members') demands. Before the changeover, the GPCC's congregational-centered programs were geared to help its participant congregations to rationalize the competition between themselves, and thus prevent irrational competition and possibly mutual annihilation. Portland's mainline, Protestant congregations "needed" the GPCC, and the GPCC needed them. This mutual responsibility between members and organization fostered a mutually increasing communication between each other. The GPCC needed the financial support of each congregation, as well. The bigger the congregation, the better. In return the GPCC offered the good rewards of its cooperative educational programs (released time and teacher training), along with the latent reward for participating clergymen, e.g., their mutual social and psychological support, instead of competitive suspicion.

Because any voluntary organization relies heavily upon membership support, the leaders must make available some kind of rewards (often latent), or continually reconvince the members of the organization's stated goals. If the organization changes its goals, it must either reconvince the membership of the value of the new goals, or offer suitable rewards—or recruit a new set of members.

Since each of the member congregations has only marginal loyalty to the GPCC, compared to the primary formal ties with their own denominations, membership in the GPCC is one of extreme voluntarism. The strength and source of the congregations' values and norms are in their own denomination. The denomination's theology and practices are deeply
traditional, and each of the denomination's pastors are schooled and socialized quite thoroughly into the value system of that church's background.

Because of the congregations' extreme voluntarism toward the GPCC, Figure 12.1 tries to demonstrate that before 1964 the larger congregations most interested and active in the GPCC were the source of power and authority in the GPCC. Those congregations which participated most actively in the GPCC's politics attended in force at the annual meetings to elect their own congregations' members to the GPCC's Board of Directors. Admittedly, they were from the more progressive, ennumerically minded denominations. These strong congregations controlled the GPCC before the 1960's, but did so conservatively to obtain the support of more of the city's congregations as potential members. Although there was a large degree of disinterest and apathy among member congregations before the 1960's, those few, active congregations did not attempt to cut off the inactive congregations in an oligarchic manner. It appears that the GPCC's Board of Directors then tried to communicate with all congregations by informing them of the GPCC's programmed assistance for congregations.

Before the 1960's, apathy of the majority of other member congregations appears to have been the greatest deterrent to feedback; however, the GPCC provided no organizational machinery for feedback, and thus discouraged it. The movement of information outward was motivated by the GPCC's precarious need for financial support. The GPCC then sent out frequent bulletins, propagandizing the GPCC's current types of assistance for member congregations' programs. The GPCC's leaders were merely advertizing the rewards of membership.
Late 1958's and Early 1960's

Figure 12.1 illustrates the source of authority by the double lines emanating from those few congregations which were most involved in governing the earlier GPCC. The single arrows demonstrate the source and direction of communications with the organization. The double-lined arrows demonstrate the informal authority, which those larger and most politically active congregations in the GPCC came to exert within the Board of Directors. The constant plight of financial instability during the pre-1960's forced the GPCC to be greatly dependent upon those congregations contributing the largest sums.

Also organizational communication was primarily in one direction, originating in the several larger churches which supplied most of the GPCC's elected leaders. Combined with the apathy of the majority of other member congregations, there was little means of feedback of information to the Board from these "outside" congregations. However, because of the constant need for financial support, the GPCC then sent out a steady flow of information to all congregations, advertising the advantages of membership in the GPCC.

The Period from 1963 to 1968

Figure 12.2 indicates the complete change of direction in the flow of communication and authority. The hard, unfiltered information was communicated within the Board among its members; thereby, automatically excluding any person from the uninvolved, conservative congregations.

First, that information purposely disseminated to the general membership was managed information in the sense that the Executive staff filtered the information concerning the CAP's most controversial activi-
Figure 12.1
The GPCC, Late 1950's and Early 1960's

Finances - Very small budget.
Programs - Congregational centered.
Participation of members - High degree of apathy.
Intercommunication - One-way publicity to the congregations about rewards and advantages given to them by the GPCC's activities.
Goals - Conservative, non-controversial.
Authority - Larger urban congregations dominated GPCC.
(Double lines above indicate direction of authority.)
Figure 12.2
GPCC, From 1963 Through 1968

Finances - Many new, "outside" independent sources.
Programs - Community Action Programs (CAP's) became central.
Participation of members - General decrease of apathy.
Authority - Shifted to new Executive Director and his staff.
Intercommunication - Primarily between activist congregations and staff; uninvolved congregations excluded.
Goals - Radical change to social action.
ties. The leaders thus were able to present a less objectionable picture of the CAP's programs to the conservative congregations. Negative feedback from member conservatives was also effectively stymied from returning to the Board. The two-way filtering of communication between general membership and the Board became extremely effective as an insulation process without formal implementation.

Secondly, because Paul Schulze consulted regularly with Cate, the CAP's during this period carried out their activities with Cate's fairly complete knowledge and consent.

Thirdly, the 1960's witnessed an almost complete reversal of the lines of authority from that illustrated in Figure 12.1. Membership on the Board became more thoroughly liberal, and the Executive more firmly grasped the reigns of authority in guiding policy decisions. As these "inside" communication lines became more engrained, more people and congregations appeared to support the Executive's authority to set social action policies.

Fourth, when the GPCC's leadership (Executive staff and Board of Directors) implemented the new social action goals into the 1968 Summer Crisis programs, the activities (and thus the goals) became controversial enough to stimulate significant public reaction throughout the city. However, as illustrated in Figure 12.2, the negative feedback loops from the conservative congregations to the Board, etc., sheltered (insulated) the leadership from criticism.

The Period from 1968 to 1970

Although social action had come to dominate, informally, the GPCC's previous goals in the 1960's, in 1968 the change of goals was formalized
with the adoption of the new constitution. It strengthened social action in three ways: (1) It added to the Board a representative from each church denomination that had five or more of their own congregations as members of the GPCC. (2) The CAP's were given separate, voting representation on the Board. (3) The GPCC was reorganized around three new working divisions, the most important being the Center for Urban Encounter (CUE).

CUE was a completely new piece of organizational machinery, which, unlike the CAP's, did not evolve or "happen." It was mostly the product of the imagination and work of Paul Schulze. He realized the essential conservativism of most of the member congregations and church laymen. Schulze came to feel strongly that if the GPCC's social action work was to be educated and convinced about the Christian necessity for social action to be carried out through local churches. Schulze wanted CUE to do this education job, thereby changing the laymen's conservative, critical attitude toward social involvement. CUE's stated purpose is "to challenge and equip people in parishes for a relevant ministry to the city." CUE now provides a wide variety of intensive training sessions, geared mostly to "parish clusters" and the new Metropolitan Ministries' community involvements.

A fourth change during this time was the CAP's individual movements toward autonomy, apart from the GPCC. Figure 12.3 shows the Executive's authority, illustrated by double lines, to be moved toward CUE and no longer extended to the CAP's.

Our three Figures show the GPCC's morphogenesis by illustrating organizational changes in the 1960's in the GPCC's intercommunication and authority. In corporate types of organizations, increased communica-
Figure 12.3
From 1969 through 1970

Finances - Foundations and private sources decreased gifts--specificly for CAP's.

Programs - Social action remained, but shifted main efforts from CAP's to CUE.

Participation of members - Apathy of members began to increase again.

Authority - CAP's asserted own autonomy, but new division, CUE, is under formal authority of Board and Executive. Informal authority still in Executive.

Intercommunication - Continues primarily with involved, urban larger congregations; membership on Board of Directors greatly enhances it.

Goals - Overt pursuit of social action goals diminishing, while some conservative goals being revived.
tions between the leaders and employees increases the leaders' ability to know about environmental changes. This allows the organization more quickly and efficiently to adapt to the changing environment. However, the GPCC is not corporately organized, but democratically (representatively) governed. The GPCC does not have a planned cybernetic system of feedback loops, which funnels information back to a central data processing office for analysis. The GPCC leaders do not manage a feedback system in a pre-planned sense. Usually, in corporate organizations, it is assumed that the leaders will be the conservers of the organization's status quo—that the leaders need the specially tailored intercommunication system to perceive the organization's ecological contingencies and innovations. The leaders then, possibly, understand the need for organizational adaption—-for morphogenesis.

In the GPCC and mainline Protestant denominations, it is the lay members who tend to be most conservative, not the leaders. Consequently in the GPCC, the leaders' management of communication is not so much to be better able to adapt to changes within the organization's changing environment, but to prevent the lay members' resistance to the leaders' proposed liberal changes.

The GPCC's leaders had increasingly become aware of new contingency situations, especially in proximity to Portland's downtown churches. They saw the need for organizational innovations to be made in the GPCC to meet the changes presenting serious social problems to the community. The leaders wanted the GPCC to become involved. Conservative members did not want the change from "religious to secular" values. Instead of the GPCC's ordinary members, laymen, making innovative, practical adapta-
tions (religiously) to the changing environment, which are usually the first signs of needed change-adaptations (noted by the cybernetic feedback system) within corporate groups, the GPCC's leaders have taken the initiative for new organizational changes. Primarily by informally managing the organization's intercommunications (a method of insulation), the leaders have been able to move the GPCC out from conservative socio-religious values and actions into new socially oriented goals and role patterns.
CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSION

Generally, man's relationship to society is a continuous dialectical process. Society is a product of man; yet man is a product of society. This basic social dilemma of man leads to a fundamental paradox. Society has no reality or meaning except that which is bestowed upon it by human acts. On the other hand, all that we know about man is in the context of society. So every individual develops and attains his own personhood and conducts his life activities to form his identity as a result of the total social processes in which he is immersed. Man cannot exist apart from society. Yet, he himself creates it, and it recreates him.

Society appears to common sense as something independent of human activity and as being a part of the inert giveness of nature. In reality the structure of society is human meanings externalized in human activity. Therefore, part of the tension between man and the social world he creates is the false independence with which man imagines his social constructions are endowed, but which in reality, are appropriated by man himself. Man loses the human meaning of his own social constructions, and thereby is alienated from his own society. He becomes subservient to it.

So man's own works, insofar as they are part of a social world, become part of a real action world; his social constructs become a reality other than himself. In other words, alienation is the process
whereby the dialectical relationship between the individual and the world is lost to consciousness. The individual forgets that this world was and continues to be co-produced by him. There is an unresolved tension between man and the human world which he creates, but which is now estranged and now turns back on him to rule man. Alienation is the over-extension of the process of objectivation, whereby the human objectivity of the social world is transformed in consciousness into the non-human objectivity of nature.

The essence of alienation is the imposition of a fictitious inexorability upon the humanly constructed world. The innumerable contingencies of human existence are transformed into inevitable revelations of universal law. Activity becomes process. Choices become destiny. These powers become independent of the men who have constructed them. When alienation is religiously legitimated, the independence of these powers is vastly undergirded, both in the social order and in the individual consciousness. When man is alienated from his own world so that he cannot make free choices regarding the reality of the relationship of man to society and other men, then alienation results in a polar repulsion.

However, it must not be thought that religious formations have only to be alienating, inert, mechanical reflections of their social base. Actually, some religions have proved the ability to de-alienate social structures and to give religious legitimation to the de-alienation. De-alienation by religion is relatively rare but it has historical validity. In the Biblical tradition, the confrontation of the social order with the majesty of the Hebrew's transcendent God caused society to be relativized to such an extent that one may validly speak of de-alienation—in the sense that, before the face of God, the institutions
are revealed as nothing but human works, devoid of inherent sanctity or immortality (Nathan confronting David, etc.).

Peter Berger's concept of alienation and de-alienation describes the fundamental paradox which accompanies secularization. On one hand, religion most generally legitimates the humanly constructed social structures as being immutable and sacred cows. On the other hand, when religion withdraws its support of traditional social structures and reveals them to be really human constructs and not immutable "facticities" of the world, then religion secularizes, de-alienates, causes social change, and in some cases, encourages revolution. The prophetic tradition in the Old Testament contains many cases of this relativizing, and resulting process. Therefore, a de-alienating religion secularizes by removing its own web of religious sanctions strung through much of the social order. When religion acts in this double manner, it reveals a basic, pervading ambivalence in relation to secularization. Religion's ambivalent poles are between status quo and relativized social structures, a world-maintaining compared to a world-shaking force, conservatism compared to secularization.

In the United States as in previous history, once a religion has established itself, it in turn legitimates the predominating social structures which men have constructed into social "facticities." Religion thus provides a positive function by supporting the established social order, but inherent within this superficial support is the process of alienation. The established order turns back on the religion and prevents the religion from becoming dis-establishmentarian. When "established" social constructs determine and coerce the religion which support the society, the humanly constructed social order is revealed to be against
man himself (the human being). The social order reveals itself to be alienated against man. In the degree that the conservative elements of a religious group take the part of the established social orders and resist the prophetic actions for change of other elements of the same religious group, then the society's religious order, as part of the conservative social structures, acts to alienate further society's structures against man, as man. When the GPCC's new program stepped outside of the established social norms, society's constructions--the police, churches, newspapers, the public, etc.--reacted indignantly. On the one hand, there are those in the GPCC who remain true to the traditional Protestant posture--that the church support, not challenge, long-established community norms and institutions. These conservative churchmen tend to foster false consciousness (reify) toward man's humanly constructed norms, institutions and ideologies as being objectively part of the given, natural world. In this stance they participate in the process of alienation. On the other hand, those GPCC liberals who have used the GPCC to challenge those same social objectivations as being merely representations of human activity have promoted the process of de-alienation. Consequently, the GPCC dialectly acts and reacts ambivalently toward society.

It becomes more evident from the preceding theory about the GPCC that the alienation of "secular" social structures is aided by religion when we recognize that established religious groups contribute to the ossification of humanly produced social structures by lending their special ability to deify, or make the social construct appear inexorable. This kind of religious legitimation of status quo order is more normal than not. Until the 1960's, the GPCC played its conservative role of
legitimating Portland's more established social order. However, when the GPCC moved into its new social action programs, instead of giving unqualified support, the GPCC's programs openly questioned several of the city's important social norms. In contradiction to most religious groups within the city, the GPCC began to act as an agent for social-de-alienation.

To the degree that the GPCC's action programs de-alienated society, the GPCC contributed to secularization. That is, the GPCC revealed that local government and law enforcement, business and education are only human, social products— not immutable facts. In so doing, the GPCC removed its own religious legitimation of these structures, and forced the process of secularization, in essence, social change.

Because de-alienation of a group's norms often threaten es it with the loss of its fundamental meaning before the rest of society, the group is also subject to the threat of its own anomy. As we have seen, the threat of basic change to the goals and practices of political, economic and educational groups did foster anomy and social tension among them. The city's law enforcement agency over-seeing juvenile social deviants viewed the GPCC's Youth Ministry as a real threat to its authority. The GPCC-led Grape Boycott (1969) greatly threatened local business men. The GPCC lobbied for the legislative bill, HB 1307 (1965), which provided busing for minorities in schools without educational opportunities, so it became a threat to the city's upper middle-class and their better high schools. The GPCC's C-CAP assisted black juvenile deviants and "revolutionary" black cultural projects, threatening police and whites. Their anomy gave way to overt reaction. Since the threat of anomy means a certain amount of social chaos (normlessness) within the
threatened group, those seen to be the source of this threat (GPCC) were regarded with suspicion and distrust. Documentation in Chapter 7 shows that the Women's Protective Division, City Councilmen and other city government officials were distrustful and angered by the church CAP's successful infringement upon their law enforcement activities, etc. Result: tension, conflict and reaction against the GPCC.

The GPCC's primary ecumenical goal, stated in its pre-1969 constitution, was to increase the areas of cooperation between the member congregations. Sociologically interpreted, its purpose was to reduce tension between its competing members. Following 1964, the GPCC's practical goal shifted from tension reduction between congregations over to, in effect, increasing social tension between some secular structures and the churches. Although William Cate and other GPCC leaders went to great lengths to minimize that tension by mollifying the city fathers and the churches with the assurance that the GPCC's community action programs were not a "real threat" to the established community power structures, the latent, undeniable product of the church CAP's activities was often increased anomy and tension. Even though unintentional, the work of the church CAP's did expose the humanness and thus the relativity of some widely accepted norms for treating deviant youth and black segregation in Portland. Unwittingly, the GPCC radically moved to become an instrument of de-alienation and secularization.

The research here has shown there was a significant negative reaction by the public--by several secular groups in the city--against the GPCC's aggressive social action programs. Following the front page newspaper stories about the GPCC's Youth Ministry to runaways and drug users in the downtown area, several public organizations withdrew support
of the GPCC or publicly chastized the GPCC's actions. Why was there not a substantial reaction from the conservative member congregations? Some evidence has indicated that there probably was a greater reaction among the church members than was actually registered upon those interviewed for our sample (mostly former and present Board members). Some of this member reaction got through to the Board, but most of it was minimized at the grass roots, filtered through the insulation process. In other words, there was a conservative member reaction actually registered at the leadership level, but it was minimal. Yet, other studies quoted here (Chapter 1) have shown that congregations across the country have reacted vehemently against their own pastors' direct involvement in social actions and causes.

In searching for the reason for the discrepancy in the conservative religious reaction against the GPCC, I have concluded that the GPCC's multiple process of insulation effectively minimized its members' conservative reaction. The insulation has served to remove from view—to "hide"—the GPCC's de-alienating social involvements from the conservative congregations. The GPCC has demonstrated itself to be a specific exception to local church members' reactions. The "insulation" of the GPCC and its leaders allowed for the exception.

Since no congregations were coerced into social action participation, no conservative congregation was forced into re-evaluating itself and seeing itself as a religious legitimator of the status quo "secular" social order (local government, etc.). The several forms of insulation screened the de-alienating social actions from the uninvolved members. The filtered communication between the GPCC's offices and the conservatives prevented any coordination of wide conservative disaffection against
the GPCC. The process of minimizing conservative members' challenges to the GPCC's liberal action programs is summarized in the forms of insulation (viz. Chapter 10).

The form of insulation listed last (seventh) in Chapter 10—the GPCC's ambivalent policy of changing its primary goal to direct involvement in community actions, while publicizing its conservative, congregational-centered programs for those churches which wanted them—describe in microcosm the plight of the GPCC's overall interrelationship with its community. Sociologically, the GPCC was pursuing two contradictory goals. Formerly a conservative organization, the GPCC turned to serve the contradictory goal of challenging its own community's institutions, practices and values. If the evidence from this investigation does indicate a real, although qualified, disconfirmation of Durkheim's theory of social conservation by religion, the paper makes no claim to generalize this finding toward wider social worlds. If anything, the study does demonstrate an important exception to the general conservative role of local religion in one community.

Equally important, the same evidence indicated that, while not conserving but de-alienating its secular social order, this ecumenical religious group was in the process of pursuing paradoxical organizational goals. The social catalyst that permitted the organization to do it was the process of insulation. The GPCC was going in two directions at once. As its social action programs de-alienated some of the city's most taken-for-granted, "established" institutions, the GPCC had the latent effect of relativizing those institutions, i.e., local government (law enforcement), education (school busing for racial equality), businesses (secondary, local grape boycott).
Unintentionally, the GPCC had come to play this role of de-alienation, because Cate and other leaders did not appear to have realized then that their commitment to socially controversial causes would necessarily involve having to choose to withdraw their own organization's (religious) sanctions from community power structures, i.e., effect de-alienation. The GPCC's Board was embarrassed by its CAP's social actions which offended conservative community values and norms. Paradoxically, the GPCC tried to offset in the eyes of its conservative constituency the GPCC's liberal social involvements by reassuring members that its own actions were not the apostate's steps from orthodox "Christian" values and its conservative social norms. The GPCC's leaders indicated in several interviews that they were exceptionally sensitive to the conservatives' old criticism that the GPCC was "mixing religion with politics." They attempted to disprove this accusation. I view this attempt to give the appearance to conservatives that the GPCC was socially and politically neutral as being the GPCC's reversal back to conserving those old power structures. In order to prevent members' social anomie and consequent reaction against itself, the GPCC brought back some of its traditional programs and tended to legitimate the present social structures, rather than de-alienate them.

Sociologically, conservative denominations have one thing in common. They are, whether Catholic, Protestant or Jewish, reactionary on socio-political issues. Silence and neutrality are the hallmarks of religious conservativism on such issues, viz. the church in Germany during the early years of Hitler's take-over. As noted earlier, the lack of challenge to the way things are done—and to those who do them—indicates that silence itself legitimates those patterns of doing things.
Quiescence, neutrality, or compliance, by group members legitimates the powers that be. In this manner, the religious conservatives conserve the established values and norms of society.

Although the GPCC had steadily increased until 1968 the number of "position papers" (to be sent to the press, etc.) on some local problems, since then it became neutral on most political issues. Not long after the city police made charges against the GPCC's downtown Youth Ministry program in 1968, this researcher asked the GPCC Executive Director, William Cate, about the GPCC's goals in the light of their recent controversy with law enforcement. Cate answered, "The Church has always been the supporter of things good and decent. We are a cooperative church group, working for better cooperation among people, for better lines of communication—a healthier Portland. The police's role is justified as part of the state. We need law and order. The state's purpose is to keep order, harmony and just laws—as part of God's plan for peace." Cate added, "However, God's church has loyalties that transcend obedience to the state. Conscience sometimes transcends—and speaks—and demands obedience."

Cate's response summarizes the GPCC's ambivalence. On the conservative side, although two of the GPCC's church CAP's programs have run afoul of some established community norms, the GPCC Executive here presents the Council itself as supporting the community's common values—what is "good and decent." Cate also describes the work of the police, law and order and the GPCC—all on the same side. Cate is saying that the GPCC is, politically, a conservative force in the community. Cate is also reassuring the local congregations of the GPCC that the GPCC helps and strengthens each of the congregations in their common
cause—to keep their own members and get more.

On the liberal side, Dr. Cate applied the transcendent standard to the church and to the GPCC, saying the church must have a higher loyalty to God rather than to the state. In calling back to the radical transcendentalization of God and the church's primary responsibility to this "completely other" value, Cate is harking back to the ancient Israelite prophets. To that degree, the GPCC is relying on a standard which completely relativizes all other values and norms. Before the transcendent God, all institutions are revealed as nothing but human works.

Religious institutions rarely challenge their own established social order, largely because the leaders sense the conservative wrath built into their own organizations, as well as that of their own society's power structures. A few modern religious bodies have contributed energetically to both social change, as well as to the ossification of the status quo. William Cate and the GPCC tried to straddle this socio-religious paradox—on the one hand, to conserve the established social order (integrate society), and on the other, to challenge society to change (disintegration). Cate recognized the danger of reaction against being too prophetic. By galvanizing the GPCC's ever-increasing commitment to social action types of programs with a generous amount of propaganda about their great effort to promote a few old, conservative-pleasing programs, Cate was able to maintain the appearance that the GPCC was not rejecting its traditional goals for radical ones. This ambivalent appearance was an important insulating quality.

Within Western religion is the seed of protest, the potential for vital change in the face of any society. That potential to beget social change resides in a religion's own grasp of a transcendent standard, by
which all other values are gauged. Without this transcendence, there is no ultimate meaning given to man's humanly made structures. Only if religions of transcendence do not become so well accommodated to society that their sense of the transcendent standard is not lost, can they maintain this basis for criticism and dissent against dominant vested interests of ruling and influential elites. Consequently, if church institutions (GPCC), which claim loyalty to a transcendent standard, are to contribute positively to a democratic society where social change and secularization are encouraged, then a substantial degree of unadjustment between religion and society must remain, despite the fact that the unadjustment itself will be the source of some anomy, tension and conflict.

Theoretically, the actions of the GPCC are a description of the ambivalent social power of a local (ecumenical) religious group to divide, as well as unite; to disintegrate, as well as integrate, the old order of society; to liberate, as well as conserve; to de-alienate, as well as reduce social anomy. The GPCC illustrates this paradoxical impact on a local society. The evidence, which largely disconfirmed the study's original working hypothesis, also confirmed that by dividing its goals between being a world-maintaining along with a world-shaking force, the GPCC was indeed successful at side-stepping serious, conservative reaction.
REFERENCES

CHAPTER I


2. The Albina area of Portland is in the Northeast, central area of the city, directly across the Willamette River from the main business district (Southwest downtown). Ethnically, Albina's population before World War II was largely Scandinavian and German. Note in Chapter V the description of Albina's physical and economic changes. See the Inner City Map for Albina's geographical situation, page 6.


CHAPTER II


3. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

4. Ibid., p. 40.

CHAPTER III

1. Emile Durkheim, op. cit., pp. 43ff.


6. Ibid., p. 10.


9. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
CHAPTER IV

1. The Rev. J. H. Jackson, a black pastor of an Albina congregation, stated that all but three black fundamentalist churches in Albina were unwilling to join into any kind of ecumenical, or ministerial group -- up until 1972.

2. Albina was not a solid black ghetto during the 1960's. Its population was still partly white, although in the minority. Several white mainline Protestant churches remained with few, if any, black members.

CHAPTER IX


3. Ibid., pp. 157-193.


7. These figures were compiled from the GPCC's annual reports during 1960 through 1969 for the General Assembly's annual meeting in April of each year.

8. Robert Michels, op. cit., pp. 25-27. Michels mentions size in terms of specific numbers in this context: "The most formidable argument against the sovereignty of the masses is, however, derived from the mechanical and technical impossibility of its realization. . . . The impotence of direct democracy, like the power of indirect democracy, is a direct outcome of the influence of number. . . . The regular holding of deliberative assemblies of a thousand members encounters the gravest difficulties in respect of room and distance; while from a topographical point of view, such an assembly would become altogether impossible if the members numbered ten thousand. . . . Hence the need for delegation. . . . Originally the chief is merely the servant of the mass. The organization is based upon the absolute equality of all of its members."

CHAPTER X


CHAPTER XI

2. Ibid., pp. 64 & 75.
3. Ibid., pp. 34-46.
6. Ibid., pp. 1064-5.
7. Ibid., p. 1063.
8. Ibid., p. 1061.
9. Ibid., p. 1058.
12. Ibid., p. 136.
15. Ibid., p. 186.
16. Ibid., p. 199.
CHAPTER XIII


2. Ibid., pp. 96-7.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


