

1979

# The political integration of the Kurds in Turkey

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Kathleen Palmer Ertur for the Master of Arts in Political Science presented February 20, 1979.

Title: The Political Integration of the Kurds in Turkey.

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The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the situation of the Kurdish minority in Turkey within the theoretical parameters of political integration. The problem: are the Kurds in Turkey politically integrated? Within the definition of political development generally, and of political integration specifically, are found problem areas inherent to a modernizing polity. These problem areas of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution are the basis of analysis in determining the extent of political integration for the Kurds in Turkey. When these five problem areas are adequately dealt with in order to achieve the goals of equality, capacity and differentiation, political integration is achieved.

The methodological approach used in this study is simple quantitative analysis of data gathered primarily from Turkish government and business sources. The available data was categorized according to regions corresponding to the geographic concentrations of Kurds. The geographic concentration of Kurds was decided upon according to the languages spoken in the various provinces. The concentration of Kurdish-speaking peoples was then divided into three categories: over 50% of the population; 10% to 50% of the population; less than 10% of the population.

The socio-economic indicators were grouped according to those aspects of integration that could be illustrated and analyzed. According to the data available through research, five socio-economic indicators emerged: employment, education, health care, public investment and private investment. A combination of statistics and literature sufficed to present an adequate outline of the problem of the political integration of the Kurds in Turkey. I was thus able to conclude the social, economic and cultural situation of the Kurds in their regions of majority occupancy in comparison to the rest of Turkey.

The Kurdish area exhibits the lowest amount of irrigated land. This situation exists in an area of the country in which almost 40% of the land mass is classified as non-arable, yet in which agriculture is the main source of income. The Kurdish area also exhibits a definite inequity in land distribution among farming families. A small percentage of the farming families owns the land and perpetuates a feudal system of share-cropping.

The Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia exhibits the highest illiteracy percentage of all of Turkey. Between 1965 and 1970 the illiteracy rate dropped by an average of 5.27% in Turkey as a whole. During the same period, the illiteracy percentage in the Kurdish area rose 10.24%. By 1970 the average percent of population illiteracy in the Kurdish area was up to 71.74%. The Kurdish area exhibits the lowest number of reading rooms, printing houses and schools per square mile in comparison to the non-Kurdish area.

In the Kurdish area there was the highest population per physician than any of the other regions in the non-Kurdish area. On a national average, the number of health care personnel increased between 1967 and 1974 by 74.25%. In the Kurdish area, however, the increase in health care personnel for the same period was only 48.92%. Between 1967 and 1974 the number of private hospital beds in the Kurdish area increased by only 7.05%; the increase for the same time period in the non-Kurdish area was 86.23%.

From a total of 61 state-sponsored industries in all of Turkey, only 18 were located in the Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia. Of the seven major state irrigation schemes in operation in 1965, only one was located in the Kurdish area. From a total of 100 top private firms in Turkey in 1977, not even one was located in the Kurdish area of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

The pattern of behavior of the Turkish government toward its Kurdish minority has adversely affected the participation of

the Kurds in the political and social life of Turkey; essentially the goal of equality has not been met. The patterns of penetration have not been adequate to allow access by Kurds to the increased and specialized roles of the bureaucracy, institutions and associations in Turkey; thus the goal of differentiation has not been met. Although the political structure and institutions of the Turkish Republic have reached an adequate level of capacity to deal with the problem of identity and legitimacy in general, this capacity level has hindered the particular problems of identity and legitimacy of the Kurds. My conclusion, therefore, is that the Kurds in Turkey are not politically integrated.

THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF  
THE KURDS IN TURKEY

by

KATHLEEN PALMER ERTUR

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the situation of the Kurdish minority in Turkey within the theoretical parameters of political integration. The problem: are the Kurds in Turkey politically integrated in relation to the rest of the country? To answer this question the definition of political integration, in relation to the broader scope of political development, is presented. The evolution of the concept of political development, as cited by such outstanding scholars in the field as Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Samuel Huntington and Sidney Verba, is briefly explained. My definition of political development, and ultimately of political integration, is derived from the writings of the aforementioned scholars. Within this definition are found problem areas inherent to a modernizing polity. It is these problem areas (identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution) which are the basis of analysis in determining the extent of political integration for the Kurds in Turkey. The data is organized and presented to illustrate the degree to which these problem areas are adequately dealt, but always with the intent of regional comparisons. The socio-economic indicators selected to correspond, as closely as possible, to the problem areas are: employment, education, health care, public investment and private investment.

There are substantial Kurdish populations in other countries of the Middle East, including Iran, Iraq, Syria and the southern portions of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan).

The Kurds in the Middle East have long been a source of unrest. Their history is one of constant struggle to maintain independence from those seeking domination. They were often used as pawns in power struggles between their neighboring countries, from the Ottoman Empire and Persia over boundaries, to the strife between Iran and Iraq over rights in the Persian Gulf. The history of the Kurds in every country of the Middle East wherein they constitute a sizeable minority revolves around the struggle for independence, autonomy or representation as an entity.

The people referred to in this study as the Kurds comprise approximately 7.1% of the population of Turkey, and reside primarily in the regions of Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia. They consider themselves an ethnic, cultural and political minority in Turkey, defining their heritage as the Median branch of the Aryans combined with indigenous populations.

This thesis attempts to bring the reader up to date on the situation of the Kurds in Turkey in particular. Although a brief outline of the Kurdish situation in Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Soviet Union is presented, the focal point is Turkey. The emphasis is on the Kurdish situation from the beginning of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 under Mustafa Kemal ("Atatürk") to the present government of Bülent Ecevit.

Since the inception of the Republic, Turkey's goal has been to become a unified, assimilated and modern country capable of solid leadership among the nations of the Middle East. Nationalist uprisings which reinforce separatist or "anti-Turk" sentiments have never been

tolerated, regardless of whether their origin be Greek, Armenian, Laz or Kurd. The Republic of Turkey, on its road to modernization and industrialization, has recognized the necessity of unquestioned loyalty to a common goal, that of development. In the past, efforts by minority groups, including Kurds, to assert independence have been met with quick and decisive force in the hopes of minimizing energy to maintain law and order which would be better directed toward developing the potentials of the country as a whole.

The situation of the Kurds in Turkey today, from the Kurdish perspective, can be cited according to three approaches: traditionalist, which advocates acceptance of the status quo; moderate, which advocates political representation and cultural autonomy; and extremist separatist which advocates an independent or autonomous Kurdish state. Within these three approaches to the plight of the Kurds in Turkey lie descriptions, again from the Kurdish perspective, of the inequality and differences between the Kurdish regions and the rest of Turkey. These Kurds claim discrepancies in the equality of political representation, exploitation by feudal land-based elite, economic underdevelopment, and lack of employment and educational opportunity.

The lack of studies and publications concerning the Kurds in Turkey is understandable when one realizes the unavailability of research material. In spite of the fact that information and statistics regarding this thesis topic were difficult to obtain, an adequate amount of data was procured. Again, it must be emphasized that the data was organized regionally to facilitate comparisons. The

Kurdish-dominated regions were determined according to population concentrations--greater than 50% of the population Kurdish; 10%-50% of the population Kurdish; and less than 10% of the population Kurdish. The data corresponding to the five selected socio-economic indicators, such as employment statistics, literacy figures, physician availability, natural resource distribution and investment patterns, combine with population distribution and land use descriptions to provide an adequate picture of the situation of the Kurdish areas as compared to the rest of Turkey.

All aspects of the situation of the Kurds in Turkey, from their historical struggles for independence to the current inequality of economic opportunity, were considered before any conclusion was reached. My determination, based primarily on interpretation of the data presented in Chapter V, is that the Kurds in Turkey are not politically integrated. The unbalanced nature of the Kurdish regions, supported by the statistics and the literature, indicates conscious neglect economically, politically and educationally, of the Eastern regions of Turkey wherein resides a majority of Kurds. This is not to imply that anti-Kurdish prejudice is the definite and specific cause of said neglect. Obviously many extenuating factors, such as resource availability and accessibility, transportation ease, market potential, etc., affect the decisions to invest in and develop particular areas of the country. However, more is involved in this case than economic underdevelopment. Circumstances of suppression of cultural and language expression are reported, in addition to the data-supported evidence of unequal distribution of educational and health care facilities

and high unemployment.

My conclusion, within the parameters of political development, is that the goals of equality, differentiation and capacity are not maximized by a pattern of institutionalization with specific reference to the Kurdish population in Eastern Turkey. In the regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia, equitable participation (political and social) and distribution (economic) have not been achieved; access by the Kurds to the increased and specialized roles of the bureaucracy, institutions and associations has not been enhanced; and the problems of identity (concurrency regarding the appropriateness of the decision-makers) and legitimacy (acceptance of governmental decisions and the decision-making process) have not been solved. Unrest and violence continue as do demands from Turkey's Kurdish minority for change.

### Historical Background

A brief descriptive modern history of the Kurds in other countries of the Middle East will provide a more general overview of the Kurdish situation. It will also provide a perspective from which to compare and relate the history and present situation of the Kurds in Turkey with those in the Soviet Union and other countries of the Middle East, namely Iraq, Iran and Syria. "From all that has been said it follows that the history of the Kurdish people from the second half of the 19th century until the Second World War is marked with a string of revolts aiming at freedom and independence. Beginning with the 20th century, namely with World War I, the struggle is led with the goal of creating an independent Kurdish state." (Ghassemlou, 1965, p.73)

## Iraq

Of the total 13,132,000 population of Iraq, estimates of the Kurdish population vary from 80,000 to 300,000. (Kinnane, 1964) At the end of World War I, British troops occupied Iraq, including the province of Mosul in southern Kurdistan. According to Abdul Ghassem lou (1965, p. 76) a liberation movement against the British began to develop in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the area of Sulaymania in 1919, the Kurds declared their independence under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji. In the ensuing revolt the Kurds made known their expectations of national and political liberty and improvement in social conditions. Although the revolt was crushed by British forces and Barzinji exiled, Iraqi Kurds had experienced organization and unity toward a common goal.

At the conference of San Remo in April 1920, Iraq was placed under British mandate. This action resulted in violent protest by all Iraqis, including Kurds. Following this armed rebellion, which lasted from June until October, a referendum was called to establish a monarchy for Iraq. Sulaymaniya, the Kurdish area of revolt in 1919, refused to participate. It became known that Emir Faisal of the Hashemite Dynasty had been promised independence by the British in return for Arab military support against the Ottoman Empire in World War I. (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 9) Faisal ascended the throne and the Kingdom of Iraq was formed with an Arab center and south, and a predominantly Kurdish north. In order to placate the Kurds, prevent attempts by Turkey to gain influence over its southern border and counter-balance growing hostility, Sheikh Barzinji was

allowed to return to Sulaymaniya. In 1923 he proclaimed himself King of Kurdistan and announced his intention to liberate all of Kurdistan. The British retaliated in full force and, after months of fighting, forced Barzinji to surrender.

The discovery of a large oil field in Kirkuk, the Kurdish area, destroyed any possibility of Western sympathy for the Kurdish independence struggle. The oil concession in Kirkuk was dominated by British, American, French and Dutch interests. In 1925 the League of Nations "temporarily" awarded Mosul (Iraqi Kurdistan) to the new Arab state of Iraq under these conditions: ". . . regard should be had to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services." (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 10) A series of Kurdish revolts continued which set the future tone of Iraqi-Kurdish relations.

When the British mandate expired in 1930, Iraq became independent. In Sulaymaniya the Kurds again refused to participate in the scheduled elections, and demonstrations ensued. A Kurdish nationalist party, HIVA (Hope) was formed, and armed revolt under Sheikh Barzinji and Mullah Mustafa Barzani continued. In 1932 Sulaymaniya demanded a separate administration and an assembly for Kurdistan within Iraq. As these demands immediately followed an application by Iraq for membership in the League of Nations, the monarchy was sorely angered. It decided to establish firmer control over its Kurdish regions, and chose the northern region of Barzan

as a precedent-setting example. Mullah Mustafa Barzani led the rebellion against the harsh intrusion, and succeeded in fighting until 1945 when a crushing defeat forced Barzani to flee to Iran. There he assumed control of the Kurdish forces of the Mahabad Republic.

This deprivation of leadership forced Kurdish nationalism underground until 1958 when a coup d'etat by General Kassem ended the monarchy in Iraq and put an end to British domination. The constitution of the new republic hinted at Kurdish rights to autonomy: "Arabs and Kurds are partners in this homeland." (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 11)

The change in government enabled Mustafa Barzani to return after 11 years of exile. His return caused a resurgence of independence-oriented demands by the Kurds and concessions by the government. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was recognized and the publication of books and newspapers in Kurdish was allowed. Despite outward signs of progress toward peaceful coexistence, relations worsened. Kassem remained preoccupied with the oil-rich Kurdish region of Kirkuk, and sought to deport or lure Kurds from the area. In September 1961 Kassem's Iraqi army launched a full-scale attack against Kurdistan, particularly against Mustafa Barzani. The fighting continued for nine years, during which Kassem's regime collapsed and others came and went. However, the Kurds remained undefeated.

In 1970 the Ba'ath Government determined that the struggle with the Kurds proved too costly to continue indefinitely. A 15-article Peace Agreement was signed which: recognized the bi-national character of Iraq; reaffirmed Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights; established

a program of rehabilitation and economic development in the devastated regions; established a self-governing region of Kurdistan, demarcated on the basis of an official census which would define the areas of Kurdish majority to be self-governing.\* (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 12) The terms of the Agreement were to be met within a four-year period. Before the policies were carried out, the Iraqi government, in March 1974, announced the Law of Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan.\*\* (Short and McDermott, 1975, Appendix I)

The Kurdistan Democratic Party accused the government of failing to comply with the Peace Agreement, and rejected the Law of Autonomy. The Kurds and the Iraqi army took up arms again in a war which has yet to cease.

Since 1958 the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi government has been erratic and unpredictable. This relationship is due in part to the character of Iraq; that is, a state formed with no geographic, ethnic or religious cohesiveness. Since 1958 Iraq has experienced six coups d'etat and nine changes of government. None of the successive regimes has felt constrained to abide by conventional codes of government. Their prime concern has been maintenance of power. The present military regime of the Ba'ath Government has been in power since the 1968 coup. It has accused Barzani and his followers of alliance with Iran (long an enemy of Iraq over Persian Gulf rights) in order to maintain open borders to facilitate arms and supplies. In return, Barzani agreed (according to Iraqi

\*See Appendix A for further details.

\*\*See Appendix B for further details.

allegations) not to arouse the Kurds in Iran, or seek their support in any way. However, in 1976 an agreement between the governments of Iraq and Iran to settle boundary disputes included the Shah of Iran's promise to withdraw all military and moral support of the Kurdish cause in Iraq. This did much to undermine Barzani's struggle, and Kurdish activity has since been very low.

The basis of the struggle in Iraq between the Kurds and the government are found in the Kurds accusations against the government: (1) no census has been conducted by the Iraqi government as it would demonstrate a definite Kurdish majority in the oil-producing regions of Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Sinjar (which provides two-thirds of Iraq's oil production revenues); (2) the Revolution Command Council (the state policy decision-making body) has conducted a Policy of Arabization to replace the Kurds with Arabs in the oil-producing regions; (3) there has been inadequate economic rehabilitation in the area devastated by the 1961-1970 war; (4) discrimination against Kurds exists in the areas of employment, education, health and citizenship; (5) because Kurds constitute 30% of Iraq's population, they should no longer be regarded as a minority but rather as one of the two nations that comprise the state of Iraq. (Nyrop, 1973, p. 54)

### Iran

The Kurds form the largest minority group in Iran, some two million. Following World War I, uprisings in Iranian Kurdistan were led by Simko in the region of Urmia. Simko liberated a large part of Iranian Kurdistan and successfully fought Persian, Turkish and Iraqi forces until his death in 1930. These extensive revolts were

caused by national discrimination (the Kurdish language was prohibited and national dress not allowed), exploitation by governmental authorities, high taxation and economic pressure by the army and gendarmerie on rural populations. (Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 72)

In the region of Mahabad in northern Iranian Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Party was formed. Its platform: freedom and self-government for Kurdish people within the limits of the Iranian state; Kurdish to become the official language in administrative affairs and to be used in education; election of the provincial council of Kurdistan which was to be the leading body in the district; establishment of links with the people of Azerbaijan in joint struggle with the other national minorities; improvement of the economic situation through exploitation of Kurdistan's natural resources, agriculture and commerce, hygiene and education. (Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 76)

In 1945 Iranian Kurds established the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. This move followed four years of successful independent governing under the influence of the Soviet Union which had occupied that northern region during World War II. (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 11) After the Russian withdrawal in May 1946, Iranian troops mobilized northward to capture Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, sister republic to Mahabad. Both republics collapsed. After only one year, the first example of national liberty for Kurds had been crushed. In March 1947, all of the leaders of the Mahabad Republic were executed by the Iranian government.

The centralized rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi, in addition to

the brutal suppression of Mahabad, has deterred further agitation for Kurdish autonomy. Iranian secret police forces, notable SAVAK, maintain strict security in Kurdish areas. Although Kurdish is spoken freely and permitted in daily radio and television broadcasts, the teaching of the Kurdish language is prohibited. The Kurdish Democratic Party is suppressed. The Shah had given no consideration to the idea of Kurdish autonomy within Iran. He was concerned with rapid reform and modernization, and tolerated no obstacles to his goal. Now that the Shah is deposed, temporarily at least, one can only speculate on the future of Iranian Kurds. The primary issue for Iran in the immediate future is that of Islam versus secularization. Although there will undoubtedly be much violence, there will be little time for the government to deal with the particular problems and demands of the Kurds.

### Syria

In the aftermath of World War I, Syria was taken from the Ottoman Empire and given to France as a Mandate. The French supported the Kurdish Khoibun Party in its struggle against Turkey, but primarily as a means to gain influence and leverage in their border dispute with Turkey. The eventual settlement of the dispute saw a portion of Turkish Kurdish territory assigned to Syria.

The major concentration of Kurds in Syria, 320,000 to 600,000, is in the northern frontier area of Jazire. In 1957 the Kurdish Democratic Party established itself in Syria. Its aim was to secure linguistic and cultural freedom of expression land reform and a democratic Syrian government. According to Kurdish sources, the

TABLE I

## KURDISH POPULATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST\*

<u>Country</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Total Population of Country</u>
Turkey	3,200,000	8,000,000	41,000,000
Iraq	1,550,000	2,500,000	9,498,000
Iran	1,800,000	5,000,000	28,448,000
Syria	320,000	600,000	6,924,000
Soviet Union (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan)	80,000	300,000	13,132,000

\*Source: Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 5

Syrian government in 1962 decided upon an "Arab Belt" plan to replace the Kurdish population of the northeastern border area with Arabs. (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 13) Prior to 1962, approximately 40% of Syrian Kurds were denied citizenship on the basis of their being "infiltrators" from Turkey and Iraq. (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 13) Despite proclamations by the Syrian government that Kurds should participate fully in the development of the state, Kurds claim that the KDP has been declared illegal, there is no linguistic or educational freedom and Kurds enjoy no national rights whatsoever.

### Soviet Union

The Gulestan Agreement in 1813 between Iran and Russia awarded some Kurdish territories to Russia. Today there are approximately 80,000 to 300,000 Kurds in the Soviet Union, concentrated in the Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Although little information is available, it is known that the Kurds are a recognized nationality in the Soviet Union. Cultural expression is allowed through schools, universities, newspapers and radio programs. Although national pride is encouraged, questioning the Soviet system of government is not tolerated. There is little communication between Soviet Kurds and Kurds in the areas of the Middle East.

### Historical Background

The historical relationship between governments of Turkey (and the subsequent Republic of Turkey) and its Kurdish minority has been fraught with contradictions, oscillations between alliance

and rebellion, revolts, repression, compromise, and tokenism. Prior to the inception of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Kurds in the Eastern provinces of present-day Turkey were a geographically isolated, culturally identifiable minority which oscillated between loyalty to Persia and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. As their territory was often disputed as the boundary between Persia and the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were the object of policies of incorporation into the Ottoman Empire or the Persian Empire. Until 1639 when the Treaty of Erzurum established a quasi-permanent boundary between Persia and Turkey, frequent inter-tribal warfare was encouraged by the Persians and the Ottomans to enhance their respective positions. Nonetheless the Kurds retained a fierce sense of independence which prevented their being entirely subjugated by either side. There were frequent revolts against unpopular taxation or military demands of the Ottoman Empire upon the Kurdish principalities. If the revolts were successful, bargains were made; if unsuccessful, the Kurds simply crossed the border into the other state to take shelter with Kurds of that area until safer times returned.

The defeat of the Ottomans in Vienna in 1683 resulted in their attention being focused on the Eastern provinces, particularly Kurdistan. The Ottoman government was sorely in need of revenues due to the debilitating wars in which the Empire had been embroiled in Europe.

The power of the Kurdish tribes in Persia during the early 18th century (for example, Merdan Khan, chief of the Bakhtiari tribes; Kerim Khan Zendi and Lutf Ali Khan of the Lur tribes) was seen as a

potential source of instigation of the Kurds in Turkey to rebel against the Ottoman government. Policies were formulated to bring the Kurds under stricter control via the creation of military centers, removal of Kurdish tribal chiefs as governors and the transfer of real power to the three Ottoman Pashas of Baghdad, Diyarbakir and Erzurum. (Safrastian, 1948) Kurdish resentment toward the Ottomans grew. A number of revolts were organized against the Ottoman government, particularly during and after the reign of Sultan Mehmed II. (Adamson, 1964)

Two of the most notable figures during this period of revolt were Prince Badr Khan of Jazirat-ibn-Omar and Kiör Ahmed Pasha of Revanduz. Both men led their followers in fierce rebellion against Ottoman troops sent by the Porte to the Kurdish areas to obtain taxes and recruits. Although they were ultimately defeated, they succeeded in temporarily retarding the Ottoman onslaught and briefly uniting some of the tribes in revolt.

Despite these frequent revolts and movements toward independence, there was no cooperation among the Kurdish tribal chiefs and no idea of an independent Kurdish nation until 1880. In 1880 the Kurdish Sheikh Obaidullah led a revolt against the Ottomans that successfully united the tribes of the area between Lakes Van and Urmia. The Sheikh stated, ". . . I am simply of the opinion that now, such a suitable moment, when the Kurdish chiefs have been attacked by the Iranian government, we cannot miss the opportunity that has arisen before us to seize from Turkey and Iran all the territories settled by Kurds, which come under my authority, and establish an independent Kurdish principality." (Ghassemlou, 1965,

p. 100) Although this revolt was crushed by joint Ottoman and Persian forces, the Kurds were subsequently treated with more flexibility by the Ottomans. This flexibility included reducing travel restrictions to and from the Kurdish area, relaxing military patrols among the Kurds, and alleviating, slightly, the pressures of taxation to support the Empire.

Many young Kurds were studying in Turkish schools in Constantinople, and some even succeeded in attending universities in Switzerland and France. A newspaper, "Kurdistan," appeared in the Kurdish language in Egypt, and a periodical appeared in Geneva, in French, under the same name. These publications constantly reiterated that Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians and Yezidis should form a common front against the Ottomans for a common purpose. In order to drive a wedge among these groups, the Sultan, Hamid II, organized the northern Kurdish tribes into a cavalry corps.

The incorporation of Kurdish youth into the body politic of Turkey injured the natives in two ways. It increased their violence towards their neighbors, the Armenian as well as Kurdish agricultural population; but above all, it considerably retarded the growth of Kurdish nationalism, by deflecting the energies and the aspirations of a healthy race into negative and anti-national channels. (Safrastian, 1948, p. 67)

In 1908 the Young Turk Revolution resulted in the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the establishment of the new Constitutional Turkish Government. The Young Turks were military officers, organized in order to restore the 1876 constitution, liberalize the repressive policies of Sultan Hamid, and unify the diverse elements of the Empire into a homogeneous nation. (Arfa, 1968) Hamid II

was replaced by his compliant brother Mehmed V. Mustafa Kemal, one of the outstanding leading officers of the Young Turks, disassociated himself after the initial revolt in 1908. He disagreed with the militarist orientation of the new government which had, in fact, become a military dictatorship. This unknown officer was to go on to play the pivotal role in Turkey's history, and to have a profound influence and effect on the Kurds.

Immediately following this change of governments, the Kurds, who had somewhat supported Sultan Hamid, again took the opportunity to promote the idea of an independent Kurdish state. This promotion took the form of publications in Kurdish bulletins, poetry and literature, as well as the resumption of guerrilla-type harassment of Turkish travellers and military through Kurdish areas. (Nyrop, 1973) These activities were abruptly curtailed by the outbreak of World War I between the Allied Powers of France, Russia and Great Britain on one side and the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. In August 1914, the Ottoman government allied with Germany. During the war the Kurds remained loyal to the Ottoman government and fought against Russian forces on the Eastern front.

At the end of the war, the Kurds slowly began to shift their support from the Ottoman government to Mustafa Kemal. Kemal, still an army officer but divorced from the Young Turks, was in Anatolia organizing a revolution against the government. The reasons for this shift of support are important, as are the consequences and subsequent relationship between Mustafa Kemal and the Kurds.

In the immediate post-World War I period, Kemal organized a

Turkish nationalist movement in Anatolia and launched a war for independence against the terms of the peace agreement which the Ottoman government had accepted. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in June 1920 by the Allied Powers and the sultan's (Mehmed VI, successor to the late Mehmed V) representatives, reduced Turkey to northern Anatolia and Istanbul, placed the sultan under European protective custody, placed the straits under a European commission without a Turkish member, gave the remainder of European Turkey to Greece, demilitarized the empire and provided for an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdish state.

The official reason for the treaty's providing for an autonomous Armenian and Kurdish state was President Wilson's "program of the world's peace." Point 12 of this program stipulated that non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be assured of an absolute and unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, presumably to promote peace on a world-wide scale. Within a more realistic framework, the rationale for an independent Armenia and Kurdistan was probably one of concern for the effective and permanent break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Two independent states within the former boundaries of the Empire would be added insurance against a resurgence of Ottoman power.

Although the Treaty of Sevres marked the pinnacle of Kurdish aspirations and elevated their situation to an important international level, the Kurds eventually supported Mustafa Kemal. They believed that his Turkish national liberation struggle would lead to a realization of their national rights as well. In July 1919, a meeting

of the "Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia" was held in Erzurum. It was attended by politically conscious Kurds who unequivocally supported the Turkish national liberation struggle. (Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 46) This rationale was supported by Kemal's earlier opposition to the Young Turks' ideology which had included assimilation to Ottoman Turkism and by the arousal of the unity and support of all Turkic-speaking peoples in Anatolia, southern Russia and central Asia. This ideology had effected further alienation of the non-Turkish peoples of the empire, and stimulated the rise of separatist national movements. When Mustafa Kemal called to order the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Ankara in 1920, 72 Kurdish deputies attended. They collaborated with Kemal as representatives of Kurdistan.

According to scholars in this field, there were several military and extremely realistic reasons for the Kurdish support of Kemal. The structure of Kurdish leadership was so decentralized and fragmented by rivalry and strife from within as to render a decision of support or nonsupport impossible. This meant that a strong direction of support, either toward Kemal or toward the participants in the Treaty of Sevres, was never determined. The blatant imbalance of military power between the Kurds and Kemal's Turkish troops was a factor in persuading the Kurds to join forces with Kemal. The Kurds had witnessed the swift decimation of their Armenian neighbors who had been much more organized, disciplined and well-supplied than they themselves were. If the Kurds also opposed Kemal, there was every reason to expect a similar fate. Rather than be overrun by

Kemal's army for resisting, it was better to hope for concessions from him in return for aiding him in his struggle.

Furthermore, some Kurds entertained the suspicion that an autonomous Kurdish state, as well as an independent state of Armenia, were intended by the European powers to be a buffer between a socialist Soviet Russia and Turkey. The signators of the Treaty of Sèvres had made no effort in the past, or even following the agreement, to support the Kurds or the Armenians in their struggles against the Ottoman government or the Kemalist forces. There were no offers of financial, moral or military support to give credence to the sincerity of Europe's desire for an autonomous Kurdish state. By all appearances the Kurds were once more witnessing a policy of exploitation by parties hoping to gain some advantage by espousing support for the Kurdish drive for self-determination.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Kurds should elect to ignore a treaty which would grant them an autonomous state but which had been concluded with the government proclaiming intolerance of minority recognition. In addition, Mustafa Kemal was a staunch critic of military involvement in politics. "He was convinced that the military should stay out of politics and the administration of government once its revolutionary move had succeeded." (Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 73) To the Kurds, who had experienced countless advances from the Ottoman military, Mustafa Kemal seemed to provide at least the hope of a solution to their plight.

Mustafa Kemal successfully led the resurgence of nationalist Turkey against the Ottoman government and Greek forces. His military

successes culminated in the abolition of the sultanate and the end of the Ottoman Empire. In October 1923, the Grand National Assembly declared Ankara the capital of the country and proclaimed the Republic of Turkey with Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk, "father of the Turks") as President.

The Treaty of Lausanne, signed by Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan and by the Republic's representative, General İsmet İnönü, obliterated any similar plans for or recognition of Kurdish autonomy as outlined by the Treaty of Sèvres. The agreement stated only that the cultural and religious rights of minorities must be respected.

## CHAPTER II

### FROM ATATÜRK TO ECEVIT

Atatürk's objectives for the now independent Republic of Turkey are clearly illustrated by the rapid series of reforms he initiated. He sought to transform Turkey politically, socially and economically into a modern state modelled, in some instances, on Western Europe. Some of his reforms included: abolition of the sultanate and caliphate; closure of traditional religious schools; abolition of seriat religious courts; abolition of Dervish orders; outlawing of the fez; introduction of Western clothing; adoption of Western calendar; adoption of new civil, commercial and penal codes based on European models; introduction of civil marriage; abolition of Islamic polygamy; adoption of a modified Latin form as the new Turkish alphabet; declaration of Turkey as a secular state.

Atatürk's efforts to secularize and modernize Turkey upset many traditionalists who felt that the changes had come too quickly and too severely, particularly the prohibition of the fez. In February 1925, the Kurds revolted in Eastern Turkey under the leadership of Sheikh Said. The cause of the revolt was two-fold: conservative reaction against secularism; Kurdish nationalism. The latter cause resulted from growing awareness of Atatürk's policy of assimilation and Turkification of minorities. Officially there was no "Kurdish problem." The peoples in the mountains of Eastern Turkey were referred to as "mountain Turks."

Sheikh Said and 45 of his supporters were tried by a military court and executed in June of 1925. Restrictions against cultural

identity were begun--Kurdish mosques were closed, Kurdish associations dissolved, Kurdish ceremonies and meetings banned, Kurdish traditional dress proscribed and the Kurdish language prohibited. (Nyrop, 1973, p. 32)

In 1927 all Kurdish nationalist movements united to form the Koibun Party. The Koibun was supported by the British, French and Armenians, each hoping to use it to enhance their respective interests in the Middle East generally, as well as Turkey specifically. The Koibun lost its influence and disbanded following the unsuccessful 1930 revolt led by Kurdish ex-officers of the Ottoman army. The central figure in this revolt, which spread throughout Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Van and Bohtan, was Ihsan Nuri Pasa. When the revolt was crushed, he fled to Iran where he remained until his death. (O'Ballance, 1973, p. 17)

As Atatürk began his military policy of pacification and penetration into Kurdistan, the Kurds rebelled at the attempts to strengthen governmental control. As revolts occurred, the Turkish army merely moved in, constructed military garrisons in volatile areas and established civil administration as it proceeded to penetrate the area. In 1937 the Turkish army moved in upon the district of Dersim, near the Euphrates River. There had been a long struggle between the Turkish authorities and the Kurds in Dersim over the issue of taxes and recruits. In order to illustrate the efficiency of the army and the achievements of the Republic, the Turkish army occupied the passes of Dersim and demanded that a certain number of tribal chiefs surrender and proceed to Ankara. In the ensuing clash, the

Kurds retreated into the inaccessible mountains. Unable to reach these tribes, the army began to bomb mountain villages and camps. Incapable of resisting these aerial attacks, Sheikh Said and his chief followers surrendered. They were taken to trial and twelve of them executed.

This disturbance in Dersim was the last armed and organized revolt by the Kurds in Turkey. It was a direct result of Atatürk's determination to assimilate the Kurds. After the actual fighting, Tunceli province, in which Dersim lay, was placed under martial law until 1946. The Kurds were put under strict governmental control: they were disarmed; efforts were made to detribalize them, discourage national dress and language; the Turkish language was made compulsory; Kurdish titles were abolished and sheikhs deported to other regions; roads and rail links were constructed which made the frontier more accessible to control; the word "Kurd" was banned. (O'Ballance, 1973, p. 22) These rather harsh tactics, considered necessary by the government in order to preserve the territorial integrity and political unity of the Republic, succeeded in forcing the Kurds into relative passivity for a number of years.

In 1946 a multi-party electoral system allowed some Kurdish expression, but only because the parties needed Kurdish votes. The government of Adnan Menderes replaced Atatürk's successor İsmet İnönü in the 1950 elections. Menderes concentrated on quick, post-war major industrial modernization which resulted in heavy debts for Turkey. In the process his government gradually assumed authoritarian, centralized powers and increasing intolerance of dissent. Opposition

attempts resulted in restrictions on the press and on individual liberties. In May 1960, General Cemal Gürsel directed a military take-over and charged Menderes and his government with abrogating the constitution and instituting a dictatorship. (O'Ballance, 1973, p.22)

The 1960 coup was the catalyst to a resurgence of assertion of Kurdish rights and demands for autonomy. National committees of Kurds were formed which condemned Gürsel's (and later Süleyman Demirel's) government for failing to deal positively with Kurdish education and economy. Gürsel's new military, neo-Kemalist regime deported 55 Kurdish tribal chiefs to Western Anatolia, along with thousands of their followers. This only served to increase discontent and violent opposition. Only when the exiles were repatriated did the Kurdish areas calm down. (Nyrop, 1973, p. 32) From the perspective of the Turkish government, this movement of tribal chiefs was not a policy of deportation but rather of resettlement. The rationale was the resettlement of landlords in order to break up large land-holdings, an essential prerequisite to land reform and redistribution.

Gürsel's response to the agitation was to threaten bombardment of Kurdish villages; Demirel's response was to ban all Kurdish political activity. (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 8) During the subsequent political instability, the Kurds took the opportunity to form three political associations through which to verbalize their demands to the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. One such association was the DDKO--Progressive Cultural Organization for Eastern Anatolia.

It published reports concerning military repression and torture, and initiated a campaign to eliminate illiteracy (77% in Kurdish areas, according to Turkish government statistics). (O'Ballance, 1973, p. 23) In December 1972, twenty leaders of the DDKO were found guilty of charges of "trying to establish the domination of one class over the other classes" and "following a separatist policy on behalf of Kurdish people." They were sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment by the First Military Court of Diyarbakır Martial Law Headquarters.

In 1967 a Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was illegally established and allied to the legal Turkish Labor Party. Most Kurdish intellectuals and workers joined the Turkish Labor Party which, in 1971, adopted a party program demanding equal rights for Kurds. However, the main effect of this left-wing alliance was not greater strength but rather increased military repression in Kurdish areas. A strong anti-Kurdish reaction in the Assembly ensued, followed by much violence. In the aftermath, a Kurdish parliamentary deputy was killed; demonstrations by urban Kurdish workers and students; Kurdish villages were raided and sometimes destroyed by a militia; many reports were published citing incidents of murder and torture. (Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 8) On July 20, 1971, the Turkish Labor Party was closed by the Constitutional Court for adopting a resolution on the democratic rights of the Kurds. Its leaders were accused of "trying to establish the domination of one class over other classes and to follow a separatist policy." Again the same rhetoric was used as that which condemned the twenty leaders of the

DDKO in 1972. The charge was vague enough to be applicable in numerous situations, at the discretion of the prosecuting elements. The Turkish Labor Party leaders were sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for their support of Kurdish nationalism, as well as for their socialist policies. (Cousins, 1973, p. 88)

In April of 1971 the Kurds again made demands for reforms and autonomy. This occurred when Demirel was ousted by the military which maintained that the country had fallen into "anarchy and fratricidal strife." (Cousins, 1973, p. 89) In fact internal politics had become sharply polarized. Kurdish separatism had continued to develop in the East, a left-wing guerrilla movement (Turkish People's Liberation Army) had emerged in urban areas, and clashes between left-wing and right-wing students increased.

The successor to Demirel, Nihat Erim, declared his government's intent to initiate reforms in education, land distribution and agriculture, to devise constitutional amendments to minimize factionalism without threatening democracy, and to establish law and order. Erim made specific references to reforms in the Kurdish areas. When ammunition liaisons between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds were discovered, Erim renounced all formal verbal concessions. In May 1971, Prime Minister Erim stated, "We accept no other nation as living in Turkey other than Turks. As we see it, there is only one nation in Turkey: the Turkish nation. All citizens living in different parts of the country are content to be Turkish." (Nyrop, 1973, p. 54)

The apparent concessions which Iraq had made to its Kurds in 1970 had already caused anxiety for the Turkish government.

Indications of collaboration convinced the Ankara government that the Iraqi guarantee of self-government had aroused the Kurds in Turkey, and that a Kurdish revolt was imminent. Martial law was declared in all of Turkey's 11 Eastern provinces. Between April and December approximately one thousand Kurds were arrested. (Cousins, 1973, p. 93).

According to Jane Cousins (1973) the use of torture in Turkey under the military rule from 1971 to 1973 has been well-documented. (Cousins, 1973 and Short and McDermott, 1975, p. 17) Harsh tactics and modes of suppression were applied against Kurds as well as against Lertist political opponents of the government in Western Turkey. The return of parliamentary rule in 1973 under Bülent Ecevit brought about the abolition of martial law and, apparently, extremist methods of control. Ecevit's party's platform (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) included socio-economic development of the Eastern provinces among its many plans for internal reforms. However, due to the unexpected and sudden crisis on Cyprus in June 1974, government attention was diverted from the issues in the Eastern provinces. During his six months in office, Ecevit was unable to devote much time to internal matters.

In November 1974, Ecevit's coalition with the right-wing Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) collapsed. Basic ideological differences between the two parties which had been overshadowed by the Cyprus crisis finally came to the forefront. Ecevit resigned and a new four-party coalition was formed by Süleyman Demirel who assumed the Prime Ministership. This government, composed of the Adalet Partisi, Cumhuriyet Güven Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi and Milli Hareket Partisi,

reverted to policies of maintenance of the status quo. Although no direct reference was, or is, made to the Kurds (indeed not even official recognition of a problem), Demirel's party enjoyed the support of conservative Kurdish leaders in the East; in other words, of the landlords. Results of the 1977 election (a three-party coalition of the Adalet Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi and Milli Hareket Partisi) illustrates the trend of support for the Adalet Partisi from Kurdish areas. This phenomenon is due, I believe, to "gun-barrel voting"--villages being coerced to follow the voting preference of the local landlord whose only concern is the preservation of his personal interests and wealth.

Reports from Kurdish areas now indicate that Kurdish activity is much decreased and that any Turkish military presence is discreet. There are still clashes between Kurds and the Turkish authorities, such as those which occurred during the summer of 1976 in Diyarbakır and Gaziantep. However, these clashes are relatively isolated and do not suggest a widespread organization of Kurdish rebellion. Even the most recent violence in Turkey (December 1978) which resulted in declaration of martial law in several provinces, did not directly involve Kurdish aspirations of autonomy or recognition. I believe the recent rioting to be caused by deep and serious economic problems currently plaguing Turkey. The rationale of religious differences was simply the emotional catalyst of the violence.

## CHAPTER III

### KURDS AND THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

The objectives of the Kurds in Turkey today fall into four broad categories: political, cultural, economic and social. These goals and objectives have been evident in the Kurdish struggle for decades, but have yet to be realized.

Politically the Kurds in Turkey are striving toward equal representation in the National Assembly in Ankara. They wish to see the Kurdish Democratic Party legitimized and legalized. They seek unhampered participation in other established political parties of their own choosing.

Culturally Turkish Kurds desire their own language. They want to see the Kurdish language taught in their schools, although there is no insistence that the lessons be taught in Kurdish; they would continue to accept Turkish as the official language of instruction. Newspapers and books should be published in Kurdish, and radio broadcasts to Kurdish areas made in their own language. There is a desire to practice traditional Kurdish customs as well as to wear Kurdish national dress, beyond special costumes for specific holidays. Most importantly, the Kurds wish to preserve their ethnic distinctiveness, to be recognized as "Kurds," not as "mountain Turks."

Economically the Kurds desire economic revitalization of Kurdish areas, that is, of the region of Eastern Anatolia and portions of the region of Southeastern Anatolia. (Figures 2 and 3) Revitalization should be in the form of capital investments made in the area, industrialization promoted, education expanded and more adequate services

provided. The provision of services would include roads, railroads, electricity, water, telephones, television, radio, newspapers and health services.\*

Socially the Kurds desire equal access to the distribution system. They wish an equal opportunity for education, employment, and participation outside the predominantly Kurdish areas.

Turkey's overall objectives can be categorized under two general headings: modernization and integration. Turkey is striving to realize a program of modernization and development by means of industrialization, economic and political independence and improvements in communications, transportation, the provision of services, education and employment.

Turkey is also striving toward territorial and political integrity, as well as toward the assimilation of minorities, non-Muslim (Greeks, Armenians, Jews) as well as Muslims (Laz, Circassians, Kurds). This desire for an integrated society is the focal point of dissent between the Kurds and the Turkish government.

An objective scrutiny of the desires and goals of the Kurds and of the Turkish government could produce a compatible program of development and progress that could satisfy both factions. The economic and social objectives of the Kurds are basically the same objectives of the Turkish government; in other words, modernization and development. Whereas the Kurds seek investment, industrialization and provision of services in Kurdish areas specifically, the Turkish

\*Data illustrating the existent conditions regarding the above demands is provided in the following chapter.




Figure 1. Regional map of Turkey.




Figure 2. Kurdish population distribution in Turkey.

government is striving to achieve these goals in Turkey generally. The political independence the Kurds are striving toward in their own areas is that same political independence toward which post-Ottoman Turkey struggled in order to achieve territorial and political integrity as well as international recognition and respect. The root of the struggle becomes apparent when one examines the Kurds' goal of cultural autonomy and Turkey's goal of assimilation. Obviously the two goals are diametrically opposed. The Kurds' fierce history of warfare and revolt has centered on their refusal to be absorbed, be it by Turkey, Iraq, Iran or Syria.

#### The Kurdish Perspective

Three Kurdish approaches to the problem can be distinguished from the literature, authored by Kurds, available in Turkey:

(1) "traditionalist" in which the status quo is acceptable and no demands should be made on the Turkish government other than cultural concessions such as language and religious privileges; (2) "moderates" in which the answer to the problem is acceptance of a situation granting Kurds political representation and cultural autonomy, and a willingness to work within the existing legal framework; (3) "extremist separatist" in which the only viable solution to the problem is complete independence or, at least, autonomy.

The first approach, that of "traditionalist," is best represented from among the Turkish and Kurdish authors by General Kenan Esengin in the book Kürtçülük Sorunu ("The Problem With the Kurds", 1976). General Esengin contends that if the government were to follow the Kemalist attitude of nationalism, there would be no cause

to identify ethnic differences in Turkey. He suggests that ethnic diversity of tribal groups was first enhanced by the Ottoman Empire government's lack of enforcing a unified Turkish language. Esengin's approach, as well as other Kurdish and non-Kurdish "traditionalists," is ideological rationalization of early government policies which state that Kurds are Turks and therefore must behave accordingly. Esengin's traditionalist suggestions to alleviate future problems focus on policies that would eliminate strong ethnic and language identification with the intent to absorb Kurds into Turkish society. His suggestions include: initiation of large-scale education programs for Kurds, integrated with instruction from teachers of non-Kurdish regions; unification of political parties to destroy the decentralized seats of power of local sheikhs and agas; appointment of nationalists to key government positions in Kurdish areas; organization against ideologies which support ethnicity. (Esengih, 1976)

The history of the Kurds in Turkey, from the Kurdish perspective, is concisely described by Stefanos Yerasimos in his book entitled Azgelismislik Sürecinde Türkiye. ("Turkey in the Period of Underdevelopment", 1976) According to Yerasimos the development of the Kurdish separatist notion is based in Ottoman history. During a period when Ottoman policy was forceful integration of Anatolian Turkoman groups, Kurdish leaders were being offered semi-autonomy. This was in exchange for Kurds acting as a buffer between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The primary reason for such a contradictory policy concerning the Kurds was their geographic location. This most

probably set the stage for subsequent Kurdish separatist ideas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This Ottoman policy may also have created the basis for the socio-economic imbalance which exists today between the Eastern provinces and the rest of Turkey.

During the early years of the Republic (1920-1940) the policy of somewhat ignoring the Kurds was reversed to a certain extent. Kurdish leadership was brought under strict political control and allowed no responsibilities of government. However, at the same time the new republican government took no responsibility for the region either, which was thus left to manage on its own with no direction internally or externally. Gradually the internal situation of Kurdish leadership, control and hierarchy changed to control by pro-government elements. Since the feudal political power structure of the Kurdish groups still operated, the extent of their internal power depended on compliance with the policies established in Ankara. Non-Kurds sent into the area by the government to quell the uprisings were supported by the Kurdish landed aristocracy which wished only to protect and further their private interests.

Governmental apathy toward the Eastern and Kurdish regions, coupled with exploitation by a land-based elite interested in perpetuating the Ankara government's policies to protect their own interests, has exacerbated differences in development levels and rates between the Western and Eastern (Kurdish) regions of Turkey.

This interpretation of Kurdish history and the present-day situation is most representative of those Kurdish authors who could be classified as "moderate separatists." Stefanos Yerasimos'

approach, as well as other Kurds who share his view, is exemplified by his moderate suggestion to alleviate the problems in the Kurdish region by changing the political base from a land-oriented, pro-Ankara rich elite to a political base emphasizing public participation and interest in the Kurdish provinces.

The third approach, "extremist separatist," is espoused in the literature by those Kurds who admit to no other alternative than complete autonomy, minimally, or independence. The means to accomplish such an objective are expressed by C. Aladağ in his book, Milli Mesele ve Doğu'da Feodalizm-Aşiret. ("National Problems and the Feudal Tribe in the East", 1976) The initial steps must eliminate the feudal tribal character of the Eastern region and build up political democracy.

Democratization of the region is not only ending feudal pressure and exploitation in the region, but also ending class-based ethnic and racist separatist policy treatment by the government. Under those circumstances, the changes needed in the infrastructure would be based on elimination of separate treatment policies toward the region and consequently having new policies with extreme efforts to economically develop the region. (Aladağ, 1976, p. 187)

The contention of supporters of this approach is that Kurds cannot continue to live in the shadow of the Turkish government, treated as renegade Turks with none of the benefits and privileges of a Turkish citizen. Turkey's refusal to recognize their historical and cultural distinctiveness, of which they are fiercely proud, is a constant incentive for them to assert their independence.

This approach is considered most dangerous by the central government. Supporters of this approach are closely supervised by

Turkish authorities, and their publications rarely allowed to be distributed. "Extremist separatist" adherents are generally militant and comparatively uncompromising.

## CHAPTER IV

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework within which this thesis operates is that of political integration and, more broadly, political development. Within the various approaches to political development lies the concept of political integration, which I will attempt to illustrate.

My definition of "political development" is based on establishing the evolutionary process of change within individual polities in response to modernization and with the intent to maximize the goals of equality, differentiation, and capacity. By equality I mean that the entire society, not just a privileged few, is the reference for legitimacy. Demands will be made by all parts of the society for equal opportunities, equal application of laws, equal distribution of resources, etc. By differentiation I mean the separation and specialization of roles, institutional spheres, and associations. By capacity I mean the ability of the political structure and institutions to be responsive, adaptive and innovative in their performance. The approach I prefer is sequential and the tool to be used is a sequential model of the patterns in creating or differentiating institutions in order to deal with the challenges of modernization.

Modernization, which includes the phenomena of urbanization, industrialization, expansion of educational opportunity, increased social mobility, etc., brings to the polity five problem areas: identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution. The penetration problem is the problem of how much effective control

the central government has. The participation problem concerns who takes part in, or has some influence over, the making of governmental decisions. The legitimacy problem refers to the basis upon which and the degree to which the decisions of government are accepted by the populace of a society because of normative beliefs by the populace as to the "rightness" of ways in which decisions are made. The distribution problem refers to the extent to which the decisions of government are used to allocate or reallocate material benefits and other benefits in the society. The identity problem concerns the definition of the set of individuals whom it is believed fall, appropriately, within the decision-making scope of the government. (Verba, "Sequences and Development," 1971)

I maintain that a polity is politically integrated, or a specific group politically integrated into that polity, when these five areas are adequately dealt with by the pattern of institutionalization.\*. When this happens, the goals of equality, differentiation and capacity will be maximized by means of institutionalization in the following manner: (1) The establishment of patterns of behavior that will maximize participation and the distribution of resources to meet demands for equity. In specific relation to this thesis, what have been the patterns of behavior of the Turkish government toward its Kurdish minority which have affected, positively as well as negatively, the participation of Kurds in the political and social life of Turkey?

\*Institutionalization in this context means the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of a political system is defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures. (Huntington, Political Order, 1968, p. 12)

How have these institutionalized policies affected the pattern of resource distribution between the Kurdish minority and the Turks?

(2) The establishment of patterns of penetration to deal with increased differentiation. Specifically, what have been the patterns of penetration which have allowed or prevented access by the Kurds to the increased and specialized roles of the bureaucracy, institutions and associations in Turkey? (3) The achievement of a high level of capacity to deal with the problems of identity and legitimacy. Assuming that the political structure and institutions of the Turkish Republic have reached an adequate level of capacity to deal with the problem of identity and legitimacy in general, how has this capacity level helped or hindered the very particular problems of identity and legitimacy of the Kurds?

### Methodology

The methodological approach used in this study is simple quantitative analysis of data gathered primarily from Turkish government and business sources. (Prime Ministry State Institute of Turkey, 1976, and Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, 1977) The available data was categorized according to regions corresponding to the geographic concentrations of Kurds. (Figure 3, page 34) The geographic concentration of Kurds was decided upon according to the languages spoken in the various provinces. The concentration of Kurdish-speaking peoples was then divided into three categories: over 50% of the population; 10% to 50% of the population; less than 10% of the population.

The socio-economic indicators were grouped according to those

aspects of integration that could be illustrated and analyzed. According to the data available through research, five area indicators emerged: employment, education, health care, public investment and private investment. These socio-economic indicators emerged from the available data as those which could best correspond to the five problem areas prevalent in any polity facing modernization. Because of the lack of data, the parameters of this research were practically self-determined. Although there was not enough raw data to correspond to every problem area (identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution), a combination of statistics and literature from various sources sufficed to present an adequate outline of the problem of the political integration of the Kurds in Turkey. From these figures, as well as through available literature, I was able to conclude the social, economic and cultural situation of the Kurds in their regions of majority occupancy in comparison to the rest of Turkey. Again, the spatial analysis was based on regional comparisons.

The data research was, however, not without formidable obstacles. The primary difficulty in researching this topic is simple lack of substantial publications of statistics as well as relative inaccessibility of what little information is available. The primary sources of data were official Turkish government statistical publications, and books by Kurdish authors dealing with the problem between Kurds and the Turkish government.

The former source provided the statistics from which the majority of the figures and tables presented in this thesis were derived. However, I was unable to locate any data which could

provide a long-term picture of changes in the selected socio-economic indicators. There were no available statistics representing the situation prior to 1964 nor later than 1975. Thus a major obstacle emerged regarding my desire to present a pattern of institutionalization in relation to the theory of the political integration of the Kurds.

The latter source, books authored by Kurds, was less helpful in terms of raw data and specific statistical information, but did present detailed historical accounts of the Kurdish struggle as well as predictions regarding the future of the Kurds in Turkey. The little information available through these books was the only opportunity to interpret the situation, past and present, from the Kurdish perspective.

The data presented in the following chapter was organized and compiled so as to consistently compare the situation among the seven regions. Since the purpose of the analysis is to illustrate the differences between the Kurdish area (primarily the regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia; see Figure 2, page 34) and the remainder of Turkey, constant reference will be made to the comparative regional characteristics.

## CHAPTER V

### DATA ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is presentation of the raw data and corresponding analysis to clearly illustrate the situation of the Kurds in the Eastern provinces as compared to the rest of Turkey. The following data will hopefully substantiate certain statements and assumptions, by non-Kurds as well as Kurds, by offering concrete evidence of the existing situation. There is no intention by the author to support one position over the other, for example, the Turkish government's over Kurdish; nor was any data selected out of the presentation in order to persuade the reader toward a particular conclusion.

The data was categorized according to regions corresponding to the geographic concentration of Kurds. (Table I and Figure 2, page 34) The seven regions (European, Black Sea, Marmara and Aegean, Mediterranean, Anatolian, Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia) are identical to the Turkish government's official regional divisions of the country. The Kurdish population distribution pattern (Figure 3) was determined according to the languages spoken in the various provinces. The concentration of Kurdish-speaking people was then divided into three categories: over 50% of the population; 10% to 50% of the population; less than 10% of the population. (Nyrop, 1973)

Ismail Cem's statistics regarding language groups serves to support the conclusion derived from government sources. Cem states that over six million people in the Eastern regions speak a language

TABLE II

## REGIONAL STATISTICS

Region	Population*	Population*	Population Increase	Regional Population as Percent	
	1967	1974	by Percent 1967-1974	1967	1974
(Non-Kurdish Area) European	3,425,678	4,596,730	36.0%	10.3%	11.7%
Black Sea	4,714,048	5,297,068	12.0%	18.5%	17.6%
Marmara & Aegean	5,192,495	5,950,936	16.0%	16.2%	15.5%
Mediterranean	2,551,471	3,130,084	24.0%	12.2%	12.7%
Anatolian	11,607,144	13,533,725	16.0%	25.5%	25.0%
(Kurdish Area) Eastern Anatolia	3,545,757	4,179,446	16.8%	12.1%	12.0%
Southeastern Anatolia	1,814,398	2,271,333	24.8%	5.2%	5.5%
TOTAL	32,850,981	38,959,322			

\*Computed by means of yearly population increase percentages.

Source: Dewdney, John C. Turkey: An Introductory Geography. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, p. 76.

Prime Ministry State Institute of Turkey. Turkiye Istatistik Yilligi 1975. Ankara: State Institute of Statistics Printing Division, 1976, p. 30.

TABLE III

APPROXIMATED REGIONAL POPULATION  
INCREASE PER YEAR\*

<u>Region</u>	<u>Population 1965</u>	<u>Population 1970</u>	<u>Yearly Percentage Increase</u>
<u>(Non-Kurdish)</u>			
European	3,142,824	3,895,534	4.5%
Black Sea	4,576,746	4,997,234	1.5%
Marmara & Aegean	4,992,784	5,510,126	2.0%
Mediterranean	2,407,049	2,794,718	3.0%
Anatolian	11,160,716	12,531,227	2.0%
<u>(Kurdish)</u>			
Eastern			
Anatolia	3,402,829	3,855,578	2.1%
Southeastern			
Anatolia	1,708,473	2,020,759	3.1%

\*Concluded by calculating the population increase from 1965 to 1974 and computing the average yearly change.

other than Turkish. Of those six million, 53% speaks Kurdish.

(Cem, 1974, pp. 504-505) The Kurdish-speaking percentages in the vilayets which help comprise the defined Kurdish region include: 64% in Ağrı; 69% in Bingöl; 66% in Bitlis; 91% in Siirt; 61% in Urfa; 69% in Diyarbakır; and 92% in Mardin. (Cem, 1974, p. 506)

The land use information presented in Table II provides a numerical description of the seven regions of Turkey in relation to the agricultural use of the land. The figures categorized as "non-arable land" includes non-agricultural use only. It does not include land incorporated by cities or villages, nor does it include land used for industry.

The regions of the Black Sea, Marmara and Aegean, and Mediterranean exhibit the highest percentage of non-arable land in relation to the total land mass for the respective regions. However, it must be pointed out that these regions also contain numerous mountain chains which greatly reduce the amount of arable land. For example, the Black Sea Region contains a mountain chain which runs parallel to the coastline, leaving merely a strip of land suitable for agriculture. In the Marmara and Aegean Region, the mountain ranges which run perpendicular to the coast limit the arable land to valley patches between the ridges.

On the average, the percent of non-arable land in the Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia is 38.19%, according to the latest available data of 1970. Although there are high mountain ranges in these regions, they are located primarily in the extreme Eastern portions, close to the Turkish border. As there are

## LAND USE, 1970

<u>Region</u>	<u>Total Land Mass (Square Miles)</u>	<u>Non-Arable Land* (Square Miles)</u>	<u>% of Non-Arable Land to Total Regional Land Mass</u>
<u>(Non-Kurdish)</u> European	9,642.2	4,108.3	42.61%
Black Sea	26,662.2	14,302.4	53.64%
Marmara & Aegean	33,923.7	20,641.6	60.85%
Mediterranean	24,277.6	15,632.7	64.39%
Anatolian <u>(Kurdish)</u>	133,343.4	61,556.2	46.16%
Eastern Anatolia	50,541.6	20,388.6	40.34%
Southeastern Anatolia	20,557.2	7,408.2	36.04%
TOTAL	298,947.9	144,038.0	38.68%

\*Non-agricultural use; does not include cities or industry.

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yillığı 1975, 1976, pp. 182-183.

TABLE V

STATE IRRIGATION SCHEMES  
1965

<u>Area (Region)</u>	<u>Land Irrigated (Square Miles)</u>	<u>Percentage of Total Irrigated Land</u>
Konya (Anatolia)	120.00	19.3%
Şeyhan Plain (Mediterranean)	119.31	19.2%
Büyük Menderes (Marmara & Aegean)	82.36	13.2%
Gediz (Marmara & Aegean)	65.67	10.6%
Aras (Eastern Anatolia)*	59.72	9.7%
Malatya Basin (Anatolia)	27.53	4.4%
Antalya Plain (Mediterranean)	25.95	4.2%
Others	120.93	19.2%
TOTAL	621.92	

\*Kurdish area

Source: Dewdney, John C. Turkey: An Introductory Geography.  
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, p. 151.

TABLE VI

DISTRIBUTION OF ARABLE LAND\*  
BY USE BY REGION, 1970

Region	Cereals	Bean Crops	Industrial Crops	Oil Seeds	Root&Fodder Crops	Fallow	Orchards		Non-Agri. Land
							Vineyards	OliveGroves	
I	640,590	11,603	7,492	328,608	17,800	184,768	21,790	195,842	1,064,863
II	1,774,609	42,114	65,597	30,811	64,645	218,241	520,358	470,629	3,707,183
III	1,208,375	96,499	480,902	102,865	47,580	437,569	720,271	261,462	5,350,299
IV	1,061,859	37,402	331,764	58,448	17,579	284,178	237,315	135,122	4,051,990
V	7,324,134	291,061	197,036	36,047	692,655	5,734,970	777,922	3,396,337	15,955,355
VI**	1,607,660	50,851	19,480	1,484	80,278	1,140,205	55,106	4,827,042	5,284,718
VII**	1,141,648	85,651	23,297	1,405	6,996	1,044,276	374,660	682,205	1,920,193
TOTAL	14,270,723	615,241	1,125,558	559,747	395,275	9,044,207	2,706,615	10,881,808	40,457,565

\*Hectares = 2.471 acres or 100 square meters

\*\*Kurdish area

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı 1975, 1976, pp. 182-183.

few large cities and practically no industrial use of the land, it would appear that some potential for land use development does exist. This hypothesis is supported by the data available in Table III, State Irrigation Schemes. At the time of that data compilation (1965) there was only one state irrigation scheme in the Kurdish area. That project irrigated only 9.7% of the total irrigated land in all of Turkey. This is the lowest percent of irrigated land in any region.

According to İsmail Cem (1974) and Stefanos Yerasimos (1976) the distribution of land among Kurds is highly unbalanced. In 17 vilayets, or provincial capitals (Erzincan, Erzurum, Kars, Ağrı, Tunceli, Bingöl, Muş, Bitlis, Van, Adiyaman, Malatya, Elâziğ, Siirt, Gaziantep, Urfa, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Hakkâri), 38% of the farmers exist as share-croppers. In other words, 38% of the farmers pay a large portion of their subsistence earnings to a landlord, or *lâğa*, in support of a feudal system. 33% of the arable land is owned by only 2.4% of the farming families in the Eastern regions. In the four most Kurdish provinces of the Southeastern Region (Hakkâri, Bingöl, Siirt, Muş), 56% of all arable land is owned by a mere 3.6% of the farming families. (Cem, 1974, p. 506) Of this 3.6%, 45% are absentee landlords.

In 17 vilayets of the Eastern Anatolia Region, 4.5% of the land owners live in urban areas; in other words, are absentee landlords. However, this tiny percentage of landowners owns 30% of the region's arable land. A similar situation exists in four vilayets of the Southeastern Anatolia Region (Urfa, Diyarbakır, Mardin and Gaziantep)

where 7.5% of the landowners are in absentia while owning 70% of the arable land.\* (Cem, 1974, p. 509)

Table I illustrates the population distribution, by region, in Turkey. These figures, plus the above information which gives a general description of the land use profiles of the regions, serve as the backdrop against which the data presented on the following pages can be compared.

### Employment Indicator

The figures in this table (Table VII) illustrate the employment changes, region by region, between 1967 and 1974. In those years the economically active population (defined as persons 15 years of age and over who worked for income in the last week before the census) increased from 12,937,588 to 15,737,354. Job placements for those years, respectively, numbered 286,531 and 407,829. These job placements do not refer only to previously unemployed persons, nor to persons seeking initial employment; they also apply to persons changing jobs..

In the European Region there was very little change in the number of job placements between 1967 and 1974, even though the population increased by 1,171,052. Although there is an influx of persons to that region, there is no substantial change in employment opportunity to accommodate the increased population. This is not

\*The most inclusive, detailed and reliable source for the aforementioned statistics on the Kurdish region is Ismail Beşikçi, Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni. ("Eastern Anatolia's Orderliness", 1969) Cem and Yerasimos have taken most of their supportive data from this book. However, the book is banned and out of print in Turkey, thus impossible to obtain.

TABLE VII

EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS  
1967, 1974

Region	Economically Active	Job Placements by Labor Placement Office	Economically Active	Job Placements by Labor Placement Office
	1967	1967	1974	1974
(Non-Kurdish) European	3,425,678	28,339	4,596,730	28,936
Black Sea	4,714,048	22,993	5,297,068	13,696
Marmara & Aegean	5,192,495	100,489	5,950,936	160,667
Mediterranean	2,551,471	67,688	3,130,084	132,623
Anatolian (Kurdish) Eastern Anatolia	11,607,144	51,115	13,533,725	52,501
	3,545,747	9,635	4,179,446	11,934
Southeastern Anatolia	1,814,398	6,272	2,271,333	7,472
TOTAL	12,937,588	286,531	15,737,354	407,829

Source: Genel Nüfus Sayımı: Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri, 24.10.65. ("Census of Population: Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population, 10/24/65.") Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1969.

surprising given that Istanbul, the largest and most industrial of all the urban areas, is located in this region. Because of its size and industrial capacity it is often the first choice of those seeking a better life style in an urban area. Thus, despite an obvious inability to absorb workers into the economy, the European Region has the largest annual population increase (4.5%) with no corresponding increase in job placements.

The Black Sea Region saw an increase in population from 4,714,048 to 5,297,068 while the number of job placements decreased from 22,993 to 13,696. This is the only region in which there was a decrease in job placements without a corresponding decrease in population. This region has the lowest average annual population increase of all the regions. This low population increase (1.5%) reflects the lack of economic opportunity due to little industrialization or investment development occurring in the region.

The Marmara and Aegean Region, while showing a somewhat average annual population increase of 2.0%, indicates a commendable proportionate increase in job placements. This is probably due to an availability of industrial employment in such cities and towns as Izmir, Bursa and Kocaeli as well as a substantial increase in tourism along the coastal resorts such as Çanakkale, Bodrum, Çeşme, Marmaris, etc.

A very similar situation is evident in the Mediterranean Region which boasts a slightly higher annual population increase of 3.0%. Whereas the job placements in 1967 numbered only 67,688 in an economically active population of 2,551,471, they increased to 132,623 in 1974 for an economically active population of 3,130,084. The

reasons for a more successful job placement in this region, given the healthy population increase, may be attributed to rapid development, industrially as well as economically, of such urban centers as Antalya, Mersin, Iskenderun and Adana. There is also a major increase in tourism along the Mediterranean shoreline.

In the central region of Anatolia the population increase between 1967 and 1974 was 1,926,581 while the corresponding increase in job placements was only 1,396. This region often functions as a transition area for Turks migrating Westward in search of employment or changes in life style. As there is not much opportunity for either industrial or agricultural employment, most families in transition continue to move Westward after a brief period of residency in Anatolia.

The employment statistics concerning the predominantly Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia reflect some interesting changes in the migration and employment pattern. It is obvious that population increases reflect not only migration patterns but simple increase in the birth rate as well. While the annual population increase in the Eastern Anatolia Region roughly coincides with the average increase in the remaining regions, the region of Southeastern Anatolia demonstrates an increase second only to the heavily industrialized European Region and closely followed by the developing and tourist-oriented Mediterranean Region. There is some indication of movement into this region from, presumably, the region of Eastern Anatolia directly to the north. One might assume that economic opportunity in the larger urban areas of Diyarbakır and

Urfa (which, incidentally, are not considered highly Kurdish areas; see Figure 2, page 34) induce some to move from the Eastern Anatolia Region into the Southeastern Anatolia Region.

Ismail Cem (1974) contends that urbanization and internal regional migration is limited because the economy is based primarily on employment in agriculture. Even if residents of these Kurdish areas choose to move to urban areas (such as Erzurum in the Eastern Anatolia Region) only 19% of the residents of squatter housing there are employed. (Cem, 1974, p. 509) Cem contends that migration from the Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia Regions is limited due to language barriers, cost and distance to major urban areas such as Istanbul and Izmir. Cem reiterates this point by stating, "Only 0.4% of the squatter-house residents of Istanbul are from the Southeastern Anatolia Region. The majority of that group is employed as porters." (Cem, 1974, p. 511)

#### Education Indicator

The second socio-economic indicator to be considered is that of education. Tables VIII, IX and X illustrate, regionally, the literacy of the population in 1965 and 1970. In 1965 the regions demonstrating the highest percentage of illiteracy were the predominantly Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia, with 67.08%, and Southeastern Anatolia, with 74.18%. The region with the lowest illiteracy rate in 1965 was the European Region with only 26.21%. In 1965 the national average of illiteracy was 41.78% of the total population. The illiteracy average for the Kurdish regions was 70.63% while the comparative average for the remaining regions was 45.71%.

TABLE VIII

POPULATION LITERACY BY REGION  
1965, 1970

Region	Literate Pop.	Illit. Pop.	% of Pop. Illit.	Literate Pop.	Illit. Pop.	% of Pop. Illit.
	1965	1965	1965	1970	1970	1970
(Non-Kurdish) European	2,023,393	720,019	26.21%	2,552,340	783,773	23.04%
Black Sea	1,520,043	2,070,424	56.20%	2,025,150	2,036,498	49.72%
Marmara & Aegean	2,466,702	1,865,602	43.74%	3,000,870	1,863,199	39.45%
Mediterranean	958,639	971,674	50.27%	1,292,566	982,596	43.07%
Anatolia (Kurdish) Eastern	4,329,018	4,714,210	52.14%	5,666,179	4,498,511	44.08%
Anatolia	874,535	1,789,012	67.08%	1,202,164	1,776,850	59.05%
Southeastern Anatolia	341,692	984,979	74.18%	489,928	1,058,705	84.42%
TOTAL	19,482,799	13,115,920	41.78%	16,229,197	13,000,132	36.51%

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1975, pp. 40, 41, 113 and 246.

TABLE IX

AVAILABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL AIDS  
BY REGION

Region	Printing Houses	Printing Houses	Reading Rooms	Square Miles per Reading
	1967	1974	1963	Room, 1963
(Non-Kurdish) European	467	667	260	37.09
Black Sea	125	163	568	46.94
Marmara & Aegean	338	384	1,620	20.94
Mediterranean	106	127	193	125.79
Anatolia (Kurdish) Eastern	431	647	1,480	90.09
Anatolia	62	63	338	149.53
Southeastern Anatolia	31	33	35	587.37
TOTAL	1,560	2,084	4,494	

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1975, pp. 40, 41, 113 and 246.

TABLE X

AVAILABILITY OF SCHOOLS  
BY REGION

<u>Region</u>	<u>Land Mass</u> <u>(Square Miles)</u>	<u>Number of Schools</u> <u>1963</u>	<u>Square Miles Per</u> <u>School, 1963</u>
<u>(Non-Kurdish)</u> European	9,642.2	1,066	9.04
Black Sea	26,662.2	4,298	6.20
Marmara & Aegean	33,923.7	4,084	8.31
Mediterranean	24,277.6	1,817	13.38
Anatolia <u>(Kurdish)</u>	133,343.4	9,858	13.52
Eastern Anatolia	50,541.6	3,128	16.16
Southeastern Anatolia	20,557.9	1,091	18.84
TOTAL	298,947.9	25,342	

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1975, pp. 40, 41, 113 and 246.

By 1970 the percent of population illiteracy had decreased in every region of Turkey except the predominantly Kurdish region of Southeastern Anatolia. In this region the percentage of the population which remained illiterate rose an incredible 10.24%. In five years' time the national average of illiteracy had decreased to 36.51% of the population, a reduction of 5.27%. The average percentage of illiteracy for those regions other than Kurdish (in other words, for the European, Black Sea, Marmara and Aegean, Mediterranean and Anatolian Regions) decreased to 39.87% of the population. However, between 1965 and 1970 the average percent of population illiteracy for the Kurdish areas of the Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia Regions climbed to 71.74%. Thus during a period in which the illiteracy rate was declining for most of Turkey, it rose sharply in the areas occupied by a majority of Kurds.

In Table IX is presented the number of printing houses (1967 and 1974), the number of reading rooms (1963) and the square miles per reading room by region. These indicators illustrate the availability of printed material as well as the accessibility of reading material to those not able to afford buying their own.\* The Kurdish areas of the Eastern Anatolia and the Southeastern Anatolia Regions exhibit a surprising difference in the number of printing houses as compared to the remaining regions of Turkey. Eastern Anatolia showed only 62 printing houses in 1967 which increased by only one between 1967 and 1974; Southeastern Anatolia showed 33 printing houses

\*This is the purpose of "reading rooms" where literature is provided to be perused on the premises.

in 1974, an increase of two houses since 1967. The figures pertaining to these two regions, which are predominantly Kurdish, demonstrate the lowest number of printing houses than any of the other regions. This data is even more revealing when combined with the information on square miles per reading rooms, presented in the same table. Again the Kurdish areas, represented by the Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia Regions, exhibit the highest number of square miles per reading room than any other region (149.53m<sup>2</sup> and 587.37m<sup>2</sup>, respectively). The lowest number of square miles per reading room is found in the regions in Western Turkey, in the European, Black Sea, and Marmara and Aegean Regions.

Table X, entitled "Availability of Schools," was compiled as an attempt to demonstrate the distribution of schools throughout Turkey on a regionally comparative basis. I submit that the data is a bit outdated (1963), but no later statistics were available. There was no supportive data to facilitate computing the number of students per school or classroom, nor the number of persons served by one school. The only variable which could be used to illustrate the distribution pattern was square miles per school.

This table clearly indicates that, while the European, the Black Sea and the Marmara and Aegean Regions are fairly well represented by numbers of schools, the situation deteriorates as one moves further Eastward. Again the regions with the most square miles per school are Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia with 16.16 square miles and 18.84 square miles per school, respectively. The

Mediterranean and the Anatolian Regions each exhibit approximately 13 square miles per school, which, although high, is not as high as the regions of the Kurdish area. The national average is 12.20 square miles per school. The average for those regions in the Kurdish area is 17.5 square miles per school. The average for the remaining regions is 10.09 square miles per school. Thus it is evident that in the Kurdish areas of Turkey schools are not as physically accessible as they are in the remaining portions of the country.

#### Health Care Indicator

The next socio-economic indicator presented in this chapter is that of health care. The following tables offer statistics to illustrate the situation of health care distribution throughout Turkey, on a regional basis. The tables also demonstrate the population concentrations serviced by various aspects of health care necessities.

Table XI shows the number of physicians and health care personnel found in each region in relation to the population of each region. It also shows the change, between 1967 and 1974, in the percentage of the population served by a physician, and in the change in health care personnel, by percentage, serving the various regions. This table shows that the most obviously well-represented region in terms of numbers of physicians and health care personnel is the European Region. Although it appears that all the other regions seem to suffer from a high population/physician ratio, the Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia exhibits the highest population per physician.

Between 1967 and 1974 the population per physician in every region of Turkey decreased--except for the Kurdish region of Eastern

TABLE XI

PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL\*  
BY REGION

Region	Population/Physician		Health Care Personnel		Change in Pop. Per Physician by %		Change in Health Care Pers. by %	
	1967	1974	1967	1974	1967-1974	1967-1974	1967-1974	1967-1974
(Non-Kurdish) European	740	588	8,283	13,597	- 20.54%		+ 64.16%	
Black Sea	24,086	18,081	2,311	4,289	- 24.93%		+ 85.59%	
Marmara & Aegean	6,698	4,851	5,470	9,917	- 27.57%		+ 81.30%	
Mediterranean	9,673	9,143	1,603	3,064	- 5.48%		+ 91.14%	
Anatolia (Kurdish) Eastern Anatolia	23,608	19,208	10,098	20,192	- 18.64%		+ 99.96%	
Southeastern Anatolia	18,954	20,733	3,000	4,990	+ 8.58%		+ 66.33%	
TOTAL	90,244	76,344	31,855	57,522	-42.33%		+ 31.52%	

\*Includes all personnel working in public and private sectors; specialists, practitioners, dentists, registered nurses, health officials and midwives.

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1975, pp. 80-85.

Anatolia where it increased by 8.58%. On the national average the percent of population per physician did decrease by 18.70%. In the regions other than those defined as Kurdish the decrease was 19.43%. However, the Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia decreased the least, 16.88%. Although the situation of numbers of physicians serving the communities did improve in all of Turkey, it improved the least in the Kurdish area, particularly in the Eastern Anatolia Region.

The change in the number of health care personnel between 1967 and 1974 indicates that, while these professionals increased in number throughout Turkey, the Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia benefited the least. On the national average there was an increase in the number of health care personnel of 74.28%. The increase in the Kurdish regions was only 48.92% compared to the average of the other regions of 84.43% increase.

Table XIII shows the number of health care centers, pharmacies and pharmacists throughout Turkey. Between 1967 and 1974 the most dramatic increase in the number of health care centers occurred in the Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia Regions, where the increase was 21 and six, respectively. Although any increase in available medical care might be considered admirable, one must examine the type of care as well. Even though a health care center could conceivably provide adequate care, they are nonetheless not as proficient as hospitals staffed by physicians. Health care centers are generally staffed by practitioners and registered nurses, so the quality of care, albeit good, would not be as high as in a hospital.

Tables XIII and XIV deal with the number of hospital beds (public,

TABLE XII

HEALTH CARE CENTERS, PHARMACIES AND PHARMACISTS  
BY REGION

Region	Health Care Centers		Pharmacies & Pharmacists	
	1967	1974	1967	1974
<u>(Non-Kurdish)</u> European	18	20	1,326	2,753
Black Sea	46	45	315	812
Marmara & Aegean	48	50	759	1,529
Mediterranean	12	14	290	690
Anatolia <u>(Kurdish)</u>	127	129	1,087	2,572
Eastern Anatolia	13	34	117	377
Southeastern Anatolia	4	10	113	307
TOTAL	268	302	4,007	9,040

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1975, pp. 80-85.

TABLE XIII

HOSPITAL BEDS: PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND SOCIAL  
INSURANCE AGENCY-AFFILIATED, BY REGION

Region (Non-Kurdish)	Hosp. Beds, Public		Hosp. Beds, Private		Population/Bed Pub. & Private		Hosp. Beds Affiliated With Soc. Ins. Agency	
	1967	1974	1967	1974	1967	1974	1967	1974
European	14,691	19,552	2,520	3,387	199	200	1,826	4,142
Black Sea	5,995	8,447	81	146	775	616	937	1,280
Marmara & Aegean	7,856	12,197	569	571	616	466	1,095	3,144
Mediterranean	2,605	3,590	162	314	922	801	390	770
Anatolia (Kurdish) Eastern	19,529	26,976	183	585	588	491	1,598	2,510
Anatolia	3,300	5,522	50	50	1,058	750	355	730
Southeastern Anatolia	1,545	2,279	90	77	1,109	964	255	305
TOTAL	55,521	78,563	3,655	5,130	5,267	4,288	6,456	12,881

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1975, pp. 80-85.

TABLE XIV

CHANGE IN STATUS OF HOSPITAL BEDS, 1967-1974,  
BY REGION

Region	% Change in Hosp. Beds, Public	% Change in Hosp. Beds, Private	% Change in Pop./Bed Public & Private	% Increase in Hosp. Beds Affiliated with Social Insurance Agency
(Non-Kurdish) European	+ 33.08%	+ 34.40%	+ .05%	126.83%
Black Sea	+ 1.67%	+ 80.24%	- 21.05%	36.60%
Marmara & Aegean	+ 55.25%	+ 3.51%	- 24.35%	187.12%
Mediterranean	+ 26.30%	+ 93.82%	- 13.12%	97.43%
Anatolia (Kurdish) Eastern	+ 38.13%	+ 219.67%	- 16.49%	57.07%
Anatolia	+ 67.33%	0%	- 29.11%	105.63%
Southeastern Anatolia	+ 47.50%	- 14.44%	- 13.07%	19.60%

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1975, pp. 80-85.

private and those affiliated with the Social Insurance Agency) on a comparative basis between 1967 and 1974. In general the number of public hospital beds increased in all regions of Turkey. The Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia showed an average increase of 57.41%, the highest in all of Turkey. The national average was an increase of 38.46% while the average increase in the remaining regions was 30.88%.

The situation changes dramatically, however, when one examines the increase in private hospital beds. While the national average showed an increase in private hospital beds of 63.72%, and the regions other than those defined as predominantly Kurdish showed an average increase of 86.32%, the Kurdish regions showed an average increase of only 7.05%. This is grossly below the national average and is indicative of a situation wherein private hospital medical care is not readily available. In this category the Kurdish regions were the only ones showing a no-change status in number of private hospital beds (Eastern Anatolia Region) as well as a decrease (14.44% decrease in the Southeastern Anatolia Region).

#### State Investment Indicator

In this section the socio-economic indicator of state investment is put forth. Although there is not an abundance of information available, enough data was found to give a general, but admittedly sketchy, view of the pattern of state investments in Turkey.

The most detailed information was found in Turkey, An Economic Survey 1977 compiled by the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association in 1977. This source provided a detailed listing of the

various state-sponsored projects and businesses, and their corresponding locations. (See Appendix C.) In the Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia the main investments by the state involve textiles and sugar refineries; of 13 state-sponsored factories in all of Turkey for each of these industries, six were located in the aforementioned Kurdish regions. There were four fertilizer plants (from a total of 12), five cement factories (from a total of 18), one tractor factory (from a total of 12), two machinery plants (from a total of 27), one machine tools plant (from a total of four) and one electronics plant (from a total of two).

According to the same source mentioned above there are no existing organized industry zones in the Kurdish regions, although two are allegedly under construction in Gaziantep (Southeastern Anatolia Region) and Erzurum (Eastern Anatolia Region). Apparently there are plans to organize and construct 35 more industry zones, of which five will be located in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. (See Appendix C for specific locations.)

Table V, page 50, demonstrates the number and location of state irrigation schemes in Turkey in 1965. Of the seven major irrigation schemes, only one was located in the Kurdish area.

Ismail Cem presented some revealing statistics in his book entitled Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi ("The History of Underdevelopment in Turkey", 1974). He contends that only seven percent of Turkey's established businesses are located in the Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia Regions; only 2.2% of the country's bank reserves are located in the East; only ten percent of the state's

total investments are channeled eastward to the Kurdish regions; and only 2.7% of the private investments in Turkey are in the Eastern regions. (Cem, 1974, p.507)


Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of natural mineral resources throughout Turkey, as well as the location of major airports and dams. This is useful in determining that the Kurdish regions (Regions VI and VII) are not drastically lacking in natural resources that could be used for state investments.

#### Private Investment Indicator

The main source of information regarding private investment in Turkey is the data provided by the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (1977, pp. 57-61) Appendix D contains the list of the top 100 private firms in Turkey in 1975. It also lists the regional location and the number of persons employed. These firms cover a broad spectrum of business and economic activity, including iron and steel works, fertilizer, chemicals, automobiles and farm equipment, textiles, radio and television, glassworks and food products.

Of the 100 top firms listed in Appendix D (of which 18 locations were unavailable), 56 were located in the European Region, 13 were located in the Marmara and Aegean Region, eight were located in the Mediterranean Region and five were located in the Anatolian Region. Of the top 100 private Turkish firms, none were located in the regions of the Black Sea, Eastern Anatolia or Southeastern Anatolia.

Bearing in mind extenuating economic factors that must be considered in investment (such as natural resources, available labor



- Airports - A
- Rivers - ~
- Dams - X
- Lignite - IIII
- Bituminous Coal - ■
- Petroleum ●
- Iron Ore - Fe
- Manganese Ore - Mn
- Chromite Ore - Cr
- Lead Ore - Pb
- Lead-Zinc Ore - Pb-Zn
- Copper Ore - Cu
- Silver Ore - Ag
- Antimony Ore - Sb
- Mercury Ore - Hg
- Arsenic Ore - As
- Magnesite Ore - Mg
- Sulfur - S
- Colemanite - B
- Potash - K
- Sodium - Na

Figure 3. Natural resource distribution in Turkey, 1973.

force, transportation and communication facilities, etc.), the fact clearly remains that private investment is reluctant to venture into the Eastern regions of Turkey, the regions in which resides a majority of Kurds. This is not to say that investment will never move eastward, nor is it to imply that prejudice against Kurds or any other minority group is the main reason for lack of private investment in the Eastern sectors. However, the fact that Kurds comprise a minimum of 10% of the population in some of these sectors, as well as 100% in other sectors, must be dealt with when considering the impact of lack of private investment in these regions.

"(5) Investment projects to be undertaken in the East and South East [sic] of Anatolia and other backward regions." (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, 1977, p. 36) This quotation, taken from official pronouncements regarding Turkey's "planned economy," attests to the recognition by Turkish economists of a distinct, definable and undesirable economic character of those regions which are, for the purposes of this study, predominantly Kurdish.

### Summary

The highlights of the differences between the Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia and the non-Kurdish area of the European Region, the Black Sea Region, the Marmara and Aegean Region, the Mediterranean Region and the Anatolia Region are summarized below.

The Kurdish area exhibits the lowest amount of irrigated land. In an area of the country in which almost 40% of the land mass is

classified as non-arable, and in which agriculture is the main source of income, there is a gaping lack of irrigation and plans for land development.

In the Kurdish area, as compared to the non-Kurdish area, there is blatant inequity in land distribution among farming families. A tiny percentage of the farming families own the land and perpetuate a feudal system of share-cropping.

The most serious and detrimental difference between the Kurdish and the non-Kurdish areas of Turkey is that which was illustrated by the socio-economic indicator of education. The Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia exhibit the highest illiteracy percentage of all of Turkey. In 1965 the national average of illiteracy was 41.78%; the average in the Kurdish area was 70.63%. During the next five year period the illiteracy rate dropped by an average of 5.27% in Turkey as a whole. During the same period, the illiteracy percentage in the Kurdish area rose 10.24%. Thus by 1970 the average percent of population illiteracy in the Kurdish area was up to 71.74%.

The Kurdish area exhibited the lowest number of reading rooms, printing houses and schools per square mile in comparison to the non-Kurdish area. In the Kurdish area, in 1963, there existed one school for every 17.5 square miles; in the non-Kurdish area there was one school for every 10.09 square miles.

In the Kurdish area there was the highest population per physician than any of the other regions in the non-Kurdish area. In other words, there were fewer physicians to serve a greater number

of people in the Kurdish area as compared to the non-Kurdish area. On a national average, the number of health care personnel increased between 1967 and 1974 by 74.28%. In the Kurdish area, however, the increase in health care personnel for the same period was only 48.92%. Between 1967 and 1974 the number of private hospital beds in the Kurdish area increased by only 7.05%; the increase for the same time period in the non-Kurdish area was 86.23%.

From a total of 61 state-sponsored industries in all of Turkey, only 18 were located in the Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia in 1977. There were, at that date, no existing organized industry zones in the Kurdish area. Of the seven major state irrigation schemes in operation in 1965, only one was located in the Kurdish area. From a total of 100 top private firms in Turkey in 1977, not even one was located in the Kurdish area of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

The data presented in this chapter illustrates a definite and distinct sequence of differences between the Kurdish area of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and the non-Kurdish area of the remainder of Turkey. These differences, which correspond to problem areas inherent to any modernizing polity intent upon political development, support the thesis of this study which seeks to determine the political integration of the Kurds in Turkey. By comparing the pattern of differences which emerged between the Kurdish and non-Kurdish areas, the concluding chapter will reflect the extent to which the Kurds in the Kurdish area conform within my definition of political integration.

TABLE XV.

LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN TURKEY\*  
1965

	<u>Eastern Turkey</u>	<u>Turkey</u>
Urbanization	24%	34%
Literacy (aged six and over)	31%	49%
Non-agricultural Employment (aged 15-64)	17%	28%

\*Eastern Turkey defined in this source as the provinces of Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Mus, Bingol, Elazig, Agri, Erzurum, Erzincan, Tunceli, Kars and Artvin (Kurdish area).

Source: Genel Nüfus Sayimi: Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri, 24.10.65. ("Census of Population: Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population, 10/24/65") Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1969.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION AND PRESCRIPTIONS

Are the Kurds in Turkey politically integrated? Have the problem areas of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution been adequately dealt with by patterns of institutionalization to maximize, for the Kurds, the goals of equality, differentiation and capacity? Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, the answer is negative: the Kurds in Turkey are not politically integrated.

#### Equality

Within the goal of equality lie the problem areas of participation and distribution which must be solved to facilitate the political integration of the Kurds. The participation of the Kurds in the political and social life of Turkey has been severely limited by a pattern of policies and decisions which has left the Kurdish area relatively isolated and underdeveloped. Direct and immediate participation by means of migration from the Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia is made difficult by language barriers, lack of job training in a population whose livelihood is agriculture, and the prohibitive cost of moving. Mobility of the Kurds is confined to intra-area moves.

The pattern of resource distribution between the Kurdish and non-Kurdish area of Turkey is unequal. In an area which exhibits substantial natural resource deposits as well as adequate road and railway links, there is an appalling lack of investment and development.

In 1965 there existed only one state irrigation scheme in the Kurdish area. This gave that area the lowest percentage of irrigated land in all of Turkey. The arable land in the Kurdish area is owned primarily by absentee landlords, or *ağas*, who are notorious for their support of government policies. In an area wherein the primary source of income is agriculture, it is not equitable that the land still be concentrated in the hands of a small, rich, in abstentia elite and governed by a feudal system of share-cropping.

State investment in the Kurdish area is minimal. From a total of 88 state-sponsored industries in Turkey, only 20 are located in the Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia. According to İsmail Cem (1974, p. 507) only 7% of the country's businesses are in the Kurdish area, only 3.2% of the state's bank reserves are in this area, only 10% of the government's investments are directed toward this area, and only 2.7% of Turkey's private investments are in this Kurdish area.

The private investment spectrum is even more indicative of the inequality of resource distribution between the Kurdish area of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and the rest of Turkey. There exists no single private Turkish firm, of the top 100 firms, in the Kurdish area. Given the fact that the Kurdish area is not devoid of industrial potential, natural resources, communication and transportation sources and a taxable labor force, there exists no discernible rationale for deliberate non-investment by private firms in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions.

Equitable health care distribution between the Kurdish and

non-Kurdish areas is poor. The Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia exhibits the highest population per physician. Based on personal conversations with Turkish doctors, it is a fact that the Kurdish area is considered the least desirable part of Turkey in which to practice. This is due, according to these doctors, to uncomfortable living situations and lack of amenities, low wages, arduous work loads and professional isolation. The fact that the work load is heavy bespeaks a need for more doctors; the low wages bespeak the economic difficulties encountered by Kurds; the professional isolation refers to the lack of communication and publications between professionals in the Kurdish area and the rest of Turkey.

Obviously equitable distribution and participation is not occurring in the Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia regarding medical care by physicians. Although the number of health care centers, pharmacies and pharmacists did increase most dramatically in the Kurdish area between 1967 and 1974, the quality of this health care is inferior to that provided by a physician. Additionally, health care centers can be placed in the Kurdish area as a result of government intervention whereas physicians belong to the private sector. If the state were to encourage investment and development of the area, with subsequent changes in those aspects of life criticized by physicians, private practices there might increase.

Inferior medical care in the Kurdish area is further evidenced by the difference in public and private hospital beds per region. The Kurdish regions of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia demonstrated a higher number of public hospital beds and Social

Insurance Agency hospital beds than the non-Kurdish regions. However, in the case of private hospital beds the Kurdish area demonstrated a decrease of 14.44%. Without knowing the important difference in the quality of care between a private and a public hospital in Turkey, this distinction is not significant. In reality, the best of care is available only in a private hospital or from a privately-practicing physician. The Kurds, due to the scarcity of private hospitals in their area, are not afforded the equal opportunity to select the best care available. The social resource distribution is inequitable.

#### Capacity

Capacity, the ability of the political structure and the institutions of the Republic of Turkey to be responsive, adaptive and innovative in dealing with the problem areas of identity and legitimacy with specific reference to the Kurds, has obviously not been achieved. The pattern established by the Turkish government in dealing with the Kurds has been responsive, but never adaptive and innovative. The government has most always responded to Kurdish demands and unrest with force and decisiveness to subjugate and assimilate this minority in the East.

The Kurds have not and do not identify with the individuals who are the decision-makers within the government. Furthermore, the Kurds generally have not accepted the decisions, nor the way in which decisions are made by the government, as being legitimate. The Kurds, as a group, have no political representation whatsoever. Every attempt at organization, from the ill-fated DDKO in the 1960's to the illegal Kurdish Democratic Party's alliance with the Turkish

Labor Party, has been thwarted by the government. The Kurds have thus been denied the opportunity to participate in the political structure and institutions of the government and thereby make known their desires, demands and opinions. Obviously the problems of identity and legitimacy have not been solved.

### Differentiation

Included in the goal of differentiation is the pattern of penetration which has allowed or prevented access by the Kurds to the increased and specialized roles of the bureaucracy, institutions and associations of Turkey, the modernizing polity. Although many other differences already cited between Kurdish and non-Kurdish areas could also pertain to the problem of penetration, the most basic is that of educational opportunity.

The Kurdish area of Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia exhibits the highest degree of illiteracy of any other region in Turkey. While illiteracy in the population of Turkey decreased between 1965 and 1970, it increased in the Kurdish area by 10.24%. Educational opportunity, measured by the availability of schools on a regional basis, and the availability of educational aids (printing houses and reading rooms) are below the standards achieved in non-Kurdish regions. Schools in the Kurdish area are not as easily accessible, physically, as they are in the non-Kurdish area. The Kurdish area has a lower number of printing houses than the non-Kurdish area, as well as the lowest number of reading rooms available per square mile. By not encouraging the education and literacy of the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia through the

provision of adequate numbers of teachers, schools and reading material, the central government is effectively reducing the pattern of penetration which could allow access by Kurds to the increased and specialized roles of the modernizing state.

The obstacle to penetration affects the other problem areas and goals as well. Illiteracy and poor education are detrimental to the Kurds' effectiveness in participating in the political and social life of Turkey outside the Kurdish area. Their mobility, in relation to employment opportunity, is circumscribed. Their ability to challenge the feudal landlord system is limited, and thus the opportunity to alter an inequitable resource distribution. Their lack of education and high illiteracy rate hinders investment, public and private, in an area where skilled labor and technological knowledge is void. Their ignorance of political alternatives, due to language barriers, illiteracy and lack of publications in the Kurdish area, adversely affects their capacity to involve in the decision-making processes of the government.

In conclusion, I submit that, based on my definition of political integration and supported by the data presented in this thesis, the pattern of behavior of the Turkish government toward its Kurdish minority has adversely affected the participation of the Kurds in the political and social life of Turkey; essentially, the goal of equality has not been met. The patterns of penetration have not been adequate to allow access by the Kurds to the increased and

specialized roles of the bureaucracy, institutions and associations in Turkey; thus the goal of differentiation has not been met. Although the political structure and institutions of the Turkish Republic have reached an adequate level of capacity to deal with the problem of identity and legitimacy in general, this capacity level has hindered the particular problems of identity and legitimacy of the Kurds.

### Prescriptions

My conclusion that the Kurds in Turkey are not politically integrated is in no way a reflection of the degree of political integration and political development in Turkey in general. Turkey's goals as a modernizing entity are diametrically opposed to the goals of the Kurdish minority within her borders. The Kurdish demands, in general, need not be an obstacle to Turkey's goals of modernization and development. The Kurds' desire for recognition of their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness, freedom to use Kurdish as the language of instruction in their schools, in publication of their books, newspapers and periodicals, freedom to associate politically by means of their own party, and unhampered representation in the central government could be accomplished with few, if any, negative repercussions.

The existent situation can do nothing to further or better the relationship between the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia and the central government. The Kurdish interpretation of the government's policies is that the Ankara government consciously diverts economic development, in the form of capital investment,

industrialization, transportation and communications, from their region. The intent is to limit Kurdish participation in the economic, social and political activities of Turkish life and to continue to keep the Kurds relatively confined to a geographic area which can easily be controlled, if necessary.

The Turkish government continues to refuse to officially recognize the Kurds as a distinct and legitimate minority group. The purpose of this position of non-recognition is, presumably, to completely evade the issues at hand regarding Kurdish demands. Any policy which would grant minority recognition to a group in Turkey is seen by the government as potentially divisive and threatening to the overall goal of development. The government is striving toward assimilation of its Kurdish minority; the Kurds are refusing to compromise for less than cultural, social and linguistic autonomy.

The problem does have a solution but, as with any problem, compromise is essential. The idyllic situation would be political integration of the Kurds in Turkey, accompanied by retention of their cultural, social and linguistic distinctiveness. The Kurds thus avoid being assimilated and yet are no longer perceived as a threat to the stability and cohesiveness of the Turkish state. Political integration would facilitate the government's strength along its Eastern and Southeastern borders, eliminate useless violence and open up an entire section of the country to development.

The initial steps toward a viable solution must be taken by the central government. Effort must be made to encourage investment, increase education and better the social and economic situation of

the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia. The Kurds will not begin to approach a compromise (which, in essence, would entail abandonment of their ideal of an autonomous or independent Kurdish state) unless they first see concrete efforts on the part of the government to invest in their regions.

I don't believe that an autonomous or independent Kurdish state within the borders of the Republic of Turkey is feasible. However, a politically integrated Kurdish minority, retaining the beauty and distinctiveness of its cultural heritage, is possible. Before any such can begin, there is much mutual suspicion, distrust and antagonism which must be overcome. However, without mutual sacrifice and compromise the relationship between the Turkish government and its Kurdish minority will only deteriorate into more violence and bloodshed.

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## APPENDIX A

### THE PEACE AGREEMENT OF 11 MARCH 1970

Extracts taken from the translation provided by the  
Ministry of Culture and Information of Iraq)

The Revolutionary Council, in a statement issued on 11 March 1970, announced a complete and constitutional settlement of the Kurdish issue. The historic announcement was made by the President of the Republic and Chairman of the RCC over Baghdad television and radio networks. The following is the extracts [sic] from the statement:

The Revolutionary Command Council affirms its determination to deepen and broaden all effective measures for achieving the full means of cultural and economic resurgence and general development in the Kurdish area, seeking in the first place to enable the Kurdish masses to exercise their legitimate rights and assure their actual participation in earnest endeavours to build a homeland and struggle for the fulfillment of its major nationalist goals. Thereupon, the Revolutionary Command Council has resolved on the following:

1. The Kurdish language shall be, alongside with the Arabic language, the official language in areas populated by a Kurdish majority. The Kurdish language shall be the language of instruction in these areas. Arabic language shall be taught in all schools, where the Kurdish language is the language of instruction while the Kurdish language shall be taught in schools throughout Iraq as a second language within the limits stipulated by law.
2. The sharing of our Kurdish brothers in Government and non-discrimination between the Kurds and others in the assumption of public offices including sensitive and important posts in the state such as cabinet portfolios, army command, etc., have been and still remain among the important objectives which the Revolutionary Government seeks to achieve. The Revolutionary Government, in approving this principle, stresses the necessity of working for its fulfillment in an equitable ratio with due regard to the principle of efficiency the proportionate distribution of inhabitants and the inequities which had befallen our Kurdish brothers in the past.
3. In view of the state of backwardness which in the past afflicted the Kurdish nationality from the cultural and educational standpoints, a plan shall be worked out to make good that backwardness. This is to be achieved by:
  - A. Speeding up the implementation of the resolution of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning the language and the cultural right of the Kurdish people and placing under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information the task of preparing and steering radio and television programmes concerning Kurdish national issues.
  - B. Reinstating all students who were dismissed or were compelled to

leave the school on account of the circumstances of violence in the area regardless of their ages or producing a convenient remedy for their problem.

C. Building more schools in the Kurdish area, elevating the standards of schooling and education and admitting in just proportions Kurdish students to universities, military colleges, educational missions and fellowship.

4. In the administrative units, populated by a Kurdish majority, officials shall be from among the Kurds or from among persons well-versed in the Kurdish language provided the required number is available. Appointment shall be made of the principal officials--Governor, Qaimaqam, Police Commandant, Security Director, etc. Work will promptly commence to develop state machineries in the area in consultation with the High Committee supervising the implementation of this statement in a manner assuring such implementation and cementing national unity and stability in the area.

5. The Government concedes to the Kurdish people its right to set up student, youth, women and teachers organisation of its own--such organisations to become affiliated in the corresponding national Iraq organisations.

A. The operative period of paras (1) and (2) of the RCC's resolution No. 59 dated 5 August 1968, shall be extended right up to the date of the issuance of this statement and shall extend to all of those who took part in the acts of violence in the Kurdish area.

B. Workers, officials and employees--both civilian and military, shall return to service without this being affected by cadre restrictions. The civilians among them shall be put to use in the Kurdish area within the limits of its requirements.

C. A body of specialists shall be constituted to work for uplifting the Kurdish area in all spheres as quickly as possible and for compensating it for what has descended upon it in the past number of years. An adequate budget is to be set aside for this purpose. The body in question shall operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Northern Affairs.

D. The economic plan shall be drawn up in such a way as to assure equal development to various parts of Iraq with due attention to the Kurdish area.

E. Pension salaries shall be made for the families of those who met with martyrdom in the regrettable circumstances of hostilities from among the members of the Kurdish armed movement and others as well as to the persons who became disabled or deformed as a result of those conditions. This is to be enacted by a special legislation on the pattern of other legislations in force.

F. Speedy efforts shall be made to provide relief to stricken and needy persons through the accomplishment of housing projects and others assuring work to the unemployed. Appropriate in kind and cash subsidies shall also be made available and reasonable compensation offered to those stricken persons who need help. This all is to be entrusted to the High Committee. Excluded from this shall be the persons covered by the above paras.

8. The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be restored to their former places of habitation. As to the villagers of areas where housing units cannot be set up and which are taken over by the Government for public utility purposes under law, they shall be resettled in neighbouring areas and duly compensated.

9. Speedy measures shall be taken to implement the Agrarian Reform law in the Kurdish area and amending it in such a manner as guarantees the liquidation of feudal relations and the acquisition of appropriate plots of land side by side with waiving for them agricultural taxes accumulating over the years of unfortunate hostilities.

10. It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution as follows:

A. The people of Iraq is made up of two principal nationalities: the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution confirms the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all minorities within the framework of Iraqi unity.

B. The following para shall be added to Article (4) of the Constitution: the Kurdish language, alongside with the Arabic language, shall be an official language in the Kurdish area.

C. The above shall be confirmed in the Permanent Constitution.

11. The broadcasting station and heavy weapons shall be returned to the Government--this being tied up to the implementation of the final stages of the agreement.

12. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents.

13. The Governorates Law shall be amended in a manner conforming with the substance of this statement.

14. Following the announcement of the statement, necessary measures shall be taken, in consultation with the High Committee supervising its implementation to unify the governorates and administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority in accordance with official census operations yet to be made. The state shall endeavour to develop this administrative unity and deepen and broaden the exercising by the Kurdish people therein of the sum of its national rights as a guarantee to its enjoyment of self-rule. Until this administrative unity is achieved, the Kurdish national affairs shall be coordinated through periodical meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As the self-rule is to be achieved within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, the exploitation of national riches in the area will naturally be under the jurisdiction of the authorities of this Republic.

15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population ratio in Iraq.

"Kurdish countrymen, these gains scored by the Revolution will be nothing more than a step for the full achievement of your national goals in the shade of this beloved homeland and the unity of its great people. History will bear witness that you did not have and never will have a sincere brother and dependable ally as the Arab people..."

APPENDIX B

EXTRACTS FROM THE 11 MARCH 1974:

LAW FOR AUTONOMY IN THE AREA OF KURDISTAN  
(from the translation provided by the Iraqi Embassy, London)

Part one: FOUNDATION OF AUTONOMY

Chapter one: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article One

A) The area of Kurdistan shall enjoy autonomy and be called the area whenever it is mentioned hereinafter.

B) The area shall be so defined as to be populated by a majority of Kurds and the general census shall specify the demarcation of the area in accordance with the provisions of March 11 Manifesto and the general census records of 1957 shall be the foundation for defining the national nature of the absolute population majority in the places where general census is to be conducted.

C) The area shall be considered an integral administrative unit, enjoying a juridical personality and autonomy within the framework of the legal, political and economic integrity of the Republic of Iraq, and the administrative divisions therein shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the governorates' law, with due consideration to the provisions of this law.

D) The area is an integral part of the Iraqi territory and its people an integral part of the Iraqi people.

E) The city of Arbil shall be the metropolitan centre for the administration of autonomy.

F) The administrative bodies of autonomy shall be part of the administrative bodies in the Republic of Iraq.

Article Two

A) The Kurdish language shall be the official language, besides the Arabic language, in the area.

B) The Kurdish language shall be the language of education for Kurds in the area, and the teaching of Arabic shall be compulsory in all stages and institutions of education.

C) Educational institutions shall be established in the area for

members of the Arab nationality, wherein education shall be in Arabic and the Kurdish language shall be taught in a compulsory manner.

D) All citizens in the area shall enjoy the option to join the schools for their education, regardless of their mother tongue.

E) Education shall be subject, in all stages in the area, to the general educational policy of the state.

#### Article Three

A) The rights and liberties of members of the Arab nationality and minorities in the area shall be guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, laws and resolutions promulgated in that connection, and the autonomous administration shall be bound to guarantee their exercise.

B) Members of the Arab nationality and minorities in the area shall be represented on all autonomous bodies, in proportion of their ratio to the population of the area, and shall participate in assuming public civil service posts, in accordance with laws and regulations governing them.

#### Article Four

Legislature shall be independent and void of any other control than the law, and the legal formations in the area shall constitute an integral part of the legal system in the Republic of Iraq.

### Chapter two: FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

#### Article Five

The area shall constitute an autonomous financial unit, within the financial integrity of the state.

#### Article Six

A) The area shall have a special budget within the consolidated budget of the state.

B) For the preparation and compilation of the budget of the area the same rules and principles of compiling the consolidated budget of the state shall be adopted.

## Article Nine

Accounts of the area shall be made under the supervision of the Board of Supreme Auditing and Financial Inspection.

## Part two: AUTONOMOUS BODIES

## Chapter one: LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

## Article Ten

The Legislative Council is the legislative body elected for the area, and its formation, organisation and progress of work therein shall be defined by law.

## Article Eleven

A) The Legislative Council shall elect a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary from amongst its members.

B) Meetings of the Legislative Council shall be convened by the presence of the majority of its members, and its decisions shall be adopted by the majority of the present members, unless otherwise provided for in this law or the law for the legislative council.

## Article Twelve

The Legislative Council shall exercise, within the definition of the Constitution and the laws, the following powers:

A) The formulation of its articles of association.

B) The adoption of legislative decision required for the development of the area and promotion of its social, cultural, constructional and economic aspects of local character within the framework of the general policy of the state.

C) The adoption of legislative decision connected with the development of culture and the nationalist characteristics and traditions of citizens in the area.

D) The adoption of legislative decisions related to semi-official departments, institutions and administrations of local character after consultation with the competent central authorities.

E) The ratification of projects covered by detailed plans drawn up by the Executive Council on the economic, social and developmental affairs, as well as the educational and health affairs, and the discharge of activity in accordance with the requirements of the general central planning of the state and prerequisites of its implementation.

- F) The proposition of the special budget of the area.
- G) The adoption of final statements of accounts, following their auditing by the Board of the Supreme Auditing and submitting them to the legislative power for ratification.
- H) The introduction of amendments to the special budget of the area after their ratification, within the scope of amounts allotted thereto and purposes allotted therefor, provided that such measures shall not contravene the laws and development plans for the state.
- I) Discussion with and questioning of the Executive Council members on the affairs covered by their fields of competence.
- J) Withdrawal of confidence from the Executive Council, or one or more of its members. The confidence withdrawal decision shall be adopted by the majority number of the Legislative Council's members.

## Chapter two: EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

### Article Thirteen

- A) The Executive Council is the executive body for the administration of autonomy in the area. . . .
- C) The President of the Republic shall entrust one of the Legislative Council's members to preside over it and form the Executive Council.
- D) The chairman-designate shall select the vice-chairman and the Executive Council's members from among the members of the Legislative Council or from among those who enjoy the qualifications of membership therein, and shall submit to the Legislative Council, for confidence. Upon realisation of confidence by the majority of the Council's members, a Republican ordinance shall be promulgated to the effect of calling the Executive Council.
- E) The chairman and members of the Executive Council shall hold a grade of minister.
- F) The President of the Republic may dismiss the chairman of the Executive Council from his position, in which case the Council shall be considered dissolved.

### Article Fifteen

The Executive Council shall exercise the following powers:

- A) Securing the implementation of laws and regulations.

B) Abiding by the provisions of the legislature.

C) Realisation of justice, security and public order, and protection of national and local public amenities and the public and private properties.

D) Promulgating decisions on all that is required for the implementation of provisions of the resolutions adopted by the local Legislative Council.

E) Drawing up projects under the detailed plans for the economic, social and developmental affairs, as well as the educational, health and labour affairs, in accordance with the requirements of the general central planning of the state and prerequisites of its implementation, and submitting the same to the Legislative Council for ratification.

F) Supervising the local public amenities and institutions in the area.

G) Appointing officials for the autonomous administration whose appointment does not require the promulgation of a Republican ordinance or approval of the President of the Republic.

H) Implementing the budget of the area in accordance with the laws and principles adopted in the accounting system of the state.

I) Preparing an annual report on the conditions of the area, to be submitted to the President of the Republic and Legislative Council.

### Part three: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND THE AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION

#### Article Sixteen

With the exception of the powers exercised by the autonomous bodies in accordance with the provisions of this law, the exercise of authority in th entire part of the Republic of Iraq shall revert to the central bodies of their representatives.

#### Article Seventeen

Police, security and nationality formations in the area shall be attached to their directorates general at the Ministry of Interior and their staff shall be subject to the provisions of the laws, regulations and instructions applied in the Republic of Iraq.

### Article Eighteen

A) The offices of the central authority in the area shall fall under the ministries they are attached to and shall discharge their duties within their jurisdictions, the autonomous bodies may submit reports on them to the respective ministries they are attached to.

B) The central authority may within the scope of their jurisdiction make general guidance to the local administrations...

C) The central authority shall appoint a Minister of State who will coordinate between the authority and the autonomous bodies. He may attend all meetings of such bodies. The central authority may delegate any other minister to carry out such a mission.

D) The decisions of the autonomous bodies shall be conveyed to the Minister of State as soon as they are taken.

E) The head of the Executive Council shall attend the (Iraqi State) cabinet meeting.

### Article Nineteen

A) Supervision over the legality of the decisions of the autonomous bodies shall be exercised by the Cassation Court of Iraq through a special committee made of the chief judge of the court and other four members selected by the members of the cassation court from among themselves for a period of three years renewable for one time only.

B) The Minister of Justice or the Minister of State may object to the decision of the autonomous bodies before the supervisory committee mentioned under the previous paragraph in case they violate the Constitution, laws or regulations within 30 days from the date the Minister of State is notified of them.

E) The decisions of the autonomous bodies which the supervisory committee rules as non-legal, shall be considered as wholly or partly abrogated from the date of their issue and all legal consequences resulting therefrom shall be null and void.

### Article Twenty

A) The President may dissolve the Legislative Council in case it is not possible for the Council to exercise its authority due to the resignation of half of its members or due to failure of securing the legal quorum within 30 days from the date it is called for a session or due to failure in getting the confidence stipulated under Para.D of Article 13 of this law for two successive times or due to its failure to comply with the supervision committee stipulated under Article Nineteen of this law.

B) In case the Legislative Council is dissolved, the Executive Council shall continue exercising its authority until the elections of a new Legislative Council in a maximum period of 19 days from the date the Republican ordinance has been issued to dissolve it.

## APPENDIX C

## STATE-SPONSORED INVESTMENTS\*

SEKA (Cellulose & Paper)

<u>Location (Region)</u>	<u>Type of Investment</u>
Afyon (Anatolia)	Paper Mill
Balıksir (Marmara&Aegean)	Paper Mill
Mersin (Mediterranean)	Paper Mill
Kastamonu (Black Sea)	Paper Mill
Artvin (Black Sea)	Paper Mill
Samsun (Black Sea)	Paper Mill

SUMERBANK (Textiles)

Kars (Eastern Anatolia)	Textile Printing Plant
K. Maraş (Anatolia)	Weaving & Finishing Plant
Erzurum (Eastern Anatolia)	Textile Plant
Kars (Eastern Anatolia)	Shoe Manufacturing Plant
Erzurum (Eastern Anatolia)	Shoe Manufacturing Plant
Van (Eastern Anatolia)	Shoe Manufacturing Plant
Bolu (Anatolia)	Chipboard Plant
İsparta (Anatolia)	Chipboard Plant
Malatya (Anatolia)	Textile Machinery Plant
Gaziantep (Southeastern Anatolia)	Textile Machinery Plant
Kirşehir (Anatolia)	Ready-Made Clothes Plant
Çanakkale (European)	Ready-Made Clothes Plant
Adıyaman (Anatolia)	Ready-Made Clothes Plant

TEMSAN (Electromechanics)

Elazığ (Anatolia)	Power Trans.Lines Equipment
Diyarbakır (Eastern Anatolia)	Turbines, Pumps Plant
Malatya (Anatolia)	Transformer, Motor Plant
Yozgat (Anatolia)	Boiler Manufacturing Plant

NITROGEN INDUSTRIES INC.

İçel (Mediterranean)	Fertilizer Plant
Manisa (Marmara&Aegean)	Fertilizer Plant
Siirt (Southeastern Anatolia)	Fertilizer Plant
Mardin (Southeastern Anatolia)	Fertilizer Plant
Sivas (Anatolia)	Fertilizer Plant
Konya (Anatolia)	Fertilizer Plant
Erzurum (Eastern Anatolia)	Fertilizer Plant
Yozgat (Anatolia)	Fertilizer Plant

\*Source: Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, Turkey, An Economic Survey 1977, Istanbul: April 1977, pp. 57-61.

Tekirdağ (European)	Fertilizer Plant
Trabzon (Black Sea)	Fertilizer Plant
Kars (Eastern Anatolia)	Fertilizer Plant
Aydın (Marmara&Aegean)	Fertilizer Plant

### IRON AND STEEL WORKS

Sivas (Anatolia)	Iron and Steel Plant
Sivas (Anatolia)	Pelletized Iron Plant
Sivas (Anatolia)	Iron Ore Dressing Plant
Bolu (Anatolia)	Steel Construction
Antakya (Mediterranean)	Extens. of Iskenderun Steel Mill
Zonguldak (Black Sea)	Extens. of Ereğli Steel Plant
Zonguldak (Black Sea)	Extens. of Ereğli Steel Plant

### SUGAR INDUSTRIES INC.

Çorum (Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Konya (Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Muş (Eastern Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Samsun (Black Sea)	Sugar Refinery
K. Maraş (Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Kars (Eastern Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Konya (Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Ağrı (Eastern Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Mardin (Southeastern Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Denizli (Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Niğde (Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Urfa (Southeastern Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery
Van (Eastern Anatolia)	Sugar Refinery

### CEMENT INDUSTRIES INC.

Diyarbakir (Eastern Anatolia)	Cement Plant
K. Maraş (Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Adiyaman (Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Samsun (Black Sea)	Cement Plant
Bingöl (Eastern Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Siirt (Southeastern Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Denizli (Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Antalya (Mediterranean)	Cement Plant
Kayseri (Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Tekirdağ (European)	Cement Plant
Kastamonu (Black Sea)	Cement Plant
Edirne (European)	Cement Plant
Muğla (Marmara&Aegean)	Cement Plant
Bitlis (Eastern Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Manisa (Marmara&Aegean)	Cement Plant
Kütahya (Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Malatya (Anatolia)	Cement Plant
Urfa (Southeastern Anatolia)	Cement Plant

TUMOSAN (Engines)

Konya (Anatolia)	Tractor Plant
Niğde (Anatolia)	Truck Engines Plant
Sakarya (Black Sea)	Heavy-Duty Truck Engines Plant
Bursa (Marmara&Aegean)	Gasoline Engines Plant
Eskişehir (Anatolia)	Locomotive Engines Plant
Rize (Black Sea)	Marine Engines Plant
Konya (Anatolia)	Tractor Engines Renewing Plant
Uşak (Anatolia)	Car Engines Renewing Plant
Nevşehir (Anatolia)	Transmission Parts Plant
Konya (Anatolia)	Tractor Plant
Mardin (Southeastern Anatolia)	Tractor Plant
Burdur (Anatolia)	Tractor Plant

MKEK (Machinery & Chemicals)

Yozgat (Anatolia)	Larg-Scale Textile Mill
Kütahya (Anatolia)	Large-Scale Press Mfg. Plant
Afyon (Anatolia)	Large-Scale Forging Plant
Kütahya (Anatolia)	Annealing Furnaces Mfg. Plant
K. Maraş (Anatolia)	Annealing Furnaces Mfg. Plant
Adiyaman (Anatolia)	Cement Mill Machinery Plant
Gaziantep (Southeastern Anatolia)	Bottling Machinery Plant
Giresun (Black Sea)	Packaging Machinery Plant
Kirsehir (Anatolia)	Cutting Tools Plant
Tokat (Anatolia)	Cutting Tools Plant
Kayseri (Anatolia)	Cutting Tools Plant
Gümüşhane (Eastern Anatolia)	Cutting Tools Plant
Ankara (Anatolia)	Die Manufacturing Plant
Ankara (Anatolia)	Die Manufacturing Plant
Ankara (Anatolia)	Die Manufacturing Plant
Ankara (Anatolia)	Die Manufacturing Plant
Çorum (Anatolia)	Heavy Machinery Mfg. Plant
Konya (Anatolia)	Heavy-Duty Construction Mach.
Amasya (Anatolia)	Heavy Machinery & Paper Mills
İsparta (Anatolia)	Heavy Machinery & Fertilizer Plant
Trabzon (Black Sea)	Hydraulic Machinery Plant
Konya (Anatolia)	Flour Mills Machinery Plant
Bilecik (Anatolia)	Ball-bearings Manufacturing Plant
Ordu (Black Sea)	Ball-bearings Mfg. Plant; Oil
Ankara (Anatolia)	Const. & Excavation Machinery
Çankiri (Anatolia)	Heavy Industries Equip. Plant
Elazığ (Anatolia)	Quality Steel Plant

TAKSAN (Machine Tools)

Kayseri (Anatolia)	Automatic Machine Tools
Erzincan (Eastern Anatolia)	Heavy-Duty Machine Tools
Tokat (Anatolia)	Universal Machine Tools
Yozgat (Anatolia)	Gears Manufacturing Plant

TESTAS (Electronics)

Erzurum (Eastern Anatolia)	Electronics Plant
Aydın (Marmara&Aegean)	Electronics Plant

ORGANIZED INDUSTRY ZONES

Bursa (Marmara&Aegean)	Existing
Manisa (Marmara&Aegean)	Existing
Konya (Anatolia)	Existing
Eskişehir (Anatolia)	Existing
Gaziantep (Southeastern Anatolia)	Under Construction
Erzurum (Eastern Anatolia)	Under Construction
Çerkezköy (Anatolia)	Under Construction
İzmir (Marmara&Aegean)	Under Construction
Kirşehir (Anatolia)	Under Construction
Malatya (Anatolia)	Under Construction
Adana (Mediterranean)	Planned
Ankara (Anatolia)	Planned
Bolu (Anatolia)	Planned
Bursa (Marmara&Aegean)	Planned
Denizli (Anatolia)	Planned
Edirne (European)	Planned
Elazığ (Anatolia)	Planned
Hatay (Mediterranean)	Planned
Istanbul (European)	Planned
Istanbul (European)	Planned
Kars (Eastern Anatolia)	Planned
Kayseri (Anatolia)	Planned
Kütahya (Anatolia)	Planned
Zonguldak (Black Sea)	Planned
Afyon (Anatolia)	Planned
Antalya (Mediterranean)	Planned
Bilecik (Anatolia)	Planned
Burdur (Anatolia)	Planned
Diyarbakir (Eastern Anatolia)	Planned
Mardin (Southeastern Anatolia)	Planned
Sakarya (Black Sea)	Planned
Tokat (Anatolia)	Planned
Artvin (Black Sea)	Planned
Çanakkale (European)	Planned
Çorum (Anatolia)	Planned
Giresun (Black Sea)	Planned
Kahramanmaraş (Anatolia)	Planned
Ordu (Black Sea)	Planned
Samsun (Black Sea)	Planned
Sinop (Black Sea)	Planned
Sivas (Anatolia)	Planned
Trabzon (Black Sea)	Planned
Urfa (Southeastern Anatolia)	Planned
Van (Eastern Anatolia)	Planned
Nevşehir (Anatolia)	Planned

## APPENDIX D

## PRIVATE INVESTMENTS\*

The Top 100 Turkish Firms in 1975:

<u>Name of Firm</u>	<u>Location (Region)</u>	<u># Employed</u>
Ipras Refinery	S.E.E.**	716
Ereğli Iron&Steel Co.	Ankara (Anatolia)	8,944
Karabük Iron & Steel	S.E.E.	13,276
SEKA Paper Mill	S.E.E.	10,374
Petkim-Petrochemicals	S.E.E.	2,693
Oyak-Renault Autos	Bursa (Marmara&Aegean)	2,688
Otosan-Koç Automotives	Istanbul (European)	2,672
Azot Sanayii Fertilizers	S.E.E.	5,311
Tofaş-Fiat Automotives	Bursa (Marmara&Aegean)	2,331
Arçelik-Koç Grp. Goods	Istanbul (European)	2,764
Unilever	Istanbul (European)	1,088
Turkish Cement Industry	S.E.E.	6,151
Güney Sanayi Textile Co.	Adana (Mediterranean)	4,812
Uzel Tractor Manufacturer	Istanbul (European)	1,766
Türk Traktor/Fiat Traktor	Ankara (Anatolia)	1,029
Gübre Factories-Fertiliz.	Istanbul (European)	771
Rabak Electrolitic Wks.	Istanbul (European)	1,025
Mensucat Santral Textiles	Istanbul (European)	3,470
Paktaş Textile Co.	Adana (Mediterranean)	3,958
Bossa-Sabancı Grp. Textiles	Adana (Mediterranean)	4,220
Chrysler Automotive Co.	Istanbul (European)	765
Profilo White Goods Co.	Istanbul (European)	2,290
Türk Pirelli Tire Co.	Istanbul (European)	1,154
Metaş Metalurgical Works	Ege (European)	1,578
Borusan Pipe Mfg. Co.	Istanbul (European)	790
Sasa-Sabancı Synth. Fibers	Adana (Mediterranean)	1,903
Otomarsan Mercedes Busman	Istanbul (European)	1,077
Türyağ-Henchel	Ege (European)	1,041
Eskişehir Locomotive Ind.	S.E.E.	4,129
Mannesman Steel Pipe Mfg.	Izmit (Marmara&Aegean)	678
Uniroyal Tire Co.	Istanbul (European)	985
Konya Sugar Mfg.	S.E.E.	1,193
Steel Industry	Istanbul (European)	270
Çukurova Industry	Tarsus (Mediterranean)	3,357
Simko-Siemons House.Appl.	Istanbul (European)	1,100
Goodyear Tire Company	Istanbul (European)	920
Deftedar Woolen Worsted	S.E.E.	3,402
Eczacebaşe Pharmaceuticals	Istanbul (European)	1,432

\*Source: Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, Turkey, An Economic Survey 1977, Istanbul: April 1977, pp. 57-61.

\*\*S.E.E. stands for State Economic Enterprise. The location of these firms was unavailable.

Aksu Textile Co.	Istanbul (European)	2,722
Toe Automotive Industry	Istanbul (European)	1,029
Susurluk Turkish Sugar Fty.	S.E.E.	1,342
SIDEMAS Railroad Machinery	S.E.E.	4,636
MAN Truck & Bus Co.	Istanbul (European)	855
Sifas Synthetic Fibers	Bursa (Marmara&Aegean)	1,309
Tebra, T.V. & Radios	Istanbul (European)	765
Turkish Pig Iron & Steel	Istanbul (European)	2,351
Bağfaş, Bandirma Fertilizer	Ege (Marmara&Aegean)	210
İpragaz	Istanbul (European)	407
Koruma, Agri. Pesticides	Istanbul (European)	714
Merinos Woolen Worsted Co.	S.E.E.	3,359
Cayırova Glassworks	Izmit (Marmara&Aegean)	1,366
Trakya Co.	Istanbul (European)	212
Türk Kablo-Cable Co.	Istanbul (European)	468
Marsa, Margarin Co.	Adana (Mediterranean)	576
Beko T.V. & Radio Mfg.	Istanbul (European)	712
Kayseri Sugar Factory	S.E.E.	523
DYO Synthetic Paints	Ege (Marmara&Aegean)	573
Ergani Copper Works	S.E.E.	2,828
Adapazari Sugar Co.	S.E.E.	411
Genoto	Istanbul (European)	504
Hürriyet Newspaper Group	Istanbul (European)	792
Paşabağçe Glassworks	Istanbul (European)	2,506
Kayseri Textile Co.	S.E.E.	3,093
Derby	Istanbul (European)	1,803
Otoyol Automotive Ind.	Istanbul (European)	582
Çukurova Cement Industry	Adana (Mediterranean)	727
Nasas Aluminum Works	Istanbul (European)	668
Aksa Acrylic Co.	Istanbul (European)	640
Çanakkale Ceramics Ind.	Istanbul (European)	2,042
Trakya Margarin Co.	Tekirdağ (European)	263
Bozkurt Textile Co.	Istanbul (European)	2,045
Ayekş Margarin Co.	Istanbul (European)	207
Marshall Paint Mfg. Co.	Istanbul (European)	525
Akımento Cement Factory	Istanbul (European)	947
Derby Plastic Works	Istanbul (European)	603
CBS Paint & Chemicals	Istanbul (European)	485
Birlik Textile Co.	Kayseri (Anatolia)	1,784
DESAS-Unilever Detergants	Istanbul (European)	164
Tokar Construct. Materials	Istanbul (European)	904
Nuh Cement Co.	Ankara (Anatolia)	525
Pancar Motor Engine Co.	Istanbul (European)	964
Muhittin Ekiz Oil & Soaps	Ege (Marmara&Aegean)	281
Narin Textile Co.	Istanbul (European)	897
Türk Siemens Cable Co.	Bursa (Marmara&Aegean)	293
Fruko Temek Fruit Juices	Istanbul (European)	1,070
Berrak Vegetable Oil	Istanbul (European)	62
Mutlu Power Battery Co.	Istanbul (European)	1,014
Birleşik Alman Pharmaceut.	Istanbul (European)	804
Izmir Textile Co.	Ege (Marmara&Aegean)	1,473

Maktaş Macarovi Co.	Ege (Marmara&Aegean)	651
Malatya Textile	S.E.E.	2,681
Turkish General Electric	Istanbul (European)	844
Bandırma Borax Co.	S.E.E.	875
Teksa Textile Co.	Adana (Mediterranean)	1,234
Verb-Günaydin Newspaper.	Istanbul (European)	537
Kula Textile Co.	Ege (Marmara&Aegean)	2,186
Sunta Wood Co.	Istanbul (European)	576
Eti Food Industry	Eskişehir (Anatolia)	823
Yücel Pipe Industry	Izmit (Marmara&Aegean)	170
Altınyıldız Textile Co.	Istanbul (European)	1,720