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Fort Ross: Russian Colony in California, 1811-1841

Kathryn E. Mitchell
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
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Kathryn E. Mitchell for the Master of Arts in History presented May 14, 1984.

Title: Fort Ross: Russian Colony in California, 1811-1841.

APPROVED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:


Basil Dmytryshyn / Chairman


David A. Johnson


Michael F. Reardon

The essential objective of this study was to fill a bibliographic void of secondary source material concerning Russian California. This was accomplished by combining available translations and more specific studies on the subject into one extensive work. Introductory chapters provide: (1) a brief statement regarding Russia's massive eastward expansion through Siberia, to Kamchatka and Alaska; (2) an examination of the nature of the Russian-American Company; and (3) a detailed look at the programs instituted by the Company to provision Alaska and Kamchatka. The establishment of Fort Ross in 1811 is viewed as one of those programs. The settlement's primary function throughout its existence was to send

foodstuffs to Russia's northern colonies. The main body of the paper describes fully the structure of the settlement and analyzes the various activities, undertaken by the Russians at Fort Ross, in order to provide grain to the Company. Those activities were sea otter hunting, manufacturing, and agriculture and animal husbandry. In closing, the paper focuses on the Native Californians of Fort Ross, detailing their culture and their relationship with imperialist powers in nineteenth-century California.

The industries of Fort Ross--hunting, manufacturing, and husbandry--met with failure. Each endeavor proved to be either inadequate or untimely: The harvesting of pelts was quickly curtailed by the depletion of animal populations; a successful manufacturing enterprise was interrupted by foreign competition; and lack of labor and expertise hindered the Russians' effort to transform the Ross Counter into the Company's "granary." The research conducted for this study led to the conclusion that the Russians' decision to abandon their California settlement was finalized when another means to provision the northern colonies became available.

A Study of Fort Ross necessarily demands an international historical perspective. A consideration of the Spanish colonial enterprise in Mexico and California, the British activities in the Pacific Northwest, and the increasing strength of the United States on the western coast of North America are essential in understanding the failure of the Russians at Fort Ross and in Alaska.

A number of published, primary source materials were used exhaustively to complete this study. A complete selected bibliography is included. Several categories of material were of prime importance. Briefly, they are: (1) correspondence between the Chief Manager of the Russian-American Company colonies in Alaska and the Company's Main Office in St. Petersburg. These documents are available on microfilm in the National Archives and in Vneshniaia Politika Rossii, Series I and II, edited by N. N. Bolkhovitinov. (2) Journals, kept by navigators who participated in Russian circumnavigations which made calls in the Russian America, are invaluable sources of information on the circumstances of the colonies. (3) Reports of Company employees, such as Kirill T. Klebnikov and Ferdinand P. Wrangell provide important statistical information on agricultural production, otter hunting, manufacturing, and the population of Russian California. As mentioned, secondary sources on Russian California are scarce. However, James R. Gibson's work, Imperial Russia in Frontier America, does offer a thorough treatment of Russian trade and husbandry in California.

FORT ROSS: RUSSIAN COLONY IN CALIFORNIA,
1811-1841

by

KATHRYN E. MITCHELL

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
HISTORY

Portland State University

1984

TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH:

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Daniel L. Baker and Kenneth B. Hawkins, who proofread the text and offered invaluable suggestions, were instrumental in seeing this thesis through to completion.

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In a country which is blessed with so mild a climate as California, where there is such plenty of wood and water, with so many other means for the support of life, and several excellent harbors, persons of enterprising spirits might, in a few years, establish a very flourishing colony. With the assistance of able mechanics who are to be found at Sitcha, wind and water mills might soon be constructed, looms established, and manufactories for burning brandy. Large and small vessels, and granaries for corn, would then be built; vast herds of cattle would be raised, and sea-otters in abundance taken; thus, in time, Kamschatka and Eastern Asia would be amply supplied from hence with all kinds of vegetable and animal productions for the support of life.

George H. von Langsdorff, 1806
Voyages and Travels in Various
Parts of the World




Figure 1. Russian map of California, 1844. Reprinted from the Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), prec. 189.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of a Russian Settlement in California

From 1811 to 1841, the Russian-American Company, under the sponsorship of the imperial government, held the tiny settlement of Fort Ross in Alta California, eighty miles north of San Francisco.¹ The settlement of Fort Ross represented the extent of Russian colonization in California. Yet from this 75-acre settlement, the territory of "Russian California" evolved, designating an area from Cape Mendicino to Drake's Bay and three Spanish leagues inland (see Figure 2).² Fort Ross had one essential purpose--the provisionment of Russia's northern colonies in Alaska, Kamchatka, and Eastern Asia. Several methods were employed to carry out this provisionment and thus Fort Ross served several functions throughout the Russians' stay in California.

At different stages in its development, Fort Ross was a station for otter hunting, manufacturing, and agricultural production. The Russians first hunted sea otter off the California coast in 1803 and that harvest was facilitated with the founding of Fort Ross in 1811. In its early years, Fort Ross also served as a manufacturing center, producing articles attractive to the Spanish California market, such as rowboats, wheels, tools, and bricks. Russian manufactories and pelts were exchanged for Spanish agricultural goods, particularly grains, which were produced abundantly at the missions during this period.




Figure 2. Russian California. Adapted from map in V. M. Golovnin, Around the World on the Kamchatka, 1817-1819 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1979), p. 136.

Fort Ross was no longer used primarily as a hunting post after 1818 when the population of California sea otter had been greatly diminished. The period of Russian manufacturing also declined abruptly in 1821 when Mexico assumed control of California, following the Mexican secession from Spain. The Mexican government reversed the Spanish policy of restrictive trade and opened California's ports to foreign vessels. As a result, the Russians lost a large part of their California market to foreign competition.³ Moreover, since the Russian-American Company held little Spanish currency, the loss of pelts and manufactured goods as exchange media greatly diminished the Russians' ability to purchase mission grain. These circumstances forced the Russians at Fort Ross to turn their resources primarily to agricultural production in the 1820s and 1830s. Their farming venture, however, met with little success and never fully satisfied the provisionment needs of the Russian colonies.

Faced with the successive failures of hunting, manufacturing, and agriculture, in conjunction with the political instability of the California region, Company officials began to question the long-term viability of a Russian California colony. Consequently, attention was turned to other means of provisioning the Company colonies. In 1839, through an agreement negotiated between the Russian-American Company and the Hudson's Bay Company, it appeared that the problem of provisionment would finally be remedied. In the ten-year contract, the British agreed to provide the Alaskan colonies with essential grains and foodstuffs in exchange for a lease on a ten-mile strip of Alaskan coastline. Confident that this contract would provide needed agricultural goods, the Company relinquished the Ross settlement which

had never realized its intended purpose. Fort Ross was sold to J. A. Sutter in December 1841 for \$30,000, with two-thirds of that price to be paid in wheat and other foodstuffs.

Two Centuries of Russian Eastward Expansion

The establishment of Fort Ross, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, was a final step in two-and-a-half centuries of eastward expansion conducted by the Russian state.⁴ Under the guise of freedom of enterprise, Russia had expanded through and sparsely colonized a vast territory, east of the Ural Mountains, which increased her empire by five million square miles and provided an essential revenue of furs to the state. This expansive phase began in 1582 when a band of mercenary cossacks, fighting on hire to the Stroganov family, crossed the Urals and defeated the Siberian Khanate. From this point d'appui, the Russian empire expanded rapidly, as the Russian promyshlenniki⁵ utilized the vast network of rivers and portages, exploiting the rich supply of furs of the intemperate taiga.⁶ By 1652 the Russian promyshlenniki completed this initial phase of expansion which extended Russia east from Europe, through the contiguous territories of Central Asia and Siberia, to the shore of the Pacific Ocean.

Once reaching the Pacific shore, the movement east was held in abeyance as the Russians readjusted their orientation from a mode of river travel to the uncertainties of the North Pacific. The Russian government spearheaded the movement toward America by sponsoring two expeditions of Vitus Bering in 1725-31 and 1733-43.⁷ Peter I (1682-1725) conceived the expeditions and transformed Russia into a naval

power. He no longer recognized the Pacific as a barrier to expansion. With missions such as Bering's, Peter aspired to conquer northwestern America on the pattern of Siberian expansion, increasing state revenue from the harvest of furs and the exploitation of mineral resources and native populations.⁸

With the foundation laid by government direction, Russian eastward expansion proceeded, true to form, after 1743: Under strict government regulation, merchants sponsored numerous voyages across the Pacific, toward North America, at a pace slowed only by the introduction of antagonistic variables such as foreign competition and geographic confinement (see Appendix A). By 1799, the Russians founded Novo-Arkhangel'sk which served as the administrative center of their North American holdings until the time of the Company's dissolution in 1867.⁹

Russian expansion to Alaska followed a course familiar to the history of fur trapping: expansion following the rapid depletion of hunting grounds.¹⁰ By 1804, hunting was banned by the Company's directors in many of the North Pacific holdings, as the animal populations were dangerously low. The traditional solution to the problem of depletion of fur-bearing animals was the acquisition of new hunting grounds; however, with the conquest of coastal Alaska, the Russians exhausted their geographical limits. Penetration into interior Alaska was infeasible due to the difficulties of inland provisionment. Expansion southward could only occur into lands already claimed by other European colonial powers. One such solution was the expansion into the claimed yet unsettled territory of California, north of

San Francisco. This area was bordered to the north by a British colony, and to the south by Spanish colonial America. To the east, the emerging force of a new world power was felt, as United States' imperialism transformed territories into statehood.

The Russians and Spanish America. The Russian movement southward from Alaska aroused a legitimate concern among the Spaniards: that the boundary of northern California was in jeopardy--vulnerable to redefinition, as Spain had claimed California in name only, not possessing the resources necessary to colonize.

The Spaniards' ungrounded fear of a strong Russian presence on mainland America resulted in a series of Spanish expeditionary investigations along the Pacific coast and in the founding of new settlements in the San Francisco District (see Figure 3).¹¹ By intensifying the Spaniards' concern that Alta California was open to foreign encroachment, Russian movement unintentionally served as a catalyst, prompting the Spanish development of California. However, Spanish colonial officials failed to realize that St. Petersburg, like Madrid, was unable to direct resources to a colonizing effort in California and unwilling to divert attention from the important political matters in Europe and Asia, such as the Amur Basin, to the concerns of the burdensome and unproductive American colonies.

What occurred in nineteenth-century California was the meeting of two immense expansionist powers, veritably without more than nominal support from their patron states. With resources exhausted, the Russian expansionist movement east and the Spanish west touched in an extended reach that would serve as the breaking point of their American colonial enterprises. Maintaining a hold on California,

with the emergence of new world strength, proved an insurmountable task to both Russia and Spain. Thus they retreated, eventually to their geographical confinement; Russia to the limits of the Asian continent, Spain to the Iberian peninsula. And the United States advanced, in geographical righteousness, westward to the Pacific.

The Nature of the Russian-American Company

This is a study of the short-lived Russian tenure in California. It attempts to reconstruct the events that brought the Russian-American Company to California and those that led to its departure. Therefore, one question of particular relevance to a study of Russian expansion into California demands attention: that is, the problem of the political nature of the Russian-American Company. This problem requires consideration, as the Company's persuasion necessarily defines the stance of the imperial government in the course of Russian-American expansion. Moreover, an understanding of the nature of the Company assists in determining what forces--political and economic--were ultimately responsible for the attempt to expand Russia's borders to include a possession in California.

The formation of the Russian-American Company in 1799 was a reorganization of government control over the fur trade, rather than a movement of the trade from the entrepreneurship of Russian promyshlenniki to the rigid regulation of imperial bureaucrats as the literature often suggests.¹² The visibility of this restructuring process has been clouded by the description, in historical analyses, of a private sector opposing the highly formalized and developed bureaucratic structure of eighteenth-century Russia. The nature of the

Russian socio-economic system, however, warranted no such distinction between individual and state enterprise.¹³ A private sector had not and could not flourish as monarchical Russia was not compromised by the existence of a middle class--semi-feudal aristocracy ruled unchallenged and serfdom precluded a free labor pool. The state not only restricted individual movement, but it also owned the means of the trade, including material and human resources. To acquire access to these means, an individual merchant needed to satisfy bureaucratic requirements. Petitions needed to be filed and approved in order to complete virtually any phase of the voyage; for example, to build a vessel, to buy provisions (firearms included), to hire hands, or to transport outside city limits. Therefore, the reorganization of the fur trade into the Russian-American Company, occurred perforce within the confines of government association where it had resided since its placement under the Sibirskii Prikaz in 1693.¹⁴ The Russian government, although circumscribed by slow communication, carefully monitored this enterprise which brought such a handsome revenue to the state.

The construction of a private segment of the Russian economy has resulted in the consideration of historical problems debased of legitimacy. Specifically, two questions regarding the government and the fur trade must be re-evaluated: (1) What motivated the Russian government, in 1799, to form a monopoly over the maritime fur trade? and, concomitantly, (2) To what end did the government operate the Russian-American Company? Was the Company a governmental instrument of expansion and colonization, christianizing and civilizing? Was

its formation somehow reflective of Russia's Drang nach Osten, the processes of prisoedinenie and osvoenie, or the Russian manifest destiny?

The question of goals which the Russian government hoped to achieve, through control of the trade, acquires an air of ambiguity in light of the claim that there was a governmentally-controlled trade prior to the Company's formation. As government control existed prior to 1799, the ability to manipulate the fur trade to the state's political, economic, and social advantage was not new. The government traditionally orchestrated the force of eastward movement by regulating the degree of control it placed over individuals and commerce. Thus, with little governmental design yet optimal control, the fur trade had served as a vehicle of expansion and colonization for the Russian state. And this expansion and colonization had, in turn, complimented the commercial enterprise which fueled the bureaucracy and encouraged institutional growth and dependency.

To address the question regarding what motivated the government to form a monopolistic Russian-American Company, it seems clear--considering the degree of imperial regulation--that the government did not assume control of the trade in 1799; the organs of control had been intact at least a century prior to the Company's formation: The movement of the trade was always subject to the scrutiny of the imperial apparatus. Thus, it is inappropriate to search for the motive guiding the Russian government's attempt to commence domination over the lucrative trade. More appropriate, perhaps, would be a determination of those agents which did force the rearrangement of

the bureaucratic structures and, more essential to this study, the degree of independence the Company experienced as it expanded into America in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The Agents of Change. When the development of the Russian fur trade is traced to the close of the eighteenth century, an enterprise of limitless potential is found; an ostensibly endless eastern frontier offered boundless success in terms of the volume of pelts that could be harvested and peoples conquered. The problem of the depletion of the numbers of fur-bearing animals was perpetually avoided by expansion into virgin territories to the east. These hunting grounds offered millions of animals, insuring a large profit despite the inhospitability of the land. The first half of the nineteenth century, however, found the trade confined: The restraints of resource (animal and human) depletion were not new, yet in conjunction with geographical limitations and foreign competition, the trade was deprived of its previous liberty to advance. Hence, these three factors were agents which forced the government-sponsored trade to define a stronger position. The monopolization of the fur trade, through the formation of the Russian-American Company, was in part a response to these incessant problems which challenged the continued success and existence of the trade.

Administrative Structure of the Russian-American Company. The administrative structure of the Russian-American Company (1799-1867) was composed of the Main Office in St. Petersburg, the General Assembly of Shareholders, the Coordinating Council, and the Chief Manager of the Russian-American Colonies (see Figure 4). The Assembly's power was the most circumscribed of the four administrative




Figure 4. Administrative structure of the Russian-American Company (Rossiisko-Amerikanskoi Kompanii, *RAK) under the Company's second charter, 1821-1841. Based on information provided in Stephen A. Johnson's "Baron Wrangell and the Russian-American Company, 1829-1849," Diss. University of Manitoba, 1978 and Petr A. Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company, trans. and ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), pp. 54-60.

divisions and this was due to strong government involvement in Company affairs. The shareholders' most important responsibility was the selection of two of the three council members.¹⁵ The remaining three branches of the Company administration unequally shared power within the Company, yet all were ultimately responsible to the Russian government and the emperor.

The Main Office was placed under the Department of Manufactures and Foreign Trade in 1819 and this Department was, in turn, a division of the Ministry of Finance.¹⁶ The five-member directorship, comprised overwhelmingly of naval officers, had four basic responsibilities in addition to the supervision of the Company's branch offices.¹⁷ These responsibilities were: (1) the approval of business transactions, (2) control of Company credit, (3) maintaining public (shareholder) confidence, and (4) guarding the welfare of the Company colonies. The last of these responsibilities--the welfare of the colonies--was charged to the Chief Manager of the Russian-American Colonies who, by the terms of the second charter, was to serve a minimum term of five years (see TABLE I). The Chief Manager of the American Colonies had six basic responsibilities. He was charged with the supervision of: (1) Company employees, (2) Company office and establishments, (3) the clergy and churches, (4) supplies and provisions, (5) native subjects, and (6) the Company fleet.¹⁸

Government Involvement in Company Affairs. From its inception, the administrative structure of the Russian-American Company assured strict governmental guardianship over commercial as well as political activities of the Company . Petr A. Tikhmenev (182?-1888),

TABLE I
CHIEF MANAGERS OF THE RUSSIAN-
AMERICAN COMPANY COLONIES

Chief Manager	Term of Office
Alexander Andreevich Baranov	[?] 1790 to 11 January 1818
Leontii Andreevich Hagemester	11 January 1818 to 24 October 1818
Semen Ivanovich Ivanovskii	24 October 1818 to 15 September 1820
Matvei Ivanovich Murav'ev	15 September 1820 to 14 October 1825
Peter Egorovich Chistiakov	14 October 1825 to 1 June 1830
Baron Ferdinand Wrangel	1 June 1830 to 29 October 1835
Ivan Antonovich Kupreanov	29 October 1835 to 25 May 1840
Adolf Karlovich Etholen	25 May 1840 to 9 July 1845
Mikhail Dmit'rievich Teben'kov	9 July 1845 to 15 October 1850
Nikolai Iakovlevich Rosenberg	15 October 1850 to 31 March 1853
Alexander Il'ich Rudakov	31 March 1853 to 22 April 1854
Stephan Vasil'evich Voevodskii	22 April 1854 to 22 June 1859
Ivan Vasil'evich Furuhjelm	22 June 1859 to 2 December 1863
Prince Dmitrii Petrovich Maksutov	2 December 1863 to 18 October 1867

Reprinted from Petr A. Tikhmenev's A History of the Russian-American Company, trans. and ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 507.

historian of the Russian-American Company, reprinted an order issued by the government on July 8, 1799--the year of the Company's formation, stating that the Company was obliged to report "everything concerning the affairs of the Company, its orders as well as achievements, directly to His Imperial Majesty."¹⁹ The government-company link was initially embodied in the position of inspector or correspondent, a position created and filled by the emperor. The first occupant of this office (1799-1806) was Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, who was also a large shareholder. Rezanov, using the influence of this position, played a major role in the development of the Russian-American Company. While in Novo-Arkhangel'sk in 1803, he called for a major reorganization of the colonies' administration. In addition, Rezanov embarked on commercial-diplomatic missions in Japan and Spanish California on the Company's behalf (see pp. 50-55).

As the Company developed, government control over its activities was refined and strengthened. Expansion led to dealings with other European colonial powers and these political complications forced the government to oversee the Company's colonial trade, the opening of new hunting grounds, and founding of new settlements. "As business transactions expanded, so did the Company's relations with the various governmental agencies become proportionately intricate..."²⁰ This increasing intricacy was manifested in the establishment of a coordinating committee which superceded the office of government inspector in 1807.²¹ The committee was comprised of three members; two were elected from the General Assembly of Shareholders and the third was appointed by the emperor. The committee was also known as the

Special Council of the Russian-American Company and it oversaw:

...all matters which are important or which demand secrecy in the way of political views, matters inseparable from the extension of trade, navigation, and various...plans and the determination of said matters, which may at times impede the Directors [of the Main Office of the Russian-American Company] or be found to be beyond their powers, is entrusted to the attention and care of the Council jointly with the government of the "Entire Company."²²

The primary reason for the Special Council was to deal with the politically sensitive issues which arose from Russian contact with Britons and Spaniards on the western coast of America. The formation of the Council coincided with the initiation of several Company activities which presumed a high level of interaction with other European political forces in the new world. Russian global voyages began in 1803 (see pp. 42-49) and consequently, the Russians established relations in the Sandwich Islands where Britain and America also presided (see pp.56-58). Through circumnavigation and other independent Company actions, the Russians made contact in the Californias and in the Pacific Northwest where the Spaniards and British respectively had established dominance. Additionally, the United States exerted new strength in the Pacific and challenged their right of access to the strategic and profitable waters off Alaska and western North America. The increasing complexity of foreign contacts created substantial Russian-American Company participation in the North Pacific and the Russian government, reaffirming its control over Company affairs, established a complimentary agency--the Special Council--to oversee the planning and implementation of affairs that involved other European powers. The move to California and the establishment of Fort Ross, specifically, created

problems of a political nature on a scale never before encountered by the Company and hence the government required particularly close surveillance over Company activities in this region.²³

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹ The date for the establishment of Fort Ross can be accurately placed at 1812, the time when the actual fort was erected in the location where it stands today. However, in late November 1811, the Russians began construction of a post at Bodega Bay, which they renamed Rumiantsev Bay. In March 1812, the Russians decided that their original site was inappropriate for a main settlement and moved eighteen miles north. There they built the walled structure which is referred to as "Fort Ross" and which remained the administrative center of Russian California until 1841. Port Rumiantsev, however, also remained an integral part of the Russian's settlement, as it served as the Russian harbor in California (see pp. 79-80). It is for this reason--that construction at Port Rumiantsev began in 1811 and that the Port remained a vital part of Russian California throughout its existence--that the date of Russian occupation in California and Fort Ross, in this work, is placed at 1811 instead of 1812.

"Alta California" was used by the Spaniards to designate that area which comprises the present state of California. The name "California" originally designated what is now known as Baja California, founded by Cortes in the 1530s. It was originally thought to be an island. The expedition of Francisco de Ulloa (1539-40) is credited with finding that Baja California was actually a peninsula.

² The area of Rumiantsev Bay, Fort Ross, and the Khlebnikov, Kostromitinov and Chernykh Ranches were the only settlements the Russians established during their thirty-year occupation of Alta California. The colonial population of adult Russian males in California peaked at 41 in 1833. Despite the insignificance of the Russian colony, in terms of settled territory and inhabitants, Russian California was considered to extend 250 miles north of the fort itself, adjacent to the southern boundary of the Oregon Territory. This notion of "Russian California" which exaggerated the actual strength of the Russians in California is peculiar to sources, Spanish and Russian, dated at the time of the fort's sale. In particular, the deed written by Petr S. Kostromitinov, agent for the Russian-American Company stated that the Russian-American Company ceded to John A. Sutter, founder of the California colony of New Helvetia and the purchaser of the property of Fort Ross upon the Russian's departure:

the establishment embracing on the North the land adjacent to Cape Mendicino, and on the South the land adjacent to Punta de los Reyes, or Cape Drake, and extending back from the shore three Spanish leagues, and of which property the Russian American Fur Company has had and held possession from the year 1812 to the year 1841,...

(The above text was found in Clarence DuFour's "The Russian Withdrawal from California," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), 269.) Similarly, Mariano G. Vallejo, commander of the San Francisco Presidio, informed California's Governor, Juan Alvarado, that the "Russians are going [to evacuate California] at last...Cape Mendicino will now truly be the northern boundary of the Californias, for although the geography said so, our jurisdiction did not pass American Creek." (Reprinted in DuFour, p. 254.)

³ Correspondence informing Matvei Ivanovich Murav'iev, head of the Russian-American Company colonies in America (1820-1825), that Mexico had succeeded to Spain's former position in California and that Spanish laws forbidding foreigners to trade in ports of North and South America had thus been abolished is available in the "Records of the Russian-American Company," National Archives, Washington, D.C. Documents are dated March 3 (15), April 28 (May 10), and July 18 (30). These sources are listed in C. Alan Hutchinson's Frontier Settlement in Mexican California: The Hajar-Padres Colony, and its Origins, 1769-1835 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 87, 101, 140.

⁴ Many historians have dealt with the phenomenon of Russia's tremendous eastern expansion. The most notable considerations in English are by: Raymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1700 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1943); Frank A. Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850: An Account of the Earliest and Later Expeditions Made by the Russians Along the Pacific Coast of Asia and North America; Including some Related Expeditions to the Arctic Regions (Gloucester, Mass: P. Smith, 1960); Robert J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History. The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries and Furs (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1946); George V. Lantseff, Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1943); Lantseff and Richard A. Pierce, Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750 (Montreal: McGill's-Queen's Univ. Press, 1973). James R. Gibson, geographer of Russian expansion, has produced many works, including Feeding the Russian Fur Trade: Provisionment of the Okhotsk Seaboard and

the Kamchatka Peninsula, 1639-1856 (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969) and Imperial Russian in Frontier America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976). For an extensive bibliography of Russian expansion see Basil Dmytryshyn's "Russian Expansion to the Pacific, 1580-1700: A Historiographical Review," Slavic Studies (Hokkaido Univ.), No. 25 (1980).

⁵ The term promyshlenniki [plural of promyshlennik]: translates from the Russian with difficulty as there is no comparable term in English. Generally, promyshlenniki describes the individuals involved in eastward expansion for profit, e.g., traders, trappers, and deputized cossacks. However, the participants in this Russian movement are not equivalent to American frontiersmen, as Russian expansion and trade were closely monitored by the imperial government and not exercised in private enterprise. In his work, The Russian Fur Trade, Fisher provides a most comprehensive definition of the participants in Russian eastward expansion.

It was the [promyshlenniki] who obtained the furs at the source, and for that reason participated actively and extensively in the conquest. The term promyshlenniks, ordinarily referred to men who worked for themselves, exploiting natural resources...They hunted and trapped fur-bearing animals, or got them from the natives by trade, extortion, or as tribute. So active were they in the fur trade in Siberia that in that country the term "promyshlennik" became synonymous with fur hunter or trapper. By the very nature of their occupation they became explorers and conquerors (p. 30).

⁶ The taiga is the subarctic coniferous forest of Siberia, south of the tundra region. The harsh climatic conditions of the taiga are responsible for the luxuriant and valuable pelts of the region's fur-bearing animals.

⁷ See Raymond H. Fisher's Bering's Voyages: Whither and Why

(Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1977) for an historical re-evaluation of the purposes behind these expeditions. See also Robert J. Kerner, Urge to the Sea.

⁸ Peter's motivation was not geographical in nature as is generally accepted. Raymond H. Fisher convincingly argues that the geographical mystery, regarding the separation of the Asian and North American continents, had been solved, in Peter's mind, by 1722. By this time, Peter had been presented with three maps which convinced him that the continents were in fact separated by water (p. 62). At the time of the first voyage, Bering expected to reach America and reconnoiter its coast. When the course proved incorrect, Bering turned back. On the second voyage, Bering and his captain of both voyages, Aleksei Chirikov, again headed for America; Bering on the St. Peter and Chirikov on the St. Paul. Although the vessels were permanently separated at mid-voyage, both reached America between 55° and 59° North latitudes. Chirikov returned to Kamchatka in October, but Bering died of scurvy the following December on what is now Bering Island.

⁹ Novo-Arkhangel'sk is present-day Sitka, Alaska.

¹⁰ The Russian practice of depleting an area's fur resources and then moving on to a virgin area did not pose problems until the Russians met with geographical limitations, as in Alaska. Additionally, in Alaska the sea otter was the primary fur-bearing animal hunted by the Russians. In Siberia, the sable had been the most prized pelt harvested. Though the sea otter pelt was worth 40 times that of the sable (in 1817), the sea otter population also depleted five times faster. This was because the female sable averaged five offspring a year to the sea otter's one pup annually. Additionally, the pelt of

the female sea otter was valued over the male pelt. See James R. Gibson's "Russian Expansion in Siberia and America: Critical Contrasts," The Wilson Center, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Occasional Paper, No. 72 (1979), p. 2. For further reading on the causes of animal depletion, the rate of depletion, the absence of conservation measures, and specifically, the relationship between depletion and eastward advance, see Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, pp. 94-107.

¹¹ See pp. 74-77 for a brief account of the most significant Spanish expeditionary missions between 1774 to 1792.

¹² Anatole G. Mazour evaluated the nature of the Russian-American Company as "an agency of the crown rather than a free private enterprise" in "The Russian-American Company: Private or Government Enterprise?" Pacific Historical Review, 13 (1944), pp. 168-73. Mary E. Wheeler considered this problem in "The Russian-American Company and the Imperial Government," The Wilson Center, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Occasional Paper, No. 67 (1977), pp. 1-40. Wheeler concluded that "the company was established only to bring order of the chaos brought about by merchant rivalry in Irkutsk following the death of Shelikhov, and that the grant of privileges for twenty years was not the conscious creation of a strong monopoly for imperialistic purposes but an attempt to broaden--rather than limit--merchant participation in the North Pacific fur trade."

¹³ See Dmytryshyn's "Russian Expansion to the Pacific," for the first consideration of Russian eastward expansion, prior to 1799, as a movement spurred by "an inseparable link between private and national interests." See also Mazour's "The Russian-American Company." Mazour's

consideration of the fur trade is one of a private enterprise prior to the formation of the Russian-American Company. He states that "private initiative" was responsible for the expansion of Russia to the Pacific and that the founding of the Company in 1799 allowed for the entrance of government involvement in the trade. While this author would agree with Mazour's assessment that the Company was not a private organization, she also would assert, in disagreement with Mazour, that the trade prior to 1799 was significantly controlled by the Russian government.

¹⁴ From 1615 the fur trade was administered by the Sibirskii Prikaz (Siberian Department) which was a special division for Siberian affairs in the Kazan Palace. Until this time, the trade was administered by the Posolskii Prikaz (Department of Ambassadors), until 1596, the Novgorod Quarter or Novgorodskii Chet (1596-1599) and the Kazan Palace (1599-1614). By 1637 the Sibirskii Prikaz was independent of the Kazan Palace. The head of the Sibirskii Prikaz decided "all matters relating to Siberia, except for the most important, which were referred to the emperor. In Siberia itself the conduct of the fur trade of the state was one of the most important tasks of the officials and serving men who the Siberian Department employed to carry on the conquest and administration of the country. The voevodas, guided by detailed instructions from the Siberian Department, supervised and were responsible for the activities necessary to obtain furs for the state; the serving men, often assisted by the promyshlenniks, carried them out. Thus it was by means of a political rather than a commercial organization that the state acquired its furs." Definition from Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, p. 49.

¹⁵ The emperor appointed the third member of the Coordinating

Council.

¹⁶ Stephen M. Johnson, "Baron Wrangell and the Russian-American Company, 1829-1849," Diss. Univ. of Manitoba 1978; Mazour, *The Russian-American Company*, p. 170.

¹⁷ See Glynn Barratt's Russia in Pacific Waters (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1981) for complete consideration of Imperial naval participation in Company affairs. See Johnson, "Russia," p. 17 and Petr A. Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company, trans. and ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1978) pp. 53-56 for accounts of the responsibilities of the Main Office of the Russian-American Company.

¹⁸ Johnson, "Russia," p. 17 and Tikhmenev, History, pp. 54-56.

¹⁹ Tikhmenev, History, p. 54. Also reprinted in Mazour, "The Russian-American Company," pp. 168-69.

²⁰ Mazour, "The Russian-American Company," p. 169.

²¹ Johnson, "Russia," p. 17 and Mazour, "The Russian-American Company," pp. 169-70.

²² Vneshniaia Politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka [VPR] Dokumenty rossiiskogo ministerstva innostrannykh del. Seriiia vtoraiia 1815-1839, Vol. 9 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 78.

²³ The Company colonies in America needed a reliable fleet, hence the Imperial Navy as well as other government agencies experienced significant involvement in Company affairs during the nineteenth century. See Barratt's Russia.

CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIANS IN ALASKA

The Russian movement to Alaska began in earnest only in 1743 with the emergence of a maritime hunt conducted by a number of individual fur-gathering and trading companies (see Appendix A). These companies, often organized for the duration of only one voyage, harvested furs off the Northern Pacific Islands and this harvest partially compensated for the diminishing Siberian hunting grounds. This oceanic hunt brought Russian promyshlenniki from the coast of Kamchatka northward to the Alaskan Ridge. A chain of bases for Russian hunting operations was formed across the North Pacific: The Kommander Islands of Bering and Mednyi, the Near Aleutians of Attu and Agattu, the remaining Aleutians, including the Rat Islands, the Andreianov Islands, and Umnak Island, the Fox Islands of Unalaska and Unimak, and, to the north, the Pribylov Islands of St. Paul and St. George each harbored Russian sites. After 1760, the eastward movement of Russians continued along the Alaskan Peninsula, to the major islands of Kad'iak and Afognak, to the regions of the Kenai Peninsula, bordered by the inlet of the same name, along the Gulf of Alaska and the coastal regions of southeastern Alaska (see Figure 5).

The Expense of Pacific Hunting Ventures

The distances involved in traveling to these remote islands from Okhotsk or Kamchatka meant that only financially solvent merchants could sustain the cost of such a voyage. Costly factors which had not been

involved in the continental hunt, such as constructing a seaworthy vessel, outfitting that vessel, hiring an experienced crew, and provisioning that crew for the length of the hunting season, were essential to the maritime hunt.²⁴ A natural and often costly impediment to the development of the hunt was the poor condition of Okhotsk, the port of departure from Asia to America.²⁵ Okhotsk was an unsatisfactory port, causing incessant delays and setbacks and limiting the growth of the Russian fur industry. It was not uncommon that vessels with their valuable cargoes and provisions were damaged, delayed, or lost through some fault of the harbor.

A major difficulty at Okhotsk was ice, a familiar problem to Russian navigation. The area suffered from severe springtime flooding when the ice of the Okhota River melted. There were twenty such major floodings recorded in the ninety-year period prior to 1813.²⁶ In other months, it was not uncommon for a merchant vessel to postpone entry into the harbor until the floodtide reached sufficient height. Wind also presented a problem at Okhotsk. When the tide was satisfactory, a ship might wait a month or longer for sufficient wind to leave the harbor. Ryl'sk merchant Gregorii Ivanovich Shelikhov conveyed the disadvantages of the port in 1794, complaining that half a ship's journey was spent leaving Okhotsk.²⁷ Yet, with all its drawbacks, Okhotsk remained the port of departure, as there was not a consensus regarding its replacement on the Kamchatkan coastline. It was the chief Siberian port until 1845, when operations were moved to Ajan, 300 miles south on the Asian coast.

With navigation only possible three or four months of the year

(generally June through September) a company could not absorb the financial loss caused by the inferior harbor. Losing a vessel to flooding or to dangerous sea route was devastating in a commercial venture where many fell to financial ruin. And the difficulty of ocean travel took its toll. By the time the Russian-American Company was formed in 1799, only the three companies of Golikov-Shelikhov, Lebedev-Lastochkin, and Kiselev-Bocharov were succeeding in the Pacific hunt.²⁸

Gregorii Ivanovich Shelikhov: Attempts to Monopolize the Fur Trade

Gregorii Ivanovich Shelikhov (1747-1795), owner of the most successful hunting company sought to use his fur-gathering operation to further Russian colonization as well as to reap a handsome personal profit.²⁹ By establishing island outposts in the Aleutians, he aimed to legitimize Russia's claim to the Pacific possessions and, concomitantly, to reduce the expense of returning to Okhotsk after each voyage. Assisting Shelikhov in this aim was the Governor-General of Irkutsk from 1783 to 1789, Ivan Varfolomeevich Iakobii (1726-1803). In 1787 he prepared a report on Pacific hunting, advocating Shelikhov's position for Empress Catherine II (1762-1796).³⁰ Iakobii documented the report with detailed information--including maps of the Aleutians and construction plans for island ostrogi--gathered by Shelikhov during a 1786 voyage to the Aleutians.³¹ Iakobii's recommended means of consolidating control over the islands in the Pacific and the coastal territories of North America and methods to govern the indigenous people and to improve their lives.³² Two proposals to achieve these goals were suggested: To change iasak to a voluntary assessment and to grant Shelikhov exclusive fur-gathering rights in those places discovered by his vessels.³³

Concurrent to Iakobii's report was Shelikhov's personal petition to Catherine, requesting assistance in establishing outposts throughout the islands--a domain that would include an area from 49° to 60° and North 53° to 63° West. To persuade Catherine in favor of Shelikhov's interest, Iakobii expressed concern that the trading vessels of European companies might settle where the Russians hunted in the North Pacific. He also stressed that few merchants were able to gather furs in the remote parts of the Pacific where Shelikhov had been successful. Other companies suffered great monetary loss due to native interference brought about, according to Shelikhov, by those Russians' inhumane treatment of the islanders.³⁴

Intrigued by Iakobii's suggestions and Shelikhov's petition, Catherine ordered an additional study to be conducted by the College of Commerce.³⁵ The College's findings, like Iakobii's, suggested that the best means of consolidation included granting exclusive rights to Shelikhov in the regions he had settled and a loan of 200,000 rubles to improve those settlements.³⁶ The report cited incidents on the Fox Islands in the 1770s and 1790s as incentive to Catherine for the granting of these privileges. The Fox Islands had lost a large percentage of their indigenous population to cruel abuse by Russian promyshlenniki. Such actions violated the enlightened policies of Catherine's government, yet monopoly was apparently more objectionable, because in 1794 Catherine rejected wholly the Iakobii and College of Commerce proposals.³⁷ The Empress further specified that financial and military assistance could not be authorized, due to commitments in European Russia; economic and military strengths were already overstrained by

Russia's struggle against the Ottoman Empire (1768-1774).

Monopolization of the Fur Trade, 1799. Without a monopoly, the Pacific fur merchants were left in an awkward position. Denied the security of government protection--while subjected to its bureaucracy--and the freedoms of private enterprise, fur companies stood as the vedette, advancing the empire territorially and financially at their individual risk. The trade remained in this state until Catherine's death and the subsequent reversal of many of her policies by her son, Paul I (1769-1801). The accession of this antagonistic heir paved the way for the monopolization of the fur trade in the North Pacific. Paul granted a charter and exclusive hunting privileges to the Russian-American Company in 1799 and thus afforded, in theory, the long-sought financial and military protection of the imperial government over the fur trade. Further, the charter provided for the sanctioned expansion of Russian possessions, authorizing the Company to "make new discoveries not only north of the fifty-fifth degree of north latitude, but farther to the south, and to occupy these newly-discovered lands, as Russian possessions, according to prescribed rules..."³⁸


Alaska, the Limit of Eastward Expansion

At the time of the Company's formation, the eastward movement of Russian promyshlenniki was veritably complete. Indeed, in 1799, the Russians settled Baranov Island, the easternmost site of their possessions in North America. Aleksandr Andreevich Baranov, the first manager of the Russian American colonies (from 1799 to 1817), established Company headquarters at Novo-Arkhangel'sk on that island in 1804, after defeating the island's Kolosh inhabitants.³⁹ Novo-Arkhangel'sk became

the center of harvesting activities in Russian America, processing 75% of the Company's catch.⁴⁰

The Decline of Fur-bearing Animals in Alaska. The volume of fur-bearing animals in Alaskan waters, however, followed the pattern familiar in the course of Russian expansion; the animal population was in dramatic decline after 1804 (see Figure 6) and the traditional solution--expansion to new grounds--was no longer viable. The coastal region to the south of Novo-Arkhangel'sk was occupied by the British and penetration into the interior of Alaska was infeasible because of the difficulty of provisionment and native hostility. The wealth of furs in Siberia and America, which served as the impetus of Russian expansion across the Northern Pacific, had overridden concern for the cost of such an extensive expansion of empire. The difficulty of provisioning this vast and barren expanse was outweighed by the enormous revenue in pelts--nearly eight million rubles from 1750 to 1800. Early in the nineteenth century, the harvest had dropped to one-twentieth of its pre-1800 figure. The situation deteriorated, eventually leading to the temporal (1805-1815) extinction of many of southeastern Alaska's fur-bearing marine animals.⁴¹

The Company was geographically confined. Denied its previous freedom to expand eastward, it was unable to compensate for the loss of revenue. Attempts were made to expand hunting into the waters off the California coast, but expansion beyond Alaska involved encroachment into foreign colonial territories, those of the Spaniards, British, and Americans (see Chapter IV, Part 1). The Russians were never able to maintain or colonize a region beyond Novo-Arkhangel'sk with any sem-



- A. Period of relative stability of volume of furs harvested.
- B. Gradual increase in the volume of furs harvested. This is possibly the result of the discovery of more fertile hunting grounds to the east.
- C. Sharp increase in volume immediately following the formation of the Russian-American Company in 1799. This increase is followed by a more gradual decline in volume (possibly caused by the depletion of fur-bearing animals).

Figure 6. Volume of Russian fur catch, 1746-1821 (three-year moving averages). Based on computer analysis of information listed in Appendix A, column six and figures given by Vasilii Berkh, A Chronological History of the Discovery of the Aleutian Islands or the Exploits of Russian Merchants, trans. Dmitri Krenov, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1974), pp. 110-113.

blance of success. Novo-Arkhangel'sk as such was the geo-political limit of Russian expansion. Expansion could not continue as geographically the available regions posed insurmountable provisionment problems and, politically, there was the certain complication of foreign objection and interference.

THE PROBLEM OF PROVISIONMENT IN ALASKA

The primary hindrance to Russian success in Alaska was the inability to supply necessities to the colonial population. Other difficulties encountered by the Russians in Alaska were subordinate to the problem of provisionment. Whether producing for their own needs or attempting to import foods, the Russians were unable to find a viable means of adequately and dependably sustaining the population in Alaska.

During their colonization of Alaska, the Russians proposed four programs to solve the problem of provisionment and these met with varying degrees of success. They were; (1) Production in Alaska of foodstuffs needed to sustain the colonial population; (2) circumnavigation, to import needed supplies--particularly grains--from European Russia; (3) establishing dependable commercial connections to import goods from foreign territories; and (4) occupying lands outside the imperial domain where foodstuffs could be produced and shipped to the northern colonies.

In addition to these attempts to provide for Russia's colonists and native workers, the Russians continued to supplement their food supplies by means established early in the course of eastward expansion. These included the circumscribed acceptance of natural diets, that is, diets which utilized the proffered food resources of the particular

region and the continued transport of provisions across Siberia. The latter practice quickly proved to be infeasible and unreliable. Transport routes from European Russia across Siberia had traditionally been difficult, and the addition of overseas voyages proved costly and dangerous.

Because sufficient provisions could not be transported overland, the Russians found it necessary to accustom themselves to the foods naturally available.⁴² There were, of course, practical and cultural limitations to the kind and degree of foods that could be introduced, but native foods did constitute an essential supplement to the Russians' diet.⁴³ For example, their diet, as that of their Aleut subjects, depended heavily on various fish. Herring, salmon, halibut, blueback cod, turbot, pike, perch, and dog humpback contributed variably, according to availability, to the Russians' diet in Alaska. Kirill Khlebnikov, employee of the Russian-American Company (1816-1832), reported that some 20,000 fish (1,150 barrels) were salted and dried at the Novo-Arkhangel'sk Redoubt in 1825.⁴⁴ And a very small portion of this was intended for export. Further, this figure does not include fish prepared for the Aleuts, as they consumed only fresh fish.⁴⁵

PROGRAMS TO PROVISION ALASKA

Russian officials invested considerable time trying to solve the critical problem of undersupply. While Baranov perhaps concentrated unduly on increasing the volume of furs harvested (as this resource was in decline), he also focused attention on agricultural

production in Alaska--an endeavor which met however with little success. The failure of agriculture in Alaska provided the motivation for the second program: circumnavigation, in which provisions were delivered from European Russia. Circumnavigation, in turn, unleashed a phase of expansion in the Russian colonial world that led to the settlement of the Sandwich Islands and California. The potential productivity of those regions, however, would not preserve the Russian-American colonial empire, as the Russians met with foreign interference and they lacked necessary skills and resources.

Agricultural Production in Alaska

Farming in Alaska accompanied the establishment of permanent settlements. In many remote Alaskan outposts, "kitchen gardens," sown with grains and vegetables, were a common means of provisionment for Company employees. Shelikhov had initiated this practice by 1784, establishing a garden at Three Saints Harbor.⁴⁶ In 1790, Shelikhov reported optimistically, to the new General-Governor of Siberia, Ivan A. Pil', the results of his company's initial agricultural endeavors.⁴⁷

Kad'iak Island was intended as the main site of agricultural production for the Russian-American Company in Alaska. The island was the site of two agricultural settlements: one located immediately north of Ugak Bay and another at Chiniatsk, south of St. Paul's Harbor on Chiniak Bay.⁴⁸ The Kad'iak Office also included Spruce Island which had an agricultural settlement at New Valaam and possibly a fourth site at Kalsunsk on Afognak Island.⁴⁹ To varying degrees, however, agriculture was present throughout Russian Alaska as well as in northern Asia, as gardens were an intrinsic part of any settlement. Therefore,

production was present on Baranov Island, Atka and Unalaska Islands, and the Kenai peninsula.⁵⁰ Despite Shelikhov's initial confidence, agriculture in Alaska met with only negligible results.

Hindrances to the Development of Agriculture in Alaska. The causes for the unsatisfactory results in agriculture were the harsh climatic and physical features of Alaska coupled with a deficiency of resources--most importantly, the lack of persons experienced in agriculture. Difficult farming conditions were faced by persons generally ignorant of agriculture. Moreover, the Russian-American Company was incessantly plagued by a chronic labor shortage. These problems were acknowledged by all competent observers. Baron Ferdinand Wrangel, the Company's sixth Chief Manager (from 1830 to 1835), simply stated that except for knowledgeable farmers, ...promyshlenniki arriving in America...consist of all kinds of riffraff."⁵¹ Golovnin summarized the effect of this incompetency on agriculture, when he noted that "a lack of experience, especially the lack of persistence and determination," were the primary reasons for the failure of agriculture in Alaska.⁵²

Physical conditions specific to Alaska proved to be the most inhibitive factors to agriculture. The growing season was of extremely short duration, the moisture excessive, and the temperatures low--conditions detrimental to the proper maturation of plants. Overcast skies assumed the constant presence of rain or fog. Rain continued throughout the winter and the temperatures averaged 3° Reamur (4.75 Celsius). Furthermore, Alaska was cursed with "gravely, rocky and sandy soil," not the fertile chernozem of European Russia.⁵³

Gardens in Russian Alaska were sown with the traditional crops of European Russia--wheat, barley, rye, radishes, turnips, beets, cabbage, carrots, peas, beans, and potatoes.⁵⁴ Warm-weathered plants such as peas failed due to the shortness of the season.⁵⁵ Grains rarely grew to maturity (barley yielded better than wheat or rye).⁵⁶ Tubers and roots retained much excess moisture.⁵⁷ The potato was the most successful crop grown in Russian Alaska. In fact, potatoes were a crucial supplement to the Russians' diet, primarily used to feed the sick and school children.⁵⁸ As many as 150 barrels of potatoes were produced each year to feed the Novo-Arkhangel'sk Redoubt.⁵⁹

In overview, the Russians in Alaska could not provide for themselves. The production of necessary grains proved virtually impossible and vegetable production was limited to radishes, turnips, and potatoes. These vegetables, in addition to fish, constituted the staples of the Russians' diet. The production of these relatively successful crops continued throughout the Russians' stay in Alaska and this is indicative of the tremendous need for supplies in this colony. The impracticality of production necessitated the importation of grain from European Russia, over the traditional Asiatic route--a difficult task yielding little success. In time, the Russians would explore alternative means (around-the-world voyages) to satisfy their need for grain.

Animal Husbandry in Alaska. Attempts at raising livestock in Alaska met with the same unsatisfactory results as did food production. Husbandry was compromised primarily by two factors: (1) the difficulty in providing feed and (2) poor propagation rates, each related to the severe Alaskan climate. The processing of hay was limited by rain and

fog.⁶⁰ The high humidity rarely allowed the hay to dry so that it could be cut. And the hay that was cut would often mold in storage. The difficulty of drying, cutting, and storing hay resulted in an insufficient supply of feed to maintain any sizeable herd of cattle.

The excessive cold and frozen environment also reduced livestock's ability to propagate at sufficient rates. Tikhmenev noted that the wild goats, herded by the Russians on Kad'iak, would not breed due to the cold. That condition was applicable to other livestock in Alaska, namely cattle.⁶¹ Animals that could reproduce sufficiently, such as pigs and chickens, were given a daily feed of fish but this gave their meat an unappetizing odor.⁶² Therefore, the meats produced domestically were either unacceptable in amount or quality, leaving fish as the only reliable source of meat protein in Russian Alaska.

In summary, the Russian-American settlements in Alaska were not able to produce sufficient crops or meats to feed the colonial population. This inability to produce or to acquire adequate foodstuffs, to the point of virtual starvation, forced the decision to organize trans-global voyages in order to supplement provisions. When this proved inadequate, the Russians tried to establish an agricultural settlement in Spanish California. Hence, there is a certain correlation between the failure of agriculture in Alaska and the establishment of Fort Ross. Originally, Fort Ross was intended to serve as a hunting base and shipping depot for essential grains purchased in Spanish California. The Ross Counter was converted to a settlement directed primarily to the production of foodstuffs intended for Russia's northern colonies.

Circumnavigation

When the Russian-American Company was officially formed in 1799, the need for a reliable method of provisionment was already evident. There was little doubt that animal husbandry and agriculture in Alaska, which had failed through nearly twenty years of experimentation, would never supply more than a modicum of the colony's needs. Shelikhov had recognized the need for additional provisionment in Alaska some years earlier and proposed the solution of dispatching vessels from the Baltic to Russian Alaska.⁶³ Such voyages required trans-global travel, but were more efficient than the arduous and expensive Siberian method of transport (the cost of which averaged 400 silver rubles annually).⁶⁴

Nikolai P. Rezanov and the Introduction of Circumnavigation.

Shelikhov died in 1795, four years prior to the formation of the Russian-American Company and his vision of circumnavigations, like many of his projects, was not realized in his lifetime. But his son-in-law, Nikolai P. Rezanov (1764-1807), Company Councillor (Kammerger), pursued circumnavigation as a solution to the problem of provisionment.⁶⁵ He backed a proposal made in 1799 to Paul I by Captain-Lieutenant Ivan F. Kruzenstern. The young naval officer, just returning from service under the British flag, submitted a plan for the first round-the-world expedition as a means to ease provisionment problems in Alaska and to train naval personnel. Kruzenstern's plan was supported by Rezanov, Admiral N. S. Mordvinov, head of the Naval Ministry, and by N. P. Rumiantsev, head of the College of Commerce.⁶⁶ Rezanov further advised the newly-formed Board of the Russian-American Company to report to the new emperor, Aleksandr I (1801-1825), of the advantages expected from such

expeditions. In 1802, the Board communicated the following report:

The provisionment of America, at once for several years with all the necessities, would reduce transport from the Okhotsk port, and in addition would lower the cost of transport for which not only the treasury expends 400 silver rubles for Okhotsk and Kamchatka annually but also protects all of the Irkutsk Oblast from exhaustion, for which her people endure the fiscal burden of transport, which impels the people, to go from year to year in great poverty.⁶⁷

Rezanov also convinced Nikolai Petrovich Rumiantsev, who was Minister of Commerce from 1808 to 1814, to send a supportive petition to the Emperor in March 1803.⁶⁸

The Emperor quickly endorsed Company participation in trans-global voyages. He was enthusiastic to join powers such as France and England in undertaking these commercial and scientific navigations. The reputation of such foreign ventures had encouraged the adoption of circumnavigation as a remedy to Alaska's provisionment problem.⁶⁹ Circumnavigation was intended to provide more than a means of bringing food to Alaska. It was to permit the orchestration of diplomatic missions and regulate the trade of Company furs in Chinese markets, as southern Chinese ports were accessible during the return voyage. Furthermore, circumnavigation was made attractive by the opportunity it afforded for the compilation of scientific information, especially ethnographic and geographic, on little known colonial possessions and their peoples, and it also served as an excellent training ground for Russian naval personnel.

The Voyages, 1803-1841. Circumnavigation, as a means of provisioning Company settlements in Alaska, included 16 voyages, spanning a 38-year period from 1803 to 1841 (see Table II),⁷⁰ The cargo of the vessels varied little because of the constant need in the colonies of the basic

TABLE II

RUSSIAN CIRCUMNAVIGATIONS, 1803 to 1841

No.	Vessel	Commander	Departure from Kronstadt	Stay in Colonies	Returned to Kronstadt	Value of Cargo (in Rubles)
1	<i>Kozehada</i>	I. F. Kruzenstern	1803	1804-1805	1806	260,510
2	<i>Neva</i>	Iu. F. Lisianskii	1803	1804-1805	1806	
3	<i>il'eva</i>	L. A. Hagemeister	1806	1809-1810	remained	131,593
4	<i>Suvorov</i>	M. P. Lazarev	1813	1814-1815	1816	246,476
5	<i>Rurik</i>	O. E. Kotzebue	1815	1816-1817	1818	?
6	<i>Kutuzov</i>	L. A. Hagemeister	1816	1817-1818	1819	426,566
7	<i>Suvorov</i>	Z. I. Panafidin	1816	1817	1818	184,385
8	<i>Kamchatka</i>	V. M. Golovnin	1817	1818	1819	2,800 puds of goods
9	<i>Borodino</i>	Z. I. Panafidin	1819	1820	1821	798,927
10	<i>Kutuzov</i>	P. A. Dokhturov	1820	1821	1822	441,215
11	<i>Rurik</i>	E. A. Kiochov	1821	1823	remained	142,741
12	<i>Elizaveta</i>	I. M. Kislakovskii	1821	sold at Cape of Good Hope		89,674
13	<i>Kreiser</i>	M. P. Lazarev	1822	1823-1824	?	
14	<i>Elena</i>	P. I. Chistiakov	1824	1825		462,004
15	<i>Elena</i>	M. I. Murav'ev			1826	
16	<i>Elena</i>	V. S. Khromchenko	1828	1829	1830	458,276
17	<i>Amerika</i>	V. A. Khromchenko	1831	1832	1833	467,505
18	<i>Elena</i>	M. D. Teben'kov	1836	1836	remained	350,000
19	<i>Nikolai</i>	E. A. Berens	1837	1838	1839	400,000
20	<i>Nikolai</i>	N. K. Kadnikov	1839	1840		500,002
21	<i>Konstantin</i>	S. V. Voevodskii			1841	
22	<i>Nikolai</i>				remained	
23	<i>Nab Lednik</i>	D. L. Zarembo	1840	1841		122,580 (silver r.)
24	<i>Aleksandr</i>					

Note. For detailed information regarding Russian global voyages from 1803, see A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849 (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980). Also see Appendix B.

necessities: ammunition and weapons, food, clothing, tools, tobacco, and sea gear, for example, anchors and canvas.⁷¹ The routes of circumnavigations included many ports of call. Generally, the route included departure from the Baltic port of Kronstadt, passage around Cape Horn (with probable calls in Hamburg, London, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Callao, Chile--where provisions could be purchased), and travel across the Pacific to the northern colonies in Kamchatka, the Aleutians, and Alaska. The return voyage might involve calls in the Sandwich Islands, southern China, and passage through the Sunda Strait and around the Cape of Good Hope, returning to Kronstadt via the Atlantic Ocean and English channel. The voyage from Kronstadt to Novo-Arkhangel'sk could be completed in about eight months. The additional length of the return voyage and the stay in the colonies, brought the duration of a circumnavigation to approximately three years. This length of time constituted a large investment of resources, in terms of the investment of men, provisions, and equipment.

The Significance of Circumnavigation: Understanding the Colonial World. In addition to provisioning the Alaskan colonies, there were a number of benefits garnered from circumnavigations. From these voyages, the Russians secured a wealth of geographic, political, economic, navigational, and ethnographic information not only about colonial America but also places they visited. This newly-attained information had an important influence on the direction of Company policies. Even from the first voyage, Company officials gained an understanding of the grave limitations of the Spanish colonial empire and the consequent ease with which the Company could extend into the

salubrious California region. Acting as colonial inspector on that voyage, Rezanov inspected California and was amazed by its productivity and the inability of the Spaniards to defend the possession.⁷² Rezanov personally negotiated a one-time exchange of goods, with San Francisco Commandant Jose Arguello, to provide grain for the starving Alaskan colony. He received 2000 bushels of grains and five tons of flour in exchange for 11,174 rubles worth of Russian goods.⁷³ He further suggested to the Main Office that permanent commercial relations be established with the agriculturally productive Spaniards.

The second circumnavigation, commanded by Leontii Andreanovich Hagemeister, who later became the Company's second Chief Manager, (from January to October 1818), introduced the Russian-American Company to the treasures of the Sandwich Islands.⁷⁴ Hagemeister surveyed the islands from the deck of the Neva in 1809 and received tara and sandalwood from the natives in exchange for furs. The remaining Russian voyages also proved fruitful and their participants preserved, in journals, Russian and European perceptions of the nineteenth-century American colonial world on the Pacific.⁷⁵

Circumnavigation and the Imperial Navy. Circumnavigation forced a change in the internal organization of the Russian-American Company, perhaps to the Company's detriment. In order to undertake global voyages, the Company needed an able fleet and this opened an avenue for naval involvement in Company affairs. This involvement proved overwhelming and permanent. As early as 1803, the Company directors realized that the ability to finance circumnavigation exceeded available revenue. In order to initiate the programs, the directors petitioned

Emperor Aleksandr I for a state loan as well as permission to purchase equipment and supplies from government warehouses.⁷⁶ This procedure was not uncommon. Government sponsorship was standard for the Company as it had been for the individual merchant companies prior to 1799. However, this 1803 petition also included a hitherto unheard-of request: that the vessels be staffed by naval crews, including sailors and officers. This request was necessitated by the Company's lack of vessels and experienced employees and provided an ostium for naval encroachment into the affairs and policymaking of the Russian-American colonies. After the removal of Baranov from office in 1817, the position of Chief Manager was invariably held by a naval officer on temporary leave from service.⁷⁷

Initially, the Company benefitted financially from its close association with the Imperial Navy. The Navy not only substantially bolstered the emaciated Company fleet, but also aided in routing furs to market. Thus the Navy allowed independence from the foreign traders who previously came to Alaska and paid lower prices for furs than the Russians received in Chinese markets. However, the increased affiliation forced officials to defend the Company's existence as a purely commercial entity. Naval interests in North American affairs, although providing a commercially important service, were pursued for non-financial purposes as well. Company power had been determined on economic grounds, while the Navy sought consolidation of Russian America to strengthen the empire strategically.

Circumnavigation, as the second attempted solution to the unsatisfactory conditions in colonial Alaska, strongly influenced the course of development of the Russian-American Company. First, it provided the

Navy with the opportunity to participate in Company affairs. And second, circumnavigation afforded the knowledge necessary to determine additional solutions to provisioning problems; that is, the establishment of trade and settlements in California and the Sandwich Islands. Fort Ross was the first immediate consequence of Russia's global experience. The knowledge the Russians acquired through circumnavigation provided insight to provisioning programs through familiarity with the arrangement of the colonial American world: the strengths, and lack thereof, of European powers in the remotest outposts of their empires. Such recognition afforded Rezanov with the grand scheme of exploiting California--a territory dubiously claimed and protected by the Spanish Empire and the resources of which seemed an alternative means to reverse the deprivation suffered in the colonies of the Russian-American Company.

Provisioning colonial Alaska was the impetus and an advantage of global voyages. Naval infiltration into Company affairs was circumnavigation's antagonistic by-product and scientific investigation its enthusiastic and indivisible companion. In Siberia, the import of provisions was necessary, because the land was unproductive. In North America, it was also imperative, because the land was barren but, in addition, failure to maintain stability in the colony, it was believed, could tip the delicate balance of possession in favor of foreign powers. Hence, circumnavigation functioned primarily as a reaction to the provisioning difficulties encountered in expansion. Only in an incidental capacity did it serve as a means to expand. The Russian movement to California and the Sandwich Islands could also be interpreted, like

circumnavigation and in concomitance to it, as a response to provisionment deficiency, rather than as the Russian conative expansion of the centuries before.

Circumnavigation, as a means of provisioning the Alaskan colonies, ceased in 1841, as did the Ross settlement, when a more effective method was found. This came in 1839 with the negotiation of a ten-year trade agreement between the Russian-American Company and the Hudson's Bay Company. The agreement provided for the annual delivery of seven essential foodstuffs (wheat, wheatflour, peas, groats, corned beef, lard, and ham) to Novo-Arkhangel'sk at predetermined prices.⁷⁸ For the first time, the Company ostensibly acquired security, as the agreement assured that colonial needs would be met in full each year--a claim that could not be made on behalf of agricultural production in Alaska or circumnavigation. Therefore, the Company terminated its reliance on the lengthy and inefficient circumnavigations which, in the long term, had failed to be cost-effective.⁷⁹

Russian Commercial Relations with California and the Sandwich Islands

The third program undertaken by the Russians to solve Alaska's provisionment problem was the establishment of commercial relations with Spanish California and the Sandwich Islands. This included the dispatching of voyages to California and the Sandwich Islands--a task which proved difficult because the Company fleet was impoverished, in terms of vessels and qualified personnel. In order to compensate, the Russians established trading posts in these regions, hoping that their proximity would stimulate trade and they could thus acquire goods, needed in Alaska and Kamchatka, with greater regularity. But difficul-

ties were encountered establishing these posts; Russian encroachment into Spanish-claimed California and the British-held Islands did more to arouse the suspicion and indignation of colonial rivals than to enhance commercial intercourse.

Rezanov and the Opening of Trade between Alaska and California.

Official contact between Russian Alaska and Spanish California was initiated during the course of Russia's first circumnavigation (1803-1806) when Rezanov was prompted to seek relief for the critical situation of deprivation in the northern colonies. Rezanov had arrived in Novo-Arkhangel'sk on board the Juno in August 1805 after calls at Unalaska and Kad'ia⁸⁰ Islands. He found a state of severe malnutrition and disease throughout the settlements. The Russians spent a difficult fall and winter in Novo-Arkangel'sk during which "two hundred men were being rationed only a pound of bread per week, and even that could not continue beyond October 1."⁸¹ Tikhmenev described the severity of the situation:

Fish were no longer being caught. The only food in New Archangel consisted of iukola, sea lions, and occasional seals. Through necessity they [Company employees] scorned nothing: they ate eagles, crows, cuttlefish, and, in general, anything they could find.⁸²

The lack of adequate food supplies had increased disease among the colonists. Scurvy was prevalent, reaching epidemic proportions during the winter of 1805-06. George H. von Langsdorff, physician on board the Juno, recounted the nature of the disease and its effect on colonial life, especially the lives of Company laborers.

Many of these needy and diseased beings [Company employees], were kept daily to very hard work, were unfortunately in debt to the Company, and it not unfrequently happened, that when wholly exhausted, and lying on a sick-bed, they were driven to

their work with blows. The consequence is obvious: they sunk one after another wholly exhausted, a prey to the scurvy, and all work was in danger of being stopped.....

In the month of February, out of a hundred and fifty of the youngest and most healthy men that had been selected from the different settlements and brought hither, eight were already dead, and more than sixty were laid up in the barracks with their strength wholly exhausted, and full of scorbutic sores...

The scurvy commonly shewed itself first by debility, listlessness, and melancholy; inflammatory spots, sometimes smaller, then appeared on the legs from the knees to the toes, which in a short time turned to sores. Those who were thus afflicted were not required to work, but were set to mount guard day and night in the cold and wet: this was alleged to be necessary for the public security: for the love of their native country, these poor wretches were doomed to die in misery. It was a commonly received opinion that exercise was very salutary in the scurvy; the weakest among the sick were therefore dragged about by their comrades; and others, who had still some little strength left, were made to draw or carry heavy stones about the room.⁸³

By winter's end, the situation of disease and starvation was acute; seventeen of the total population of 194 Russian males had perished.⁸⁴ Company work was at a standstill, as "scarcely any of the promyshlenniki could be said to be free from disease..."⁸⁵ If the colony was to survive, drastic measures had to be taken; consequently, Rezanov organized an expedition to procure a supply of fresh provisions. San Francisco was chosen as the destination because it was the most northerly of the nearby Spanish possessions: "The Sandwich Islands might perhaps have been preferred for the purpose in an economical point of view, but political reasons led to the choice of San Francisco."⁸⁶ On March 9, 1806, Rezanov and the weakened crew of the Juno sailed southward, under the command of N.A. Khvostov, reaching San Francisco a month later.⁸⁷ The Russians were received by Luis de Argüello, son of the Commandant of the San Francisco Presidio, who was in charge during his father's ab-

sence. Arguello denied Rezanov permission to travel to Monterey to confer with the governor; instead, Jose Joaquin de Arillaga, California Governor (1800-1814), agreed to travel to San Francisco to meet with the Russians. When they met in April 1806, Rezanov proposed that the Russians and Spaniards open regular commercial relations between their colonies:

I shall tell you sincerely, that we need bread, which we can get from Canton; but since California is closer and has a surplus, which she cannot dispose of elsewhere, I came here to talk to you, as chief of these regions, assuring you that we can establish some preliminary measures and can forward them for favorable perusal and confirmation by our authorities.⁸⁸

Rezanov was confident that commercial contacts between Alaska and California were "predestined by nature itself...to preserve forever the friendship between the two states possessing such extensive territories."⁸⁹ Arillaga, however, was forced to refuse the request, because of Madrid's fanatical insistence that colonial possessions remain isolated from all foreign contact.

[Arillaga] did not consider himself as endowed with sufficient powers to establish such an intercourse, although he perfectly concurred in considering it as a thing advantageous to both parties. He said that even the Viceroy of Mexico's powers were too much limited for him to enter into any arrangement, but he promised that the proposal should be submitted to the cabinet of Madrid.⁹⁰

To solve Alaska's immediate problem, Arillaga invited Rezanov to negotiate directly with Commandant Jose Davio Argüello and the fathers of the San Francisco Mission.⁹¹ Arillaga was willing to permit this illegality because California suffered from a serious lack of material goods, though agriculturally over-productive, and the Russians could provide manufactured articles (see Chapter IV, Part 2): Alta California was

as removed from Madrid as Alaska was from St. Petersburg and suffered from infrequent and irregular shipments of Spanish provisions. Rezanov accepted Arillaga's proposal. He and the officers of the Juno remained in San Francisco as guests in the Arguello home, awaiting return of the commandant.

Rezanov and Maria Concepcion. During his stay from April to June 1806, Rezanov contemplated an additional means by which to strengthen ties between Russian Alaska and Spanish California: To arrange a marriage between himself and Commandant Argüello's daughter, Maria de la Concepcion. "He had nearly come to a resolution to sacrifice himself by this marriage to the welfare, as he hoped, of the two countries of Spain and Russia."⁹² The 40-year-old Rezanov "courted the Spanish beauty daily" and the girl, then fifteen, soon agreed to the marriage. Rezanov wrote the Minister of Commerce [Rumiantsev]:

Beautiful Concepcion increased her attentions to me from day to day, and her various favors, meaning so much to one in my situation, and her sincerity to which I had been indifferent for a long time, gradually began imperceptibly to fill the emptiness of my heart.⁹³

Initially, the Argüello family rejected the marriage proposal on religious grounds; the Argüellos were Roman Catholic and Rezanov was Russian Orthodox. But Rezanov was adamant.

He assured [Arguello], that, immediately on his return to St. Petersburg, he would go to Madrid as ambassador extraordinary from the Imperial Russian court, to obviate every kind of misunderstanding between the two powers. From there he would proceed to Vera-Cruz, or some Spanish harbour in Mexico, and finally come on to St. Francisco to reclaim his bride, and settle all matters relative to the commerce he so much wished to promote.⁹⁴

In mid-May, the family and local church fathers conceded to Rezanov's persistence, agreeing to the marriage pending approval from Pope

Pius VIII.⁹⁵ The engagement took place, the betrothal agreement was signed, and Rezanov departed California, promising to return for his fiancée in two-years time. But he did not return and the marriage contract was never completed because Rezanov died suddenly of fever during his return to St. Petersburg, in Krasnoiarsk, on March 13, 1807.⁹⁶

Although the marriage plans were not fulfilled, the Rezanov-Argüello engagement had a positive influence on immediate relations between Russian Alaska and Spanish California. Argüello defied Spanish law by providing the Russians with 4,300 puds of bread and other provisions, the maximum amount that could be transported aboard the Juno.⁹⁷ Rezanov was satisfied with the mission and recorded with confidence the consequences he expected from trade relations with California.

Our American territory will not suffer any shortages; Kamchatka and Okhotsk will be supplied with bread and other provisions; Iakuts, burdened at present by the transport of bread, will be left in peace; the government will decrease the expenses allotted to the provisions for the military; there will be relief on bread prices in Irkutsk...customs will give new income to the Crown, Russia's internal industry will be noticeably encouraged.⁹⁸

This "initial experiment of commerce with California" proved very successful and so attempts to maintain the trade were continued after Rezanov's departure. Rezanov himself sent a message from San Francisco to the viceroy in Mexico, Jose de Iturrigaray, hoping to encourage the establishment of permanent trade relations.

New California, which produces various grains and cattle in abundance, can market her products in our settlements; she will readily be assisted in filling all needs through trade with our regions; the best means for achieving the well-being of her missions

and for bringing the country to prosperity is exchange of surplus production for goods which do not have to be paid for in cash and the import of which is not beset with difficulties... In the same measure the proximity of the transport will alleviate the existence in our settlements in the North, which at present have to bring from afar everything that the severity of the climate denies them.

Despite the apparent practicality of the Russian-Spanish trade, commercial relations between the two colonies faltered in Rezanov's absence. Spanish California officials subsequently refused to trade openly with the Russians, abiding Madrid's proscription against trade with foreigners. Negotiations also proceeded poorly, lacking a diplomat of Rezanov's ability. Russian-American Company officials attempted to motivate discourse between St. Petersburg and Madrid, but results were not forthcoming. Prior to 1808, Russian government officials approached authorities at the Madrid court.¹⁰⁰ Even the representative of the Spanish Council of Regents in St. Petersburg (1812-1820), Francisco Zea de Bermudez, petitioned his superiors at the Company's urging.¹⁰¹ These attempts proved fruitless. In 1810, the frustrated Company directors, after having received little satisfaction through proper channels, addressed the inhabitants of California directly. They proposed "to establish commercial intercourse and to determine a list of goods for exchange."¹⁰²

Company officials continued to pursue Rezanov's dream of establishing regular trade. Even his suggestion that a warehouse be built near Monterey to store goods, prior to their transport to Alaska and Kamchatka, was realized in the settlement at Fort Ross. In the year after Rezanov's mission to California, Company employee Ivan Kuskov (1765-1823) was sent

by Baranov to reconnoiter the California coast: "to survey and describe the whole coast from Defuk Strait to California and set it up on the map."¹⁰³ Following two additional reconnaissance voyages by Kuskov, a location suitable for a Russian settlement was chosen. Baranov's motives for establishing this settlement were those of Rezanov, as Baranov was "a man who...devoted his life to the improvement of the trade in various forms."¹⁰⁴ Indeed, he named Kuskov, the settlement's first manager, "Administrator and Trade Advisor."¹⁰⁵ Baranov had first learned of California's fertile hunting grounds in 1803 and was particularly interested in augmenting the volume of furs harvested (see Chapter IV, Part I). The Company could then use these furs to purchase badly-needed grain from the Spaniards in California.

The hunt, however, did not proceed as well as Baranov had anticipated. The pelts of the Northern California Sea Otter were not of the quality of those skins harvested in the frigid waters of the North Pacific. Furthermore, their numbers were in decline. There was also difficulty hunting in the protected waters of the Spanish colonial empire (see Chapter IV, Part I, p.108). As relations between Alaska and California failed to improve, the Russians were forced to draw their attention away from occupations which required Spanish involvement, such as hunting and trading. The Russians initiated activities that could be conducted with little interference. Consequently, agriculture became the Counter's dominant activity.

The Russians in the Sandwich Islands, Russian contact with the Sandwich Islands occurred in June 1804, during Russia's first trans-global voyage. The crews of the Neva, under Lieutenant Iurii Fedorovich Lisianskii, and the Nadezhda, under Lieutenant-Captain Ivan

Fedorovich Kruzenstern, were amazed at the islands' wealth, especially tara and sandalwood, and were eager to open trade. The expedition opened a dialogue between Baranov and the King of Hawaii, Kamehameha I, who sent word to Alaska in 1806 of his interest in establishing commercial ties.¹⁰⁶ In 1807, the Nikolai under the command of Pavel Slobodchikov also called in the islands en route from California to Novo-Arkhangel'sk. Slobodchikov established a good rapport with Kamehameha and exchanged furs for foodstuffs.¹⁰⁷

In November 1808 and April 1814, the Company dispatched vessels to the Sandwich Islands in the wake of Russia's second circumnavigation. Leontii A. Hagemeister commanded the ubiquitous Neva and an American, James Bennett, commanded the Bering. On Baranov's instructions, Hagemeister and Bennett were to extend trade relations with the natives of Oahu, Maui, and Kauai Islands. Hagemeister's mission was successful; Company furs were exchanged for badly-needed salt, tara, and sandalwood. The Neva returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk in September 1809. The Bering, however, washed ashore at Waimea Bay, Kauai, in January 1815, where its valuable cargo of furs was confiscated by Kaumualii, a lesser rival of Kamehameha, positioned on Kauai Island. The crew of the Bering returned home safely aboard the American vessel, Albatross, in April.

Bennett's report of Kaumualii's actions angered Baranov and provoked him to send a third expedition to Kauai in 1816. The purpose of this expedition was to seek retribution for the loss of Russian goods. The mission to Kauai was charged to George A. Shaffer, a Barbarian physician who had been expelled from Russia's third circumnavigation of the Suvorov in 1814, but subsequently managed to establish a cordial relationship with Baranov.¹⁰⁸ Shaffer had only been in Company

service since 1813, but Baranov entrusted him to regain the seized cargo of the Bering (or to accept restitution in precious sandalwood) and to obtain trading privileges with the islanders for the Russian-American Company. Shaffer far exceeded those initial instructions, as he established settlements for agriculture and manufacturing on Kauai. It is unclear whether the intent to settle was Baranov's or if Shaffer acted independently. Baranov may have given Shaffer additional secret instruction or Shaffer, with his limited experience, may have acted overzealously. In either case, the short-lived Russian presence in the Sandwich Islands witnessed the construction of three outposts--Aleksandr, Barclay, and Elizabeta. These ambitious projects quickly failed as a result of Shaffer's ignorance of tropical farming techniques and his inability to harness the native labor needed to adequately farm and collect sandalwood for export.¹⁰⁹ The affair managed only to arouse the contempt of island natives and British merchants. Shaffer was not able to accomplish even the objectives openly stated by Baranov and the Russians were expelled from Kauai only two years after their venture began. The estimated loss to the Company from the Shaffer affair totaled 300,000 rubles.¹¹⁰

Conclusion

The history of Russia as a colonial power in Alaska is one of a struggle for stabilization; to secure food for Alaska by insuring a balanced exchange of furs for provisions. From the colony's inception, the Russians directed resources to achieve this balance. But two factors inhibited stabilization; the number of fur-bearing animals was incessantly in decline and provisions either required long

transport or were halted by political difficulties. Russian Alaska also struggled for political stability. But emerging European colonial forces, collided in the North Pacific, and resources were too few for all powers involved to achieve polyvalence.

Expansion beyond Alaska, to Fort Ross and the Sandwich Islands, was part of the struggle for stability. It was a calculated response to the unending provisionment problems of the Alaskan colonies. Fort Ross, to be considered in some detail in the following chapters, was one in a line of potential solutions. It was viewed as a continuation and improvement of Alaska. Its individual value was negligible, although some nineteenth-century Russian visionaries viewed California as the point d'appui for Russian control of the North Pacific (see Chapter VI, pp. 190-95). Fort Ross met, as did each of these approaches, with very limited success. The gains were slight and did not justify a prolonged retention of the settlement. California was not a viable extension of empire; considerably more practical gains could be made in the Amur region. Langsdorff, participant in Russia's first circumnavigation, recognized the mistake of continued expansion, as early as 1806, when he observed:

The Russian-American Company has already sufficient sources of wealth in its present possessions from the extensive fur-trade it yields,...Its settlements only want a better administration to rise with fresh vigour from its ruins; but to effect this, its strength must be concentrated, and it must abandon the mistaken policy of extending them to such a degree as to weaken every part.

Yet in that same passage, Langsdorff expressed, in apparent contradiction, the Company's need to open a post in California,

If Russia would engage in an advantageous commerce with these parts [California], and procure from them provisions for the supply of her northern settlements, the only means of doing it planting a colony of her own in [California].¹¹²

The additions of Fort Ross and the settlements in the Sandwich Islands, therefore, should be ascribed to necessity, that is Alaska's colonial sustenance, not merely to expansion of empire.

Thus, Fort Ross signified a new phase of expansion for the Russian-American Company. As Langsdorff aptly perceived, this new phase was one of expansion for commercial, rather than strictly territorial gain. Formerly, imperialistic expansion occurred, as it did in seventeenth-century Siberia, when obstacles were overwhelmingly compensated for by the wealth of furs harvested, the ease of movement through and retention of territory. The Russian-American Company was not in a position to undertake large-scale expansion when the extension into California was perpetrated, early in the nineteenth century.

During the difficult early years of the Russian experience in Alaska, knowledge of the territory of California was formalizing. Through circumnavigation and hunting and trading ventures, the Russians learned of the limited extent of Spanish occupation in California and the inferable inability to defend that region. Rezanov's design to incorporate a California outpost into the colonial empire was influential, but it did not mark the first consideration of a Russian settlement in California. The great schemer of Russian-American expansion, Gregorii Shelikhov, envisioned California as "the natural boundary of the territory of Russian possession."¹¹³ But his plan was not comparable to Rezanov's ambition of the early 1800s; the political arrangement of the American colonial world had become increasingly

intricate. Whereas, Shelikhov had sought a continuation of Russia's undaunted expansive enterprise in which political considerations were subordinated to commercial advantage, the movement to California, in the nineteenth century, presupposed a change in the Company's constitution: its political nature demanded assertion on an equal basis with its commercial identity.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

²⁴ For an exhaustive account of the difficulties encountered in the Asiatic hunt, see James R. Gibson's Feeding the Russian Fur Trade (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969).

²⁵ Gibson, Feeding, pp. 127-8 and George H., von Langsdorff, Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World (N.Y.: De Capo, 1968), II, 331.

²⁶ Gibson, Feeding, p. 127.

²⁷ A.I., Andreev, ed., Russian Discoveries in the Pacific and in North America in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, trans. Carl Ginsburg (Ann Arbor Michigan: J.W. Edwards, 1952), p. 135.

²⁸ Vasilii N. Berkh, A Chronological History of the Discovery of the Aleutian Islands or the Exploits of Russian Merchants, trans. Dmitri Krenov, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1974), pp. 98-107; Raisa, Makarova, Russians on the Pacific, trans. A.S. Donnelly and Richard A. Pierce (Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1975), pp. 109-217. Both of these works offer detailed tables of merchant voyages from 1741. See Appendix A for consolidation of these and other works and complete listing of "private" voyages from 1743 to 1800.

²⁹ For bibliographical information of Gregorii I. Shelikhov, see Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, The Beginnings of Russian-American Relations, 1775-1815, trans. Elena Levin, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975),

pp. 156-67; Semen B. Okun, The Russian-American Company, trans. A. Ginsburg (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951), pp. 22-32, 34-38; and Tikhmenev, History, pp. 11-12, 17-18, 20-21.

³⁰ Andreev, Russian Discoveries, pp. 62-72; Berkh, Chronological, p. 87; Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 22-35; and Tikhmenev, History, pp. 1-25.

³¹ An ostrog was a fort built by the Russians as they expanded eastward through Asia. It served to control the conquered area and to further expansion.

³² Andreev, Russian Discoveries, pp. 62-72; Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 22-35; and Tikhmenev, History, pp. 1-25.

³³ Ibid., pp. 19-21. Iasak was a tax paid in furs to the Russians natives. This form of tribute was enforced in the Aleutian Islands until its official abolishment by Catherine II in 1768.

³⁴ Tikhmenev, History, pp. 19-21.

³⁵ Tikhmenev stated that the study was carried out in 1788 by the President of the College of Commerce, Count Chernyshev. In fact, A.R. Vorontsov was the President of that College from 1773 to 1793. Ivan Arigor'erich Chernyshev was the vice-president of the Admiralty from 1768 and remained with Catherine's Council until the time of her death in 1796.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 23; Innokentii Veniaminov, "Notes on the Islands of the Unalaska District," Part II, pp. 187-94; Innokentii Veniaminov (1797-1879) was a Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church who worked among the natives of Alaska and the Aleutians. See Stanton H. Patty's "Mission to Zagorsk," Alaskan Journal, 2, No. 2 (1972),

34-40 for more information on Veniaminov. See also Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, pp. 163-7. In 1788, Catherine II did reward Shelikhov with medals and swords of the empire, for all his "high-minded exploits and activities for the benefit of society."

³⁸ Tikhmenev, History, pp. 54-5.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁰ Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 10; Kirill Khlebnikov, Baranov, trans. Colin Bearne, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario; The Limestone Press, 1973), pp. 28-9.

⁴¹ See graph included in Appendix A for the volume of fur catch from 1741 to 1810.

⁴² Khlebnikov spoke to this issue stating that, as a means of provisioning the employees in Alaska, "fish represent[ed] the chief food." Colonial Russian America, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976), p. 53; see also, P.N. Golovin, The End of Russian America: Captain P.N. Golovin's Last Report, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1979), pp. 82-83. See also Tanya DeMarsh's unpublished mss., "Disease, the Labor Force, and Provisionment in Nineteenth-Century Russian America: Starving in a Land of Plenty," M.A. Thesis, Univ. of California at Davis, March 1982.

⁴³ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 53. It has been suggested by Tanya DeMarsh that the Russians had the potential to survive in Alaska pending the implementation of proper fishing and agricultural techniques. This necessitated re-education of the natives and a rechanneling of resources to the needs of provisionment to the detriment of

"political and economic policies." That their attempted solutions were unsuccessful and, retrospectively, not the best means of addressing the situation assumes a chronocentricity not conducive to historical study. The Russian's inability to determine their errors is merely an historical artifact.

⁴⁴ Golovin, Russian America, p. 82.

⁴⁵ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, pp. 54-55. This process for preparing fish is called iukola. The fish are salted in chests or bins lined with cloth.

⁴⁶ Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 93. Although Shelikhov initiated this practice of gardening by 1784, even earlier attempts may have been undertaken by the Lebedev-Lastochkin Company.

⁴⁷ Andreev, Russian Discoveries, pp. 89-94; Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 94.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 97. Russian America was divided into five offices (Novo-Akhangel'sk, Kad'iak, Unalaska, Atka, and Fort Ross) and three districts (the Pribilov Islands, the Kiriles, and Stuart Islands). These classifications changed later in the history of the Russian-American Company, see Tikhmenev, History, pp. 296-97.

⁴⁹ Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 99.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 95-99.

⁵¹ James R. Gibson, "Russia in California, 1833: Report of Governor Wrangel," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (1969), 210.

⁵² Golovin, Russian America, p. 11.

⁵³ Tikhmenev, History, p. 84.

⁵⁴ DeMarsh, "Disease," p. 3; Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 99.

⁵⁵ DeMarsh, "Disease," p. 10.

56 Tikhmenev, History, p. 83.

57 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 100.

58 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 54.

59 Ibid., p. 54.

60 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 105.

61 Tikhmenev, History, p. 84.

62 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 101.

63 Tikhmenev, History, p. 69; A.A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the World Voyages, 1803-1841, trans: Glynn R. Barratt, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980) p. vi.

64 VPR, Series I, I, Doc. no. 99, pp. 266-269. A ruble, if silver, in early 19th-century Russia, was approximately \$.50 in U.S. currency. A paper ruble (assignat) was worth 68 kopeks in 1794, 25 kopeks in 1810, and 20 kopeks in 1815. Technically, Russia was on the silver standard until 1897. However, from the reign of Catherine II through the mid-19th century, paper rubles were issued to cover the increasing deficit. Both silver and paper rubles fluctuated greatly, but generally, the ratio was 1 to 3.

65 Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov was one of the founders of the Russian-American Company and headed Russia's first circumnavigation (1803-06).

66 Ivashintsov, Voyages, p. vii.

67 VPR, Doc. no. 99, pp. 266-269.

68 Loc. cit.

69 Loc. cit.

70 This is a selected grouping of Russian circumnavigations. The

selection focuses on those voyages which specifically intended to provision the northern colonies. Consequently, there are some global voyages, such as those primarily serving naval functions, which have been omitted. See Ivashintsov's Voyages for a detailed history of Russian circumnavigations, including those conducted after 1841.

71 Tikhmenev, History, p. 108; Ivashintsov, Voyages, p. xi.

72 Richard A. Pierce, Russia's Hawaiian Adventure (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1965), p. 3.

73 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 177.

74 Ibid., p. 3-10.

75 Ibid., p. 25-27.

76 VPR, Doc. no. 99, pp. 266-269.

77 Barratt, Glynn, Russia in Pacific Waters, 1741-1825 (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1981), pp. 233-239. Even before this extreme change in administrative policy, in 1812, N.P. Golovnin, a Russian naval commander, headed a faction of the Imperial Navy, accusing the Russian-American Company of failing in its obligation to protect Russian interests in America.

78 Tikhmenev, History, pp. 25-27.

79 Russian circumnavigations, of course, continued after 1841.

Their primary function, however, was not to meet the provisioning needs of the northern colonies. See Note no. 70.

80 See N.N. Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 176-79.

81 Tikhmenev, History, p. 95.

82 Ibid., pp. 95-96.

83 Langsdorff, Voyages, pp. 93-94.

84 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 175.

85 Langsdorff, Voyages, pp. 97-98.

86 Ibid., pp. 97-99.

87 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 177, Hector Chevigny, Russian America: The Great Alaskan Venture, 1791-1861 (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), pp. 105-129.

88 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 177.

89 VPR, Series I, 3, Doc. no. 145, p. 692; and Doc. 5/17, May 1806: p. 209: Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 179.

90 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 178.

91 Tikhmenev, History, p. 97.

92 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 183.

93 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 178.

94 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 183.

95 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 178.

96 Ibid., pp. 176-79. Some historians contend that Maria Concepcion did not learn of the exact circumstances of Rezanov's death until 1842 (see, for example Jenson, Russia and America, p. 49), but Bolkhovitinov convincingly argues that Baranov felt duty-bound to inform the woman once learning the news, see n. 135, p. 431.

97 A pud is a Russian measure of weight; 36.11 pounds, 16.38 kilograms.

98 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 179, see note n. 136, p. 431.

99 Ibid., p. 179.

100 VPR, Ser. I, V, Doc. no. 102, p. 235-36. See also VPR, Ser. I, V, Doc. no. 40, p. 105-06 and Doc. no. 165, p. 163-4.

101 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, pp. 244-45.

¹⁰² VPR, Ser. I, 5, Doc. 15/27 March 1810, p. 402; Potekhin, "Celenie Ross," pp. 5-8.

¹⁰³ Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 274, note n. 72, p. 449.

¹⁰⁴ Gavriil I. Davydov, Two Voyages to Russian America, 1802-1807, trans. Colin Bearne, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Kingston Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1977), p. 104.

¹⁰⁵ Diane Spencer-Hancock and William E. Pritchard, trans. Ina Kalikan, "Notes to the Treaty between the Russian American Company and Kaskaya Pomo Indians," California History, 59, No. 4 (1980), p. 309; See also Chapter VII.

¹⁰⁶ Pierce, Hawaiian Adventure, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 2-3.

¹⁰⁸ George Anton Shaffer also appears in literature as Dr. Igor Sheffer, or George Shaeffer.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 7. The production of fruits and vegetables, under Shaffer, was relatively successful.

¹¹⁰ Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 148. Tikhmenev quotes the loss to the Company at 230,000 rubles. See his discussion of the Russian adventure in the Sandwich Islands in his History, pp. 212-215.

¹¹¹ Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 186.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 185.

¹¹³ Okun, Russian-American Company, p. 118. Svetlana Fedorova writes that Shelikhov wrote to his agent K.A. Samoilov from Kad'iak Island in 1786: "to proceed with settling Russian artels on the American land and California to the 40th parallel, for the pacification of the Americans and the glorification of the Russian State." The Russian Population in Alaska and California, Late 18th Century to

1867, trans. and ed. Alton S. Donnelly and Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1973), p. 134.

CHAPTER III

THE FOUNDING OF FORT ROSS

The Changing Borders of California

The "California" into which Shelikhov dreamed of expanding was geographically, as well as politically, altered by 1800. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Russians had known of California as an ill-defined Spanish possession located directly south of their Alaskan holdings. The Spaniards, whose geographical knowledge of northwest America was likewise poor, claimed a territory which extended north to the "Icy Sea" or to the 75th parallel North. The boundaries of the region that became known as Alta or Upper California underwent numerous changes since its first discovery by Europeans in the 1540s. The area of Bodega, which later formed the northern boundary of Spanish Alta California, was originally claimed by Sir Francis Drake in 1579. But for the two centuries following the initial contact, California remained unscathed by European colonists. The Spaniards searched the coast for a good harbor, finally discovering Monterey in 1603, but settlements were not erected for 150 years because of the inaccessibility of Alta California and its limited value to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonizing powers. California was a land difficult to reach by northward voyage and its coast was rocky and dangerous. These dangers were ostensibly not recompensed by natural features: California did not border the northwest passage as many

Europeans thought and it was apparently void of precious metals. Owing to these disadvantages, the physical boundaries of California remained nebulous for centuries.¹¹⁴

In the eighteenth century, the desirability of Alta California was redefined. With the commencement of circumnavigation, the Pacific coast of North America, once alienated from the colonial world, was quickly becoming a location of convenience. The Spaniards were the first to settle coastal California as it was geographically adjacent to their colony. And the move to occupy California, came in direct response to the Spaniard's poorly-perceived fear about the extent of Russian penetration into Alaska. That false perception was largely based on the misinformation generated by the Russians, in regard to the extent of Russian expansion into America, especially during the reign of Catherine II.

In less than a decade, the Spaniards founded many settlements, ranging the coast of California as far north as San Francisco Bay: the most significant settlements, commercially and politically, were the mission and presidio of San Diego (1769), the presidio of Monterey (1770), and the San Francisco mission and presidio (1776). By the turn of the century, the Spanish empire could claim the occupation of the California coast, south from San Francisco, with 19 missions, four presidios, and three pueblos.¹¹⁵

This flurry of settlement represented the extent of Spanish colonization in California, although the Spaniards continued to claim that New California extended north to the 75th parallel. And this boundary, for a time, was respected simply by virtue of the Spanish colonial expanse in the Americas. As Jean Francois de Galaup La Perouse

logged in September 1786, during a French circumnavigation (1785-1788), "Northern California, of which the most northerly settlement is San Francisco, in latitude 37°58', is bounded, according to the opinion of the governor of Monterey, only by the limits of North America."¹¹⁶ However, when other European colonial powers arrived on the Pacific coast of America and witnessed Spain's inability to defend her North American possessions, the northern boundary of Spanish California was challenged--first by the Fort Astor post of the American Fur Company, under John Jacob Astor (1763-1848), and then by the Russians--and consequently changed.¹¹⁷

Spanish Perceptions of Russian Strength in America

The Spaniards' misconception of Russian strength in the north, which led to California's settlement in the 1770s, arose from incomplete information concerning the intention and extent of Russian expeditions in the Northern Pacific. Initially, the mystery surrounding the voyages of Vitus Bering in 1728 and 1741, which were publicly billed as missions of geographical exploration--to determine the association between the Asian and North American continents, heightened Spanish fears that the Russians intended to encroach into Spanish America.¹¹⁸ The Spaniards were probably correct in their assessment of Russian colonial designs, as Peter I (1672-1725) no longer recognized the Pacific Ocean as a hindrance to Russia's eastward expansion. Interested in increasing the treasury's income from fur and mineral resources and the subordination of tribute-paying peoples, Peter ordered Bering to locate North America and reconnoiter the coast for the purpose of expansion (see pp. 6-7, p. 23 n. 7).¹¹⁹

It was not until the 1760s that the Spaniards learned of the Russians' actual progress in their movement toward America. In 1764, the Visconde de la Herreria, Spanish ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported that Russian trappers had brought black fox pelts from islands somewhere off the northwest coast.¹²⁰ The ambassador was probably informed of the voyage of the Iulian (1758-62), sponsored by Moscow merchant Ivan Nikiforov, Tobol'sk merchant Il'ia Snigirev and Irkutsk merchant Nikifor Trapeznikov. Captain Glotov brought back not only an unprecedented cargo of foxes (1002 black foxes, 1100 cross foxes, 400 red foxes, and 58 blue foxes valued at 130,450 rubles), he also is credited with the discovery of Unalaska.¹²¹ In December 1767, ambassador de la Herreria further reported that Russian forces had reached the mainland at an unknown latitude. In fact, the merchant company of Ivan Lopin and Vasilli Popov had succeeded in exploring Kad'iak Island (1762-66), during the easternmost Russian voyage to that time.¹²²

Spanish Expeditions to California. Interpretations of reports from St. Petersburg overestimated the strength of the Russian penetration into Alaska, and this coupled with the ignorance regarding northwest America in eighteenth-century geography, heightened Spanish concern for the safety of northern California.¹²³ This concern triggered a series of reconnaissance expeditions along the northwest coast. The first of these Spanish expeditions, called "the expedition for Russia," was commanded by Juan Jose Perez Hernandez in 1774. Hernandez succeeded in reaching the 56th parallel north, but found no indication of foreign activity.¹²⁴

The findings of his mission, however, did little to quell the

Spaniard's fear of Russian encroachment and thus the Mexican viceregal government organized a second expedition in 1775. Commander Bruno de Hezeta was ordered to proceed north to the 65th parallel. Although he was only able to reach 58° North, like Hernandez before him, he found no trace of Russian settlement. According to tradition, de Hezeta planted crosses to claim the lands he explored for the Spanish crown. Concurrently, the presidio and mission of San Francisco were founded to reinforce the Spaniards' claim in Alta California.

European Voyages into the Spanish Colonial Sphere of Influence.

During the 1770s and 1780s, the Spaniards' fear of foreign encroachment was heightened, as the British and the French commenced their great trans-global voyages of scientific and geographic discovery. Captain James Cook (1728-1779) undertook a voyage in search of a passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans--either a northwest passage around Canada and Alaska or a northeastern one around Siberia. On this voyage (1776-1779), that was to be his last, Cook commanded the Resolution with a consort ship, the Discovery. The search for a usable passage was unsuccessful. However, Cook's movements alarmed the Spanish, because on March 7, 1778, Cook surveyed the coast of New Albion.

Mexico responded by organizing additional expeditions along the Pacific coast. Their reconnaissance of the coastline resumed in 1787, with the expedition of Esteban Jose Martinez. Martinez sailed as far north as Nootka Sound where he encountered English merchant vessels. Martinez demanded that the British vacate the area, asserting that the Spanish crown held right to the coast north to the 75th parallel. But the British refused to recognize the Spaniards' claim, thus signaling

what is known as the Nootka Sound Controversy. Martinez was unable to remove the British forcibly and so the incident resulted in the two parties agreeing, in 1794, to leave the region unsettled.¹²⁵

At the time of the Martinez voyage, the French expedition of La Perouse was following Cook's northern route. In June 1786, the Boussole, under La Perouse's command, tacked off the California coast. The French crew met disaster in 1788, but not before the ship's interpreter had disembarked and reported about the Russian activity in Kamchatka and Alaska.¹²⁶ The news of the Russian expansion found its way to the Madrid court and reconfirmed the Spanish fear of the threat to California. In the midst of the Nootka Sound Controversy, the Spaniards dispatched the Perez-Martinez expedition (1792) in direct response to the information gathered by the French. In addition, Alejandro Malaspina, who was en route to the Sandwich Islands, in the course of a trans-global voyage, received orders to change course in 1791 and sail to the 60th parallel of the northwest coast.¹²⁷

The Spanish expeditionary voyages of the eighteenth century finally did succeed in confirming the fact of foreign encroachment in northern California. They further emphasized the diversity of that intrusion: English merchants, Russian promyshlenniki, and American settlers had found their way into what had been Spanish-claimed territory and, by 1800, there was little hope that Spain could reassert its supremacy over this region. The incident at Nootka Sound was perhaps the pivotal event in the colonization of North America, as it redefined California's northern border at the 61st degree North. More importantly, the controversy exposed the vulnerability of the

over-extended Spanish colonial empire. Spain's forfeiture of California's border at Nootka Sound opened the way for the Russians, in 1811, to found a settlement at Bodega, only 78 miles north of the San Francisco Presidio. Once more the Spaniards protested, but had neither the men nor artillery to support their demand.

The Founding of the Port Rumiantsev Settlement and Fort Ross

Ivan Kuskov's First Mission to California, 1808. The process of establishing a Russian post in California was lengthy. From 1808 to 1811, the Russians searched the coast for a suitable location, then they transported men and supplies. In the fall of 1808, while Hagemeister departed for the Sandwich Islands aboard the Neva, Baranov also dispatched an expedition to the California coast to seek a site for settlement. The schooner Nikolai and the brig Kad'iak, commanded by Navigators Nikolai Bulygin and A. Petrov, respectively, carried Kuskov, an Aleut hunting party led by T. Tarakanov, and several Aleut women.¹²⁸ The Nikolai's assignment was to investigate the mouth and lower reaches of the Columbia River, barter with local natives, and identify any potential sites for Russian settlement. The Nikolai was then to proceed to Gray's Harbor where it would rendezvous with the Kad'iak. Together the vessels would then continue on to California and, once there, engage in hunting and trading ventures, and again investigate a possible location for a Russian post.

The first leg of the mission met with disaster. The Nikolai, carrying Tarakanov and a hunting party, was destroyed by high winds and strong currents off Destruction Island near the Olympic Peninsula. Most of Bulygin's crew members were killed by the Makah Indians and

at least four women were taken into slavery.¹²⁹ Bulygin, his wife, two Russians, and four Aleuts reportedly died in slavery early in 1809.¹³⁰ In June 1808, a small number of crew members and women were rescued by American Captain Brown, of the Boston-based Lydia, and were returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk.

Kuskov's assignment in California, in contrast, met with great success. He gained 1453 large, 406 medium, and 491 small otter pelts that were harvested by Aleut hunters in the vicinity of the Little Bodega Bay.¹³¹ He also succeeded in locating an adequate place to settle and reported that this site contained "a fairly good harbor, excellent defensive positioning, [and] land suitable for cultivation."¹³² Kuskov likewise observed that the natives of the Little Bodega Bay (see Chapter VII) were friendly and that several temporary buildings were left behind.

Baranov was pleased with Kuskov's findings and submitted a report to the Company Board which requested the Board petition Aleksandr I (1801-1825) for permission to erect a "southern outpost."¹³³ Aleksandr granted permission and assured imperial protection. This assurance was given, at least in part, because the Board was purposely vague in its description of the location of the prospective settlement. It was described as lying on the coast of New Albion, which extended some 200 miles north of San Francisco. The report from the Main Office to Foreign Minister Nikolai Petrovich Rumiantsev (1808-1814) was more exact regarding the details of the first expedition.

Baranov sent an expedition to the coast of New Albion in search of a better spot for settlement than Kad'iak or Sitka, and this expedition...did find one, near the California port of San Francisco in Bodega Bay. However, settlement is being postponed until a future time and orders; our traders...have surreptitiously surveyed the local situation, and have been directly across from the Spanish fortress, but have not seen any military or trade vessels...¹³⁴

Kuskov Returns to California, January 1811. Kuskov's second voyage to the California coast was primarily a hunting expedition, according to Kirill Khlebnikov (1776-1838), Russian-American Company employee.

On January 22, 1811, Kuskov was sent to Albion on the schooner Chirikov commanded by [Khristofor] Benzeman. They reached Bodega on February 21, but they did not find such an abundance of sea otters there as formerly; they therefore sent 22 baidarkas to San Francisco Bay. In that place they found a band of Aleuts under the supervision of Tarakanov, who had been left there by [William] Davis. They had 48 baidarkas. There was also a party who had been with Winship, under Losev's supervision, who had 68 baidarkas. Altogether the three groups had 140 baidarkas. Using the 22 baidarkas from Kuskov's group, in a three-month period the hunt took 1,160 prime sea otters and 78 yearlings.¹³⁵

The Spanish however interfered with the Russian hunting parties, demanding that they depart from the bay. On June 22nd, the Russians abided, sailing north, and arrived in Novo-Arkhangel'sk on July 28th.

Kuskov Again Sails to California, November 1811. In late November 1811, Kuskov once again returned to California on the Chirikov. On this voyage, he brought 25 Russian employees, 40 baidarkas of Aleuts, and the materials necessary to begin construction of a settlement.¹³⁶ Early in 1812, building was complete at Bodega Bay, renamed Rumiantsev Bay in honor of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. A safe and convenient harbor was essential to the Russian settlement. The coastline north of Spanish California lacked good harbors, and this was the "one serious drawback to making it a

colony." Port Rumiantsev (38°33' North, 123°151' South) was considered to be the Russians' best option, as it was "protected from all winds and is completely safe, but because of shallow water can be used by only the smallest vessels."¹³⁷

Other requirements for a successful settlement, however, such as farming and defense, necessitated a more suitable site than the bay area. Kirill T. Khlebnikov, Baranov's chief assistant, thought that Rumiantsev "was considered inadvisable for a settlement because the surrounding area was completely devoid of forests..."¹³⁸ Hence, the Russians moved their primary settlement to a more suitable area for fortification, eighteen miles north of Rumiantsev Bay. The new site was located on a "small plateau resembling a peninsula [forming a barely perceptible curve, and] on three sides it was surrounded by steep banks."¹³⁹

The Geography of Russian California

The physical descriptions of California and the Ross settlement during the first half of the nineteenth century are numerous. Voyagers and Company servicemen, such as I.F. Kruzenstern, Otto Kotzebue, F.P. Lutke, V.M. Golovnin, K.T. Khlebnikov, F.P. Wrangel, and D.I. Zavalishin, recorded the paradisaical attraction to California. California's allure was not surprising considering its stark contrast to Russian Alaska. One nineteenth-century Russian enthusiast spoke of California as follows:

What a fairyland is California!--For eight months of the year the skies are always clear; in the remaining months, starting with late November, rain falls periodically. The temperature in the shade does not go over 25 degrees by Reaumur.

In January everything comes to life. Flowers are in full bloom, rainbow colored humming birds shimmer and shine on flowers or vibrate like precious jewels over the blossoms. The virgin soil of California brings unbelievable harvests. I have observed the harvest of wheat multiplying 150 fold, and maize and frijoles 1,150 fold, with very little cultivation. A crooked stout branch of a tree, sharpened at one end into something like a blade, serves as a plow. After scraping the ground to the depth of 3 inches, the plowman starts sowing...

If you pick a peach from a tree and throw away the peach stone, three years later you will find a full grown fruit-bearing tree...¹⁴⁰

In the early years of settlement, another Russian visitor to California believed that the Fort Ross site would prove itself productive.

Ross is blest with an abundance of the finest wood for building. The sea provides it with the most delicious fish, the land with an inexhaustible quantity of the best kinds of game; and, notwithstanding the want of a good harbour, the northern settlements might easily find in this a plentiful magazine for the supply of all their wants.¹⁴¹

The Geographical Disadvantages of the Fort Ross Site. Many Russian visitors to California were overly optimistic regarding the advantages of the site they had selected. The geography of this region of New Albion coast was not conducive to many of the activities undertaken by the Russians, especially shipbuilding and agriculture (see Chapters IV and V). The coastal location of Fort Ross was swept with strong northwesterly winds, an unusually low seasonal range of temperature, prevalent cloudiness, frequent fog belts, and drought.¹⁴² During the summer months, the coast became especially unproductive; the landscape was sere, as the vegetation browned under the grey skies of the cold and raw atmosphere.¹⁴³

The littoral of northern California, moreover, was (and still is) notorious for its perilous coast and lack of natural harbors.¹⁴⁴

The cliffed, eroded coast, noted for its boldness and irregularity, represented a succession of headlands and reentrants. Island residuals such as the Russian-occupied Farallon Islands, opposite San Francisco Bay, were characteristic and the shores were strewn with great boulders. The coast, from Cape Mendocino southward, roughly parallels the structural axis which extends from the northwest to the southeast. This structure was also evident in the parallelism of the coastal ranges, such as the Northern Coast Range east of Fort Ross, and the San Andreas Fault which the fort straddles. And finally, at the western edge of the forest surrounding Fort Ross, the trees were often bent, flattened out, and stunted due to the intense prevailing winds.¹⁴⁵ These winds which distinguish the coastline were strongest during the months of May and June and were responsible for the weather-beaten appearance of the wooden buildings and fences at Fort Ross.

Description of Fort Ross

The Russians commenced construction of the walled settlement in the spring of 1812 and completed it by September. At this time, they also named it Fort Ross. In March 1832, a detailed description of Fort Ross was given by an observer, calling himself only an "intelligent Bostonian."

Arrived at the Presidio [Fort Ross], we passed thro' an assemblage of 60 or 70 men and children, who respectfully doffed their caps on our entrance into the square. The Presidio is formed by the houses fronting inwards, making a large square, surrounded by a high fence. The Governor's house stands at the head, and remainder of the square is formed by the chapel, magazine, and dwelling houses. The buildings are from 15 to 20 feet high, built of large timbers, and have a weather-beaten appearance. The first room we entered

was the armory, containing many muskets, ranged in neat order; thence we passed into the chief room of the house, which is used as a dining room, & in which all business is transacted. It was comfortably, though not elegantly furnished, and the walls were adorned with engravings of Nicholas I, Duke Constantine, &c. There are a number of workshops outside the walls, in which many different trades are pursued; and in a small place near the sea are huts of the Kodiacs. I should think there were about 300 inhabitants of all descriptions. They cultivate about 400 acres of wheat and raise many vegetables and some fruits...They have several cannon, but all their batteries are of wood, and not in very defensible situation...¹⁴⁶

As in Siberian ostrogs, the pallisade of Fort Ross (1204 feet in circumference, 14 feet high) formed a rectangle and contained a smaller fence which divided the living quarters at the northern end of the enclosure from the service buildings in the southern portion. In the northern section, which separated the manager's house and officers' barracks, the flag of the Russian-American Company was flown. Outside this internal enclosure was a chapel, some warehouses, and the main kitchen (see Figures 7 and 8 and Appendix C).

The Living Quarters. The main structure of the fort was the manager's house, sometimes referred to as the "Old Commandant's House." It was built during the administration of Ivan Kuskov (1811-1821). It measured 56 by 42 feet, roofed with double beams, and contained six rooms, a corridor and a kitchen.¹⁴⁷ (There was a second manager's house constructed during Aleksandr Rotchev's administration (1836-1841). It was smaller, 56 by 28 feet, with six rooms and a corridor.¹⁴⁸ Along the wall, to the northwest of the manager's house, was the commissioned officers' housing. This 70 by 24.5 foot building contained ten rooms and two corridors. The last living quarter, within the wall itself, was the employee barracks. It sat




Figure 7. Fort Ross in 1828. Reprinted from E. O. Essig, "The Russian Settlement at Ross," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 202.




Figure 8. Map of Fort Ross, 1817. Reprinted from Svetlana G. Fedorova, The Russian Population in Alaska and California, Late 18th Century to 1867, trans. Alton S. Donnelly and Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1973), fol. p. 356.

along the western wall and measured 77 by 28 feet.

Service Buildings at Fort Ross. The outer wall, at the southern end of the fort, surrounded five buildings, none of these were living spaces. Along the western wall were two warehouses. The older warehouse was two-stories high and measured 56 feet long by 28 feet wide. It had an open gallery supported by pillars. Directly to the south of this warehouse was another building. It was constructed of thicker planks and was smaller, measuring 49 by 28 feet.

On the southern edge of the wall were three buildings. From west to east, there was a kitchen, a third warehouse, and the Russian Orthodox church. The kitchen (28 x 24.5') was one of the fourteen cooking buildings constructed in the immediate vicinity of the fort. Other kitchens and sheds used to prepare foods stood to the south of the fort between the wall and the cliff. The warehouse (42 x 21') was built of thick planks and reportedly served a dual purpose; a storage facility and a prison. Perhaps the most familiar structure at Fort Ross was and still is, in its reconstructed state, the Orthodox church. The church, with cupolas and belfry, stood in the southeastern corner of the wall and measured 42 by 28 feet. It was not one of the original buildings of the settlement; the buildings listed as complete by 1814 were the "dwelling for the administrators, the barracks, warehouse, storehouse, stable, kitchen, workshops, bathhouse, tannery, mill, barn and other service buildings..."¹⁴⁹ The church was completed before 1825 when the Main Office sent icons to adorn it.¹⁵⁰ The property also included a drinking well, 17.5 feet deep.¹⁵¹

Russian Property Outside the Walled Settlement. The property enclosed by the redwood pallisade comprised only a small portion of the land occupied by the Russians in Alta California. There were reportedly 40 buildings within the immediate vicinity (3,500 feet) of the fort at the time of sale in 1841.¹⁵² Included among these were a main kitchen (35 x 21'), ten smaller kitchens and a bakeshop. There were also two wooden-planked houses with glass windows and wooden floors. Their inhabitants are unknown. Adjacent to Fort Ross was 75 acres of fenced, cultivated land, a corral which measured 196 by 140 feet, and two cattle barns constructed of thick planks. At the foot of the hill, north of the enclosure, there was a landing used by baidarkas and small boats. Near the landing were a blacksmith shop (38.5 x 21') with forge and anvil, a cooper's shop (70 x 35'), a bathhouse, a boathouse on rafters, and a tannery with a "machine to compress tanned hides."¹⁵³

Russian Ranches in California, post-1830. In addition to the property at Port Rumiantsev and Fort Ross, there was a large amount of real estate added to the Russian properties in the 1830s. These establishments were the ranches of Khlebnikov, Kostromitinov, and Chernykh. They comprised the largest area of Russian California and they were established primarily to increase agricultural production. The Russian ranches were patterned after the Spanish rancheros which became so numerous after secularization in 1834. The exact locations of the ranches, as can be seen from Figures 9 and 10, are uncertain. Petr Kostromitinov, Fort Ross' Manager from 1830 to 1836, supervised the establishment of two ranches. The first




Figure 9. Russian California. Reprinted from Warren A. Beck and Ynez D. Haase, Historical Atlas of California (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1974), No. 40.




Figure 10. Russian California in 1843. Reprinted from E. E. Blomkvist, "A Russian Scientific Expedition to California and Alaska, 1839-1849," trans. E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan and Basil Dmytryshyn, *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, 73, No. 2 (1972), p. 104.

was the 70-acre Khlebnikov Ranch built in 1833. It was located on a plain in the interior, five miles east of Port Rumiantsev and two miles north of the Avacha River.¹⁵⁴ The Khlebnikov Ranch (sometimes referred to as the Vasilii or Basil Ranch) incorporated nine structures: an abode house of three chambers roofed with lapped boards, complete with sun dial; barracks with three divisions; a wooden-floor warehouse; a kitchen with bread oven and forge; a large bathhouse; and four houses of various sizes and purposes--one for food supplies, two Indian dwellings, and one for tobacco storage.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, the ranch had a large wooden-planked floor (84 feet in diameter) probably for threshing wheat, a corral, and a mill worked by horses. The mill had only one stone and thus could grind approximately four fanegas.¹⁵⁶

The second ranch was the Kostromitinov Ranch. It is of unknown acreage and was also established in 1833. The ranch was situated halfway between Port Rumiantsev and Fort Ross on the confluence of the Rotchev and Russian Rivers. The ranch was strategically located to provide communication between the port and fort. There were six buildings at the Kostromitinov Ranch at the time of an inventory taken early in 1841. These were barracks (roofed with planks, containing three rooms and two corridors, individually roofed), a supervisor's house, a planked Indian dwelling, a wooden warehouse for storing wheat, a kitchen with two ovens, and a roofed bathhouse.¹⁵⁷ In addition to these structures, the Kostromitinov Ranch had a corral, two threshing floors, and a "floor for winnowing wheat."

In 1838, the last manager of Fort Ross, Aleksandr G. Rotchev, established the interior ranch named for the Russian agronomist,

Igor Chernykh, who came to Fort Ross in 1836. The Chernykh Ranch was located fifteen miles east of Port Rumiantsev on the Schmidt or Khlebnikov Plain (see Figure 11). It was a small ranch, covering approximately 20 acres of enclosed land for the cultivation of wheat. Within its confines were six buildings, including a six-room barracks, a kitchen, a bathhouse, and three supply houses. The Chernykh was also the only ranch at which fruit was grown—including a "remarkable" vineyard of 2000 plants—and it had a winnowing floor and two hotbeds.

The Farallon Artel. The Ross Counter included the Farallon Artel which provided abundant numbers of sea otter pelts, seal meat, and bird eggs during the early years of Russian occupation.¹⁵⁸ "Los Farallones de los Frayles," "little peaks of the friars" was the name given to these islands by the Spaniards and sustained by their Russian successors. The Farallones are a broken string of small, rocky islands 50 miles west of the San Francisco Presidio. In aggregate, the islands extend for ten miles and 211 acres. Ordinarily, there were only two Russians and several more Aleut hunters stationed on the Farallones, because the climate was inhospitable and the life difficult. The islands are generally shrouded in coastal fog, buffeted by high winds, and washed by the frigid Pacific waters. Nevertheless, the Aleuts hunted the Stellar Sea Lion (weighing up to 2,200 lbs. (a cow, 600 lbs.)), the smaller and more plentiful California Sea Lion, the harbor seal which was a year-round resident of the islands, although in numbers the least significant, and finally sea birds which were a common food supply for the Russians.



"A view of the Chernykh ranch in northern California," by I.G. Voznesenskii, circa 1840. A year after this unique sketch was made, the Russians sold the Ross settlement and arranged for all the inhabitants to be resettled in New Arhangel. Although farming was generally not a successful Russian venture at Ross, the Chernykh ranch was an exception. In the foreground one sees a fenced area for livestock; there were two hothouses; and the ranch produced grain, vegetables, fruits, and had a vineyard with 2,000 grapevines. (Archive MAF AN SSSR.)

Figure 11. The Chernykh Ranch. Reprinted from Kirill T. Klebnikov, Colonial Russian America, 1817-1832, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976), fol. p. 106.

The Natives of Fort Ross

An accurate and meaningful reconstruction of Russian California requires consideration of the native peoples with whom the Russians established relations--economic and political. Due to the multicultural nature of the Fort Ross site, a consideration of Russian activity, movements, and policy is only a part of the complete historical picture. Native Californians, especially the Southwestern Pomo and, to a lesser extent, the Coast Miwok, and displaced Aleuts provided invaluable assistance to the Russians at Fort Ross, veritably creating the supply of labor. Indeed the Russian venture in California, as the entire experience of eastward expansion, was made possible only through native skill and service.¹⁵⁹

Native Labor at Fort Ross. The most crucial relationship between natives and Russians at Fort Ross was economic in nature, as native labor constituted a majority of the labor force. In 1833, there were 45 adult Russian males at Fort Ross in proportion to 174 native peoples. Of that later figure, 72 were Pomo, 67 Aleut, and 35 creole.¹⁶⁰ The quantity and skill of the labor force was decisive in the success of agricultural production at Fort Ross. The labor force was stratified culturally--Russians acted as administrators, the Aleuts, transplanted from the Alaskan colony, served as hunters, and the Southwestern Pomo as craftsmen and farmers. The pattern of Russian administration ordinate to a native manual labor force was familiar in Russia's eastward expansive movement.

From Fort Ross' inception, the Southwestern Pomo and the Russians retained cordial relations. "The inhabitants of Ross,"

reported Russian Captain Kotzebue, "live in the greatest accord with the Indians."¹⁶¹ This idea was consistently documented in Russian sources and contradicting materials are unavailable. In Tikhmenev's trenchant determination, relations between the Russians and natives were friendly due to two factors: First, the Russians served as a buffer between free natives and the Spanish mission. Second, a large portion of the settlement's composition was itself native, i.e., of those company employees assigned to Fort Ross from the Alaskan colony, 60% were Aleut while only 40% were Russian.¹⁶²

Fraternity between the Aleuts and the Pomo quickly promoted the Russian's position in California. Intermarriage between the Pomo and Aleut occurred not infrequently after the establishment of Fort Ross.¹⁶³

They willingly give their daughters in marriage to Russians and Aleutians; and from these unions ties of relationship have arisen which strengthen the good understanding between them.¹⁶⁴

These marriages expedited contact between the Pomo and Russians; the former quickly became an important element of the social and economic structure of Russian California. Many Pomo emigrated to the Aleut quarter of Fort Ross which (in 1817) consisted of fourteen wooden yurts, located "outside the pallisade," 200 feet to the south.¹⁶⁵

The native economic component of Fort Ross facilitated the establishment of social bonds between natives and Russians. Much to the amazement of their European chroniclers, the Pomo initially came to Fort Ross "voluntarily to help the Aleuts in their work."¹⁶⁶ Kuskov, feeling a need to sanction their work that it might continue, "tried constantly to reward them with various gifts."¹⁶⁷ Later, the

Pomo natives worked in considerable numbers as day laborers "for wages."¹⁶⁸ However, as the Ross settlement diversified to include an unproportionate emphasis on agriculture, the need for native labor at Fort Ross increased. Pomo natives were no longer afforded the opportunity to work voluntarily, because the Russians came to depend on their efforts. Natives were forced into the service of the Russian-American Company, and the Russians were able to provide less and less compensation as the settlement's financial predicament worsened each year. Yet even the mild success of agriculture at Fort Ross, "was wrought largely by Pomo Indian laborers, they with some Aleuts did most of the farmwork."¹⁶⁹ "Without their assistance it would not [have been] at all possible to reap and to have the wheat [hauled] from the plowland to the threshing floors."¹⁷⁰ Considering their eventual loss of freedom and homeland, it is perhaps the Pomo who suffered most from the failure of Fort Ross and its sale to the Americans (see Chapter VII for a comprehensive consideration of Fort Ross' native population). Although, at the time, it seemed most important that the Spaniards were losing hold of a valuable colonial possession.

Spanish-Russian Relations after the Founding of Fort Ross

At the time the Russians moved into Alta California, the politics of Spain, Mexico, and California were in disarray. The Spanish monarchy was dismantled by Napoleon Bonaparte, who forced the abdication of Charles IV in March 1808, and installed his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, as Spain's figurehead.¹⁷¹ In Mexico, certain factions struggled for independence from Spain, and this was finally

achieved in 1821. In California itself, the well-established, pro-Californian Governor, Jose Joaquin Arrillaga, died in 1816. He was replaced by Pablo Vincente de Sola (1815-1822), a staunch advocate of the Mexican viceregal government, who carried out the dictated isolationist policy, even to the detriment of California and Russian America.

The restoration of the Spanish monarchy in March 1814 was a pivotal event in Spanish-Russian relations in California. Ferdinand VII, son of Charles IV, dissolved the liberal Cortes and annulled the Constitution of 1812. Thus Madrid reverted to many of the policies--including colonial isolationism--of Charlestonian Spain. Especially after 1816, the atmosphere created by Arrillaga, which tolerated and at times even welcomed the Russian presence in California, abruptly changed. That tolerance is evident in a March 1817 meeting between the Spanish Minister of State, Jose Garcia de Leon y Pizarro, and the Russian ambassador in Madrid (1821-1822), Dmitrii Pavlovich Tatishchev (1767-1845). "Mr. Pizarro spoke in a very light-hearted manner with Tatishchev about the Russian factories on the northwest coast of America."¹⁷² At this time, the only apparent ramification of Russian encroachment into Spanish territory was to be a directive "with precise instructions indicating how far east and south the Russian settlements may go." Concurrently, Frederick Lutke, participant of the Russian circumnavigation of the Kamchatka, 1817-1819, reported that "Spanish authorities in California only allow Russians to settle no closer than Fort Ross."¹⁷³ The Spaniards apparently recognized the trade advantage created by the Russian presence and, in any case,

their inability to defend California north of San Francisco. It appeared that Madrid, though concerned, was willing to negotiate a common Russian-Spanish border in California, allowing a Russian post in what had been exclusively Spanish territory.

Only a month following the Tatishchev-Pizarro meeting, Madrid's attitude toward Russian activity in California measurably worsened. On April 15, 1817, the Spanish consul in St. Petersburg, Zea de Bermudez, registered a bitter complaint on behalf of the Spanish government. He reproached the "permanent" settling of Russians on the California coast. As not to betray the Russian-Spanish alliance, Bermudez expressed his country's conviction that the settlement resulted from the rash actions of traders and did not reflect any official government policy.¹⁷⁴ In addition, Bermudez warned that Spanish authorities would have exerted military force if these traders and hunters patronized any country other than Russia.¹⁷⁵ This obviously was an empty threat as the condition of the military forces in New Spain was desperate.

The Spaniards were partially correct in their assessment of the situation as resulting from the ambitions of overzealous traders of the Russian-American Company. Although Aleksandr I had granted permission to settle in California, the project had been planned and manipulated by Baranov and the Company's Main Office. The emperor was too involved in European affairs to contemplate aggressive territorial acquisitions in America. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Main Office of the Company, and not a government official, replied to Bermudez's protest regarding Russian encroachment into

Spanish California. The emperor wanted the economic benefits, not the political complications, of activities in Russian America. The Company Directors, admittedly responsible for the settlement, rebutted that California was essential for the provisionment of Russia's northern colonies, because efforts to open trade with Spanish California had failed.

Instead of stimulating commercial activity, Fort Ross was interfering with the opening of trade, thus the flow of provisionments north--the very wound it had intended to heal. In the fall of 1817, the Main Office was informed that attempts to obtain commercial privileges were underway, but that the settlement at Bodega was an impediment to these attempts. Realizing the adverse influence of Fort Ross and hoping to create a situation of economic stability, rather than to secure Alta California as an imperial territory, the directors candidly explained their priorities.

Although the considerable amount of capital used to establish this settlement Ross has not given the company the expected return, owing to the short period and the fact that the company still lacks men to settle there permanently with their families...the Spanish government of New California nevertheless continually demands the destruction of this settlement and the removal of Russian subjects, considering the land that they occupy, and even the entire cost of New Albion, a possession of the Spanish crown by reason of Columbus' discovery of America, and perhaps to this day they would resort to the use of force, if they were in a position to do so.

Under these circumstances, the Russian-American Company would willingly destroy this settlement, which rouses the Spaniards to envy and fear, and would never again consider seeking another place on the Albion coast, if the loss of this settlement could be exchanged for regular trade with New California, to which foreigners are not admitted both by colonial law and by the fear of revealing the remarkable insecurity and weakness of the government. 176

In summary, Spanish-Russian colonial relations during the period of Spanish domination were characterized by unsuccessful attempts, on the part of the Russians, to establish trade between California and Alaska. Spain, on the other hand, continued to protect her mare nostrum, isolating the ports of Monterey, San Diego, and San Francisco from foreign traffic. To foreigners, including Russians, the Spanish interdiction seemed unreasonable because the excessive restraints stifled California's wealth of resources for inhabitants and foreigners alike. During the circumnavigation of 1803-1807, which preceded Charles IV's removal from the throne, George von Langsdorff recorded:

The Spanish government is well known to be extremely suspicious, and properly speaking, does not allow the vessels of other nations to run into any of her ports in either North or South America... 177

A decade later, after the restoration of the Spanish monarchy, the commercial isolationism in Spanish California endured. Lutke noted his impressions, similar to those of Langsdorff as well as American and British observers, of Spanish commercial policy and its effect on the colonial economy.

What a pity that the richest countries in all parts of the world would fall into the hands of such stagnant people, people with such insignificant political leaders as the Spaniards,...

California does not trade with anyone, but actually, it is prevented from having any trade. This prosperous country could have a considerable trade with all kinds of grain, forest, even wine, grapes grow here very well in some of the missions, and they would grow everywhere very well if some effort were taken to plant them. Sea otters alone could bring great profit. A multitude of them are along its shores, but from the very time that California had belonged to the Spaniards, not one Spanish ship has been used to hunt them. They are denying the boats of other nations to hunt, although some American ships and

and our American company have agreed to pay them substantial sums to do it. The Spanish government's attitude seems that it is afraid that California in some way would bring some sort of advantage to someone.¹⁷⁸

Spanish colonial policy under Ferdinand continued as it had under Charles; foreigners were forbidden to trade in Spanish colonial ports or to hunt in Spanish waters. As a result, the Spanish colonists, who were not equipped to hunt or manufacture, existed in a state of material deprivation. With the founding of Fort Ross, the Russians were able to satisfy a part of California's manufacturing needs. In return, the Russians received a small but significant amount of agricultural produce.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

114 Vasilii M. Golovnin, Around the World on the Kamchatka, 1817-1819, trans. Ella Lury Wiswell (Honolulu: Hawaiian Historical Society and the University Press of Hawaii, 1979), p. 166; Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 118-152.

115 Only three additional settlements--all missions--would be built in northern California in the nineteenth century. These were the missions of Santa Ines (1804), San Ranfael (1817), and San Francisco Solano (1823). The last of these missions was built in response to the Russian establishments of Port Rumiantsev and Fort Ross.

116 Jean Francois de Galaup La Perouse, A Voyage Round the World... (London: A. Hamilton, 1799), p. 456.

117 John Jacob Astor (1763-1848) was the German-born founder of the American Fur Company. His Company had an outpost on the Columbia River named Fort Astor or Astoria. At the time of his death, in New York in 1848, he was thought to be the richest man in America.

118 See Alan Hutchinson's work on Spanish California, Frontier Settlement in Mexican California (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 1-42.

119 Raymond H. Fisher, Bering's Voyages, p. 62.

120 Hutchinson, Frontier, p. 5.

121 Berkh, Chronological, p. 100; Makarova, Russians on the Pacific Ocean in the Second half of the 18th Century, trans. and ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1975), p. 211.

122 Berkh, Chronological, p. 100.

123 Spanish misperception of Russian strength in the northwest is evident in the report of an unnamed Spanish voyage in 1789 in which the Russians are listed as having 11 settlements along the coast at 48° and 49° North, totaling 462 inhabitants.

124 Hutchinson, Frontier, pp. 8-9.

125 Ibid., p. 18.

126 La Perouse, Voyages, p. 106. The ship's interpreter was Barthelemy de Lesseps (1766-1834). He was the son of the French Consul-General in St. Petersburg.

127 Thomas Vaughan, E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan, and Mercedes Palau de Iglesias, Voyages of Enlightenment: Malaspina on the Northwest Coast, 1791-1792 (Portland, Oregon Historical Society, 1977), p. 5.

128 Barratt, Russia, p. 152; Tikhmenev, History, p. 133.

129 Tikhmenev, History, p. 133.

130 Loc. cit.

131 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 107.

132 V. Potekhin, "Selenie Ross," Zhurnal manufaktur i Torgovgi, 9 (1859), 8-9.

133 Barratt, Russia, p. 153.

- 134 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, pp. 274-75.
- 135 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 107.
- 136 Loc. cit.
- 137 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 169.
- 138 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 107.
- 139 E.E. Blomkvist, "A Russian Scientific Expedition to California and Alaska, 1839-1849," trans. Basil Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan, Oregon Historical Quarterly, 73, No. 2 (1972), 105-6; Golovnin, Voyage, p. 137.
- 140 Orechestvenniye Zapiski, St. Petersburg, Sec. 8, 62 (1849), 216.
- 141 Otto Kotzebue, A Voyage of Discovery into the South Sea and Bering's Strait, trans. H.E. Lloyd (N.Y.: De Capo, 1967), I, 126.
- 142 J.W. Hoover, "The Littoral of Northern California as a Geographic Province," The Geographical Review, 22, No. 2 (1933), 217-229.
- 143 Loc. cit.
- 144 Humbolt Bay is the exception on the New Albion coast, being the largest port between San Francisco and the Columbia River.
- 145 Hoover, "Littoral," p. 221.
- 146 Northwest Coast of America and California: 1832, Letters from Fort Ross, Monterey, San Pedro, and Santa Barbara by an intelligent Bostonian (Los Angeles, 1959), pp. 1-7.
- 147 Clarence DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal from California," California Historical Society Quarterly, 12, No. 3 (1933), 259. The measurements given by DuFour have recently (1983) been corrected by

Glenn J. Farris, who convincingly argues that the standard English source (DuFour's work) contained translation errors. Specifically, the Spanish measurement term braza was translated into feet instead of the Russian sazhen. To convert the figures listed in DuFour, each measurement must be multiplied by 7/6. See Glenn J. Farris, "Fathoming Fort Ross," Historical Archaeology, 17, No. 2 (1983), 93-99.

148 All of the measurements given in this paper are in accordance with Farris' hypothesis. Therefore, the figures were derived by taking the measurement given in DuFour, "The Russians," and multiplying by 7/6. See n. 147.

149 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 108.

150 The church is not present in map shown in Figure 7. It does however appear in drawings dated 1828.

151 Farris, "Fort Ross," p. 96.

152 Blomkvist, "Russian," p. 105. See Farris, "Fort Ross," p. 98 regarding the "3,500 feet" figure, which was originally 5,000 in DuFour.

153 DuFour, "The Russian," p. 259.

154 Gibson, Imperial, pp. 117-18; Fedorova, Russian Population, p. 135.

155 DuFour, "The Russian," p. 259.

156 A fanega is a dry measure used in Spain (1.58 bushel) and Spanish America (varies); about 135 lbs.

157 DuFour, "The Russian," p. 259.

158 The Ross Counter refers to the entire Russian possession in

California--the ranches, the Farallon Island, and the fort itself. Office and factory are terms synonymous to counter. In 1832, there were five offices in Russian America: Novo-Arkhangel'sk Office, Kad'iak Office, Unalaska Office, Atka Office, and Ross Office. Other terms designating divisions of Russian America are: Otdel or district which refers to a division subordinate to the office, such as the Pribilof Islands' District or the Northern District. Redoubt is another term commonly used in Russian eastward expansion. It refers to a small fort. Odinochka refers to a one-man fort. Artel, such as the Farallon Artel, refers to a work party; men organized under a leader or on a cooperative basis for work, hunting, harvesting, fishing, etc.

¹⁵⁹ James R. Gibson's "European Dependence Upon American Natives: The Case of Russian America," Ethnohistory, 25, No. 4 (1978), 359-385.

¹⁶⁰ James R. Gibson, "Russian America in 1833: The Survey of Kirill Khlebnikov," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 63, No. 1 (1972), 8. In Russian America, a "creole" refers to the offspring of a Russian father and native mother.

¹⁶¹ Kotzebue, Voyage, pp. 123-4.

¹⁶² Gibson, "Russian America in 1833," p. 8.

¹⁶³ Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 124. See also, Lutke, "Diary," p. 27; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 140.

¹⁶⁴ Tikhmenev, History, p. 140.

¹⁶⁵ Kotzebue, Voyage, pp. 123-4; Fedorova, Russian Population, p. 358-59.

- 166 Tikhmenev, History, p. 140; Kotzebue, Voyage, pp. 123-4.
- 167 Tikhmenev, History, p. 140.
- 168 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 123.
- 169 Gibson, "European Dependence," p. 380, n.7.
- 170 Gibson, "Russia in California, 1833," p. 211.
- 171 According to Lutke, the news of Charles' abdication did not reach California until 1812, "Diary," p. 32.
- 172 Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825 (Durham, Univ. of North Carolina, 1947), pp. 389-390.
- 173 Loc. cit.
- 174 Bancroft, California, 2, 214-15; Zea Bermudez to Nesselrode, Series I, 9, Doc. April 15/27, 1917; Tikhmenev, History, p. 139.
- 175 Russia and Spain had become allies in 1807.
- 176 Tikhmenev, History, p. 142.
- 177 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 172.
- 178 Lutke, "Diary," p. 20.

CHAPTER IV

HUNTING AND MANUFACTURING AT FORT ROSS

The Purpose of Hunting

Hunting sea otters off the California coast was an important Russian industry prior to the establishment of Fort Ross and in the early years of the settlement's existence. In the early nineteenth century, the pelt remained the Company's most accessible medium with which to purchase colonial provisions, although currency replaced furs and manufactured goods as these later items became scarce. Spanish piasters were the most acceptable exchange media in California, but their availability to the Company was limited. In the 1820s and 1830s, the Company's reserves of furs and bills fluctuated. As late as 1828, the Company directors urged Chief Manager Peter Igorovich Chistiakov to continue to hunt otters, in agreement with the Californians, so that grain could be purchased for the colonies.¹⁷⁹ At that time, the cashier at Novo-Arkhangel'sk had 7,591 piasters to be used for purchasing grain when "it is not possible to get wheat in California in exchange for goods."¹⁸⁰ By 1833 currency had superceded the use of pelts. Khlebnikov reported that provisions were purchased "formerly for fur seals and otter furs and lately for bills of exchange."¹⁸¹

In the late twenties and the early thirties, the availability of furs in Alaska was poor as the result of foreign encroachment and the depletion of the area's fur-bearing animal population--

historically, a constant concern to the Company. The exploration of new hunting grounds was crucial, especially by the turn of the century, because past exploration in North American, Eastern Siberia, and the Kurile Islands had continued unmonitored and resulted in the near extinction of many animals. By 1804 the condition was so severe that the directors banned hunting in these regions.¹⁸² New hunting operations off the California coast served to compensate partially for the loss of those grounds.

Russian Hunting Operations off the California Coast

Russian hunting operations in California were also hampered by animal depletion, in addition to a problem which had continually beset Russian commerce in California; the Spanish prohibition against foreign activity within the colonial empire. The spectrum of Spanish suspicion included trading in California's ports as well as hunting for otters in colonial waters. Under Spanish law, foreigners were not permitted to hunt in waters for 30 leagues off the California coast. After 1821 certain Mexican administrations continued to reinforce this prohibition,

The Russians were, however, able to engage in hunting expeditions in California. This was accomplished in three ways. From 1803 to 1812, Baranov contracted with Boston captains to hunt jointly in Spanish California waters. Secondly, the Russians engaged in independent hunting ventures beginning in 1809 with Kuskov's first expedition south in search of a suitable location for Russian settlement. After the establishment of Fort Ross in 1812, a permanent hunting party was sent to the Farallon Islands and various expeditions were dispatched

along the coast, from Cape Mendicino to San Francisco Bay. Both joint Russian-Bostonian and independent Russian hunting ventures were accomplished in defiance of Spanish colonial law. The Russians also undertook a third, legal practice to procure pelts: From 1823 to 1828, the Company contracted with California authorities to participate in joint Russian-Spanish hunting ventures.¹⁸³

The Contract System: Joint Russian-Bostonian Hunting Ventures

From 1803 to 1812, Chief Manager Baranov contracted with Boston merchants 13 times to hunt California sea otters off the California coast (see Appendix F).¹⁸⁴ Before the contract system had been established, the Boston captains relied on bartering with California natives for pelts, as they did not have access to skilled hunters. Bartering for pelts was not only risky, but less profitable than hunting for pelts. Likewise, the Russians had not been able to participate in the California hunt, because they lacked the vessels and experience crewmen needed to make the journey from Alaska to California. The contract system, therefore, allowed for an excellent combination of resources: Boston vessels and crews, coupled with Russian Aleut hunters and baidarkas, permitted both parties to hunt profitably in California waters.¹⁸⁵

The first contract between Russian and Boston merchants was signed on Kad'iak Island in October 1803. Joseph O'Cain, an experienced Irish-American navigator, had made four voyages from Boston to California.¹⁸⁶ He had become frustrated with the limited profitability of procuring pelts through barter with the local natives. O'Cain approached Baranov in 1803 with the practical plan of combining resources for a joint hunt: O'Cain would supply transportation to California's hunting grounds on

the O'Cain, a vessel owned and operated by the Winship family of Boston. Baranov would supply 40 Aleut hunters and 20 baidarkas. The pelts harvested would be divided equally. O'Cain assured Baranov that the venture would result in considerable profits, claiming that he knew of untapped hunting grounds off California.¹⁸⁷

Baranov was intrigued with O'Cain's proposition; it would allow the Russians to compete with the Anglo-Americans in the northwest hunt. And the ability to compete was of urgent concern, because Baranov feared the Russians were losing influence in the Alaskan hunting grounds to the Anglo-Americans.¹⁸⁸ Once settled in Alaska, the Russians had been unable to significantly extend their hunting operations. Not only was the Company fleet emaciated, but the Russians had to contend with the hostile Kolosh, who had destroyed the settlement at Novo-Arkhangel'sk in 1802.¹⁸⁹ Baranov, therefore, agreed to contract with the Bostonian and thus afforded the Russians the opportunity to enter the California hunt and, a decade later, to dominate that hunt by establishing a settlement in California at Fort Ross.

The O'Cain left Kad'iak in November 1803 with Russian provisions and Aleut hunters, under the command of the Russian Shvetsov. Captain O'Cain gave Baranov 12,000 rubles of merchandise as collateral for the Company's investment.¹⁹⁰ The O'Cain arrived in San Diego on December 4, but the Spaniards refused entry into the harbor for fresh supplies. On December 8, the vessel continued southward to San Quintin. There, Commander Jose Manuel Ruiz permitted entrance to port. And once O'Cain gained entrance into San Quintin Bay, he refused repeated orders from Ruiz and Governor Arrillaga to depart.¹⁹¹ The O'Cain remained at

San Quintin from December 13, until March 26, 1804, harvesting otters and piling their pelts on the beach. The catch was protected from the Spaniards by Aleut guards with five cannons. When O'Cain finally left Lower California, the Spaniards denied him the firewood and water he needed for the remainder of the hunt.¹⁹² He returned to Kad'iak in June 1804 and delivered to Baranov 550 pelts--one-half of the total harvest.¹⁹³

The venture proved successful for both Baranov and O'Cain, therefore new contracts with Bostonians quickly followed. Three were arranged in 1806. They were between Baranov and Oliver Kimball of the Peacock, Captain O'Cain, this time in charge of the Eclipse, and Jonathan Winship, Jr. of the O'Cain.¹⁹⁴ Winship contracted with Baranov in April 1806. Confident of the mission's success, Baranov sent fifty baidarkas, 12 native women, and 100 Aleut hunters under the command of the Russian Sysoi Slobodchikov. Provisions for the hunt included

15,400 pounds of Aukola and 1,000 pounds of whale meat.¹⁹⁵

GLIDEON YUKOLA - DRIED FISH STRIPS *(E SPSE ANY FISH)*
 Winship hunted in Trinidad Bay for two weeks in June 1806 and then sailed directly to the Lower California coast. There, Winship stationed the Aleuts on various islands and kept the O'Cain harbored away from the hunting grounds in the mainland ports of Todos Santos and San Quintin.¹⁹⁶ In August 1806, Winship departed from Lower California but left the Aleuts stationed on the islands to continue the hunt. Winship sailed to the Sandwich Islands to sell the harvest, then called at Novo-Arkhangel'sk in January 1807 for 50 more Aleut hunters. These hunters were used to supplement the initial hunting parties and were also newly-stationed around Catalina and nearby islands.

...the O'Cain had now from seventy to eighty baidarkas, carrying about a hundred and fifty Kod'iak Indian hunters, fitted out and hunting sea otter among the Islands of Guadalupe, Natividad, Cerros and Redondo, while other parties were stationed on some of the islands to take fur seals.¹⁹⁷

There were, however, problems on the hunt; apparently, conflict arose between Winship and Slobodchikov. Slobodchikov left the party early in 1807 and purchased a small schooner with 150 otter pelts. He sailed the vessel, which he named Eclipse, to the Sandwich Islands and purchased provisions for the Alaskan colonies. Slobodchikov returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk on August 22, 1807.¹⁹⁸ Winship returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk in September with a hefty catch of 3,006 prime skins, 1,264 yearlings, and 549 pups.¹⁹⁹

Joseph O'Cain contracted with Baranov, for a second time, early in 1806. In command of the Eclipse, O'Cain sailed along the Californias and, as on the first voyage, experience Spanish opposition. O'Cain anchored the Eclipse just beyond range of the San Diego Presidio on June 25 and requested permission to enter port for fresh provisions, but Comisionado Rodrigues refused.²⁰⁰ O'Cain sailed on to Todos Santos Bay on June 29 and hunted there until July 8. Two days were then spent hunting in San Quintin Bay, Rodriguez, however, pursued O'Cain by dispatching five men to wait for the party at likely hunting grounds. After several confrontations, five of the Eclipse's crew were captured on July 18 in San del Cabo Bay.²⁰¹ O'Cain was forced to return to Novo-Arkhangel'sk in August 1806. without securing the return of those crew members. The Eclipse proceeded to Canton and Kamchatka, but was lost in September 1807.²⁰²

In October 1806, Oliver Kimball of the brig Peacock formed a hunt-

ing contract with the Russians. Baranov agreed to provide 12 baidarkas and twice as many Aleuts. The hunters were supervised by Vasili Petrovich Tarakanov who had assisted Shvetsov on the first Russian-Bostonian hunt. From March to May 1807, Kimball anchored in Bodega Bay and erected temporary quarters along the coast.²⁰³ The Aleuts hunted in Bodega and even San Francisco Bay. In May, the Peacock sailed to Lower California, to San Quintin Bay, where pelts were harvested through June. In August, Kimball returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk and delivered to Baranov one-half of the catch of 753 prime otters, 258 yearlings, and 250 pups.²⁰⁴

Little is known about the fifth hunting agreement contracted between Baranov and Benjamin Swift who represented the Boston merchants of Perkins, Lyman, and Sturgis. The 300-ton Derby was operating along the California coastline in 1807, at the same time as were the Peacock and the O'Cain, with a hunting crew of 50 Aleuts and 25 baidarkas. The Derby returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk sometime in 1808 and then sailed for Canton, where it anchored on March 23, 1809, and finally reached Boston on August 18, 1809.²⁰⁵

Joint hunting ventures decreased between 1808 and 1810 when the Winship vessels--the Peacock and O'Cain--were returning to the northwest via China and Boston. Only Captain George Washington Eayrs of the 145-ton Mercury contracted with the Russians in May 1808. Eayrs who had been extremely successful bartering with California natives for pelts, represented the Boston merchant Benjamin Lamb.²⁰⁶

From December 1808 until May 1809, Eayrs hunted with 50 Aleuts and 25 baidarkas in San Francisco, Todos, Trinidad, and Bodega Bays.²⁰⁷

In May, the Comisionado of Los Angeles, Francisco Javier Alvarado, sent word for Eayrs to leave San Juan Capistrano where the crew had been hunting since April. Eayrs complied with the order and returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk shortly afterward with a cargo of 2,117 pelts.²⁰⁸

By the fall of 1810, joint hunting efforts had been renewed; three more contracted vessels--the O'Cain, Isabella, and Albatross--were operating just north of San Francisco at Drake's Bay.²⁰⁹

Jonathan Winship, Jr., who had returned to the Northwest on the O'Cain in December 1809, contracted with Baranov to receive 50 baidarkas and the necessary Aleuts to hunt.²¹⁰ The hunt began in November of the following year in Drake's Bay. From there, Winship sailed south to San Quintin Bay and hunted through December. By May 1811, the O'Cain was back at Drake's Bay and then sailed to the Sandwich Islands and Canton to sell the harvest of 3,952 otter skins,²¹¹

In June 1810, Captain William Davis of Boardman and Pipe of Boston, contracted with the Russians. Baranov was to supply Aleuts and 48 baidarkas, and Davis the transportation to California on the 209-ton Isabella,²¹² The Isabella made Bodega Bay its base from the fall of 1810 until February 1811. The Aleuts, supervised by Tarakanov, hunted in the Farallones, Drake's Bay, and San Francisco Bay. In September and October, 12 Aleut hunters were captured by Spaniards and imprisoned in the San Francisco Presidio.²¹³

Despite such conflicts with the Spaniards, the hunt was a success, bringing in 2,976 otter skins.²¹⁴

In 1810, the Winship Family of Boston sent a third vessel to participate in the joint Russian expeditions, the 165-ton Albatross,

commanded by Nathan Winship. In November 1810, Winship contracted with Baranov for 50 Aleuts to be supervised by the Russian Lasseff and 30 baidarkas.²¹⁵ Winship covered the California hunting grounds thoroughly. Parties hunted in the Farallon Islands in December 1810 and May and June 1811, in San Quintin Bay in December 1810, in Drake's Bay from January until March 1811, and at San Luis Obispo at an undetermined date. Winship harvested a total of 1,190 pelts.²¹⁶

During the month of November 1810, the Albatross, Isabella, and the O'Cain were using Drake's Bay as their base of hunting operations. Baidarkas took provisions to hunters stationed on the Farallon Islands and returned with furs. (The Russian-American Company vessel, Chirikov, was also anchored at Bodega Bay during this time, under the command of Ivan Kuskov, see pp.78-9). The Bostonians harvested 8,118 skins but, in Baranov's words, "did not return without a small loss of men."²¹⁷

While the Albatross, Isabella, and the O'Cain sailed for the Canton market in 1812, Baranov negotiated the three final hunting contracts to be made between Russians and Bostonians. In November 1811, Baranov contracted with William Blanchard of the 145-ton Katherine and Thomas Meek of the 270-ton Amethyst. Blanchard was given 50 baidarkas and half as many Aleuts and Meek received 52 baidarkas.²¹⁸ Blanchard and Meek hunted in San Quintin Bay in June and July, harvesting 1,516 and 1,442 pelts, respectively.²¹⁹ Upon returning to Novo-Arkhangel'sk in the fall of 1811, Meek sold his vessel to the Russians.²²⁰

The final hunting contract was made with Isaac Whittemore of the Clarion, in 1812. Whittemore represented the merchant Patrick Jackson of Boston. Late in 1812, the Clarion sailed south to California, leaving a hunting party of Aleuts on the Farallon Islands while con-

tinuing on to San Quintin Bay. Whittemore harvested 1,792 otter skins which he sold in the Sandwich Islands in July 1813.²²¹ According to Tikhmenev, the joint expeditions, operating off the California coast in 1811, 1812, and 1813, under Captains Blanchard, Meek, and Whittemore, brought the Company 270,000 paper rubles.²²²

Summary. Both Bostonians and Russians alike profitted from the joint-contract system of hunting sea otters. The Bostonians could not have participated in the California hunt, without Russian help, in the face of Spanish law enforcement and lack of hunting equipment. The Aleut hunter made it possible for Bostonians to establish a line of hunting bases, removed from occupied areas. Such bases included Bodega Bay, Drake's Bay, the Farallon Islands, the Santa Barbara Channel Islands, San Quintin Bay, Todos Santos Island, and Corros Island.²²³ The Boston vessels were able to maintain a safe distance from the Spaniards who had no means of sea travel.

To the Russians, the contract system meant the ability to participate in the hunt along the California coast at a time when they lacked able vessels and finding new hunting grounds was essential. Nikolai Rezanov, who had arrived in Alaska to inspect the colonies after the contract system was already in use, lent his approval to the joint expeditions. It ensured the extension of hunting grounds and prevented the Anglo-American monopolization of old and new grounds--two conditions which Rezanov viewed as necessary to the Company's survival.²²⁴ As Langsdorff wrote, "Thus did the Russians endeavour to supply their want of ships and men, and to extend, by new means, the circle of their valuable fishery for sea-otters."²²⁵

Independent Russian Hunting Ventures in California

While the Russians entered the California otter hunt in 1803 with assistance from Bostonians, Baranov also was determined to establish an independent Russian hunting network and "not to divide the profits of this business with anybody."²²⁶ Independence required a permanent Russian California hunting base, because of (1) the Spaniards' refusal to allow foreigners to enter their harbors for fresh provisions and water and (2) the lack of sufficient and adequate vessels.²²⁷ Ivan Kuskov was charged by Baranov to lead two Russian expeditions to California to hunt sea otter and to find a suitable location for a Russian settlement. In October 1808, the first expedition was dispatched when Kuskov commanded two vessels southward (see also pp. 77-9). The Nikolai wrecked near the Columbia River, but the Kad'iak, under Navigator A. Petrov, and a crew of 40 Russians, 130 Aleut hunters, and 20 Aleut women sailed to Bodega Bay. They remained there for eight months, returning to Novo-Arkhangel'sk on October 4, 1809 with 2,350 otter skins.²²⁸

The second voyage was undertaken by Kuskov on the schooner Chirikov. Again, Bodega Bay served as the Russians' base while Aleuts hunted in nearby San Francisco Bay. These hunters, in addition to those of the Albatross, Isabella, and O'Cain, stationed in Drake's Bay at the time, alarmed California officials. Soldiers reportedly were positioned at wells and springs, prohibiting the Aleuts from obtaining water until "the party was compelled to go away."²²⁹ Consequently, the Aleuts were sent to the Farallones to hunt and gather a fresh supply of sea-lion meat. They returned

with 1,160 prime pelts and 78 yearlings.²³⁰ The Chirikov left Bodega on June 20 and reached Novo-Arkhangel'sk on July 28, 1811.

By the time of Kuskov's third voyage in November 1811, Baranov had decided that Bodega--a hunting base much used by Bostonians and Russians since 1802--was the appropriate site for a permanent Russian settlement. With 86 Aleut hunters, 40 baidarkas, Kuskov and his crew sailed to Bodega and began construction of Fort Ross in the spring of 1812.²³¹ Shortly after construction begun, hunting expeditions recommenced. Whenever the Aleuts could be spared, they were sent to hunt, going as far north as Cape Mendicino but rarely further south than Drake's Bay due to Spanish resistance.²³²

Sometime in the spring, Kuskov dispatched the 40 baidarkas to unknown hunting grounds.

The Farallon Artel. The number of fur-bearing animals in the waters north of San Francisco was relatively small; the richest grounds were those under Spanish jurisdiction.²³³ To compensate, in 1812, Kuskov dispatched a permanent party of hunters to the Farallon Islands.²³⁴ These islands, which had served as Aleut hunting grounds under Bostonian supervision since at least February 1807, were located 15 miles southwest of Drake's Head. The Farallones were barren and provided a harsh existence for the Aleuts.

They are treeless and have only a bit of grass; the largest of them is no more than three miles in circumference. They were created by volcanic action, which is obvious from their characteristic barrenness, and the lack of minerals. Persons who live there say that during storms the islands shake, and one can hear a kind of moaning noise against the breaking waves. The islands have no fresh water or driftwood, consequently persons who stay there have a very hard time sustaining themselves.²³⁵

The number of animals taken from the artel was at first plentiful, 1,350 pelts annually until 1815.²³⁶ But soon the otter population diminished. "Over the period of 6 years during the Kuskov administration, 8,427 fur seals were taken there [in the Farallones]... Later this gradually decreased, and in recent years, not more than 200 to 300 pelts are taken there each year." By the early 1830s, only six to ten Aleuts and one Russian remained stationed on the Farallones.²³⁷

Russian-Mexican Hunting Expeditions

The Capture of Tarakanov's Hunting Party. Although the Russians were successful harvesting otters at the Farallon outpost, they found that hunting along the Spanish coast could not continue on an independent basis. Attempts to extend hunting operations after 1813 failed because of constant surveillance by Spanish officials. This problem was exemplified by the experiences of the Ilmen, in 1814. The Ilmen sailed from Novo-Arkhangel'sk to Fort Ross with provisions and 50 Aleut hunters, supervised by Vasili Tarakanov.²³⁸ Hunting north of San Francisco had been unsuccessful because of native hostility, so the party hunted for two days around the Farallon Islands. The Aleuts were then ordered to enter San Francisco Bay. As Tarakanov recounts:

The Aleuts...hunted all day, killing about 100 sea otter, but when we went to the beach on the south side [of San Francisco Bay] to camp for the night we found soldiers stationed at all the springs who would not allow anyone to any water. At this the Aleuts became frightened and started back toward the ship which had remained outside [the Bay]. It was dark and some wind was blowing and two baidarkas were capsized and the men being tired with their days work, could not save themselves [from capture].²³⁹

The Ilmen continued southward to hunt, gathering 150 sea otters and fur seals from the Santa Barbara Channel Islands.²⁴⁰

Spanish interference did not end with the Ilmen's voyage. In San Pedro, Wadsworth ordered 11 Aleuts and Tarakanov ashore to gather provisions and there they were captured by Spanish soldiers.²⁴¹ The men were held at the Santa Barbara Mission for two years before being released in 1816. The Ilmen then returned to Fort Ross with a small catch of 392 pelts.²⁴²

Ilmen again set sail in June 1815 and again met with Spanish resistance. The commander of the expedition, Boris Tasarov, and 24 men were arrested in San Pedro by Comisionado, Guillermo Cota. These men were imprisoned in Los Angeles.²⁴³ In September, the supercargo, John Elliot d'Castro, four Russians, one American, and one Aleut were captured at Refugio. Tarakanov was freed in November 1816 and returned to Fort Ross aboard the Rurik, while Elliot and Tarasov were freed only after being taken to Mexico. Other captives remained in custody two to three years before release.²⁴⁴

Failed Attempts to Negotiate with Spanish California. Despite Spanish opposition, the hunt remained profitable for the Russians. Ludovik Choris reported in 1816 that the Russians harvested nearly 2,000 pelts annually which were generally sold to Americans.²⁴⁵ Moreover, in 1818, over 120 additional Aleuts were sent to hunt along the Northern California coast.²⁴⁶ To improve their catch significantly, however, the Russians needed unrestricted hunting privileges in Spanish waters.

The Russians sought negotiations with the California government, requesting hunting rights south of Drake's Bay. The Russians proposed to give the Spaniards one-half of their catch in return for harassment-free access to Spanish waters. In 1817, the Russians twice approached California's new governor, Pablo Vicente de Solá (1815-1822), with

this proposal. Lieutenant Iakov Paduskin was received cordially by de Solá sometime in the spring, but no concessions were granted.²⁴⁷ While in San Francisco in October, Lieutenant Leontii Hagemeister also contacted de Solá, outlining specifically a contract for joint hunting expeditions. According to Adele Ogden, historian of the California hunt, Hagemeister offered:

"to furnish for the army at the very lowest prices such things for which they may have need," under the following conditions. Aleutian hunters were to be allowed to enter San Francisco Bay. All expenses of hunting would be borne by the Russian company. Skins were to be divided equally between the Russians and the Spaniards. The Spanish share of furs was to be exchanged at contract prices for Russian goods. Hagemeister reminded Solá that California Indians were not skilled in sea otter hunting and that neither skins nor goods could ever be obtained by the Spaniards "with such convenience and with such small expense."²⁴⁸

De Solá again refused the proposition, as he had received word from Madrid in 1814 to limit manufactured and agricultural trade with the Russians. Apparently de Solá interpreted these orders to include denying the Russians permission to harvest "Spanish" pelts.²⁴⁹

Although Paduskin and Hagemeister failed to reach an agreement with Governor de Solá, their negotiations established a precedent: Subsequently, a policy was implemented by Chief Manager Murav'ev calling for all trade missions to San Francisco to solicit permission to hunt in Spain's California waters.²⁵⁰ Semen Ivanovich Ianovskii, appointed Chief Manager of the Alaskan colonies in 1818, continued this policy. He sent Kirill Khlebnikov, with gifts and instructions to persuade de Solá to form a commercial agreement. The Governor received the Russian and returned gifts, but his reply was standard: it was not within his

authority to grant foreigners permission to hunt.²⁵¹

Attempts to Negotiate Hunting Rights through Madrid. Company officials also sought resolution to their dilemma in Europe. Hagemeister presented the Company's circumstance to the Russian envoy in Madrid, stating the need of "obtaining permission from the high Court of Spain to hunt furs on the coast of California in company with His Catholic Majesty's subjects on equal shares."²⁵² Company officials further petitioned Karl V. Nesselrode, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1815-1822), in 1820, to secure the right from the Spanish government to hunt and trade in California. They even pledged to abandon the settlement at Fort Ross in exchange for these privileges from the Spaniards.²⁵³ There were, however, no concessions from Madrid and the Russians' situation did not change while de Solá remained in power in California. In a February 1824 instruction from the Main Office Murav'ev was encouraged to continue to hunt otter even though negotiations for a mutual agreement with the Mexicans had been unsuccessful.²⁵⁴

Luis Argüello and Joint Russian-Californian Hunting Expeditions. The governorship of Luis Argüello (1822-1825) resulted in a change in California policy that favored the Russian-American Company. Argüello, a native Californian, shared the concern of his father for the welfare of California, even if this countered official Mexican policy. In December 1823, he concluded an agreement by which the Russians were permitted to hunt in San Francisco Bay.²⁵⁵ The hunt was to continue for three months--through March--but could be and was renewed quarterly for that year. As a result of this contract, the volume of Company fur catch increased substantially (see Figure 12).




Figure 12. Sea otter catch off the California coast, 1812-1834. Based on computer analysis of figures given in Kirill Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian America, 1817-1832, trans. and ann. Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976), pp. 108, 110-12 and Petr A. Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company, trans. and ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1978), p. 227.

Under the terms of this nine-point agreement, the Russians were allowed to hunt with 25 baidarkas in Spanish waters and all profits and costs were to be divided equally between the Russian-American Company and the California government. The Russians, however, were responsible for providing the hunters, supervisors, vessels, and crew.²⁵⁶ Even with these contractual obligations, the joint hunting expeditions proved advantageous to the Russians. Their catch, during this period, was higher than in other years. The Company Board was pleased with the Mexican-Russian cooperation and expressed hope that the expeditions would continue.²⁵⁷ Similar agreements were executed between the Russians and Jose Herre in 1825 and 1828.²⁵⁸ These later hunts, however, proved less successful, as no baidarkas had been sent from Novo-Arkhangel'sk and the Ross settlement could provide only two.²⁵⁹

Summary. Even the relative success of the Mexican-Russian hunting ventures, in addition to the productive hunt of the Farallon Artel, could not overcome the Company's interminable problem, the steady depletion of hunting grounds. The receding grounds had been the continual nemesis of the Company, and California proved to be no exception. Within a period of ten years, the catch in the Farallones had decreased dramatically and the decline in other California waters was just as visible--a 300 percent decline from 1812-1818 (see Figure 12). By 1835, the hunt in California had ceased completely.²⁶⁰ And by 1838, all Aleut hunters who lived at Fort Ross had been re-transferred to Kad'iak Island, because the hunters could be used more effectively in the northern settlements.²⁶¹

In spite of its eventual failure, the hunt was the motivating factor behind Baranov's decision to settle in Alta California. After all, it was with more Aleuts than Russians that Baranov founded the settlement.²⁶² And the one professed skill of the Aleuts was hunting otter.

The intention of forming this settlement was to pursue the chase of the sea-otter on the coast of California, where the animal was then numerous, as it had become extremely scarce in the northern establishments.²⁶³

Hunting could not remain the primary or only purpose of the Ross settlement, because: (1) the decreasing value of pelts as an exchange currency; (2) the toll of the restricted hunt in California; and (3) the number of fur-bearing animals off the California coast was, at least, erratic and temporarily in decline. These three factors were responsible for the eventual elimination of Russian hunting operations in California.

MANUFACTURING AT FORT ROSS

The Purpose of Manufacturing

With the founding of Fort Ross, Russia succeeded in "planting a colony of her own" which would allow for the procurement of "provisions for supply of her northern settlements." However, one obstacle required rectification to assure that plan's fundamental feasibility. The Russians' lacked sufficient Spanish currency or other acceptable exchange medium to procure food. Trade in Novo-Arkhangel'sk had been conducted "formerly for fur seals and other furs and lately for bills of exchange [Spanish piasters and Russian rubles] payable by the Main Administration."²⁶⁴ Because of the diminishing supply of furs after

1810, purchasing goods in Spanish California was instead "done with Spanish piasters and sometimes by barter for goods of Russian manufacture."²⁶⁵ The precedent of exchanging Russian goods for California foodstuffs was established by Rezanov, during his mission to Monterey, in May 1806. Langsdorff offered a description of this arrangement.

... [Governor Argüello] dispatched messengers to all the surrounding missions, desiring them to send corn, flour, meat, salt, and other objects that we wanted, permitting us, as we had not the means of paying for them in money, to furnish an equivalent in the objects of merchandise that we had to dispose of.²⁶⁶

This barter of Russian goods for grain between the missions and the Russians remained the standard after the establishment of Fort Ross. An authoritative report by Khlebnikov, in the 1820s, re-enforced this procedure with these words:

We received supplies from [the missions] in payment for all of this construction [of boats]; sometimes these were loaded aboard ships which had come from Sitka, and sometimes on those en route to Fort Ross.²⁶⁷

The Economy of Spanish California and Manufacturing at Fort Ross

The Poor Production of Manufactured Goods in Spanish California.

The exchange of Californian grain for Russian manufactures was a transaction equally advantageous to the Russians and Spaniards. Spanish California was materially impoverished, because it was denied trade with foreign nations. Similarly, the Russian-American Company had failed to provision adequately its Alaskan colonies with agricultural goods. The California missions were notorious for their inability to manufacture. For their own use, the missions managed to produce "coarse woolen blankets, crude shoes, the leather parts of saddles, soaps, candles and coarse pottery." Generally, though, the Spaniards

preferred to export raw materials--hides and tallow, for instance--and purchase ready-made goods from foreigners. Unable to process tallow for soap and candles, the mission fathers purchased these goods in Peru and Chile. Likewise, California leather was made into goods in New England.²⁶⁸

The mission's inability to manufacture adequately was due to the combination of native laborers' ignorance of European manufacturing techniques and the inexperience of Spanish supervisors. Vasilii Mikhailovich Golovnin (1776-1831), participant in the circumnavigation of the Kamchatka, 1817-1819, spoke to this issue in defense of native competency: "if [the natives] could be taught by good craftsmen, they probably would be the equal of Europeans."²⁶⁹

Lack of Currency in Spanish California. The Spaniards further benefitted from the barter with the Russians, because it was easier to exchange grain--rather than currency--for badly-needed manufactured goods. Tikhmenev explained the poor financial condition of the Spanish colonies, particularly in the troubled times of the early nineteenth century, in the following terms:

There was almost no money in circulation, aside from a small quantity of coin which had been issued by the insurgents and was supported by the Spanish government until better times. It should be observed that only the crown property in California was a herd of livestock which had been recently imported. Although the missions, who used the labor of natives gathered under the pretext of converting them to Christianity, had enough grain, most of it went to support these natives or the soldiers stationed in the presidios. Payment for the soldiers' food was also made in bills of exchange drawn on Guadalajara. Thus little of the food produced could be sold to passing ships.²⁷⁰

After the declaration of Mexican independence, the situation of the currency became even more desperate, "...with the cessation of subsidies

from Spain everyone on salary was immediately impoverished."²⁷¹
 With the exception of agricultural goods, the Californians were in great want and there was little currency with which to purchase necessities. It was this dire need in California for goods and the increasing unavailability of currency that sealed the Californians' association with Fort Ross from the settlement's inception. "The missions... had constant intercourse with Fort Ross,... there were uninterrupted relations."²⁷²

Agricultural Production in Spanish California, California's poor economic state of manufacturing was countered by a very successful agricultural production. Golovnin wrote favorably of the missions' ability to produce agriculturally in contrast to his report on manufacturing.

The Spaniards had developed irrigated agriculture to the point of producing a remarkable variety of grains, vegetables, and fruits, and some wine and brandy.²⁷³

In 1814, the governing board of the Company reported to Foreign Minister Rumiantsev of California's agricultural wastefulness: Grain produced at the missions was going to waste and ten to 30 thousand head of cattle were slaughtered annually due to overbreeding.²⁷⁴ The Company wanted to divert these unused foodstuffs to Novo-Arkhangel'sk and the Spaniards' need for manufactured goods provided the opportunity. The mission fathers' lack of funds restricted them to purchase "only iron and simple tools worth only 2,500 piasters annually."²⁷⁵ Hence the Russians were a most suitable trading partner. Their grave need for agricultural goods provided a convenient way for the Spaniards to ease their own material dilemma. California grain, a commodity available

in surplus, could be exchanged for Russian manufactures at Fort Ross.

Manufacturing for Spanish Needs. The Russians manufactured articles at the Ross factory that were well suited to the market of Spanish California. The greatest proportion of manufactures were products pre-ordered by the Californians.²⁷⁶ Manufactured goods were also shipped to Novo-Arkhangel'sk, as the Russian colonies were also in great want of goods, manufactured as well as agricultural. Compared to the missions' small industry, the Russians at Fort Ross manufactured prolifically.

There was scarcely any article of wood, iron, or leather which the mechanics of Ross could not make of a quality sufficiently good for the California market and to the last they received frequent application from the Spaniards.²⁷⁷

The articles needed by the Spaniards were many, such as longboats, wheels, leather products, cookware, construction materials (especially lumber), tar and bricks.²⁷⁸ Landsdorff reported in 1806:

The wants of New California consist of manufactured goods, sugar, chocolate, wine, brandy, tobacco, iron and iron tools, etc., and of these the Russian settlements [in the north] are no less in want, perhaps even more, than the Spanish.²⁷⁹

Kotzebue's comments illustrate that the situation was fundamentally unchanged nearly two decades later, in 1825.

The Spaniards often find Ross very serviceable to them. For instance, there is no such thing as a smith in all California; consequently the making and repairing of all manner of iron implements here is a great accommodation to them, and affords lucrative employment to the Russians.²⁸⁰

The proximity of Fort Ross to the Spanish settlements made trade convenient and it was valuable because the Spaniards obtained badly-needed manufactured goods and the Russians purchased agricultural

produce.

Resources for Manufacturing in California

A comparison between Russian and Spanish manufacturing, in early nineteenth-century California, illustrates that the Russians at Fort Ross better utilized the abundant resources of Alta California than did their Spanish counterparts. Russian technology was more sophisticated than that of the missions. There is record of the Spaniards' awe of Fort Ross' windmill "which found no imitators."²⁸¹ As mentioned, the missions did produce some rather crude manufactured articles, but attention was primarily directed to agricultural production which proved to be their vocation. The articles produced at the missions were only for Spanish use but, in quantity, fell far short of satisfying even mission needs.

Earthen Resources for Manufacturing. The land surrounding Fort Ross provided the materials necessary for a number of manufactures. A high quality clay was used by the Russians to make cooking dishes, tiles, and bricks. These bricks were shipped, in sizeable quantity, to Novo-Arkhangel'sk and were sold locally. Redwood, pine and oak also served as materials for manufacturing. Redwood was soft and malleable and thus suitable for making barrels. Pine and oak were used in shipbuilding (see pp. 131-33). The materials of the Russian River and the coastal mountains were also used for manufacturing at Fort Ross. These included minerals such as granite, syenite, iron ore, obsidian, serpentine, hornstone, and sandstone. Varieties of sandstone were used to manufacture grindstones and whetstones.²⁸²

Animal Resources for Manufacturing. Animal products were also

used in manufacturing to a greater degree by the Russians than by the Spaniards. Hides were tanned and dressed into good quality apparel-- shoes were especially well-crafted. Suede was processed from goats, deer, and elk. This too was used to manufacture garments.²⁸³ The Aleuts used the intestine of sea lions to produce working garments, that is, waterproof clothing for the hunt. Tallow from animals was used to produce lard, and candles.²⁸⁴ Nightlamps were fueled by sea lion fat sent from the Farallon Artel.²⁸⁵

Shipbuilding. During the early years of Fort Ross (1817-1824), the California oak and pine were used in the construction of Company vessels. At Port Rumiantsev, "Kuskov built... a shipyard where boats [were] built." Brigs constructed at Fort Ross were for Company use, but rowboats or longboats were also manufactured and used in trade with the Spaniards. Baranov and Kuskov believed that the American oak was "excellent building timber" for the construction of vessels.²⁸⁶ Generally, the decks were constructed of pine, and sometimes the skeleton of fur, but the keel and sternpost always of oak.²⁸⁷ The shipwright at Fort Ross was an "ordinary" promyshlennik, Vasilii Grudinin, who learned the trade of shipbuilding in Novo-Arkangel'sk from the American, Lincoln.²⁸⁸ Unfamiliar with the qualities of the oak timber, Grudinin failed to water process the wood properly and it quickly rotted.

....[The] trees were cut and the lumber was used while still unseasoned. During the construction period in this mild climate, the moisture caused the wood to rot and the ship was launched just when the rot set in. After three or four years the changes of climate, of heat and moisture, caused the rot to increase in all the vital parts of the ship and there was no way to replace it by usual means.²⁸⁹

Four Company vessels were constructed before the deficiency was detected, the Rumiantsev, Buldakov, Volga, and Kiakhta.²⁹⁰ When experience proved the vessels faulty, construction was discontinued.²⁹¹

TABLE III
SHIPBUILDING AT FORT ROSS

Year Constructed	Ship Name	Type	Tonnage	Construction Cost	Declared Unseaworthy due to rot
1818	<u>Rumiantsev</u>	brig	160 tons	20,212.63 r.	1823
1820	<u>Buldakov</u>	brig	200 tons	59,404.75 r.	1826
1822	<u>Volga</u>	brig	160 tons	36,186.54 r.	1827
1824	<u>Kiakhta</u>	brig	200 tons	35,248.36 r.	by 1833

Despite the failure of shipbuilding at Fort Ross, the experience, as remarked by Khlebnikov had one advantage: It brought "a certain amount of esteem among our inactive neighbors in Spanish California. The Spaniards were astonished at the activity, seeing the construction of four ships, one after another..."²⁹² Prior to the Russian's arrival in Alta California, the missions in the San Francisco District were completely without vessels. Langsdorff recorded his amazement in 1806.

Although the three missions of St. Francisco, Santa Clara, and St. Joseph, all lie near the south-eastern part of the Bay of St. Francisco, and a communication by water, from one to the other, would be of the utmost utility, it seems almost incredible, that, in not one of them, no, not even in the Presidency of St. Francisco, is there a vessel or boat of any kind...

This total want of vessels, which are, as it were, the keys to all southern and eastern possessions, is a strong proof of the great negligence of the government. It was because they had not a boat themselves, that, on the day of our arrival, they were obliged to remain so long upon the shore, and were precluded all communication with us till we sent our boat to them.²⁹³

In the 1820s, after the construction of the missions of San Rafael (1819) and San Francisco Solano (1824), "the missionaries needed sailing vessels for transport along the coast of San Francisco Bay and came to ask [the Russians] to build ships for them."²⁹⁴ The Russians at Fort Ross again filled a gap in California manufacturing, constructing vessels-- rowboats or longboats--which the missionaries used to travel across San Francisco Bay.²⁹⁵

The Mexican Confederacy, 1821-1836

In April of 1822, the Russian-American Company Board of Directors informed Chief Manager Murav'ev that Spain had relinquished control of Mexico and California. The founding of the Mexican Confederacy, which had actually occurred in September 1821, invoked different reactions from Company officials, on the one hand, and the Russian Imperial government, on the other. Company officials saw, as they had in 1808, the possibility of opening free and regular trade between Monterey and Novo-Arkhangel'sk. Contrarily, Nicholas I was fundamentally opposed to egalitarian movements in any form. He consistently refused Company requests to consider recognition of the Confederacy, even though that action was detrimental to the welfare of his colonies in North America.²⁹⁶ The Russian-American Company's unvoiced departure from official Russian policy stemmed from the Company's confidence that Mexico's secession from Spain would favorably impact trade relations in North America, especially between California and Alaska. The board surmised that an independent Mexico would relinquish the California territories of the Spanish interdiction on foreign trade, because under Spain, California had been denied adequate provision-

ment.

The belief of Company officials that the end of Spanish control over Mexico would produce conditions conducive to the cultivation of trade relations, between California and Alaska, appeared provident, as in 1821 foreigners were welcomed in California ports. The first constitution of the Mexican republic (1824) legally confirmed this action, relaxing the stringent prohibition on foreign trade in California.²⁹⁷ However, the Company's anticipated increase in the quantity of supplies shipped to Alaska from California did not occur. The difficulty of obtaining supplies from California remained and, perhaps, increased. Fort Ross' proximity to the Spaniards and the ability to trade using land routes had been advantageous to the Russians, because Europeans did not have easy access to California. With the opening of ports, this advantage was negated. In Tikhmenev's determination, "The acquisition of food supplies in San Francisco and other neighboring ports had become even more burdensome because of the newly arisen competition."²⁹⁸

Mexican Independence and Manufacturing at Fort Ross

The period of Mexican control over California, in apparent paradox, increasingly harmed the Russian sale of manufactured goods to California: The opening of trade with California had been feverishly anticipated by the Company as a means of satisfying their colonies' victual needs. However, once the Spanish prohibition against foreign trade was lifted, the Russians were forced to compete for the California market. The opening of ports allowed California a more extensive choice of goods, it was no longer bound to the covert trade which had formerly been con-

ducted with Americans, Britons, and Russians. Vessels, traveling from Europe, carried goods that could be sold more cheaply than those manufactured at Fort Ross. Thus Russian goods, once used to barter for grain, decreased in value once trade was open. Spanish requisitions from Fort Ross decreased, as foreigners were able to undersell the Russians with products of greater diversity, larger quantity, and better quality:

...foreigners controlling the trade in California have brought all the possible needs of the inhabitants and supply them at such low prices that it is not possible for us [Russians] to compete with them.²⁹⁹

Khlebnikov's Proposal to Revitalize Manufacturing. In his survey of Fort Ross in the 1820s, Khlebnikov suggested improvements and additions to manufacturing that would allow Fort Ross to participate once again in the expanding California market.³⁰⁰ He believed that the manufacture of goods to serve a local population would require only minimal cost and effort. Most significant was to be the addition of woolen products. Heretofore, woolen blankets had been exclusively a mission commodity.³⁰¹ Khlebnikov proposed that the Russians assume and refine this production. The cost would be small, in Khlebnikov's estimation, only 1000 sheep could provide a sufficient amount of wool for this new industry. Not only could blankets be manufactured, but hats, coverlets, and harnesses could provide a handsome revenue from California, exchangeable for grain.³⁰² The Ross settlement, however, could not afford the manpower necessary to implement Khlebnikov's proposals. In the twenties, the Russians at Fort Ross started to direct their labor resources toward agricultural production, to insure a supply of food no longer provided by the California trade.

The Russians Turn to Agriculture. The Russians lost much of a valuable supply of grain with the opening of California's ports. The colonies could not do without this grain supply, even though it had never fully met provisionment needs. To solve this problem, the Russians turned to agricultural production at Fort Ross. The production of grain, which had undergone only random experimentation under Kuskov, was to be the settlement's primary focus after 1821. Karl Schmidt, whose managership concurred with the opening of ports, led the Company away from manufacturing for the Spanish market; instead, he was concerned with internalizing the market. Husbandry and ship-building became the dominant activities at Fort Ross, intending to serve only the domestic economy of Russian America.

Manufacturing did continue after 1821. It was, however, less extensive. The benefits of manufacturing remained satisfactory, although the profits would never again reach the 6000 ruble mark as in the past years.³⁰³ The need for Russian manufactures in California persisted. This was exemplified in 1833, when Governor Jose Figueroa sent Alfredes Vallejo to Fort Ross to buy arms, munitions, and clothing for his soldiers.³⁰⁴ It is likely, however, that these goods were not manufactured at Fort Ross or even of Russian make, but purchased by the Russians from foreigners.³⁰⁵

Secularization of the Missions and the Decline of Manufacturing

The opening of California's ports to foreign trading vessels in 1821 was not the only decision of the newly-established Mexican government that dramatically altered the economic composition of Alta California. A high priority of the Mexico government was to destroy the refuge of Spanish theocracy: The mission, which was also the

economic base of California--virtually the only producer of agricultural and manufactured goods--was targeted for secularization. With its disintegration in the 1830s, manufacturing veritably disappeared. Even the rudimentary products of the mission were lost to secularization and the consequent disbursement of the mission's communal, conscripted native labor force. "Even such ordinary articles as brooms had to be imported."³⁰⁶ The mission's tremendous agricultural production also declined.

The Mexican Cosmopolitan Company and Russian Manufacturing.

The Mexican government realized the economic importance of the mission and thus created the Cosmopolitan Company to compensate for the projected loss. The mission was not only a hated remnant of Spanish imperialism, but also the locus of California's economic stability. The Cosmopolitan Company was an attempt to reorganize and decentralize the economic structure of California without losing the vital services the mission had provided. The Mexican government even hoped that the Company would accelerate development in California. The project, devised in 1828, was similar in tone to Khlebnikov's plan of establishing a commercially viable manufacturing center in Russian California.³⁰⁷ The Company would provide manifold services, for example, improvement of transportation, administration of farms, and establishment of trading stations.³⁰⁸ The Company's primary objectives were to increase domestic agriculture and mining production, and concomitantly, to market these products to foreigners and Californians.

In regard to manufacturing, the Company hoped to utilize efficiently California's raw materials and sell these products through a central

trading station. Manufacturing was to be organized, as it had been in the days of the missions, so that secularization could occur with little change in California industry. A director, assigned to a specific factory was to administer, maintain, and supervise the labor force, formerly the task of mission fathers. In short, the Cosmopolitan Company was to assume the functions of the missions so that secularization could occur with little agitation to California's delicate economic situation.

However, the Cosmopolitan Company was short-lived and failed to fulfill its intended purpose. Secularization did occur in 1834 and, as anticipated, the economic structure of Mexican California fell into ruins. More political upheaval followed and, in 1836, California declared autonomy from Mexico. A series of petit revolutions occurred, attempting but never achieving, political stability. As power ricocheted from one rancho leader to another, the neglected economy worsened. The Spaniards' irrigated system of agriculture, which sometimes yielded 40-fold and produced a "remarkable variety of grains, vegetables, and fruits,...disappeared with secularization."³⁰⁹ The Russian-American Company was rapidly losing the mission as a once-valued trading partner and, in addition, the need to maintain a post in California. The Californians still could not produce the manufactured goods that had opened a market to the Russians, but neither could they produce the agricultural goods which were the objective gain of manufacturing at Fort Ross.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹⁷⁹ VPR, Ser. II, 7, Doc. no. 349, 122-23. In this Correspondence of the Main Office to Petr Chistiakov, the directors stated that even though the Ross settlement is at present useless, it should be left as is for the time being in case Russia recognizes Mexico.

¹⁸⁰ Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 210.

¹⁸¹ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 83. Rubles, used for transactions in Novo-Arkhangel'sk, were first issued to the Company in 1817 in the amount of 12,000 rubles. In 1822, rubles (30,000) were again issued to the Russian-American Company administration.

¹⁸² Tikhmenev, History, p. 152.

¹⁸³ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 110; and Adele Ogden, California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1941), pp. 63-5.

¹⁸⁴ Ogden describes the contract system in detail in Sea Otter Trade, pp. 45-57. See also Appendix F.

¹⁸⁵ Baidarkas are native canoes, made of seal skins sewn together. They have one, two, or three round openings for oarsmen.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁸⁸ Baranov dreamed of creating a great Russian commercial empire in the North Pacific. See John Wm. Stanton, "The Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1847-1875," Diss. Univ. of California

(1932), p. 485.

189 For accounts of Kolosh hostility, see Tikhmenev, History, pp. 65-6.

190 Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," III, Pt. 3, 12; Tikhmenev, History, p. 68; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 46.

191 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 47; and Arrillaga to Iturrigaray, Loreta, Californias, (March 2, 1804), Vol. 50, No. 8.

192 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 47.

193 Loc. cit.

194 Oliver Kimball and Joseph O'Cain were brothers-in-law.

195 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 60; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 46-48; and William Dane Phelps, "Solid Men of Boston in the Northwest," pp. 4, 15; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 110.

196 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 49.

197 Ibid., p. 51; and Phelps, "Solid Men," pp. 21-22.

198 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 60; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 51; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 110-11, 121.

199 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 52.

200 Arrillaga to Luis Antonia Arguello, Santa Barbara Provincial Records, 12 (February 14, 1807), 269. In Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 49.

201 Rodriguez to Arrillaga, San Diego, Provincial State Papers, 19, (June 23, 1806), pp. 136-68; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 50.

202 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 50; see also Appendix F.

203 Ibid., p. 50.

204 Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. 14; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 50; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 112-13.

205 See Appendix F for the ports visited by the vessels hunting operations.

206 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 52.

207 Ibid., p. 52-53.

208 Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," pp. 14-15.

209 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 54.

210 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; and Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. 15.

211 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 53-4

212 John Ebbets to John Jacob Astor, Macao, John Jacob Astor Collection; (January 11, 1811), Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 53.

213 Arrillaga to Francisco Javier de Venegas, Monterey, Provincial Records, 9 (October 20, 1810), 125; Luis Antonia Argüello to Arrillaga, San Francisco, Provincial State Papers, 19 (November 26, 1810), 280-81.

214 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 54.

215 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. 15; Phelps, "Solid Men," p. 52; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, 53-4.

216 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 54.

217 Aleksander Baranov to Astor, Sitka, Astor Collection (August 13/15, 1811); and Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 129. The Albatross had harvested an additional 74,562 otter skins while not under contract with the Russians.

218 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 56-7.

219 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; and Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. 15.

220 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 57.

221 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 57, 164.

222 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 272; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 113.

223 A complete identification of known California hunting grounds can be found in Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, Chapter IV.

224 Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 272. Lutke stated that "of some assistance in this pursuit [of extending hunting grounds because of decreasing animal numbers in Alaska] were the California sea otters," "Diary," p. 36. References to the policies of Rezanov, directed toward checking encroachments of foreigners in the North Pacific can be found in Bancroft, History of Alaska, p. 481; Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob Astor (Cambridge: Harvard, 1931), I, 171-72, 180; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 91.

225 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 221.

226 Lutke, "Diary," p. 36.

227 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 57.

228 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 70; Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. 16, 204; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 58; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 133.

229 Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. 205; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 51.

230 Ibid., p. 59

231 See Chapter III, "The Founding of Ross," pp. 72-74.

232 According to Khlebnikov, the Aleuts also surreptitiously hunted in San Francisco Bay when Russian boats were allowed to enter for trade of food and merchandise, Colonial Russian, p. 105-07.

233 See Figure 12 which indicates that the number of sea otters caught was minimal except during a period from 1823 to 1826 when the Russians contracted with the Spaniards and before the animal populations had been completely depleted. Golovnin stated that, in 1818, Aleuts were sent for otters "which are found between [Cape Mendicino] and Trinity Bay [Trinidad] though not in great numbers," Voyages, p. 162. In California, the slaughter of fur-bearing animals began in mid-October when the animal's pelt reached its full thickness and length. See Golovnin, Voyage, p. 166.

234 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 123.

235 Loc. cit.

236 Loc. cit.

237 Loc. cit.

238 Tikhmenev, History, p. 135.

239 From Vasili Tarakanov's "Statement," reprinted in Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 60.

240 See Appendix F; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 61.

241 Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 87-8; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 60-1, 165.

242 Loc. cit.

243 Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 493-4; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 198.

244 Ibid., p. 62.

245 Ludovik Choris, Voyage pittoresque autour du monde, (Paris, 1922). Pt. 3, p. 8.

246 Golovnin, Voyages, p. 162.

247 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 64, 168.

- 248 Loc. cit.
- 249 Jose Luyando to Calleja, Madrid, (February 4, 1814), 52-6-6-9.
- 250 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 110.
- 251 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 64-5.
- 252 Ibid., p. 65.
- 253 Company officials in St. Petersburg, however, were unaware that an agreement had finally been concluded, three months earlier, between Murav'ev and the Californian.
- 254 Khlebnikov, "Survey," p. 8.
- 255 Jose Argüello was Governor of California in 1814.
- 256 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, pp. 110-12.
- 257 Ibid., pp. 112-13.
- 258 VPR, Ser. II, 7, Doc. no. 349, 122-23.
- 259 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 113.
- 260 Ibid., pp. 8, 108, 123.
- 261 Blomkvist, "Russian Scientific" p. 164 n. 29.
- 262 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 107.
- 263 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 121; Golovnin, Voyages, p. 166, and Lutke, "Diary", p. 35.
- 264 Khlebnikov, "Survey," p. 8.
- 265 Ibid., p. 7.
- 266 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 718.
- 267 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116.
- 268 Bean, California, p. 70.
- 269 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 150.
- 270 Tkhhmenev, History, p. 141.
- 271 Zavalishin, "California in 1824," p. 386.

- 272 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, pp. 115, 131, 134.
- 273 Bean, California, p. 70.
- 274 VPR, seria pervaia, tom sedmoi,
Doc. no. 280, pp. 695-97; trans. Basi Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-
Vaughan.
- 275 Tikhmenev, History, p. 141.
- 276 Ibid., p. 227.
- 277 Smith, Janice Christine, "Pomo and Promyshlenniki: Time and
Trade at Fort Ross", M.A. thesis, UCLA, (1974), p. 27.
- 278 Bean, California, p. 647; and Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 123.
- 279 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 184.
- 280 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 123.
- 281 Ibid. p. 126 and Golovnin, Voyage, p. 166.
- 282 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 126.
- 283 Ibid., p. 122.
- 284 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
- 285 Ibid., p. 123.
- 286 Golovnin, Voyages, p. 166. There was also a shipyard at Novo-
Arkhangle'sk. The wood of spruce, larch, and cedar were used in the
construction of both Company vessels and rowboats.
- 287 Ibid., pp. 166, 170, n. 7.
- 288 Ibid., p. 166; Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116; Lutke,
"Diary", p. 31.
- 289 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116.
- 290 Golovnin, Voyages, p. 166; Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian,
p. 116-117; and Lutke, "Diary", pp. 6, 31.

- 291 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 117.
- 292 Loc. cit.
- 293 Langsdorff, Voyages, pp. 187-188.
- 294 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116.
- 295 Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 210; Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 137; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 141.
- 296 Under Viceroy Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, the decision for free trade in California ports was finalized. It was proposed that open trade would bring prosperity to the heretofore neglected colony, but would further make California appealing to hispanic emigrants and thus promote colonization. See Hutchinson, California, p. 87.
- 297 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 210; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 121-123.
- 298 Bancroft, California, p. 16.
- 299 Smith, Pomo, p. 28.
- 300 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 127.
- 301 Golovnin reported that Kuskov intended to manufacture woolen products but, perhaps, this never came to be. Golovnin, Voyage, p. 166.
- 302 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 128.
- 303 Loc. cit.
- 304 Bean, California, p. 70.
- 305 Loc. cit.
- 306 Loc. cit.
- 307 Hutchinson, Frontier, p. 198.
- 308 Ibid., p. 201.
- 309 Bean, California, p. 70.

CHAPTER V

HUSBANDRY AT FORT ROSS

AGRICULTURE

Russia's two-and-a-half centuries of eastward expansion was completed with the acquisition of coastal Alaska. The mercurial growth of the empire slowed, as geo-political constraints appeared, and generally abeyed as expansion perforce assumed qualities of predesign and calculation. The Company's primary concern turned from the extension to the stabilization of its possessions. The addition to Company holdings of Alta California and the Sandwich Islands signified this new phase of planned expansion. Their annexation was a response to the difficulties encountered in the process of stabilization or colonization of previously claimed territories. California and the Sandwich Islands were viewed as panacean territories, possessing the resources necessary to maintain the Company's North American holdings. Both regions were loci of nineteenth-century commerce and, perhaps less critical at the time of acquisition, they were salubrious environments conducive to abundant agricultural and animal husbandry.³¹⁰

The Purpose of Agriculture

Resolute agricultural endeavors were slow to be introduced at Fort Ross for a variety of reasons. Initially, the Russians were concerned with the construction of the settlement and the continuation of sea otter hunting off the California coast. By 1813, agriculture (or, more

appropriately, gardening) had commenced.³¹¹ Yet this effort did not reflect an attempt to produce on a large scale for the northern colonies, as would be undertaken in later years. Rather it was domestic agriculture, intended to enhance the quantity and variety of food available to the inhabitants of Fort Ross. Not until 1818 was there a sizeable effort directed towards the production of agricultural surplus. In that year, the Russians increased the amount of seed planted and, concomitantly, the amount of acreage farmed and diversified to include the sowing of barley in addition to wheat.³¹² From this point on, large-scale agriculture production became the dominant concern of the Ross Counter.

Factors Hindering Agricultural Production at Fort Ross

Agriculture at Fort Ross had several unique problems as well as those common to the overall Russian colonizing effort in North America. Production was especially hampered by labor shortages--in terms of skill and number--a problem encountered at other Russian American settlements. Specific to Fort Ross was the difficulty of producing in the unfamiliar and inhibitive climatic conditions of coastal California.

Initial Priorities at Fort Ross. Initially, the Fort Ross site was to have several functions, agriculture not being of the highest priority. It has been suggested that the site was chosen primarily for its defensive features which proffered protection against Spanish and native resistance.³¹³ It is also clear that proximity to harvesting grounds was of major concern to Kuskov, the person ultimately responsible for the selection of the site. The Russians' choice of locale was somewhat limited due to the possession of the coastal lands

to the north and south by the English and Spaniards, respectively. But the area of Fort Ross did present the opportunity to establish a Russian foothold close to San Francisco, an increasingly important commercial port of nineteenth-century colonial trade.

The fact that the Fort Ross site was chosen for purposes other than agriculture resulted in serious problems for the Russians when they decided to primarily focus on raising crops and livestock. The farm sites at Fort Ross were characterized by physical and climatic conditions, conducive to no more than irregular agricultural success, especially considering the inexperience of those who worked the land. Farm sites situated close to the sea were subjected to the thick fog which blanketed the coast in the summer months.³¹⁴ Farming inland was conducted in the mountainous regions of the North Coast Range and these mountainous settings provided little accessible land and, thus, negatively influenced grain production. One of the Company's influential employees, Khlebnikov, described Fort Ross' various farmlands as follows: "There are mountain slopes near Fort Ross, sometimes level areas, and sometimes hills and meadows...Obviously the flat meadow areas are the best for agriculture, and the further from the sea they are, the better they are hidden from the fog."³¹⁵ Wrangel, Chief Manager of the Russian-American colonies, who inspected the Counter in 1832, at a time when much of the farming was done inland (on the eastern slopes of the coastal mountains) in an attempt to avoid the devastating fog belt, described Fort Ross' farmlands as:

...very few and...small patches on the slopes of high, steep hills accessible only on foot or on horseback, so that, having overcome cultivation of this steeply mountainous plowland with no little labor.³¹⁶

To remedy the problem of farming these lands, with no access for conventional plows, the Russians "employ[ed] Indians to break up the earth with spades."³¹⁷ Igor Chernykh, an agronomist stationed at Fort Ross (1836-1838), described the impracticality of Fort Ross as an agricultural settlement in an 1836 letter to a former teacher, Pavlov, at the Moscow School of Agriculture:

A few words about the unfavorable location of Ross for the pursuit of agriculture. The purpose of Ross was initially the hunting of otters and the building of ships. Ever since the sea otters were depleted and the timber was found to be unsound for ships, the original object of the settlement has changed. Now they pay attention to it in terms of agriculture; but the site does not answer this purpose so much; the closeness of the sea, and from this the heavy fogs, which produce the plant disease called rust are almost every year the cause of the meager harvest. The high mountains, covered with huge trees and cut by deep, steep ravines, leave a very limited amount of land for agriculture.³¹⁸

Farm Sites at Fort Ross. The Russians farmed near the fort and at several ranches in California. The inventory attached to John Sutter's bill of sale in 1839 described four areas at which farming occurred.³¹⁹

(1) Garden sites located within 3500 feet of the fort itself claimed 70 acres of arable land suitable for the production of grains, two orchards with a combined total of 554 fruit trees, and a vegetable garden, 490 x 140 feet. (2) The Khlebnikov Ranch possibly located near the present-day town of Bodega Corners, had "sufficient" farmland, suitable for the production of "beans, corn, tobacco, etc.," but apparently no land suitable for the production of grain.³²⁰

(3) The Kostromitinov Ranch, located midway between Rumiantsev Bay and Fort Ross on the coastal trail near the portage of the Russian River, had "about 100 acres of cultivated land" suitable for the production of

of wheat. (4) The Chernykh Ranch, located on the Klebnikov Plain, had 20 acres of cultivated land, but the "larger part of the land is suitable for corn, beans, onions, chili, etc." and not grains.

Problems of Native Labor. In addition to mediocre natural resources, human resources for agriculture were also limited. It had been often recorded that the agricultural labor force--primarily Southwestern Pomo natives--was insufficiently experienced.³²¹ While it is true that the Pomo were not farmers--their sustenance relied on the foods proffered by the immediate environment (they harvested foods from the sea and wild grains further inland)--native ignorance of European agricultural techniques was less an inhibitive factor to agricultural success at Fort Ross than were the conditions under which the natives labored and the inexperience of their supervisory personnel.

Initially, the natives living near Fort Ross came voluntarily to work for the Russians with little compensation.³²² As time passed, however, this relationship changed, because of the extension of farming at Fort Ross without a correlative increase in resources. The Russians needed more labor to meet the agricultural goals of provisioning the northern colonies set by the Company. This was unlike the early years when there had only been a modest amount of farm work to be done and Kuskov "cultivated only a small area," because of a shortage of "the labor necessary" to farm.³²³ From 1813 to 1817, only 42 puds of grain were planted and 87 harvested, a task manageable by the available native laborers, employing nineteenth-century farming techniques.³²⁴ Whereas, from 1823 to 1827, 233 puds were planted and 4093 puds from 1818 to 1822. The increase in agricultural production required more farmhands or more time from the existing laborers. And since additional

laborers were not available, the Russians demanded much more from their Pomo workers.³²⁵ Wrangel described the difficult work required from workers after cultivation was moved (in 1821) to the slopes of the coastal mountains:

...after harvesting there remains the extremely difficult and slow work of hauling the sheaves on shoulders to the threshing floor or to such places whence they can be conveyed by horses.³²⁶

Russian Forced Labor System. The Russians had instilled in the Pomo a new understanding of labor value--labor in exchange for wages. When the Pomo first came to Fort Ross and worked voluntarily with the Aleuts, Kuskov was compelled to reward their labor in kind.³²⁷ These gifts increased the natives' expectations of their labor relations with the Russians. But the Russians were unable to compensate the natives in accordance with the increased demand for labor. In the 1820s, the Russians resorted to forceful conscription of native labor, introducing a system of restitution which veritably tied the natives to the settlement by penalizing them for unsuccessful harvests.³²⁸ Natives were denied their freedom if a crop failed and were forced to atone that loss by providing additional labor for the Russians. In concurrence with the increase demand for laborers, there was a decrease in the number of natives choosing to participate in Russian farming. The increase in native resistance is not surprising considering the institutionalization of this forced-labor system. This developed resistance on the part of native workers, was more an impediment to successful agriculture than was native ignorance of agriculture. Wrangel reported his concern, in 1833, of the conditions under which the natives labored. He encouraged Russian "humanity" to remedy this unjust method of labor recruitment.

...[Because] of the bad food and negligible pay the Indians have stopped coming to the settlement for work, from which the Factory found itself forced to seek them in the tundras, attack by surprise, tie their hands, and drive them to the settlement like cattle to work: such a party of 75 men, wives, and children was brought to the settlement during my presence from a distance of about 65 verstas [43 miles] from here, where they had to leave their belongings without any attention for two months. It goes without saying what consequences there must be in due course from such actions with the Indians, and will we make them our friends?³²⁹

Russian Supervisory and Agricultural Inexperience. The inexperience of Russians, who served principally as supervisors, was more a hindrance to agricultural development than the inefficiency of native workers. The supervisory personnel, that is the Russians, determined the type of crops to be planted, the acreage to be used, the time planting and harvesting would occur, and the methods that would be employed to that end. In 1833, Wrangel spoke to the fact that the managership of Fort Ross did not necessary presume agricultural knowhow:

...the Manager of the Factory himself, who supervises agriculture here, has never had any experience whatsoever in these matters: consequently, in all fairness should it be surprising that with great local difficulties and without the benefit of practical experience agriculture has been reduced to the mediocre condition in which it is now found.³³⁰

Russian Company employees had little agricultural experience, but also limited enthusiasm. As Wrangel commented, "...promyshlenniki arriving in America,...consist of all kinds of riffraff."³³¹ John Sutter recalled the response of Russian officials to his request to retain Company employees as his own:

I wanted some of the Russians to remain with me as hired men, but the officers told me I could do nothing with them, that they could hardly manage them and that they were sure I could not be severe enough.³³²

Since the availability and skill of labor was important to the realization of agricultural goals, the inadequate labor supply should have been a consideration at the decision-making level. But this level, and detrimentally so, was infused with an ignorance of agriculture as well as management.

Russian Unfamiliarity with California's Growing Conditions.

Agriculture developed poorly, because of the paucity and obstinacy of native and Russian workers, coupled with the incompetence of the supervisory work force. The agricultural ignorance of Russian supervisors was intensified by the Russians' unfamiliarity with the particular growing conditions of Alta California. Khlebnikov reported that "because of lack of experience, cultivation was first begun on the hillsides" close to the sea where the fog caused considerable crop damage.³³³ Igor Chernykh, a Moscow-trained agronomist, reverently noted his astonishment at the dissimilarity between climatic conditions of Alta California and his native Russia.

Moving from the winter and the blizzard of my homeland to a country of eternal summer, I was astonished at first by the unusual change of climate; in late October [early November], when in much of Russia the entire plant kingdom dies; here, on the contrary, everything comes to life; it arises from the rains, which begin at this time and signify winter. The rain mostly continued until the month of March. April, May and June--these months can be called blossoming ones: at this time all fields and mountains are adorned with luxuriant flowers and form an inimitable picture. Especially at this time is the heart imbued with a reverent feeling toward the Perpetrator of Life!³³⁴

Exhaustion of the Soil in Russian California. Despite the natural productivity of northern California, Russian agriculture developed poorly. The limited land, poorly managed, quickly lost its ability to produce effectively. In the 1820s, Khlebnikov reported,

"in some places the soil is good chernozem, in other places it is sandy but it is equally fertile everywhere."³³⁵ However, by 1833, the nutrient value of the land was apparently already greatly diminished. Chernykh reported in 1836 that future prospects for agriculture were poor due to the condition of the soil. Wrangel speculated that poor farming techniques in Fort Ross' early years were responsible for the exhausted condition of the land.

Perhaps with the introduction of intercropping and other auxilliary means the fields would not have depleted so quickly, and with the improvement of threshing and winnowing they would not have lost so much as now.³³⁶

Chernykh reported in 1836 that future prospects for agriculture were poor due to the condition of the soil.

The Land that could be cultivated [at Fort Ross] has for long been continously sown with wheat, and despite this yields are sometimes extraordinary; I think that the reason for this is that here slime forms from the chernozem year round, except for 2-3 months. But the exhaustion of the soil is already noticeable.

The exhausted, abandoned land goes to weeds, and it is impossible to replace it with new land as well as to destroy the weeds because of the shortage of hands for plowing at the time when they could be destroyed,--all this together greatly worries me.³³⁷

The possiblity of Fort Ross serving as the Company's food producer, its "granary," seemed bleak and this was the outlook after two-and-a-half decades of additions and improvements.

GRAIN PRODUCTION AT FORT ROSS

The production of grain was the most important agricultural pursuit at Fort Ross. This is measured by the emphasis afforded its improvement and development. Grain was a basic necessity for survival in the Russian-American Company colonies. It was difficult to purchase or to transport from Europe and, hence the most indispensible crop to be pro-

duced at Fort Ross. The amount of wheat and barley--the principal grains of Fort Ross produced, quantified and charted--visibly breaks into six distinct periods (see Figure 13). These periods of grain production at Fort Ross vary from three to five years and each is characterized by a short-term trend, generally definable by circumstances particular to Fort Ross at the time. Overall, the first three periods of production at Fort Ross constitute a trend of long-term growth, but periods four and five show production in decline. The information available for the final period is scanty, but it is apparent that production increased from the preceding, unproductive period. From 1813 to 1825 (periods I to III), the rate of growth is 82%; whereas, from 1826 to 1835 (periods IV and V), there is a negative growth rate of approximately 6.7%. The trend of the final years was positive, increasing 50% through 1841. It should be noted that the increase in absolute production numbers did not necessarily constitute agricultural development inasmuch as yields were subject to large fluctuations throughout the years at Fort Ross (Compare Figures 13 and 14).

Period I: Production at Fort Ross, from Founding to 1817

Minimal Agricultural Production. The minimal amount of grain production at Fort Ross through 1817 accurately reflected the limited resources the Russians directed toward agriculture at that time. Farming existed only on a small scale: in total, 42 puds of wheat were planted before 1818 on acreage within 3500 feet of the fort proper. The increase in production of wheat was high, 25.9%, but this was due to the annual increase in the amounts sown. Actually,




Figure 13. Production (in puds) of grain at Fort Ross, 1813-1841. Based on information found in James R. Gibson, Imperial Russia in Frontier America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 112-49 and Petr A. Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1978), pp. 211-24.

the yields were meager, averaging 2.16-fold annually. The total production of wheat during this period was only 90 puds.³³⁸

Factors Limiting Agricultural Production. Before 1818, the Russians were less interested in converting Fort Ross to a large-scale grain producer than continuing to harvest sea otters which, "during the Kuskov administration, accounted for 1200 to 1500 pelts annually."³³⁹ Early in 1818, Golovnin ranked the importance of hunting over agriculture and manufacturing, remarking that Kuskov "does not lose sight of his main business--sending out hunting parties for otter."³⁴⁰ Moreover, Golovnin referred to grain cultivation as an activity of low priority.

As an experiment, Mr. Kuskov tried some grain cultivation, but for lack of workers and necessary equipment, and possibly due to inexperience, the yield did not live up to expectations...³⁴¹

Hence, agriculture had several detractors in the early years. The Russians, not initially intending to create an agricultural settlement, expended resources on several productions. Manufacturing and hunting drained the already deficient supply of native labor. These productions assured a dependable profit in Spanish California; pelts and manufactured goods could be exchanged for mission grain, whereas agricultural prospects at Fort Ross were, at most, uncertain. Prior to 1818, it was unreasonable to risk directing full attention to agriculture, with only modest resources of knowledge, labor, and equipment and perforce averting attention from profitable industries.

The ability of the Russians to undertake large-scale agriculture may also have been hampered by the effects of disease which struck the native populations, reaching epidemic proportions between 1815 and

1822.³⁴² Included in the destructive rage of the disease, possibly measles, were the Southeastern Pomo who served as Fort Ross' principal farmers.

It is difficult to assess what impact if any the outcome of agricultural pursuits, during this period, had for future policy at Fort Ross. Russian efforts and results were minimal, reflecting the dearth of resources. Clearly, agriculture was attempted only as a sideline; gardening was an integral part of the settlement, but large-scale agricultural production was not a primary focus of Company labor. In the early years, it seemed that the expectation of Fort Ross as a granary was non-existent. The introduction of farming followed a general pattern, discernible in the early Alaskan and Asian colonies: Gardening began in conjunction with the settlement; a predictable correlation as there existed no reliable source of provisionment in such remote outposts.³⁴³ It may be that instituting agricultural production on a scale sufficiently large to supply the Russian colonies was a goal originally slated for the Ross settlement. However, it was not its foremost purpose as agriculture was subordinated to the needs of hunting and manufacturing, which provided the easier means to obtain grain from the Spaniards.

Period II, 1818-1821

The Promise of Agricultural Development. The year 1818 was transitional in Fort Ross' agricultural development. There was a perceptible change in attitude as agriculture assumed a greater importance among the activities of Fort Ross. Its development was no longer

subordinated to the interests of hunting and manufacturing. This change in attitude is discernible both in communications from Company officials and in actions undertaken by the Russians at Fort Ross. Foreshadowing a trend toward stabilization of the colonies through regulation of provisions, Baranov, in 1817, ordered Kuskov to "increase grain cultivation" covertly, without arousing suspicion from the Spaniards.³⁴⁴ Kuskov acted accordingly, introducing barley of which 12.7 puds were planted. Additionally, he doubled the amount of wheat sown, from the previous year, to 46.7 puds. Consequent to the larger amounts of seed sown, the amount of acreage cultivated was increased substantially.

Factors Limiting Agricultural Development. Russian efforts during this second period were justly rewarded. Although the rate of production slowed to 18%, the yields doubled to an average of 4.05 per year. Yet these improved results were hardly sufficient to justify Fort Ross' conversion to an agricultural settlement alone. Though the number of fur-bearing animals was in decline, hunting continued to be a profitable industry. Manufacturing for the illegal California market also remained an important concern, providing a dependable income of grain.³⁴⁵ Throughout this period, therefore, hunting, manufacturing, and shipbuilding continued to siphon resources away from agriculture.

In addition to hunting and manufacturing, shipbuilding was especially significant, making its appearance in 1818. The Company decided that the Fort Ross site was convenient for the construction of vessels for the Company fleet. Four vessels were built in the seven years from 1817 to 1824 and this was a considerable drain on the available labor force (see Chapter IV, pp. 131-32).

The Russians' inability to produce in sizeable quantities resulted from several factors other than diversification of activities.³⁴⁶ First, an epidemic which struck California natives in 1815 continued until 1822 and circumscribed the available work force. Also of great importance was the fact that the Russians continued to cultivate farmland near the ocean. The coastal farmlands were subject to heavy fogs, high winds, and low temperatures. These elements diminished grain production significantly: Fog frequently resulted in stem rust, which at times destroyed an entire crop. Low temperatures and high winds reduced the rate of plant growth.

Despite these inhibitive factors, the production trend of this period was positive. Although it did not result in a large production of grain, it indicated to Company officials that there existed potential for Fort Ross to serve as the colonies' granary. This progress prefigured the growth of the third production period (1822-1825) in which this trend would continue, only more dramatically due to the decline in hunting and manufacturing and the impending disappearance of shipbuilding.

Period III, 1822-1825

Agricultural Prosperity at Fort Ross. The period from 1822 to 1825 constituted the most successful period of agriculture at Fort Ross. This was in large part due to the transfer of leadership from Kuskov to Karl Schmidt, in 1821, who effected a number of changes in agricultural management. The trend of improvement, initiated by Kuskov, continued under Schmidt (1821-1824), but improvements were considerably more radical. In 1821 Schmidt Schmidt introduced private farming and moved

Company farm operations inland.³⁴⁷ These were the principal factors creating this period of prosperity in which wheat production increased, in absolute figures, at the phenomenal rate of 62.9%. These factors were supplemented by natural forces. In 1822, the rage of disease which had killed countless natives, subsided. This enabled the Russians to have access to a larger and healthier supply of native laborers. For this reason, it was a practical time for the Russians to turn their full attention to improving agriculture.

Factors Facilitating Agricultural Production. The cultivation of mountain lands, removed from the restrictive farming conditions of the coast, proved a provident decision by Schmidt. Yields immediately increased, averaging 7.85-fold and were recorded as high as nine-fold. Farming the sloped east of the North Coast Range, while hampered by limited accessibility, avoided several of the aforementioned problems related to coastal farming, namely thick and prevalent fogs, strong northerly winds, and low temperatures. Schmidt also managed to increase the acreage sown each year: 42 additional acres in 1821, 315 in 1823, and 679 in 1825.

In addition to increasing Company farm holdings, Schmidt introduced private farming among Company employees (see Figure 14). He encourage Aleuts and Russians to produce on land which was leased to them by the Company.³⁴⁸ Such private farming accounted substantially for the tremendous jump in production during this period. On their private land, the inhabitants of Fort Ross duplicated the less-than-satisfactory results of Company agriculture. The Company's average yield was 5.543-fold, whereas the private sector produced, on an average, 5.547-fold. But the aggregation alone, of private and Company farming,

Company yields of wheat and barley (plotted with a broken line) show a regular fluctuation, but the trend is visibly downward, with a growth rate of -8%. (This rate excludes the one relatively phenomenal harvest yielding 14.2-fold in 1831.)

Yields of wheat and barley, produced privately at Ross, closely parallel company production. These yields, illustrated by the solid line, declined by 4.9% in the 9-year period.

In 1832 and 1833 the production figures are combined. In those years, company and private production together yielded 8- and 9-fold.

Below is a graph of company grain production prior to the introduction of private plots in 1822. The yields were small and fluctuated greatly from year to year.





Figure 14. Private versus Company yields of wheat and barley, 1822-1831. Based on chart found in James R. Gibson, *Imperial Russia in Frontier America* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), p. 121 and information found in Kirill T. Khlebnikov, *Colonial Russian America, 1817-1832*, trans. and annotated E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan and Basil Dmytryshyn (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1978), pp. 117-19 and Petr A. Tikhmenev, *A History of the Russian-American Company*, trans. and ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1978), pp. 211-24.

doubled the amount of grain harvested annually.

The changes implemented by officials at Fort Ross after 1821 evidenced that agriculture had assumed a position of relative importance to the Company. It had become the object of long-range planning. Such concentration on agriculture was perhaps necessitated by the failure of other productions at Fort Ross. First, the market for, and thus the production of, manufactured goods virtually disappeared after the opening of California's ports. In addition, shipbuilding was terminated in 1824. These failures freed resources for agriculture. The change in manufacturing, however, may have been more concomitant than cause of the intense agricultural expansion after 1821. The true motivation may have been the changing political atmosphere in California, outside the Russian possessions. More precisely, 1821 saw an end to Spanish sovereignty over California and the Russians had the chance, to the dismay of the United States, Britain, and Spain, to expand their holdings and establish agricultural settlements in the midst of the ensuing political confusion and instability.

Period IV, 1826-1830

Agriculture in Decline at Fort Ross. The agricultural prosperity brought about by Schmidt's innovations--inland and private farming--continued throughout his tenure as manager and is undoubtedly his most notable contribution to the settlement and the Company. Unfortunately, after his departure, the innovations and improvements waned and the healthy trend he helped install continued for only the first year of the following administration. Although the absolute harvest figures continued to increase in 1826 and 1827, the yields actually

decreased by one-half. And this occurred even though the acreage was doubled from 1825 to 1830. From 1828, this negative change was apparent in the reversal of grain production. The absolute figures declined 28% in a three-year period (1828-1830), a loss of 1,667 puds per year. The decline is even more drastic than the absolute figures indicate, because the amount of seed planted was increased substantially throughout the period. In 1826, the seed planted doubled, from the previous year, to 203 puds. And each year, during the period, the seed sown was increased considerably, a total increase of 43% from 1825 to 1829. The quantity of barley sown remained fairly constant. Despite the increase in the quantity of seed planted, the wheat harvest increased only once, to 5.3-fold in 1827. Subsequently, the yield decline one-fold per year.³⁴⁹

Factors Responsible for the Decline in Agriculture. Searching for explanations for the sudden halt of the prosperous trend in wheat production is frustrating. Manufacturing was already greatly reduced in 1821 and this should have freed labor to agricultural pursuits. Additionally, in 1826, there was a startling decline in the number of fur-bearing animals taken by Aleuts hunters. In 1825, 1,550 pelts were harvested, but this number fell to 755 in 1826, and 302 in 1827, and one in 1828.³⁵⁰ From 1829 on, the catch stabilized at 200 to 300 pelts annually. Agriculture was apparently the most important occupation of the Ross Counter. Since this sudden and temporary change in production was comprised of only four years, its causes maybe undetectable. However, violation of the land, coupled with agricultural mismanagement, may provide a defensible explanation for the failed production.

Physical factors should certainly be considered when seeking explanations for the decline in production. The depletion of the soil at Fort Ross' farm sites, due to inferior farming techniques, is well-documented.³⁵¹ The scarcity of arable land led to the annual sowing of any available lands. Yearly cultivation quickly drained the land of nutrients. In the early 1830s, the condition had become desperate and Wrangel reported to the Main Office that the plowland "does not return to seed, and should be abandoned," because the soil "has now already lost its strength."³⁵² Chernykh, who introduced a two-field system of agriculture, described how agricultural mismanagement had led to the current condition of Fort Ross' plowland: "The land that could be cultivated has for long been continuously sown with wheat, ...the exhaustion of the soil is already noticeable."³⁵³ A climatic impediment, which intensified the damage caused by the poor soil, was stem rust--a problem common to coastal farming (see p. 149). The poor yields in 1826 and 1830 can be partially attributed to this phenomenon.³⁵⁴

The Failure of Management. The mismanagement of agriculture during this period was the failure to remove agriculture from the rust-prone coastal mountain tracts, within the confines of the Ross Counter, which had returned so unfavorably. While it is true that farming at these sites had continued for only a short time, perhaps nine years, the fact that no ulterior lands were cultivated during the administration of Paul I. Shelekhov (1825-1829) may explain the diminished production. Under the last two managers of Fort Ross, Petr S. Kostromitinov (1830-1836) and Aleksandr G. Rotchev (1836-1841), the virgin lands east of Russian California, were cultivated and yields correspondingly tripled

from three- to nine-fold.

The failure to expand agriculture during this crucial period was more a function of the onerous Company bureaucracy than simply the mismanagement of Shelekhov. In fact, Shelekhov was well aware of the need for additional plowland. He reported in 1822 that land was scarce because of the small size of the settlement and its dual use for agriculture and animal husbandry. He did expand agriculture as much as possible within the confines of the settlement. Each year the amount of grain planted was increased. From the 1826 to 1829, the wheat sown was doubled to 860 puds. Inferably, there was an increase in acreage. By 1828, the Main Office was aware of the soil exhaustion and the need for more farmlands at Fort Ross. But this cognizance did not result in a corrective action. No additional land was cultivated outside the fort until 1830 when Ferdinand Wrangel became Chief Manager of the Russian-American Company colonies and the like-minded Petr Kostromitinov was appointed Manager of Fort Ross. Together they introduced the necessary improvements to rejuvenate Fort Ross' agricultural production.

Period V, 1831-1834

The Wrangel Period. Ferdinand Wrangel, "one of the best governors [Chief Managers] of the colonies," was important to the reascendance of agriculture in the early 1830s. He had come to govern the colonies for five years--taking leave from the Imperial Navy--and was determined to "adjust" and "correct" the economy of Russian America which, in his view, was "the most neglected in the colonial administration."³⁵⁵

Wrangel apparently felt that agriculture at the Ross Counter was not

producing at its potential and, following an inspection in 1832, he suggested that expert help from the Moscow School of Agriculture could help Fort Ross meet its goals.

...It is best to ask the Moscow [Agricultural] Society for sensible advice in order not to incur expenses in vain and uselessly lose time besides.³⁵⁶

The Society obliged Wrangel, dispatching Igor Chernykh, a graduate of that institution, to Fort Ross in 1836.

Petr Kostromitinov, the Chief Manager Wrangel demonstrated a willingness and an ability to implement measures needed to rejuvenate Fort Ross' sagging agricultural development. Soon after his arrival at Fort Ross, Kostromitinov opened new lands for cultivation. He began to farm uninhabited river valleys such as those of the the easternmost border of Russian California, the Avancha, and the Rotchev Rivers.³⁵⁷

Factors Facilitating the Improvement of Production. The deteriorating political situation in California allowed the Russian to cultivate lands outside the immediate vicinity of the fort. Kostromitinov founded two ranches, the Khlebnikov and Kostromitinov, as was the trend in California's overall land reorganization. The ranches were founded at a time when hundreds of ranches were being established by Spanish settlers on land recently unlocked by secularization of the missions. It is probable that Wrangel and Kostromitinov decided to avoid arousing Mexican suspicion by creating these private ranches, minimizing their association with the Russian-American Company.

The argument that the decline in agricultural production during the Shelekhov administration was caused by the cultivation of overused lands close to the fort is bolstered by the immediate change in the fifth

period. Utilizing new lands away from Fort Ross, which constituted only one-half of the previous acreage, resulted in a dramatic jump in yield and absolute production figures. The Ross Counter even increased production in 1831 and 1833 despite an epidemic of disease which killed many nearby Indians and incapacitated Russian Company employees, and thereby limited the amount of available labor. The yield was nearly ten-fold in 1832 and nine- and eight-fold in the succeeding years, an anomolous showing for agriculture at Fort Ross.³⁵⁸

Phase VI, 1835-1840

Final Attempts to Increase Agricultural Production. From 1832 to 1834, the absolute production rate climbed nearly 6% and the yields were also high. There was no indication that the subsequent years, from 1835 to 1837, would show the poorest yields of grain since Fort Ross' founding. Each year the crop failed. There were corresponding crop failures in California in 1835, 1836, and 1837. In 1835, production at Fort Ross fell sharply, 53% from the previous year. In 1836, another 14% reduction occurred. Finally, in 1837, the harvest began to show signs of rejuvenation and, in fact, it continued to improve for the next few years. It is possible that as much as 5500 puds of grain were produced at Fort Ross from 1833 to 1841.³⁵⁹

Production would, however, never again approach the pre-1835 figures.

Igor Chernykh Attempts to Improve Agriculture at Fort Ross. The early 1830s had seen considerable improvements to agriculture, but these proved ineffective as well as costly. In 1836, the Company received the assistance of agronomist Igor Chernykh, who surveyed Fort Ross' farm sites and made further improvements. His most valuable

addition to agriculture was the introduction of a "mobile Scottish" threshing machine; an improvement suggested by Wrangel in his 1833 report.³⁶⁰ Heretofore, threshing was done by horses as described by Wrangel:

...30 or more [horses] are mobilized in an enclosure covered with sheaves, from which the kernels are dislodged by the running hooves. By this method they thresh 900 sheaves per day with 40 horses under 8 drivers.³⁶¹

Chernykh admitted some quirks in his device--"owing to the stubbornness of the workers in the face of this innovation and the unfamiliarity of the horses with circling."³⁶² Not completely satisfied with the initial product, Chernykh hoped to correct the machine to adequately serve Fort Ross' needs.

The machine built by me is entirely wooden, except the coaks the bearings, which are made from iron; the cams on all wheels, as well as the teats on the gears, are of hard laurel; the conveying cylinders are also laurel. It is set in motion by two horses; the drum with six beaters makes 180 revolutions per minute, which are insufficient, as I noted from experience; it can thresh up to 700 large sheaves in 10 hours; but with the help of 4-5 men and 4 horses (which are replaced every two hours) it threshes from 350 to 550 sheaves per day...

It is impossible, of course, to avoid defects with the first construction of this important and rather complex machine. Next summer [1837] I intend to correct the mistakes noted in my machine, and I shall try to build another wooden [one].³⁶³

Chernykh further attempted to improve agricultural production by introducing new grains to the site, principally English Oats and Himalayan rye. Both yielded well. In addition, a final ranch was founded--the Chernykh Ranch--in 1836, somewhere on the Khlebnikov Plain. It had two hotbeds, an estimated 50 acres of cultivated land, and a floor for winnowing.³⁶⁴

The Company's Decision to Abandon Fort Ross. The abject failure of agriculture in this final period destroyed any hope that Fort Ross' agricultural mission could ever succeed. Chernykh's commendable efforts, in the face of California's first recorded crop failures, did not convince the Company of the possibility of transforming Fort Ross into the colonies' "granary." Fort Ross had rarely been able to satisfy more than a modicum of Novo-Arkhangel'sk's needs; in fact, there were years in which Fort Ross could not produce for itself. It is difficult to determine precisely how much grain was needed annually to feed the Alaskan colonies. Yet the amount produced at Fort Ross, 800 puds per year, was "a quantity far short of satisfying the colonies' needs."³⁶⁵ Khlebnikov estimated that "from 12,000 to 15,000 puds" annually would meet provisionment needs of the colonies, apparently those of Alaska and Irkutsk.³⁶⁶ The agreement made between the Russian-American Company and the Hudson's Bay Company in 1839 provided the colonies with 14,000 puds of grain annually, inferably the least amount required to feed Alaska.

Thus, the Hudson's Bay Company was willing to provide the Russians with the provisions necessary to maintain their Alaskan possessions, a quantity far above that ever produced at Fort Ross. The Ross Counter never sent more than 5000 puds to Novo-Arkhangel'sk in a given year, and the average figure was much less--1650 puds per year from 1826 to 1840.³⁶⁷ Even the amount of grain exported from Fort Ross, combined with the amount of grain that could be purchased from Spanish California, never approached the figure needed to sustain the Company colonies. From 1826 to 1833, the combined amount of grain

(wheat and barley) destined for Novo-Arkhangel'sk exceeded 12,000 puds perhaps once, in 1832, when an estimated 12,185 puds were exported. The average shipment during those years, however, was much less--8455 puds--only 60% of the quantity guaranteed by the Hudson's Bay Company agreement. This agreement, consequently served the final blow to the existence of Fort Ross as an agricultural settlement. That purpose could be served better through other means, with less inconvenience and political complication. Fort Ross was abandoned in 1841 and this signified an important retreat of Russian political involvement in North America.

GARDENING, ORCHARDING, AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

Gardening at Fort Ross

Gardening was initiated by Kuskov who "liked to garden." He planted melons, squash, and pumpkins.³⁶⁸ In "a good year 800 melons [were] harvested."³⁶⁹ Khlebnikov reported that Kuskov:

Always had a surplus of beets, cabbage, turnips, radishes, lettuce, peas and beans. Radishes and turnips grow unusually large, but they are not flavorful. He supplied all the ships that put in here with vegetables, and he frequently pickled beets and cabbage and sent a large amount to Sitka.³⁷⁰

The cultivation of fruits and vegetables at Fort Ross was conducted on a small-scale, relative to grain production. Wrangel noted this in his 1833 report:

I do not mention gardening and orcharding at Ross because neither one nor the other brings the Company profits and should remain pursuits of private persons only.³⁷¹

That fruit and vegetable crops did not return a profit was not due to any inability to produce in the 1820s; the Russians produced these crops abundantly.

The land [of Ross] produces many plants in great abundance. In his kitchen gardens, Mr. Kuskov grows cabbage, lettuce, pumpkins, radishes, carrots, turnips, beets, onions, and potatoes. Even the watermelons, melons and grapes that he introduced recently, ripen in the open air. The vegetables are very tasty and sometimes reach extraordinary size...³⁷²

Kotzebue commented in a similar vein:

...plants of the warmest climates prosper surprisingly. Cucumbers of fifty pounds' weight, gourds of sixty-five and other fruits in proportion, are produced in [gardens].³⁷³

Potatoes yielded especially well at the Ross settlement. Golovnin reported that "in Fort Ross the usual yield is a hundred to one, and in Port Rumiantsev 180 to 200 to one, and they are planted twice a year.."³⁷⁴ Kotzebue believed that the potato would serve as "an effectual security against famine," especially since two crops could be planted each year, one in March and one in October.³⁷⁵ The production of such crops, however, declined as the Russians concentrated on grain production. Khlebnikov, who toured California in 1825 and 1829, reported that the harvest of potatoes was no more than "6 or occasionally eight-fold."³⁷⁶

Gardening at Fort Ross was conducted almost entirely in the immediate vicinity of the settlement. Within 3500 feet of the fort there was a hotbed and apparently the only permanent Company vegetable garden in Russian California; it was 490 by 140 feet.³⁷⁷ There was little gardening at the ranches, although land at the Chernykh and Khlebnikov ranches was "suitable" for growing vegetables and the Chernykh Ranch had one

hotbed in 1840.³⁷⁸

Orcharding at Fort Ross

Orcharding at Fort Ross was quite extensive. Near the fort itself, there were two orchards, the larger was 385 by 133 feet.³⁷⁹ There was a third orchard (and vineyard) at the Chernykh Ranch.³⁸⁰ The Fort Ross orchard was started during the Kuskov administration, in 1814, when fruit trees were brought from San Francisco aboard the sloop Chirikov.³⁸¹ From 1817 to 1829, vines were introduced from Lima, peach trees from Monterey, and the Company shipped "100 cuttings of apples, pears, cherries, peaches, and bergamots."³⁸²

By the time the Russians departed from California, the orchards and vineyards had grown considerably. The larger Fort Ross orchard contained 534 fruit trees, including apple, peach, pear, quince, and cherry trees and "some" vines.³⁸³ The smaller orchard had "20 fruit trees, and also some vines."³⁸⁴ In 1841, at the Chernykh Ranch, the vineyard boasted some 2000 plants in addition to some fruit trees.³⁸⁵ It appears that the Russians were quite capable of producing vegetables and fruits in California. But, as this production was not as essential as grain cultivation, Company officials, such as Wrangel, preferred that expansion of orcharding and gardening be undertaken only by private individuals or, in other words, not at Company expense.

Animal Husbandry at Fort Ross

Animal husbandry at Fort Ross shared several characteristics of the settlement's agricultural development. It suffered from the proximity to the ocean, enjoyed a heightened significance beginning in 1821, showed a steady rate of improvement throughout the 1820s, and

produced an output insufficient for supply of the northern colonies.³⁸⁶ Yet the information available on the operations of animal husbandry at Fort Ross is relatively small. Hence it is difficult to determine if stock-breeding had years of dramatic failure as did agriculture. Judging from the on-hand information and the nature of stock-breeding, generally, it seems that animal husbandry at Fort Ross enjoyed a gradual and continual appreciation, in terms of the number of head of cattle, horses, sheep, and pigs tended (see Figure 15). The Russians' initial attempts at stock-breeding were more promising than those of grain cultivation, which "did not live up to expectations."³⁸⁷ Golovnin's comments attested to the high expectations for stock-breeding at Fort Ross:

...[Kuskov] also raises cattle, and there is no doubt about success here, for abundant pastureland, water, and year-round grazing make it possible to maintain large herds with a small number of people. At present he has 10 horses, 80 head of cattle, up to 200 sheep and over 50 pigs. All these animals are in very good condition.³⁸⁸

Factors Hindering the Development of Animal Husbandry: Limited Land for Grazing. There was little land in the immediate vicinity of Fort Ross for grazing, as "not one piece of suitable land near the settlement was left uncultivated."³⁸⁹ The land of Fort Ross is pasture and actually better suited to grazing than the production of grain.³⁹⁰ But the emphasis on grain production made stock-breeding difficult during Fort Ross' early years when husbandry occurred only near the fort. As Wrangel noted in his 1833 report:

The mountainous site and the forest pose an insurmountable obstacle to the considerable propagation of cattle in the vicinity of the settlement. From July to November or December the cattle are scattered 20 versta [13½ miles] on




Figure 15. Head of cattle, horses, sheep, and pigs at Fort Ross, 1817-1841.

all sides, seeking grass that in summer fades from the sun and is plucked by the cattle in the vicinity of the settlement.³⁹¹

The lack of grazing lands forced livestock to wander far from Fort Ross in search of pasture and thus supervision was difficult: "...it is impossible to carefully tend the cattle and, being driven twice a day from distant places to the barn for milking, the cows tire and give... little milk."³⁹² The animals were also vulnerable to predators--natives, bears, and wildcats. Other fell from cliffs while wandering in search of pasture.³⁹³

Insufficient Labor to Supervise Herds. The undersupply of labor intensified the problem of supervising the dispersed herds. Khlebnikov reported that only "two Russians, Aleuts or Indians looked after the livestock."³⁹⁴ In his view, these circumstances made animal husbandry unprofitable and unworthy of development during the Kuskov administration. But the progress made during Kuskov's managership should not be overlooked. Kuskov initiated animal husbandry in 1813 when he received "several horses and horned cattle from the mission and from the inhabitants of San Francisco."³⁹⁵ The animals were brought to Fort Ross "by officers of the presidio of San Francisco who, as Kuskov testified, thought that the Russians did not know how to milk cows, sat down under them and showed how it was done."³⁹⁶ From September 1817 until October 1821 the number of head of stock at Fort Ross increased nearly five times, to 1037 head of cattle, horses, and sheep.³⁹⁷

The Development of Animal Husbandry after 1821. Animal husbandry exhibited a significant change in 1821, concurrent with the Russian's resolution to develop agriculture substantially. From the time of the Schmidt administration through 1841, livestock showed a steady growth

rate, resulting from the natural propagation of herds coupled with the addition of grazing lands within Russian California. In the immediate vicinity of Fort Ross (within 3500 feet of the fort) there was one corral (196 feet x 140 feet) and two cattle barns of "thick planks" (140 feet x 24.5 feet).³⁹⁸ A French traveler, La Place, came to Fort Ross in 1839 and remarked: "...In every respect Ross can be called the livestock farm of the barren Russian colonies in the Pacific."³⁹⁹ In 1833, the Kostromitinov and Khlebnikov Ranches were founded and each is listed as having a corral, but there is no reference to the type or size of herds. Basil Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan noted, however, of the Vozhensenskii sketch of the Chernykh Ranch, "the entire front of the picture is given over to fenced-in stockades for cattle...It is possible that cultivated land is shown in the slope behind..." (see Figure 11).⁴⁰⁰

The Inability to Supply Novo-Arkhangel'sk

Fort Ross was better able to produce meat than grain for Russian Alaska, although the quantities of meat were still short of those needed to completely satisfy colonial requirements. Novo-Arkhangel'sk annually required 500 puds (or 28,900 lbs.) of salted beef to feed Company employees.⁴⁰¹ Fort Ross required another 300 to 400 puds (or as much as 14,445 lbs.).⁴⁰² In Wrangel's estimation, 2,250 head of horned cattle could satisfy the needs of Fort Ross and Novo-Arkhangel'sk without depleting the herd, "but because of the smallness of the place, up to 2,000 head altogether should not be allowed..."⁴⁰³ Herds grew tremendously during Fort Ross' last decade (82% from 1833 to 1841), largely due to the addition of ranches with pasture and facilities for stock-breeding. Yet even with such improvements, there were still

only 1700 head of cattle at Fort Ross at the time of its sale.⁴⁰⁴ So, while Fort Ross did supply Novo-Arkhangel'sk with much-needed beef, the quantities were inadequate. Through 1822, the Ross settlement provided 48,893 pounds of meat to the northern colonies.⁴⁰⁵ This averaged to 4,889 annually, or 2,000 pounds less than the quantity needed. Tikhmenev recorded that, in the last 15 years that the Russians held Fort Ross, approximately 6,000 puds of beef were exported to Alaska.⁴⁰⁶ This averages to 400 puds (or 14,444 lbs.) annually, 100 puds less than the settlement required.

In conclusion, the Ross settlement showed considerably more success in stock-breeding than in producing grain. Fort Ross could meet its own needs and still provide one-half of Alaska's beef provisions. However, the Hudson's Bay Company could offer the Russians a greater supply of meat than was ever produced at Fort Ross or purchased in California. Just as it had guaranteed the Russians more grain than they could produce in California or provide through circumnavigation and traditional transport methods (via Kamchatka), the 1839 agreement promised the delivery of 922 puds (33,293 lbs.) of beef per year and an additional 92 puds (3,322 lbs.) of ham.⁴⁰⁷ This quantity of meat was sufficient to supply Alaska's needs of 28,900 pounds per year, but not the additional needs of Fort Ross. Since Russian California was able to provide for its own needs, in terms of meat and grain, Fort Ross could have been maintained--as a self-sufficient entity--had the fort and its surrounding ranches been deemed valuable for reasons other than offering a source of supply for the northern colonies. Once relieved of the responsibility to provide

for those colonies, the Russians were not interested in determining if Fort Ross could have operated without loss, as there was no attempt to hold the territory. With the guarantee of provisions for Alaska, the Company without hesitation rid itself of the burdensome settlement. Negotiations for the 1839 agreement were held between Wrangel and Sir George Simpson of the Hudson's Bay Company in Hamburg in 1837.⁴⁰⁸ By the spring of 1838, the Main Office petitioned Nicholas I for permission to withdraw from California.⁴⁰⁹ That April, the Emperor approved the Company's request.

There was no doubt as to the priority of the Hudson's Bay Company's promised provisionment over the retainment of Fort Ross. The imminent abandonment of Fort Ross was made more certain when John A. Sutter, who purchased the Russian settlement in 1840, agreed to make payment in drafts to the Hudson's Bay Company for the cost of foods for Russian Alaska.⁴¹⁰ Through negotiations with the British and a Swiss colonizer, the Russians succeeded in providing a dual safeguard against starvation in the northern colonies. Since the Russians own attempts to produce food met with only marginal success, there was little purpose in maintaining a settlement. The food cultivated at Fort Ross, in addition to the dwindling foodstuffs obtainable in California, was not sufficient to meet the needs of Russia's northern colonies. These failures, to purchase and produce, resulted in increasing financial losses. But the failures were more concomitant to than cause of the Russian's decision to abandon Fort Ross. The change in California's political direction under Mexico and the subsequent disintegration of her agricultural productivity, left little for California to offer the Russians, other than political imbroglio. And this changing

political structure, which was the cause of California's decreased agricultural productivity, was the deducible reason for the end of Alta California as a Russian colonial possession.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

³¹⁰ James R. Gibson offers incisive accounts of the Russian-American Company's short-lived agricultural settlements in Alta California and the Sandwich Islands in Imperial Russia, pp. 112-149.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 120; Kirill T. Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 118; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 135.

³¹² Gibson, Imperial Russia, pp. 120-121; and Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 118.

³¹³ Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 114; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 136.

³¹⁴ Gibson, Imperial Russia, pp. 135-6; and Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 117.

³¹⁵ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 117.

³¹⁶ Excessive moisture still impeded agricultural attempts after 1821. Stem rust which was caused by the heavy fogs reportedly damaged crops in 1826 and 1830. See Gibson, "Russia in California, 1833: Report of Governor Wrangel," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4, (1969), p. 208; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 224.

³¹⁷ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 119.

³¹⁸ James R. Gibson, "Two New Chernykh Letters," The Pacific Historian, 12, No. 4 (1968), pp. 58-60.

³¹⁹ Clarence DuFour, John E.O. Essig et al., "The Russians in California," California Historical Quarterly, 12, No. 3 (1933),

Documentary Appendix X, pp. 257-60. Reprinted from Vallejo Documentos, 10, p. 229, undated and unsigned.

³²⁰ Gibson, Imperial Russia, pp. 117-118.

³²¹ See for instance, Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 130, and Zavalishin, D., "California in 1824," trans. J.R. Gibson, Southern California Quarterly, 55, No. 4 (1973), p. 409.

³²² Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 119.

³²³ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 117.

³²⁴ A pud is a Russian measure of weight; 36.11 pounds, 16.38 kilograms.

³²⁵ Diversification at Fort Ross: It has been suggested that the availability of native labor was limited significantly by over-diversification of activities at Fort Ross, and thus was a factor hindering agricultural success. See Gibson, Imperial Russia, pp. 126-27. Although it is true that productions at Fort Ross varied, the use of native labor was adequately concentrated on a specific task. This is because diversification at Fort Ross was generally temporal. There was only a slight overlapping in a definite succession of productions. Hunting was practiced from pre-1811 to 1818, manufacturing from 1812 to 1821, shipbuilding from 1818-1824, and agriculture from 1821 to 1841. Agriculture, in particular, was a separate program and effectively began in 1822, a time when hunting and manufacturing were already greatly reduced, and shipbuilding was terminated in 1824. The time was optimal for serious agricultural endeavors to commerce, because the entire labor force could be directed primarily to farm work.

³²⁶ Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 208.

327 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 119.

328 See Governor Wrangel's comments in Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 211.

329 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 211.

330 Loc. cit.

331 Ibid., p. 208.

332 DuFour, "The Russians Withdrawal," Documentary Appendix 29, p. 275. Reprint of John H. Sutter's Personal Reminiscences, MS 54-59, Bancroft Library.

333 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 117. On the other hand, the Russians were able to imitate some Californian agricultural techniques and equipment, such as plows. The land was "cultivated after the first rains of November and December, which is the way of the Californians" (p. 119).

334 Gibson, "Chernykh Letters," p. 58.

335 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 119. Chernozem, or black earth, is the rich, dark soil typical of midlatitude grasslands. It is not found at the Fort Ross site. Like many Russians, Chernykh classified dark soil as chernozem.

336 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 208.

337 Gibson, "Chernykh Letters," p. 59-60.

338 See Figures 13 and 14 for the amounts (in puds) of grain produced at Fort Ross from periods I through IV.

339 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 123.

340 Golovin, Voyage, p. 266. Sea otter hunting occurred in the spring and summer months and thus would have conflicted with agriculture,

because Aleuts were needed for sowing. In Siberia, however, the sable was trapped during the winter months, leaving an available labor pool for agricultural production. See James J. Gibson's "Critical Contrasts," p. 3, 5.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 267.

³⁴² Petr Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians in Upper California," in Ethnographic Observations on the Coast Miwok and Pomo by Contre-Admiral F.P. von Wrangell and P. Kostromitinov of the Russian Colony Ross, trans. Fred Stross, Archaeological Research Facility (Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1974), p. 7.

³⁴³ Spanish California served as a supplier of provisions to Russian America, but trade was forbidden by the Spanish government therefore supplies were not dependable.

³⁴⁴ Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 116, Reprinted from Document 1:67 verso - 68 of the U.S. National Archives.

³⁴⁵ In 1821, the newly-independent Mexican government order California's ports opened to foreign trading vessels. Foreigners imported goods which the Fort Ross factory could not duplicate in quality or price. Thus, in that year, the need for Russian manufacturing, in the eyes of the Californians, declined dramatically.

³⁴⁶ Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 131.

³⁴⁷ Tikhmenev, History, p. 224.

³⁴⁸ Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 116, and Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 118. James Gibson credits Zavalishin with the proposal for expanding agriculture in Russian California through free colonization by Russian peasants. See Gibson's introduction to Zavalishin's work "California in 1824," p. 372.

349 See Figure 12, p. 151.

350 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 135, and Tikhmenev, History, p. 227.

351 Both Chernykh and Wrangell comment on this phenomenon. See Gibson, "Chernykh Letters," pp. 59-60, Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 133, and Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 208.

352 Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 208.

353 Gibson, "Chernykh Letters," p. 60.

354 Gibson, "Chernykh Letters," p. 59, and Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 137.

355 Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 206.

356 Ibid., pp. 208-9.

357 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 118.

358 See Figure 12, p. 151.

359 Tikhmenev, History, p. 211.

360 Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 208.

361 Gibson, "Chernykh Letters," pp. 59-60; and Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 208.

362 Gibson, "Chernykh Letters," p. 55.

363 Loc. cit.

364 DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," p. 259.

365 Tikhmenev, History, p. 224.

366 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 127.

367 Tikhmenev, History, p. 224.

368 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 121.

369 Loc. cit.

370 Loc. cit.

371 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 209.

372 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 165.

373 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 125.

374 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 165.

375 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 125.

376 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 121.

377 The deed to the Ross settlement noted only one vegetable gardening site, and that was at the fort itself. See DuFour, "The Russians in California," p. 258.

378 DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," p. 258.

379 Loc. cit.

380 Ibid.

381 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 121.

382 Loc. cit.

383 DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," p. 258; In 1929, there were still standing "15 huge fruit trees (two varieties of apples, pears and cherries) which were planted by the Russians in 1840." See E.E. Blomkvist, "Russian Scientific," p. 108.

384 DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," p. 258.

385 Ibid., p. 259.

386 Pigs were fed sea lion meat and wandered the shore eating shellfish and, as a result, their meat was tainted. See Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 119.

387 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 165.

388 Loc. cit.

389 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 117.

- 390 During the American period, post-1846, stock-breeding became the central activity on the land of Ross. And this holds true today.
- 391 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 209.
- 392 Loc. cit.
- 393 Ibid., p. 119.
- 394 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 119.
- 395 Loc. cit. Tikhmenev reported that there were 20 horses and 3 cattle, History, p. 171.
- 396 Lutke, "Diary," p. 33.
- 397 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 120.
- 398 DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," p. 257-59.
- 399 Bloomkvist, "A Russian Scientific Expedition," n. 7, p. 162.
- 400 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
- 401 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 209.
- 402 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 127.
- 403 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 209.
- 404 DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," p. 260. There were 3540 head of livestock at Fort Ross, at the time of the Russian's departure.
- 405 Tikhmenev, History, p. 141.
- 406 Ibid., p. 226.
- 407 Ibid., p. 222.
- 408 Ibid., p. 171.
- 409 Gibson, Imperial Russia, p. 138.
- 410 DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. no. XXIX, p. 275.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM CALIFORNIA AND THE SALE OF FORT ROSS

The Russian Withdrawal from California

The viability of the Russian annexation of Alta California was a serious consideration for some Russians despite the Counter's continuous financial losses and its inability to provision Alaska. It was the intention of some Russians to retain a foothold in California and expand that possession if the political circumstances permitted. Two individuals, in particular, advocated such a position, expounding the advantages that the California region could offer the Russian Empire. They were Lieutenant Dmitrii Zavalishin (1804-1892), a nineteen-year-old Russian naval officer, and Ferdinand P. Wrangel, sixth Chief Manager of the Company colonies. The plans proposed by these men came at different times in the history of Russian California, but both were contingent to the political climate of California and its relation to the Russian Empire.

Zavalishin's Proposed Russian Annexation of California, 1824.

Dmitrii Irinavkhovich Zavalishin participated in the Russian voyage of the Kreiser (1822-1825), under the command of Mikhail Petrovich Lazarev, which wintered in California in 1823-24.⁴¹¹ At that time, Zavalishin witnessed the gross political instability of California, as the Mexican party, composed of officials based in the town, clashed with the pro-Spanish supporters of the missions. He realized the

consequent ease with which Russia could annex, "by force of arms," California and the "magnificent port of San Francisco Bay, the favorable climate, and the rich soil—all eternal and immutable conditions."⁴¹² But because the forceful conquest of California could lead to retaliation from both Great Britain and the United States, Zavalishin devised a peaceful scheme for the Russian takeover of California.⁴¹³

The Order of Restoration. The focal point of Zavalishin's plan for annexation was an independent California that could be easily manipulated by the Russians. To that end, Zavalishin created the "Order of Restoration" which would supposedly "spread enlightenment, support human rights, and purge troubled minds of Europe." In actuality, it would support a California independent of Mexico under the guise of Russian intention to restore California to Spain, so that Russia could itself expand into California. Initially, Zavalishin approached the Mexican faction with his idea, but quickly found rejection. He then proceeded to contact the pro-Spanish missionaries, advising them to secede from Mexico with the Emperor's backing as head of the Order of Restoration.⁴¹⁴ Zavalishin succeeded in persuading Father Jose Altamira of the San Francisco Mission to accept the plan, but failed to win the essential support of Governor Argüello. Consequently, Argüello was toppled from power, with the assistance of Altamira, and replaced by Governor Noreiga, a missionary supporter.

At this critical juncture, Zavalishin was recalled to St. Petersburg where, in November 1824, he presented his proposal for

annexation and the Order of Restoration to Aleksandr I. The proposal was handed over to a conservative committee which rejected it on the grounds of impracticality. Zavalishin, however, was determined and submitted his scheme to the Directors of the Russian-American Company. Company officials were more enthusiastic about the plan, because the Company could make considerable gains from its implementation.⁴¹⁵ Zavalishin was then asked by the Company to facilitate Company expansion in California as the Manager of Fort Ross and possibly Chief Manager of the colonies. This suited Zavalishin:

In case our government did not agree to annexing this province, there still remained a way of defending itself against encroachment of the United States. For this there had only to be an expansion of the territory of the Russian-American Company's colony of Ross so as to place it between California and the boundary of the United States.⁴¹⁶

But Aleksandr intervened, realizing that Zavalishin's overzealous ambitions could lead to political complications with Great Britain and the United States. Zavalishin remained bitter about the Emperor's refusal to release him from naval service, stating in the 1840s, "the Russian-American Company did not demand any [governmental] assistance. Its sole request was to release me for its service; twice it made an urgent representation about this."⁴¹⁷

Zavalishin remained dedicated to the Russian annexation of California. In 1826, after the death of Aleksandr the previous year, he wrote the new Emperor, Nicholas I.

California annexed by Russia and settled by Russians, would forever remain in its control. The acquisition of harbors and the cheapness of upkeep would permit the maintenance there of an observation fleet which would give Russia command of the Pacific Ocean and the China trade...⁴¹⁸

This final plea went unnoticed, because Zavalishin had fallen from

official favor in 1825 for his association with the famed Decembrists, an organization committed to the destruction of autocracy and serfdom. Nicholas I rounded up the Decembrists for staging a revolt in December 1825. They were tried in St. Petersburg and Zavalishin was initially sentenced to death. Later his sentence was commuted to life and then to thirteen years hard labor in Siberia. Upon his release from hard labor in 1839, Zavalishin remained to study and write about Siberia. It was during this time that he wrote his account of his adventure in Russian America.⁴¹⁹

Wrangel's Negotiations with Mexico, 1836. A decade after Zavalishin's failure to install permanently Russia in California, Wrangel attempted a similar result. The ex-Chief Manager of the Company colonies feared, as did Zavalishin, the growing strength of the United States in California. Upon completion of his term as Manager, Wrangel was well aware of the problems thwarting Russian success in California. He viewed agriculture as the primary function of Fort Ross and knew it could only succeed if the Company expanded to more fertile lands. He suggested to the Main Office that the Ross Counter extend 58 miles east and 35 miles south.⁴²⁰ Realizing that the Company could not independently undertake such an expansion, Wrangel hoped that Emperor Nicholas I would open a dialogue between the Russian and Mexican governments. But Nicholas refused even to recognize the rebellious Mexican Republic. He did, however, grant Wrangel permission to visit Mexico during his return trip to Russia, although he was not given official letters of introduction from the Russian government.⁴²¹ Wrangel was entrusted, by Nicholas,

with "the complete power to negotiate with the Mexican Government... the right to make terms with the Mexican Government in relation to our Ross settlement."⁴²² On behalf of the Company, Wrangel was further instructed to negotiate the following five points: (1) The right to unrestricted call on ports in California and establishment of warehouses maintained by local authorities; (2) The right to hunt sea otter off the California coast; (3) The right to unrestricted call on ports of the Mexican Republic for commercial purposes; (4) Permission for Mexican vessels to frequent Novo-Arkhangel'sk for commercial purposes; and (5) Permission to educate Mexican subjects in the Alaskan colonies.⁴²³

At the end of 1835, Wrangel left for Monterey to obtain a letter of introduction from Governor Jose Figueroa, as he had not received one from his own government. The Governor had asked Wrangel, in 1834, to negotiate a commercial settlement between the Russian-American Company and the Mexican government. By the time Wrangel arrived in California, however, the Governor had been two months dead.⁴²⁴ Wrangel continued on to Mexico, but the negotiation process proceeded poorly. He tried "to carry out his orders," but having no documentation to prove that his visit was in fact officially sanctioned, "Senor Korro, the newly elected Vice President, was completely opposed to entering into so delicate a relationship as that of receiving a military officer from Russia, who has no credentials to present from his government."⁴²⁵ Wrangel had been provided with only his instructions (in Russian) and a passport signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Karl

Nesselrode. The passport however was not signed by a Mexican agent in Russia, as was required for legal travel through Mexico. Wrangel, therefore, was only permitted to travel because he had been granted a valid passport through the English and Prussian consulates in Mexico City.

The entirety of Wrangel's stay in Mexico proved discouraging and unproductive. The Russian's insufficient credentials, in addition to the fact that Russia officially opposed the Mexican Confederacy, made it difficult for Wrangel to even obtain an audience with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose M. Ortiz Monasterio. Although that meeting finally took place, the results were negligible. The Mexicans failed significantly to respond to the Company's proposals and would assure only that California officials would not act inhospitably toward Russian commercial vessels in California.⁴²⁶ Wrangel's failure to negotiate successfully with the Mexican government was a pivotal event in regard to Fort Ross in that it left little alternative other than the Russian evacuation of California. Upon completion of these uneventful talks in Mexico, Wrangel proceeded to Russia via New York, Le Havre, and Hamburg where he resumed negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company. These talks resulted, in 1839, in an agreement for that company to provision the Russian-American colonies, for a period of ten years, in exchange for the lease of a valuable strip of Alaskan coastline.

The Sale of Fort Ross

Wrangel's Agreement with the Hudson's Bay Company. In 1839, Baron von Wrangel of the Russian-American Company and Sir George

Simpson of the Hudson's Bay Company completed two years of negotiations regarding a disputed strip of sea coast on the Stakhina River at 54° 40', the site of the Russian St. Dionysius Redoubt.⁴²⁷ The resulting agreement not only solved that territorial dispute, but also served to remedy the Russians' long-standing problem of provisioning the northern colonies. The Wrangel-Simpson contract stipulated that the disputed land was to be leased to the Hudson's Bay Company by the Russian-American Company for a period of ten years. The price of the lease was 2,000 otter furs (their estimated worth, 118,000 rubles) and an obligation to sell the Russians 5,000 pelts annually. More important to the Russians' concern, the agreement obliged the Hudson's Bay Company to provide the Russian-American colonies with a predetermined quantity of foodstuffs at a contracted price.⁴²⁸

Article six of the Wrangel-Simpson accord stated that the Hudson's Bay Company was to deliver the following goods annually for the length of the renewable contract.⁴²⁹

TABLE IV
PROVISIONS PROPOSED IN THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY/
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COMPANY AGREEMENT
1839

Provision	Amount	Price
Wheat.....	14,000 puds	@ 3r. 25k. per pud
Wheat flour.....	498 puds	@ 6r. 32k. per pud
Peas.....	404 puds	@ 4r. 90k. per pud
Groats.....	404 puds	@ 4r. 90k. per pud
Corned beef.....	922 puds	@ 3r. 78k. per pud
Butter.....	498 puds	@ 20r. 20k. per pud
Ham.....	12 puds	@ 59r. - per lbs. [sic]

As noted in Chapter V, "Husbandry at Fort Ross," the quantity of provisions provided through this agreement surpassed that which the Russians could produce independently in California or purchase from the Californians (see pp. 171 - 72). Consequently, the Russians were able to relinquish their hold on the California settlements as their intended purpose had been fulfilled through another means. As Simpson, then head of the Hudson's Bay Company reported:

...the Russians lately entered into an agreement with the Hudson's Bay Company for obtaining the requisite supply of grain and other provisions at a moderate price; and they have accordingly, within a few weeks, transferred their stock to a Swiss adventurer of the name of Sutter, and are now engaged in withdrawing all their people from the country.⁴³⁰

The 1839 agreement was scheduled to take force on June 1, 1840. By April 1840, Fort Ross, the real estate and movable property, was up for sale. An entry from Sir James Douglas' Journal of April reads:

[The Russians] wish to sell Bodega for \$30,000. with a stock of 1500 Sheep at \$1½, 2000 neats and 1000 Horses & mules at 40/. ea with improved land fenced in with Barns. threshing floor &c sufficient to raise 3000 fanega's of wheat They of course can not sell the soil but merely the improvements; which we can hold only through a native.⁴³¹

Bidders for the Fort Ross Property

An Agreement Reached with the Mexican Commander-General, Vallejo. The Hudson's Bay Company's interest in purchasing Fort Ross was less than Sir Douglas indicated. John A. Sutter, a naturalized citizen of Mexico, and Mariano G. Vallejo, Commander-General of the Sonoma Presidio, were the most important bidders for the Fort Ross property. Vallejo initially corresponded with Petr Kostromitinov in February 1841 and stated that he had "no objection to accepting the

the proposal" made by the Russian for the purchase of Fort Ross at a price of \$30,000.⁴³² One-half of the price was to be paid in agricultural goods from California and one-half in warrants to the Hudson's Bay Company. To insure the propriety of Kostromitinov's offer, to pay partially for Fort Ross in drafts, Vallejo contacted the leader of the Columbia River colony. He informed Kostromitinov that a response was expected in July or August, at which time the sale of Fort Ross could be finalized.⁴³³

Kostromitinov, "having made preliminary arrangements," proceeded to draft an official offer of sale to Vallejo, with the approval of the Chief Manager of the Russian-American Company colonies, Adolf K. Etholen (1840-1845). In the 12-point agreement,

The Russian-American Company, evacuating Ross with the approval of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, cedes its rights to Mr. M. G. Vallejo over all settlements and farms on the coast of New Albion at the port of Bodega, and to the North at the presidio of Ross according to the inventory arranged and signed by both individuals entering into the treaty.⁴³⁴

A detailed list of the provisions to be provided was incorporated, as well as an extensive inventory of the properties, fixed and movable, in Russian California.⁴³⁵ Kostromitinov, eager to unload the settlement, drafted the document at his ranch near Rumiantsev Bay and submitted it to Vallejo for approval. The document was completed and tentatively approved between March and June 1841. On July 17, Kostromitinov received Vallejo at Port Rumiantsev on the Elena and a contract was ostensibly finalized between the long-standing rivals.⁴³⁶

Kostromitinov informed Rotchev at Fort Ross of the settlement's sale and charged him to notify Sutter of that decision.

[The decision]...has not been in your favor, since you have not the intention of buying the real estate, as well as the personal property belonging to Ross, but merely the cattle, whilst the agent of the Company, Mr. Kostromitinov, has found wholesale purchasers, that is to say, for the houses, the ranches, and the cattle. The making known to you these measures, you can no longer count upon purchasing the properties enumerated, for the said reasons.⁴³⁷

From New Helvetia, Sutter responded to the notification of Fort Ross' sale to Vallejo with indignation. In an August 10th letter to Antoine Sunol, Sutter complained of the situation:

The Russian gentlemen have found buyers for all of their houses and ranches, a fact which pleases me not at all. In the meanwhile, you can get insight into the character of the Russians. They spoke very loud of preferring to burn all the houses before selling them to a local man, especially to Mr. Vallejo who had insulted the Russian flag, etc., etc., and now, just to get a few thousands of piasters more, they are not ashamed to make arrangements like this one. Nobody but a Russian would act like that. I would much rather they had not made any deals with me.⁴³⁸

To Sutter's advantage, what appeared to be a certain sale between the Russian-American Company and Vallejo crumbled within a matter of weeks. By mid-August, Vallejo had reneged on the contract, as he became aware of the impropriety of his actions and feared government reprisals. The Mexicans, like the Spaniards before them, viewed the Russian's establishment of Fort Ross as an illegal seizure of previously claimed territory. In their mind, Fort Ross was already a Mexican possession. In a letter dated July 19th, Vallejo was informed by California Governor Jose B. Alvarado, "that purchasing the property [especially the real estate] of Ross... cannot be done on account of the [Mexican] government nor is it proper for you or me...to take this step, that is, speaking of our private interests."⁴³⁹ Vallejo realized the impossibility of his purchase

of Fort Ross, because the contract required official approval that had not and would not be granted.⁴⁴⁰ He immediately informed Kostromitinov that he was not able to carry through with the purchase without government authorization. With this breach, the short-lived cordiality between Kostromitinov and Vallejo ended. Kostromitinov, incensed by the revocation, sailed for Monterey to confer directly with Alvarado "to clear up doubts which he retains concerning the...incontestable right the Government had [to Fort Ross]."441

Vallejo sent a letter to Alvarado in advance, warning the Governor of the Russian's arrival and clarifying his own position on the matter.

[Kostromitinov,] not being satisfied with the reasons which I alleged for not entering into a trade for the houses of Ross and its dependencies. Principal among my motives was that those buildings belong by right to the government, on account of having been constructed on national ground and that without an express order from the the Superior Government I could not make any innovation in this respect for that would be transgressing the laws and my powers, insisting always upon the incontestable right that the Government had to the aforesaid buildings.⁴⁴²

In closing, Vallejo stated his conviction "that the Mexican nation could not, without loss to its dignity, buy what already unquestionably belongs to it."⁴⁴³ Alvarado, however, was not as resolute in his view; he wished to attain the properties of Russian California and justified such an action. While agreeing that purchasing Mexican-claimed territory would be less than dignified, Alvarado wrote: "...on the other hand I see that in spite of the justice of this view the buildings may be destroyed or burned by [the Russians].

This conduct would be reprehensible to the whole civilized world."⁴⁴⁴ Alvarado devised a plan that would legitimize the purchase of Fort Ross for Mexican officials. The plan included the formation of a private company and the placing of a bid for the Russian properties, on behalf of that company.

...I have thought of the great advantages that would result from the purchase of a brigatine in the United States. For this undertaking I count upon Cooper and my Uncle Jose de Jesus, who has indicated to me that you would take part in this. I would desire that, for it is necessary to have some partners capable of forming a company and a sufficient capital.⁴⁴⁵

Kostromitinov, inspired by his meeting with Alvarado, again approached Vallejo, hoping to conclude the sale of Fort Ross. In an attempt to force Vallejo to meet the terms of their contract, Kostromitinov threatened to prolong the Russians' stay in California.⁴⁴⁶ In response, Vallejo agreed to purchase farm equipment and livestock for \$9,000, but not the houses of Fort Ross.

[The government's position creates] the impossibility in which I find myself of accepting the proposals which you made to me, or any other relative to the purchase of the houses; and I only insist upon those which I made to you regarding the movable property, in case you should agree to them.⁴⁴⁷

Renewed Negotiations with Sutter. The conditions proposed by the Californians were unacceptable to the Russian-American Company and the negotiations between Kostromitinov and Vallejo, which had lasted from February through August 1841, were finally terminated. On September 1, 1841, Sutter reported, again to Antoine Sunol:

It seems that the Russian gentlemen cannot come to an agreement with Mr. Vallejo; they are renewing negotiations with me, but I shall be a little more exacting now.⁴⁴⁸

Negotiations between Sutter and the Russians formally commenced on

September 4th when Rotchev approached Sutter at the Swiss' colony on the Sacramento River. Sutter recounted in his Personal

Reminiscences:

...a Russian schooner, with Governor [Manager] Rotcheff on board, arrived from Fort Ross and offered to sell me the place [of Ross]...⁴⁴⁹

According to Sutter, Rotchev informed him that Vallejo and Jacob Leese were standing ready to purchase, but that Chief Manager Etholen, "having greater confidence in Sutter, said that he would have the preference."⁴⁵⁰ Sutter had been on good terms with the Russians in both Novo Arkhangel'sk, where he spent a month in 1838, and in California, where he befriended Rotchev early in that same year, when he visited Fort Ross en route from Monterey to the Sacramento River Valley. In his Personal Reminiscences, Sutter recounted that Rotchev, once "learning of my intentions to settle in the Sacramento Valley... asked me to call on him if he could be of any service."⁴⁵¹ In the initial stages of settling, Sutter was a natural prospect to buy Fort Ross, as he could instantly gain the livestock and appurtenances the Russians had spent years accruing.

To negotiate the sale, Sutter agreed to accompany Rotchev to Port Rumiantsev. They sailed down the Sacramento, landing at San Rafael, "where we found horses with Russian servants, ready to carry us to Bodega."⁴⁵² Once arriving at Port Rumiantsev, Sutter and Rotchev quickly came to terms and continued on to Fort Ross so that Sutter could inspect the property. After this inspection, Sutter, Rotchev, and Kostromitinov returned to Port Rumiantsev and had a "grand dinner on board the Elena. Champagne flowed freely;

the Emperor's health was toasted and the health of the new owner of Ross and Bodega."⁴⁵³

After dinner, a formal offer to sell Fort Ross was presented by Kostromitinov, on behalf of the Russian-American Company. The agreed price was \$32,000; "two thousand dollars cash included the schooner that Rotcheff went up to Sutter's Fort in, then lying at San Rafael, and the stores at Ross."⁴⁵⁴ The remaining \$30,000 was for the real estate of Russian California from Port Rumiantsev north to Fort Ross and the houses, farms, livestock, and farm implements. Sutter was to pay this sum in produce, "chiefly in wheat at \$2 the fanega...The Russians were to send down every year their vessel and take whatever wheat I could give them..."⁴⁵⁵

The Sale Finalized. Although Sutter had planned to be "a little more exacting," the bill of sale (which was not actually signed and sealed until December 13th), drawn between himself and Kostromitinov, was hardly indistinguishable from the offer made to Vallejo. Sutter was granted four years to complete payment, one more year than specified in the Vallejo contract. The price itself remained identical--\$30,000 for the property--but the terms of payment differed slightly.⁴⁵⁶ Whereas Vallejo was to pay one-half in drafts on the Hudson's Bay Company and one-half in California produce, Sutter was to pay two-thirds in produce and one-third in coin.⁴⁵⁷ The terms of guarantee were similar, although Sutter's collateral was significantly greater: Vallejo agreed to the reoccupation of Fort Ross and Port Rumiantsev by the Russians upon failure of payment, while Sutter offered New Helvetia, Fort Ross,

Port Rumiantsev, and the Khlebnikov and Chernykh ranches as collateral.⁴⁵⁸ On September 19, 1841, Sutter informed Vallejo of his purchase.

...I have bought all the movable and fixed property of the settlement of the Honorable Russian-American Company at Ross and...I am going to send a party of men by land to that place for the embarking of the above mentioned furniture &c. Please be kind enough to allow them to pass...⁴⁵⁹

During the final week in September, Sutter began to remove all livestock from Fort Ross to New Helvetia.

I dispatched a number of my men and a clerk by land to Bodega, to receive the Cattle, Horses, Mules & Sheep, to bring them up to Sutter's fort, called then New Helvetia, by crossing the Sacramento the[y] lost me from about 2000 head about a 100, which drowned in the River, but of most of them we could save the hides...⁴⁶⁰

Through December Sutter recommenced removing property from Fort Ross to Port Rumiantsev. According to the terms of their contract, the Russians assisted Sutter by moving some property to Port Rumaintsev where it could be more easily transported to the Sacramento River colony.⁴⁶¹ Sutter had no intention of occupying the lands of Fort Ross or Port Rumiantsev. Instead, the livestock, except for a few hundred head, was driven overland to New Helvetia while other property was transported on the Konstantin. Even the buildings were dismantled, "lumber, windows and doors were taken to the settlement and used in finishing up of the fort and buildings [of New Helvetia]."⁴⁶²

By December 1841, most Company employees had been relocated to Novo-Arkhangel'sk. Rotchev remained behind to finalize the Russian departure. Some Russians did remain in California, particularly those who lived and worked on the outlying ranches and

continued to farm as employees under Sutter.⁴⁶³ Despite these few human and physical remnants, Russian California ceased to exist on December 13th, 1841 when the deed to the Russian properties was signed by John A. Sutter and Petr S. Kostromitinov in San Francisco.⁴⁶⁴ On the 19th of December, Kostromitinov notified Vallejo of the Russian withdrawal.

...I have the honor to state to you that the employees and inhabitants of the settlement of Ross embarked on board the Russian-American Company's brigantine Constantin for Sitka.⁴⁶⁵

Vallejo surveyed the abandoned post and reported to the Minister of War, Ignacio Mora Y. Villamil: "...although barren, Fort Ross continues to keep the character of a Russian possession..."⁴⁶⁶

In January 1842, Sutter dispatched John Bidwell, a 23-year-old colonist, to Fort Ross to oversee the transport of property to New Helvetia. Bidwell recalled in his memoirs:

[Sutter] engaged me in January, 1842, to go to Bodega and Fort Ross and to stay there until he could finish removing the property which he had bought from the Russians. At that time the Russians had an orchard of two or three acres of peaches and apples at Fort Ross, I dried the peaches and some of the apples and made cider of the remainder. A small vineyard of white grapes had also been planted...I remained at Bodega and Fort Ross fourteen months until everything was removed...⁴⁶⁷

In 1845, Sutter leased the land and any remaining material to a former employee, William Benitz, who later paid Sutter \$6,000 for the property.

Payment for Fort Ross. The contracted time of four years for Sutter to complete payment to the Russians was necessarily liberal as Sutter, already deeply in debt, had no capital except his leagues of unchartered land. Sutter was aware of Fort Ross'

inability to produce profitably (in agriculture or in other activities) when he assumed the obligation, having stated that Fort Ross "did not prove a good wheat country, furs were getting scarce and the expenses were greater than the income."⁴⁶⁸ Yet Sutter felt the advantages of purchasing the Russians' livestock, equipment, and land outweighed the disadvantage of delaying the development of his own colony. Hubert Howe Bancroft's appraisal of Sutter's intention when purchasing Fort Ross is apt:

In purchasing the Ross property Sutter had not deliberately intended to swindle the sellers. He had, as was usual with him, assumed a heavy obligation without considering his prospective ability to meet it. That he could make no payments within the time assigned to paying the whole sum did not seem to him an alarming state of affairs.⁴⁶⁹

The Russians found it difficult to make demands for Sutter's payment, because his economic situation only worsened after the purchase of Fort Ross. Payments to the Russian-American Company were delayed due to crop failures and poor harvests of pelts—occurrences all too familiar to the Russians.

Sutter's first and only installment was made after the four-year expiration date. With the discovery of gold, Sutter's commercial activities prospered and the Russians expected payment. Although additional extensions were refused, Sutter continued to delay payment. In 1848, the Russians threatened to levy an attachment to Sutter's property unless the remaining \$19,000 balance was paid. To block the levy of an attachment, Sutter began to transfer his property to his son, John A. Sutter, Jr. The Russian Company initiated legal proceedings, through its San Francisco agent, William A. Leidesforv, to prevent Sutter from disposing of any

property. But Sutter prevailed, avoiding payment by transferring property, including that removed from Fort Ross. John Sutter, Jr. wrote in 1856:

I know very well that, if the country had been in a settled state..., this transfer would have been of no avail whatever, an attachment on the property having been levied before the deeds were [executed].⁴⁷⁰

It is questionable whether the Russian-American Company ever received full payment for Fort Ross, although Sutter stated in his Personal Reminiscences:

When the gold-discovery broke out I yet owed them a balance and the miner's destroying my crop, I was obliged to pay them the balance in gold.⁴⁷¹

Representative of the Russian-American Company, P.N. Golovin, however, summarized the affair differently:

Parts of this sum [the original price of Fort Ross] were paid by Sutter at various times, but there remained unpaid \$15,000, the recovery of which was undertaken by the Company, under instructions from the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Bodisco, through the Russian Counsel at San Francisco, An American, Stewart, absconded and stole the money received from Sutter and this, with the expenses attending the several efforts to recover the money from Sutter, the Company was at a loss in their accounts with the Ross settlement to the amount of 37,484 rubles,45 kopeks.⁴⁷²

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

411 Dmitrii Zavalishin, "California in 1824," pp. 369, 411 n. 1. See also Anatole G. Mazour's article, "Dimitry Zavalishin: Dreamer of a Russian-American Empire," Pacific Historical Review, 5, No. 1 (1936), pp. 26-37.

412 Zavalishin, "California," pp. 370, 408-09.

413 Ibid., pp. 370-71.

414 Ibid., pp. 371, 411 n. 7.

415 Admiral N.S. Mordvinov, Russian-American Company Council member was especially interested in Zavalishin's proposal and it was he who suggested that Zavalishin be installed as Manager of Fort Ross.

416 Zavalishin, "California," p. 407. The Russian government actually had no choice regarding the dismissal of Zavalishin's plan. By the Conventions of 1824-1825, between Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, the boundaries of Russian territory in North America (now Alaska) had been precisely defined. See Johnson, "Baron Wrangel," p. 15.

417 Zavalishin, "California," p. 411.

418 Ibid., pp. 372, 411 n. 13.

419 Ibid., p. 372.

420 Gibson, "Russia in California," pp. 214, n. 18.

421 Ibid., p. 214, ns. 1, 2.

422 Johnson, "Wrangel," p. 15.

423 Unpublished letter from Wrangel to Vice President Korro, written in Mexico, dated February 28, 1836, trans. E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan and Basil Dmytryshyn, pp. 3-4.

424 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 214; Letter of Wrangel to Korro (2/28/36), p. 1.

425 Unpublished letter from Wrangel to the Main Office of the Russian-American Company, March 1836, trans., E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan and Basil Dmytryshyn, pp. 1-2.

426 Attachment of letter of Wrangel to Korro, (2/28/36), pp. 3-4.

427 Tikhmenev, History, p. 71.

428 Ibid., pp. 71-2.

429 Table found in Ibid., p. 222.

430 Sir George Simpson, Narrative of a Journal Round the World During the Years 1841 and 1842, 2 vols. (London), I, 270.

431 Sir James Douglas, Journal, MS, 16 (Bancroft Library, April, 1840), See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 1, p. 249.

432 Mariano G. Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 62, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 5, p. 252. Petr Kostomitinov, Administrator of Fort Ross from 1835 to 1840, ceded his post to Aleksandr Rotchev and acted as an agent of the Russian-American Company, charged with selling the settlement in Russian California.

433 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 5, p. 252.

434 Veritas, Examination of the Russian Grant from A. Rotcheff to John A. Sutter in 1841 (Sacramento, 1860), pp. 9-10, See DuFour,

"The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 8, p. 254.

435 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 229, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 10, pp. 255-260.

436 Vallejo, Documentos, 205 and 227, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 7 and 9, pp. 254-255.

437 Veritas, Examination, pp. 9-10, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 8, p. 254.

438 Sutter-Sunol Correspondence, MS. California State Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 8, p. 263.

439 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 236, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 11, pp. 260-261.

440 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 229, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 10, pp. 255-260.

441 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 249, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 14, p. 264.

442 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 249, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 14, p. 264.

443 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 249, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 14, p. 264.

444 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 246, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 15, p. 264.

445 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 236, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 11, pp. 260-261. The Konstatin, actually a 60-ton sloop, was part of the Russian property sold to Sutter.

446 Vallejo had informed Governor Alvarado that it was to his credit that the Russians were finally evacuating California.

Vallejo claimed that the Russians' decision to leave California resulted from "occurrences which took place in the Port of Bodega during the last year [1840]." See Vallejo, Documentos, 1, 2, 3, and 227. See DuFour, "The Russians in California," Documents 2, 3, and 9, pp. 249-51, 254-255. See also Archives of California, Superior Government State Papers, decrees and dispatched, MS, 16, 16-18, Bancroft Library. See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 6, pp. 252-253.

447 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 232. See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 17, p. 266.

448 Sutter-Sunol Correspondence, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 19, pp. 266-267.

449 Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 29, p. 275. See also J.A. Sutter Diary, 3, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 28, p. 274. The Russian-American Company sloop, Konstatin, was renamed the Sacramento by Sutter in 1841. Rotcheff or Rotchev was actually Manager of Fort Ross in 1841.

450 Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russians in California," Document 29, p. 275. See Also J.A. Sutter Diary, 3. See DuFour, "The Russians in California," Document 28, p. 274. Jacob P. Leese, Vallejo's brother-in-law, Sutter's associate, and signator of the final deed for Fort Ross, reportedly made an unsuccessful bid of \$20,000 for the property of Ross--\$5,000 in cash and \$5,000 annually for three years. See, for instance, John S. Hittell, History of the City of

San Francisco and Incidentally the State of California (San Francisco, 1878), p. 89.

⁴⁵¹ Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc.No. 29, p. 275.

⁴⁵² Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc.No. 29, p. 275.

⁴⁵³ Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 29, p. 275.

⁴⁵⁴ Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 29, p. 275.

⁴⁵⁵ Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 29, p. 275.

⁴⁵⁶ Golovin sets the sale price of Fort Ross at 42,857 rubles, 14 kopeks, See P.N. Golovin, The End of Russian America, Capt. P.N.Golovin's Last Report, 1862, trans. and ed. E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan and Basil Dmytryshyn (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1979), p. 6.

⁴⁵⁷ Vallejo, Doc. No. 10, 229. See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 10, pp. 255-260.

⁴⁵⁸ Manuel Castro, Documentos para la historia de California, MS, 1, 57-59, certified copy of copy. See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 24, pp. 270-272; Vallejo, Documentos, 16, 229, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 10, pp. 255-260.

⁴⁵⁹ Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 282, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 20, p. 267.

⁴⁶⁰ Sutter, Diary, 3. See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc.No. 28, p. 274. The clerk was an ex-crewman named Robert Ridley.

461 Vallejo, Documentos, 10, 251, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 25, pp. 272-273.

462 T.J. Schoonover, Life and Times of General John Sutter, (Sacramento), p. 30.

463 H.E. Bolton, Mexican Transcripts, MS, No. 69, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 22, pp. 268-269.

464 Manuel Castro, Documentos, MS, 1, 57-59. See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 24, pp. 270-271, Article 9. of the deed to Russian properties.

465 This is the date of the signing of the deed to the Russian properties by Kostromitinov and Sutter in San Francisco.

466 Russian America, 5, part 2, p. 29, Bancroft Library, Translation of extract of a letter of Captain Etholen to the Directors of the Russian-American, dated at Fort Ross, (December 12, 1941), and published in the Journal of Manufactures and Trade, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 23, pp. 269-270.

467 John Bidwell, "Life in California before the Gold Discovery," Century Magazine, 41, No. 2, December 1890, p. 168.

468 Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 29, p. 275.

469 H.H. Bancroft, History of Alaska, Vol. 33, pp. 487-89.

470 John A. Sutter, Jr., Statement Regarding Early California Experiences (Sacramento: 1943), Sacramento Book Collectors Club.

471 Sutter, Personal Reminiscences, MS, 54-59, Bancroft Library, See DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal," Doc. No. 29, p. 275.

472 Golovin, End, p. 6.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATIVE CALIFORNIANS OF FORT ROSS

During their occupation of Fort Ross, the Russians established crucial economic and even political ties with the Natives of Alta California, (see pp. 93-4). The Russian-American Company owed what success it did achieved in California, as well as in Siberia and Alaska, to the efforts of native laborers.⁴⁷³ In view of the importance of the role played by Native Californians in Russia California, a brief consideration of these people--their culture and the nature of their relationship with nineteenth-century imperialists--is added, as an essential part of the study of Fort Ross.

The Southwestern Pomo and Coast Miwok

The Southwestern Pomo and the Coast Miwok were the principal indigenous peoples with whom the Russians associated during their occupation of Fort Ross.⁴⁷⁴ Other Indian groups, however, were also known to the Russians and lived around Fort Ross. These peoples were classified, by nineteenth-century observers, into Steppe and Marginal Indians.⁴⁷⁵ Steppe and Marginal Indians probably constituted several peoples, such as the Southern and Central Pomo, who lived in Russian territory and had seasonal or occasional contact with the Russians. The Russians knew comparatively little about these remote peoples who spoke "many dialects or languages, whose character and relationships [were] not yet known."⁴⁷⁶ The Russians established permanent relations--primarily labor-

oriented--with the Coast Miwok, but especially with the Southwestern Pomo on whose land Fort Ross was situated. The documentary evidence of contact between the Russians and these two tribes is therefore substantial, relative to information available on the Marginal and Steppe Indians, whose tribal distinctions were not well delineated. Hence, it is with the Pomo and Coast Miwok tribes only that this section deals.

Native Territories

Pomo. The Pomo was a large Indian designation, in nineteenth-century California, whose people occupied 3200 square miles of the Northern Coast Range in present-day Mendicino and Sonoma Counties (Figures 16 and 17). The homeland of the Pomo bordered approximately 100 miles of the Pacific coastline between 38° and 39° North and included the drainage of two major rivers--the Gualala and the Russian Rivers, and three environmental regions--coastal, mountainous, and riparian.⁴⁷⁷ Pomo territory was situated just north of the Spanish limit of complete missionization, but its southernmost portion was incorporated within the boundary of partial missionization (see Figure 18). While spared the direct incursion of Spanish theocracy, which had distended to their southern border, the Pomo Natives were still displaced by the Catholics. The Mission Registers of San Francisco show that 600 Pomo were baptised there before 1799.⁴⁷⁸ The increasing proximity of the Spanish civilizing effort, which had obtruded drastic change upon neighboring Native Americans since 1769, was a frightening reminder to the Pomo of the intention of this foreign encroachment.




Figure 16, Pomo (14) and Miwok (15) homelands. From S.F. Cook, *The Population of the California Indians, 1769-1970* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 11.




Figure 17. California Indian homelands. Reprinted from Michael W. Donley, Stuart Allan, Patricia Caro, and Clyde P. Patton, *Atlas of California* (Culver City, Ca.: Pacific Book Center, 1979), p. 8.

The California coastline was familiar to navigators on the trade to Asapuka from the sixteenth century on. The traders named bays, headlands, and coastal mountains, but the land itself remained uncolonized until the late eighteenth century. A joint religious-military occupation of California by Franciscans extended their missions beyond the Christian frontier, and the Viceroy established a northern port to support the Manila galleon. The first mission were founded at San Diego in 1769, extensive reconnaissance expeditions followed, and the establishment of the mission chain began.

The Franciscan effort to create a utopian society met with mixed success. The military, the Missions resettled and concentrated Indian population, introduced agriculture and the basic crafts of contemporary Mexico. In the Mission period, the tribes of the Coast Range valleys south of the San Francisco Bay had been converted to Christianized peasants. But Mission population declined due to disease. The military establishments on which the Missions depended for protection and supplies were small settlements which grew up by forts and Missions formed the nucleus of a growing Spanish-Mexican population which had a natural outlet into private exploitation.

Mexican independence in 1821 removed the protecting central authority and political power to the local oligarchies. Mission lands were exploited as private ranches during the next decade, while Anglo-American traders opened overland routes into what had been a deliberately isolated colony. The missions fell into ruins until the romantic revival of the turn of the century.




Figure 18. Spanish missionization effort in California, 1830s. Reprinted from Michael W. Donley, Stuart Allan, Patricia Caro, and Clyde P. Patton, *Atlas of California* (Culver City, Ca.: Pacific Book Center, 1979), p. 11.

The Pomo Indian classification is divided into seven dialect groups: Northern, Eastern (or Clear Lake), Southeastern (or Lower Lake) Northeastern (or Salt), Central, Southern (or Gallinomero), and Southwestern (or Gualala). The Northeastern, Southern, and Southwestern are relatively unknown to modern anthropologists. And it is the Southwestern Pomo with whom the Russians initially associated at Fort Ross. Hence, the written evidence left by nineteenth-century Russian observers provides invaluable source material.

The Southwestern Pomo were the poorest of the Pomo peoples, inhabiting the inhospitable mountainous regions which front the Pacific Ocean. The coastal plain was rugged and narrow and broke into sheer cliffs, offering only a difficult existence. This was, therefore, a thinly-occupied region, claiming an estimated pre-Russian population of 550.⁴⁷⁹ There were nine Southwestern Pomo communities-- five coastal and five riparian, and it was adjacent to the coastal village of Meteni (or Madshuinui) that the Russians built Fort Ross.

Meteni was the village which Kuskov purchased from the Pomo with "hoes, axes, breeches, blankets, and glass [trading] beads."⁴⁸⁰ It was located directly northeast (inland) of Fort Ross and included ten to 15 houses and one dance house.⁴⁸¹ The size of Meteni reveals that it supported a population of 70 to 105 people. These figures are comparable to the known Indian (excluding Aleut and Creole) population of 125 at Fort Ross in 1833.⁴⁸² This population was largely, but perhaps not entirely, Southwestern Pomo. The Pomo continued to use the Meteni site less than a year after the Russians

arrived in California,⁴⁸³

It would have been impossible for [the Pomo] to continue living at the old village of Metini after construction of the Fort Ross, as the north wall of the stockade cuts through a portion of the aboriginal settlement.⁴⁸⁴

Once the Pomo received compensation for their village site, they abandoned it and moved to a new location "some distance to the north."⁴⁸⁵ The new Meteni was a lesser site, 680 feet northeast of old Meteni, on the western edge of Fort Ross Creek,⁴⁸⁶ With only this slight displacement, the Pomo continued contact with the Russians and worked as menial laborers at Fort Ross.

Miwok. The Coast Miwok Indians occupied the coastal lowland immediately south of Pomo territory; Salmon Creek formed their common border. Coast Miwok territory was relatively small, comprising only 800 square miles (50 miles bordering the Pacific), but the natural features of this region were numerous and proved appealing to European maritime powers. Miwok territory bordered San Francisco Bay on the south and included Drakes Bay, Point de los Reyes and Rumiantsev Bay. The Spaniards established two missions in Coast Miwok territory, the San Rafael in 1817 and San Francisco Solano in 1823. San Francisco Solano was to be the northermost settlement of the Spanish missionizing effort.

The Miwok Indian group has two primary divisions--Lake and Coast--but it was primarily with the Coast or Bodega Miwok that the Russians associated. Russian contact with the Coast Miwok preceded that with the Southwestern Pomo, as the Russians first settled at Bodega Bay, within Miwokan territory. Yet this association was soon altered, because the settlement was relocated after several

months of occupation. It was moved 18 miles further north into Pomo territory to its permanent site 90 miles north of San Francisco.

Native Californians: Appearance and Lifestyle in Nineteenth-century

Sources

Nineteenth-century recordings of Native Californians, in regards to appearance, language, custom, and lifestyle, are generous and offer the optimal tool for addressing the Russian's understanding of these peoples. The works come from varying perspectives and periods: a government official, G.I. von Langsdorff (1803-1807); the navigators--P.I. Kruzenstern (1803-1806), F.P. Lutke (1815-1817), V.M. Golovnin (1817-1819), Otto von Kotzebue (1823-1826), and Dmitrii Zavalishin (1822-1825); and Russian-American Company employees--K.T. Khlebnikov (1823-1826), F.P. Wrangel (1830-1835), and P.S. Kostromitinov (1830-1836). The recordings of Company employees offer the more specific information: Having spent many years in Russian America and Fort Ross, they had an intimate understanding of its operation compared to seamen whose call at Fort Ross was generally of short duration, perhaps several months.

Appearance. In descriptions of appearance, Russian travelers, whose association with Russian California was limited, tended not to delineate much distinction between various California Natives. For instance, Golovnin described the appearance of the Indian as a whole:

The Californian natives, in general, are small of stature and appear to have a weak and flabby build; they are dark skinned, have a somewhat flat facial structure, with straight, very black, coarse hair, and regular white teeth; many have beards, although some pluck out their facial hair in youth

by means of bivalve shells and thus appear beardless by nature.⁴⁸⁷

Kruzenstern also used such an encompassing description, stating the California Natives "in their general appearance resemble each other except for languages which are radically different." He contributed a physiognomous analysis, bordering on indignation:

They have all a very savage look, and are of a very dark colour. Their flat, broad countenance, with large staring eyes, is shaded by black, thick, long and smooth hair.⁴⁸⁸

Lutke more specifically described the physical appearance of the Californians who lived near Fort Ross.

These Indians are dark copper color; their hair is very black and all have ckokuchenie, they are somewhat less than medium height and awkward physique. Their eyes, however, are full of life. In regard to the women, in addition to this, one may say that they are not bad looking. Their round full faces, are fairly well proportioned, with a small mouth, not over large nose and sparkling eyes have a not unpleasing appearance. The color of their skin they receive it seems from filth in which they live with nature-----from the nature itself and they assured us that if they should wash, then they would be quite white.⁴⁸⁹

Recordings of Company employees, such as Wrangel and Kostromitinov, whose tenures at Fort Ross and in Russian America were relatively long, are of greater ethnographic value. Kostromitinov had a seven-year association with Fort Ross and offered greater specificity in his description of the California Natives who frequented the fort.

The Indians are of medium stature, but one also finds tall individuals among them; they are rather well-proportioned, the color of their skin is brownish, but this color is caused by the sun rather than being innate; eyes and hair are black, the latter is straight...Both sexes are of robust build; one rarely finds crippled people among them; but as a result of the climate and their mode of life they do not reach old age. The women age very rapidly, and consequently one always sees more old and aged women than young ones. The physiognomy of the Indians

in general bears and expression of good nature rather than savagery and one often encounters charming faces, among males as well as females. They are gentle and peaceful and very clever...⁴⁹⁰

Wrangel inspected Fort Ross in 1832 and further described the physical appearance of these people.

The unusual distribution of the workload is probably the reason for the fact that the women here in general have a much stronger physique than do men who, although tall and well-proportioned, yet seem to be weaker than the women.⁴⁹¹

The only descriptive distinction found between the Southwestern Pomo and the Coast Miwok, in nineteenth-century Russian sources, was rendered by Kostromitinov.

The Bodega [Miwok] Indians have no artificial coloration on their body; the Northerners [Pomo], on the other hand, tattoo their faces, breasts and hands with various figures, and apply an herbal extract to their bodies, which gives their skin a dark blue color, which is permanent.⁴⁹²

Language. The Miwok and Pomo Americans are presently classified into the Hukon language family. But the Russians knew little of these languages, as they rarely learned to speak native tongues. Languages were mentioned only briefly in journals, because the Russians' understanding was so poor. There were usually only references to the languages' unusual sounds. Lutke commented that the "Pomo language is quite pleasing to the ear, and that is all that can be said about it. It has not rough or heavy sounds on the ear and they speak very rapidly."⁴⁹³

Wrangel described in more detail the Pomo language:

Their language and the melodious quality of their voice and song make a pleasant impression on the sense of hearing, and bear no resemblance to the lugubrious monotony and hard-to-utter, impure, guttural sounds that strike one so unpleasantly in speech and sound of the seashore inhabitants such as the Kolosh, Aleuts as well as of the northern Americans [Alaskan Natives] and Tchuktch generally.⁴⁹⁴

Most observers did recognize the Pomo-Miwok language distinction. Golovnin remarked that there were some "minor" differences.⁴⁹⁵ Kruzenstern wrote that these northern Indians, who tatoo their bodies [the Pomo] and rarely come into the missions, "all speak the same languages."⁴⁹⁶ But Kostromitinov observed that: "The Bodega Indians do not understand the Northerners, their language as well as their pronunciation is different."⁴⁹⁷ The perceptive Wrangel warned "against giving blind credence" to the alleged disparity between these languages; "on closer study one may discover a relationship, and they may appear only as daughters of a root language, as well as the different tribes as the branches of a great race."⁴⁹⁸

As stated earlier, the Russians rarely learned the language of those peoples indigenous to Russian California. A practice established early in Russia's eastward movement was the utilization of natives, already subjects of the empire, as interpreters when new peoples were encountered. This practice, Lutke suggests, was due to the similarities of the Indian language groups.⁴⁹⁹ Nevertheless, this was the circumstance of Russian California. Aleut hunters, brought from Alaska to serve as hunters at the Ross Counter, functioned in the additional capacity of interpreter for the Russians and newly-subjugated Pomo and Miwok Natives.

Diet. The Natives of Fort Ross were semi-nomadic, seasonally attracted to locales which provided their sustenance. They maintained a single "permanent" village, the new Meteni village in the case of the Fort Ross Pomo. Kostromitinov described the Pomo's

tri-seasonal migrations in search of food:

In spring they live in the vicinity of the rivers and in locations that abound in water, so that they may catch fish and collect roots and herbs, while they spend the summer in woods and plains, where they collect berries and seeds of wild plants; in autumn they lay in store of acorns, wild chestnuts, and sometimes nuts, hunt bison and goats with their arrows.⁵⁰⁰

The Native Californians' diet consisted of a large variety of food due to northern California's productivity. Russian observers though, ascribed their diet to indiscretion: "They are not too particular in their choice of food; without the least repugnance they consume the flesh of any animal they come across, any type of shellfish or fish, and even reptiles, except poisonous snakes."⁵⁰¹ Kostromitinov commented, "The menu of the indians encompasses anything they can acquire, large and small land and marine animals, fish, crayfish, roots, herbs, berries and other products of the soil, even insects and worms."⁵⁰² It is true that the Southwestern Pomo diet contained great variety, but fish was probably the main staple consumed in the winter and spring months. They were known to eat matash (sea trout), gaka (perch), and tsaka (eels) which were cooked in earthen ovens.⁵⁰³ Blue cod fish were caught from the rocks of the coast while shin-abototo (bullhead) were caught with hook and line. Shinabototo was dried uncooked and stored for the winter months.⁵⁰⁴ The Pomo did not construct boats, thus deep-sea fish were unknown in their diet.⁵⁰⁵ Aleut fisherman, employed at Fort Ross, introduced hayhsa (cod) and ushati (flounder) to the Pomo diet.⁵⁰⁶

In the early summer months, the Pomo camped at river sites to take advantage of the foods offered there. Kauwina (river turtles) were a summer delicacy to the Pomo. Preparation consisted of placing

the live turtle in a slight depression, covering it with hot ashes and allowing it to bake for many hours. Staples in the Pomo's summer diet included the staka (grasshopper), preferably immature, pala (slugs), served roasted, and nokoh (mussel) which were collected from October to May with the rains. Ishuwa (Varied Thrush) and sawala (Crested Jay) were the only birds known to be consumed by the Fort Ross Pomo.

The main staple of the Pomo's autumn diet, while living at the Meteni village, was the acorn. These were collected from the barks of trees where they had been stored by woodpeckers and prepared by drying and water flushing in order to remove the bitterness.⁵⁰⁷ The acorns were then either boiled for immediate consumption (as "gruel" by Lutke's description) or ground to a pulp which served as a flour for bread and cakes.⁵⁰⁸ This corn mixture was at times flavored with katalo (the grubs of yellow jackets).⁵⁰⁹ The Fort Ross Pomo also conducted some rather unsophisticated agricultural endeavors, growing rye, oats, and a copious plant which was described thus:

The plant reaches a height of 1½ to 2 feet, several sprouts start from the roots, the leaves are narrow-oblong and covered with a delicate down, have a peculiar aroma, and stick to the fingers, the flowers are yellow and grow in pointed tufts and the small black seeds resemble Latuk.⁵¹⁰

The Pomo method of farming was, to the European temperament, a very simple, "although rather curious, method" which increased fertility and facilitated the harvest.⁵¹¹

[The Indians] set fire to the entire field; the grass and stalks, being very dry, burn very fast, while grain is not consumed by the fire but only scorched. Then the Indians collect the scorched grain and eat it without any further preparation.⁵¹²

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the diet of California Natives and Russians mixed. The cultural unappeal of the native diet is recorded by some Russians, such as Lutke, who noted of the acorn concoction: "this form of eating is not appetizing to others."⁵¹³ Lutke, however, tasted the mixture in the name of observation. As the Russians at Fort Ross were able to maintain themselves through traditional diets, it is doubtful that they adopted Native dishes. Instead, it appears that the Californians were introduced to several foods consumed by Russians. It has been mentioned that flounder, cod, and sea trout were introduced in Russian times by Aleut hunters. Sea lion meat and sea birds brought from the Farallon Artel were also introduced into the Pomo diet. (The skins of sea mammals were also introduced as clothing.)⁵¹⁴ Thus it seems that dietary alteration was one-sided--the Pomo added measurability to their diet through Russian-Aleut contact, while evidence of Russian acceptance of Pomo foods is non-existent. Archaeologist Janice C. Smith speculated about the extent of Russian-Pomo cultural interchange and wrote: "in North American contact sites, Native subsistence methods usually gave way rapidly to Euro-American methods..."⁵¹⁵

Shelter. The Fort Ross Pomo spent the winter months in their main village northeast of the Russian settlement. Their homes generally consisted of simple thatched huts as "there was no shortage of stick and dry grass for making dwellings."⁵¹⁶ Lutke irreverently described these homes.

Their living quarters resemble more beehives or anthills than human dwellings. They are built out of twigs stuck in the ground in a semi-circle raised up above the ground about one and one-half arshins, these are joined together and cov-

ered with dry grass or coniferous twigs. These dwellings protect them neither from rain nor generally foul weather...⁵¹⁷

In contrast, Wrangel displayed his typical romantic appreciation of the homes of these "friends."

...these temporary dwellings, made of the flexible shafts of sand-willow and other willows, which can be pushed into the ground quite easily, in such an extraordinary tasteful manner, that I was most pleasantly surprised by the sight. The colorful shading and the variety of sizes of the willow-leaves...lent a quite special, rustic aspect to the open huts; the sides opening, which serves as a door, is decorated with foliage with special care; several of the huts also communicate with each other by means of internal openings.⁵¹⁸

Kostromitinov provided greater specificity, offering insight to the seasonal component of native dwellings.

During the summer, [natives] find shelter in bushes, which are thinned below, and tied together above; in winter, however, they construct barabaras. A pit is dug, some vertical fixed poles are driven into the ground with their pointed ends first and covered with wood bark, twigs, and grass; and opening is left on top and on the side, the former to let the smoke escape, the latter to serve as the entrance into the barabara.⁵¹⁹

The simplicity of these homes served a dual practicality: (1) the homes were easily constructed--an important consideration as they were temporary homes; and (2) the homes held little value and this afforded the hygienic practice which relied on destruction of the site by fire. This practice hindered contamination and spread of infectious diseases such as "fever, colic, and syphillic maladies" which were common to the Pomo.⁵²⁰

Arts and Crafts. To the nineteenth-century Russian observer, the art of the Pomo appeared poorly developed. Lutke commented that their crafts were "still in a state of absolute infancy, or to state it

better, there is none."⁵²¹ And his assessment is not without some merit as the Pomo, adapted to habitual migration, maintained a paucity of material culture. Crafts were limited to a few items of convenience--particularly woven basketry. But in this skill, the Pomo attained an unusually high level of sophistication. Pomo basketry and wickerwork is highly regarded by anthropologists for the great number of materials and techniques utilized.⁵²² The Pomo employed ten materials in five full-twined weaving techniques, as compared to two techniques found in comparable societies.

The absence of crafts, other than basketry, often led to the description of primitiveness. As has been mentioned, the Pomo did not construct boats for ocean travel despite their coastal habitat. Zavalishin noted his surprise that a coastal people lacked the skill to construct sea-worthy vessels.⁵²³ However, Golovnin astutely surmised that this is not because the Pomo are "extremely stupid or lazy," but rather they "spend their lives constantly roaming from place to place."⁵²⁴

[Natives] seldom travel by water, that they do not use anything from the sea in their diet other than shell food picked up on the beaches at low tide, and that moving from place to place on land, through forests and over mountains, they would not carry along wooden boats that they would be obliged to discard after spending so much time and labor on them. Hence, the invention of grass rafts that are used only occasionally, can be made up in a few hours, and can be left behind at the coast, should not be regarded disdainfully.⁵²⁵

Similarly, Russian observers recorded an absence of native art, but this stems from a difference in interpretation. For the Fort Ross Native, art was confined to adornment of the body and in this regard, they had an extensive art. Jewelry and elaborate costumes were mentioned by many

observers. Tattooing was a prevalent form of physical adornment practiced by the Pomo who etched figures on their faces, chests, and hands.

Some of the men had tattoos on their chest, with straight lines and zigzags, which were extended from shoulder to shoulder; likewise they had pierced ears, and in the openings they had small pieces of feathers stuck. Women had no ornamentation.⁵²⁶

In addition, tinting the skin with a permanent dye was considered attractive by the Pomo.⁵²⁷ Head ornaments, belts and hats were among items artistically constructed of feathers and neuals.⁵²⁸ Bone and shell nose sticks were commonplace decoration, as were hairpins, although hair cutting became fashionable after the Russians introduced scissors.⁵²⁹ Wrangel wrote that the Native Californians' art forms betrayed "not only their inventiveness, but also a certain penchant for beauty."⁵³⁰

Russian chronicles of nineteenth-century California often reverberate notions of primitiveness in regard to Indian lifestyles, clothing, shelter, and arts. To the European mind, Native Americans "live in complete idleness" or "they lead a pitiful life, which provides them it seems with no satisfaction except the same as animals."⁵³¹ Interpretation is limited, however, due to the judgment of the chroniclers and, perhaps, these sources provide a better tool for analyzing European ethnocentricity than native ethnography.

A Reconsideration of Russian-Pomo Relations in Nineteenth-century California

...It is difficult, I believe, to find a people who attain a lesser political comprehension than those Indians.

Lutke, 1818

The Native as Child. Especially striking in nineteenth-century descriptions of California is the redundancy of the metaphorical "child" interpretation of Native Americans. A parent-child signification was firmly entrenched in the colonial mentality.⁵³² The native childhood had increasingly been viewed as less a stage than a state, soliciting permanent tutelage.⁵³³ Such a consciousness forced the colonizers-missionaries to accept paternal responsibility to care for and civilize the abjectly dependent native. The child image was the prevalent conveyance in Russian descriptions of Native Californians. Kruzenstern, in oblique reference to this metaphor, stated, "The savage is inconsiderate and inconstant, like a child."⁵³⁴ Both Lutke and Kostromitinov saw a childness in the Native Californians' disinterest in material possessions. Lutke called this a "state of absolute infancy."⁵³⁵ Kostromitinov spoke of these "true children of nature" as yet developing the knowledge required to understand the value of possessions.⁵³⁶ Kruzenstern described the unfortunate place of the nineteenth-century California Native vis à vis Spanish missionizing power: The native who "unthinkingly" enters the mission and so "belongs to the church... The church has an inalienable right to her children, and exercises this right with vigor."⁵³⁷

The metaphorical child, so prevalent in European descriptive endeavors, had manifold implications. The cause, perhaps, was that chroniclers rarely knew the California Natives as anything but a people culturally and socially altered by European imperialism--previously defeated and violated, continually exploited and subjected to deprivation. It has been suggested that this is the true reason for the chronicled docility and indolence of native peoples: "Their

uncomplaining acceptance of acute poverty, physical hardship, and above all their seeming lack of interest in material things," which so often were attributed to innate qualities.⁵³⁸ Such was the ascription of Russian observers. Langsdorff attributed native docility,

In a great degree to the extreme simplicity of these poor creatures, who in stature no less than in mind are certainly of a very inferior race of human beings...⁵³⁹

Zavalishin wrote that "California Indians were a meek tribe."⁵⁴⁰

And Kostromitinov reported that their "indifference and inattention go very far."⁵⁴¹ Even the provident Golovnin remarked that the Pomo living near Fort Ross are "like all unlightened races" and "lead an idle existence."⁵⁴² The consensus of Russian observation is perhaps extractable from Golovnin's conclusion:

The ease with which the Spaniards conquered them and now hold all the best lands with very small forces, which the natives could overcome in one night if they were to form a conspiracy, is proof of their peaceable nature, while their gentle character is demonstrated by the fact that they have never organized an uprising or conspiracy against the Spanish to protest their cruel treatment.⁵⁴³

In contrast to these descriptions, the writings of several Russian authors echoed sentiments in condemnation of European treatment of Native Californians. Yet these descriptions intended, in part, to emphasize the dissimilarity between Russians- and Spanish-Native relations. Consensually, the Russians at Fort Ross and their native subjects lived in an easy harmony while the Spaniards could claim only a volatile co-existence with the missionary Indians. Kruzenstern, addressing the Spaniard's attitude toward Indians wrote: "The contempt which the missionaries have for the people, to whom they are sent, seems to us, considering their pious occupation, a very unfortunate circumstance."⁵⁴⁴

Unlike missionary Indians who live in the "most abject subservience" under Spanish rule, Fort Ross Natives preferred to live under Russian domination. Kostromitinov expressed a sentiment commonly found in Russian sources. "[The natives] emigrated to Ross" to avoid removal to the missions.⁵⁴⁵ Kostromitinov even suspected that native stupidity was illusory and that the Californian, given "some not too difficult or complex task,..are immediately able to imitate it."⁵⁴⁶ Golovnin, who visited California in 1818, re-acknowledged the Indians' capability and his own defiance of traditional attitudes:

...I am justified in daring to express a different opinion from the famous voyager mentioned above [La Pérouse] concerning the native abilities of the Californian Indians. My opinion is confirmed by the Indians living in the missions; many of them soon learn various trades from the missionaries. For example, the stone church at the San Carlos Mission was built by the Indians, the carpentry and joiner's work was also done by them, and they even did wood carving and plastered and decorated the walls. It is their mentors, the Missionary Fathers, are not the best of artists either; if they could be taught by good craftsmen, they probably would be the equal of Europeans.⁵⁴⁷

The different type of relationship experienced by the Spaniards and Russians with their native subjects, in the early 1800s, stemmed not from any racial tolerance on the part of the Russians, but from the contrasting stages of colonial economic development in "Spanish" versus "Russian" California. From the inception of Fort Ross until 1818, the Russians' primary task in California was harvesting sea otter pelts (see Chapter IV, Part I). The Russians did not actually hunt themselves, but employed Native (Aleut) laborers, as they had done throughout their expansion across Siberia to America. When the Russians moved to California, a sufficient number of Aleut hunters were transferred to Fort Ross. Consequently, there was little demand for laborers from

among the Native Californians. The economic ties that were initially established, between the Russians and the Natives, were voluntary and unstrained.

When hunting operations diminished and the Russians directed their attention to transforming Fort Ross to an agricultural settlement, in the 1820s, the Russians' relationship with the California natives changed dramatically. The Russians lacked the necessary agricultural laborers, not having qualified individuals to transfer from the northern colonies. This void of farm workers was filled by the Pomo Indians--and not necessarily by the choice of the Indians. The labor, once offered freely by the Pomo, was now demanded by the Russians. In this manner, the Russians eventually implemented a forced labor system and thus their treatment of Native Californian populations more closely resembled that of the Spanish missionaries.

Russian-Pomo Treaty, 1817

A majority of the above-cited authors, who stress such contrasts between Russian and Spanish treatment of Native Californians, maintained Russian loyalties and sought to legitimize the Russian-American Company's claim that the Pomo had invited the Russian presence to serve as a buffer against Spanish intrusion. However, the relationships warrant consideration inasmuch as determination of the veracity of the Russian rationale is to understand any consequences of the disparity between imperial (Russian versus Spanish) methods of christianizing and civilizing.

In September 1817, the Russians and the Southwestern Pomo executed a treaty in which the Americans granted land, ex post facto, for Russian

occupation (See Figure 19). Its intent was to formalize a transaction completed in 1812 between Kuskov and the Native Californians of Meteni. At that time of initial encroachment, Kuskov purchased the Pomo village for an equitable (to the Pomo frame of reference) number of trading beads. The Russians' interest in executing a written contract, five years after the fact, was merely an attempt to legitimize this agreement vis à vis other European colonial powers; the verbal accord between Kuskov and the Meteni elders held firm.⁵⁴⁸

As for the Americans' interest in restating such a treaty, the Russians cited the familiar contrast of Spanish disdain in contrast to Russian protectiveness toward the California natives. Kirill Khlebnikov, signator of the treaty, later explained:

On this occasion [the founding of Fort Ross], the well-behaved Indians of that area were completely free, and had no protection whatsoever from their Spanish neighbors. On the contrary, they were oppressed by attacks of savages under the control of Spaniards, and had a hostile attitude toward them. Because of this, the local Indians not only did object to the presence of the Russians on the shores of New Albion, but expressed the desire to see them there in greater numbers, in order to make certain that they received protection from their hostile neighbors. One of the chief elders or toions, named Chu-Chu-Oan, who had owned the land which was taken to build the fort, voluntarily gave it up to the Russians in exchange for certain appropriate gifts. The Indians informed Captain Golovnin, who was then in the port of Rumiantsev aboard the sloop Kamchatka, that they were independent of the Spaniards, that they hated them, and that they wished the Russians to settle and live in their vicinity. One elder, Valenila, asked Golovnin to give him a Russian flag so he could show it as evidence of friendship and good will toward the Russians.⁵⁴⁸

Historians and participants of Russian expansion have scoffed at what they considered the Russians' ludicrous attempt to deceive and ridicule

Translation of the Treaty with the Kashaya Pomo

Accepting the invitation, the Indian Chiefs Tchu-Gu-An, Aman-Tan, Gem-Le-Le and others arrived at Fort Ross on September 22, 1817.

On behalf of the Russian American Company, Lieutenant-Captain [Leontii] Hagemeister extended thanks to them for donating to the Company that land locally called Mad-Zhi-Ni which belonged to Tchu-Gu-An, for construction of the Fort and administrative and service buildings. He [Hagemeister] also stated that he hoped they [the Indians] would never have reason to regret having Russians as their neighbors. After hearing the translation, Tchu-Gu-An, as well as Aman-Tan, whose lands were not far away, replied that "They are very pleased to see Russians occupy this land, for they now live in safety from other Indians who used to attack them from time to time." This security began only from the time of Russian settlement."

After this pleasant reply, the Indians were presented with gifts and Chief Tchu-Gu-An was awarded a silver medal decorated with the Russian Imperial emblem and with an inscription [reading] "Allies of Russia."

It was declared that this medal gives the Indian Chief the right to respect from Russians. Because of this, it was not advisable for him to come to the Fort without it. It [the medal] also obliged Indians to be loyal and render help to the Russians should the occasion arise.

In reply to this, Tchu-Gu-An and the others expressed their readiness to render assistance and extended their gratitude for the reception.

After the dinner, during the departure of the Chiefs from the Fort, a one-gun salute was sounded.

We, the undersigned, hereby witness that the reply of the main Indian Chiefs in our presence was exactly as stated above.

Fort Ross
22nd day of September, 1817

(Authentic Signatures)

- Navy Lieutenant and Order Bearer Hagemeister
- Staff Physician-Court Counsellor Kerner
- Administrator and Trade Advisor Ivan Kuskov
- Assistant Navigator 14th Class Kislakovsky
- Company Agent Kirill Khlebnikoff
- Commercial Navigator Prokopi Tumanin, Secretary

[Faint, illegible text, likely the original Russian or Pomo script of the treaty.]

Figure 19. Russian-Pomo treaty, 1817. Reprinted from Diane Spencer-Hancock and William E. Pritchard, "Notes to the 1817 Treaty between the Russian American Company and Kashaya Pomo Indians," California History, 59, No. 4 (1980), 308-9.

their audience. And, undeniably, the specifics of the situation were generated by Russian sources. Succinctly, the Pomo invitation to cede land to the Russians was an invention of Russian convenience. Diane Spencer-Hancock recently (1981) entered an eloquent rendition of this argument:

The Kashaya [Fort Ross Pomo] were thus used as a two-edged diplomatic sword for the Russian empire: their existence was initially denied to validate Russian right to colonize, yet their status as a separate nation was recognized by the Russians in an effort to thwart Spanish claims.

The document between the Russians and the Kashaya Pomo, while unique in form, content and intent, clearly utilized the Kashaya as a pawn in the game of international politics. Knowledge of Russia's considerable hope of dramatically extending her Pacific colonial empire suggests that this document was but another step in the process by which the Russians hoped to solidify their tenuous California claims. However, one cannot help but admire the audacity of the masterfully Machiavellian Russians in openly espousing both sides of the Kashaya paradox. Under slightly different circumstances they might well have succeeded in their efforts to gain international recognition and sanction of their colonization attempt in Alta California.⁵⁵⁰

The potential of Native Californian "political" manipulation, i.e., their desire to settle an advantageous contractual agreement with Europeans remains unconsidered. Their purported invitation is termed an invention of imperialists seeking to justify a debated claim to a piece of salubrious California.⁵⁵¹ This interpretation of the event involves the overt acceptance of a major premise: that the Russians were imperialists, expansionists, "masterfully Machiavellian." While historically not an indefensible position, does it not involve, on a more subtle level, the acceptance of the child-like state of Native Americans? It is not a case of the maleficent Russian imperialists, in a struggle for colonial domination, deceiving the unsuspecting or nonresistant native, deprived of a political awareness?

The easy assimilation of such an argument is caused by interpretative bias, but more by the complete lack of Native Californian source material.

Initially, it should be clear that Russian manipulation of Native Californians in their colonizing effort is not disclaimed, but fully accepted. Inexorably, the Russians produced their claim to Pomo territory after the fact--Fort Ross was settled in 1812, the treaty signed in 1817. It was surely a means of reinforcing a previous and tenuous acquisition of territory. A reconsideration of the Pomo-Russian treaty should instead be functional in that it focuses more heavily on the critical circumstances of the nineteenth-century Pomo and defines the political awareness of those people.

The traditional lifestyle of Native Californians was in jeopardy with the intrusion of Spanish peoples into Alta California in the eighteenth century. The Natives saw the beginnings of the Spanish reorganization of Alta California in 1769. The coastal region, was arranged spatially in the pattern familiar to Spanish expansion in which missions, intending to civilize, violated the Native Californians' cultural existence. Additionally, mission life decreased the population of native peoples significantly through disease. Wrangel served as a sympathetic observer of the native plight in missionary California as well as apologizer of Indian vengeance.

A powerful enemy, such as the Europeans seem when they first appeared must of necessity inspired these harmless tribes with great fear; but when, on knowing them better, they realized that their dreaded enemies were humans just as they were themselves, only more unfeeling and unjust, hot vindictiveness ignited in their hearts. They ravaged the herds of their oppressors, they stole their horses, ambushed their missions and allowed them to be despoiled, but only killed those Europeans that had made themselves

most hated through their cruelty, for example, some evil padre. But this thrust for vengeance never allows them to go beyond the dictates of a certain feeling of compassion, it never reached the degree of brutal cruelty as in the case of the Kolosh.⁵⁵²

The Spanish missionization effort, which began in the southern extremity of Alta California with the founding of the San Diego Mission, steadily expanded, territorily and numerically. Missionization proceeded northward, incorporating an increasing percentage of the American population (see Figure 20). Early in the course of mission expansion, the Pomo were aware of the intended foreign intrusion into their territory; In 1770, the District of San Francisco was established and, with the founding of the San Francisco Mission and Presidio, a number of Southwestern Pomo were interned. San Francisco was the northernmost district of Spanish California and it was adjacent to the southern boundary of the Pomo homeland. In 1777, the Mission of Santa Clara and the San Jose Pueblo were founded also within the District of San Francisco. Before the turn of the century, a minimum of 600 Pomo were known to have been baptised in San Francisco's district missions.⁵⁵³ The percentage of Southwestern Pomo included in this figure is not known, but it is know that the southern groups of Pomo were more significantly affected than northern tribes. Hence, it seems clear that a number of Southwestern and probably Meteni Pomo were displaced as (1) Pomo territory was adjacent to the San Francisco District, and (2) the Russians had not yet settled at Fort Ross and thus there was little protection from the "attacks of savages under the control of the Spaniards..."⁵⁵⁴

After the founding of Santa Clara and San Jose, Spanish expansion subsided and missionization was not resumed for 20 years; at that time, the San Jose Mission was constructed. Then again there was a 20-year




Figure 20. Development of Spanish missionization. Reprinted from Michael W. Donley, Stuart Allan, Patricia Caro, and Clyde P. Patton, *Atlas of California* (Culver City, Ca.: Pacific Book Center, 1979), p. 10.

abeyance, interrupted only in 1817 by the construction of the San Rafael Mission, fifty miles north of San Francisco. This too was the year of the renegotiation and signing of the treaty between the Russian-American Company and the Meteni-Pomo Americans.

Although Spanish and Russian colonial powers (as opposed to British) shared a like attitude regarding the value, economically and religiously, of native peoples, the methods of realizing these attitudes differed substantially. Both the Spanish and Russians' conquests of natives peoples was in part a conquest of native labor and souls. (Whereas, Anglo-American preference constituted eradication through displacement, segregation, or extermination.)⁵⁵⁵

Albeit the Spanish, in their quest for converts, were notoriously harsher, native labor was as vital to Spanish agricultural production as it was to Russian hunting, manufacturing, and husbandry. To this economic end, both Russians and Spaniards sought to incorporate Native Californians into their social structure. Racial interbreeding and marriage were tolerated among the Russians, "creoles" were accepted as imperial subjects, needless to say, subordinate in position to pure-breeds.⁵⁵⁶

Contemporaneous criticism of the violence of the Spanish missions and its inefficacy in matters of conversion are not uncommon. Institutionally, punishment was a part of the Spanish missionaries' process of Native American transformation. The Spaniards deemed punishment necessary for their neophytes of civilization and gained justification through the paternal metaphor. Outsiders viewed it an unjustified violence but were blinded regarding the unhumanness their own practices. Nineteenth-century observers described missionary

Indians as receiving treatment like that of children, animals or prisoners--depending on the observer. For example, Wrangel's respectful description condemning the Spanish missionary process:

Dazzled by the great advantages of the Europeans, who, armed with firearms and riding their swift horses slay the fleet deer, they appear timid; this timidity expresses itself in a certain dullness, which contrasts completely with the acuteness with which the christian Padres drive those unhappy people together in herds into their missions, and treat them as beings unworthy of being called men. This is generally the case; there are exceptions to this. One would commit a great injustice if one were to call those Indians dull; nature had provided their spirit and heart with great gifts; in the missions they rapidly assume the ranks of their teachers; they easily learn diverse arts and crafts; they become daring and nimble horsemen, and are accomplished in speaking the Spanish language. Since they observe nothing on these first steps to civilization, which could compensate for their lost freedom, they seize every opportunity to retire back to their woods.⁵⁵⁷

While Kotzebue does not display a similar regard for the humanness of the Native Californians, like Wrangel, he lambasted the Spaniards for their punitive technique of conversion:

The Indians of Ross are so much like those of the missions, that they may well be supposed to belong to the same race, however different their language. They appear indeed by no means so stupid, and are much more cheerful and contented than at the missions, where a deep melancholy always clouds their faces, and their eyes are constantly fixed upon the ground; by this difference is only the natural result of the different treatment they experience.⁵⁵⁸

Zavalishin re-emphasized the discrepancy in colonizing methods, apologizing for the difference between Russian and Spanish treatment of Californians, consigning it to an inherent quality of tolerance among Russian peoples!

...regarding the Indians I shall say a few words about their relations with the Russians. Whoever has studied the Russian national character knows very well that Russians, if they have not been aroused by some special external circumstance, are very good-natured and well-disposed to everyone, despite differences in religion, nationality, and social status. A Russian

disdains neither a savage nor a heterodox...Thus did the Russians also treat the nomadic, half-savage, and savage tribes. "It means such according to their faith" or "Such is their custom," a sailor would say, and without disdain or mockery he would watch the strangest things and perhaps sometimes merely add "wonderful people, really wonderful!" ...No wonder the [Californian] Indians liked the good-natured Russian sailors, especially the generous and affectionate officers.⁵⁵⁹

Institutionally, Spanish means for civilizing Native Americans--Spaniardizing them--were more developed and formalized than the early integrating methods of the Russian-American Company. The Russians separated themselves socially and physically from the Californians, but to a lesser degree than did the Spaniards. Fort Ross, representing the Russians' colonizing structure, in an abbreviated form, allowed areas for the Aleuts and California Natives, to establish themselves traditionally, "At night...usually remaining outside the pallisade."⁵⁶⁰ The Aleut settlement was located to the south downhill from the fort, near a workshop and barracks. At the time the Aleuts departed Fort Ross, in 1838, there were 24 buildings (Russian style pine log dwellings) in their settlement, where the hunters had lived iwth their families.⁵⁶¹

Spanish segregation of Californians was more severe. The missions isolated Indians completely from military and civilian structures of the colonies. Within these missions, Californians were to undergo cultural and religious transformations that would prepare them to live in Spanish society. Ostensibly the transformation would occur in a determinable time inasmuch as missions, in theory, were to be disbanned after a decade, allowing new ones to emerge, extending the frontier. The disbanned mission sites were then to be parceled out among the neophyte Spaniards who would continued to produce, but

without supervision. Secularization, however, was never accomplished in ten-year's time; some missions were in existence for more than a century.

In consideration of the above-described circumstances, it is not unreasonable that Pomo Cheifs Tchu-Gu-An, Aman-Tan, and Gem-Le-Le were willing to donate land for the already constructed Russian settlement. Nor is it unreasonable that these people were "very pleased to see Russians occupy this land for they now live in safety from other Indians who used to attack them from time to time. This security began only from the time of Russian settlement."⁵⁶² That the Americans sought contractual agreement from the Russians at Fort Ross, for these considerations, is eloquently argued by Tikhmenev:

The desire of the natives to benefit by the Russian presence strongly justified the occupation of the shores near Rumiantsev Bay, especially since the Spaniards, who had been close to these places for a very long time, had shown no wish to enter into relations with the inhabitants. Rumors of the oppression by the Californians of their native subjects, particularly when compared to Kuskov's behavior toward his neighbors, compelled the inhabitants of Rumiantsev Bay to fear falling under the authority of the Spanish presidios and Catholic monks, who had turned everything to their own advantage. The bonds between the Russians and the natives were soon strengthened by family ties between the latter and many of the newly arrived Aleuts, so that many of the natives did not confine themselves to ordinary visits with their new relatives, but came voluntarily to help them in their work...⁵⁶³

At the time the treaty was signed, the Pomo had already experienced five years of relatively equitable treatment from the Russians, although this relationship would eventually deteriorate. This was in contrast to decades of Spanish aggression: Native Californians were cognizant of the advancing frontier of Spanish missionization, the Spaniard's intention to displace free Indians to the missions, and also the

violent nature of Spanish converts. As Zavalishin proclaimed in 1824, illustrating well the Russian position, "I have the full right to say that the Indians expected the best from the Russians."⁵⁶⁴ And the circumstances of Russian California in 1817 offer no opposition to this position. Even at the time of the Russian's departure, the physical design of the settlement "testifies to the peaceful relations between the Russians and the local Indian population," as there were 50 Indian buildings which stood outside the pallisade.⁵⁶⁵ A decade after the abandonment of Fort Ross, in 1851, there was intact a population of 500 Southwestern Pomo and Coast Miwok along the coast from Fort Ross to San Francisco Bay.⁵⁶⁶

The question of which party initiated the agreement is a moot point. The 1817 treaty made by the Russian-American Company and the Pomo nation appeared to satisfy needs of both parties. It was a document that delivered to both nations promises of great value. It offered and provided the Natives an opportunity to maintain a semblance of their cultural life in the face of Spanish destruction, which had been advancing at a rapacious rate for fifty years. To the Russian-American Company the treaty offered, but could not deliver, the right to a strip of land which would provision their northern colonies.

Was the Russian-Pomo treaty invalid, as Lutke suggested in 1818? "The agreement with an illiterate individual who has no written language or the slightest understanding of what a treaty means, may serve only as leverage,..and not as a fundamental right; and obviously will serve no purpose."⁵⁶⁷ But apparently, the treaty did serve its function between the Russians and the Meteni Pomo. The Russians received their

land and the Pomo apparently did not regret leaving Metini for a new site. That the Spaniards did not recognize the treaty, and thus the Russians' right to Alta California, lessened the treaty's value to the Russians, not to the Pomo.

Perhaps the Russian Company employees did display Machavellian techniques in an effort to sanction their right to colonial lands which, in name, were within Spanish borders. But this does not exclude the concomitant possibility that the treaty was executed for altruistic purposes. The Russians could protect the California Natives from "attacks of savages under control of the Spaniards" without added difficulty or cost to the Company. The compound at Fort Ross alone served as a formidable deterrent to native [or Spanish] hostility. And, as it has been documented, many Russian observers were sympathetic to the plight of Native Californians.

Futhermore, the Russian-Pomo treaty served a very pragmatic purpose if Russian altruism is yet unacceptable. If Spanish resistance was encountered, as had been threatened, the treaty "obliged Indians to be loyal and render help to the Russians should the occasion arise." The treaty, in the least, provided security for the Russians as it increased their numbers in case Spanish-Russian enmity turned to violence. There was another practical motive for the Russians to offer the Pomo sanctuary--the economic factor. Fort Ross, as had been true for the entire Russian expansive enterprise, heavily depended on native skills and assistance. The Aleut employee's skill and interest were circumscribed by the demands of otter hunting. The Meteni Pomo, despite their technical ignorance, provided the labor for husbandry and manufacturing.

The
A consideration that manipulation was two-fold is undeniably an apology of the Pomo's strategy for coping with the contravening, ever-consuming Spanish forces in their homeland. It is not intended as either a denial of Russian expansionist tendencies or is it intended in deference to the presently acceptable view of Native Americans. Rather it is a critique, of the historicity of past interpretations, only insofar as blind acceptance of the Russian's imperialism (to the exclusion of Native Californian cognizance of foreign encroachment, exploitation, and an awareness of the essential differences between Spanish and Russian intruders) may well be little more than a continuation of the metaphorical child interpretation of the American Natives.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

473 See James R. Gibson's "European Dependence Upon American Natives: The Case of Russian America," Ethnohistory, 25, No. 4 (1978), 359-385.

474 "Pomo" and "Miwok" are names given to these Californian Native peoples early in the twentieth century. Nineteenth-century Russians knew the Pomo as Chalanchawi or Chwachamaja Indians and Severnovskiia (Northern) Indians. The Coast Miwok were known to Russians as Bodega or Olamentka Indians. "Some Remarks on the Savages on the Northwest Coast of America. The Indians in Upper California," P.S. Kostromitinov "Notes on Indians in Upper California," Ethnographic Observations on the Coast Miwok and Pomo by Contre-Admiral F.P. von Wrangell and P. Kostromitinov of the Russian Colony Ross, trans. Fred Stross, Archaeological Research Facility, (Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1974), pp. 7, 19.

475 The Steppe Indians were also known as Kainama, Kainamero, and Gallonimero. Wrangel, "Savages," p. 7, 19.

476 Wrangel, "Savages," p. 7.

477 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 306.

478 Cook, Sherburne F., The Conflict Between the California Indian and White Civilization, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976), p. 173.

479 Smith, Janice Christine, Pomo and Promyshlenniki: Time and

Trade at Fort Ross, M.A. Thesis UCLA 1974, p. 114.

480 Smith, Pomo, p. 69-70.

481 E.W. Gifford, Ethnographic Notes on Southwestern Pomos, Anthropological Records, (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1967), 25, 9.

482 Gibson, "Russian America in 1833," p. 8.

483 Ibid., pp. 2, 83.

484 Ibid., p. 4.

485 Loc. cit.

486 Gifford, Ethnographic Notes, p. 9.

487 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 148.

488 Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 47.

489 Lutke, "Diary," p. 27.

490 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 7.

491 Wrangel, "Savages," p. 4.

492 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 7.

493 Lutke, "Diary," p. 25, 28.

494 Wrangel, "Savages," p. 5.

495 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 167.

496 Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 51.

497 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 7.

498 Wrangel, "Savages," p. 5.

499 Lutke, "Diary," p. 27.

500 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 8.

501 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 168.

502 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 8.

503 Gifford, Ethnographic Notes, p. 19.

504 Ibid., p. 20.

- 505 Loc. cit.; Golovnin, Voyage, p. 149; and Lutke, "Diary,"
p. 25-6.
- 506 Gifford, Ethnographic Notes, p. 19-20.
- 507 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 8.
- 508 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 168; Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians,"
pp. 8-9; Lutke, "Diary," p. 25; and Wrangel, "Savages," p. 5.
- 509 Gifford, Ethnographic Notes, p. 20.
- 510 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 9.
- 511 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 168; and Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 48.
- 512 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 168.
- 513 Lutke, "Diary," p. 25.
- 514 Gifford, Ethnographic Notes, p. 38.
- 515 Smith, Pomo, pp. 5-6.
- 516 Lutke, "Diary," p. 26.
- 517 Ibid., p. 23.
- 518 Wrangel, "Savages," pp. 3-4.
- 519 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 8. A barabara is a sub-
terranean house.
- 520 Ibid., p. 13.
- 521 Lutke, "Diary," p. 26.
- 522 For analysis of Pomo craft, see Alfred L. Kroeber, Handbook of
the Indians of California. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 78,
(Washington D C; Smithsonian, 1925).
- 523 Zavalishin, "California in 1824," p. 383.
- 524 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 149.
- 525 Loc. cit.
- 526 Lutke, "Diary," p. 35.

- 527 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 7; and Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 48.
- 528 Gifford, Ethnographic Notes, p. 32; and Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," pp. 7-8; Wrangel, "Savages," p. 5; and Zavalishin, "California in 1824," p. 382.
- 529 Gifford, Ethnographic Notes, p. 32; and Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 7-8.
- 530 Wrangel, "Savages," p. 5.
- 531 Lutke, "Diary," p. 23.
- 532 See Inga Clendinnen's "Disciplining the Indians," Past and Present, 31, No. 94 (1982) 27-48.
- 533 Clendinnen, "Disciplining," p. 43.
- 534 Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 43.
- 535 Lutke, "Diary," p. 26.
- 536 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 7.
- 537 Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 45.
- 538 Clendinnen, "Disciplining," p. 42.
- 539 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 168.
- 540 Zavalishin, "California in 1824," p. 382.
- 541 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 13.
- 542 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 168.
- 543 Ibid., p. 167.
- 544 Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 47.
- 545 Kostromitinov, "Notes on Indians," p. 7.
- 546 Loc. cit.
- 547 Golovnin, Voyage, pp. 149-150.
- 548 The Russian-American Company officials claimed that Fort Ross'

existence was justified on several points (see Chapter III), one being that the Meteni Pomo had invited the Russians to settle in exchange for protection from the missions.

549 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, pp. 129-130.

550 Diane Spencer-Hancock and William E. Pritchard, "Notes to the 1817 Treaty between the Russian American Company and Kashaya Pomo Indians," California History, (1981) 59, No. 4 (190), pp. 312-13.

551 Spencer-Hancock, "Treaty," p. 306-313.

552 Wrangel, "Savages," p. 6.

553 Cook, California Indian, p. 173.

554 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 129. The vaquero acted in this capacity. He was a Christianized Indian, generally born at the mission and fluent in Spanish. Their principal skill was tending livestock but "their chief importance centered on the fact that they were kind of mission police force. They were considered the most trustworthy and loyal persons by the Spaniards and as a result were hated by other Indians who saw them as administrators of sentences, as instruments of punishment and oppression, and as informers for the missionaries." See Blomkvist, "Russian Scientific," pp. 112-313.

555 Bean, California, p. 27.

556 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 124. See also Kruzenstern, Voyage, p. 19.

A creole is the offspring of a Russian father and Native American mother.

557 Wrangel, "Savages," p. 6.

558 Kotzebue, Voyage, pp. 126-7.

559 Zavalishin, "California in 1824," pp. 85-6.

560 Kotzebue, Voyage, pp. 123-4.

561 Blomkvist, "Russian Scientific," p. 107.

562 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 124.

563 Tikhmenev, History, p. 140.

564 Zavalishin, "California in 1824," p. 386.

565 Blomkvist, "Russian Scientific," p. 106.

566 A.B. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California, (Berkeley:

Univ. of California, 1925), p. 237. The population remained consistent with its pre-Russian estimate of 550.

567 Lutke, "Diary," p. 34.

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APPENDIX A

TABLE AND GRAPHS OF RUSSIAN FUR-GATHERING
EXPEDITIONS, 1743-1800

TABLE V
 RUSSIAN FUR-GATHERING EXPEDITIONS, 1743 to 1800

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1743-44	<i>Petr</i>	Sgt. Emel'ian Basov	Sgt. Emel'ian Basov	unk	64,000
1745	<i>Kapiton</i>	Basov	Basov, A. Serebrenikov	unk	unk
1745-46	<i>Petr, Kapiton</i>	E. Sannikov, Basov	Basov, Nikifor Trapeznikov (Irkutsk)	7680	112,220
1745-47	<i>Evdokim</i>	Mikhailo Nevodchikov	Afanasil Chebaevskii (Lal'sk) Trapeznikov	320	19,200
1747-48	<i>Petr</i>	Dmitrii Nakvasin	Basov, Trapeznikov, Andreian Tolstykh (Selengin'sk)	unk	50,020
1747-48	<i>Sv. Ioann</i>	Sannikov	Trapeznikov, Fedor Kholodilov (Tot'ma), Balin (Irkut'sk), Zhukov (Iaroslav)	1481	23,042
1748	<i>Simeon I Ioann</i>	G. Chudinov	Trapeznikov, Ivan Rybinskii	4010	62,590

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1747-49	<i>Ioann</i>	unk	Andrei Vsevidov	unk	5990
1748-49	<i>Perikar I Zamat</i>	unk	Shilkin (Sol'yechodsk), Ivan Bakhov, Nikita Shalavrov, Novikov (Irkut'sk)	766	4780
1749-50	<i>Petr</i>	Dmitrii Nakvasin	Basov, Trapeznikov	1965	39,376
1749-50	<i>Nikolai, Boris I Gleb</i>	Sila Sheyrin, Butin	Trapeznikov	unk	3127
1749-52	<i>Ioann</i>	E. Sannikov	F. Kholodilov, Trapeznikov	unk	95,960
1750-52	<i>Petr</i>	Basov	Basov, Trapeznikov	wrecked	
1750-52	<i>Simeon I Ioann</i>	Aleksei Vorob'ev	Rybinskiĭ, Trapeznikov	10,430	61,520
1750-53	<i>Nikolai</i>	unk	Trapeznikov	3510	105,730

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1750-54	<i>Ioann</i>	G. Mzovtsev	E. Iugov	10,721	65,429
1751-52	<i>Boris I Gleb</i>	Butin	Trapeznikov	unk	11,650
1752-55	<i>Boris I Gleb</i>	Aleksei Druzhinin	Trapeznikov	1,495	3,473
1755	?	unk	Kholodilov	1600	80,000
1753-55	<i>Jeremija</i>	P. Bashmakov	Rybinskiĭ, Serebrennikov	2080	65,960
1753-55	<i>Ioann</i>	V. Obukhov	Kholodilov, Trapeznikov	unk	109,355
1755	<i>Ioann</i>	Andrian Tolstykn	Trapeznikov, Balin	3069	95,690
1756-57	<i>Nikolai</i>	R. Durnev	Trapeznikov	5938	189,262
1757	<i>Fish</i>	unk	S. Krasil'nikov	2318	14,380

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1754-58	Fish	unk	S. Krasil'nikov	2318	14,438
1756-58	Petr I Pavel	Bashmakov	Rybinskii, Serebrennikov	1530	50,365
1756-59	Andrian I Natal'ia	A. Tolstykh	Balin, Zhukov, Trapeznikov	10,975	37,541
1757-61	Kapiton	St. Kozhevnikov	Sol'vychevodsk, Ivan Zhikin	532	17,330
1759-61	Petr I Pavel	Bashmakov, A. Serebrennikov	Rybinskii, Serebrennikov	4356	150,270

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1758-62	<i>Iulian</i>	Stephan Glotov	Iv. Iikiforov (Moscow) Snigiev (Tobit'sk) Trapeznikov	4372	130,540
1758-63	<i>Vladimir</i>	Dmitrii Pankov	Krasil'nikov, Trapeznikov	2312	78,340
1758, 63	<i>Nikolai</i>	Nasedkin	Trapeznikov	1891	58,170
1758-63	<i>Ioann Predtecha</i>	P. Verkhoturou, R. Durnev	A. Chebavskii, Trapeznikov	2476	104,218
1762	<i>Adrian</i>	unk	Chebavskii	unk	unk
1759-62	<i>Zakharii I. g'ltza- betd</i>	Cherepanov	Posinkov (Shitsk) Kul'kov (Vologda) Krasil'nikov	2280	101,430
1760-62	<i>Gavriil</i>	G. Pushkarev	Iv. Bechtvin (Irkutsk)	1794	52,570

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1759-65	<i>Vern. Muleshka, Liubou'</i>	Iv. Rakhov	Iv. Bakhov, N. Shafavrov	Exploration	
1760-63	<i>Ioann Ustiuzhskii</i>	Al. Vorobiev	T. Chebavskii, Vas. Popov	unk	5409
1760-64	<i>Andreian I Natal'ia</i>	Tolstykh	Kholodilov, Tolstykh	5838	170,000
1762-63	<i>Petr I Pavel</i>	Bashmakov	Rybinskii, Serebrennikov	464	17,040
1761-63	<i>Ioann</i>	D. Medvedev	Iakov Protasov, Iv. Lapin	unk	unk
1763	?	unk	Popov	913	31,817

Continued

TABLE V

CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1762-63	Zakhar'ii I Etta- veta	P. Druzhinin	Fedor Koli'kov, Vasilii Koli'kov	unk	unk
1762-63	Troitsa	Korovin	Trapeznikov	unk	unk
1762-66	Adveian I Matai'ia	Glotov	Popov, Popov, Chebaevskoi	unk	68,000
1963	Nikolai	L. Nasedkin	Trapeznikov	unk	unk
1964-66	Petr I Pavel	Iv. Solov'ev, E. Delarov	Grigorii, Peter Panov	1697	42,280
1766	Nikolai	unk	Trapeznikov	341	10,524

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1766	?	unk	Popov	3822	132,806
1764-68	<i>Ioann Ustuzh- skii</i>	V. Shoshin	Popov, Chebevskii	2962	98,804
1764-68	<i>Petr I Pavel</i>	V. Sof'in	Trapeznikov	5832	37,547
1765-69	<i>Vladimir</i>	A.I. Sapozhnikov	Krasil'nikov	5370	83,387
1766-70	<i>Pavel</i>	Af. Ocheredin	Af. Orekhov, Shilov	2695	68,520

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1770	<i>Petr I Pavel</i>	Iv. Korovin	Panov Bros.	10,367	284,868
1767-72	<i>Adriam (Adriatic Natalia)</i>	L. Vtorushin	G. Peloponsov, Popov, Lapin	4470	109,943
1772	<i>Ioann Ustuzhskii</i>	unk	Popov	4386	111,889
1772	<i>Sv. Ioann Predtecha</i>	unk	Popov, Peloponsov	7724	18,747
1772	<i>balarka</i>	unk	Novikov	503	15,000
1773	<i>Nikolai</i>	St. Cherepanov Solov'ev	Orekhov, Zasyukin, Mulchin	5205	140,670
1773	<i>Prokopi</i>	unk	Protod'iakov, Okonnishnikov	640	20,130

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1774	baidarka	unk	Novikov	40	1660
1770-74	Sv. Alek- sandr Neuskii	Pankov	Serebrennikov, Aleksi Arkashev, An. Shaposhnikov	6024	136,050
1770-75	Pavel	Solov'ev	Orekhov, Shilov, Lapin	6104	137,455
1776	Petr I Pavel	Korovin	Panov	unk	6915
1777	Mikhail	Polutov	Kholodilov	7236	166,056
1777	Nikolai	Petushkov	Lebedev, Shelekhov	890	15,600
1778	Nikolai	unk	Protod'iakonov, Okonnishnikov	405	6922
1778	Prokopi	Dm. Bocharov	Protod'iakonov, Okonnishnikov, Fedor Shubin	40,800	98,840
1779	Vladimir	Zaikov	Shilov, Lapin, Orekhov, Peloponisov	13,066	300,416

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1779	Eupl	Sapozhnikov	F. Burenin	4512	52,520
	Petr I Pavel	F. Putintsev	P. Osokin, Mikhail Shvetov	wrecked	
1779	Alek- sandr Neukii	Delarov, Soshin	Panov	unk	unk
1779	Pavel or Petr I Pavel	Sapozhnikov, Tret'iakov	Shelikhov, Luka Alin	37,296	74,240
1781	Pavel	G. Izmailov	Drekhov, Shilov, Lapin	18,679	172,020
1781	Alek- sandr Neukii	Shien, Soshin	Panov	unk	41,948
1781	Varfolomei I Varnicua	Korelin, Cherepanov	Shelikhov, Savel'ev, Panov Bros.	13,991	57,860
1781	Zosima I Savatii	unk	Protasov	10,156	49,215
1781	Izovin I Savatii	Dolzhanov	Kieselev Bros.	unk	40,215

Continued

TABLE V

CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of peits	Value in Rubles
1782	<i>Mataliia</i>	Bocharov	Shelikhov	810	100,950
1784	<i>Anchei</i>	Petushkov	Golikov, Shelikhov	6515	133,150
1785	<i>Nikolai</i>	Paikov, Polutov	Panov Bros	6635	127,834
1785	<i>Kiziment</i>	Ocheredin, Polutov	Panov Bros.	4147	89,160
1785	<i>Ioann Predacha</i>	Danilo Shirokoi, A. Sapozhnikov	Golikov, Shelikhov	2836	63,417
1785	<i>Eupl</i>	Pankov, Korelin	Panov Bros.	5142	71,746
1786	<i>Mikhail</i>	Mukhopiev	Kholodilov	unk	unk
1786	<i>Ioann Ryl'skii</i>	Tiutrin, Menshikov	Shelikhov	20,976	93,827
1786	<i>Prokop II</i>	Bacharov	Zhuravle, Krivorotov	wrecked	
1786	<i>Pavel</i>	Potap Zaikov	Orekhov, Shilov, Lapin	8452	35,219

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1786	<i>Aleksai</i>	Delarov	Panov Bros.	6155	63,367
1786	<i>Alek-savir Nevskii</i>	P. Zaikov	Orekhov, Shilov, Lapin	45,401	238,700
1786	<i>Zoimz I Savatii</i>	unk	Protasov	26,854	86,970
1787	<i>Georgii</i>	unk	Panov Bros.	1571	40,300
1789	<i>Georgii Pobedo-nosets</i>	G. Pribylov	Lebedev, Shelikhov	44,436	285,081
1791	<i>Izolim I Savvatii</i>	P. Savel'ev	Protasov, Kiselev	53,209	171,914
1791	<i>Varmava I Varfolomsz</i>	Mukhoplev, Korelin	Shelikhov, Savel'ev, Panov Bros.	unk	109,733
1787	<i>Petr I Pavel</i>	T. Sapozhnikov	L. Al'in	unk	35,219
1786	<i>Tri Sviatitelia</i>	G. Izmailov	Golikov, Shelikhov	unk	56,000

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1789	<i>Mikhail</i>	Bocharov	Golikov, Shellikhov	unk	300,000
1790	<i>Pavel</i>	Zaikov	Lebedev, Lastochkin	unk	102,108
1793	<i>Simon</i>	Izmailov	Golikov, Shellikhov	unk	128,000
1793	<i>Georgii</i>	Balakiyev	Panov Bros.	33,266	73,000
1795	<i>Nikolai</i>	Soshin	Kozitsyn	unk	unk
1790	<i>Ioann Predtechka</i>	D. Shirokikh	Golikov, Shellikhov	wrecked	
1792	<i>Mikhail</i>	Delarov	Golikov, Shellikhov	14,583	376,000
1795	<i>Phoenix</i>	Shields	Golikov, Shellikhov	13,031	321,130
1795	<i>Aleksandr</i>	Izmailov	Golikov, Shellikhov	77,745	276,500

Continued

TABLE V
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Captain	Owner	No. of pelts	Value in Rubles
1797	<i>Georgii</i>	Gr. Konovalov	Lebedev-Lashtochkin	73,956	183,200
1797	<i>Orel</i>	Talin	Golikov, Shelikhov	822	21,912
1797	<i>Simson I Anna</i>	D. Shirokikh	Golikov, Shelikhov	unk	51,000
1797	<i>Izozim I Savvatii</i>	Dmitrii Bocharov	Kiselev	11,998	38,860
1800	<i>Ioann</i>	Zaikov	Lebedev-Lashtochkin	unk	unk




Figure 21. Number of merchants participating in Russian fur trade, 1743-1803. Based on data listed in TABLE V.

A. Period of fur gathering initiated by Emel'ian Basov in 1743. Basov's ventures came in response to the valuable cargo (900 sea otter pelts) brought back by Chirikov in 1741. The number of individual merchants participating in the trade steadily increased following the success of Basov's voyages.

B. The number of individual companies increased and showed greater stability throughout the period.

C. A constant downward trend in the number of individual merchants who were willing and able to invest in voyages which were of greater duration and required sturdier vessels, more provisions, etc. In other words, the cost of these voyages had become a prohibitive factor for many merchants.




Figure 22. Number of merchants participating in Russian fur trade, 1743-1802 (ten-year moving averages). Based on data given in TABLE V.




Figure 23. Histogram, owners by total wealth. Based on data given in TABLE V.




Figure 24. Number of Russian fur-gathering voyages, 1745-1822. " Based on data given in TABLE V.




Figure 25. Volume of fur catch, 1746-1821 (three-year moving averages). Based on data given in TABLE V.




Figure 26. Value (in rubles) of fur catch, 1746-1797. Based on information provided in TABLE V.

Returns remain fairly constant.
 Fluctuations are dependent on
 various factors, e.g., the
 number of voyages made in a
 particular year.




Figure 27. Value (in rubles) of fur catch, 1747-1796 (three-year moving averages). Based on data given in TABLE V.

TABLE VI

PARTICIPANTS IN RUSSIAN FUR-GATHERING EXPEDITIONS
1743-1803

Owner	No. of Voyages	Years of Voyages	Success of Expeditions (in Rubles)
Alin	1	1776-1779	74,240 r.
Arkashev	1	1770-1774	136,050 r.
Bakhov	2	1748-1765	4,780 r.
Balin	4	1747-1759	295,567 r.
Basov	5	1743-1750	265,616 r.
Bechevin	1	1760-1762	52,570 r.
Burenin	1	1773-1779	52,520 r.
Chebaevskii	6	1745-1768	295,567 r.
Golikov	12	1777-1797	1,727,167 r.
Iugov	1	1750-1754	65,429 r.
Kiselev (Bros.)	3	1777-1803	259,989 r.
Kholidilov A.	6	1749-1786	808,642 r.
Kholidilov, F.	2	1747-1755	103,024 r.
Krasil'nikov	4	1754-1769	277,559 r.
Krivirtov	1	1780-wrecked	0 r.
Kulikov	2	1759-1763	101,430 r.
Lapin	10	1761-1791	1,130,263 r.
Lebedev-Lastochkin	7	1777-1800	862,316 r.
Mukhin	1	1768-1773	140,670 r.
Nikiforov	1	1758-1762	130,450 r.
Nikonov	2	1770-1774	16,660 r.
Okonnishikov	3	1771-1778	125,892 r.
Orekhov	7	1776-1791	952,320 r.
Osokin	1	1774-wrecked	0 r.
Panov (Bros.)	13	1764-1793	1,009,016 r.
Peloponisov	1	unk.-1772	18,747 r.
Popov	8	1760-1772	577,356 r.
Posnikov	1	1759-1762	101,430 r.
Protasov	4	1761-1791	308,099 r.
Protod'iankonov	3	1771-1778	125,892 r.
Rybinskii	6	1747-1763	369,835 r.
Savel'ev	2	1771-1791	167,598 r.
Serebrenikov	6	1745-1774	418,775 r.
Shalaurov	2	1748-1765	4,780 r.
Shaposhnikov	1	1770-1774	136,050 r.
Shelikhov	21	1774-1799	2,538,930 r.
Shilov	7	1766-1791	952,320 r.
Shubin	1	1774-1778	98,840 r.

Continued

TABLE VI
CONTINUED

Owner	No. of Voyages	Years of Voyages	Success of Expeditions
Shvetsov	1	1774-wrecked	0 r.
Sibiriakov	1	1779-1785	63,417 r.
Snigirev	1	1758-1762	130,450 r.
Tolstykh	2	1745-1764	170,020 r.
Trapeznikov	23	1745-1768	1,596,273 r.
Tyrin	6	1747-1763	369,835 r.
Vsevidov	1	1747-1749	5,990 r.
Zasytkin	1	1768-1773	140,670 r.
Zhilkin	2	1748-1757	22,110 r.
Zhukov	1	1756-1759	317,541 r.
Zhuravlev	1	1780-wrecked	0 r.

APPENDIX B

PARTICIPANTS IN AND ROUTES OF RUSSIAN CIRCUMNAVIGATIONS




Figure 28. Voyage of the *Nadezhda* and *Neva*, 1803-1806. Reprinted from A.A. Ivashintsov, *Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849*, trans. Glynn Barratt (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980), p. 9.




Figure 29. Voyage of the Suvorov, 1813-1816. Reprinted from A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849, trans. Glynn Barratt (Kingston, Ontario: The Lime-stone Press, 1980), p. 21.




Figure 30. Voyage of the Rurik, 1815-1818. Reprinted from A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849, trans. Glynn Barratt (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980), p. 29.




Figure 31. Voyage of the Kamchatka, 1817-1819. Reprinted from A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849, trans. Glynn Barratt (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980), p. 39.




Figure 32. Voyage of the Borodino, 1819-1821. Reprinted from A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849, trans. Glynn Barratt (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980), p. 59.




Figure 33. Voyage of the Rurik, 1821-1822. Reprinted from A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849, trans. Glynn Barratt (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980), p. 61.

TABLE VII
PARTICIPANTS IN RUSSIAN CIRCUMNAVIGATIONS,
1803 to 1833

Ship Nadezhda (1803-06)

Commander, Capt.-Lt. Ivan Fedorovich Kruzhenshtern	d. 1846; admiral; attached to His Imperial Majesty's suite.
Lt. Makar Ratmanov	d. 1833; vice-adm.; duty general.
Lt. Fedor Romberg	Died in the service as a captain.
Lt. Petr Golovachev	Shot self in 1806 on St. Helena Island.
Lt. Ermolai Levenshtern	d.
Midshipman Faddei Bellingshausen (Bellingsgauzen)	d.
Navigator Filipp Kamen'shchikov	d.
Assistant Navigator Vasilii Spolokhov	d.
Dr. Karl Espenberg	
Sub-physician Ivan Sidgam	Went abroad.
Astronomer Horner	Went abroad.
Naturalist Tilesius	d. 1852.
Naturalist Langsdorf	d. in retirement as Capt. (1st rank).
Naval Cadet Otto Kotzebue	d.
Naval Cadet Moritz Kotzebue	d. 1807 in Krasnoyarsk, on return journey from Kamchatka.
Envoy to the Court of Japan, Actual Counsellor of State, Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov	
Major Ermolai Frideritsi	
Guards Lieutenant Count Fedor Tolstoi	
Court Counsellor Fedor Foss	
Artist Stepan Kurliandtsev	
Dr. Brinken (Brykin)	
R.-Amer. Company Agent Fedor Shemelin	d.
Lower ranks: 51	

Ship Neva (1803-06)

Commander, Capt. Lt. Iurii Fedorovich Lisianskii	d. 1837; in retirement since 1809: Capt. (1st rank).
Lt. Pavel Arbutov	d. 1837 in ret.
Lt. Petr Povalishin	d. in the service as Capt.
Midshipman Fedor Kovediaev	
Midshipman Vasilii Berkh	d. 1834; Colonel; section head in Hydrography Depot.
Dr. Moritz Laband	
Navigator Danilo Kalinin	Perished in the wreck of the <u>Neva</u> , 1813.
Assistant Navigator Fedor Mal'tsov	
Assistant Surgeon Aleksei Mutovkin	
Hieromonk Gedeon	
Clerk Nikolai Korobitsyn	
Lower ranks: 42	

Continued

TABLE VII

CONTINUED

Ship Neva (1806-07)

Commander, Lt. Leontii Vasil'evich Gagemeister (Hagemeister)	d. 1833 as Capt. (1st rank).
Lt. Moritz Berkh	d.
Lt. Aleksandr Kozlianinov	d. in the service.
Nav. Ivan Vasil'ev	d. 1832, Captain in charge of the Instruments Bureau, Hydrography Depot.
Assistant Nav. Efim Klochkov	
Surgeon Karl Mordgorst	
Company Agent Rodion Zakharov	
Lower ranks: 36	

Ship Suvorov (1813-16)

Commander, Lt. Mikhailo Petrovich Lazarev	d.
Lt. Semen Unkovskii	
Lt. Pavel Povalo-Shveikovskii	
Navigator Maksim Samsonov.	d. in ret.
Navigator (hired) Aleksei Rossiiskii	
Navigator (hired) Iosif Desil'e	Jumped ship in Port Jackson.
Dr. Egor Sheffer (Georg Anton Schaeffer)	Subsequently Brazilian Envoy at one of the German Courts.
Supercargo German Molvo	
Clerk Fedor Krasil'nikov	
Lower ranks: 26 Hunters: 7	

Brig Rurik (1815-18)

Commander, Lt. Otto Evstaf'evich Kotzebue	d. 1846 in ret. (Capt. 1st rank).
Lt. Gleb Shishmarev	d. 1855, rear adm., commanding a Guards equipage.
Lt. Ivan Zakharin	
Apprentice Navigator Vasilii Khromchenko	d. 1819, retired Capt. (2nd rank).
Apprentice Navigator Vladimir Petrov	d. in the service.
Apprentice Navigator Mikhailo Korenev	d. on service in America.
Dr. Ivan Eschscholts	Went abroad.
Naturalist Adalbert Chamisso	Went abroad.
Naturalist Vormskel'd (Wormskold)	
Artist Choris (to Sitkha)	
Lower ranks: 24	

Ship Kutuzov (1816-19)

Commander, Capt. Lt. Leontii Vasil'evich Hagemeister	
Lt. Aleksandr Selivanov	d. 1849, rear-adm., member of Gen. Committee of Naval Intend.

Continued

TABLE VII

CONTINUED

Lt. Nil' Kropotov	d. 1827, Capt.-Lt.
Reserve Midshipman Otto de Roberti	d. 1817 at Sitkha.
Navig. Efim Klochkov	
Nav. Ivan Kislakovskii	d.
Hired navig. Prokopii Tumanin	d. in Company service.
(to Ross)	
Staff Surgeon Lavrentii Kerner	
(to colonies)	
Supercargo Kiril Khlebnikov	d. 1830, Commercial
(to Sitkha)	Counsellor and Company
	Director.
Clerk Aleksandr Meshchovskii	
Lower ranks: 49 Hunters: 4	

Ship Suvorov (1816-18)

Commander, Lt. Zakhar Ivanovich Ponafidin	d. 1830, Lt.-Col. Inspector of School of Navigators.
Lt. Semen Ianovskii (to Sitkha)	d. Capt. (1st rank) in ret.; Lt.
Lt. Valerian Novosil'tsov	
Nav. Dionisii Zarembo	d.
Navig. Andrei Domashnev	
Agent Fedor Krasil'nikov	
Clerk Iona Sukhanov	
Surgeon Vasilii Bervi	
Surgeon Lavrentii Kerner (from colonies)	
Lower ranks: 30	

Sloop Kamchatka (1817-19)

Commander, Capt., 2d Rank, Vasilii Mikhailovich Golovnin	
Lt. Matvey Murav'ev	d. 1832, Major-Gen. Com. member of Uchetn.
Lt. Nikandr Filatov	d.
Lt. Fedor Kutygin	Admiral, General- Adjutant.
Midshipman Fedor Litke (Lütke)	
Midshipman Baron Ferdinand Vrangell' (Wrangell)	
Naval Cadet Ardalion Lutkovskii	d. 1821 in Holland on <u>Aiaks</u> .
Naval Cadet Stepan Artiukov	d. on service wit Black Sea Fleet. See No. 18.
Naval Cadet Feopemt Lutkovskii	
Naval Cadet Vikentii Tabulevich	
Collegiate Secretary Matiushkin	
Navigator Grigorii Nikiforov	d.
Assist. Nav. Prokopii Kozmin	d.
Assist. Nav. Ivan Afanas'ev	
Nav. apprentice Petr Il'in	d. in Okhotsk, Lt Col. inspector of navi
Staff Surgeon Anton Novitskii	d.
Artist Mikhailo Tikhonov	
Lower ranks: 119	

Continued

TABLE VII

CONTINUED

Ship Borodino (1819-21)

Commander, Lt. Zakhar' Ivanovich
Ponafidin
Lt. Vsevolod Ponafidin d. in ret.
Lt. Petr Chistiakov d.
Lt. Dmitrii Nikol'skii d. 1835. Capt. 2nd Rank
Navigator Dionisii Zarembo
Navigator Mikhailo Prokof'ev d. 1833, Lt., in
(to Sitkha) Company service.
Navigator Aleksandr Kil'khen
(to Sitkha)
Hired Navigator Petr Resukhin
Surgeon Karl Shpigel'berg d. during the voyage.
Supercargo Fedor Krasil'nikov
Lower ranks: 80 Hunters: 27

Ship Kutuzov (1820-22)

Commander, Lt. Pavel Afanas'evich d. 1847 in ret., Actuary
Dokhturov Counsellor of State.
Lt. Valerian Novosil'tsov
(to Sitkha)
Lt. Vladimir Romanov
Lt. Pavel Naumov d.
Navigator Ivan Lazarev drowned in 1834, at
Lovisa, as Lt.
Navigator Dmitrii Yakovlev d. in the service,
as Capt.
Dr. Vasilii Bervi (to Sitkha)
Dr. Vasilii Volkov (on return
voyage)
Agent Sergei Chernyshev
Clerk Stepan Kitaev
Lower ranks: 45 Hunters: 26

Brig Riurik (1821)

Commander, Navigator 12th Class,
Efim Alekseevich Klochkov
Assist. Navig. Maksim Samsonov d. in the service, Capt.
Assist. Navig. Vasilii Nabokov d. in the service, Lt.
Assist. Nav. Ivan Vasil'ev
Lower ranks: 22 Hunters: 6

Continued

TABLE VII

CONTINUED

Ship Elisaveta (1821)

Commander, Navigator 14th Class,
Ivan Mikhailovich Kislakovskii
Assist. Navig. Mikhailo Nozikov d. 1855, Lt., at
Okhotsk.
Assist. Navig. Nikolai Antonov d. in the service.
Assist. Navig. Mikhailo Pashinnikov
Lower ranks: 17 Hunters: 14

Frigate Kreiser (1822-25)

Commander, Capt. 2nd Rank Mikhailo
Petrovich Lazarev
Lt. Ivan Kad'ian
Lt. Mikhailo Annenkov
Lt. Ivan Kupreianov
Lt. Fedor Vishnevskii dismissed in 1826.
Lt. Dmitrii Nikol'skii (to Sitkha) (later admiral)
Midshipman Pavel Nakhimov (exiled to Siberia)
Midshipman Dmitrii Zavalishin d. 1826, fligel'-
Midshipman Ivan Butenev ad'jutant, Capt. 2nd r.
Midshipman Pavel Murav'ev d. 1848, State Counsellor
and Director of the
Mercantile Marine School
Adjutant-General,
Count.
Midshipman Efim Putiatin drowned off Sicily,
Sept. 1827.
Midshipman Aleksandr Domashenko d. 1847, Actual State
Counsellor and senior
surgeon with the Black
Sea Fleet.
Dr. Petr Aleman d. in ret.
d. 1849 as Capt. See
No. 31.
Navigator Pantelei Kononov d. Staff-Capt., Keeper
of Magazines.
Navigator Vasilii Klopotov
Assist. Nav. Trifanov
Lower ranks: 162

Ship Elena (1824-26)

Commander, Lt. Petr Egorovich
Chistiakov (to Sitkha)
Captain 2nd Rank Matvei Ivanovich
Murav'ev (on ret. voyage)
Lt. Zakhar' Balk
Lt. Nikolai Shishmarev
Lt. Aleksandr Stadol'skii d. in the service
Navigator Nikolai Rodionov
Assist. Navig. Dmitrii Iakovlev
Seaman Adol'f Kristiern
Surgeon Ivan Sakharov
Agent Ivan Severin
Lower ranks: 41

Continued

TABLE VII

CONTINUED

Elena (1828-30)

Commander, Capt.-Lt. Vasilii
 Stepanovich Khromchenko
 Lt. Baron Lavrentii Levendal'
 (Loewendal)
 Lt. Petr Dmitriev
 Company Navigator Aleksandr Kashevarov d.
 Pilot Otto Greil
 Dr. Vebel'
 Company Agent Arakelov
 Clerk Vasilii Kashevarov
 Passenger, Captain 1st Rank Pavel Kuzmishchev d. 1850 as Rear-Adm.,
 Port Captain at
 Arkhangel'sk.
 Passenger, Titular Counsellor Til'
 Lower ranks: 38

Naval transport Amerika (1831-33)

Commander, Capt.-Lt. Vasilii
 Stepanovich Khromchenko
 Lt. Egor' Tsebrikov
 Lt. Fedor Bodisko
 Cadet Andrei Freigang
 Sub-Lt., Navigator's School
 Aleksandr Kashevarov
 Sub-Lt., Navigator's School
 Kristian Klet
 Sub-Lt., Navigator's School
 Vasilii Zhivodarov
 Pilot Aleksandr Khalezov Lt.-Col.
 Botanist Lushnat (to Rio and back) Went abroad.
 Staff-Surgeon Averkii Skrypchinskii
 Lower ranks: 54

Ship Elena (1835)

Commander, Lt. Mikhailo Dmitrievich
 Tchen'kov
 Lt. Rostislav Mashin
 Company Pilot Aleksandr Khalezov
 Pilot Mikhailo Murashev
 Cadet Konstantin Timkovskii
 Surgeon Nikolai Volynskii
 Agent Aleksandr Rotchev
 Lower ranks: 26

Ship Nikolai (1837-39)

Commander, Capt.-Lt. Evgenii
 Andreevich Berens
 Lt. Vasilii Zavoiko

Continued

TABLE VII

CONTINUED

Ship Nikolai (1839-41)

Commander, on the voyage to Sitkha,
 Capt. 2nd Rank and **Manager**
 designate of the Company colonies
 Adolf Karlovich Etolin (Etholen)
 Commander of the vessel, Lt. drowned in the Company's
 Nikolai Kondrat'evich Kadnikov service in 1842.
 Lt. Ivan Bartram
 Company Navigator, Staff-Capt.
 Varlaam Sergeev
 Physician Aleksandr Romanovskii
 (on return voyage from Sitkha)
 Commander on the voyage from Sitkha
 Capt. 1st Rank and former
Manager of the colonies
 of A. Kupreianov
 Commander of the vessel, Capt.-Lt. Vice-Adm.
 Stepan Vasil'evich Voevodskii
 Lt. Rostislav Mashin
 Navigator's School Ensign
 Aleksandr Khalezov
 Staff-Surgeon Eduard Blashke
 (Blaschke)
 Company official Kostromitinov
 Lower ranks: 40

Ship Naslednik Aleksandr (1840)

Commander, Capt.-Lt. Dionisii
 Fedorovich Zarembo
 Lt. Arkadii Voevodskii Vice-Adm.
 Lt. Egor Ogil'vi
 Navigators School Sub-Lt.
 Aleksandr Gavrilov
 Dr. Aleksandr Frankengeizer
 (Frankenheiser)
 Agent Valerian Bazhenov
 Lower ranks: 30

Adapted from listing in A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyages, 1803-1849 (Kinston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980), pp. 136-150.

APPENDIX C

SKETCHES AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF FORT ROSS





Figure 34. Fort Ross, 1826. Drawing by Wassurts; inscription reads, "Ross The Russian Colonial Installment and Fort in California, 1826." Reprinted from E.O.Essig, "The Russian Settlement at Ross," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 190.



Figure 35. Fort Ross, 1828. Drawing originally published in Duhaut-Cilly's Voyage Autour du Monde (Paris, 1835), as "Bodega." Inscription reads, "View of the establishment at Bodega and the coast of New Albion, 1828." Reprinted from E. O. Essig, "The Russian Settlement at Ross," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 202.



ESAMBY BLACK "OLD FORT ROSS" AS SEEN FROM THE HILL. HELD BY C. W. CALL, SONOMA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA. STATE ROSS ARCHIVE.

Figure 36. Fort Ross, undated. Reprinted from Clarence DuFour, "Russian Withdrawal from California," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 248.




Figure 37. View of the landing at Fort Ross. Reprinted from Clarence DuFour, "Russian Withdrawal from California," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 216.



Figure 38. View of the landing at Fort Ross, 1890s. Reprinted from Clarence DuFour, "Russian Withdrawal from California," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 241.



VIEW OF FORT ROSS FROM THE LANDING
(From "In a Redwood Logging Camp" by Ernest Ingersoll; *Harper's Magazine*,
Vol. 66, No. 392, Jan. 1893.)

Figure 39. View of Fort Ross from the landing.
Reprinted from Adele Ogden, "Russian Sea Otter and
Seal Hunting off the California Coast," Quarterly
of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3
(1933), fol. p. 236.

The site
of
Fort Ross


A marine terrace
between
the mountains
and the sea



Figure 40. The site of Fort Ross. Reprinted from James R. Gibson, "Russia in California, 1833: The Report of Governor Wrangel, Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (1969), p. 209.




Figure 41. Photograph of Fort Ross site. Courtesy of the Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon, Negative no. 63432.



"Ross Settlement," by I. G. Voznesenskii, about 1840. The palisaded fort encloses chapel, administrative offices, barracks and officers' quarters as well as kitchen and storerooms. The bathhouse and stables are outside the fort, to the left. On the right are workshops and small dwellings for Aleut trappers, who had given up their traditional turts in favor of Russian-style log cabins. This drawing was intended by the artist as a gift for the last manager of Ross, A. G. Rotchev. (Archive MAE AN SSSR.)

Figure 42. Fort Ross, 1840. Reprinted from Kirill T. Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian America, 1817-1832, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976), fol. p. 106.



"Fort Ross," an unfinished sketch by I.G. Voznesenskii. The clearly depicted high palisaded walls and octagonal shore bastions bear a strong resemblance to the earlier traditional Siberian ostrogs. The Orthodox chapel is visible on the right. The structure collapsed in the 1906 earthquake, was rebuilt in 1915, burned to the ground in 1970-1971, and was again faithfully reconstructed according to the original plans. It was dedicated in the spring of 1976 by a devoted historian, His Grace, The Right Reverend Grigorii, Russian Orthodox Bishop of Sitka and Alaska. (Archive MNE AN SSSR.)

Figure 43. Fort Ross, 1840. Reprinted from Kirill T. Khlebnikov, *Colonial Russian America, 1817-1832*, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976), fol. p. 106.




Figure 44. Fort Ross, 1906. Reprinted from E. O. Essig, "Russian's Settlement at Ross," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 197.





Figure 45. Barracks at Fort Ross, restored. Reprinted from James R. Gibson, "Russian in California, 1833: The Report of Governor Wrangel," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (1969), p. 209.



THE SOLDIERS' QUARTERS AT FORT ROSS IN 1912
(Courtesy of Miss Honorin Tunney.)

Figure 46. Barracks at Fort Ross, 1912. Reprinted from Adele Ogden, "California Sea Otter and Seal Hunting off the California Coast," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 236.




Figure 47. Bastion at Fort Ross. Reprinted from Nellie Stow, The Russians in California (San Francisco: The National Society of Colonial Dames of America in the State of California), p. 12.



Figure 48. Bastion and Landing at Fort Ross. Reprinted from Clarence DuFour, "The Russian Withdrawal from California," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 276.



Figure 49. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted from James R. Gibson, "Two New Chernykh Letters," The Pacific Historian, 12, No. 4 (1968), p. 59.




Figure 50. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted from Adele Ogden, "California Sea Otter and Seal Hunting off the California Coast," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 227.




Figure 51. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted from James R. Gibson, "Russia in California, 1833: The Report of Governor Wrangel," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (1969), p. 210.



Figure 52. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted from Adele Ogden, "California Sea Otter and Seal Hunting off the California Coast," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 236.




Figure 53. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted from Frederick C. Cordes, trans. "Letters of A. Rotchev: Last Commandant at Fort Ross," Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 39, No. 2 (1960), p. 97.




Figure 54. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Courtesy of Chuck Williams.

APPENDIX D

COMPARISON OF HEADS OF RUSSIA/RAK COLONIES/FORT ROSS
TO HEADS OF SPAIN/MEXICO/CALIFORNIA

TABLE VIII

COMPARISON OF HEADS OF RUSSIA/RAK COLONIES/FORT ROSS
TO HEADS OF SPAIN/MEXICO/CALIFORNIA

Spanish Kings	Mexican Viceroy/Presidents	Alta California Governors	Date	Fort Ross Managers	Administrators of RAK Colonies	Russian Tsars	
Charles IV	Vicente de Guemes	Jose Arrillaga	1790			Catherine II	
			1791				
			1792				
			1793				
		Marques de Branciforte	Diego de Borica				1794
							1795
							1796
		Jose de Iturrigaray	Jose Arrillaga				1797
							1798
							1799
	1800					Alexander Baranov	
	1801						
	1802					Alexander I	
	1803						
	Joseon Bonaparte	Pedro de Garibay Francisco de Lizana Francisco Venegas				1804	
						1805	
						1806	
1807							
1808							
1809							
1810							
1811				Ivan Kuskov			

Continued

TABLE VIII
CONTINUED

Spanish Kings	Mexican Viceroy/Presidents	Alta California Governors	Date	Fort Ross Managers	Administrators of BAK Colonies	Russian Tsars	
Ferdinand VII	Felix Calleja del Rey Juan Ruiz de Apodaca		1812				
			1813				
			1814	Jose Davia Arquele			
			1815	Vincente de Sala			
			1816				
			1817				
			1818				
			1819				Leontii Hagemeister Semen Ivanovskii Matvei Murav'ev
			1820				
			1821			Karl Schmidt	
	1822	Agustin de Iturbide	Luis Arquele				
	1823		Jose Echeandia				
	1824	Guadalupe Victoria		Paul Shelekhov			
	1825		Jose Echeandia			Petr Chistiakov	Nicholas I
	1826						
1827							
1828	Vincente Guerrero						
1829	Jose de Socavegra Melchor Nizamilz						
1830				Petr Kostramitinov	Ferdinand Wrangel		
1831		Manuel Victoria Pio Pico					
Maria Cristina	Manuel Gomez Pedraza	Jose Echeandia (s) Agustin Zamorano (n)	1832				
	Antonio de Santa Anna	Jose Figueras	1833				
		Jose Castro	1834				
	Miguel Barragan		1835			Ivan Kuropnev	
Baldomero Espartero	Jose Justo Corro	Nicolas Gutierrez Mariano Chico Juan Rautista	1836	Aleksandr Rotchev			
	Anastasio Bustamante		1837				
			1838				
			1839		Adolf Ethelen		
			1840				

APPENDIX E

POPULATION INFORMATION ON
RUSSIAN CALIFORNIA

TABLE IX
POPULATION INFORMATION ON RUSSIAN CALIFORNIA

Date	MALE			FEMALE			CHILDREN			TOTAL	
	Russian	Creole	Aleut	Russian	Creole	Aleut	Native	Russian	Creole		Aleut
1812	25	0	80*	0				0			unk
1818	27	0	78**	0	0			0	0		unk
1819	27										378
1832											300
1833	41	10	12	35	14	15	37	5	63	26	293

*Kuskov arrived at Big Bodega Bay with twenty-five Russians and Aleuts in forty baïdar-kas.

**This figure, according to Golovnin, included both male and female Aleuts.

Note. Based on information found in Svetlana Fedorova, The Russian Population in Alaska and California, Late 18th Century to 1867, trans. and ed. Alton S. Donnelly and Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1973), p. 135; James R. Gibson, "Russian in California, 1833: Report of Governor Wrangel," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (1969), p. 210; and "Russian America in 1833: The Survey of Kyrill Khlebnikov," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 63, No. 1 (1972), p. 8; P.A. Tikmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company, trans. and ed. Alton S. Donnelly and Richard A. Pierce (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 161.

APPENDIX F

CALIFORNIA SEA OTTER HUNT, 1803-1836

TABLE X

VESSELS ENGAGED IN THE CALIFORNIA SEA OTTER HUNT, 1803 to 1836

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Other pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1803 -1805	<i>O'Caïn</i> +	280 tons 18 guns 20 baidarkas V.P. Tarakanov ? Shvetsov 40 Aleuts	J. O'Caïn	Boston mer., A. Winship, B. Homer, J. Winship, Jr.	San Quintin Bay (12/13-3/26/04) Todos Santos Bay (4/15-19/04)	1,800	Boston Kad'iak San Diego Kad'iak Canton Boston 12/11/03 10/26/03 12/4-8/03 6/?/04 1/2/05 7/1/05
1805 -1806	<i>Peacock</i> +	Brig 108 tons 14-18 crew 8 guns	O. Kimball	Bos. mers., Winship?	Bodega Bay (3/?-5/?/07) San Quintin Bay (6/?-7/?/07)	1,261	Boston Sandwich Is. Carmen Santo Tomas Kad'iak Is. 9/14/05 2/12/06 4/20/06 4/21/06 10/25/06
1806 -1807	<i>Eczipae</i> +	343 tons 18 guns 35 crew	J.O'Caïn	J&T Perkins, J.Lloyd, of Boston	Todos Santos Bay (6/30-7/8/1806) San Quintin Bay (7/8-7/10/1806)	unk	Boston Sandwich Is. San Diego Novo Arkh. Canton Kamchatka wrecked 1/26/06 unk 6/25/06 8/?/06 3-5/8/07 unk 9/?/07
1805 -1807	<i>O'Caïn</i> +	280 tons 16-30 crew 18 guns 100 Kad'iaks 50 baidarkas ? Stobod- chik	J. Winship, Jr.	see above	Trinidad Bay (6/11-25/06) Todos Santos Bay San Quintin Bay Cerro Island (8/13/06) Farallon Is (2/15/07) San Quintin Bay (5/31/07)	4,819	Boston Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Kad'iak Kad'iak San Pedro Santa Catalina Santo Domingo Novo Arkh. 10/?/05 3/?/06 4/1/06 10/12/06 unk 11/9-1/06 2/15/07 1807 1807 5/4/07 10/8/07

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter Pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1806 -1809	<i>Derby</i> +	300 tons 50 Kad'iaks 25 baidarkas	B. Swift	Boston mer., J. Perkins G. Lyman Wm. Sturgis	unk	unk	Boston N.W. Coast California Canton Boston 9/5/06 unk unk 3/23/09 8/18/09
1807	<i>NikoZai</i>	Schooner	unk	Stobodchikov	unk	unk	California Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. unk unk 8/22/07
1808 -1809	<i>Kad'zak</i> +	40 crew 130 Aleut hunters 20 Aleut women I. Kuskov	Petrov	RAK**	Trinidad Bay Bodega Bay (12/28/08-8/18/09)	2,350	Novo Arkh. Novo Arkh. 10/15/08 10/4/09
1808 -1809	<i>Mercury</i> +	145 tons. 18 crew 25 baidarkas ?Shvetsov	G. Eayrs	B. Lamb of Boston	San Francisco Bay (12/1-12/12/08) Tcos Santos Bay (12/17-12/21/08) Trinidad Bay Bodega Bay	2,117	Canton Kad'iak Is. Qu. Charlotte Is. Columbia River San Diego San Pedro San Juan Cap- istrano Columbia River 1/7/08 6/7/06 unk unk unk 7/7/09 4/26/09 unk

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter Pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1809 -1811	<i>O'Cuirt</i>	280 tons 50 baidarkas	J. Winship	see 1806 listing	Drake's Bay (11/29/10, 5/11/11) San Quintin Bay (12/21/10)	3,952	Boston Sandwich Is. ? Novo Arkh. 12/7/09 Qu. Charlotte Is. ? Novo Arkh. 8/26/10 Lower Ca. coast 4/1/11 Sandwich Is. 11/20-1/11 Canton 2/26-4/8/11 Sandwich Is. 6/15-10/11
1810 -1811	<i>Albatross</i>	165 tons 22 crew 25 Kanakas 50 Kod' laks 30 baidarkas ? Lasseff	N. Winship	Winship Fam- ily and B. Homer of Boston	Farallon Is. (12/3-7/10, 5/4-7/11, 5/24-6/3/11) San Quintin Bay (12/21-7/10) San Luis Obispo (unk) Drake's Bay (1/24-3/3/11)	1,190	Drake's Bay 11/29/10 San Benito Is. 6/15/11 Novo Arkh. 8/8/11 Point Woodhouse 8/19-23/11
1810 -1813	<i>Tebeitz</i>	209 tons 48 baidarkas V. Tarakanov	Wm. Davis	Boardman & Pipe, Boston	Farallon Is. (7/30/10) Bodega Bay (9/7/10) Drake's Bay (11/29/10) San Francisco Bay (2/7/11)	2,976	Novo Arkh. 6/28/10 Sandwich Is. 11-1/1/12 Canton 2/26-4/12 Sandwich Is. 6/15/12 Canton 2/15/13 Sandwich Is. 6/29/13

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1811	<i>Chirikov</i>	Schooner	I. Kuskov	RAK**	Farallon Is.	1,238	Novo Arkh. Bodega Bay Novo Arkh. 1/22/11 2/21-2/20/11 7/28/11
1809 -1812	<i>Kzchierzine*</i>	145 tons 50 baidarkas	Wm. Blanchard	unk Boston merchant	San Quintin Bay (6-7/12)	1,516	Boston Sandwich Is. Kaigani Novo Arkh. Sandwich Is. Canton Boston 4/?/09 ? 9/?/12 11-1/12, 8-9/12 11/10/12 unk unk
1811 -1812	<i>Ametzhet*</i>	270 tons 52 baidarkas	T. Meek	J. Dorr, G. H. Eayrs, B. Lamb of Boston	San Quintin Bay (6/?-7/?/12)	1,442	Canton Novo Arkh. Novo Arkh. unk (vessel sold to Russians) 9/?/11 11/?-1/12 unk
1811 -1812	<i>Chirikov</i>	Schooner 40 baidarkas 86 Aleut hunters	I. Kuskov	unk	unk	unk	Novo Arkh. Bodega Bay 11/?/11 ?/1812

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1811 -1813	Charont	Brig 283 tons	I. Whitte- more	P. Jacksrn, Boston	San Quintin Bay (?/1812) Farallon Is. (?/?/1812)	1,792	Boston Novo Arkh. Sandwich Is. 11/?/11 2/1812 7/?/13
1812	Mercury	145 tons	G. Eayrs	Boston mer. B. Lamb	San Quintin Bay (unk) Bodega Bay (unk)	500	Novo Arkh. San Luis Obispo off Relugio Santo Tomás Cape San Lucas Novo Arkh. 1/?/12 2/?/12 2/3/12 4/12/12 unk 9/27/12
1813	Mercury	145 tons	G. Eayrs	B. Lamb	Bodega Bay (unk)	1,603 skins 947 tails	Novo Arkh. San Luis Obispo Point Conception 4/28/13 5/25/13 6/1/13
1813 -1814	Forester	Brig	J. Jennings	Pacific Fur Co.	unk	unk	New Holland Sandwich Is. Bodega Bay San Luis Obispo Wash. coast Novo Arkh. unk 11/9/13 unk 1/14/14 4/?/14 6/25/14

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1814 -1816	<i>Ilmen</i>	Brig 50 Aleuts and creoles 25 baidarkas V. Tarakanov Antipatro ²	? Hadswoth	RAK**	Faraillon Is. (8/?/14)	392	Novo Arkh. Bodega Bay San Francisco Santa Barbara San Pedro unk unk unk unk unk
1815 -1816	<i>Isabella</i>	209 tons	Wm. Davis	Boardman & Pope	unk	unk	unk California Sandwich Is. Novo. Arkh. Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Sandwich Is. Canton 1/?/15 3/?/15 6/9/15 7.9/15 9-10/15 12/24/15 1/26/16
1814 -1816	<i>Peifer</i>	Brig 225 tons	S. Northrop	Pacific Fur Co.	unk	unk	1/8/14 Sandwich Is. Columbia River 4/2/14 6/?/14 unk 8/26/14 5.9/14 Novo Arkh. Sandwich Is. 1/9/15 2/?/16 10/?/16
1814 -1815	<i>Forster</i>	Brig 10 guns	Wm. Pigot	Pacific Fur Co.	unk	unk	unk California near Loreto San Diego Point Conception Bodega Bay Novo Arkh. Kamchatka 11/?/14 3/24/15 4/7/15 6/4/15 6-7/15 11/?/15

1) Vasilii Petrovich Tarakanov and 11 men seized at San Pedro.
2) Son of Alexander Baranov.

Continued

TABLE X

CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Other pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1815 -1816	<i>Izmen:</i> Brig Boris Tarasov (comm. of hunters)	?Madsworth	RAK**	Santa Barbara Channel Is.	955	San Francisco San Luis Obispo San Pedro 1 off Refugio 2 Bodega Bay Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Sandwich Is.	6/?/15 7/?/15 8/?/- 9/18/15 9/21/15 unk unk unk //1816
1815 -1816	<i>Izmen:</i> Schooner	H. Gyzeelaar	B. Wilcocks	unk	unk	Canton Novo Arkh. Fort Ross Refugion Santa Barbara Monterey 3 Sandwich Is.	7/12/15 9-12/15 unk 1/16/16 1-2/16 3/9/16 9/?/16
1815 -1817	<i>Abom</i> unk	I. Whittmore	unk	unk	unk	Boston Galapagos Is. Novo Arkh. San Pedro Santa Barbara Channel Is. Sandwich Is.	1815 10/?/15 11/?/16 1/20/17 2/?/17 11-12/17
1817	<i>Chirikov</i> Schooner I. Padushkin (comm. of expedition)	C. Beuseman	RAK**	unk	unk	Novo Arkh. Bodega Bay San Francisco Monterey Santa Barbara Novo Arkh.	2/?/17 unk 3/?/17 5/12/17 unk 6/?/17

1) Tarasov and 24 Aleuts seized by Spanish officials.
 2) Seven on board, including John Elliot d'Castro, seized.
 3) Vessel sold to King Kamehameha I.

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1817	<i>Columbia</i>	Brig 185 tons 25 crew 10 guns	J. Jennings	Northwest Company	unk	unk	Columbia River 1/10/17 Sandwich Is. 1-4/?/17 Novo Arkh. 5/10/17 Columbia River 6-7/17 Trinidad 7/24/17 Bodega Bay 7-8/17 Farallon Is. 8/9/17 Drake's Bay 8/10/17 Trinidad 8/20/17 Pt. St. George 8/23/17 Columbia River 10-11/17 Sandwich Is. 12/6/17
1815 -1817	<i>Cosack</i>	Brig	J. Brown	J. J. Astor	unk	unk	Boston 5/?/15 Sandwich Is. 11-12/15 Northwest coast 9/?/16 Novo Arkh. 11/?/16 Sandwich Is. unk Canton 2/20/17 Sandwich Is. 5/7/17
1817	<i>Kutusov</i>	I. Kuskov	L. Hagemis- ter	RAK**	unk	unk	Novo Arkh. unk Bodega Bay unk San Francisco 10-11/17 Novo Arkh. 11/20/17
1818 -1819	<i>BonzeLais</i>	200 tons 30 crew	de Roquefeuil	? Balquerie	unk	unk	Novo Arkh. 4-5/18 Kad'jak 5-6/18 Novo Arkh. 6-7/18 Nootka 9/5/18 San Francisco 9-10/18 Novo Arkh. 11-12/18 Sandwich Is. 1/12/19 Canton 3-4/19

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter Pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1817 -1821	<i>Clarion</i>	Brig 17 crew 6 guns	H. Gyzeelaar	A. Winship	unk	unk	Boston Cape of Good Hope Tasmania Sandwich Is. Santa Barbara San Diego Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Sandwich Is. Canton
1816 -1820	<i>Eagle</i>	Schooner	Wm. Davis	Boardmen & Pope	unk	unk	Boston Rio de Janeiro Sandwich Is. Novo. Arkh. Canton
1818	<i>Kutusov</i>	unk	L. Hagemeyer	RAK **	Santa Cruz (unk)	72	Novo Arkh. Monterey Novo Arkh.
1818	<i>Okhotok</i>	50 Aleuts		RAK **	unk	unk	Novo Arkh. Bodega Bay
1820	<i>Ilmen</i>	Brig	K. Khlebnikov	RAK **	unk	unk	Novo Arkh. Monterey Novo Arkh.
1822	<i>Volga</i>	Brig 23 crew	P. Tamanin	RAK **	unk	15	Novo Arkh. San Francisco Monterey Novo Arkh.

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter Pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1823	<i>Buzdakov</i>	Brig	K. Vikilman	PAV**	unk	46	Hovo Arkh. unk San Francisco 8/8/23 Santa Cruz unk San Francisco 9/22/23 Hovo Arkh. unk
1822 -1823	<i>Mentor</i>	unk	G. Newell	Bryant & Sturgis	unk	unk	Boston 6/31/22 Sandwich Is. 11-2/23 Northwest coast unk Sandwich Is. 7/19/23 Bodega Bay unk Monterey 10/11/23 San Francisco 11/1/23
1824 -1825	<i>Mentor</i>	unk	G. Newell	Bryant & Sturgis	San Francisco	18	Sandwich Is. unk Canton 3-4/24 Bodega Bay unk Monterey 6/15/24 San Francisco 7/17/24 Santa Barbara unk San Diego 9/13/24 Canton 2/17/25
1824	<i>Oahynee</i>	Brig 166 tons 22 crew	J. Kelly	Marshall & Wildes		110	Sandwich Is. 4/1/24 Bodega Bay 5/2/24 San Francisco 5/4/24 San Pedro 7/13/24 Mazatlan 7/17/24

Continued

TABLE X

CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter Pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1824	<i>Washington</i>	Schooner 45 or 52 tons	? Stevens	Marshall & Hildes	unk	18	Sandwich Is. Bodega Bay San Francisco Monterey San Luis Obispo San Diego 10/10/24 Sandwich Is. 10/29/24
1824 -1825	<i>Rover</i>	Schooner 83 tons	J. Rogers	Govt. of California	unk	444 skins 263 tails	Monterey Bodega Bay San Francisco Monterey Sandwich Is. Fanning Is. Honila Canton 9-10/24 10-12/24 12-1/25 1-3/25 4-5/25 7/7/25 8-9/25 9-10/25
1825	<i>Hile</i>	Brig 15 crew	R. Forbes	Perkins & Co.	unk	unk	Sandwich Is. Bodega Bay San Francisco Santa Barbara Mazatlan unk 9/16/25 9/19/25 10/?/25 11/7/25
1825 -1826	<i>Tamaahmahah</i>	Brig 180 tons	? Meek	J. Astor	unk	unk	New York Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. San Francisco Sandwich Is. Lima Canton Sandwich Is. 4/9/24 8-11/25 unk 1/1/5/26 3-4/26 8/24/26 unk 12/9/26

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Other Pelts	Ports of Departure/Call date
1825 -1826	<i>Baikal'</i>	Brig 180 or 203 tons	K. Beuseman	RAK**	unk	468	Novo Arkh. San Diego Monterey San Diego unk 11/17/25 1/4/26 2/14/26
1828 -1829	<i>Baikal'</i>	Brig 180 or 203 tons 12 Aleuts 6 baidarkas	A. Etolin	RAK**	San Quintin Bay	63	Novo Arkh. San Diego unk 12/10/28, 2/12/29
1828 -1829	<i>Kaveriy</i>	Brig 142 tons	Mm. Dana	Govt. of Sand- wich Is.	unk	unk	San Diego Bodega Bay Santa Barbara Monterey Santa Barbara Sandwich Is. 8/23/28 10/7/28 unk 11-12/28 12-1/29 2/7/29
1829	<i>Volunteer</i>		C. Taylor	Bryant & Sturgis	unk	unk	Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Northwest coast Novo Arkh. San Francisco Monterey 2/13/29 3/11/29 unk 8/31/29 9/30/29 10/18/29
1831	<i>Lovisa</i>	Bark 174 tons 16 crew	G. Wood	J. Jones of the Sand- wich Is.	unk	400	Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Monterey Santa Barbara San Diego Sandwich Is. New York 4/14/31 unk 6/26/31 unk 7-8/31 9/14/31 unk

Continued

TABLE X
CONTINUED

Date	Vessel	Description*	Captain	Owner	Hunting Grounds	Otter Pelts	Ports of Departure
1835 -1836	<i>Diana</i>	Brig 199 tons	? Carter	French & Co., Sand- wich Is.	unk	unk	Canton Sandwich Is. Novo Arkh. Monterey Sandwich Is. Canton

*These vessels hunted in conjunction with the Russians under the contract system, 1803-1812

**Description may include that of the vessel, crew, cargo, and passengers.

**Russian-American Company