

1983

A Rhetoric Of Movements: A Dramatistic Analysis of the Open Convention Movement

Gunnar Neil Farevaag
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds



Part of the [Social Influence and Political Communication Commons](#), and the [Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons](#)

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation

Farevaag, Gunnar Neil, "A Rhetoric Of Movements: A Dramatistic Analysis of the Open Convention Movement" (1983). *Dissertations and Theses*. Paper 3235.
<https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.3226>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Gunnar Neil Farevaag for the
Master of Science in Speech Communication presented July
25, 1983.

Title: A Rhetoric of Movements; A Dramatistic Analysis
of the Open Convention Movement.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

[REDACTED]

Larry Steward, Chairman

[REDACTED]

Ben Padrow

[REDACTED]

Robert W. Vogelsang

[REDACTED]

Michael F. Reardon

The purpose of this study was to analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement, a conglomerate of political mavericks who arose during the Democratic Presidential primary campaign of 1980. It consisted of both supporters and antagonists of incumbent

President Jimmy Carter, primarily because of opposition to a proposed rule which would have required delegates to the Democratic National Convention to vote, on the first ballot, for the presidential candidate whom they represented in their state-wide primaries.

It was hypothesized that certain rhetorical themes repeat themselves within movement rhetoric. It was further hypothesized that Identification (unity) was impossible in this context, owing to both internal and external factors. This research sought to investigate the degree to which Identification was achieved by the various spokespersons of the movement, and the rhetorical strategies employed to accomplish that Identification. To do this, Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad was utilized.

Fourteen representative samples of rhetoric were selected, produced by eight major spokespersons within the Open Convention Movement. From these samples, seven rhetorical strategies were identified, and the rhetoric catalogued accordingly. As repositories of data (information and/or details), these samples were also analyzed to determine what material was divergent and unique.

Chapter III dealt with the Open Convention Movement as the Act. The constituency of the movement was considered, the level of Identification inherent among participants examined, especially in light of personal goals and ambitions, and finally, the actions of the participants

and the influence of the media on the movement was explored.

Chapter IV considered the 1980 Democratic National Convention as the Scene. Investigation was made into audience make-up and homogeneity, the events and circumstances of the Convention itself, and the immediate effects of the movement on the Convention.

Chapter V dealt with the spokespersons of the movement as the Agents, examining the major spokespersons, how they viewed their roles, whether any significant rhetors arose and, if so, what influence they exerted, and finally, what alliances were formed.

Chapter VI analyzed the fourteen speeches, articles, and interviews as the Agencies. The rhetorical strategies were examined, the rhetorical themes viewed, and divergent information considered.

Finally, Chapter VII considered opposition to Proposed Rule F(3)(C) as the primary Purpose of the Open Convention Movement. Some of the consequences of the delegate vote on the proposed rule were exposed, and the impact of the rhetorical medium on the delegate decision was weighed.

Burke's Dramatistic Pentad proved to be a viable method for the investigation of this movement. Certain rhetorical themes did appear to repeat themselves in the rhetoric of the movement. As a unique political movement,

this hypothesis bears further investigation.

When pondering the possibilities for achieving Identification, internal and external factors were considered. Internally, the movement divided into four distinct sub--groups, each displaying diverse goals and ambitions, differing levels of Identification between themselves, and fractured loyalties. Only two spokespersons were active for more than three months, and as a result there was heavy reliance on media coverage and exposure. Externally, the general effect of the extensive use of the mass media appears to have been to reinforce existing attitudes and beliefs (supporting Klapper's theory). The level of influence and power available to an incumbent President are considerable, and the delegates, as "king makers", chose their candidate by securing the renomination of Jimmy Carter.

The rhetoric of the movement did not persuade the delegates to reject the proposed rule, but proved to be a divisive element at the National Convention, and a contributing factor to the Democratic defeat in the November general election.

A RHETORIC OF MOVEMENTS:
A DRAMATISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT

by
GUNNAR NEIL FAREVAAG

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
SPEECH COMMUNICATION


Portland State University

1983


TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH:

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of
Gunnar Neil Farevaag presented July 25, 1983.



Larry Steward, Chairman


Ben Padrow


Robert W. Vogelsang


Michael F. Reardon

APPROVED:


Theodore G. Grove, Head, Department of Speech Communication


Stanley E. Rauch, Dean, Graduate Studies and Research

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
LIST OF TABLES	
CHAPTER	
I INTRODUCTION.	1
Statement of Purpose.	4
Justification for Study	5
Historical Overview	7
The Terms The Movement	
Directional Overview.	25
Methodology	30
Endnotes - Chapter I	38
II THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTIONS . . .	41
The Convention of 1924 The Convention of 1960 The Convention of 1968 The Convention of 1972 The 1980 Presidential Campaign	
The Open Convention Movement.	63
Endnotes - Chapter II	70
III THE ACT: THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT. .	73
The Purpose	73
The Movement Constituency	74

		iv
	Goals and Motivations	81
	Identification Within the Movement.	83
	The Actions of the Participants and the Influence of the Media on the Movement	86
	Summary	93
	Endnotes - Chapter III	94
IV	THE SCENE: THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION.	99
	The Audience.	99
	Homogeneity and Identification Among Delegates	100
	The Events and Circumstances of the Convention.	103
	Immediate Effects of the Movement on the Convention	107
	Summary	108
	Endnotes - Chapter IV.	110
V	THE AGENTS: THE SPOKESPERSONS OF THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT.	113
	The Major Spokespersons	113
	The Role of the Spokespersons	116
	Significant Rhetors and Their Influence	122
	Alliances of the Spokespersons.	126
	Summary	128
	Endnotes - Chapter V	130
VI	THE AGENCIES: THE SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND ARTICLES OF THE SPOKESPERSONS FOR THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT.	133

	The Rhetorical Acts	133
	The Rhetorical Strategies	139
	The Rhetorical Themes	150
	Divergent Information and Details	154
	Summary	157
	Endnotes - Chapter VI.	159
VII	THE PURPOSE: OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED RULE F(3)(C).	165
	The Primary and Secondary Purposes.	165
	Consequences of the Decision.	167
	The Impact of the Rhetorical Medium	170
	Summary	173
	Endnotes - Chapter VII	175
VIII	CONCLUSIONS	177
	Endnotes - Chapter VIII.	189
	SOURCES CONSULTED	190
	APPENDIX A.	197
	APPENDIX B.	201
	APPENDIX C.	206

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
I	Chronological Development of the Open Convention Movement	115
II	Rhetorical Breakdown by Occasion for Spokespersons	137
III	Rhetorical Breakdown by Occasion for Spokespersons	138

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Given the usual problems of estimating the effects of a single speech . . . it is not surprising that few rhetoricians have undertaken the more difficult task of analyzing the role of persuasion in social movements It is frequently impossible to separate detractors from supporters, let alone to discern rhetorical intentions, to distinguish between rhetorical acts and coercive acts, or to estimate the effects of messages on the many audiences.¹

Nevertheless, this is our intention; to analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement of 1980.

An open convention is one in which the delegates are theoretically free to vote for whomever they wish on the first ballot. The Open Convention Movement was composed of a loose-knit conglomerate of political mavericks who arose during the Presidential primary campaign of 1980. It consisted of both supporters and antagonists of incumbent President Jimmy Carter, primarily because of their opposition to a proposed rule which would have required delegates to the Democratic National Convention to vote, on the first ballot, for the Presidential candidate whom they represented in their state-wide primaries. This rule would have virtually guaranteed the renomination of Jimmy Carter,

inspite of his drastically diminishing showing in the polls. Some simply opposed the rule because they felt it hurt party unity, while many in the movement became popularly identified as the "Anybody-But-Carter" dissidents. This group and its varied constituency comprised the Open Convention Movement of 1980. Their identity, rhetorical strategies, and the circumstances of these events will be the subject of this research project. The methodology employed will be based on Kenneth Burke's formulation of rhetorical events in the categories of Act, Scene, Agent, Agency and Purpose (c.f., page 34).

In Chapter One, we shall examine certain key words which require close scrutiny and definition: Rhetoric; Analysis (and Criticism); Movement; and Movement Rhetoric. More specifically, we shall also glimpse the Open Convention Movement, as an historical entity; we shall briefly consider the method of analysis to be applied, namely, Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad; and finally, we shall expose the methodological operation to be utilized.

Chapter Two will present an historical perspective of the Democratic National Convention of 1980, and the Democratic presidential primary campaign. Finally, elements of the Open Convention Movement will be examined, such as the origin of the term, the participants, and the rationale behind the movement.

Chapter Three will consider the Open Convention

Movement as the Act (in Burke's Pentad). Here we shall briefly state the purpose of the movement, consider the constituency of the movement, examine the level of Identification inherent among participants in the movement, especially in light of personal goals and ambitions, and finally, view the actions of the participants and the influence of the media on the movement.

Chapter Four will deal with the 1980 Democratic National Convention as the Scene. Here we shall examine what audience was addressed, how homogeneous this group was, including the level of Identification inherent among the delegates, the events and circumstances of the Convention itself, and finally, the immediate effects of the movement on the Convention.

Chapter Five will deal with the various speakers as the Agents, examining who the major spokespersons were, how they viewed their roles, whether any significant rhetors arose within the movement and, if so, what influence they exerted, and finally, what alliances, if any, were formed.

Chapter Six will deal with the various speeches, articles and interviews of the movement as the Agencies. Here we shall examine what rhetorical strategies were employed, and by whom, what rhetorical themes, if any, repeat themselves, and finally, what information and details were divergent and unique.

Chapter Seven will deal with opposition to Proposed

Rule F(3)(C) as the Purpose. The primary and secondary purposes of the movement will be exposed, some of the consequences of the vote on F(3)(C) will be considered, and finally, the impact of the rhetorical medium on the delegate decision will be weighed.

Chapter Eight will present a Conclusion. Here we shall ask whether we now understand the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement, including the implications of choosing Burke's Pentad as the method of analysis. Also, we shall prove whether rhetorical themes did repeat themselves within the rhetoric of the movement, and whether it was possible to achieve Identification among the delegates owing to internal factors within the movement, as well as external factors. We shall judge the effectiveness of the movement in light of McBurney and Wrage's quadrilateral criteria. We shall also determine what we learned from the study, what we did wrong, and what should be looked to next.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

It is the purpose of this study, as already mentioned, to analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement. The term Strategy (discussed in more detail beginning on page 34) is meant here to represent a choice of the speaker. These choices, apart from the discretion of the individual speakers, can be identified as recurring

themes in a number of rhetorical events. It is therefore hypothesized that certain rhetorical themes repeat themselves within movement rhetoric. It is also hypothesized that Identification (by which we mean Unity) was impossible in this context, owing to many factors, some inherent in the movement itself, and others only indirectly related.

In order to understand the major rhetorical strategies of a movement, it must be understood: Who the major spokespersons are; What rhetorical acts they perform; How they view their role as spokesperson; What audience they are addressing; and finally, the rhetorical medium through which they are operating. This research seeks to investigate the degree to which Identification (unity) was achieved by the various spokespersons of the Open Convention Movement, and the Rhetorical Strategies employed to achieve that Identification. To accomplish this, it is proposed that Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad will best suit both purposes of this study, and accommodate the definitions of Rhetoric and Movement, soon to be rendered herein.

JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY

Having previewed the Open Convention Movement, a word needs to be said here in justification of this study. First, it should be noted that the Open Convention Movement is unique. As mentioned earlier, its constituent make-up, its rhetorical direction, its limited existence, as well as its

rhetorical strategy all combine to make it unparalleled in contemporary social and political history. Therefore, it is worthy of study because it represents such a singular opportunity to rhetorical critics, but also because, to date, no other attempts of this scale have been made to research either the Movement or its abiding philosophy.

A review of the literature reveals no study having been undertaken, and this includes the referenced areas of Rhetoric, Rhetorical Analysis, or general Political Science. Sources consulted were: Master's Thesis In The Arts And Social Sciences, 1980-1981 (Cedar Falls, Iowa. Research Publications), Volume No. 5, as well as Volume No. 6, representing the 1981-1982 edition; American Doctoral Dissertations 1980-1981 (Ann Arbor University Microfilms Publications, 1981); and The Comprehensive Dissertation Index, 1981 Supplement, Part 2 (Ann Arbor University Microfilms Publications, 1982). This scarcity of research, to date, is unfortunate, because the Open Convention Movement provides the critic the opportunity to study, in depth, a rhetorically prolific, inner-directed movement. No previous work having been done, this study will broadly consider the rhetorical strategies of the movement, the role of the various spokespersons, and the audience to which these rhetorical efforts were directed.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Terms:

The tradition of rhetoric spans more than twenty-three hundred years, with proponents and opponents relentlessly suggesting definitions and methods. Socrates said that "rhetoric is the art of persuading an ignorant multitude about the justice or injustice of a matter, without imparting any real instruction,"² by which he meant instruction in an abstract, philosophical knowledge of the nature of justice. In contrast, Aristotle saw rhetoric as:

the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning.³

For Aristotle, the function of rhetoric is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the available means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allows.⁴

The word Rhetoric may be traced through several etymological stages to its earliest Greek form, RHETORIKE. Standing almost inseparable from this term is a second word, EIREIN, which when transliterated becomes Oratory, and means "To Speak". Rhetoric then comes to mean The Art of Speaking, for Rhetoric was, in Grecian culture, an

oratorical form, originating in its practice through Corax and Tisias (who instructed the residents of Syracuse on how to present legal claims in court).

Among later classicists, Hermogenes, in spite of his Neoplatonist tradition, concluded that the end of rhetoric was not to persuade, but to use persuasive methods, accepting ultimately the definition of rhetoric as "an artistic faculty of persuasive speech on a political subject having as its goal to speak well."⁵

Inasmuch as another term, Persuasion, has come into discussion, it behooves us to pursue it etymologically. From the Latin, SUADERE, meaning to advise or to urge, or to appeal to one's sense of morality, Persuasion has come to be used by many contemporary "authorities" as synonymous with Rhetoric, while others have even presumed to trace it through an evolution to an eventual kinship with the term Manipulation.⁶ Clearly Manipulation was not the original meaning (i.e., to appeal to one's sense of morality), and even Webster's New World Dictionary-Second College Edition currently defines Persuasion as "to cause to do something, especially by reasoning, urging, or inducement; to prevail upon."

Writing on "Later Greek Philosophy And Rhetoric" in The Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric, George A. Kennedy asked himself of rhetoric:

What is its cause or purpose? To persuade, as the sophists had said? To utilize available means of persuasion, even if they fail, as Aristotle claimed? To speak well, as Quintillian, for example, proposed? It could also be applied to the EIDE, or species, of the genus rhetoric: the end of judicial is the just; the end of deliberative is the expedient; the end of epideictic is the honorable.⁷

Writing in 1963, Bryant offered this definition:

I take rhetoric to be the rationale of informative and suatory discourse . . . operating chiefly in the areas of the contingent, its aim is the attainment of maximum probability as the basis for public decision.⁸

Simons, writing in 1976, uses the terms rhetoric and persuasion interchangeably, and defines them as "human communication designed to influence others by modifying their beliefs, values and attitudes."⁹ Scott and Brock, in their Methods of Rhetorical Criticism, define rhetoric as "the human effort to induce cooperation through the use of symbols."¹⁰

In a 1977 article entitled "Dialectical Rhetoric And Rhetorical Rhetoric", Holmberg attempts to define rhetoric by tracing the concept of democracy.

The Greek word DEMOKRATIA can be etymologically reduced to two parts, DEMOS and KRATIA. We usually translate the two parts as 'people-power', where DEMOS means People, and KRATIA means Power. However, the word DEMOS at the time of Solon was intimately connected to the word DEME . . . suggesting a Tribe. That is, the word DEMOKRATIA

may not only mean 'people-power' as we today mean it; it could also mean "Tribe-power" . . . Persuasion as conversion of value and belief would have been anathema to ~~DEME~~ organization. Instead, the appropriate way of legally dealing with this sort of problem may have been . . . a balancing of views. In this way, the 'persuasion' would occur as an admission that both ways of life are important and viable (here viable means livable), and that they need to be balanced against each other. This rhetoric of balance . . . is not based upon correctness of one view or the other, but upon a view which potentially and pluralistically includes both.¹¹

Among the ancient Greeks and Romans, rhetoric was identified with speech-making in the performance of three vital public functions. Citizens argued their own cases in the courtroom (forensic), delivered orations on ceremonial occasions (epideictic), and participated in debates about matters of public policy (deliberative).¹² The very fact that Corax and Tisias acquired students to instruct about legal matters, the funeral oration of Pericles, and Athenian law itself, which demanded of every citizen availability to deliberate on public matters, all attest to the practical outworking of rhetoric in the schemework of everyday life.

In coming to grips with an acceptable definition of Rhetoric, these three elements must be kept in balance - the etymological evidence, the historical context and application, as well as contemporary usage. Certainly

if one is to accept the term etymologically, Rhetoric is The Art of Speaking. Again, if we consider historical context, Rhetoric is concerned with the creation, or genesis, of discourse, as well as its interpretation, or analysis, and both of these are customarily based on the premise of probability. This is consistent with contemporary thought, for even the theory of Uncertainty would not beg the question of probability. Does the very act of "looking" alter what is being looked at? Again, if reality is individually perceived and couched in uncertainty, or at least individuality, one only strengthens the argument for a basis in probability. Etymologically, we have demonstrated Persuasion to be an appeal to one's sense of morality, and if contemporary rhetoricians are correct in using the terms Rhetoric and Persuasion interchangeably, then one must assume that an ethical speaker is motivated by his perception of truth to appeal to the highest motives and values of his audience.¹³ Further, if Argumentation is the next logical consideration in a sequence of rhetoric, it can etymologically be understood to mean to assert, or urge. This "form", or element of rhetoric, is not the whole of the picture but rather a part, indeed a significant one, within the framework of Rhetoric. Its strength lies in the development of logical proof, and certainly one major application involves the forensic element of rhetoric.

Having gathered some small measure of the collective

wisdom of twenty-three centuries of thought concerning rhetoric, we must settle upon a definition. This shall serve as a foundation upon which one may operate to build a rhetoric consistent with etymology, history and current usage. In recognition of all that has foundationally constructed this work to this point, then, Rhetoric may be said to be: The artful creation and interpretation of discourse, designed to appeal to the highest nature of man, arriving at consensus on the basis of maximizing probability.

Having settled upon a workable definition of Rhetoric, we next turn our attention to the term Analysis. Webster says that it is:

a separating or breaking up of any whole into its parts, especially with an examination of these parts to find out their nature, proportion, function, and interrelationships.¹⁴

Therefore, by contemporary definition, Analysis refers to the critical examination, separation, and investigation of the component parts of a subject. Implicit within this process is also the work of criticism, wherein judgments are rendered based upon an evaluation of comparative worth.¹⁵ Hence Rhetorical Analysis may be said to be: The critical evaluation of discourse, whereby judgment is rendered upon the final consensus, after careful examination of the fitness of the constituent parts.

While it is not our objective to settle the debate over the question, "How do we judge what success is, rhetorically?", a brief word needs to be addressed to the subject at this point. There are numerous arguments concerning the best and most appropriate criteria for determining rhetorical success. McBurney and Wrage, in their book entitled The Art Of Good Speech, briefly delineate four of the more-oft discussed theories, namely, the Results theory, the Truth theory, the Ethical theory, and the Artistic theory. The Results theory reduces rhetoric to a bottom-line approach; did the politician win votes, did the lawyer win his case, did the entertainer win applause?

In every speech situation, the causes that operate to produce results are extremely complex. These other factors may be sufficient in themselves to guarantee success or failure. . . . In some cases they are largely beyond the control of the speaker. Even though the purpose of speech is response, the failure to get the desired response is not necessarily a sign that the speech was bad, nor is a favorable response a sure indication that the speech was good.¹⁶

The Truth theory seeks to measure effective speech by its concurrence with the truth.

One of the oldest and most profound attacks on speech is that it can delude the unwary by making false causes appear true. There are unquestionably cases in which people have been beguiled, misled, and

cheated by speakers. It is equally true, however, that speech can serve to make sound causes appear true to those who might not otherwise accept them. . . . If the efforts of the speaker are to be judged by the truth of the cause in which they are engaged (assuming the critic knows what the truth is), we admit that the critic has grounds for condemning rhetoric which makes a bad cause look good; but, by the same token, he is logically compelled to praise bungling and incompetence which makes a good cause look bad.¹⁷

This assumes that Truth, as an entity, is absolute and knowable, and that the speaker, at the time of speaking, was fully aware of the truth.

The Ethical theory would judge a speaker by his motives and intentions, assuming these are knowable by the critic. Of course, that which is ethical is that with which we agree, and which is consistent with our perception of both truth and reality. McBurney and Wrage contend that this involves the critic in a hopeless confusion between ethics and rhetoric. However, Aristotle felt that the speakers character was the most potent of all means of persuasion. Indeed, his Ethics preceded his Rhetoric for the very reason that he sought to establish beforehand the character required of a rhetorician. McBurney and Wrage continue:

Good men are not necessarily good speakers, and bad men are not necessarily poor speakers. We believe most emphatically that goodness in a speaker works in his

behalf, and we prefer to see competence in speech bestowed upon good men. But neither of these positions justifies the blind equating of good motives and good speech.¹⁸

The Artistic theory, according to McBurney and Wrage, is the only adequate means for judging effective speech.

The Artistic theory holds that speech is an art reducible to principles The opening lines of Aristotle's Rhetoric identify speech as an art and suggest the feasibility of formulating the principles of the art: 'Everybody makes some use of speech; all make attempts to sift or support the theses, and to defend or attack persons. Most people do so, of course, quite either at random, or else merely with a knack acquired from practice. Success in either way being possible, the random impulse and the acquired facility alike evince the feasibility of reducing the processes to a method; for when the practiced and the spontaneous speaker gain their end, it is possible to investigate the cause of their success; and such inquiry, we shall all admit, performs the function of an art'. The speaker seeks a response, and the nature of that response and our assessment of it do not alter this fundamental fact; nor do the methods the speaker uses or our assessment of these methods alter this basic fact. . . . The Artistic theory differs from the Results theory in one crucial respect; it does not judge a speech by its results The Results theory ignores the very important and easily demonstrable fact that factors other than the speech are always operating along with the speech to influence the outcome.¹⁹

All this has been said because, in the end, we too, must have some criteria for judging the Open Convention

Movement as a rhetorical entity. We have proposed a rhetorical analysis of this specific political movement, so it behooves us to clarify our standard of judgment. While it may be possible to agree with McBurney and Wrage in that establishing Results as the sole basis for judging rhetorical effectiveness ignores other factors operating upon the situation, we are a results-oriented society. Also, our definition of Rhetoric as discourse designed to appeal to the highest nature of man, presupposes that Truth (as it can be known) will be of primary importance to the Speaker, who should ideally exemplify Aristotle's Ethical Man. Therefore, while McBurney and Wrage discount all but the Artistic theory, we shall use all four of these, in balance, as we consider the rhetorical effectiveness of the Open Convention Movement.

Having proffered our own definition of the term Rhetoric, and having considered for a moment our criteria for judging the effectiveness of the rhetoric engaged in by the Open Convention Movement, we must now ask ourselves, What exactly is a Movement? Griffin illustrates the term this way:

An historical movement has occurred when, at some time, 1. men have become dissatisfied with some aspect of their environment; 2. they desire change - social, economic, political, religious, intellectual or otherwise - and desiring change they make efforts to alter their environment; and 3.

eventually their efforts result in some degree of success or failure; the desired change is or is not effected, and we say that an historical movement has come to its termination.²⁰

Inherent within this illustration is the premise of conflict - on however grand or limited a scale. This premise is carried another step forward by Cathcart, who considers the creation of dialectical tension as essential, for his perception is one of a conflict model of society, as opposed to a consensus model. Cathcart attempts to define Movements rhetorically by presenting, on the one hand, one or more "actors" who, perceiving that the "good order" is in reality a faulty order, full of injustice and absurdity, cry out through symbolic acts for immediate salvation.

On the one hand, there is a reciprocating act from the establishment which perceives these calls from the agitators, not as calls for corrections, but as direct attacks on the foundation of the established order. It is this reciprocity, or dialectical enjoinder in the moral arena, which defines movements.²¹

This reciprocity is predicated on conflict, even more heavily than the Griffin illustration, for Cathcart presupposes a society in constant flux and social opposition. As Cathcart develops his thesis it becomes necessary to accept a society where conflict is the norm, whereas Griffin presents a societal picture which paints movements as arising in response to a specific, given

conflict - not a norm, but an occurrence. However, for our purposes, both serve to clarify how social movements arise, and how they function. Therefore, we may define a Movement as a group of persons drawn together in response to a particular crisis, be it social, political, economic, or religious, who attempt to alter their environment through symbolic acts.

Ideally then, we might synthesize these two so that Movement Rhetoric may be said to be the creation of discourse by persons drawn together in response to a particular crisis, designed to appeal to the highest nature of man, in an attempt to alter their environment and arrive at a consensus in settlement of their perceived needs. This presumes an ideal situation, to be sure. However, just as Aristotle presented his thesis on Rhetoric based upon conclusions and assumptions in his Ethics, so this definition is rendered upon certain assumptions. One of these assumptions is that truth and virtue ultimately triumph over deceit and evil. Therefore, one need not conform to this ideal definition in order "to do" movement rhetoric, but the greatest value and the most profound results will be achieved when the definition is personified.

Unlike rhetorical studies which focus upon an individual speaker, the analysis of a social movement presents some unique difficulties. By dealing with a

multiplicity of speakers, it may be troublesome to discern rhetorical intentions, for while the general goals of a movement may be clear, individual personalities, personal ambition, and speaking style may combine to cloud the picture of a movement, as a whole. Estimating the effects of a particular message must be done in the light of a multiple public--members as well as leaders, sympathizers as well as opponents, the organized bureaucracy as well as society, as a whole. Internalized goals must be recognized and dealt with apart from the more obvious external ones, for a:

major rhetorical process (for the leadership of a movement) consists of legitimizing the privately-held feelings (of anxiety, hostility, and wish-fulfillment) of its members which they cannot say to others or even themselves.²²

This last consideration must not exclude the very deepest internal goals of any movement, for "the ideology presented to the mass of followers is a 'mask' for the real beliefs of the inner core. Its real ideology is hidden from all but the initiated."²³ Our further investigation of the Open Convention Movement will illuminate the significance of these deeper, internal goals. Finally, the effects of the mass media upon a movement must be borne in mind. Obviously, the effects of media represent a study in itself, which we shall not attempt to do here, yet the significance of the media must be acknowledged.

The Movement

As we address our attention to the Open Convention Movement in particular, certain questions must be considered. When and why did it arise? What makes it unique? Who was involved, and how did they operate rhetorically? First of all, it must be remembered that the Open Convention Movement was a political movement which sprang up in the Spring of 1980, as the Democratic Party moved toward New York's Madison Square Garden and their selection of a Presidential candidate. Incumbent President James Earl "Jimmy" Carter had won considerable support in the early primaries, inspite of challenges by Massachusetts Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy and California Governor Jerry Brown. Early in the primary race, Senator Kennedy called for an open convention, in which delegates would be free to abstain from casting their vote on the first ballot, thus freeing them on subsequent ballots to vote for whichever candidate they currently preferred.

The President's supporters had initiated Proposed Rule F(3)(C), a 77-word resolution which would require all delegates to the National Convention to vote, on the first ballot, for the candidate whom they represented in their home primaries.

However, President Carter's popularity was in serious decline. Conventional wisdom attributed the cause to the Iranian crisis, where fifty-two American hostages were

being held in captivity by the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Billy Carter affair, in which the President's brother was under Senate investigation for having accepted more than \$200,000 from Libya's Khaddafi. Carter was perceived as incapable of handling domestic economic problems. For whatever reasons, President Carter's popularity dipped dramatically in opinion polls. Indeed, one poll by Lou Harris found Reagan leading in California by 51%, with independent candidate John Anderson drawing 23%, while Jimmy Carter gathered only 21%.²⁴ This decline began slowly, after the first of the year, and continued through the end of the primaries in early June. Senator Kennedy told advisers he was confident that public acceptance would continue to decline, thus forcing the Democratic Party to find a winnable alternative in order to avert political disaster. It was this climate that spawned the Open Convention Movement, and in the course of approximately five months a highly vocal collection of political dissidents waged a rhetorical war to defeat Proposed Rule F(3)(C). For five months the battle would be fought, and while this was a rather short-lived moment, the time demands placed upon the dissenters, as well as the defenders of the President and Proposed Rule F(3)(C), served to create a sense of urgency which produced a great diversity of public rhetoric.

The Open Convention Movement is unique on several counts. As we have already mentioned, it was rather short-

lived, by most standards of measurement. Also, it had a specific, predetermined termination date; namely, August 11th, 1980. This was the date on which delegates to the Convention would vote on whether or not they would support Proposed Rule F(3)(C), thus binding themselves on the first ballot and insuring the renomination of Jimmy Carter, who had gathered more than the required 1,666 delegates during the primaries.

It is also unique in that it developed rather slowly, over a period of four months, while Griffin has noted that movements most often are born at the movement of a rhetorical crisis (as, for example, the vast swelling of ranks of the womens' movement after the arrest of Margaret Sanger). However, the "official birth" of the Open Convention Movement was heralded by approximately 40 Congressmen on July 25th, 1980, less than three weeks before its final hour. Of course, the spirit of the movement had existed for some months prior to July 25, with Senator Kennedy calling for delegate abstentions on the first ballot as early as March 20, 1980.

Also, unlike most movements, which seek public support and often encourage mass participation (i.e., the anti-Nuclear movement, the Nuclear-freeze movement, etc.), the Open Convention Movement was rather elitist. It consisted of a handful of political mavericks who neither sought nor encouraged large scale participation, but

rather sought to use existing public sentiment to sway the opinions and allegiance of some three thousand Democratic National delegates. It was these delegates who would vote, on August 11th, on the fate of Proposed Rule F(3)(C), and it was these delegates that were the target group of these political dissidents.

If we are to analyze the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement, it is critically important that we understand "who" it is that makes up this movement. In the narrowest sense, of course, the 40 Democratic Congressmen who spoke out on July 25th constitute the "body of believers" known as the Open Convention Movement. These would include Representatives Thomas J. Downey, Michael D. Barnes, Toby Moffett, Fortney H. Stark, Jerome A. Ambro, and Timothy E. Wirth, among others. However, if we consider that the primary goal of the Open Convention Movement was the defeat of Proposed Rule F(3)(C), and secondarily to provide an alternative candidate in lieu of the re-nomination of Jimmy Carter, then one must recognize that this small band of politicians represent too narrow a framework to constitute the entire movement. Indeed, their official proclamation of intent, which gave formal recognition to the Committee to Maintain An Open Convention, came less than three weeks prior to its most critical hour. But what of others involved in the spirit of the movement?

Senator Kennedy was not only an early opponent of

President Carter in the primaries but, as mentioned earlier, had on March 20th called for delegate abstentions. As he pursued the nomination, he also continued to press for an open convention policy. Meanwhile, on May 5th, 1980, Governor Hugh Carey of New York also called for an open convention, and was to become the unofficial voice of this challenge. Edward Bennett Williams, celebrated Washington attorney and owner of the Baltimore Orioles baseball franchise, became the official chairman of the Open Convention Movement on July 31, 1980. Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, himself a Carter supporter, also called for an open convention. Mayor Ed Koch of New York City, also a Carter supporter, called for an open convention on several occasions.²⁵ Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado also publicly espoused the open convention concept, as did William Lemieux, an aide to Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington. It is proposed that each of these individuals, who gave voice to their support for the intent and spirit of the movement, were as much "members" as the forty who spoke out on that July afternoon. It was the public pronouncements of these political personalities that gave weight and credence to the development of the movement, and hence their rhetoric, in speech and interview, before large crowds or in front of the television cameras, must certainly be a part of the total rhetorical picture of the Open Convention Movement.

DIRECTIONAL OVERVIEW

Having thus developed a definitional framework for Rhetoric, Movements, and Movement Rhetoric, and having briefly surveyed the historical backdrop of the Open Convention Movement, we now turn our attention to the method of analysis to be employed in this study. As mentioned earlier, this is Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad.

Certainly our choice was not made because of some paucity of alternatives. Leland Griffin had begun, as early as 1952, to espouse his method of literary-historical investigation, a method which for twenty-five years was to prove to be one of the main avenues of analysis used by rhetorical critics. However, as of 1980, the Central States Speech Association Journal devoted itself entirely to newer, and more-oft used methods of analysis for movement studies. These included James Andrews method of Historical Perspective, wherein he advocates searching for the uniqueness of events in quest of what "really happened", avoiding an a priori interpretation. Charles Stewart advocates a Functional Approach, viewing rhetoric as the primary agency through which social movements perform necessary functions to enable them to come into existence, to meet opposition, and to make efforts at bringing about change. Herbert W. Simons advocates a

Situational Approach, very similar in type to that of Bitzer and Black. Simons sees movements and non-movements confronting very different types of situational pressures, which therefore compel them to exhibit different patterns of rhetoric. Robert Cathcart has also developed his own method of analysis, based on his Confrontational Approach to society. Cathcart differentiates social movements as objective phenomena, as opposed to language constructs, an argument advanced by Michael McGee, who seeks explanations of "movement" in rhetoric, as opposed to persuasion in "allegedly" discrete and objective situations. Hence, what was once a field with limited availabilities of methods has now exploded with a proliferation of ideas and philosophies, some quite distinct and opposite from one another.

Actually, the choice of method was arrived at because of three reasons: 1. its flexibility; 2. its adaptability, in light of our afore-mentioned definitions of both Rhetoric and Movement; and 3. its history as a preferred methodology in previous studies.²⁶

Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad had been gaining popularity since the early 1950's.

Burke's rhetorical philosophy evolved through literary criticism into social criticism, with the result that his dramatistic pentad has a markedly socio-psychological tone. His rejection of Aristotelian rhetoric differs from the General Semanticists in that he builds on the Aristotelian philosophy and extends its range.²⁷

Burke finds rhetorical motives at work in a wide variety of literary forms, and he asserts that their purpose is to induce identification between individuals and groups. By Identification, Burke means Unity.

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.²⁸

This is consistent with our premise of conflict as a catalyst of movement conception and propulsion; individuals perceive a need not being met, or a threat not being addressed, and they respond symbolically to that perception through group action. Yet their ultimate goal is met in Identification (unity), and the perceived ill is redressed not in conquest but in consensus.

An individual does in actuality compete with other individuals. But within the rules of Symbolic, the individual is treated merely as a self-subsistent unit proclaiming its peculiar nature. It is 'at peace', in that its terms cooperate in modifying one another. But insofar as the individual is involved in conflict with other individuals or groups, the study of this same individual would fall under the head of Rhetoric One would not scrutinize the concept of Identification very sharply to see, implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart: division. Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall.²⁹

Burke defines his own pentad when he says:

In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another names the scene (the background of the act, the situ-ation in which it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or about the character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. But be that as it may, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he ³⁰did it (agency), and why (purpose).

Strategy is another Burkean term meaning a method or plan of attack, which is intended to serve as:

an aid to discovering what is going on in the total situation surrounding the event, or act, under scrutiny. The rhetorical nature of the act is derived from man's attempt to identify with his fellows This identification is possible because man shares a common substance. Their division from one another is an aberration of their essential nature, and it is in bridging this division that rhetoric is born.³¹

It is significant in that strategy serves as a bridge as certain relationships in the rhetorical picture are examined, seeking to influence the state, or level, of Identification.

One of the significant virtues of Burke's system

is its fluid character. It should be emphasized that a major strength of Burke's pentad is that it allows for the exploration of relationships between the various factors named by the terms. For instance, as we consider the Open Convention Movement, we could divide the subject into five main categories:

1. The Open Convention Movement may be dealt with as the Act.
2. The various speakers may be dealt with as the Agents.
3. The various speeches/interviews/articles of the speakers as the Agencies.
4. The Democratic National Convention (historically and in the present) as the Scene.
5. Opposition to Proposed Rule F(3)(C) as the Purpose.

This division represents a very logical approach to the analysis of material in light of the dramatic pentad. However, it is also within the realm of possibility to divide the categories as: The Open Convention Movement as Agency; the various speakers as the Agents; the various speeches and interviews as the Act; the Democratic National Convention as the Scene; and Opposition to Proposed Rule F(3)(C) as the Purpose. The possibilities might exceed these, certainly, but enough has been said to demonstrate the flexibility, and therefore desirability,

of Burke's method. Further, one need not assume that to define the categories by different labels would result in different conclusions; rather, it would simply afford a fresh perspective on the subject under consideration. For our purposes, the first division illustrated above shall be used in this project as we seek to understand the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement.

METHODOLOGY

As we consider a methodological approach for this study, three assumptions need to be stated, upon which the structure of this study is constructed:

1. Man creates his own reality through his perceptions and reactions.
2. Man acts with some purpose, consistent with his subjective perception of reality.
3. Man receives information from his environment selectively, and organizes it so as to best fit his established perception of his environment.

Methodologically, we have already established categories for study, and discussed those earlier in our consideration of Burke's pentad. Of paramount importance in a Burkean analysis are the concepts of Identification (unity) and Strategy (methods). Therefore, we shall expose rhetorical strategies as they arise in the rhetoric of the

spokespersons for the movement, determine the level of Identification inherent among spokespersons for the movement, as well as the level of Identification among the delegates, and determine the degree to which that Identification was enhanced by this rhetoric.

Fourteen representative samples of rhetoric have been selected from the Open Convention Movement (specifically considered in Chapter Six), produced by eight major spokespersons for the movement (specifically considered in Chapter Five). A review of these fourteen samples provides seven identifiable rhetorical strategies, as follows:

1. The Strategy of Thwarting -- whereby Candidate Carter is portrayed as beatable.
2. The Strategy of Confrontation -- whereby President Carter is portrayed as incapable of the demands of his office.
3. The Strategy of Viability -- wherein alternate candidates are portrayed as acceptable.
4. The Strategy of Unity -- wherein unity in the Democratic Party is stressed.
5. The Strategy of Precedence -- wherein historical precedent and the Democratic Party charter are cited in opposition to the proposed rule.
6. The Strategy of Principle -- wherein

philosophical grounds are developed in opposition to the proposed rule.

7. The Strategy of Self-Esteem -- whereby the delegates are asked to choose their own roles within the Convention.

For example, nothing will be considered under the Strategy of Thwarting except those remarks which actually depict President Carter as being "beatable", either by another Democratic nominee or the Republican challenger (i.e. Senator Kennedy, referring to Federal budget deficits faced by officials, said, "Somehow they always manage to close the gap, which is exactly what I intend to do."). For the Strategy of Confrontation, only those remarks which attack the administrative credibility of Jimmy Carter will be considered (i.e., Governor Carey listing categorically high interest rates, lay-offs, the housing slump, skyrocketing inflation and general unemployment as the Carter legacy). The Strategy of Viability will consider only those remarks which promote the candidacy of a Democrat other than Jimmy Carter (i.e., Representative Barnes said, "Jimmy Carter couldn't beat Reagan today But I think there are other candidates who could win much more readily. Some people like Muskie. Some people like Mondale."). The Strategy of Unity will deal exclusively with rhetoric directed at maintaining or increasing Democratic Party unity (i.e.,

Governor Grasso saying that Jimmy Carter should release his delegates "in the interest of party unity."). The Strategy of Precedence will consider only that rhetoric which refers to either historical precedent from past conventions, or to the then-current Democratic Party charter (Albert Shanker said that "The Commission on party rules . . . found a rich history of 'bound' delegates switching their votes and of nominating conventions recognizing that right.") The Strategy of Principle will rest on philosophical arguments against the binding of delegates (i.e., Albert Shanker, drawing on the illustration of Sir Edmund Burke, who said, "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment, and he betrays instead of serving if he sacrifices it to your opinion."). Finally, the Strategy of Self-Esteem will consider only those arguments which demand a choice of roles from the delegates (i.e., Edward Bennett Williams argued that the proposed rule would reduce the delegates to "nothing more than robots or automatons.").

The proposed seven rhetorical strategies did not "appear" but seemed rather to emerge after continued exposure to the various rhetorical products of the Open Convention Movement, and while they are not "etched in stone", they should serve to organize the material in a logical and thorough manner.

One of our stated purposes is to determine whether

any rhetorical themes repeat themselves within movement rhetoric. By "rhetorical theme" we mean recurring topics or arguments which are evident within the rhetoric of the movement. At first glance this would seem to be an investigation into what was said repeatedly by the spokespersons of the movement, as opposed to "rhetorical strategies" which seek to categorize the rhetorical choices presented by the spokespersons. In practice the two terms overlap one another, defying discreteness. As an example of rhetorical strategies, the Strategy of Unity was employed by spokespersons in an effort to maintain Party cohesion. Governor Grasso sought to avoid a political bloodbath, while Senator Byrd asserted the President could have a stronger vote of confidence by opening the convention and uniting the delegates around the strongest candidate. The Strategy of Unity was manifested as a theme in a number of addresses illustrated, as when both Grasso and Byrd were cited once again, and their remarks presented as evidence of rhetoric which is repeated within the movement. This is not contradictory, but rather is representative of the unique rhetorical situation in which the Open Convention Movement existed.

The speeches and interviews considered in Chapter Six will be dealt with as repositories of data. By "data" we mean information and/or details contained within the rhetoric. Therefore, each rhetorical sample will be

analyzed to see what themes recur, or are common among them, as well as what themes are unique.

Also, our purpose is to determine whether or not Identification was possible in this context. As we consider these repositories of data in Chapter Six, we shall ask what information was presented that was divergent and unique. This would include rhetoric which did not fall within the prescription of the afore-stated rhetorical strategies (i.e., as Governor Carey's call for a national primary). We shall also dissect the rhetoric according to the strategies outlined, determining which avenues were most often used by the spokespersons, and what rhetorical themes, if any, repeat themselves.

In Chapter Five, as we consider the eight spokespersons for the movement, we shall identify them based upon criteria established by this writer, as well as that mandated by the media. Personal goals of the spokespersons shall be examined, as well as allegiances which they formed. This examination will help to reveal how the spokespersons viewed their roles within the movement. In addition, it will form the basis for a determination as to whether any significant rhetors arose within the movement, and what influence, if any, they exerted.

In Chapter Four, we will have considered the multiple-audience aspect, investigating its composition, and the level of Identification inherent among the delegates. This

level shall be divided into the categories of Low, Moderate, or High. By "Low" we mean less than approximately thirty percent of the measured group; by "Moderate" we mean something in excess of thirty percent but not exceeding approximately seventy percent; by "High" we mean anything in excess of seventy percent. These categories are, by their very nature, somewhat arbitrary, as statistical sampling was not attempted. More often random inquiries were made, with inferences drawn from these inquiries, and hence we have had to approximate our percentage ranges.

The work in Chapter Four will be related to Chapter Three, in which we will have investigated the Open Convention Movement, as an entity, to understand its purpose, composition, and level of Identification inherent among its participants. This will be done by tracing the development of the movement, considering its constituent make-up, and considering the effect which the mass media had upon the movement.

In contrast to the Strategies, designed to enhance Identification, we will consider factors which might have been operative in precluding Identification. For instance, if Identification is compensatory to division, as Burke stated, how was this division manifest? To what degree were the various audiences addressed homogeneous? Was the media, as a medium, helpful to the goals of the movement, or harmful?

With respect to the rhetorical situation, the effect of the rhetors will be examined in light of immediate and long-range consequences. This will be done by first assessing whether the goal of the movement was attained, estimating the future effects on up-coming conventions, as well as considering the role of delegates at future national conventions. Judgment will be rendered as to the level of Identification attained at the conclusion of the movement. This, combined with the Results, Ethical, Truth, and Artistic theories of McBurney and Wrage, will provide a set of criteria for judging the effectiveness of the rhetors.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER I

¹Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech. February, 1970, Vol. LVI, page 123-136.

²Raymond F. Howes, Historical Studies of Rhetoric And Rhetoricians. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961, page 29.

³Ibid., page 58.

⁴Ibid., page 68.

⁵George A. Kennedy, "Later Greek Philosophy And Rhetoric," Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric. Penn State University, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 1980, page 187.

⁶Philip Biddle, University of California of Sacramento, during a guest lectureship given at Portland State University, Department of Speech Communication, November 23, 1982.

⁷George A. Kennedy, "Later Greek Philosophy," page 183.

⁸Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Its Scope," Quarterly Journal of Speech. Vol. 39:15-37, 1963, page 404.

⁹Herbert W. Simons, Persuasion: Understanding, Practice and Analysis. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1976, page 4.

¹⁰Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, Methods of Rhetorical Criticism. New York: Harper and Row, 1972 page 6.

¹¹Carl Holmberg, "Dialectical Rhetoric and Rhetorical

Rhetoric," Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric. Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1977, page 235-236.

¹²Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision By Debate. New York: Harper and Row, 1978, page 4.

¹³James A. Winans, Public Speaking. New York: The Century Co., 1917, page 198-199.

¹⁴Webster's, New World Dictionary of the American Language: Second College Edition. Cleveland: William Collins Publishers, Inc., 1979, page 49.

¹⁵Ibid., page 336.

¹⁶James H. McBurney and Ernest Wrage, The Art of Good Speech. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1953, page 23-24.

¹⁷Ibid., page 25.

¹⁸Ibid., page 28.

¹⁹Ibid., page 29-30.

²⁰Leland Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech. Vol. 3, 1952, page 184-185.

²¹Robert S. Carthcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech. Spring, 1972, page 87.

²²Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems," page 125.

²³Kurt Land and Gladys Engel Land, Collective Dynamics. New York: Random House, 1961, page 539.

²⁴A Lou Harris Poll, published in Newsweek Magazine, July 31, 1980, page 37.

²⁵New York Times article, August 4, 1970, page 1,2.

²⁶Beverly Ann Byrum-Gaw, A Sociodramatistic Analysis of Rhetorical Strategies Employed by Spokespersons of the Libertarian Movement. (dissertation, Ohio State University, 1974); and, Roberta Larson, From Teacups to Terror: The Rhetorical Strategies of the Women's Social and Political Union, 1903-1918. (dissertation, University of Iowa, 1975).

²⁷Scott and Brock, "Methods", page 82.

²⁸Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, page 22.

²⁹Ibid., page 23.

³⁰Ibid., page XV.

³¹Robert Harvey, The Rhetoric of Sir Thomas More and Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Original Work and Dramatic Portrayal. Master's Thesis, Portland State University, July 29, 1971, page 19.

CHAPTER II

THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTIONS

"It is an inhuman spectacle. If the Democratic Convention were a fight, it would long ago have been stopped by a referee."¹ And so it was, after 17 days and 103 ballots, that the delegates to the Democratic National Convention finally selected a presidential candidate. It was 1924, and Democratic delegates were meeting in New York for the first time since 1868. After they slugged their way through the longest national political convention in American history, it would be fifty-two years before they would return to New York in 1976. They would at that time nominate Jimmy Carter, the only winner they have ever chosen in New York.

In this chapter, we will sample the Democratic Conventions of 1924, 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 in order to gain a flavor for the typical character and workings of previous Conventions. Certainly other Conventions might also shed some light on the traditions and history of Democratic Presidential selections, but these were chosen as typifying previous assemblies. We shall also look at the 1980 Democratic Presidential primaries and the campaigns leading up to the Convention, and consider the

Open Convention Movement, especially the origin of terms, demographics of participants, and the rationale behind the movement.

The Convention of 1924

On the second day of the debacle of 1924:

antagonisms had already reached the point where the 13,000 gallery spectators (at Madison Square Garden) were spitting on delegates, who were screaming, jeering, and waving their fists at one another. And the balloting had not yet begun.²

The delegates arrived during a torrid heat wave, while anti-Prohibitionists were fighting pro-Prohibitionists, Catholics were fighting Protestants, city folk were fighting country folk, and one thousand policemen were needed to calm the furor between pro-and-anti Ku Klux Klan supporters.

Will Rogers, reporting for the New York Times and other newspapers, commented:

There is a society in this town that stops us when we abuse or unnecessarily annoy a bucking horse or wild steer Now why in the world don't they get busy and protect a delegate? No trained animal was ever tortured like these delegates.³

On the 12th day, on the 78th ballot, Cordell Hull, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, fainted from the heat, was revived, and then fainted again. At one point, a motion was made to adjourn, wait two weeks and begin the process again in Kansas City, but this, too, was defeated.

Finally, after 17 days, John W. Davis of West Virginia, a former ambassador to Great Britain, was nominated--to run against Calvin Coolidge. Thus it was that the Convention of 1924 slipped into the pages of political history.

The National Convention has two primary purposes:

a.) the construction of a national party platform, and b.) the selection of a presidential team to carry this platform to the general populace. The candidate is supposed to "sell" himself to the people, sometimes by emphasizing the platform, at other times ignoring it (if it is felt to be too controversial, or too much at variance with the candidates own political philosophy). Never is the candidate for President or Vice-President supposed to openly defy or publicly repudiate the specific content of the platform. This policy represents a consensus of delegate opinion on issues of significant national importance, and hence, to reject the platform is to reject the unified concerns of Democrats, nationally. Practically, however, a national convention is one means of stroking and rewarding faithful precinct and state-level political workers--often a high time, where the spirit of the movement can sometimes obscure the sense of a mission.

Theodore H. White, writing in his The Making of the President, 1960, drew a picture of the general character of conventions when he said:

Every convention is a universe in itself, with its own strange centers of gravity, its own fresh heroes and fools, its own resolution of pressures and forces, its own irrecapturable mood of stage and place A convention is usually made up of older, if not wiser, men than the common voters who send them there. In most states, delegates are chosen by party leadership to honor long-time trusted servants of the party; or from men of eminence in culture, diplomacy or the professions, who can give the luster of their achievement and their names to the delegation; or, particularly in the organization-controlled states, very heavily from those who contribute the big money to campaign chests and now crave the honorable symbol of a delegate badge and the sense of high participation.⁴

The Convention of 1960

The 1960 Democratic National Convention met in Los Angeles, and unlike most conventions that huddle delegates together in closely-clustered hotels, the 1960 delegates were scattered across the breadth of Los Angeles. They were also divided on the relationship of white to black, Protestant to Catholic, and on the issue of trust.

What manner of man should be selected to lead the country? What kind of personality might best straddle the past and turn to face the future?⁵

By the time the delegates reached the floor of the Convention, the two primary combatants stood ready, their army of strategists having organized, caucused, projected and cajoled. The Kennedy forces verses the Stevenson forces-- the young minds in contest against the political machine.

In the end, the final tally was Senator John Kennedy 806; Senator Lyndon Johnson, 409; Stuart Symington, 86; and Adlai Stevenson 79½. Kennedy had controlled the big-city bosses, and it was these who secured for him the nomination after a last-ditch, Stevenson surge. It was Mayor's Daley (Chicago), Wagner (New York), Green (Philadelphia) and McCormack (Boston), as well as Governor's Harriman (New York), DiSalle (Ohio), and Williams (Michigan) that held the Kennedy delegate strength together and secured for him the Democratic nomination. Stevenson had sought an "open" convention, where the Kennedy delegates could abstain during the first ballot and then "vote their conscience" thereafter.⁶

The packing of the galleries by the Stevensonians was the result of sharp, well-planned organization. They had been allotted, prior to the Convention, only thirty-five tickets . . . (however), first they solicited all members of the 750 Club (a Democratic money-raising device which promised two tickets to each contributor of \$1,000) for their unwanted tickets and thus collected 1,000 free tickets; next, they pressed their friends on the host committee of the California Democratic Party . . . finally, learning that the Kennedy organizers expected to draw 2,500 tickets . . . they lined their own people up at the special distribution lines for these tickets, pinned on them large KENNEDY buttons, and claimed from the ear-marked Kennedy supply an estimated 1,500 tickets as their own. The Stevenson people thus, on the night of the Convention's nomination, were in possession of almost 4,000 tickets to pack the galleries, which they did with lusty delight.⁷

Thus, as Eugene McCarthy pleaded for Stevenson's nomination by crying: "Do not reject this man; do not reject this man who has made us all proud to be Democrats. Do not leave this prophet without honor in his own party,"⁸ the spectators spilled out of the galleries chanting WE WANT STEVENSON. Gold balloons fell from the ceiling, and banners and standards waved from the floor. Still, the party bosses held their delegates in check, and when the balloting began, Kennedy won on the first roll-call.

The Convention of 1964

The political realities of 1964 were entirely different from those of 1960. While Kennedy and Stevenson had to contend with an incumbent Republican President, Lyndon Baines Johnson pulled all the political strings at Atlantic City in 1964. The question was not, Who would be the Democratic Presidential candidate, but rather, Who would be the Vice-Presidential candidate. This is where the drama unfolded, especially in light of the two premiere political personalities of the time; namely, Lyndon Johnson and Robert Kennedy.

Robert Kennedy had suffered a great personal loss with the assassination of President John Kennedy in Dallas.

Robert Kennedy, who loved his brother more than he loved himself, saw John F. Kennedy, even while alive, as more than a person--as the flag of a cause. His brother was for him not only the occasion of brotherly love, but a new

departure in American purpose. Unspoken in any conversation with Robert Kennedy was the feeling that the old order had passed . . . impatient, strong-willed, he even more sharply than his brother expressed the single-minded clarity with which young people see things . . . For him, Lyndon Johnson was all the yesterdays; for him, Lyndon Johnson was his father's generation. And when Lyndon Johnson became President, all the yesterdays were restored.⁹

There seemingly were other aggravations between the two personalities--Johnson's desire to accompany the casket of John F. Kennedy from the plane which carried the slain president from Dallas to Washington rankled the Kennedy's; Robert Kennedy confronted the new President on this issue, insisting this was a moment of personal grief and not political purpose; Kennedy traveled to Southeast Asia on a fact-finding tour for Johnson, but on his return was required to brief a clutch of Congressmen in the President's presence; Kennedy's "Long Ranger" activities as Attorney General, when he ignored Johnson and failed to seek his advice or political savvy, embittered Johnson.¹⁰

From a political perspective, a Presidential candidate has several considerations when choosing a running-mate: regional balance; religious balance; appeal to particular groups (i.e., labor, Blacks, etc.); and, executive ability. Because of the impossibility of uniting the Kennedy and Johnson personae, the President sought someone to balance the ticket, in light of the Goldwater

Republican nomination, and Black riots in numerous cities. President Johnson was an avid follower of polls--so much so that he commissioned Oliver Quayle and Company to conduct nationwide surveys. The more he read, the more confident he became--no matter whom he chose as a Vice-Presidential running-mate, the polls fluctuated less than two percent.¹¹

But most of all Lyndon Johnson learned from the polls, which became his favorite reading material by June, that he was completely free to choose as Vice-President any running mate he fancied Theoretically free, as any President always is, to impose his own man as Vice-President, he was politically free, too.¹²

For almost thirty days prior to that late August day in Atlantic City, however, Johnson had almost settled his mind on the matter - he left himself only the smallest room for reconsideration, should the political tides recede. They did not, however, and Johnson chose Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota to join the ticket.

The Convention of 1968

'Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice; moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue'--a theme first advanced by Barry Goldwater at the Republican convention of 1964 and adopted as their own, at the Democratic Convention of 1968, by the rioters and the police who responded to them. Chicago of 1968 will pass into history as far more than the site of the Democratic Convention . . . it became the title of an episode, like Waterloo, or Versailles, or Munich. At Chicago, for the first time, the most

delicate process of American politics was ruptured by violence, the selection of Presidents stained with blood. 1968, throughout, was a year in which the ghosts of America's past returned to haunt the present; but at Chicago the goblins of America's future first appeared to haunt tomorrow.¹³

It had been Lyndon Johnson's decision to make, and it was he who opted to honor Chicago, and Mayor Richard Daley, by staging the 1968 convention in the "Second City".

The death of Robert F. Kennedy had propelled McCarthy to center stage as the only real alternative to Hubert Humphrey for the Democratic candidacy. Politically a new crest of popularity had carried McCarthy forward since June. A massive shift of loyalties had swept toward him, by every polling index He had scored astoundingly well in the New York Democratic primaries two weeks after Kennedy's death . . . yet the candidate seemed uncomfortable in his growing prominence--and as the convention approached, his behavior grew more and more erratic.¹⁴

So much so that, only two weeks prior to the convention, Senator George McGovern of South Dakota announced his candidacy for the nomination. Thus he joined both Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy, as the delegates began to gather in the wake of the assassination of Robert Kennedy, to joust for the title of Candidate. Vietnam, the issue of Civil Rights, and Law and Order, provided the backdrop. Major Daley and his crew of 11,900 Chicago police, backed by 300 Cook County riot-squad members, backed by 7,500

men of the Illinois National Guard, provided the security. The media, however, provided the mood.

Their mood, their spirit was to color almost all that America, including the arriving delegates, would see of the grand gathering. And the mood of the television men was bitter to begin with--for they were artists, in an art as esoteric as that of a commander-at-his-bridge of an aircraft carrier . . . and they were not permitted to practice it.¹⁵

The sophisticated electronics which enabled them to communicate the anticipated convention happenings had been crippled because of striking telephone workers. Therefore, old-fashioned cameras using cumbersome video-tape was to be used, but this required transport to the networks downtown affiliates, and the police were ordered to arrest speeding couriers; cameramen were forbidden to occupy sidewalks; the networks toyed with the idea of flying film by helicopter over traffic to the transmission point, but this, too, was forbidden.¹⁶

President Johnson had, as early as March, withdrawn himself from consideration as a candidate. Hubert Horatio Humphrey, as Vice-President, stepped forward to carry the standard, inspite of having fallen from grace in the eyes of Northern liberals because of his association with the Johnson Administration. It was rumored that Johnson might indeed step before the Convention and seek the nomination for himself, however, because by late-July he doubted Humphrey's presidential caliber, and because he believed

he could beat Richard M. Nixon in the Fall. Just prior to the convention, rumors were started by some McCarthy staffers that Humphrey was running 20 points behind Nixon in the polls.¹⁷ However, when Johnson learned that the latest Harris poll had the President, Humphrey, and McCarthy all trailing Richard Nixon by six points, any hope he had for a draft was dashed. In a phone conversation with the President, Mr. Harris personally shared the results of this latest poll and,

at the other end of the phone came an expression of disappointment approaching shock. Harris was asked what would be the reaction to a personal Presidential visit to the convention to attend the sixtieth birthday party which Dick Daley was planning for Johnson; Harris replied that he felt the President might be booed; and the conversation ended with an expression of the President's total incredulity.¹⁸

That same Monday evening, Yippies rioted in north Chicago, while black city bus drivers went on strike. The New York and California delegations, relegated to two back corners of the Convention hall by Mayor Daley's design, clamored for a draft-Kennedy movement (Edward Moore "Ted" Kennedy, that is). On Tuesday, a television reporter named Dan Rather was physically beaten to the floor by a security agent; "The television networks will avenge him by spending their wrath on every security agent, every policeman, from now until the end of the convention."¹⁹ Rioting spread to the central city, and dele-

gates inside the Convention hall kept challenging the credentials of other delegates, especially from the South, which resulted in a brawl among several Georgia delegates. Leaders of the Southern delegations began to collect their power and realign themselves behind Hubert Humphrey, in an "Anybody-but-Kennedy" move. On Wednesday, the Vietnam peace plank was defeated, while the California and New York delegates stood on their chairs to sing "We shall overcome . . .". Finally, the rioting began on Michigan Avenue - with bottles bursting, tear gas cannisters exploding, trash containers thrown into the streets, and barricades being used by police as battering rams. The crowd had included Yippies (members of the Youth International Party) as well as peace-demonstrators, McCarthy supporters, and hangers-on, though they were controlled by the National Mobilization Committee To End The War, and its director, David Dellinger. The police had moved on them, along with the Illinois National Guard, under orders of the Mayor to protect the campaign headquarters of the candidates. From his hotel suite, Humphrey watched as his name was placed in nomination and seconded, and then as video-tape replays recaptured the bloodshed in the streets. Humphrey was congratulated by phone, first by President Johnson, and then by Richard Nixon, after he was nominated on the first ballot. But he said, in retrospect: "I was a victim of that convention"

Chicago was a catastrophe. My wife and I went home broken-hearted, battered and beaten."²⁰ The bloody skirmishes left behind a bitter legacy, and the 12 states which Hubert Humphrey carried in the November general elections were far from enough to secure for him the office he so dearly sought.

The Convention of 1972

Miami was home to the 1972 Democratic National Convention, as Republican President Richard Nixon sat in power at the White House. This was to be the Convention of Reform - and Watergate. Still, in order to avoid the rigged appearance of another Chicago, reform was felt to be the only remedy for the Democrats. Chicago Sun-Times columnist Mike Royko wrote an open letter to reform leader Alderman William Singer:

I just don't see where your delegation is representative of Chicago's Democrats. And that is what this thing is really all about About half of your delegates are women. About a third of your delegates are black. Many of them are young people. You even have a few Latin Americans. But as I looked over the names of your delegates, I saw something peculiar . . . there's only one Italian there . . . and only three of your 59 have Polish names . . . your reforms have disenfranchised Chicago's white ethnic Democrats, which is a strange reform Anybody who would reform Chicago's Democratic Party by dropping the white ethnic would probably begin a diet by shooting himself in the stomach.²¹

The typical delegate was no longer a white, Anglo-

Saxon Protestant, of middle-age (or above) who had been hand-picked by party officials. For in 1972, women, blacks and youth prevailed. For instance, in 1968 there were only 2.6 per cent of the delegates under the age of 30, 5.5 per cent black, and 13 per cent women. In 1972, there were 23 per cent of the delegates under the age of 30, 15 per cent black, and 39 per cent women.²² These were the delegates who were to choose a candidate from amongst the likes of: George McGovern of South Dakota; Ted Kennedy; Hubert Humphrey; Edmund Muskie of Maine; Shirley Chisholm; and Senator Henry Jackson of Washington. But 1972 was the Convention of Reforms and rules, and George McGovern pulled the strings, and manipulated the rules, so that by the time the balloting began, Kennedy, Muskie and Humphrey had already withdrawn their names from consideration.²³ However, unlike Kennedy and Johnson, who used their staffs and exploited all of their talents, Frank Mankiewicz, Rick Stearns and Gary Hart controlled the McGovern operation. It was they who decided to abandon the women's cause on the South Carolina floor fight, in spite of direct assurances by McGovern that he would support the Women's Political Caucus. And it was a consensus opinion that chose Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri as the Vice-Presidential running mate. And it was a consensus opinion that ushered Lawrence O'Brien out as National Chairman and set the stage for a delegate re-

jection of Pierre Salinger as Vice-Chairman, in favor of two political unknowns. Thus, George McGovern purged the Democratic Party and established a new order, but in doing so isolated himself from the old, established order, as well as voters who conceived of the Democratic Party as the party of the common man. Historically, McGovern carried only two states in the general elections and received only 17 electoral votes, to 521 for Richard Nixon. Revelations of Watergate, as unnecessary an escapade as that may have been, would come later.

All these illustrations have been provided to enhance historical awareness. The Conventions of 1924, 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 lend insight into the character and inner-workings of previous conventions.

From the first U.S. political convention held by the Anti-Masons in 1831, through the 1950's, these gaudy, often raucous gatherings served to unify various factors within the parties. Differences in political philosophy were ironed out through debate and compromise, often on the convention floor, sometimes in the proverbial smoke-filled rooms In 1912, the Democrats slugged it out through 46 ballots before finally nominating Woodrow Wilson The nomination by political primaries is a new development. As recently as 1952, the Democratic Convention rejected Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, even though the coonskin-cap campaigner had won the most primaries and came to the convention with strong popular support. Not convinced that Kefauver was the party's best choice, delegates turned instead to a man who had entered no primaries--former Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson.²⁴

Hence, the concept of an "open-convention" was the political norm until most recent times. The proliferation of state primaries has allowed candidates the opportunity to arrive at the convention site with the nomination virtually guaranteed. As a result, the primary loyalty of most delegates today is not to a party, or its political philosophy, but to a particular presidential aspirant.

After the bitterly contested nomination of Hubert Humphrey in 1968, the Democratic Party instituted a series of reforms that encouraged states to rely increasingly on primaries and caucuses. The goal was to have the voters themselves determine the nominee . . ."25

Nearly 30 states now have laws, or party rules, that require these delegates to remain faithful to their candidates; however, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that such statutes are not binding on delegates to a national convention.²⁶ Therefore, in 1978, after the 1976 election of Jimmy Carter, the Democratic National Committee passed Rule 11 (H), requiring any delegate pledged to a candidate to vote for that candidate on the first ballot or be replaced by one who would. In 1980, that rule was recast as Proposed Rule F(3)(C), and presented to the delegates for their acceptance or rejection.

The 1980 Presidential Campaign

Having looked at some of the Democratic National Conventions of the past, we have hopefully glimpsed some

of its uniqueness, passion, and penchant for power-politics. With that background established, we shall now survey the 1980 Presidential Campaign itself, primarily from the Democratic perspective.

As with most national campaigns for the past ten years, the top domestic issue for 1980 was the Economy, singularly captured by the term, Inflation. It was this issue that prompted Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy of Massachusetts and Governor Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown, Jr., of California to contest for the Democratic presidential candidacy against President James Earl "Jimmy" Carter. As a past Governor of the State of Georgia, Jimmy Carter had overwhelmed the post-Watergate delegates at the 1976 Convention in New York, easily capturing the nomination. Governor Carter succeeded inspite of his lack of foreign-policy experience, because these post-Watergate delegates wanted more than anything else to be able to trust their leader, and they perceived Carter as trustworthy. Despite this lack of foreign-policy experience, Jimmy Carter will best be remembered for two issues related directly to foreign-policy: first, he was the architect of the Camp David Accord, the first significant peace agreement between Israel and Egypt since biblical times; and secondly, because of the seizure of 52 American hostages in Iran who's leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, defiantly rejected all diplomatic efforts to secure their release.

While it was the issue of inflation which brought the two challengers into the political arena to do battle with an incumbent President, it was the issue of the hostages which led to the "Rose Garden" policy. By asserting that his presence was required in Washington to formulate an on-going response to the Iranian leaders, Jimmy Carter remained at the White House; the Rose Garden became the site of numerous, almost daily, press conferences. Thus, without going "on the stump", President Carter was able to keep his name before the nation, and have it portrayed in the light which best measures the Office of the President-- as a leader. This was to prove to be Ted Kennedy's greatest frustration, for try as he would to draw Jimmy Carter out of the White House and into public debate, he would fail at every challenge.

In 1956, the main issue in the Eisenhower/Stevenson campaign was the fear of war; in 1960, the issue before Kennedy/Nixon was international relations; in 1964, the issue before Johnson/Goldwater was still international relations; by 1968, the issue between Nixon/Humphrey was Vietnam; by 1972, however, the issue between Nixon/McGovern was Vietnam and inflation; and by 1976, the issue before Carter/Ford was primarily inflation.²⁷ Obviously, no political campaign is run on one issue alone, but the above synthesis is meant to highlight the most conspicuous issue before the candidates, as it reflects national con-

cern.

The presidential campaign of 1980 was more difficult to assess than most, owing to the plethora of presidential hopefuls. The Republican's started it all - Philip Crane announced his candidacy on August 2, 1978, more than two years before the actual elections. He was joined by six others, in due time - John Connally of Texas (who raised \$11 million on his own, and turned-down Federal matching funds, while winning only one delegate in the primaries), Robert Dole of Kansas, Howard Baker of Tennessee, George Bush, John B. Anderson of Illinois (who, inspite of his poor showing in Republican primaries, mounted his own independent candidacy for the presidency), and Ronald Reagan, former governor of California.

The Republican's early primary battles were just that - battles, for position and power, as well as votes. However, by the conclusion of the primaries in June, five of the Republican hopefuls had joined ranks behind Ronald Reagan. Surprisingly, and uncharacteristically, the Republicans displayed a great deal of unity behind their candidate, with John Anderson being the only holdout. This made it possible for Reagan strategists to plan their Fall agenda: Connally would work for Reagan in Texas (which Carter had won in the 1976 election), and with his intimates in business and financial circles; Bush, a former Texas congressman who beat Reagan in Massachusetts, Con-

necticut and Pennsylvania and had a strong showing in Maine, would work for Reagan in the Northeast; Howard Baker would work in the cities of the Border states, where he was particularly popular among blacks; Robert Dole would work for Reagan among the farmers of the Mid-west and Plains states; and Crane, a Congressman from the Chicago-area, would work for Reagan among the industrial cities of the Mid-west.²⁸ This was the battle-plan, and it was to work as planned, because, unlike the Democrats, the Republicans were able to maintain that element of unity.

Political polls have emerged as the divining-rod of political health, measuring the strength of any candidate at any given moment. Lyndon Johnson virtually inhaled them, and Jimmy Carter, as the newly-elected President in 1976, used them to his advantage in convincing a reluctant Congress to accept his proposals, based upon his strong showing in the polls. By late 1979, however, President Carter's popularity had begun to sag. Enter Ted Kennedy, the challenger. Pause. The Iranians attack the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, seizing 52 American hostages. Suddenly President Carter's position in the polls is strengthened markedly. Re-evaluate. No longer threatened by political erosion in the polls, the President, under advice, decided not to campaign in the primaries, but to remain at the White House "in the national interest", placing himself and his office above mere politics. Thus,

the course of the primary campaign was altered immeasurably. Eventually, with the continued belligerence of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the unsuccessful rescue attempt in the Iranian desert, Jimmy Carter's position in the polls began to slide dramatically. Unable to attack the President on the sensitive issue of the hostage negotiations, Ted Kennedy, in frustration, took to calling the President a clone of Ronald Reagan, referring to his fiscal policies.

Kennedy declared that 'the first real test' of the primary season would come in January's Iowa caucuses. But Kennedy's organization was no match for Carter's, and he lost by a 2-to-1 margin The New Hampshire primary, the nations first, was next, and though it was in his own backyard, he lost. And he continued to lose steadily--dropping seventeen of the first nineteen contests Kennedy's dismal streak culminated in a humiliating 2-to-1 shellacking in the Illinois primary in March.²⁹

However, it was at this point that the Iranian situation began to deteriorate and this, coupled with soaring inflation and increasing unemployment, brought about a dramatic shift. In the final ten weeks of the primary ordeal, Kennedy beat the President nine times, including four major races--New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and California.

Governor Jerry Brown had also entered the primary contests early, but had attracted only a small following of support. After a poor showing in the Wisconsin primary, in which he had hoped to score highly, Brown withdrew his

candidacy. His presence was not to be felt during the final ten weeks, when Carter's popularity diminished. What had been, for all practical purposes, a two-man race was now officially to be that way.

"'Not a victory for a candidate, but for a cause', Kennedy scribbled in his notes the night he won the Pennsylvania primary."³⁰ Disenchantment with President Carter's domestic and foreign policies caused a backlash in the last weeks of the primaries, and as a result, many Democrats chose to vote for Kennedy as a means of registering their discontent. As will be seen later, these were not so-much votes for Kennedy, as they were votes against Carter.

Tuesday, June 3rd, 1980 was unofficially dubbed "Super Tuesday"--the final eight primaries of the season were held, and Kennedy won five of the contests, including New Jersey, California, Rhode Island, New Mexico and South Dakota, while Carter captured Ohio, West Virginia and Montana. Statistically the race was over at this point, for the Ohio victory gave Jimmy Carter more than the 1,666 delegates needed for the nomination, but Kennedy refused to accept the inevitable. One reason for his optimism was the fact that campaign monies continued to arrive, even after Super Tuesday. Kennedy, therefore, vowed to "close the gap."³¹

Technically, closing the gap meant dispatching two

dozen delegate hunters, to contact uncommitted delegates.

Senator Kennedy also plans to spend long hours on the telephone talking to Carter delegates and uncommitted delegates . . . 'We have to convince them that they're not going to New York just to ratify an earlier decision but to set an agenda for the next four years and to pick someone who can carry it out.'³²

They pursued this impossible dream because the party charter prohibits it from requiring any delegate to vote against the dictates of his or her own conscience. They were, in effect, living out the principles of the Open Convention Movement, but we shall discuss this in greater detail in Chapter Three.

THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT

Having already briefly surveyed the Open Convention Movement in Chapter One, we shall briefly consider at this point: a.) the origin of the term "Open Convention"; b.) the occurrence of an open convention concept at other conventions; c.) the demographics of the participants in the movement; and d.) the rationale behind the movement.

The term Open Convention originated, according to William Safire, with California Governor Earl Warren on the eve of the 1948 Republican convention: "I don't think any one candidate has enough votes to win. As long as that prevails it's a wide-open convention."³³ Safire defines an Open Convention as a political convention where no

single candidate arrives with a clear mandate.³⁴ "Origin of the phrase is probably from gambling terminology: a 'wide-open' town is one in which gambling, as well as prostitution, is permitted."³⁵

The concept of an open convention has occurred at several other national conventions. In 1956, former President Harry Truman made it quite clear that he favored an open Democratic convention, because he did not want Adlai Stevenson to lock up the nomination before the convention began--Truman supported the candidacy of New York Governor Averell Harriman. Senator Estes Kefauver actually arrived at the convention with the largest measure of delegate support, but the open convention eventually worked to Stevenson's advantage and, ultimately, to his nomination.

At this point, Stevenson in turn announced that he favored an 'open convention' in the choice of a vice-presidential nominee. The delegates, who couldn't remember a previous opportunity to choose a vice-president freely, almost went for Senator John F. Kennedy, but finally chose Kefauver.³⁶

Again, in 1960, former President Truman called for an open convention because he didn't feel John Kennedy, the Senator from Massachusetts, was ready to be President. "Kennedy told an aide: 'Mr. Truman regards an open convention as one which studies all the candidates, reviews their records and then takes his advice.'"³⁷ As we have already seen, despite Adlai Stevenson's strenuous efforts,

the big-city bosses held the delegates in check and Kennedy handily won the nomination.

We have already mentioned the 1948 Republican convention, and earlier we saw how "open" the Democratic convention of 1924 was. Historically, most conventions prior to 1968 were "open", to some degree.

The degree of openness is measured against another type of convention setting, the Brokered Convention. A brokered convention is one,

at which many key delegates are committed to 'favorite sons', thus cutting down the first-ballot strength of serious contenders for the nomination . . . the opposite of a brokered convention is an open convention, in which individual delegates are free to vote their personal choice. In a 'lock-up' or 'rigged' convention, the outcome is rarely in doubt, as when an incumbent president is a candidate for renomination.³⁸

Demographically, the participants in the Open Convention Movement were largely confined to the Northeastern United States. These participants can, for the sake of our study, be divided into three main groups: 1. the Democratic establishment of the East; 2. the post-Water-gate generation of Democratic congressman; and 3. that portion of the Democratic establishment beyond the Eastern boundaries of the United States.

When speaking of the Democratic establishment involved in the Open Convention Movement, it should be remembered that these include both supporters of President

Carter, who nevertheless still wished to see the Convention opened-up for the sake of party unity, as well as antagonists. The Eastern establishment included Governor Grasso of Connecticut, Mayor Ed Koch of New York City, and Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, all Carter supporters. Also included in the group of Eastern Democrats were antagonists such as: Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, Governor Hugh Carey of New York, Mayor William Green of Philadelphia, Edward Bennett Williams (financier, and chairman of The Committee To Maintain An Open Convention) of Baltimore, and Mayor Jane Byrne of Chicago.

Among the post-Watergate freshman Democratic congressmen who aligned themselves with the Open Convention Movement were: Representative Michel Barnes of Maryland (one of the more visible proponents of the Open Convention Movement); Representatives Thomas Downey and Jerome Ambro of New York; Representative James Exxon of Nebraska; Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts; Representative Norman Dicks of Washington; Representative Benjamin Rosenthal of New York; and Representative Dan Glickman of Kansas. While this list is not inclusive it is, nevertheless, representative.

Among the Democratic establishment beyond the Eastern borders of the United States, we find such figures as: Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado; William Lemieux, an aide to Washington Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (Jackson, him-

self, supported the movement but did not actively participate); and Representative Morris Udall of Arizona, an old Kennedy supporter and friend.

While it will be seen that the Movement had widespread geographical representation, a quick perusal will indicate a heavy concentration of Eastern influence. Four conclusions may be deduced from this observation: the Eastern portion of the United States has historically been more liberal politically, and more predisposed to change and shift, politically; the Eastern population is significantly more dense than the Western, and consequently, represents areas of heavy voter-strength and electoral importance; the freshman Representatives were not particularly loyal to their party, nor did they feel obliged to return any political favors, as they had incurred few political debts; and finally, the Eastern states became a political battleground because some of the most significant primaries (i.e., New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Ohio) occurred late in the campaign season.

Lastly, the rationale behind the movement can be seen by historical precedent and the Democratic party charter. As has been observed earlier, starting as early as 1948, the concept of an "open convention" has been verbalized at numerous conventions, including 1956, 1960, and 1976. Even prior to the conceptualization of the term, Democratic Conventions, such as 1924, pragmatically

participated in the spirit of an open convention. Indeed, until the reforms of 1972, following the Chicago convention of 1968, most Democratic conventions were "open conventions", to some degree. This has changed since 1968, through the institution of reforms and rules, and the increase in statewide-primaries. However, the Democratic National Committee approved Rule 11(H) in 1978, which said:

All delegates to the national convention shall be bound to vote for the Presidential candidate whom they were elected to support for at least the first convention ballot, unless released in writing by the Presidential candidate. Delegates who seek to violate this rule may be replaced with an alternate of the same Presidential preference by the Presidential candidate or that candidate's authorized representative at any time up to and including the Presidential balloting at the national convention.

The crux of the argument put forth by proponents of Rule 11(H), which was to become Proposed Rule F(3)(C) at the 1980 Democratic Convention, was that the role of a delegate had changed. It was argued that delegates were no longer elected on their own name, or by their own merit, but rather because they represented a particular Presidential candidate.

Advocates of the rule see it as an integral part of recent Democratic Party reforms which, while originally intended to guarantee fair delegate representation for minority candidates, should not deny³⁹ the same benefit to a majority candidate.

However, a section of the Democratic Party Charter, which supporters of an open convention referred to fre-

quently, prohibited any delegate from being required "to cast a vote contrary to his or her expressed preference."⁴⁰ In other words, a delegate was to be allowed to vote their conscience, and it was this apparent conflict which recast Rule 11(H) as Proposed Rule F(3)(C), to be brought before the delegates at the national convention for their approval or rejection. It would be the delegates themselves who would decide whether they wished to retain their absolute freedom of choice, or as some had warned, be turned "into robots forced to support a candidate they were chosen to represent many months earlier, no matter how events may have changed."⁴¹

Having thus considered the historical background of Democratic National Conventions, in general, as well as surveying the 1980 Democratic Presidential campaign through the primaries, and having considered the historical authority for an open convention, as well as the rationale behind the movement, we move to Chapter Three, in which we shall investigate the Open Convention Movement rhetorically through the use of Burke's dramatic pentad.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER II

¹Barbara Basler, "In the Tumult of '24, Exhaustion Won", New York Times, August 11, 1980, page B-6.

²Ibid., page B-6.

³Ibid., page B-6.

⁴Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960. New York Atheneum Publishers, 1961, pages 164-189.

⁵Ibid., page 168.

⁶Ibid., page 181.

⁷Ibid., page 180.

⁸Ibid., page 181.

⁹Theoldore H. White, The Making of the President, 1964. New York Atheneum Publishers, 1965, page 2590260.

¹⁰Ibid., page 259.

¹¹Ibid., page 257.

¹²Ibid., page 257.

¹³Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1968. New York Atheneum Publishers, 1969, page 301.

¹⁴Ibid., page 312.

¹⁵Ibid., page 306.

¹⁶Ibid., page 307.

¹⁷Ibid., page 327.

¹⁸Ibid., page 327.

¹⁹Ibid., page 333.

²⁰Ibid., page 354.

²¹Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1972. New York Atheneum Publishers, 1973, page 174-175.

²²Ibid., page 189.

²³Ibid., page 186, 191-193.

²⁴Donald C. Bacon, "Conventions Aren't What They Used To Be", U.S. News and World Report, July 14, 1980, page 34.

²⁵David Alpern and Jacob Young, "The Row Over A Rule", Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 23.

²⁶Ibid., page 23.

²⁷Allan J. Mayer "End of the Democratic Era?", Newsweek, August 18, 1980, page 22.

²⁸Donald C. Bacon, "The Also-Rans Close Ranks Behind Regan", U.S. News and World Report, July 14, 1980, page 33.

²⁹Allan J. Mayer, "A New Ted Kennedy", Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 32.

³⁰Ibid., page 32.

³¹B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "Kennedy, Vowing To 'Close Gap', Begins Drive for More Delegates", New York Times, June 11, 1980, page 16.

³²Ibid., page 32.

³³William Safire, The New Language of Politics, New York Random House, 1968, page 305.

³⁴Ibid., page 306.

³⁵Ibid., page 306.

³⁶Ibid., page 306.

³⁷Ibid., page 306.

³⁸Ibid., page 55-56.

³⁹Arthur O. Sulzberger, Jr., "Democrats Weigh Rule Binding Delegates," New York Times, July 31, 1980, page B-13.

⁴⁰Ibid., page B-13.

⁴¹Ibid., page B-13

CHAPTER III

THE ACT

THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT

In Chapter One, we sought to locate the beginnings of the Open Convention Movement within the context of the 1980 Democratic Presidential primaries. In this chapter, we shall: state the purpose of the movement; consider the composition of the constituents of the movement; examine the level of Identification inherent among the participants, in light of personal goals and ambitions; and finally, view the actions of the participants and the influence of the media.

THE PURPOSE

The primary purpose of this short-lived movement was to present, through symbolic acts, opposition to Proposed Rule F(3)(C), a 77-word resolution which, we have already seen, would have required delegates to the Democratic National Convention to vote, on the first ballot, for the Presidential candidate whom they had represented in their statewide primaries. This opposition was philosophically founded on the Democratic Party charter, a portion of which prohibited any delegate from being required to cast

a vote against their own conscience, and substantiated by historical precedent at earlier Democratic National conventions. Secondly, certain participants also sought to "dump" President Carter, while others sought to foster Party unity. The primary purpose, however, was opposition to the proposed rule.

THE MOVEMENT CONSTITUENCY

Chapter Two presented three main classes of participants in the Open Convention Movement: the Democratic establishment of the East; the post-Watergate freshmen Democratic Congressmen; and the Democratic establishment beyond the Eastern boundaries of the country. Perhaps even more important than the demographics of the participants is the fact that the movement was comprised of both antagonists and supporters of President Carter; the supporters merely wishing to preserve party unity, the antagonists seeking to dump an incumbent President who had plummeted in the polls and whom they perceived appeared incapable of handling domestic problems and foreign crisis. Due to this natural dichotomy in the group, Identification (or, unity) was necessarily required within the movement itself.

The "members" of the Open Convention Movement, we have said, were more participants in this loose-knit conglomeration of political mavericks, than members in a

structured organization. In fact, these participants fell into four sub-groups:

1. Those who sought the Presidential nomination themselves, either directly or indirectly (whom we shall call "Candidates")
2. Those who supported these alternate candidates (whom we shall call "Supporters")
3. Those who supported the renomination of Jimmy Carter (whom we shall call "Carterites")
4. Those who rejected all of the above, and sought to introduce other politicians from outside the movement, to the delegates at the Convention as possible candidates (whom we shall call "Mavericks")

This first group, who sought the Presidential nomination themselves, included Senator Kennedy and Governor Hugh Carey of New York and Senator Jackson of Washington.

As early as March 20th, 1980, Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy had called for delegate abstentions at the Democratic National Convention,¹ and his was to be the first of many such voices crying in the political wilderness.

While Senator Kennedy had made himself an obvious candidate by his campaigning, Governor Carey had only indirectly made himself available, throwing his hat more in the direction of the ring than into the ring itself, as it were.

Mr. Carey denied any political intentions of his own - 'This for me is a non-political year', he said with a smile - but nevertheless left his own options wide open for the coming national political battle. He stopped short of saying that he would definitely support the nominee of the Democratic Party, although he said, ' I would hope to do so'.²

Senator Jackson of Washington became one of the candidates suggested by the freshman Congressmen (or, "Mavericks").³ Campaigning in 1976 for the Presidential nomination, he had beaten Carter in Massachusetts and New York, and this inspite of the fact that he was identified as a Democratic right-winger.⁴ Jackson never openly campaigned for the Open Convention Movement, though he supported it in principal.

Jackson has alienated liberals with his hawkish views on defense. But he would neutralize some of Reagan's appeal to the foreign-policy right, and he is a favorite of organized labor and of many Jewish voters.⁵

Jackson allowed the formation of a draft committee by his old fund-raiser, S. Harrison (Sonny) Dogole, but he reportedly was also willing to accept the Vice-Presidential spot on a party-unity ticket.⁶

The second group, those who supported the alternate candidates (and here we mean especially the candidacy of Ted Kennedy), was a somewhat larger group. This group included Mayors Byrne of Chicago and Green of Philadelphia,⁷ but it also included such notables as Shirley

Chisholm of New York, Iris Mitgang of the National Women's Political Caucus, and Albert Shanker, President of the United Federation of Teachers.⁸ This group was not united in its goal, but rather, participants fell into two sub-groups:

1. Those who philosophically favored the freedom of choice for the delegates which Proposed Rule F(3)(C) would deny, and secondarily favored the candidacy of Senator Kennedy (Ms. Mitgang, Mrs. Chisholm and Mr. Shanker are representative of this group).
2. Those who supported the candidacy of Senator Kennedy and, therefore, supported his efforts to open-up the convention as a means of enhancing his political opportunities (both Mayors Byrne and Green are representative of this group).

The obvious problem in this second group is that the goals, which were of primary importance to its members, were divided. Hence, Ms. Mitgang was delighted with the results of "Super Tuesday's" primaries because, with Senator Kennedy doing as well as he did, women were able to come to the Convention with a great many demands (i.e., the Equal Rights Amendment, the appointment of women to policy-making positions in government, etc.).⁹ Mr. Shanker,

writing in the New York Times, said that:

The attempt to bind the delegates - with eviction from the convention as the penalty for disloyalty - represents a startling effort by the incumbent to overturn Democratic Party history.¹⁰

Mayor William J. Green of Philadelphia endorsed the candidacy of Ted Kennedy on April 15th, saying the Massachusetts Senator was "the best candidate for the nation's major cities",¹¹ and he made this endorsement inspite of the fact that most of the nation's mayors, with the exception of Mrs. Jane M. Byrne, backed the renomination of President Carter. Mayor Green was a family friend of the Kennedy's, so the endorsement may have been anticipated but it was politically treacherous for the mayor of a large city to abandon the President's campaign.¹²

The third major group of participants in the Open Convention Movement consisted of supporters of President Jimmy Carter. These included Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, Governor Ella Grasso of Connecticut and Mayor Ed Koch of New York.¹³ What characterized this particular group of participants was their request for an open convention, as opposed to the demanding posture of other participants. Their rhetoric was significantly less critical of the President and his performance, and their rationale was consistently one of seeking party unity.

For instance, Mayor Koch threatened to withdraw his

less-than-enthusiast support from President Carter until the "Billygate" affair (involving the President's brother, Billy Carter, and his dealings with the government of Libya) was handled satisfactorily.¹⁴ The Mayor advocated an open convention as a means of promoting party unity, as the President's popularity had diminished greatly among New York's numerous ethnic minorities.¹⁵

The final group of participants in the Open Convention Movement, whom we have called "Mavericks", consisted of those who opposed both the renomination of Jimmy Carter and the candidacy of Ted Kennedy. Most, though not all, of the freshman Democratic Congressmen who came forth on July 25th to herald the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention fell into this group.¹⁶ Representative Toby Moffett of Connecticut is one notable exception; a Kennedy supporter, he went to the National Convention in New York as a committed Kennedy delegate.¹⁷ His commitment, however, was more the exception than the rule, when one considers this group. Most were disappointed by the Carter performance, fearful of his presence on the November ballot, and convinced that the Chappaquiddick incident would stymie the election campaign of Kennedy.¹⁸

"What we're looking for is an alternative to both" said Representative Jerome Ambro of Long Island (New York).¹⁹ Ambro was joined by Representatives Thomas Downey (Long Island), Don Edwards and Fortney Start (Calif-

fornia), Timothy Wirth (Colorado) and Michael Barnes (Maryland), as they issued a statement saying,

There are an awful lot of people interested in this. If we could get 50 uncommitted members of Congress to join us, we believe you'd get another 30 to 40 members presently Pro-Carter or Pro-Kennedy.²⁰

However, the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention officially came into being only three weeks prior to the vote on the Convention floor.²¹ There were approximately 40 Democratic Congressmen involved, but two were already Carter supporters and 10 were Kennedy supporters. "Some people felt we might look like dupes of a Kennedy ploy, and we didn't want to do it that way",²² Mr. Ambro said. The majority of uncommitted participants drafted a letter to both Carter and Kennedy, urging both "to release your delegates at the Democratic National Convention so that the convention may consider all alternatives for the nomination of our party."²³ Their life-expectancy was extremely short, and while most were theoretically uncommitted, they nevertheless had developed a list of favored alternatives. These included Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, Vice-President Walter Mondale, Senator Henry Jackson (Washington) and Representative Morris Udall (Arizona).²⁴ This sense of urgency, created by a shortage of time, left little opportunity for in-depth planning, or subtlety in rhetoric.

Therefore, out of this sense of crisis, Representative

James Blanchard (Michigan), a supporter of President Carter, said, "The President's relations up here (with Congress) are terrible. There's no wellspring of warmth for him. These guys are free agents."²⁵ When President Carter met with the dissidents in late-July, he told them he would not campaign in their districts if he would hurt them by doing so.²⁶ Though he acknowledged his weaknesses, Representative Dan Glickman (Kansas) said:

If there had been strong ties between the White House and Congress, this couldn't have happened. It's part of a breakdown of leadership up here . . . Some of it is a failure of Carter, and some of it is institutional - the decentralization of the House and the political parties in America. The end result is that we just don't need the President as much anymore.²⁷

Thus, what developed in 1980 was not a unified movement but rather four distinct and diverse sub-groups, all functioning philosophically to the same end (defeat of Proposed Rule F(3)(C)) but each having group goals and individual ambitions separate from one another.

GOALS AND MOTIVATIONS

Obviously, the goals and ambitions of the first two groups were similar - both sought the candidacy of Kennedy (primarily). Both groups used speeches, press interviews, and television appearances to publicly promote their candidate, challenge the President and advocate an open con-

vention policy. However, the priorities and goals differed somewhat among participants - Senator Kennedy himself, as well as Mayors Byrne and Green seeking first the candidacy of Kennedy and, secondly, an open convention as a means to that end. Mr. Shanker and Mrs. Chisholm sought an open convention, on philosophical grounds, as their primary objective. This did not so much detract from Identification as it determined the level of strident attack mounted by group participants.

The third group, or "Carterites," was not so much philosophically motivated as they were politically astute. They supported the renomination of Jimmy Carter but, recognizing that by late-July his approval rating among voters polled was only 22%²⁸ they argued that opening the convention was the only way to unify the party. Their level of Identification was high, and their rhetoric was more supportive and less strident.

The final group, or "Mavericks", was the most combative in their rhetoric, and their motivation was political survival. While they demonstrated a moderate level of Identification among themselves, they demonstrated a low level as they related to other participants in the movement. Over-all, it must be deduced that the level of Identification evidenced among participants in the movement was low-to-moderate, though cohesion was nevertheless maintained because of the broader goal of opposition to

the proposed rule.

IDENTIFICATION WITHIN THE MOVEMENT

Identification must be considered on two levels - first, there is the level of Identification inherent in the movement itself, and secondly, there is the level of Identification which the movement sought to develop among the delegates (discussed more fully under the sub-title Scene). We have discussed the general low-level of Identification inherent in the movement as it evolved, and this is due to three causes.

First, the rhetorical strategies employed by spokespersons of the Open Convention Movement were directed to external audiences.²⁹ The Strategies were designed to directly influence the delegates to the Convention, or to influence public opinion so as to bring pressure on the delegates. There was apparently no internally-directed rhetoric, which might reconcile the different factions and enhance Identification. Neither of the four sub-groups made any effort along these lines, at least in published rhetoric, nor did the two most prolific spokespersons, Kennedy and Carey.

Secondly, the four sub-groups had different goals. True, the ultimate objective of each was defeat of Proposed Rule F(3)(C), but there were still prominent group goals and individual ambitions which, by their obvious

presence, precluded Identification. Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey had personal designs on the candidacy. The supporters of Kennedy sought to promote his candidacy while disenfranchising the Carterites. The supporters of Carter sought to promote party unity without alienating the Kennedy forces. The freshman Congressmen sought to dump Carter (because they felt he couldn't win) and Kennedy (because of the character issue surrounding Chappaquiddick) in favor of the candidacy of a third nominee.

Thirdly, the four sub-groups had different allegiances. Kennedy, as an Eastern liberal, had typical allegiances with the liberal Establishment Democrats, union leaders such as Douglas Frasier and Albert Shanker, as well as the Black and Jewish communities. His followers, particularly the two mayors, had alliances with business and union representatives, on the one hand, and heavy burdens to provide necessary Federal funding and support for their municipalities, on the other. The Carter supporters were allied with the Administration and, as such, supported Carter policies to varying degrees.³⁰ Some, such as Governor Grasso, supported Administration policies more than did Mayor Koch, for example (Koch's support dropped markedly after the April U.S.-backed United Nations resolution condemning Israel's expansion on the West Bank).³¹ Lastly, the freshmen Democrats were non-aligned with the Party hierarchy, and felt politically independent of Party

politics.³² They were, for the most part, uncommitted to any one candidate but proposed the candidacy of a conservative Democrat (Jackson), a moderate Democrat identified with the Carter Administration (Mondale), or one of two liberal Democrats (Muskie and Udall). In all, the allegiances, or non-allegiances, of the four groups is as diverse as their personal goals and individual ambition. As such, this diversity presented an enormous obstacle to Identification,³² and without a concerted effort it is easy to understand why the level of unity among the participants in the movement never reached that high level so necessary for an Identification-effective rhetoric.

Considering the diversity of goals and allegiances, and the emphasis of the rhetorical strategies, it is to the spokespersons credit that Identification was as high as it was. While a low-to-moderate level of Identification is certainly not the ideal operating position, it still allowed the spokespersons to propagate their rhetorical strategies without appearing disorganized or chaotic. The most factious element, Representatives Ambro and Barnes, officially became involved only three weeks prior to the Convention vote, and this was another factor in establishing an over-all moderate level of Identification among the spokespersons. Actually, only Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey, as major spokespersons, were directly involved in the movement for three-months or longer.³³ What-

ever their personal goals and ambitions, each of the participants shared a common opposition to Proposed Rule F(3)(C), and this opposition was strong enough to offset the natural divisions among them, and this, coupled with the late entry of the "Mavericks", contributed to the moderate level of Identification.

THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA UPON THE MOVEMENT

The Open Convention Movement was first given impetus by Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy as early as March, 1980. By virtue of his campaigning, Senator Kennedy was an obvious contender for the Democratic nomination for President, having entered all the available primaries and challenging President Carter to debate.³⁴ By the conclusion of the primaries, President Carter held nearly a 2-to-1 delegate edge,³⁵ but Senator Kennedy was apparently convinced that, because of the President's drastically declining support, the Democratic Party would have to find a winnable alternative.³⁶ As heir-apparent to the Kennedy-family claim on the White House, he saw himself as the most viable alternative. As his strategy developed concerning the binding-rule, an aide stated that, "The pressure for a rules fight would have to come from the Carter delegates themselves. We can't stage it ourselves. We'd lose."³⁷

Governor Carey began his crusade for an open con-

vention with his May 5th press conference in Albany. His most impressive message, however, came on May 21st, with the publication of "An Open Convention", an impassioned cry against "an empty ritual perversely called a convention",³⁸ which established Carey as the unofficial herald of this new position (continuing to claim no interest in the candidacy himself, he still managed to react angrily when called a "political ditherer").³⁹

The Governor traveled to Washington in late-July for a joint news conference with Representatives Ambro and Barnes, as well as five other spokespersons, at which time the name of Senator Jackson arose as an alternative to both Carter and Kennedy (at the same news conference, Governor Carey's name was also mentioned as a possible dark horse candidate).⁴⁰

Governor Carey, on the eve of the convention, continued to plead the cause of an open convention, first to the New York delegation and then to the delegates from Texas. "The Governor continued his effort to allow delegates a free choice. He predicted victory on the issue . . . 'I've never lost a fight', he said."⁴¹ The announcements by Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso, both Carter supporters, lent credibility to the prospect of a convention where the delegates would be free to choose. Added impetus was provided by a Gallup Poll in Newsweek magazine (August 11, 1980), where more than 1,000 voters "returned a

55-38 majority in favor of throwing the convention open."⁴²

At his first press conference after becoming Chairman of the movement, Edward Bennett Williams argued that "the rule binding delegates would undo 148 years of Democratic history, and reduce them to 'nothing more than robots or automatons.'"⁴³ He insisted that "this is not a dump-Carter movement",⁴⁴ but that an open convention would strengthen Carter's political position, should he win the nomination. "The committee asked only, he said, that they be permitted to vote their will - that they not be 'led like lemmings to the sea'."⁴⁵ This daily production of rhetoric had an effect; in early July, 11 percent of the Carter delegates opposed the rule and another 5 percent were undecided.⁴⁶ By late-July, 16 percent opposed the rule and 7 percent were undecided.⁴⁷ However, not everyone accepted this free-flowing rhetoric unquestioningly - when Newsweek magazine covered the Williams' press conference, they captioned their story: "The Drive To Dump Carter".⁴⁸

As mayor of New York City, Ed Koch took advantage of the extensive media at his disposal to broadcast his political inclinations, much as Governor Carey did. Unlike the Governor, Major Koch was ostensibly a Carter supporter. However, as the Carter Administration continued to bounce from one political embarrassment to another, Koch's support grew cooler, and his calls for an open convention more frequent.⁴⁹

As President of the United Federation of Teachers, Albert Shanker's endorsement of the open-convention concept provided union strength to the movement, and his articulate presentation in the New York Times provided a philosophical foundation which rendered significant impetus to the movement.⁵⁰ The article traced the history of Proposed Rule F(3)(C), quoted the rule in its entirety, provided illustrations of delegates going against their "bound" commitments at earlier conventions, supported a philosophical premise for an open convention by drawing on the example of Edmund Burke, and finally closed by urging the delegates not to gag themselves.

Both Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso were self-proclaimed Carter supporters who nevertheless advocated an open convention.⁵¹ As the two made their statements only four days apart from one another (Governor Grasso on July 29th, and Senator Byrd on August 2nd), they were accorded conspicuous attention by the media. Both felt compelled to press for party unity, which they believed was being sacrificed by binding the delegates, and both seemed confident that Carter's delegate strength would hold even without the binding rule.⁵²

The media gave "favorite-child" status to Representatives Jerome Ambro (New York) and Michael Barnes (Maryland), though they were only two of a much larger group of Congressional rebels.⁵³ Many of the printed statements

of the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention were made by Representative Ambro, while Representative Barnes was a frequent television guest, as well as appearing on televised newscasts. For approximately three weeks these two political personalities became the most-oft heard voices of that group of participants in the movement who rejected both Carter and Kennedy. What they accomplished at their first news conference was to set the mood for their rhetorical participation for the next three weeks.⁵⁴

As a last consideration, the effect of the media on the movement needs to be considered. By media we mean both television and radio, as well as the printed medium of newspapers and news magazines. All these avenues were employed by participants in the movement, in an effort to popularize their cause.

The name of Senator Kennedy, we have said, became a daily headline in nationwide newspapers by late-May. He also granted numerous interviews to magazines such as Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report.⁵⁵ Towards the last weeks of the primaries he was frequently seen on television news broadcasts, and as mentioned earlier, he appeared several times on such television programs as Meet The Press and Issues and Answers.

The Kennedy staffers carried out their delegate-hunting by phone contact and personal encounters with both Carter-and-uncommitted delegates. Meanwhile, Mr. Kennedy

kept his long-shot challenge prominently in public view through a series of speeches, Congressional hearings and appearances before the committee formulating the party platform to be adopted in New York.⁵⁶

So, too, other participants used the media. Representative Michael Barnes appeared on Meet The Press on July 27th, and once the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention officially surfaced in late-July, few days went by without some newspaper carrying an article about the open convention. Governor Carey held weekly press conferences to espouse an open convention, as well as appearing at numerous cocktail parties, fund-raisers and banquets.

In fact, it might be said that the Open Convention Movement was a media event. The movement operated rhetorically through the medium of the media, which served as an avenue of dissemination for the numerous calls for an open convention. Had the media not been available as a rhetorical medium, little could have been done to propagate the rhetorical message which sought to achieve identification. Had the media not been so persuasive the delegates would not have been aware of growing national discontent with Jimmy Carter's performance, or the polling strength of the various proposed alternate candidates.⁵⁷ Had the media not been so readily available, the time constraints on the movement would have made it impossible to mete out the volume of rhetorical information which the

participants needed to broadcast.

While it may be said that the movement required an avenue for its rhetoric, some of these medium proved to be more than just avenues. For instance, Newsweek magazine ran articles entitled: "The Drive To Dump Carter"; "The Row Over A Rule"; "Fighting After The Final Bell"; "Kennedy's Delegate Hunt"; "Not Very Happy Warrior"; and, "The Mutinous Democrats". Time magazine ran articles entitled: "Vowing Defiance To The End"; "Madison Square Garden of Briars"; and "That Which We Are, We Are", eulogizing the campaign of Senator Kennedy. Even the New York Times ran articles entitled: "Congress Rebels Held Reflection of Carter Lapse"; "Binding Rule Divides Delegates In New York Area"; "Gauging The Delegate Count"; "Amid Others' Doubts, Governor Grasso joins Move For Open Convention"; "Strauss Says President's Delegates Must Support Carter On First Ballot"; and, "Most Democratic Senators Termed Uneasy Over Carter Renomination". Hence, the headlines themselves served to create a rhetoric of their own, quite apart from the content of the articles. The accessibility of the media to the Open Convention Movement not only offered a rhetorical medium to the movement, but also served to enhance credibility, serving to stimulate a more favorable response from the delegates.

IN SUMMARY

In this chapter, the primary purpose of the Open Convention Movement was presented as its opposition to Proposed Rule F(3)(C).

The membership of the movement was divided into four groups: those whom we called "candidates" themselves; those whom we called "supporters" of these alternate candidates; those whom we called "Carterites"; and finally, those whom we called "mavericks", because of their rejection of both Carter and Kennedy.

The goals and motivations of these four groups were as diverse as their make-up. This, combined with rhetorical strategies directed at the delegates, and differing allegiances, contributed to a low level of Identification among the participants of the movement. Still, because they agreed on the broader goal of opposition to the proposed rule, the participants were able to maintain cohesion.

The activities of the participants were traced, and the intense influence of the media upon the movement was surveyed. Indeed, without the media, the movement would have been hampered beyond salvation, though it is also true that the media created its own rhetoric by the way in which it presented the rhetoric of the spokespersons of the movement.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER III

¹In an interview with the New York Times, March 21, 1980, Senator Ted Kennedy, speaking at an Iowa caucus meeting, declared that delegates should be allowed to abstain on the first ballot.

²Richard J. Meislin, "Carey, Saying Nation Is 'In Trouble', Calls For Open Convention," New York Times, May 6, 1980, page D-19.

³Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention; Koch Trims His Backing For Carter," New York Times, July 29, 1980, page 1.

⁴Tom Morganthau, "The Dark Horses," Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 21.

⁵Ibid., page 21.

⁶Peter Goldman, "The Drive To Dump Carter," Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 21.

⁷Leslie Bennetts, "Philadelphia Mayor Endorses Kennedy," New York Times, April 16, 1980, page B-8.

⁸Frank Lynn, "Kennedy People Chosen To Head State Delegation," New York Times, June 9, 1980, page B-13.

⁹Leslie Bennetts, "Women's Groups Warn Democrats They Will Seek Open Convention," New York Times, June 5, 1980, page B-9.

¹⁰Albert Shanker, "Where We Stand," New York Times, July 27, 1980, page E-7.

¹¹Leslie Bennetts, "Philadelphia Mayor . . .", page B-8.

¹²Ibid., page B-8.

¹³Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .", page 1; Joyce Purnick, "Amid Others' Doubts, Governor Grasso Joins Move For Open Convention," New York Times, July 30, 1980, page 1; Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," New York Times, August 3, 1980, page 1.

¹⁴Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention. . .", page 1.

¹⁵Ibid., page 12.

¹⁶Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats in Congress Weigh Bid For New Party Nominee," New York Times, July 26, 1980, page 1.

¹⁷Joyce Purnick, "Carey Stand For Open Convention Is Denounced By Cuomo and Byrne," New York Times, July 31, 1980, page 1.

¹⁸Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats . . .", page 7.

¹⁹Ibid., page 1.

²⁰Ibid., page 1.

²¹Ibid., page 1.

²²Ibid., page 7.

²³Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .", page 12.

²⁴Ibid., page 1,12.

²⁵Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Rebels Held Reflection of Carter Lapse," New York Times, July 31, 1980, page B-10.

²⁶Ibid., page B-10.

²⁷Ibid., page B-10.

²⁸Maurice Carroll, "Most Democratic Senators Termed

'Uneasy' Over Carter Renomination," New York Times, July 31, 1970, page 11.

²⁹This is evidenced by a review of the 14 rhetorical samples (amplified in Chapter Six) as well as reviewing the chronological chart in Chapter Five. These are not inclusive, but serve to illustrate the point.

³⁰Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention. . .", page 1; Joyce Purnick, "Amid Others' Doubts . . .", page 1; Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 1.

³¹Jerry Alder, "Mr Straight Talk," Newsweek, August 18, 1980, page 29-30.

³²Steven V. Roberts, "Congress REbels . . .", page B-10.

³³A review of the chronological chart (Chapter Five) shows Senator Kennedy speaking up on March 20, 1980, for first ballot abstentions, and Governor Carey calling for an open convention on May 5, 1980.

³⁴Allan Mayer, "A New Ted Kennedy?," Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 32.

³⁵Ibid., page 32.

³⁶Ibid., page 32.

³⁷Tom Matthews, "Teddy's Long-Shot Scenario," Newsweek, May 21, 1980, page 54.

³⁸Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," New York Times, May 21, 1980, page 35.

³⁹Frank Lynn, "Binding Rule Dividies Delegates in New York Area," New York Times, August 9, 1980, page 6.

⁴⁰Joyce Purnick, "carey Supports Open Convention . . .", page 12.

⁴¹Frank Lynn, "Binding Rule . . .", page 6.

⁴²Peter Goldman, "The Drive To Dump Carter", page 19.

⁴³Ibid., page 22.

⁴⁴Ibid., page 22.

⁴⁵Steven V. Roberts, "Democratic Delegates Confused About First-Ballot Rule," New York Times, August 11, 1980, page B-10.

⁴⁷Ibid., page B-10.

⁴⁸Peter Goldman, "The Drive To Dump Carter," page 19-25.

⁴⁹Jerry Adler, "Mr. Straight Talk," page 29-30.

⁵⁰Albert Shanker, "Where We Stand," page E-7.

⁵¹Joyce Purnick, "Amid Others' Doubts . . .", page 1. Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 1.

⁵²Ibid., page 1.

⁵³Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats . . .", page 1; and Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Rebels . . .", page B-10.

⁵⁴Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats . . .", page 1. At this interview, the Mavericks emphasized the strategies of Thwarting, Viability, and Unity (although as a rule this group did not emphasize Unity).

⁵⁵David M. Alpern, "Kennedy Soldiers On," Newsweek, May 5, 1980, page 52; Tom Matthews, "Teddy's Long-Shot Scenario," page 54; Peter Goldman, "Fighting After The Final Bell," Newsweek, June 16, 1980, page 22; Allan Mayer, "Kennedy's Delegate Hunt," Newsweek, June 23, 1980, page 26; "Vowing Defiance To The End," Time, July 21, 1980, page 21; David M. Alpern, "A Veneer Of Unity," Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 24; Hugh Sidey, "That Which We Are, We Are", Time, August 25, 1980, page 24.

⁵⁶B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy Vowing To 'Close Gap', Begins Drive For More Delegates," New York Times, June 11, 1980, page 21.

⁵⁷Tom Morganthau, "The Dark Horses," page 21.

In this Gallup Poll of July 30 and 31, 1980, a national sample of 1,036 voters were questioned, with various combinations of candidates being suggested. In a three--way race with Carter as Democratic candidate, the results were: Reagan 46%, Carter 28%, Anderson 17%. In other combinations, the results were: Reagan 48%, Kennedy 27%, Anderson 18%; Reagan 45%, Muskie 31%, Anderson 16%; Reagan 47%, Mondale 27%, Anderson 18%; and finally, Reagan 46%, Jackson 21%, Anderson 20%.

CHAPTER IV

THE SCENE

THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

In our consideration of the Democratic National Convention of 1980, we shall examine the following: to what "audience" the rhetorical strategies of the movement were address; how homogeneous this group was, and the level of Identification inherent among the delegates; the events and circumstances of the Convention itself, and finally, the immediate effects of the movement on the Democratic Convention.

THE AUDIENCE

The Democratic National Convention of 1980 consisted of two audiences, not one. The first and largest group consisted of the more than 3,300 delegates to the Convention, plus alternates.¹ Almost two thousand of these delegates were pledged, prior to the Convention, to the candidacy of President Jimmy Carter,² while approximately one thousand were pledged to Senator Ted Kennedy.³ There was a very small group of uncommitted delegates, or delegates pledged to favorite-son candidates.

Most of the delegates to the Democratic Convention

were either elected in state-wide primaries, or chosen in state Party caucuses. A small number were honorary positions (for instance, Senator Patrick Moynihan of New York was selected by state Democratic Party officials to be a delegate to the National Convention, and he went to Madison Square Garden uncommitted to either Carter or Kennedy).

In 1980, there were 37 state primaries - twice as many as in 1968⁴ - stretched out over a five-month period, prompting some political analysts to suggest reforming the selection process by instituting a national primary, or regional primaries.⁵ With the conclusion of the primaries and caucuses, the make-up of the delegate-body had been largely determined.

The second group consisted of the two major candidates and their campaign staffs. For Jimmy Carter, this group included Robert Strauss, Jody Powell, Hamilton Jordan, Vice President Walter Mondale, Stuart Eizenstat and Zbigniew Brezinski, along with Tom Donilon. For Ted Kennedy, this group included Richard Stearns, Phillip Bakes, Paul Kirk, Peter Edelman, Carl Wagner, Paul Tully, and Susan Estrich.

HOMOGENEITY AND IDENTIFICATION AMONG DELEGATES

Obviously, even within these two groups, there were divisions and dichotomies. Split philosophically into

two antithetical camps - the Carterites and the Kennedy forces, the Senator's managers, sporting buttons which read "FREE THE CARTER 2,000", pushed for a resolution that would allow delegates to vote for any candidate.⁶ They argued that delegates at past Democratic Conventions had been free - in theory, at least - to vote for whomever they wanted, even on the first ballot.⁷ Joseph Raub, a longtime liberal activist, declared that the loyalty rule would prohibit any action at the convention and "turn the Democratic Party from a deliberative body to a group of robots."⁸

On the Carter-side, the President's campaign chairman Robert Strauss said:

These delegates have only one responsibility - to express the will of the people who elected them on the first ballot of the Presidential roll-call. On any other issue before the convention, they are free to do what they want. We have no intention of trying to enforce the rule except on the roll-call.⁹

The dogmatism of the Carter staff was not universally believed or accepted by all the Carter delegates, and this is the atmosphere which lessened the level of Identification.

Privately, a number of Carter delegates have expressed fear and irritation that they might be purged from the Convention if they opposed the White House on the rules issue. 'The rule stinks', said one Carter delegation leader. 'It was a tactical mistake, but we're stuck with it'.¹⁰

Virtually all the delegates to the National Convention opposed the presidential aspirations of Republican Ronald Reagan, yet this was the only goal which they universally shared. Many of the Carter delegates hoped for a Kennedy-Carter reconciliation, wishing to enhance party unity for the fall campaign.¹¹ Others in the Carter camp, dogmatically refusing to yield on either the rule fight or their allegiance to Carter, simply pushed on.¹²

By early August, a reported 16 percent of the Carter delegates opposed Proposed Rule F(3)(C),¹³ while virtually all the Kennedy delegates also opposed it. Thus, approximately 320 Carter delegates and 1,000 Kennedy delegates stood ready to vote against the rule, but simple mathematics displays that more than 1700 delegates either favored the rule, or were uncommitted. One out of almost every six Carter delegates was opposed to the rule, and another 7 percent were undecided.¹⁴ However, much of this opposition was not a pro-Kennedy shift, but a move for party unity much as Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso advocated.

Within the body of delegates who constituted the Scene, there were arguments which tended to go like this: Ed Campbell (Carter delegate and Iowa State Party Chief, opposing the rule), "I don't like to change the rules in the middle of the game . . . (but) it's worth the risk. I feel the party would be better served if they had an open

convention";¹⁵ Louise Beaudreau (Carter delegate from Oregon who was uncommitted about the rule), "I don't want to alienate the Kennedy forces . . . I'm going to wait til I get there to make up my mind";¹⁶ Judith Henning, an uncommitted delegate from Colorado, "I'm getting beat up on by some other delegates when we get together at meetings, especially the Kennedy delegates".¹⁷ This was in contrast to Barbara Holmes, a Carter delegate and state senator from Colorado, who said, "Kennedy has already lost in the Democratic primaries, and if he can't win the primaries, I don't think he can win the general election."¹⁸

There was a high level of Identification among the under-dog Kennedy delegates, but as indicated above, the level of Identification among Carter delegates was only moderate. This divisiveness was not politically motivated but, rather than disavowing their allegiance to Carter, these presidential supporters who opposed the rule were seeking to pacify the considerable Kennedy loyalists and, therefore, enhance Democratic Party unity.¹⁹ The over-all level of Identification between the two groups was low; generally, they approached the National Convention with an adversarial attitude toward each other.

THE EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONVENTION

The Convention rules committee met in Washington, D.C., in mid-July to finalize the agenda it would set

before the delegates in New York in August.²⁰ The rules committee was comprised of Democratic Party officials from around the country, and like the delegate make-up, represented a 2-to-1 split between Carter and Kennedy supporters. Kennedy strategists worked to persuade committee members not to approve the measure which would bind delegates on the first ballot. After two and one-half hours of debate, the Carter forces won, 87 to 66, and the rule was recommended for adoption by the delegates.²¹ And so the scene was set for the final decision, and the last battle would be fought in Madison Square Garden by the delegates themselves.

The Kennedy forces fought to have the vote on the rule moved to Tuesday evening, the second night of the convention - allowing them time to secure additional defections among the Carter and uncommitted delegates - while the Carter staff argued for a Monday vote.²² To present their respective arguments on the Floor, Senator George McGovern would represent the Kennedy opinion, and Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut the Carter opinion (Edward Bennett Williams would be the second speaker in opposition to the rule, and his oration would draw the most notice).²³

Still confident that he would win the rules vote, Mr. Carter's most urgent concern was Kennedy's anticipated reaction to the vote, for members of the Senator's family

had urged him to walk out should he lose.²⁴ In light of this concern,

The Carter side made most of the concessions, scheduling the rules and platform debates for evening hours at Kennedy's request, giving ground on four of eighteen disputed platform planks - Teddy dropped one in return - and increasing his ration of Convention floor passes.²⁵

Two issues were not negotiable by Carter; the roll-call on the rules issue itself, and the date of the vote.²⁶

The Carter forces assembled 128 floor "whips", clad in green and white vests, who patrolled the Convention floor watching for delegates who appeared to waiver.²⁷

"They had memorized the quickest routes through the nearly always clogged aisles", and could reach every Carter delegate on the floor in seven minutes.²⁸ The night the Convention opened, and the delegates met to decide the fate of F(3)(C), Carter's whips went from brush-fire to brush-fire.

The final vote was 1936.4 to 1390.6²⁹ in favor of the Carter position on the rule, but the voting was actually over after the Pennsylvania delegation gave Jimmy Carter the votes he needed to go "over the top".³⁰

Senator Kennedy phoned Camp David and congratulated the President, after which he went back to work on his concession speech (actually entitled the Speech on Economic Issues), to be delivered Tuesday.³¹

Kennedy had included a paragraph of praise for Carter. But then he picked up a newspaper and read a comment by Hamilton Jordan . . . 'We could do it without him . . .'. With that, Kennedy toned down his speech to only one mention of Carter.³²

The Senator's speech on Tuesday evening was a significant oratorical success, so much so that there were major defections among Carter supporters from the industrial states on votes on the platform issues. In a meeting on the podium between Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill and Carter and Kennedy staffers, it was decided a roll call vote would embarrass the President. Therefore, O'Neill would call for a voice vote and would divine the ayes and nays as agreed.³³ The result was a victory for Kennedy on the voting for a \$12 billion jobs program, while the Senator's wage and price controls plank was abandoned.³⁴

On Wednesday evening, James Earl Carter was renominated as the Democratic candidate for President of the United States. The Open Convention Movement had come to an end Monday night, and had been celebrated and laid to rest Tuesday by the Kennedy oration. However, Wednesday found the same problem of disunity.³⁵ Vice-President Walter Mondale had followed Kennedy's example, and in his speech relentlessly quoted old Reaganisms (i.e., calling the weak and disadvantaged "a faceless mass waiting for a handout"; and declaring that "the minimum wage has caused more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great

Depression.").³⁶

When Jimmy Carter rose to accept the 38th nomination at the Democratic Convention, he urged Kennedy to support the Party and his candidacy.³⁷ When Kennedy finally appeared on the podium for the traditional show of unity,

he walked stiffly onto the crowded stage and tentatively shook the hand of the President, who patted his back. For a moment, Kennedy was hugged by O'Neill, while Carter shot him quick, anxious glances.³⁸

One more handshake and Kennedy moved offstage. Called back for pictures with the President, he was gone immediately afterwards. "There was no warmth, no clasped hands held high."³⁹

Jimmy Carter had hoped his four days in New York would help him to catch Ronald Reagan (whom he trailed in the polls by 18 percentage points), but the contentions and disunity did nothing to alleviate his political handicap.⁴⁰

IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE MOVEMENT ON THE CONVENTION

Just as Pericles' addressed his Funeral Oration to the gathered throngs of Athenians, and Sir Winston Churchill addressed his war-time speeches to the beleaguered citizens of England, so too, the spokespersons of the Open Convention Movement addressed themselves over a period of approximately five months, to the delegates to the Democratic National Convention primarily, and secondarily to the public at large.

The seven rhetorical strategies (which will be examined in Chapter Six) used by participants in the Open Convention Movement proved to be only somewhat successful. Obviously, the goal of the movement was to defeat Proposed Rule F(3)(C), and this did not happen. What did happen was that an increasing portion of Carter delegates were swayed, but at the same time the chasm between the two camps was deepened.⁴¹

The Kennedy supporters were crystalized by the beginning of the Convention, somewhat as a result of the rhetorical strategies of the spokespersons of the movement. However, while approximately one-of-five Carter delegates pulled back their support of the rule (16 percent actually opposed, and 7 percent uncommitted),⁴² the balance of the Carter delegates and the entire staff united in support of the rule, deepening the existing chasm. Therefore, there was never more than a moderate level of Identification achieved. By their acceptance of Rule F(3)(C), the delegates initiated a new political pattern upon the Democratic Party, and its National Conventions. And the spokespersons of the movement must accept some of the responsibility for the establishment of this new pattern (the political power of an incumbent President cannot be overlooked here).

SUMMARY

The audience at the Democratic Convention in New York

was composed of two groups; the delegates themselves (who split into two major groups - Carterites and Kennedyites) and the two major candidates for the nomination as well as their staffs.

These two groups tended to have an adversarial attitude towards one another, thus the level of Identification between them was low. Internally, the level of Identification among the Kennedy supporters was high, while the level among the Carter supporters was only moderate.

Though the rhetorical strategies of the movement had some success in drawing away a portion of the Carter supporters in opposition to the proposed rule, over-all the primary goal of the movement was not achieved, nor was the level of Identification among the delegates significantly altered by the conclusion of the Convention.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER IV

¹Peter Goldman, "The Drive To Dump Carter," Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 18.

²Ibid., page 18.

³Ibid., page 18.

⁴James Doyle, "Is There a Better Way?," Newsweek, June 16, 1980, page 25.

⁵Ibid., page 25.

⁶ , "Vowing Defiance to the End," Time, July 21, 1980, page 21.

⁷Ibid., page 21.

⁸Ibid., page 21.

⁹Hedrick Smith, "Strauss Says President's Delegates Must Support Carter on First Ballot," New York Times, July 30, 1980, page B-5.

¹⁰Ibid., page B-5.

¹¹Steven V. Roberts, "Democratic Delegates Confused About First-Ballot Rule," New York Times, August 1, 1980, page B-10.

¹²Ibid., page B-10.

¹³Ibid., page B-10.

¹⁴Ibid., page B-10.

¹⁵Ibid., page B-10.

¹⁶Ibid., page B-10.

¹⁷Ibid., page B-10.

¹⁸Ibid., page B-10.

¹⁹Ibid., page B-10.

²⁰ _____, "Vowing Defiance to the End," page 21.

²¹Ibid., page 21.

²²Ed Magnuson, "Madison Square Garden of Briars," Time, August 25, 1980, page 14.

²³ _____, "Democrats Support Carter on Binding Rule," New York Times, August 12, 1980, page 1.

²⁴Peter Goldman, "Now For the Hard Part," Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 18.

²⁵Ed Magnuson, "Madison Square Garden . . .", page 14.

²⁶Ibid., page 14.

²⁷Ibid., page 14.

²⁸Ibid., page 14.

²⁹Ibid., page 14.

³⁰Ibid., page 14.

³¹David M. Alpern, "A Veneer of Unity," Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 25.

³²Ed Magnuson, "Madison Square Garden . . .", page 16.

³³Ibid., page 18.

³⁴Ibid., page 18.

³⁵A number of first hand sources reported that Party unity was no higher at the conclusion of the Convention than at the beginning. The rhetoric of the movement was one element in this apparent dijoining of the Democratic Party in 1980. See: Ed Magnuson, "Madison Square Garden of Briars," page 14-18; Peter Goldman, "Now for the Hard Part," Newsweek, August 25, page 18-23; David M. Alpern, "A Veneer of Unity," page 24-30; Allan Mayer, "A New Ted Kennedy?," Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 31-33; and, Hugh Sidey, "That Which We Are, We Are," Time, August 25, 1980, page 24.

³⁶Ed Magnuson, "Madison Square Garden . . .", page 18.

³⁷Ibid., page 18.

³⁸Ibid., page 18.

³⁹Ibid., page 18.

⁴⁰Ibid., page 18.

⁴¹Ibid., page 18.

⁴²Steven V. Roberts, "Democratic Delegates Confused . . .", page B-10.

CHAPTER V

THE AGENTS

THE SPOKESPERSONS OF THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT

Inasmuch as we have already examined the Open Convention Movement, as an entity, and the Democratic National Convention, we now turn our attention to the various spokespersons of the movement. In this chapter we shall examine: who the major spokespersons were; how the spokespersons viewed their roles; whether any significant rhetors arose within the movement, and what influence they exerted; and finally, what alliances, if any, the spokespersons formed.

THE MAJOR SPOKESPERSONS

In Chapter Three, we discovered four very distinct sub-groups which, when combined, represented the participants in the Open Convention Movement. These were:

1. Those who sought the Presidential nomination themselves (named, "Candidates")
2. Those who supported these alternate candidates (named, "Supporters")
3. Those who supported the renomination of Jimmy Carter (named, "Carterites")

4. Those who rejected all of the above, in favor of still other possible candidates (named, "Mavericks")

By our definition, these were participants in the movement, and virtually all made public pronouncements at one time or another. Therefore, it would technically be possible to speak of all these participants as spokespersons, but our quest is to discover the major spokespersons. Hence, Senator Jackson, Mayors Byrne and Green, Ms. Mitgang and Mrs. Chisholm, Governor Lamm and others will not be considered here. Our major spokespersons must possess at least one of the following credentials:

1. They produced a large quantity of rhetoric as a spokesperson of the movement
2. They produced a significant rhetorical product, by which they were identified with the movement, or which gave impetus to the movement.
3. The media identified a spokesperson as being a part of the movement

Some spokespersons meet more than one of these criteria, but all those classified as major spokespersons must meet at least one. Under category One, Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey are spokespersons who produced a large volume of rhetoric on behalf of the movement. Under category Two, Mr. Albert Shanker is representative of a speaker who produced a significant rhetorical product

TABLE I

The following chart represents a chronological development of the Open Convention Movement, and the contributions of the agents therein.

March 10th	Sen. Kennedy delivers a speech opposing Pres. Carter
March 20th	Sen. Kennedy issues his first call for delegate abstentions on first ballot
May 5th	Gov. Carey calls for an 'open convention' during press conference
May 6th	Paul Kirk, Kennedy aide, demands the resignation of John C. White, Democratic National Chairman
May 9th	Gov. Carey again calls for open convention at press conference
May 12th	Sen. Kennedy calls for open convention during a press conference
May 21st	Gov. Carey's article "An Open Convention" is released
May 26th	Sen. Kennedy attacks leadership of Pres. Carter during speech at Rutgers University
June 2nd	Sen. Kennedy holds press conference after <u>Meet The Press</u> where he endorsed an open convention
June 5th	National Women's Political Caucus endorses open convention concept
June 11th	Sen. Kennedy attacks Carter in speech to American Federation of State, City, and Municipal Employees, and categorically cites his own economic recovery plan
June 15th	Sen. Kennedy speaks to Americans for Democratic Action, and afterwards receives their endorsement
July 11th	Sen. Kennedy delivers a speech opposing F(3)(C)
July 26th	Democratic Congressmen announce the formation of The Committee to Maintain an Open Convention
July 27th	Albert Shanker's article entitled "Where We Stand" is released
July 29th	Gov. Carey and Mayor Koch, appearing at separate news conferences, both endorse open convention move
July 30th	Gov. Grasso calls for an open convention during her news conference
July 31st	Gov. Carey goes to Washington, D.C., for a joint news conference with the "maverick" Congressmen, where he pledges his support to their efforts to secure an open convention
August 1st	Edward Bennett Williams is named Chairman of The Committee to Maintain an Open Convention
August 3rd	Sen. Byrd announces his support of an open convention
August 4th	Mayor Koch holds press conference after calling for an open convention during a television interview
August 6th	Representatives Ambro and Barnes hold a press conference stressing their efforts for an open convention, suggest alternate candidates
August 12th	Sen. Kennedy issues a statement withdrawing his candidacy after the floor vote on F(3)(C)
August 13th	Sen. Kennedy delivers his secession speech before the delegates, stressing economic issues

(Governor Carey might also be included here). Senator Byrd, Governor Grasso, Mayor Koch, and Representatives Ambro and Barnes are representative of category Three (in which might also be included Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey).

Beginning with his March 20th call for delegate abstentions, Senator Kennedy was the most prolific spokesperson for an open convention. His was the first, and most often heard, voice for this challenging position. By May 5th, Governor Carey took up the call for an open convention, and his May 21st article in the New York Times, "An Open Convention", was a significant rhetorical product. So too, was Albert Shanker's "Where We Stand", appearing in the New York Times on July 27th. Because of their prominence in political circles, as well as their publicized support for President Carter, Mayor Koch, Senator Byrd, and Governor Grasso were given front-page attention by the news media when they stepped forward to endorse an open convention.¹ Representatives Ambro and Barnes were accorded prominence by the media as "leaders" of the Congressional rebellion against Carter and the binding rule.² These eight, then, constitute the major spokespersons of the Open Convention Movement.

THE ROLE OF THE SPOKESPERSONS

The roles of the spokespersons can be divided into five views, which we have labeled Pragmatic, Correcting,

Spiritual, Unifying, and Confrontational. First, Kennedy and Governor Carey accepted a very pragmatic role as spokespersons. Their primary intention was to open-up the convention, so that either might step into the gap should the delegates fail to renominate Jimmy Carter on the first ballot. Their arguments were founded on historical precedent, as well as the philosophical premise of freedom of choice, but an open convention was a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Senator Kennedy became the single most prolific spokesperson of the Open Convention Movement, and he utilized a variety of rhetorical media to do this. From late spring onward, he appeared frequently on such syndicated television programs as NBC's Meet The Press and ABC's Issues And Answers.³ He was a frequent speaker at such meetings as the Los Angeles Press Club, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the Association of Federal, State and Municipal Employees.⁴ By late-May he was giving daily news interviews, where he challenged Carter Administration policy and advocated an open convention. He was a national leader, head of the liberal wing of the party, and heir-apparent of the Kennedy claim to the Presidency.

Governor Carey became the unofficial spokesman of the Open Convention Movement by early May, 1980. His aspirations for the nomination were less obvious than Senator Kennedy's, and hence he spoke more as a man with

a virtuous cause and less as an aspiring candidate. He used his considerable influence as governor of New York to keep the issue of an open convention frequently on the pages of newspapers nationwide. Beginning with his May 5th press conference in Albany, he reached full stride on May 21st with his New York Times article, "An Open Convention".

Here he said:

Silence is the politicians pet chameleon and can be made to blend into any background. Discretion may dictate caution at this moment but there are times when a cause is better served with plain talk - whatever the risks. This year, a managed convention, merely anointing a prearranged winner, may adequately express the Republican Party's vision of America, but the main event for Democrats at Madison Square Garden in August must not be a simple coronation.⁵

Secondly, Mayor Koch's role may be viewed as a correcting influence. As a Carter supporter and mayor of the nation's most populous city, Koch bore a heavy political burden. New York was composed of numerous Ethnic minorities, many of which faced their own unique problems. Blacks and Puerto Ricans both faced unemployment that exceeded twice the city's average, while the Jewish community was furious over the Carter Administration's anti-Israel stance on a United Nations vote concerning West Bank settlements.⁶ Additionally, the Billy Carter affair with Libya had angered the Jewish community still further, confirming in Koch's mind the ineptitude of the Administration for

handling foreign policy crises.⁷ Balanced against these considerations were the more typical responsibilities of an urban mayor, not the least of which was to curry favor from the Federal government. Hence, Koch's dilemma bred his position - he would gently, sometimes grudgingly, support the Carter candidacy while recognizing that if Carter received the Party nomination at an open convention, his opportunities for recapturing New York's Black, Hispanic and Jewish votes, which Carter lost to Kennedy during the State's primary, would be markedly improved. Koch was too prudent a politician to oppose an incumbent President, but too outspoken to let certain Administration blunders go unnoticed or unchallenged.

Thirdly, Mr. Shanker assumed virtually a spiritual role. He was a non-political figure standing on "holy ground", as he epitomized our ideal rhetorician by appealing to the highest nature of the delegates. His argument for an open convention was based on a universal principle - the historical and philosophical right of each delegate to vote his or her own conscience - wholly apart from the pragmatics of politics.

Fourthly, the roles of Byrd and Grasso may be viewed as a unifying influence. The difference between these two spokespersons, and the role of Mayor Koch, is one of emphasis. Neither Byrd nor Grasso emphasized criticism of Carter, while Koch, on the other hand, pulled no punches.⁸

The Senator and the Governor both emphasized the political wisdom of uniting the party behind its Presidential nominee, saying "The President would have a stronger mandate, a deeper vote of confidence . . ." ⁹ if the convention were opened. Both believed that even an open convention would renominate Carter, but that party unity would be enhanced by freeing the delegates. ¹⁰ The White House tended to have a more subdued reaction to this group. Jody Powell, responding to Senator Byrd, said that,

Inasmuch as both the President and the majority leader of the Senate . . . must work together on matters of some import to the nation, the White House is going to decline comment on his statement today. ¹¹

The Carter camp had a similar response to Governor Grasso's comments.

Finally, both Representatives Ambro and Barnes assumed a confrontational role. The Open Convention Movement, as it was personified by Ambro and Barnes and the other freshmen Congressmen who chose to call themselves the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention, was the most strident element in the 1980 Democratic campaign. Their motivation was pure political survival, ¹² and their attacks on both Carter and Kennedy were unbridled and unrelenting. Appearing on Meet The Press, Congressman Barnes said that "it would be extraordinarily unlikely" that an open convention would turn to Senator Kennedy, ¹³ while

continued revelations of Billy Carter's ties to Libya had become "a Chinese water torture."¹⁴ Neither correction nor unity were the goal here, but these two spokespersons clearly sought to rid the Democratic Party of both "albatrosses", Carter and Kennedy, in favor of a candidate whom they perceived as electable.¹⁵

When they finally persuaded Senator Kennedy to sign a release agreement,¹⁶ whereby his delegates would be free to abstain on the first ballot, the additional pressure on the Carter camp for similar concessions brought only an angry response from Robert Strauss, Carter's campaign manager.¹⁷ In spite of the Kennedy camp's release of their Convention delegates, President Carter never agreed to the same release, and thus the battle for an open convention was taken all the way to the floor of Madison Square Garden. However, while they expressed their role as being peace-makers within the party, their confrontational approach served only to alienate both Carter and Kennedy supporters. Interestingly, though the sharpest attacks were issued by the freshmen Democrats, the Carter camp reacted against the Kennedy forces. Mr. Strauss declared,

If we were to free each delegate, you'd bring total disarray on that convention floor To compromise and yield to Kennedy's demands would just create more conflicts and the networks would magnify it.¹⁸

In spite of these demands originating from the freshmen

Congressmen, they were perceived by the Carter forces as "Kennedy demands".

SIGNIFICANT RHETORS AND THEIR INFLUENCE

The determination as to whether or not any significant rhetors arose within the movement is a subjective judgment. The sheer volume of rhetoric produced by Senator Kennedy would qualify him for consideration as a significant rhetor. Then, for his stirring call-to-arms address, "An Open Convention", Governor Carey must be considered a significant rhetor. Finally, Albert Shanker's articulate statement in support of an open-convention must elevate him to the status of a significant rhetor.

Senator Kennedy's campaign for the Democratic nomination had gotten off to a very slow start, which proved frustrating to the Senator.¹⁹

Almost as soon as it became clear that Kennedy didn't stand much chance of wresting the nomination from Carter, he began to win . . . Kennedy wasted no time in capitalizing on the shifting mood. He was finally finding his stride as a campaigner²⁰

Campaign aide Paul Kirk called it "a campaign of the heart".²¹ Yet privately, there was anger and bitterness brewing inside the Kennedy staff. Stephen Smith, Kennedy's brother-in-law and campaign director, complained that "nobody stood up for him (Kennedy), not even his old friends."²² Kennedy saw himself as a crusader for a cause,

and this crusade-idea kept him fighting, even after the primaries were over.²³ By early June, the name of Ted Kennedy, and his efforts to bring about an open convention, were appearing daily in newspapers nationwide. Yet the speech for which his 1980 campaign shall be remembered was his concession speech, on the floor of the Convention, after the acceptance of the proposed rule one day earlier.

"For all these whose cares have been our concern, the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the dream shall never die,"²⁴ Kennedy implored, and the delegates responded with cheers, tears and chants for 39 uninterrupted minutes.²⁵

The barn-burner of a speech was Kennedy's best. He restated the Democratic Party's concern for the little man and attacked Reagan with glee. The tone was passionate and eloquent, the substance old-fashioned liberal, evoking the heritage of the New Deal and the mystique of the Kennedy's.²⁶

Capsulizing Kennedy's campaign efforts from the early primaries to the Convention speech, Allan Mayer wrote,

In one night, with one superb speech that was by turns graceful, rousing, poetic and defiant, Kennedy transformed what was supposed to have been a tearful last hurrah into a triumphant call to arms.²⁷

If Senator Kennedy will be remembered for his concession speech, Governor Carey will be remembered for his impassioned plea for "An Open Convention." Where Kennedy closed the Open Convention Movement with his concession

speech, Carey first articulated the position on May 21th, 1980.²⁸

What I propose is, in fact, neither unfair nor apt to lead to ruinous division It recognizes that the velocity of events requires that we devise a system for selecting candidates that offers a choce based on the maximum amount of information possible.²⁹

Governor Carey continued to attract attention from the media, and he often expounded the concept of an open convention, but his May 20th proclamation became a political shot-heard-round-the-country.

Albert Shanker is a unique character within the parameters of the Open Convention Movement. As President of the United Federation of Teachers, he was a non-political personality in a highly-political movement. His appearance on the scene was also peculiar; arriving virtually out of no-where, his message struck with megaton-force, only to find him disappearing into a funnel-cloud of obscurity. Still, the message rang out a clarion call, addressing public concerns in the political arena.

If these three represent the most significant rhetors in the movement, it is more difficult to measure the extent of influence they exerted. The Open Convention Movement, inspite of its strenuous rhetorical efforts to influence the delegates, also generated a large groundswell of public support, due to its extensive media exposure. What

eventually developed was a public support for the movement (55 to 38 percent)³⁰ far exceeding the success achieved among the delegates. It is likely that Mr. Shanker's article was contributory to this public sentiment. Part of the psychology of the movement was to use public opinion to sway the delegates; therefore, if Mr. Shanker's exhortation was a vital influence, he must be considered a significant rhetor inspite of his lack of producing any further rhetorical efforts.

After his article, "An Open Convention", Governor Carey was adopted by the media as the unofficial spokespersons for an open convention policy. While it was at times intimated that the Governor had ambitions beyond his Albany office, as an unofficial candidate his rhetoric was less suspect than that of Senator Kennedy. As his most significant proclamation was trumpeted on May 21st, there was enough lead time for it to influence both delegates and the general public. In spite of the fact that no statistical evidence is available to support or deny these contentions, it does appear that Carey gained considerable stature among the delegates. For instance, even the heavily Pro-Carter delegation from Texas allowed him access, just prior to the convention, for one last pitch for an open convention (his reaction was mixed, with some delegates chanting "We Want Carter", while still others chanted "Open It Up").³¹

Senator Kennedy was the most often-heard advocate of an open convention, yet because of his Quixote-esque quest for the nomination he was also the most contested. While President Carter avoided criticism, Robert Strauss, Tom Donilon and a host of other Carter staffers often criticized the movement as a Kennedy attempt to rest the nomination away from Jimmy Carter.³² Inside the movement, the freshmen Democratic Congressmen continued to repudiate Kennedy with almost as much vigor as they accorded Carter.³³ Still, with all the media attention he was accorded, and all the criticism he attracted, his Concession speech before the Convention was probably the most memorable oration of the Democratic campaign of 1980.³⁴

ALLIANCES OF THE SPOKESPERSONS

Only three spokespersons, Senator Kennedy and Representatives Ambro and Barnes, made attempts at establishing significant alliances. Senator Kennedy's efforts were by far the most extensive, but these were aimed at strengthening his political opportunities for the Presidential nomination. Thus he sought, and received, union endorsements, from: The United Federation of Teachers, The Sheet Metal Workers International Association, The Pennsylvania Labor Federation, The United Automobile Workers Union, as well as 35 member-unions of the AFL-CIO.³⁵ He also won the endorsement of Americans for Demo-

cratic Action, a traditionally liberal organization.³⁶

Representatives Ambro and Barnes sought to attract approximately 30 to 40 Senators to their cause, believing that this alliance would erupt into an irreversible flow to free all the delegates.³⁷ This alliance never materialized, but one that did draw Edward Bennett Williams and Arnold Picker to the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention.³⁸ Williams, a Washington lawyer, financier, and owner of the Baltimore Orioles baseball franchise, was named Chairman of the Committee, and fund-raiser Picker immediately supplied \$200,000, having collected pledges on his own.³⁹

Thus, the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention secured for itself a gifted orator and a successful fund-raiser, but this was the extent of their alliances. Efforts to attract Muskie, Mondale, Udall, or Jackson, as alternates to Carter and Kennedy, would prove unsuccessful for a variety of political reasons. Both Muskie and Mondale, in public demonstrations of support for Carter, squashed draft-movements on their behalf, Mondale saying, "I am not a candidate . . . and I have no intention of becoming one."⁴⁰ Jackson allowed a draft committee to be formed, but he refused to actively participate in a dump-Carter effort. Morris Udall categorically stepped aside by saying, "If nominated I would run - for the Mexican border. If elected, I would fight extradition,"⁴¹ and he

accepted the role as keynote speaker for the National Convention. These four took their roles from their own political perceptions, and the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement would not sway them.

SUMMARY

In order to define "major spokespersons", three criteria were established:

1. They produced a large volume of rhetoric
2. They produced a significant rhetorical product
3. The media identified them as spokespersons

Using this criteria, eight spokespersons were identified, including Senator Kennedy, Governor Carey, Mayor Koch, Mr. Shanker, Governor Grasso, Senator Byrd, and Representatives Ambro and Barnes.

These eight spokespersons demonstrated five distinct roles, with Kennedy and Carey accepting a pragmatic role, Koch a correcting role, Shanker a spiritual role, Byrd and Grasso a unifying role, and Ambro and Barnes a confrontational role.

The movement produced three significant rhetors, in Senator Kennedy, Governor Carey, and Mr. Shanker, whose rhetorical products gave impetus to the movement and provided apparent popular support.

Only Senator Kennedy and Representatives Ambro and Barnes produced any significant alliances during the

course of the movement, with the Senator being the most notable achiever.

Having thus considered the Agents of the Open Convention Movement, we next turn our attention to their speeches, interviews, and articles in Chapter Six.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER V

¹Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention; Koch trims His Backing for Carter," New York Times, July 25, 1980, page 1; Joyce Purnick, "Amid Others' Doubts, Governor Grasso Joins Move for Open Convention," New York Times, July 30, 1980, page 1; Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," New York Times, August 3, 1980, page 1.

²Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats in Congress Weigh Bid for New Party Nominee," New York Times, July 26, 1980, page 1.

³Senator Kennedy appeared on Issues And Answers May 11, 1980, and once again in both June and July. He appeared on Meet The Press once each in May, June, and July.

⁴Senator Kennedy spoke to the Los Angeles Press Club on May 15, 1980; to the U.S. Conference of Mayors on May 30, 1980; and to the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees on June 10, 1980.

⁵Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," New York Times, May 21, 1980, page 35.

⁶Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .", page 1.

⁷Jerry Adler, "Mr. Straight Talk," Newsweek, August 18, 1980, page 29-30.

⁸Ibid., page 30.

⁹Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 1.

¹⁰Ibid., page 1.

¹¹Ibid., page 1.

¹²Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Rebels Held Reflection of Carter Lapse," New York Times, July 31, 1980, page B-10.

¹³Steven R. Weisman, "Kennedy Supports New Move for an Open Convention," New York Times, July 28, 1980, page 18.

¹⁴Ibid., page 18.

¹⁵Ibid., page 18.

¹⁶Maurice Carroll, "Most Democratic Senators Termed 'Uneasy' Over Carter Renomination", New York Times, July 31, 1980, page 11.

¹⁷Ibid., page 11.

¹⁸Ibid., page 11.

¹⁹Allan Mayer, "A New Ted Kennedy?," Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 32.

²⁰Ibid., page 32.

²¹Ibid., page 32.

²²Ibid., page 32.

²³Ibid., page 32-33.

²⁴Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "Transcript of Kennedy Economic Speech at Democratic National Convention," New York Times, August 13, 1980, page B-2.

²⁵David M. Alpern, "A Veneer of Unity," Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 29.

²⁶Ibid., page 29.

²⁷Allan Mayer, "A New Ted Kennedy?," page 31.

²⁸Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," page 35.

²⁹Ibid., page 35.

³⁰Peter Goldman, "The Drive To Dump Carter," Newsweek, August 11, 1970, page 19.

³¹Frank Lynn, "Binding Rule Divides Delegates in New York Area," New York Times, August 9, 1970, page 6.

³²A.O. Sulzberger, Jr., "Democrats Weigh Rule Binding Delegates," New York Times, July 31, 1980, page B-13.

³³Steven R. Weisman, "Kennedy Supports New Move . . .", page 18.

³⁴Allan Mayer, "A New Ted Kennedy?," page 31,32.

³⁵Steven V. Roberts, "Democratic Delegates Confused About First-Ballot Rule," New York Times, August 11, 1980, page B-10.

³⁶Steven V. Roberts, "A.D.A. Debates Role of Liberalism in a Year of Losses and Budget Cuts," New York Times, June 15, 1970, page 14.

³⁷Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats in Congress Weigh Bid for New Party Nominee," New York Times, July 26, 1970, page 1.

³⁸Peter Goldman, "The Drive To Dump Carter," page 22.

³⁹Ibid., page 22.

⁴⁰Tom Morganthau, "The Dark Horses," Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 21.

⁴¹Ibid., page 21.

CHAPTER VI

THE AGENCIES

THE SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND ARTICLES OF SPOKESPERSONS FOR THE OPEN CONVENTION MOVEMENT

Having already considered the Act, Scene, and Agents associated with a rhetorical analysis of the Open Convention Movement, we now turn our attention to the Agencies. Here we shall examine the speeches, interviews, articles, and other rhetorical devices of spokespersons for the movement, seeking to understand: what rhetorical acts were performed; what strategies were employed, and who employed them; what rhetorical patterns, if any, repeat themselves; and finally, as repositories of data, what information and details were divergent and unique.

THE RHETORICAL ACTS

Political campaigns are typically characterized by the "stump speech", a basic speech which a candidate presents to many audiences, with only little variation, through which he delivers the heart of his message. As mentioned earlier, however, only Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey were involved in the Open Convention Movement for three months or longer. Therefore, because of this

crisis of time, the movement was not typical of political situations. Logic dictated that maximum saturation was required to effect the attitude change among the delegates, and spokespersons quickly utilized the readily available mass media as a medium. We have chosen two speeches, nine interviews, two articles, and one statement, as typifying the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement. These include:

1. Senator Ted Kennedy's "Basic Speech", (New York Times, March 10, 1980).
2. New York Times Interview with Senator Kennedy, (April 11, 1980).
3. New York Times Interview with Governor Carey (May 6, 1980).
4. Governor Carey's Article entitled "An Open Convention", (New York Times, May 21, 1980).
5. New York Times Interview with the National Organization of Women (June 5, 1980).
6. New York Times Interview with Senator Kennedy, (June 11, 1980).
7. New York Times Interview with members of The Committee To Maintain An Open Convention, (July 25, 1980).
8. Mr. Shanker's Article entitled "Where We Stand", (New York Times, July 27, 1980).
9. New York Times Interview with Governor Carey and

- Mayor Koch, (July 28, 1980).
10. New York Times Interview with Governor Grasso, (July 30, 1980).
 11. New York Times Interview with Representative Ambro, (July 31, 1980).
 12. New York Times Interview with Senator Byrd, (August 3, 1980).
 13. Senator Kennedy's Withdrawal Statement, (New York Times, August 12, 1980).
 14. Senator Kennedy's Concession Speech (New York Times, August 13, 1980).

Also indicative of the rhetorical situation which the spokespersons found themselves in was that more than half of our representative rhetoric occurred within three weeks of the Convention, or less. The above selection is intended to be representative but not inclusive, typifying the rhetoric of the movement. The eight spokespersons, as defined in Chapter Five, are all represented in the above list of speeches, interviews and articles, and the three significant rhetors, as well as their important rhetorical products, are also included.

Senator Kennedy was the only spokesperson in the movement who consistently used speeches, as a rhetorical form, to communicate the concept of an open convention.¹ The other seven spokespersons primarily used interviews, both press and television, and articles to communicate the

Open Convention concept. The Senator used these forms also, as well as phone contacts and personal contacts.² By early-August, Governor Carey was also using personal contacts with delegates to promote an open convention.³

The following charts are provided to assist the reader in his or her understanding of the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement. The charts are designed to give an over-all grasp of the construction and emphasis of each rhetorical product, thus supplying a "wholeness" to the rhetoric. It should be borne in mind that a Burkean investigation is primarily concerned with the Strategies used to achieve Identification.⁴ Therefore, what will not be identified are items such as the degree of ethos, pathos, and logos presented by each spokespersons, or the stylistic content (such as metaphors, alliterations, etc.) These items are typical of an Aristotelian approach, but are not usually associated with a Burkean-centered investigation. While a consideration of Invention, for instance, is instructional in an understanding of the rhetoric of a given speaker, the interrelatedness of areas within the Pentad provides its own insight and appreciation for the manner and effectiveness achieved by the various spokespersons of the movement.

TABLE II

Speech/Interview	Starting	Confrontation	Viability	Unity	Precedence	Principle	Self-Interest	Unique Qualities
Sen. Kennedy - the basic speech March 18, 1960		cited an 18% inflation rate in Chicago said wages are down 2.5%	The election is a chance for people to choose					advocated budget restraint attached Reagan economic policies supported wage and price controls, a gas reticulating advocated tax reform
Sen. Kennedy Interview April 11, 1960		charged Carter economic policy has hurt the poor						called Carter a "pale carbon copy" of Reagan
Mr. Carey Interview May 6, 1960		cited interest rates, inflation, and unemployment	suggested he might support Anderson candidate	an open convention would drive Democrats together				called for "totally open" convention
Mr. Carey "An Open Convention" Interview May 21, 1960				an open convention would unite Democrats	Democratic Party policies would allow an open convention	Democratic Party principles a guiding influence	delegates should be a merged convention is unacceptable	talked about the problems of the present primary system proposed a national primary as one solution
National Woman's Political Cause Interview June 3, 1960		Carter lack of support for ERA criticized	suggested support for Anderson candidate				delegates should be free	women sought specific concessions from candidates women threatened to rally around issues, not around candidates
Sen. Kennedy Interview June 18, 1960	were to claim the gap between he and Carter						delegates meet consider the role of a national party	parameal-concert strategy is detailed
"Marxists" Interview July 25, 1960	throw open the convention to choose another candidate Carter trail- ing Reagan in polls		Standale, Stuckie are suggested as alternatives	unity in movement demand an open convention is support				drafted a letter to both Carter and Kennedy urging them to release all their delegates
Albert Shuster "Where We Stand" Interview July 27, 1960					historical precedence has never demanded delegate loyalty the Convention is the one highest authority	Edmond Burke first verbalized the philosophical basis	delegates are people, not children	coined the term "Supreme Soviet", referring to bound delegates the rule would not only bind delegates but also gag them
Mr. Carey & Moray Koch Interview July 29, 1960	Pres. Carter could lose in New York	Billie Carter affair troublesome to both Carey/ Koch	Sen. Jackson is suggested as alternate				an open convention would "free" delegates	\$200,000. raised immediately to oppose the proposed rule

TABLE III

Speech/Interview	Threatening	Confrontation	Viability	Unity	Precedence	Principle	Self-Defense	Unique Qualities
Gov. Grease Interview July 30, 1980				unity is the only way to avoid bitter- ness				
"Narcotics" Interview July 31, 1980	Pres. Carter's popularity was low	Carter's fall- out with Con- gress was a head- ache						The President's relations with Congress are "terrible"
Sen. Byrd Interview August 8, 1980	Pres. Carter's low popularity a source of concern	Billy Carter "antagonistic"	suggested he could support Kennedy	the President would have a stronger if candidate if convention opened-up			urged delegates to reject the rule	
Sen. Kennedy statement August 12, 1980						concerned about the ideals of the Democratic Party		gratified by support among the delegates withdrew his candidacy
Sen. Kennedy Speech August 12, 1980		inflation cited as a burden		unity will be achieved through adherence to Democratic principles		specific citation of Democratic principles		economic issues dominate the hearts of the people pledged for economic justice for all people re-quoted old Neoplatonism advocated a national health insurance only one congressional line addressed to Pres. Carter

THE RHETORICAL STRATEGIES

In Chapter One, seven rhetorical strategies were catalogues:

1. The Strategy of Thwarting - whereby Candidate Carter was portrayed as beatable.
2. The Strategy of Confrontation - whereby President Carter was portrayed as incapable of the demands of his office.
3. The Strategy of Viability - wherein alternate candidates were portrayed as acceptable.
4. The Strategy of Unity - wherein Party unity was stressed.
5. The Strategy of Precedence - wherein historical precedent and the current Democratic Party character were cited in opposition to the proposed rule.
6. The Strategy of Principle - wherein philosophical grounds were developed in opposition to the rule.
7. The Strategy of Self-Esteem - wherein delegates were asked to choose their own roles within the Convention.

A glance at the previous charts will reveal the following; there were 45 uses of the seven rhetorical strategies by the Agents, while 22 times they presented unique information or demands. The number One strategy, in terms of use, was the Strategy of Confrontation, used 11 times

on 8 different occasions; second was the Strategy of Self-Esteem, used 8 times on 6 different occasions; third was the Strategy of Thwarting, used 7 times on 5 occasions, fourth place was a tie between the Strategies of Viability and Unity, both used 6 times on 6 different occasions; next was the Strategy of Principle, used 4 times on 4 occasions; and last, the Strategy of Precedence was used 3 times on 2 different occasions.

The seven rhetorical strategies did not all happen at one time, nor were they all practiced by each of the eight spokespersons.⁵ Collectively, however, they convey the sense of emphasis and direction which the spokespersons developed over the course of time. To illustrate their usage, we shall consider each strategy individually.

The Strategy of Thwarting, we have said, portrayed Candidate Carter as beatable. This strategy was employed on June 10, when with the conclusion of the primaries and President Carter statistically having captured enough delegates to regain the nomination, Senator Kennedy pressed the strategy

In a speech at Anaheim, California, to the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, (Kennedy) noted that government officials often faced budget deficits, and then said: 'Somehow they always manage to close the gap, which is exactly what I intend to do',⁶

referring to his contest with President Carter for the nomination.

The strategy was also illustrated by Senator Byrd when he responded to a question about Mr. Carter's re-election prospects by saying, "it would be pretty difficult for Mr. Carter if the election were held at this time".⁷

Again, Thwarting was used by the Congressional "Mavericks" at a news conference, when Representative Barnes expressed concern that Jimmy Carter could not beat Ronald Reagan at that time.⁸ Benjamin Rosenthal (New York), as one of the late-July organizers of the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention, said, "We reflect the public. And there is no support for Carter in this country. In my district he would run third today."⁹

The Strategy of Confrontation was the most often used strategy and was practiced by a larger group of spokespersons. For instance, at his May 5th news conference, Governor Carey catalogued his perceived shortcomings of the Carter Administration by specifying "the interest rates, the discharge of auto workers, the near collapse of the economy on the housing side, unemployment raging upwards, (and) skyrocketing inflation..."¹⁰ In his March 10 speech Senator Kennedy said,

The "disgrace of the human race" of 1976 has become an accepted part of Administration's embrace of the status quo in 1980. Yet Federal spending through the tax laws has nearly doubled during the past three years . . . nor will it work to excuse inflation as an inevitable result of rising energy costs, to blame it all

on "a worldwide problem with oil prices". . .¹¹

attempting to paint President Carter as an incapable President and an undesirable candidate for the 1980 nomination. He continued this Strategy of Confrontation on April 11th, by saying,

From both the Republican front-runner and a Democratic incumbent, now striving to become a pale carbon copy, we are hearing the incantations of an economic politics that is outworn, irrelevant and, in the end, dangerous to the social fabric of the nation. . . . at stake is not merely the continuity of a party but the integrity of the nation. We must not enter a new decade with a consensus against the past but no consensus about the future. I am not appealing in this campaign solely for a candidacy, or even for a program, but for a new social bond that can temper the rancors and rivalries among us. . .¹²

Mayor Koch participated in the Strategy of Confrontation, but never committed himself to the Strategy of Thwarting. In other words, he openly criticized what he perceived to be weaknesses in the Carter Administration, but he never advocated the rejection of Carter. For instance, Koch threatened to withdraw his support of Carter (though he never actually did so) during a City Hall news conference July 27th, in which he repeatedly referred to "Billygate."¹³ Described by the press as a "measured retreat from his once vociferous support of Mr. Carter",¹⁴ Koch affirmed his continued support of the President, but

added this warning: "I don't want to rule out the possibility that under certain circumstances I might not."¹⁵

Senator Byrd was critical of the President's handling of Billy Carter's dealings with Libya, "stating that the affair had shown 'bad judgment and rather amateurish' conduct of foreign policy".¹⁶ In the Senator's opinion, White House handling of the Billy Carter case was "politically damaging to the President but. . .(it) need not be considered permanent or fatal",¹⁷ illustrating Confrontation. The Senator continued to press his case when he said,

I don't believe in family diplomacy to start with. I think it was an act of rather poor judgment to even think of sending the President's brother to any country to carry out foreign policy, particularly Libya.¹⁸

Since self-interest was the admitted chief motivator of the Congressional mavericks, it is not surprising that confrontation was implicit within their rhetoric, while at other times this strategy was more explicit; Mr. Barnes' description of continuing revelations of Billygate as "Chinese water torture" was a less-than-subtle stab at the Strategy of Confrontation.¹⁹

The Strategy of Viability was cultivated in order to portray other candidates as acceptable. Some of the spokespersons were discreet, while others were blunt and uncompromising.

For instance, at his May new conference, Carey said:

I have suggested that it would be far more preferable this year for the candidates to ask for an "open" convention where the delegates would be free to close ranks behind the best person,²⁰

typifying the strategy.

In an effort to maintain a discreet distance from the plummeting popularity of President Carter, Senator Byrd said he could support either Carter or Kennedy as the Democratic nominee,²¹ which put him in practice of the Strategy of Viability.

New York's Mayor Ed Koch participated in the Strategy of Viability only by implication, hinting that continued faux-pas' on the Administration's part would push him to support some other candidate.²²

After a June interview,

Underscoring his refusal to withdraw from the 1980 Presidential race, Senator Edward M. Kennedy dispatched two-dozen special delegate hunters across the country today, then hit the campaign trail once more. . . Mr. Kennedy kept his long-shot challenge prominently in public view through a series of speeches, Congressional hearings, and appearances. . .²³

portraying his candidacy as viable.

"'What we're looking for is an alternative to both' (Carter and Kennedy), said Representative Jerome A. Ambro of Long Island, one of the Democrats uncommitted in the Presidential race, ...".²⁴

'I'm very concerned about the possibility of a Reagan Presidency',

said Representative Barnes. 'Jimmy Carter couldn't beat Reagan today. Conceivably he (Carter) could win eventually. But I think there are other candidates who could win much more readily'.²⁵

In his next breath, Mr. Barnes named Muskie and Mondale as two possible "other" candidates,²⁶ thus illustrating Thwarting and Viability. Mr. Ambro contended that the President "might make it on the first ballot" even at an open convention, but if he did not, both he and Kennedy would be rejected for a third candidate.²⁷

The Strategy of Unity was practiced by several spokespersons within the movement. For instance, Governor Carey said he felt assured that an open convention would allow the Democratic candidate to have "the party clearly united behind him..."²⁸

Governor Grasso, a staunch Carter supporter, said:

I think the President, since he is the front runner, is the obvious one to make the gesture (to free his delegates) so we don't have a blood-bath, so we don't have bitterness, so we emerge from the convention united.²⁹

Mrs. Grasso said at her news conference that she continued to support the President, and believed he would prevail even if the convention adopted a rule releasing delegates from voting for candidates to whom they are now pledged on the first ballot.³⁰ To avoid even the appearance of criticism of the Carter Administration, the Gover-

nor added she "would vote for the convention rule supported by the Carter campaign, to bind delegates on the first ballot".³¹ She said her proposal was only an attempt to unify the Convention.

In a similar tone, Senator Byrd, speaking on August 2, endorsed an open convention and said:

The President would have a stronger mandate, a deeper vote of confidence, if the nomination were secured on the basis of the personal preference of delegates, based on current circumstances at the time of the convention. . .It's the democratic way, with a small 'd'.³²

Thus, we have two prominent Carter supporters (Grasso and Byrd) both practicing the Strategy of Unity, with Mr. Byrd also practicing the Strategies of Confrontation, Thwarting, Viability and Self-Esteem.

Governor Carey utilized the Strategy of Precedence when he defended his proposal for an open convention as being neither unfair nor ruinously divisive, but provided for in current party guidelines.³³

Similarly, both Kennedy and his aides had applied the Strategy of Precedence by appealing to the delegates via the Democratic Party charter.

The party charter, in a clause relied on by the Kennedy camp, prohibits the party from requiring any delegate to vote against the dictates of his or her conscience.³⁴

Mr. Shanker's article, "Where We Stand", illustrated

the Strategies of Precedence, Principle, and Self-Esteem.

From first line:

A little paragraph tucked into the temporary convention rules that have been proposed by the Democratic National Committee could reduce the Democratic Party's convention to a deliberative body with little more to deliberate than delegates do at the Supreme Soviet.³⁵

To last:

If the delegates in New York two weeks from now vote to accept the proposed rule change, they will be voting not only to 'bind' themselves, but to gag themselves as well.³⁶

"Where We Stand" systematically attacked and refuted the proposed rule. No where in his article does Mr. Shanker criticize the President directly, suggest the viability of another candidate, or even suggest that President Carter might not recapture the Democratic nomination. His rhetorical significance lies entirely in the Strategies of Precedence, Principle and Self-Esteem.

The commission on party rules...found a rich history of 'bound' delegates switching their votes, and of the nominating conventions recognizing that right. In 1952, for instance, delegates selected under the terms of Oregon state law were 'bound' to support Estes Kefauver,...But an Oregon delegate ended up voting for Adlai Stevenson. Or take the 1924 convention, which required 103 ballots to pick its candidate.³⁷

The Strategy of Principle was alluded to by Governor

Carey, and developed by Albert Shanker. For instance, in his article entitled "An Open Convention", the Governor insisted that "it is because of my deep commitment to the Democratic Party, and to the principles for which it stands,"³⁸ that he would continue to press the issues.

Mr. Shanker illustrated the principle in his article by asserting:

This dilemma is best described by the British philosopher and legislator Edmund Burke in 1774. Burke acknowledged his duty to his own constituents, whose "wishes ought to have great weight with him: their opinion high respect; their business uncommitted attention". But, he added, "Your representative owes you not his industry only, but his judgment, and he betrays instead of serving if he sacrifices it to your opinion".³⁹

Finally, many spokespersons practiced the Strategy of Self-Esteem, appealing to the delegates to choose their own roles at the Convention. For instance, as chairman of the Committee to Maintain an Open Convention, Edward Bennett Williams led the Congressional mavericks in the practice of this singular strategy, when he declared that the binding rule would undo "148 years of Democratic history and reduce the (delegates) to nothing more than robots or automatons."⁴⁰ He insisted that the movement wished only to see the delegates vote their own will, and not be "led like lemmings to the sea."⁴¹

Richard Stearns, Kennedy's chief delegate-hunter

explained:

What we'll argue with the Carter delegates is that they have to think not only about their previously expressed affinity for the President but also the role of a national party. We have to convince them that they are not going to New York just to ratify an earlier decision but to set an agenda for the next four years and pick someone who can carry it out.⁴²

When Governor Carey declared that

delegates to a Presidential convention should not be herded, like branded sheep, into a pen where they are expected to perform in a predictable manner,⁴³

he was practicing the Strategy of Self-Esteem very clearly.

In this same article, he contended:

This year, a managed convention, merely anointing a prearranged winner, may adequately express the Republic Party's vision of America, but the main event for Democrats ...must not be a simple coronation.⁴⁴

Events, he contended, changed so fast that

a narrow majority, culled in a checkered process, no longer represented the will of the party, but delegates should have the choice of selecting a candidate who currently reflected the will of the people.⁴⁵

In his article, Mr. Shanker also expounded this strategy when decrying:

The proposed rule change would be an affront to every delegate. These are people, after all, who have long paid their dues to the party, not merely with money but

time, often over many years, doing all the chores necessary to help the party's candidates and its platforms. They know what politics is about...they are not going to change their votes merely because of some passing whim. But they do have minds. They are not children. If the Democratic National Committee is determined to treat them like children, ready to yank delegates suspected of misbehaving, why have them there to participate in the presidential nominating process at all? If the delegates in New York two weeks from now vote to accept the proposed rule change, they will be voting not only to 'bind' themselves but to gag themselves as well.⁴⁶

It should be noted here that only Senator Kennedy systematically developed these rhetorical strategies over a period of time, assembling them much like building blocks. While Governor Carey had the time to do likewise, he chose to trumpet the Strategies of Thwarting, Confrontation, Unity, Viability, and Self-Esteem simultaneously.⁴⁷ The other spokespersons were required, by time constraints, to shotgun their way onto the rhetorical scene.

THE RHETORICAL THEMES

To understand which, if any, rhetorical themes repeat themselves in movement rhetoric, we must remind ourselves that we are looking for recurring topics in the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement. These recurring themes may concur, at times, with our rhetorical strategies, but they are not limited to that scope. As discussed in Chapter One, these two concepts over-lap, thus making a discrete defini-

tion and distinction between them virtually impossible. True, we have said that "strategies" help us to understand how the spokespersons presented their rhetoric, while "rhetorical themes" demonstrate what topics recur in the rhetoric of the movement. These rhetorical themes are the product of a movement propelled by a unique rhetorical situation, and composed of a conglomerate of loose-knit participants, most of whom were elected officials.

In light of the movement's primary purposes, it might be expected that appeals to release the delegates from the binding rule would be prominent in the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement. Governor Carey called upon President Carter and Senator Kennedy to "release all their delegates and hold a totally open convention".⁴⁸ In the same interview, he asserted that events had changed many peoples' minds since the New Hampshire primary in February, and "delegates to the convention should be able to reflect that change of mind in their votes".⁴⁹ The Governor later asserted his preference for "an open convention where the delegates would be free to close ranks behind the best person".⁵⁰ Bella Abzug called for "an open convention, in which delegates would be released to vote for the candidate of their choice on the first ballot".⁵¹ Richard Stearns, a Kennedy aide, said of the delegates: "we have to convince them that they're not going to New York just to ratify an earlier decision. . ." ⁵² Governor Carey said he would

"lend his name and office to the 40 Congressmen campaigning for an open convention, (where) delegates would be free to choose a nominee other than President Carter".⁵³ Senator Byrd endorsed an open convention, and urged delegates to reject the binding rule, saying,

The President would have a stronger mandate. . .if the nomination were secured on the basis of the personal preference of delegates. . .⁵⁴

This common thread runs through the rhetoric of spokespersons for the Open Convention Movement, but opposition to the proposed rule was predicated upon certain other factors.

One factor was a disbelief in the leadership abilities of President Carter, and this attitude took two primary forms of expression. The first often attacked the President's handling of the economy, as when Senator Kennedy said:

For the families of Chicago, an 18 percent rate of inflation is more than a statistic. . .for the elderly, inflation means cruel choices between enough heat for their apartments and enough food on their tables. . .for workers, inflation means wages declining in purchasing power. . .for middle-class families, inflation means increased costs for college. . .and for the poorest among us, inflation means an impoverishment of the already bleak bareness of their lives . . .our highest officials now admit that we confront an economic crisis.⁵⁵

Senator Kennedy called President Carter a "pale carbon copy" of Ronald Reagan,⁵⁶ charging that Carter's pro-

posed budget cuts would work "great hardship on the poor but would not significantly curb inflation".⁵⁷ Governor Carey cited "The interest rates, the discharge of auto workers, the near collapse of the economy on the housing side, unemployment raging upwards, skyrocketing inflation. . ." ⁵⁸ in arguing against Carter economic policies.

The second expression of dissatisfaction with Carter attacked the President's approach to foreign policy, and was epitomized by the Billy Carter affair with Libya. By late-July, Mayor Koch threatened to withdraw his support of Carter because of "Billygate" (a Republican-coined term).⁵⁹ In the same interview, Governor Carey described the Billy Carter affair as "damaging to the Presidency".⁶⁰ Senator Byrd criticized the President's "rather amateurish conduct of foreign policy" by asserting that

I don't believe in family diplomacy to start with. I think it was an act of rather poor judgment to even think of sending the President's brother to any country to carry out foreign policy, particularly Libya.⁶¹

Another factor involved in opposition to the proposed rule was the argument that Party unity would be hindered by the rule. Governor Carey argued that an open convention "with an element of genuine risk would be the best way to drive the Democrats together behind one candidate".⁶² The Governor later asserted that his call for an open convention would ensure "that the Democratic candidate has the

party clearly behind him. . ."63 The original letter drafted by the freshmen Congressmen, and addressed to both Carter and Kennedy, emphasized "that for the sake of unity necessary for a Democratic victory in November, the convention be permitted to make its decision in an open manner".64 Of course, both Governor Grasso and Senator Byrd publicly pleaded for Party unity, and this was the only cause espoused by the Governor.65

While establishing an historical precedence for an open convention, Governor Carey, Senator Kennedy and Mr. Shanker all acclaimed the current Party charter as clearly permitting the delegates to vote "their own conscience".66 These three were named in Chapter Five as the most significant spokespersons in the movement, and one common thread throughout their rhetoric is this appeal to the Party charter.

DIVERGENT INFORMATION AND DETAILS

While we may observe from the above that certain rhetorical patterns do indeed repeat themselves in movement rhetoric, it should be noted that not all the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement was repetitive. Scattered throughout the rhetoric of the movement were examples of information and details which was unique and unassociated with the mainstream of rhetorical strategy.

For instance, on May 21, 1980, Governor Carey criti-

cized the current primary system as a causal factor in the need for an open convention.

Deep changes and movements inside and outside the United States are calling into serious question the efficacy of the drawn-out primary process. . .we live in an era when voters can be manipulated by news media coverage of manipulated events; when events of major significance occur with terrible rapidity.⁶⁷

This singular pronouncement by a spokesperson within the movement led to Carey's own suggestion of a possible solution:

eliminate the existing system of local primaries, replacing it with a regional or national selection for each party just prior to a limited campaign period.⁶⁸

Carey was not the only person to make such a suggestion,⁶⁹ but he was the only spokesperson within the movement to publish this view.

In a joint interview with Iris Mitgang (National Women's Political Caucus), Bella Abzug, President of Women, U.S.A., said that women "would unite around issues this year, rather than automatically endorsing the Democratic nominee", as feminists had done in the past.⁷⁰ While it was threatened that women might support the independent candidacy of Representative John B. Anderson in protest against President Carter,⁷¹ this was the first time a block of voters, personified by a movement participant, threatened to rally around a set of issues as opposed to support-

ing a given candidate.

The rhetorical style of the freshman Congressman was peculiar to their sub-group, and predicated upon political self-interest. This was the only group to seek "an alternative to both" Carter and Kennedy,⁷² thus inextricably tying these two political adversaries together, dealing with them as one undesirable entity. Later, Representative Ambro explained the group psychology by saying that, "Survival is a natural instinct of all politicians",⁷² for the first time enunciating his reason for involvement in the movement. This reasoning seemed to characterize most members of the Committee To Maintain An Open Convention, but it was enunciated only this one time.

While political rhetoric is often characterized by verbal opposition to the opposing party's candidate, the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement is conspicuous by its lack of attacks on Republican Ronald Reagan. In his concession speech, however, Senator Kennedy repeatedly attacked Reagan (which he had done earlier in speeches, but not to this degree or with this singular vehemence). The overwhelming quantity of rhetoric published and recorded by the movement was directed at opposition to the proposed rule, and/or opposition to the renomination of Jimmy Carter. Citing numerous remarks by Mr. Reagan (some of which he labeled "preposterous"),⁷⁴ the Senator accused the Republican nominee of being "no friend of labor,. . .no friend of

our great urban centers, . . . no friend of the senior citizen, . . . (and) no friend of the environment".⁷⁵

These examples of original and unique data generated by the Open Convention Movement, help us to understand the participants and their novel concerns. These data were not part of the rhetorical themes, nor necessarily concurrent with our seven rhetorical strategies, but it did present a fresh breath in the political atmosphere in 1980.

SUMMARY

While the "stump" speech may characterize political rhetoric, the Open Convention Movement was typified by press conferences, and because of this, nine interviews, two speeches, two articles, and one statement were chosen as representative of the rhetorical output of the movement.

The Strategy of Confrontation was the most frequently used rhetorical strategy, being used 11 times on 8 different occasions. The Strategy of Precedence was the least used strategy.

Certain rhetorical themes were demonstrated to repeat themselves within the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement, as might be expected in a movement in which persons were drawn together in response to a commonly perceived problem.

Inspite of this redundancy, certain information and

details were unique, such as Governor Carey's call for a national primary, and Bella Abzug's threat that women might unite around issues, as opposed to a particular candidate.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER VI

¹A review of the chronological chart in Chapter Five (which is illustrative but not inclusive of the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement) indicates Senator Kennedy delivered speeches during March, May, June, July and August (at least).

²B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', Begins Drive for More Delegates," New York Times. June 11, 1980, page 28.

³Frank Lynn, "Binding Rule Divides Delegates in New York Area," New York Times. August 9, 1980, page 6.

⁴Beverly Ann Byrum Gaw, A Sociodramatistic Analysis of the Rhetorical Strategies Employed by Spokespersons of the Libertarian Movement, Ohio State University Ph.D. dissertation, 1974. Using a modified Burkean method, Ms. Gaw reviewed selected spokespersons within the Libertarian movement through an investigation of written and oral rhetoric. However, this material was catalogued and presented selectively, as applicable to prescribed rhetorical strategies, while a complete expose of specific rhetorical products was not attempted.

⁵For instance, Confrontation was practiced by all spokespersons except Mr. Shanker and Governor Grasso, as was the Strategy of Viability. On the other hand, only Governor Carey and Mr. Shanker practiced the Strategy of Precedence.

⁶B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', . . .," page 28.

⁷Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," New York Times, August 3, 1980, page 20.

⁸Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats in Congress Weigh Bid for New Party Nominee," New York Times. July 26, 1980, page 1.

⁹Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Rebels Held Reflection of Carter Lapse," New York Times. July 31, 1980, page B-10.

¹⁰Richard J. Meislin, "Carey, Saying Nation is 'In Trouble', Calls for Open Convention," New York Times. May 5, 1980, page 1.

¹¹Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "The Basic Speech," New York Times, March 10, 1980, page B-11.

¹²B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy Now Describes President as a 'Pale Carbon Copy' of Reagan," New York Times. April 11, 1980, page D-14.

¹³Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention; Koch Trims His Backing for Carter," New York Times. July 29, 1980, page 1.

¹⁴Ibid., page 12.

¹⁵Ibid., page 12.

¹⁶Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 1.

¹⁷Ibid., page 1.

¹⁸Ibid., page 1.

¹⁹Steven R. Weisman, "Kennedy Supports New Move for Open Convention," New York Times. July 28, 1980, page 18.

²⁰Richard J. Meislin, "Carey, Saying Nation is 'In Trouble' . . .," page 1.

²¹Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 20.

²²Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .," page 12.

²³B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', . . .," page 28.

- ²⁴Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats . . .," page 1.
- ²⁵Ibid., page 7.
- ²⁶Ibid., page 7.
- ²⁷Ibid., page 7.
- ²⁸Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .," page 12.
- ²⁹Joyce Purnick, "Amid Others' Doubts....," page 1.
- ³⁰Ibid., page 1.
- ³¹Ibid., page B-5.
- ³²Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 1.
- ³³Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," New York Times. May 21, 1980, page 35.
- ³⁴B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', . . .," page 28.
- ³⁵Albert Shanker, "Where We Stand," New York Times. July 27, 1980, page E-7.
- ³⁶Ibid., page E-7.
- ³⁷Ibid., page E-7.
- ³⁸Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," page 35.
- ³⁹Albert Shanker, "Where We Stand," page E-7.
- ⁴⁰Peter Goldman, "The Drive to Dump Carter," Newsweek. August 11, 1980, page 22.
- ⁴¹Ibid., page 22.

⁴²B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', . . .," page 28.

⁴³Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," page 35.

⁴⁴Ibid., page 35.

⁴⁵Ibid., page 35.

⁴⁶Albert Shanker, "Where We Stand," page E-7.

⁴⁷Richard J. Meislin, "Carey, Saying Nation is 'In Trouble' . . .", page 1; and Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention", page 35, develop the Strategies of Thwarting, Confrontation and Self-Esteem, while the Strategy of Viability is developed in Joyce Purnick's "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .", page 15.

⁴⁸Richard J. Meislin, "Carey, Saying Nation is 'In Trouble' . . .", page 1.

⁴⁹Ibid., page 1.

⁵⁰Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," page 35.

⁵¹Leslie Bennetts, "Women's Groups Warn Democrats They Will Seek Open Convention," New York Times. June 5, 1980, page B-9.

⁵²B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', . . .," page 28.

⁵³Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .," page 1.

⁵⁴Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 1.

⁵⁵Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "The Basic Speech," page B-11.

⁵⁶B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy Now Describes President . . .," page D-14.

⁵⁷Ibid., page D-14.

⁵⁸Richard J. Meislin, "Carey, Saying Nation is 'In Trouble' . . .," page 1.

⁵⁹Joyce Purnick, "Carey Supports Open Convention . . .," page 1.

⁶⁰Ibid., page 1.

⁶¹Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention," page 1.

⁶²Richard J. Meislin, "Carey, Saying Nation is 'In Trouble' . . .," page 1.

⁶³Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," page 35.

⁶⁴Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats . . .," page 7.

⁶⁵Joyce Purnick, "Amid Others' Doubts . . .," page 1; and Judith Miller, "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention", page 1. Governor Grasso said "in the interest of Party unity" the President should voluntarily release his delegates. Senator Byrd said the President would have "a stronger mandate, a deeper vote of confidence" from an open convention nomination.

⁶⁶Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," page 35; and B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap' . . .," page 28, and Albert Shanker, "Where We Stand," page E-7.

⁶⁷Hugh L. Carey, "An Open Convention," page 35.

⁶⁸Ibid., page 35.

⁶⁹James Doyle, "Is There a Better Way?," Newsweek. June 16, 1980, page 24-25.

⁷⁰Leslie Bennetts, "Women's Groups Warn Democrats . . .," page B-9.

⁷¹Ibid., page B-9.

⁷²Hedrick Smith, "Disgruntled Democrats . . .," page 1.

⁷³Ibid., page 7.

⁷⁴Ed Magnuson, "Madison Square Garden of Briars," Time.
August 25, 1980, page 18.

⁷⁵Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "Transcript of Kennedy
Economic Speech at Democratic National Convention," New
York Times. August 13, 1980, page B-2.

CHAPTER VII

THE PURPOSE

OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED RULE F(3) (C)

Having already looked at what took place during the 1980 Democratic campaign for the Presidential nomination, the background against which it was set, and who did what to whom, we at last come to the point where we ask, Why? In this chapter we shall investigate: the primary and secondary purposes for which the movement existed; some of the consequences of the delegate decision on F(3) (C); and finally, the impact of the rhetorical medium on the delegate decision.

THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PURPOSES

Again it must be said that the primary purpose of the Open Convention Movement was to present, through symbolic acts, opposition to Proposed Rule F(3) (C). This is the common ground upon which all the participants stood; it is the thread which binds this unlikely band together. Whatever divergent goals, cross ambitions or opposing philosophies they may have possessed, upon this one objective they could all agree - Proposed Rule F(3) (C) must not bind the delegates.

Conceived in 1978 by the Democratic Rules Committee, it was approved for delegate consideration at the 1980 Convention, as follows:

F. Voting

3) Roll Call Votes

(C) All delegates to the National Convention shall be bound to vote for the Presidential candidate whom they were elected to support for at least the first convention ballot, unless released in writing by the Presidential candidate. Delegates who seek to violate this rule may be replaced with an alternate of the same Presidential preference by the Presidential candidate or that candidate's authorized representative(s) at any time up to and including the Presidential balloting at the national convention.¹

The original intent was to stabilize the delegates representing a minority candidate, where a Convention "stampedede" to a favorite candidate might deprive the minority candidates of their first-ballot opportunities.² What developed in 1980 was quite nearly the reverse, with the favorite candidate seeking to implement the rule to avoid erosion of his delegate strength on the first ballot.

There were two secondary purposes, which broke down along political lines. One purpose was identified as the "dump Carter" drive (represented by the numerically largest faction). This group included a variety of figures, from Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey, to Representatives Ambro and Barnes, among others. For several reasons this group did not want Jimmy Carter to recapture the Democratic

nomination and, as we have seen, some were quite vocal about their intent.³

An additional secondary purpose was to seek Democratic Party unity, probably desired by most if not all participants in the movement but espoused by only a minority, the most conspicuous being Governor Grasso and Senator Byrd. Basically, these "Carterites" within the movement advocated unity because, they said, it would help lead the Party to victory in November without alienating the Kennedy forces.⁴ The presence of independent candidate John B. Anderson was a source of concern to Democratic politicians, who worried that Anderson might appear an attractive alternative should Kennedy not win the nomination.⁵

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION

The consequences of the delegate vote on F(3)(C) may be viewed as producing immediate and long-term results. The immediate results on the Convention were quite obvious. The rhetorical strategies of the movement influenced approximately 20 percent of the Carter supporters; thus, when the vote was taken on August 11th, the count was 1,936.4 favoring the rule and 1,390.6 against. With that the delegates bound themselves to their respective candidates on the first ballot and Jimmy Carter easily captured the renomination of the Democratic Party. In fact, after the vote on the rule, Senator Kennedy withdrew his candidacy and in-

structed his staff that he wanted the Presidential balloting to be unanimous.

The long-term effects of the movement on the Convention and its decision are more subtle, and subject to greater individual interpretation. The over-all effect of the rhetorical strategies of the movement was divisive; rather than arrive at consensus, or maximize Identification, the rhetoric of the spokespersons deepened the rift in the Democratic Party.⁶ The two major factions were crystallized, actually diminishing the level of unity and, therefore, contributing to the defeat in November, though one cannot categorically lay the defeat of the Carter-Mondale ticket at the door of the Open Convention Movement without first recognizing other factors operating on the rhetorical situation.

The apparent mis-communication between the Carter and Kennedy staffs caused the Senator to arrive at Madison Square Garden much later than the President had wanted; after his acceptance of the nomination, Carter wanted Kennedy to join him on the podium for the traditional show of unity, while the delegates danced in the aisles. Instead, Kennedy did not leave his hotel suite until the Carter celebration had ended. Kennedy expected to be on the podium with only the Carter family, but found himself one of many celebrities on a very crowded podium; miffed, he left quickly and unceremoniously.⁷

The independent candidacy of John Anderson possibly drew added support from previous Kennedyites after the Democratic National Convention. Statistics do not appear to be readily available, examining the percentage of support which the Anderson campaign received from the Kennedy element. However, from his seven percent showing in the November election, it may be reasonably assumed that no large defections took place.

Jimmy Carter had always been an "outsider" to the Senators and Congressmen on the Hill.⁸ Whereas an incumbent President has a great deal of political power to exercise, Carter's poor relationship on the Hill severely inhibited his ability to campaign effectively. This, coupled with the fact that his level of acceptance among voters had plummeted to 22 percent, created an enormous election obstacle.⁹

These factors must be coupled with voter disaffection over escalating unemployment, spiraling inflation, the Billy Carter escapade, and continuing frustration over the Iranian hostage situation and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.¹⁰ Therefore, the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement may be considered as one of many contributing factors to the Carter loss in November.

The longest-term ramifications of the movement can only be imagined. There was indeed both an historical precedent and a philosophical basis for an open convention.

However, as most of the spokespersons developed their rhetoric within the aforementioned strategies, they were perceived by the delegates as partisan rhetors.

The decision of the delegates to bind themselves established a new precedent and, perhaps, a new ritual for future Democratic Conventions. While several persons have advanced the concept of a national primary as one new reform, as of this writing nothing has seriously been proposed. Therefore, one must assume future delegates will perform roles more closely allied to that of the Electoral College than their former roles as political "king-makers".¹¹

THE IMPACT OF THE RHETORICAL MEDIUM

By rhetorical medium we mean an intervening element through which rhetoric is transmitted and an effect produced. Hence, speeches and interviews may be considered as medium, but it would also be possible to think of the transmitter of these as a medium. In this case, that would be the mass media. We shall therefore look at both these elements as we seek to understand the impact of the rhetorical medium.

An inspection of our fourteen rhetorical samples from the Open Convention Movement reveals that news conferences and interviews (totalling nine) were by far the most often used avenue of the spokespersons. To be sure,

we are left with two speeches, two articles, and one brief statement, but inasmuch as the mass media was readily available, spokespersons for the movement were not reluctant to make use of it.

Rhetorically, spokespersons for the Open Convention Movement operated through numerous medium to reach the delegates to the Democratic National Convention. Daily news reports on television and in print from late-June onward, weekly articles in news magazines from mid-May, as well as many guest appearances on syndicated television programs such as Meet The Press and Issues and Answers, all combined to provide avenues for these spokespersons. Indeed, we have suggested earlier that the Open Convention Movement might be described as a media event.

Only Mr. Shanker related to the delegates as an informed and concerned citizen. The other seven spokespersons were elected officials, and were perceived as partisans. Two final assumptions need to be stated here:

1. Mass Communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions through the nexus of selective exposure, perception, and retention.¹²
2. The general effect of mass communication is to reinforce existing attitudes, beliefs and perceptions.¹³

In other words, "good Democratic propaganda" makes better Democrats and stronger Republicans. With respect to 1980, the spokespersons were able to crystallize Carter antagonists and also attracted Carter supporters whose political commitment was somewhat weak. However, among strong Carter supporters, these delegates were crystalized in support of the President and Proposed Rule F(3)(C).

By early-June, Senator Kennedy and his staff developed an operating strategy whereby they would seek to contact and influence delegates by phone and personal contact.¹⁴ This was developed at the conclusion of the "primary season", and while it was decided not to abandon the traditional avenues of speeches, interviews, and press releases, this additional step was undertaken. This approach was unique for two reasons:

1. It was unprecedented, especially in the development of the Open Convention Movement.
2. It was unduplicated by other participants in the movement.

This last fact is noteworthy because the Kennedy forces made no effort to conceal this new strategy, but rather announced it publicly.¹⁵ This "personalized" approach could have filtered the exposure of delegates to the message, making them more receptive and ultimately altering their perception and response.

Therefore, what we find are rhetorical strategies

used by spokespersons to appeal to the delegates on immediate issues of Party politics. With the single exception of Albert Shanker's appeal to the delegates on philosophical grounds, drawing upon the illustration of Edmund Burke, the other spokespersons chose not to appeal to the highest nature of the delegates. While appeals could have been made which transcended current political issues, no such course was followed in any of the published rhetoric of the movement.

The medium of interviews and speeches and articles was often transmitted to the delegates through the mass media. This served to crystallize the delegates into two philosophical camps, as their existing ideas and beliefs were reinforced. The extensive use of the media, coupled with external factors such as the national economy, the fate of the hostages in Iran, and the political power of an incumbent President, precluded the achievement of Identification, and the desired defeat of Proposed Rule F(3)(C).

SUMMARY

The primary purpose of the Open Convention Movement was to present, through symbolic acts, opposition to the proposed rule. Secondly, some participants sought to "dump" President Carter, while others attempted to generate party unity.

The immediate consequences of the decision was the acceptance of the proposed rule, which bound the delegates on the first ballot.

The longer-term effects of the movement on the Convention are more subtle. The over-all effect of the rhetoric was divisive; rather than achieve Identification (thereby maximizing consensus), the rift between the two major factions (Kennedyites and Carterites) was deepened. It is probable that the rhetoric of the movement was contributory to the November defeat of the Carter-Mondale ticket. The decision to bind themselves has set a new precedent for the delegates to the Democratic National Conventions of the future, altering their roles.

Finally, the mass media probably contributed to the lack of Identification, as we have assumed that the general effect of mass communication is to reinforce existing beliefs and attitudes. With a 2-to-1 edge for the Carterites, this approach crystallized both camps, resulting ultimately in a Carter victory.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER VII

¹"Democrats Support Carter on Binding Rule," New York Times. August 12, 1980, page B-9.

²Ibid., page B-9.

³This group was characterized by its verbal output, as evidenced by the rhetoric of Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey. Representatives Ambro and Barnes were characterized by their strident rhetoric.

⁴Joyce Purnick, "Amid Other's Doubts, Governor Grasso Joins Move for Open Convention," New York Times. July 30, 1980, page 1; and Judith Miller, "Byrd Says he Backs Open Convention," New York Times. August 3, 1980, page 1. The rhetoric of Governor Grasso was devoted exclusively to the strategy of unity.

⁵David M. Alpern, "Kennedy Soldiers On," Newsweek. May 5, 1980, page 52.

⁶Ed Magnuson, "Madison Square Garden of Briars," Time. August 25, 1980, page 14-18.

⁷Ibid., page 18.

⁸Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Rebels Held Reflection of Carter Lapse," New York Times. July 31, 1980, page B-10.

⁹Maurice Carroll, "Most Democratic Senators Termed 'Uneasy' Over Carter Renomination," New York Times. July 31, 1980, page 11.

¹⁰Peter Goldman, "The Drive to Dump Carter," Newsweek. August 11, 1980, page 21.

¹¹Peter Goldman, "Now for the Hard Part," Newsweek. August 25, 1980, page 18-23.

¹²Earle MacCannell, Mass Communication and Persuasion, course handbook published by Portland State University Bookstore, 1977, page 5.

¹³For results of research in the field of mass communication studies, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, The People's Choice. New York. Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944; Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication. New York. The Free Press, 1960, page 8; and, Melvin DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Theories of Mass Communication. New York. David McKay Co., 1975, page 93.

¹⁴B. Drummond Ayres, "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', Begins Drive for More Delegates," New York Times. June 11, 1980, page 28.

¹⁵Ibid., page 28.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Webster has defined Conclusion as a "judgment, decision or opinion formed after an investigation or thought". Having undertaken the task of investigating and analyzing the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement, the time has come to return our attention to the purpose of the study, enunciated in Chapter One. Do we now understand the rhetorical strategies of the movement? Do certain rhetorical themes repeat themselves in movement study? Was Identification possible in this context, in light of internal and external factors? Having considered a response to these questions, we must also ask, were the rhetorical efforts of the movement worth doing? The criteria of McBurney and Wrage will be utilized in responding to this question, including the Results, Ethical, Truth, and Artistic Theories. Finally, we shall catalog what we learned from doing this study, seek to determine what we did wrong, and endeavor to explain what needs to be looked at next.

In Chapter One we catalogued seven rhetorical strategies, which we noted had evolved quite naturally after prolonged exposure to the rhetoric of the movement. These strategies seem to cover the major concerns of participants,

as they voiced their worries over time. Not every utterance fits snugly into one of our seven "boxes" (i.e., Governor Carey's suggestion for a national primary), but the majority of rhetorical concerns do seem to apply to one or another of the categories.

One must ask at some point, did the Burkean method create the strategies, or were they generated by the movement and merely glimpsed by the method? A perusal of the published rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement would seem to indicate the latter. For instance, a recurring theme in the rhetoric is opposition to the continued leadership of Jimmy Carter, both on the grounds of his inability to manage the office of the Presidency, as perceived by some participants, and his diminishing political popularity with the electorate, as perceived by other participants. Another recurring theme is the drive for Party unity, advocated by a member of participants. Whatever method of analysis had been chosen, and whatever titles were "hung" on these strategies, these recurring themes were a reality of the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement.

We have expressed as our purpose for this study "to analyze the rhetorical strategies of the Open Convention Movement". By questing for "rhetorical strategies", our study has established a Burkean premise, since Strategy is a key term and concept of Burke. Therefore, it would seem that both the purpose and the method are inextricably tied

together.

As mentioned in Chapter Six, certain rhetorical themes did repeat themselves in the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement. The rhetorical situation which gives rise to socio-political movements would have a tendency to draw people together "in response to a particular crisis", uniting them behind a common cause. This would tend to produce "recurring themes", though further study needs to be done in this area before this conclusion can be universally verified. As a unique political movement, the Open Convention Movement did produce certain repeating rhetorical themes.

When pondering the possibility of achieving Identification, internal factors inherent in the movement as well as external factors must be considered. Internally, we have seen that the participants in the movement divided into four distinct sub-groups, including Candidates, Supporters, Carterites, and Mavericks. These four groups displayed diverse goals and ambitions, as well as differing levels of Identification among themselves. Identification among the Candidates, Supporters and Carterites was high, while among participants in the Mavericks sub-group it was moderate. However, between the Mavericks and other sub-groups the level of Identification was low. The level between the three other sub-groups was generally high as they related to one another, but only low-to-moderate as they

related to the Mavericks. These factionalized participants sought to achieve Identification among the delegates, and to defeat Proposed Rule F(3)(C).

Additionally, only two spokespersons (Kennedy and Carey) advocated an open convention for three months or longer, while many participants became involved during the summer months, only weeks before the Convention. Thus the movement became a prisoner of the deadline it faced, and rhetoric to unite the participants did not appear and apparently was not produced. The little time that was available was used to reach the delegates, sometimes through generating public support.

Unlike social movements which seek public involvement, the Open Convention Movement was concerned with the political opinions of elected delegates to a national convention. Some of these delegates felt a keen sense of loyalty to the candidate they represented in their local primaries, while others felt that to change their minds was tantamount to changing rules in the middle of the game, thus betraying their constituency back home. This bifurcated sense of loyalty compounded the task of those in the movement, who were already hampered by time constraints.

Most of the spokespersons were politicians by profession. They were accustomed to holding new conferences and interviews, but this format created the air of a media event. This, coupled with the fact that many participants

were perceived as partisan politicians, served to enhance the adversarial perception of many of the delegates - an "us" and "them" attitude, which probably did not contribute to Identification. Only Senator Kennedy consistently used speeches as a rhetorical format, while apparently only he and Governor Carey made any significant attempts at developing interpersonal contacts with the delegates - the majority of participants used a media approach.

Externally, three considerations must be borne in mind. First, we have expressed an assumption in Chapter Seven which said that "the general effect of mass communication is to reinforce existing attitudes, beliefs and perceptions". To paraphrase, "good Kennedy propaganda" tends to strengthen Kennedy supporters behind him while securing Carter support from his supporters. Research would seem to substantiate this polarizing effect, and yet many professional politicians tend to use this approach when trying to alter public opinion. However, if this assumption is sound, it would have been virtually impossible to sway delegate opinion by relying so heavily on mass communication.

Next, the power of an incumbent President must at least be noted here. While a study of Presidential power constitutes a research project in itself, it can be generally stated that the level of influence, power, and control available to a President are very great.¹ In spite of diminishing popularity, and an air of being an "outsider",

Jimmy Carter still possessed considerable influence and power. The fact remains that no President, in the past one hundred years, who has desired the renomination has ever been denied by his Party.

Finally, the national delegates have a history of functioning as "king-makers". They may have been chosen by Party officials at some sequestered location, but having emerged from those "smoke-filled rooms" they descend on the national convention with the knowledge that their one vote is as powerful as anyone else's. To be sure, they were supposed to nominate Estes Kefauver but, when the balloting was done, they had re-chosen Adlai Stevenson. To be sure, he allowed them to pick his Vice-Presidential running mate, expecting that to be John Kennedy of Massachusetts, but they chose Estes Kefauver, instead. In 1980, the majority of delegates (by a 2-to-1 margin) were not only chosen to represent Jimmy Carter, but they appear to have devoutly wanted him. The movement convinced delegates that they could exercise their own free will, but then it polarized them into two distinct factions. The delegates chose their "king" when they voted on F(3)(C).

Still we must ask, was it all worth doing? As discussed in Chapter One, McBurney and Wrage have delineated four criteria which shall briefly be considered here, even though these two authors prefer the Artistic theory alone.

When one considers the rhetorical efforts of the Open

Convention Movement in light of the Results theory, one must conclude that it did not succeed. Generally, it was divisive - first among the delegates, and later it contributed to Party divisions in November. It did not secure the votes needed to defeat Proposed Rule F(3)(C) but rather, in the end, saw the passage of the rule and the renomination of Jimmy Carter.

The Ethical theory would have us consider a speaker's motives and credibility. As most of the participants in the movement were elected officials, their level of credibility among the delegates was generally high. Senator Kennedy and Governor Carey were perceived as having personal designs on the nomination, and this doubtless lowered their credibility among staunch Carter supporters. On the other hand, Senator Byrd and Governor Grasso were perceived as unifying agents, and both appear to have very high credibility. The "mavericks", including Representative Ambro and Barnes, had only low-to-moderate credibility, due to their opposition to both Carter and Kennedy. Their motivation, they had said, was political survival, and this did little to enhance their reputations among the delegates. Therefore, though our sampling indicates a diversity of motives and credibility-levels, generally the movement would score highly in this category.

The Truth theory seeks to measure effective speech by its concurrence with the truth, as it can be known. Ob-

viously at this juncture one must ask, did they know the truth, and did they speak it? Subjective appraisals are called for here, and it must be clearly stated that subjective conclusions have been drawn. When citing historical precedence and the Democratic Party charter to fortify their argument for an open convention, it would appear that speakers such as Kennedy, Carey and Shanker were speaking the truth, as they knew it. When pleading for Party unity, spokespersons such as Grasso, Byrd and Koch appear to be speaking the truth. On the other hand, terms such as "robots", "lemmings", and "the Supreme Soviet" seem to be selected solely to inflame passions, regardless of their basis in fact. When Senator Kennedy spoke specifically of inflation, and when Governor Carey spoke of the housing slump and unemployed auto workers, it seems reasonable to assume that they were dealing with truth as they saw it. However, when Kennedy called Carter a "clone" of Ronald Reagan, he had digressed from fact to name-calling. Generally, albeit with some exceptions as noted, the movement was moderately successful by this criteria.

Finally, the Artistic theory asserts that rhetoric is an art, reducible to principles. We have already stressed the media-flavor of the movement, however, and noted that the three most significant rhetorical products were Kennedy's speech, and the articles by Shanker and Carey. Of these three, the most outstanding was the Kennedy oration,

as evidenced by earlier testimony. Rich in language, inventive and persuasive, the Senator wove ethos, pathos, and logos to produce "the speech" of the campaign. However, most spokespersons used the media as a medium, and the "tongue" of the common man, to convey their message. They tended to emphasize immediate political concerns, as opposed to universal principles, and by so doing they achieved few artistic successes.

What shall we say of the movement, rhetorically? There were at least three shining moments (cited above) when the arguments and the words were above the ordinary. There were at least two spokespersons (Kennedy and Carey) who broke the media-mold, and in so doing established personal ties to the delegates. There were isolated calls to higher principles and loftier ideals, but they were the exception, not the rule. The rule, it seems, was to appeal to the immediate political concerns of what proved to be a minority of the Democratic Party. The rule, it seems, demanded extensive use of the media, in spite of other avenues of communication. The movement, it seems, had very limited success rhetorically, while being responsible, in part, for the institution of a new tradition among national delegates. The movement, finally, was contributory to the November defeat of the Carter-Mondale ticket.

Having critiqued the movement thus far, it seems appropriate that we also critique this study. Three points

need to be made in honest evaluation. First, it would appear that Burke's Dramatistic Pentad can be a valuable tool for analysis of movement rhetoric. Though many new methodologies are currently arising on the horizon (and certainly some of these deserve closer inspection and consideration) Burke's pentad is so fluid and adaptable that it readily lends itself to this type of application.

Second, it appears that certain rhetorical themes were repeated in the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement. On the basis of the rhetorical situation which gives rise to movements-in-general, it might be argued that this would often be the case when studying other movements. However, because of the uniqueness of the Open Convention Movement, further study needs to be conducted with this hypothesis before this conclusion can be universally accepted.

Third, much has recently been said about the effects of mass communication on attitude-change. It is asserted that a heavy reliance on the media was one reason for the low-level of success achieved by the Open Convention Movement. Numerous studies have been conducted,² and while this writer subscribes to one set of conclusions (based upon statistical studies in the field),³ it would be noted that some studies still tend to support an opposing view.⁴ Due to the influence of the media on the movement, however, it was necessary to take a stand on this issue.

Hindsight also provides us the opportunity of asking, what did we do wrong in this study? One area of weakness involves a definition of terms - a discreteness never obtained between the terms "rhetorical strategies" and "rhetorical themes". Though Burke defines Strategy as "a method or plan of attack" (and we have used this to determine how the spokespersons categorized the rhetorical choices which they presented), we have said that "rhetorical themes" were recurring topics and arguments in the rhetoric of the movement (seeking to determine what was said). As discussed in Chapter One, when considering rhetorical strategies, a Strategy of Unity was developed, and this strategy was illustrated by quoting spokespersons within the movement. This strategy was then manifested as a theme in a number of addresses illustrated.

Finally, there are several areas that should be looked to in future studies. As mentioned earlier, the hypothesis that certain rhetorical themes repeat themselves in movement rhetoric needs to be replicated. This can hopefully be accomplished by several studies, which should include a "conventional" (less unique) movement.

Another area should include a study of the influence of the media on both the audience and the movement. Can mass communication alter beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions? Does the media, by its influence, alter the quality and/or type of rhetoric produced? Does the media

create its own rhetoric?

Additionally, an investigation of the Open Convention Movement using another methodology (and here we are thinking of either a Situational approach, or the Confrontational method of Cathcart) could yield additional insights not yet discerned. It might even be feasible to attempt a Neo-Aristotelian investigation of the two articles by Carey and Shanker.

Lastly, deeper consideration needs to be given to the philosophical basis for the movement. Could an appeal have been made which transcended pragmatic political concerns? In light of the Artistic theory, how good was the rhetoric of the Open Convention Movement, and how could it have been better?

With the August 11th vote on the floor of the Convention, and the adoption of Proposed Rule F(3)(C), the Open Convention Movement came to an end. It may be over, but the lessons we can learn continue on long past its final days.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER VIII

¹Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960, pages 98-103.

²D. Ehrlich, "Postdecision Exposure to Relevant Information," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 54, page 98-112; J. Mills, "Selectivity in Exposure to Information", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 59, page 250-253; E. G. Boring, Foundations of Psychology, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1948, page 170.

³Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication, New York: The Free Press, 1960, page 8.

⁴Melvin DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Theories of Mass Communications, New York: Longman, 1982, pages 203-207. The authors present four primary theories: the Stimulating Effects Theory, espoused by Leonard Berkowitz, assumes that exposure to aggressive stimuli will increase a person's level of physiological and emotional arousal. Berkowitz and Tannenbaum assert the stimulus - response (S-R) relationship is neither simple nor unconditional, but the media is a particularly potent elicitor of physiological arousal; the Observational Learning Theory, espoused by Bandura and Walters, assumes that people can learn certain behavior by observing models via media portrayals. Televised forms of behavior increase the probability of audience response, it is asserted; The Cultivation Theory, developed by George Gerbner and Larry Gross, asserts that the symbolic world of the media shapes and maintains (cultivates) audiences' conceptions of the real world (their constructions of reality). This T.V. world seeps into viewers consciousness so that they see the real world as being like the T.V. world; and finally, the Reinforcement Theory of Klapper.

SOURCES CONSULTED

BOOKS

- Arnold, Carroll C. Criticism of Oral Rhetoric. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1974.
- Berelson, Bernard, and Janowitz, Morris. Public Opinion and Communication. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Black, Edwin. Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method. New York: MacMillan House, 1970.
- Boring, E. G. Foundations of Psychology. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1948.
- Bremeck, Winston Lamont, and Howell, William Smiley. Persuasion: A Means of Social Control. New York: MacMillan House, 1970.
- Brown, J. A. C. Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964.
- Bryant, Donald C., ed. The Rhetorical Idiom: Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, Language and Drama. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958.
- Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- _____. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Christenson, Reo M., and McWilliams, Robert O. Voice of the People. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1962.
- Corbett, Edward P. J. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- DeFleur, Melvin L., and Ball-Rokeach, Sandra. Theories of Mass Communication. New York: Longman, 1982.
- Douglas, Donald G., ed. Philosophers on Rhetoric.

- Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1976.
- Ehninger, Douglas, and Brockriede, Wayne. Decision by Debate. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.
- Ellul, Jacque. Propaganda. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965.
- Golden, James; Berquist, Goodwin, and Coleman, William. The Rhetoric of Western Thought. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1978.
- Goodrich, Chauncey Allen. Select British Eloquence. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963.
- Hamilton, Edity, and Cairns, Huntington, eds. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Hardwicke, Henry. History of Oratory and Orators. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896.
- Hochmuth-Nichols, Marie. Rhetoric and Criticism. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1963.
- Holland, L. Virginia. Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.
- Howes, Raymond F., ed. Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961.
- Jardine, Lisa. Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Kahane, Howard. Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1980.
- Klapper, Joseph T. The Effects of Mass Communication. New York: The Free Press, 1960.
- Land, Kurt, and Land, Gladys Engel. Collective Dynamics. New York: Random House, 1961.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul S. The People's Choice. New York: Duele, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944.

- McKeon, Richard. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941.
- McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965.
- Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960.
- Nilsen, Thomas R., ed. Essays on Rhetorical Criticism. New York: Random House, 1968.
- Peterson, Houston, ed. A Treasury of the World's Great Speeches. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
- Safire, William. The New Language of Politics. New York: Random House, 1968.
- Scott, Robert L., and Brock, Bernard L. Methods of Rhetorical Criticism. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
- Simons, Herbert W. Persuasion: Understanding, Practice and Analysis. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1976.
- Thonssen, Lester, and Baird, A. Craig. Speech Criticism. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948.
- White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1960. New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961.
- _____. The Making of the President, 1964. New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965.
- _____. The Making of the President, 1968. New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969.
- _____. The Making of the President, 1972. New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1973.
- Winans, James A. Public Speaking. New York: The Century Company, 1917.

ARTICLES

Adler, Jerry. "Mr. Straight Talk". Newsweek, August 18, 1980, pages 29-30.

Alpern, David M. "Kennedy Soldiers On". Newsweek, May 5, 1980, page 52.

_____. "A Veneer of Unity". Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 29.

Alpern, David and Young, Jacob. "The Row Over A Rule". Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 23.

Ayres, B. Drummond. "Kennedy Now Describes President As A 'Pale Carbon Copy' of Reagan". New York Times, April 11, 1980, pages D-14.

_____. "Kennedy, Vowing to 'Close Gap', Begins Drive For More Delegates". New York Times, June 11, 1980, page 28.

Bacon, Donald C. "The Also-Rans Close Ranks Behind Reagan". U.S. News and World Report, July 14, 1980, page 33.

_____. "Conventions Aren't What They Used To Be". U.S. News and World Report, July 14, 1980, page 34.

Basler, Barbara. "In the Tumult of '24, Exhaustion Won". New York Times, August 11, 1980, pages B-6.

Bennetts, Leslie. "Philadelphia Mayor Endorses Kennedy". New York Times, April 16, 1980, pages B-8.

_____. "Women's Groups Warn Democrats They Will Seek Open Convention". New York Times, June 5, 1980, pages B-9.

Bryant, Donald C. "Rhetoric: Its Function and Its Scope". Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 39:15-37, 1963, page 404.

Carey, Hugh L. "An Open Convention". New York Times, May 21, 1980, page 35.

Carroll, Maurice. "Most Democratic Senators Termed 'Uneasy' Over Carter Renomination". New York Times, July 31, 1980, page 11.

- Cathcart, Robert S. "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically". Western Speech, Spring, 1972, page 87.
- Doyle, James. "Is There A Better Way?". Newsweek, June 16, 1980, pages 24-25.
- Ehrlich, D. "Postdecision Exposure To Relevant Information". Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1957, page 54.
- Goldman, Peter. "Fighting After the Final Bell". Newsweek, June 16, 1980, page 22.
- _____. "The Drive To Dump Carter". Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 22.
- _____. "Now For the Hard Part". Newsweek, August 25, 1980, pages 18-23.
- Griffin, Leland. "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements". Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 3, 1952, pages 184-185.
- Holmberg, Carl. "Dialectical Rhetoric and Rhetorical Rhetoric". Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1977, pages 235-236.
- Kennedy, Edward M. "Transcript of Kennedy Economic Speech at Democratic National Convention". New York Times, August 13, 1980, pages B-2.
- _____. "The Basic Speech". New York Times, March 10, 1980, pages B-11.
- Kennedy, George A. "Later Greek Philosophy And Rhetoric". Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric, Penn State University, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 1980, page 187.
- Lynn, Frank. "Kennedy People Chosen To Head State Delegation". New York Times, June 9, 1980, pages B-13.
- _____. "Binding Rule Divides Delegates in New York Area". New York Times, August 9, 1980, page 6.
- Magnuson, Ed. "Madison Square Garden of Briars". Time, August 25, 1980, page 18.
- Matthews, Tom. "Teddy's Long-Shot Scenario". Newsweek, May 21, 1980, page 54.

- Mayer, Allan. "Kennedy's Delegate Hunt". Newsweek, June 23, 1980, page 26.
- _____. "End of the Democratic Era?". Newsweek, August 18, 1980, page 22.
- _____. "A New Ted Kennedy". Newsweek, August 25, 1980, page 32.
- Meislin, Richard J. "Carey, Saying Nation Is 'In Trouble' Calls for Open Convention". New York Times, May 6, 1980, pages D-19.
- Millier, Judith. "Byrd Says He Backs Open Convention". New York Times, August 3, 1980, page 20.
- Mills, J. "Selectivity In Exposure To Information". Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1959, page 59.
- Morganthau, Tom. "The Dark Horses". Newsweek, August 11, 1980, page 21.
- Purnick, Joyce. "Carey Supports Open Convention; Koch Trims His Backing For Carter". New York Times, July 25, 1980, page 1.
- _____. "Amid Others' Doubts, Governor Grasso Joins Move For Open Convention". New York Times, July 30, 1980, page 1.
- _____. "Carey Stand For Open Convention Is Denounced by Cuomo and Byrne". New York Times, July 31, 1980, page 1.
- Roberts, Steven V. "A.D.A. Debates Role of Liberalism In a Year of Losses and Budget Cuts". New York Times, June 15, 1980, page 14.
- _____. "Congress Rebels Held Reflection of Carter Lapse". New York Times, July 31, 1980, pages B-10.
- _____. "Democratic Delegates Confused About First-Ballot Rule". New York Times, August 11, 1980, pages B-10.
- Shanker, Albert. "Where We Stand". New York Times, July 27, 1980, pages E-7.
- Sidey, Hugh. "That Which We Are, We Are". Time, August 25, 1980, page 24.

Simons, Herbert W. "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion For Social Movements". Quarterly Journal of Speech, February, 1970, Vol. LVI, pages 123-136.

Smith, Hedrick. "Disgruntled Democrats in Congress Weigh Bid For New Party Nominee". New York Times, July 26, 1980, page 1.

_____. "Strauss Says President's Delegates Must Support Carter on First Ballot". New York Times, July 30, 1980, pages B-5.

Sulzberger, Arthur O. "Democrats Weigh Rule Binding Delegates". New York Times, July 31, 1980, pages B-13.

Weisman, Steven R. "Kennedy Supports New Move For An Open Convention". New York Times, July 28, 1980, page 18.

"Democrats Support Carter on Binding Rule". New York Times, August 12, 1980, pages B-9.

"Vowing Defiance To The End". Time, July 21, 1980, page 21.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Byrum-Gaw, Beverly Ann. "A Sociodramatistic Analysis of Rhetorical Strategies Employed by Spokespersons of the Libertarian Movement". Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1974.

Harvey, Robert. "The Rhetoric of Sir Thomas More and Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Original Work and Dramatic Portrayal". Master's Thesis, Portland State University, 1971.

Larson, Roberta. "From Teacups to Terror: The Rhetorical Strategies of the Women's Social and Political Union, 1903-1918". Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1975.

INTERVIEW

Biddle, Philip. University of California - Sacramento. Interview, November 23, 1982.

APPENDIX A

"AN OPEN CONVENTION" - Governor Hugh Carey

The New York Times, Wednesday, May 21, 1980

Prolonged Presidential primaries were once considered a wise expression of public opinion and a safeguard of the political well-being of our people. But deep changes and movements inside and outside the United States are calling into serious question the efficacy of the drawn-out primary process. There are fundamental differences in our society today that must be recognized in devising a system to select Presidential candidates.

We live in an era when voters can be manipulated by news-media coverage of orchestrated events, when events of major significance occur with terrible rapidity. Yet in the early primaries, voters must make a binding commitment, more than six months before a convention, while in the later primaries rather than being permitted to consider options, voters are told that their choices have vanished in a momentum built on earlier elections.

A primary system originally conceived as a chance for candidates to offer meaningful choices to the Democratic Party now ends without any great debates having taken place. The discussion of critical issues seems

less important to the candidates than 10 seconds of coverage on the evening television news. Does this process of political ratification, which culminates in an empty ritual perversely called a convention, reflect the pragmatic genius of American democracy? I think not.

I have declared that I will not be a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in August because I could be denied the right to vote the way my conscience dictates. I do not believe it is in the best interest of this nation to limit our political options without full and open deliberation. Delegates to a Presidential convention should not be herded, like branded sheep, into a pen where they are expected to perform in a predictable manner.

I have suggested that it would be far more preferable this year for the candidates to ask for an "open" convention where the delegates would be free to close ranks behind the best person. That call has been branded "bizarre", "divisive", and "self-serving" and prominent political operatives threaten to "yank any delegate off the convention floor" who differs with their set script - creating a rather grim image of the future of free expression in the Democratic Party, the traditional home for Americans who treasure our diversity and seek unity through debate.

The issues that trouble a nation will not evaporate in abuse, and it is the issues that will determine the election next November. It is because of my deep commit-

ment to the Democratic Party, and to the principles for which it stand, that I shall continue to stress the issues. With such an approach, the Democratic Party can win back the disenchanteds, the minorities, the independents and those who have crossed over to other candidacies out of frustration and confusion. Only with their support can the Democratic Party win in November.

My call for an open convention in New York City this August is to ensure that the Democratic candidate has the party clearly united behind him on the issues. At present, the party is divided and unsure of itself. Democrats' best interests are not served by ignoring this political fact of life, for the urgency of the issues will not be mitigated by Democrats' choosing to suffer in silence.

What I propose is, in fact, neither unfair nor apt to lead to ruinous division in the party. It is provided for in current party guidelines and would be permissible under such rules as might be adopted by the convention. It recognizes that the velocity of events requires that we devise a system for selecting candidates that offers a choice based on the maximum amount of information possible. Furthermore, it recognizes that a narrow majority called in a checkered process that began months earlier may no longer represent the will of the party.

An eventual solution might be to eliminate the existing system of local primaries, replacing it with a regional or national selection for each party just prior to a limited campaign period. This would not only permit the electorate in each party to select candidates openly on the basis of the most up-to-date information possible but also would obviate the costly and wasteful system of constant campaigning that adversely influences policy decisions and effectively denies the public the services of those they elect and support.

Silence is the politician's pet chameleon and can be made to blend into any background. Discretion may dictate caution at this moment but there are times when a cause is better served with plain talk - whatever the risks.

This year, a managed convention, merely anointing a prearranged winner, may adequately express the Republican Party's vision of America, but the main event for Democrats at Madison Square Garden in August must not be a simple coronation. Among the most important political rights we possess are the selection of Presidential candidates and the development of platforms. We cannot afford to abandon them to those who view this exercise merely as a number game. The American people deserve a clear choice.

APPENDIX B

"WHERE WE STAND" - Mr. Albert Shanker

The New York Times, Sunday, July 27, 1980

A little paragraph tucked into the temporary convention rules that have been proposed by the Democratic National Committee could reduce the Democratic Party's convention to a deliberative body with little more to deliberate than delegates do at the Supreme Soviet. Proposed Rule F(3)(C) is a stunning departure from the past: It would empower a presidential candidate to remove any delegate who once expressed a preference for him but whose vote the candidate might no longer feel confident of getting. In other words, if President Carter - or, for that matter, Senator Kennedy - even thought that some delegates in their columns might change their minds during the balloting in New York, they could simply boot them out and replace them.

Proposed Rule F(3)(C) states: "All delegates to the National Convention shall be bound to vote for the presidential candidate whom they were elected to support for at least the first Convention ballot, unless released in writing by the presidential candidate. Delegates who seek to violate this rule may be replaced with an alternate of

the same presidential preference by the presidential candidate or that candidate's authorized representative(s) at any time up to and including the presidential balloting at the National Convention." This is the same paragraph that was proposed as early as 1977 by a Carter operative and adopted then by the party's Commission on Presidential Nomination and Party Structure as one of the party's delegate selection rules.

But the simple fact is that neither delegate selection rules nor state laws nor state party rules have ever dictated the votes of delegates to national Democratic Party conventions since the first one was held in Baltimore in 1832. While such provisions surely carry important weight, they have not prevented delegates from voting for whichever presidential candidate they deemed best for the party and the country, whether on the first ballot or any other. The attempt to bind the delegates - with eviction from the convention as the penalty for disloyalty - represents a startling effort by the incumbent to overturn Democratic Party history.

The commission on party rules which I headed from 1969 to 1972 found a rich history of "bound" delegates switching their votes and of the nominating conventions recognizing that right. In 1952, for instance, delegates selected under the terms of Oregon state law were "bound" to support Estes Kefauver, the winner of the Oregon primary.

But an Oregon delegate ended up voting for Adlai Steveson. Or take the 1924 convention, which required 103 ballots to pick its candidate. A Florida delegate was "bound" by both state law and state party rules to support the winner of Florida's primary, William Gibbs McAdoo. He voted for Al Smith. In his ruling on the 1924 switch, the chairman of the convention, Senator Tom Walsh of Montana, succinctly stated the Democratic Party's position on this difficult issue: that "it is a matter for the delegate and his constituents as to whether he did or did not violate his instructions."

In other words, delegates essentially are in the same position as members of Congress or other representatives who commonly face conflicts between constituent wishes and their own conclusions. This dilemma was perhaps best described by the British philosopher and legislator Edmund Burke in 1774. Burke acknowledged his duty to his own constituents, whose "wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business uncommitted attention." But, he added, "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving if he sacrifices it to your opinion."

Any legislator who goes against his constituents' desires, of course, will be taking his chances when he goes back home. So will "bound" delegates who change their votes at national party conventions. But as to the dele-

gates' historic right to do this there is no question. That history was embodied in the rule adopted by both the 1972 and 1976 conventions, which said that any challenges to a state delegation's vote, ". . . the votes of that delegation shall then be recorded as polled without regard to any state law, party rule, resolution or instruction binding the delegation or any member thereof to vote as a unit with others *or to cast his vote for or against any candidate or proposition* (italics added)."

That the convention had and has a right to make such a rule - to be its own highest authority - was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1975 decision in Cousins vs. Wigoda. The high court ruled that actions by national party conventions supersede state statutes. And national Democratic Party conventions have traditionally recognized that delegates sometimes must make painful choices between conflicting obligations, that what was true in the snows of a winter primary may no longer be true in the heat of a summer convention, that circumstances, people and opinions change.

The proposed rule change would be an affront to every delegate. These are people, after all, who have long paid their dues to the party, not merely with money but with time, often over many years, doing all the chores necessary to help the party's candidates and its platforms. They know what politics is about. They know the people in their

own neighborhoods and towns and counties and parties. If they are bound by state provisions, they are not going to change their votes merely because of some passing whim. But they do have minds. They are not children. If the Democratic National Committee is determined to treat them like children, ready to yank delegates suspected of misbehaving, why have them there to participate in the presidential nominating process at all?

If the delegates in New York two weeks from now vote to accept the proposed rule change, they will be voting not only to "bind" themselves but to gag themselves as well.

APPENDIX C

"TRANSCRIPT OF KENNEDY'S SPEECH TO THE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION"

The New York Times, Wednesday, August 13, 1980

Following is a transcript of the address by Senator Edward M. Kennedy to the Democratic National Convention last night:

I thank you for your eloquent introduction. Well, things worked out a little different from the way I thought, but let me tell you, I still love New York.

My fellow Democrats and my fellow Americans.

I have come here tonight not to argue as a candidate but to affirm a cause.

I'm asking you to renew the commitment of the Democratic Party to economic justice. I am asking you to renew our commitment to a fair and lasting prosperity that can put America back to work.

This is the cause that brought me into the campaign and that sustained me for nine months, across a hundred thousand miles in 40 different states. We had our losses, but the pain of our defeat is far, far less than the pain of the people that I have met. We have learned that it is important to take issues seriously, but never to take ourselves too seriously.

The serious issue before us tonight is the cause for which the Democratic Party has stood in its finest hours, the cause that keeps our party young and makes it, in the second century of its age, the largest political party in this republic and the longest lasting political party on this planet.

Our cause has been, since the days of Thomas Jefferson, the cause of the common man and the common woman. Our commitment has been, since the days of Andrew Jackson, to all those he called "the humble members of society - the farmers, mechanics and laborers." On this foundation we have defined our values, refined our policies and refreshed our faith.

Now I take the unusual step of carrying the cause and the commitment of my campaign personally to our national convention. I speak out of a deep sense of urgency about the anguish and anxiety I have seen across America. I speak out of a deep belief in the ideals of the Democratic Party and in the potential of that party and of a President to make a difference. And I speak out of a deep trust in our capacity to proceed with boldness and a common vision that will feel and heal the suffering of our time and the divisions of our party.

The economic plank of this platform on its face concerns only material things, but it is also a moral issue that I raise tonight. It has taken many forms over many

years. In this campaign, and in this country that we seek to lead, the challenge in 1980 is to give our voice and our vote for these fundamental democratic principles:

- Let us pledge that we will never misuse unemployment, high interest rates and human misery as false weapons against inflation.
 - Let us pledge that employment will be the first priority of our economic policy.
 - Let us pledge that there will be security for all those who are now at work. And let us pledge that there will be jobs for all who are out of work.
- And we will not compromise on the issues of jobs.

These are not simplistic pledges. Simply put, they are the heart of our tradition: and they have been the soul of our party across the generations. It is the glory and the greatness of our tradition to speak for those who have no voice, to remember those who are forgotten, to respond to the frustrations and fulfill the aspirations of all Americans seeking a better life in a better land.

We dare not forsake that tradition. We cannot let the great purposes of the Democratic Party become the bygone passages of history. We must not permit the Republicans to seize and run on the slogans of prosperity.

Recalls Roosevelt Rejoinder

We heard the orators at their convention all trying

to talk like Democrats. They proved that even Republican nominees can quote Franklin Roosevelt to their own purpose. The Grand Old Party thinks it has found a great new trick. But 40 years ago, an earlier generation of Republicans attempted the same trick. And Franklin Roosevelt himself replied:

Most Republican leaders have bitterly fought and blocked the forward surge of average men and women in their pursuit of happiness. Let us not be deluded that overnight those leaders have suddenly become the friends of average men and women. You know," he continued, "very few of us are that gullible."

And four years later, when the Republicans tried that trick again, Franklin Roosevelt asked:

Can the Old Guard pass itself off as the New Deal? I think not. We have all seen many marvelous stunts in the circus, but no performing elephant could turn a handspring without falling flat on its back.

The 1980 Republican convention was awash with crocodile tears for our economic distress, but it is by their long record and not their recent words that you shall know them.

The same Republicans who are talking about the crisis of unemployment have nominated a man who once said, and I quote, "Unemployment insurance is a prepaid vacation plan for free-loaders." And that nominee is no friend of labor.

The same Republicans who are talking about the

problems of the inner cities have nominated a man who said, and I quote, "I have included in my morning and evening prayers every day the prayer that the Federal Government not bail out New York." And that nominee is no friend of this city and our great urban centers across the nation.

The same Republicans who are talking about security for the elderly have nominated a man who said just four years ago that participation in Social Security "should be made voluntary." And that nominee is no friend of the senior citizen of this nation.

The same Republicans who are talking about preserving the environment have nominated a man who last year made the pre-posterous statement, and I quote: "Eighty percent of air pollution comes from plants and trees." And that nominee is no friend of the environment.

And the same Republicans who are invoking Franklin Roosevelt have nominated a man who said in 1976, and these are his exact words: "Facism was really the basis of the New Deal." And that nominee, whose name is Ronald Reagan, has no right to quote Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The great adventure which our opponents offer is a voyage into the past. Progress is our heritage, not theirs. What is right for us as Democrats is also the right way for Democrats to win.

Fairness and Compassion

The commitment I seek is not to outworn views, but to old values that will never wear out. Programs may sometimes become obsolete, but the ideal of fairness always endures. Circumstances may change, but the work of compassion must continue. It is surely correct that we cannot solve problems by throwing money at them, but it is also correct that we dare not throw out our national problems onto a scrap heap of inattention and indifference. The poor may be out of political fashion, but they are not without human needs. The middle class may be angry, but they have not lost the dream that all Americans can advance together.

The demand of our people in 1980 is not for smaller government or bigger government but for better government. Some say that government is always bad and that spending for basic social programs is the root of our economic evils. But we reply, the present inflation and recession costs our economy \$200 billion a year. We reply, inflation and unemployment are the biggest spenders of all.

The task of leadership in 1980 is not to parade scapegoats or to seek refuge in reaction but to match our power to the possibilities of progress.

While others talked of free enterprise, it was the Democratic party that acted - and we ended excessive regulation in the airline and trucking industry. We restored

competition to the marketplace. And I take some satisfaction that this deregulation legislation that I sponsored and passed in the Congress of the United States.

As Democrats, we recognize that each generation of Americans has a rendezvous with a different reality. The answers of one generation become the questions of the next generation, but there is a guiding star in the American firmament. It is as old as the revolutionary belief that all people are created equal, and as clear as the contemporary condition of Liberty City and the South Bronx. Again and again, Democratic leaders have followed that star and they have given new meaning to the old values of liberty and justice for all.

We are the party of the New Freedom, the New Deal, and the New Frontier. We have always been the party of hope. So this year, let us offer new hope - new hope to an America uncertain about the present but unsurpassed in its potential for the future.

To all those who are idle in the cities and industries of America, let us provide new hopes for the dignity of useful work. Democrats have always believed that a basic civil right of all Americans is their right to earn their own way. The party of the people must always be the party of full employment.

To all those who doubt the future of our economy, let us provide new hope for the reindustrialization of America.

And let our vision reach beyond the next election or the next year to a new generation of prosperity. If we could rebuild Germany and Japan after World War II, then surely we can reindustrialize our own nation and revive our inner cities in the 1980's.

To all those who work hard for a living wage, let us provide new hope that their price of their employment shall not not be an unsafe work place and a death at an earlier age.

To all those who inhabit our land, from California to the New York island, from the Redwood forest to the Gulf Stream waters, let us provide new hope that prosperity shall not be purchased by poisoning the air, the rivers and the natural resources that are the greatest gift of this continent. We must insist that our children and grandchildren shall inherit a land which they can truly call America the Beautiful.

To all those who see the worth of thier work and their savings taken by inlfation, let us offer new hope for a stable economy. We must meet the pressures of the present by invoking the full power of government to master increasing prices. In candor, we must say that the Federal budget can be balanced only by policies that bring us to a balanced prosperity of full employment and price restraint.

And to all those overburdened by an unfair tax structure, let us provide new hope for real tax reform.

And let our vision reach beyond the next election or the next year to a new generation of prosperity. If we could rebuild Germany and Japan after World War II, then surely we can reindustrialize our own nation and revive our inner cities in the 1980's.

To all those who work hard for a living wage, let us provide new hope that their price of their employment shall not be an unsafe work place and a death at an earlier age.

To all those who inhabit our land, from California to the New York island, from the Redwood forest to the Gulf Streamwaters, let us provide new hope that prosperity shall not be purchased by poisoning the air, the rivers and the natural resources that are the greatest gift of this continent. We must insist that our children and grandchildren shall inherit a land which they can truly call America the Beautiful.

To all those who see the worth of their work and their savings taken by inflation, let us offer new hope for a stable economy. We must meet the pressures of the present by invoking the full power of government to master increasing prices. In candor, we must say that the Federal budget can be balanced only by policies that bring us to a balanced prosperity of full employment and price restraint.

And to all those overburdened by an unfair tax structure, let us provide new hope for real tax reform. Instead of shutting down classrooms, let us shut off tax

subsidies for expensive business lunches that are nothing more than food stamps for the rich.

The tax cut of our Republican opponent takes the name of tax reform in vain. It is a wonderfully Republican idea that would redistribute income in the wrong direction. It's good news for any of you with incomes over \$200,000 a year. For the few of you, it offers a pot of gold worth \$14,000. But the Republican tax cut is bad news for the middle-income families. For the many of you, they plan a pittance of \$200 a year. And that is not what the Democratic Party means when we say tax reform.

The vast majority of Americans cannot afford this panacea from a Republican nominee who has denounced the progressive income tax as the invention of Karl Marx. I am afraid he has confused Karl Marx with Theodore Roosevelt, that obscure Republican President who sought and fought for a tax system based on ability to pay. Theodore Roosevelt was not Karl Marx, and the Republican tax scheme is not tax reform.

Health Insurance in a Fair Society

Finally, we cannot have a fair prosperity and isolation from a fair society.

So I will continue to stand for a national health insurance. We must - we must not surrender - we must not surrender to the relentless medical inflation that can

bankrupt almost anyone, and that may soon break the budgets of governments at every level.

Let us insist on real controls over what doctors and hospitals can charge. And let us resolve that the state of a family's health shall never depend on the size of a family's wealth.

The President, the Vice-President, the members of Congress have a medical plan that meets their needs in full. And whenever Senators and Representatives catch a little cold, the Capitol physician will see them immediately, treat them promptly, fill a prescription on the spot. We do not get a bill even if we ask for it. And when do you think was the last time a member of Congress asked for a bill from the Federal Government?

And I say again as I have said before: If health insurance is good enough for the President, the Vice-President, the Congress of the United States, then it's good enough for you and every family in America.

Pride in the Democratic Heritage

There were some - there were some who said we should be silent about our differences on issues during this convention. But the heritage of the Democratic Party has been a history of democracy. We fight hard because we care deeply about our principles and purposes. We did not flee this struggle. We welcome the contrast with the empty

and expedient spectacle last month in Detroit where no nomination was contested, no question was debated and no one dared to raise any doubt or dissent.

Democrats can be proud that we chose a different course - and a different platform.

We can be proud that our party stands for investment in safe energy instead of a nuclear future that may threaten the future itself. We must not permit the neighborhoods of America to be permanently shadowed by the fear of another Three Mile Island.

We can be proud that our party stands for a fair housing law to unlock doors of discrimination once and for all. The American house will be divided against itself so long as there is prejudice against any American buying or renting a home.

And we can be proud that our party stands plainly and publicly, and persistently for the ratification of the equal right amendment. Women hold their rightful place at our convention, and women must have their rightful place in the Constitution of the United States. On this issue, we will not yield, we will not equivocate, we will not rationalize, explain or excuse. We will stand for E.R.A. and for the recognition at long last that our nation was made up of founding mothers as well as founding fathers.

A fair prosperity and a just society are within our vision and our grasp. And we do not have every answer.

There are questions not yet asked, waiting for us in the recesses of the future.

But of this much we can be certain, because it is the lesson of all of our history: together a President and the people can make a difference. I have found that faith still alive wherever I have traveled across this land. So let us reject the counsel of retreat and the call to reaction. Let us go forward in the knowledge that history only helps those who help themselves.

There will be setbacks and sacrifices in the years ahead. But I am convinced that we as a people are ready to give something back to our country in return for all it has given to us. Let this - let this be our commitment: whatever sacrifices must be made will be shared - and shared fairly. And let this be our confidence at the end of our journey and always before us shines that ideal of liberty and justice for all.

Looking Back on 1980 Campaign

In closing, let me say a few words to all those that I have met and all those who have supported me at this convention and across the country.

There were hard hours on our journey. And often we sailed against the wind, but always we kept our rudder true. And there were so many of you who stayed the course and shared our hope. You gave your help; but even more, you

gave your hearts. And because of you, this has been a happy campaign. You welcomed Joan, me and our family into your homes and neighborhoods, your churches, your campuses, your union halls. And when I think back on all the miles and all the months and all the memories, I think of you. And I recall the poet's words, and I say: "What golden friends I had."

Among you, my golden friends across this land, I have listened and learned.

I have listened to Kenny Dubois, a glass-blower in Charleston, West Virginia, who has 10 children to support but has lost his job after 35 years, just three years short of qualifying for his pension.

I have listened to the Trachta family, who farm in Iowa and who wonder whether they can pass the good life and the good earth on to their children.

I have listened to the grandmother in East Los Angeles - in East Oakland - who no longer has a phone to call her grandchildren, because she gave it up to pay the rent on her small apartment.

I have listened to young workers out of work, to students without the tuition for college and to families without the chance to own a home. I have seen the closed factories and the stalled assembly lines of Anderson, Indiana, and Southgate, California. And I have seen too many - far too many - idle men and women desperate to work.

I have seen too many - far too many - working families desperate to protect the value of their wages from the ravages of inflation.

Yet I have also sensed a yearning for new hope among the people in every state where I have been. And I have felt it in their handshakes: I saw it in their faces. And I shall never forget the mothers who carried children to our rallies. I shall always remember the elderly who have lived in an America of high purpose and who believe that it can all happen again.

Tonight, in their name, I have come here to speak for them. And for their sake I ask you to stand with them. On their behalf I ask you to restate and reaffirm the timeless truth of our party.

I congratulate President Carter on his victory here. I am confident that the Democratic Party will reunite on the basis of Democratic principles - and that together we will march toward a Democratic victory in 1980.

And someday, long after this convention, long after the signs come down, and the crowds stop cheering, and the bands stop playing, may it be said of our campaign that we kept the faith. May it be said of our party in 1980 that we found our faith again.

And may it be said of us, both in dark passages and in bright days, in the words of Tennyson that my brothers quoted and loved and that have special meaning for me now:

*I am a part of all that I have met,
Tho' much is taken, much abides
That which we are, we are -
One equal temper of heroic heart strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield.*

For me, a few hours ago, this campaign came to an end. For all those whose cares have been our concern, the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives and the dream shall never die.