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Integration in West Africa: an empirical examination of ECOWAS

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Title: Integration in West Africa: An Empirical Examination of ECOWAS.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Gary Scott, Chairman

Charles White

James Heath

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established by treaty in 1975 to promote the economic and political well-being of its 16 regional members. As a coordinated effort of geographically associated states ECOWAS joins an expanding group of regional integration schemes created by developing countries.
As an international organization with some claim to supranational authority the success of the ECOWAS scheme is of practical and theoretical importance. Success in this sense implies an increasing level of interaction among the ECOWAS members and the development of a regional economic and political position toward non-member states. This coordination of member states' national policy within a regionally constituted political body offers an interesting laboratory for the examination of regional integration efforts.

This paper seeks to establish the degree of integration achieved by the ECOWAS members to date and to chart the progress of that integration over time.

ECOWAS is placed in the historic and theoretic context of regional integration efforts; particular attention is paid to the European Economic Community (EEC). The theoretical review is notably concerned with demonstrating the rationale for integration efforts between developing countries and distinguishing this position from the rationale which motivated the founders of the EEC.

To establish the degree of integration among the ECOWAS members data sets were devised and assembled. The data considered were chosen from data tested and validated in the political science literature as displaying high levels of reliability and value for measuring integration.

Ultimately data sets were collected charting the member states' treaty activity, United Nations General Assembly
roll call votes, and international trade patterns.

The treaty and voting analyses followed traditionally accepted methodologies and offered rather unsatisfying results. The trade data analysis, on the other hand, incorporated new theoretical and practical research techniques which demonstrated a refined consideration of integration within ECOWAS. The trade data analysis has universal application, and can be used to establish integration progress as it occurs among developing countries.

The paper concludes that the ECOWAS member states, while lacking many of the prerequisites for successful integration, at least to the degree demonstrated by the EEC members, still have the potential for limited success from their integration efforts.

Trade data analyses indicate that a high level of non-primary product trade is actually directed within the community. What is required for increased integration efforts in the future is not so much a redirection of trade into the community but rather an increase in the level of trade already established among the members. This increase in trade can only be expected as the member states' economies develop.
INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA:
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ECOWAS

by

STEPHEN C. ADKISSON

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In Africa, as in other regions of the world, national leaders have struggled to increase the degree of political and economic strength of their respective countries. Somewhat ironically, many national leaders have chosen a path to potential strength that centers attention on close economic and political cooperation among fellow, regionally delimited, states. This cooperation can take the form of an integration of economic and political policies and decision-making bodies among the regional states.

Just such a movement toward regional policy making has been established in West Africa, in the form of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is pledged to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity . . . in social and cultural matters . . . and increasing and maintaining economic stability and fostering closer relations among its members.

Established by treaty in 1975, ECOWAS is made up of sixteen contiguous states in West Africa (see map - Appendix A). Members of ECOWAS are poor countries with weak economies and nascent traditions of national government. Physically the states range in size from Niger (489,191 square miles), to tiny Gambia, a riparian state which is little more than
4,361 square miles of the Gambia River valley and is surrounded on three sides by Senegal. Political and economic diversity in the region is just as great.

Membership in ECOWAS is opened to all West African states. While the term West Africa lacks geographic precision, the present affiliates appear to have filled the roster of potential members. Cameroon to the southeast is already a member of the Central African Customs and Economic Union, and Chad to the east has been associated with the North African states. One could speculate that Western Sahara, if declared a state, may desire membership in an effort to distance itself from Morocco, a regional adversary, but this eventuality remains to be seen. Western Sahara leaders have also had differences in the past with ECOWAS members, particularly Mauritania.

As an international organization pledged to the establishment and maintenance of economic integration, ECOWAS joins an historic movement that began in the early 1950s with the evolution of the European Economic Community (EEC). Most of the early integration studies focused on the EEC and integration models were designed for European realities.

Integration between sovereign states is a variable concept with political, economic, and social elements. Social scientists have been interested in measuring this variability and have adopted a multitude of indicators which
analysts believe can represent degrees of integration among states. Political scientists are particularly hampered in their efforts to measure integration. Beyond the examination of formal political structures, political scientists have often chosen to follow economic and social indicators and impute from trends discovered in those data levels of political integration.

This study will review the concept of integration and will attempt to demonstrate the level of integration within ECOWAS. It will introduce measurement techniques that will have special applicability to studies of integration among third world states. Social statistics are often lacking in third world states and the specialized indicators often employed in the past to examine integration in Europe are simply not available for studies of non-European integration efforts.

This study will examine the validity of the political actions of treaty making activity and the voting patterns of the member states at the General Assembly of the United Nations as indicators of integration. These measures hold intuitive validity for integration studies and have historical precedence as useful indicators for measuring integration within the EEC. Data on import and export patterns to member and non-member countries have also been used to implicitly measure political integration. In this study the theoretical rationale for the employment of trade data is reviewed and a
new approach to the use of trade data is presented. This refined approach offers a more enlightened view of trade relations between third world countries who typically have high concentrations of primary product exports.

The ECOWAS scheme is the product of historical circumstances. The historical context will be examined and the major events leading up to the signature of the ECOWAS treaty in May 1975 will be reviewed. Political events after 1975 will also be considered.

In spite of all optimism, there are strong structural limitations to the potential success of ECOWAS. These obstacles, to ECOWAS and to other third world integration schemes, are presented in this study.

Through an examination of the integration data and the history of the ECOWAS integration scheme conclusions will be drawn about the level of integration that ECOWAS enjoys today and speculation about the future will be offered.

The objectives of this study are ultimately 1) to examine the integration movement of the ECOWAS states and present a profile of that movement over time; and 2) consider the validity of integration indicators in a third world context and present refined indicators and a new measurement technique which, it is hoped, will have universal applicability for the study of integration effort schemes.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF INTEGRATION THEORY

As an integration scheme the ECOWAS plan falls into the large and diverse body of theoretical literature devoted to transnational integration.

A recent definition of integration suggests that, as a process, integration is,

The means through which various states within a region, in a peaceful and noncoercive manner, collectively seek to resolve conflicts in either a preemptive or reactive response. Moreover, it is a vehicle through which member states maximize, or attempt to maximize, their national interests on a long-range basis through the creation of supranational institutions and the evolution of regional policies.¹

Integration as a formal theory developed, with more restricted goals, in the last years of World War II. From those roots the concept blossomed and spread to theories both general and specific; related to global, regional and unique integration patterns. There are also cross-disciplinary concepts of integration, covering political, economic, and social aspects of the issue.

This chapter will provide an overview of the relevant integration literature. Later chapters will present the ECOWAS position within the evolution of integration theory.

The concept of integration has been applied to many types of international cooperative efforts. An often cited
breakdown of the general categories of integration types and their features appears in Bela Balassa's, *The Theory of Economic Integration.*

**TABLE I**

<table>
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<th>Common Tariffs</th>
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<td>Customs Union</td>
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<td>Common Market</td>
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<td>Economic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Economic Integration</td>
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While the focus of Balassa's categories is aimed at economic factors, it can be seen that as the functions assumed in the integration process increase, the greater active participation the member states will play, therefore demanding increased political activity within the integration process.

These stages of economic integration are more than a collection of static international agreements. They involve a created international organization designed to alter the regional relations of the member states.
FUNCTIONALISM

While integration theory has developed into many areas in the last forty years the historical bases are rooted in the theoretical conception of David Mitrany. Near the end of World War II, he proposed a theory of functional integration.\(^3\) The ultimate focus of his theory was to establish an "emeshment" of the world's states in a number of relations that would ease the possibility of future wars.\(^4\)

Mitrany posited that while international consensus for political amalgamation in a universal or world federal state did not exist, there were many issue areas where states can and do interact which are of a nonpolitical nature.\(^5\)

According to Mitrany, these issue areas should be organized into individual, issue-specific international organizations which would seek to harmonize state policies for the benefit of all members. Unlike a universal, general international organization the states need not be concerned about encroachment of sovereignty; functional organizations should neither expand nor dictate policy and are restricted to their approved province of duties.\(^6\)

In a later work Mitrany sums up the functional perspective as a logic based on the view that,

A map of the world designed to show international economic and social activities, would appear as an intricate web of interests and relations, crossing and recrossing political divisions . . . . The task is to bring that map, which is already functioning as a reality, under control of some form of international agencies. Thus the political dividing lines would in time be overlaid and blurred.\(^7\)
NEO-FUNCTIONALISM

Mitrany's early integration theory, initially global and general in scope, received regional application in Europe under the Schuman Plan. In 1950, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed a unification of coal and steel production between France and West Germany. Other European states were also invited to join.

The Schuman Plan introduced a new variant of the functionalist thesis deemed neo-functionalism. The neo-functionalist expansion of the integration process sought to establish common activities through a direct assault on politically sensitive, yet bureaucratic managed industries.

While one of the key motivations of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the amalgamation of industrial production, designed to make war "materially impossible," other motivations were also at work.

This move to key industries required the addition of a full-time international bureaucracy with a substantial expansion of duties beyond those envisioned by Mitrany.

It would be hoped that this industrial integration would, through the process of "spillover," require increased integration and policy coordination in other related areas. Spillover is a concept that increased integration activities in a given sector will create imbalances in other policy areas, difficulties which, in turn, could best be solved by an increased scope of integration activities. In later
research, Nye identified a related feature, transaction increases, which may call for similar adjustment.\textsuperscript{11}

This approach is a far cry from the original functionalist model, based on multiple, non-political single-issue organizations.

Empirically, the process of movement from functionalist theory to neo-functionalist success has been described as a political process worked out in West Europe by Lindberg and Scheingold in \textit{Europe's Would-Be Polity}, Chapter 1.

\textbf{INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES}

With the successful establishment of the ECSC, and later the European Economic Community and Euratom, theoretical considerations and empirical evaluations began to center on West Europe as the model for integration efforts.\textsuperscript{12}

While the integration process had begun with a concern for world peace, economic and welfare issues soon came to the fore.\textsuperscript{13} The process of integration however, remains a political activity, as intrastate bargaining and policy formation is initiated by state governments.\textsuperscript{14}

The early theories presupposed the existence of elements of advanced industrial societies for the success of integration efforts. Advanced bureaucracies, developed interest groups, and strong industrial imports and exports, were all considered conducive, if not essential, to regional integration success.
Within the scope of economic integration the benchmark measure for potential integration hinged on the issue of trade creation and trade diversion.\textsuperscript{15} If, through the integrative process of lowering tariffs among member states, the purchase of domestically produced goods is replaced with lower priced, regionally produced goods, then trade is "created," efficiency is increased and tariffs come down.

On the other hand, if, through common regional tariffs, purchases of cheaper extra-regional products are diverted to more expensive regional products, then trade has been diverted.

Integration efforts exhibiting trade diversion over trade creation would be considered as contributing to regional economic inefficiency and loss of welfare.\textsuperscript{16}

While integration considerations grew to hinge on economic efficiency in the developed world, the less developed regions adapted integration logic into a vehicle for their own specific problems of underdevelopment.\textsuperscript{17}

By this new consideration, what will be created is an amalgam of the development theory consideration of "import substitution" and the integration concept of an expanded market region.

In import substitution, economic efficiency of import purchases is sacrificed by establishing tariff barriers which encourage domestic production in fledgling industries. While the initial consequence is loss of efficiency, this
process will aid in the expansion of a growing domestic industrial base.

The expansion of the integration logic, from functionalist world peace and welfare motives to issues of regional development, are reflected in statements by the "fathers" of functionalism and development integration.

In 1943, David Mitrany claimed that,

The real choice is between social performance through national action and social performance through international planning and action.¹⁸

In 1965, Bela Balassa restated this proposition for the developing world,

The choice is not so much between import substitution and free trade in an integration area, as between national import substitution and regional.¹⁹

Balassa states that while national markets may be too small to ensure successful growth in economic development, the region may be a physical unit more conducive to success. He proposes that integration removes "artificial" national boundaries within a region, which obstruct a unitary economic region.²⁰ This economic view reflects Mitrany's earlier conception of a global interaction map.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION: A NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT?

As neo-functionalists expanded their theoretical judgements in parallel with the developments of the European Community, conjecture developed that the integration process would lead to a supranational organization. This
organization, it was hoped, would govern a "United States of Europe."

Later case study analysis however, suggests that the movement of states toward integration efforts was made, not because of any dissatisfaction with the nation-state as a sovereign unit, but rather because of agreement among European leaders that the state was too small a unit for effective policy success in some limited economic and social issue areas.  

What this process has in fact accomplished is to bolster the strength of the nation-state as a sovereign unit while it accepts a limited sacrifice of sovereignty in some policy areas.  

Two analysts sum up the process noting that integration groupings are, instead of a "nation writ large" rather, "an international system writ small."  

Sovereignty has not been handed over to the regional organizations, save for a few specific issue areas which states recognize can best be organized to their benefit through regional cooperation.  

Theoretical considerations of integration suggested that where nation-states would tend to agree to supranational management was in the area of "low politics" issues. In developed states these policy areas could be considered as those, usually of a welfare or economic efficiency scope, where conceptions of national pride and political hegemony
did not prevail. Some hoped this agreement on "low politics" would lead to regional unification on "high politics" issues. This has not been the case in the European Community.

Considering integration in developing regions it has been noted that there is no level of low politics. Development issues and welfare are highly politicized, and policies and decisions are often managed by national politicians instead of the technocrats of neo-functionalist logic. Nonetheless, many integration schemes have been established in developing regions.

Integration policies in the economic sector can be divided into elements of negative and positive integration. In negative integration, those elements of national policy which inhibit the free flow of exchange; i.e. tariffs, visa requirements, trade quotas, etc., are eliminated. These policy choices are regional agreements corresponding to the lower ranges of the Balassa Scale, Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions. Without an established supranational administrative body, some elements of integration can be accomplished as nations seek to align policy in specific issue areas.

Agreements of this sort will in turn create imbalances, as trade relations shift to favor those states within the new integration area who are most ready to benefit from regional integration. As barriers are removed the most developed states will act to capitalize on the expanded
market. Conversely, there will also develop pockets of underdevelopment, they are the net losers in negative integration.\textsuperscript{27}

In the European Community those regional pockets are Southern Italy and Southwest France. In the third world they will be the least developed members of the integration plan.

If these net losers are to remain members of the integration effort there must be advancement of the integration process to institutions of positive integration. Positive integration elements participate in active redistribution policies designed to remedy regional imbalances caused by the effects of negative integration.

These policies can be classified as either redistributive or creative, providing funds for economic opportunities lost or establishing development projects to balance the development of the entire region.

For integration schemes in the less developed world, Balassa suggests that the need for positive integration is imperative. He offers the following policy feature as advisable for successful integration among the less developed states,

1) Tariff reduction formula should be automatic
2) Government planning of development projects
3) Adjustment periods to Full Customs Union should be extended for the least developed states in region
4) Payment arrangements to facilitate convertibility and save foreign exchange.\textsuperscript{28}
These features will be explored in later chapters as they relate to the ECOWAS integration scheme. Other problems, typical of developing nation integration efforts and specific to the ECOWAS region, will also be noted.

**EMPIRICAL INTEGRATION MEASUREMENT**

Integration is a relative concept. Political scientists have been interested in establishing the level or intensity of integration in a given region. This division of integration analysis is based on the assumption that interstate integration can be quantified and measured by observing the transaction profiles of the regional states.

There are many transaction indices that can be employed to measure regional integration. The most common are: levels and directions of trade, student exchanges, tourist and elite foreign travel, mail flows, and telephone communication. While many of these indices have been suggested as reasonable measures of integration, trade relationships have been the most common indicator employed, as a measure of both economic and political integration.29

One clear reason for the reliance on trade relationships is simply their availability. Other indicators are expensive or impossible to obtain.30 A second, more important, reason is the contention by some that trade interaction is the best measurement of integration.31

The debate remains whether transactions cause integration.
It has been argued that increased interaction, measured by transaction data, could lead to an increased need for integration machinery to manage or support the growing relationships. Uncertainty over the specific process through which transactions may either cause integration, or be the result of it, suggests that transactions may best serve as indicators of integration. This ignores the difficult task of establishing the patterns of causation either way.

Transaction data serve best as an historical record of regional integration. They remain unreliable for predictive analysis though general patterns do tend to remain similar over short time spans.

While trade remains the most common transaction indicator, it has been stressed that a deep and broad sense of regional integration requires multiple indices examined in over-time studies. Nye suggests that indicators of economic, political, and social integration should be established.

While acknowledging the importance of social integration for increasing levels of integration, it must be noted that transaction data for this variant of integration—mail flows, telephone connections, etc.—are very difficult to collect. Past studies using mail flow analysis found strong correlations with trade data indices. The correlations were strong enough that Russett chose to eliminate mail flows as an area of investigation because the difficulty of data collection was not worth the potential, predictable outcome.
Other studies have employed personal interviewing surveys, both of elites and the general public, but these too are expensive and have exceptional validity problems.38

While the data collection difficulties are noted concerning West Europe, in the third world they are magnified to the point where transaction analysis is rarely attempted.39 Published figures for gross national product, debt, export earnings, etc., vary widely.40 Tables are speckled with asterisks indicating that the data are an estimate, or for a year other than the one specified, or simply not available. Various sources even give differing figures for the land area of some countries.

The United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1981 outlined some of the problems facing statisticians in Africa, noting that it has been common practice for some data to be "taken from a neighboring country where conditions are assumed to be similar."41 In 1977, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) reported that there were only 1,500 official statisticians working in all of Africa (compared to 23,000 employed in the United States), which is reflected in sparse data of questionable accuracy.

The report of the tenth meeting of the Conference of African Statisticians in 1977 said,

Quantity estimates of gross agricultural output include a significant amount of guesswork owing to the lack of available statistics, even for major commodities. Food crop estimates are sometimes based on eye estimates by field agents. For some countries, estimates of food crops are based on a
variety of sources such as data on population and estimates of per capita consumption from fragmentary and sporadic household surveys or information on acreage and yields.42

The report pointed out discrepancies in the methods and accuracy of data collection used in various countries and questioned the usefulness of combining data for the purpose of comparison.

Statistical information published by the United Nations and its agencies is usually taken from information provided by national governments. These figures in turn often form the basis of calculations and statistics issued by the World Bank and other multinational agencies.

Nevertheless, though the accuracy of the individual statistics is questionable, the broad outline which the available data provide is sufficient to present an estimate of the social and economic profile of the African states.

This study will attempt a transaction analysis of the ECOWAS integration scheme. The methods employed may be of utility in measuring integration in any developing region.

I have employed data sets which are readily available for all nations of the world and which offer a broad scope of indicators which may come close to capsulizing the level of integration thus far attained in West Africa.

The next two chapters will first establish the historical context of ECOWAS in West African integration policy and present an overview of the difficulties it may face.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II


9. Ibid.


Balassa, *Theory of Economic Integration*, p. 16.


Balassa, *Theory of Economic Integration*, p. 3.


Mennis and Sauvant, *Transnational Community*, p. 38.

Axline, "Dependence and Integration," p. 86.


31 Feld, "Western Europe," p. 121, in Comparative Regional Systems.


36 Feld, "Western Europe," p. 125.

37 Russett, International Regions, p. 129.

38 Feld, "Western Europe," p. 141, footnote 74.


40 This discussion appeared earlier in Africa Report, September-October 1983, p. 58, by the author and Michael Maren.


CHAPTER III

The drafting of the ECOWAS treaty was a multidimensional political event. Many factors contributed to its foundation, others influence its potential for success. This chapter will serve to detail some of those factors and establish a profile of the West African Community states.

COLONIAL HERITAGE AND HISTORICAL FACTORS LEADING TO ECOWAS

The ECOWAS states share a common heritage of colonial domination. Only Liberia escaped colonization due to its special relationship with the United States.¹

Eight of the ECOWAS states were once part of French West Africa (FWA). Togo, once a German colony, was administered by France as a Class B Mandate state for the League of Nations. It was considered in many ways to be part of FWA yet remained legally distinct. FWA was governed through a central bureaucracy until independence movements began to break up the Federation in the late 1950s.

Leaders of the various West African independence movements hotly debated the governmental structure that could best serve the component parts of FWA after liberation.

Some political leaders, such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, pressed for individual statehood for each of
the colonial units. Leopold Sengor of Senegal, on the other hand, decried this plan as serving to balkanize West Africa, and thereby lose all political strength in dealing with the former colonial power.²

In 1958 the breakup of FWA began, a constitutional referendum vote gave Guinea its independence that year. Soon after, former FWA colonies, French Sudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey (Benin) attempted to form the Federation of Mali.³ The Federation lasted only two months, thereafter the balkanization of West Africa became a reality.

This is not to say that the ex-French colonies have not maintained close international ties. Indeed, all but Mali and Mauritania continue to share common currency and a central banking system.

British colonial policy stood in stark contrast to French policy. Unlike the colonies of the FWA, no British colonies held contiguous borders. This separation helps to explain British policy of separate administration in each of its colonies. The interwar policy of "indirect rule" served to maintain and reinforce traditional administrative areas based on the rule of the traditional ethnic leaders.⁴

The British colonies had participated in some common institutions, including a common currency, but this system began to break up after the independence of Ghana in 1957.⁵ Today only an educational institution, the West African Examination Board, remains, and now includes Liberia as well.
POST-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS

As new nations, comprised of hundreds of different ethnic groups, the West African states had a difficult task of nation building, developing institutions and instilling nationalism. Establishing legitimacy has not been easy, most of the ECOWAS states have experienced at least one coup attempt, even in the past seven-year period since the founding of ECOWAS.

At the same time staggering poverty and weak economies have inspired the states to consider economic cooperation among themselves as a strategy for development. As of 1975 over 30 bilateral and multilateral development agreements of various sorts have been signed by the West African states.6

Until ECOWAS, most plans had followed lines of colonial heritage. Exclusively francophone groups comprised over one-third of the total. There were few alignments limited to strictly British heritage membership. It has been argued that these limited regional plans, mostly unsuccessful, were actually extensions of pre-independence groupings and did not represent a new and independent movement of West African states toward integration.7

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ECOWAS

There are several historical reasons why ECOWAS was formed in 1975. These reasons may be relevant to the
potential success of ECOWAS.

The death of Charles De Gaulle in 1970 is cited as one historical factor which marked the decline of French attention on West Africa. Left alone, the francophone states held a freer hand to pursue their own policies and to look to other states for cooperative endeavors.⁸

Some francophone states have attempted to form an exclusive Economic Community. The 1973 version of this effort became the Communite Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO).

This community was criticized by several francophone states, who maintained that no viable economic community could be formed without the participation of Liberia and the ex-British colonies, especially the "African Giant," Nigeria.⁹ Opposition to the CEAO was so strong that Togo and Benin refused to be partners to it.

Nigeria, a member of OPEC, dwarfs the other West African states in many key statistical indicators. Both its GNP and population count for over 50% of West African aggregate totals. Inclusion of Nigeria was vital for any true community of West African states, yet its very presence opened up new areas of integration problems based on its sheer dominance of the regional economy.

For Nigeria itself, membership in ECOWAS was an important policy consideration designed to bury the animosity between it and several neighboring francophone states who had backed Biafra during the Nigerian civil war, 1968-1970.¹⁰
Participation in ECOWAS was the perfect vehicle for Nigeria to work back into normalized relations with those states and at the same time establish economic ties that could benefit its developing industries, helping to shore up alternate revenue sources against the inevitable decline in oil production.

Another important factor which has been credited as an aid to ECOWAS is the Lomé Convention of 1973-1975. ¹¹

Before the Lomé Convention the ex-French colonial states participated in specialized trade relationships with the EEC under the Yaoundé Convention agreements. For West African states this meant that ex-French colonies traded with the EEC under different tariff regimes than the ex-British and Liberia. No form of concerted trading policies between West Africa and the EEC could be considered under Yaoundé.

As most West African states trade heavily with the EEC, this extra-regional barrier to cooperation probably could have served as a sufficient obstacle to any inclusive West African Economic Union.

The Lomé Convention agreements changed this situation. West African states now deal on equal footing with the EEC in matters of import and export quotas and tariff levels, allowing at least the possibility of successful intraregional cooperation in dealings with the EEC.

Moreover, what the Lomé Convention provided the West African states was experience in concerted negotiating.
After eighteen months of negotiations, 493 formal meetings, and 350 joint documents, the West African representatives had gained valuable experience in working together and establishing a common policy against an extraregional entity.\textsuperscript{12} Collaboration continues today. There is an ambassadorial committee from ECOWAS accredited to the EEC which is charged with managing ECOWAS member negotiations in the upcoming Lomé II round of talks.\textsuperscript{13}

Finally, a provision in the Lomé Convention Agreement will add to the potential for success of ECOWAS. Within the treaty is an aid package with provisions that ten percent of dispersed aid is to be allotted to regional development projects. These can be administered through the ECOWAS framework and the regional aid clause hints to the importance the states set on regional activities.

**ECOWAS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION MODELS**

We can speak of the ECOWAS integration scheme as a "Third Generation" model.

The first generation of regional development is embodied in the European Community. Through its example and the floods of theoretical work that helped formulate and evaluate it, the European Community appears as an example of the success that is possible for nations who are willing to cooperate in an economic community. The EEC was specifically cited as a source of inspiration by General Yabuku Gowon, head of Nigeria in 1975 and one of the chief proponents of ECOWAS.\textsuperscript{14}
Second Generation integration schemes appeared in many parts of the developing world as well as West Africa. They were typically formed soon after independence, before the individual states had managed to solidify internal, national institutions.

The East African Community (EAC), 1967-1977, of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda serves as an example of what problems were typically encountered by Second Generation schemes.

The treaty which formed the EAC failed to address many areas of key economic and development issues, including planning for industrial and agricultural production. The chief distinction between the EAC member states was the relative development of Kenya over the poorer conditions of the other two states.

In integration theory for developing states it is assumed that, without advance contingency planning to the contrary, the opening of neighboring markets will tend to enhance the economy of the most developed state while gouging the production levels of the poorer members. New industries will congregate in those areas where processes and infrastructure have already been developed.

The EAC remedy for this situation was a failure. The EAC developed a Transfer Tax system which, in effect, backfired; its purpose was to protect fledgling industries in the poorer states from undue competition. The end result however, instead of a number of complementary industries located in
the various states, was a duplication of industries which developed for protected domestic markets. Kenya retained its position of dominance and indeed increased its share of the wealth during the EAC period.

Agreement for adjustment of this problem and others was made exceptionally difficult because ultimate authority rested with the national leaders. Any decision became highly politicized and an issue for national pride. Agreement among professional bureaucrats below the focus of political decision making was impossible in the EAC. The states were also divided along ideological lines, a feature which added to negotiation tensions.

The EAC treaty was designed to regulate activity between market economies and the adjustments accorded by price manipulation. The socialist economy of Tanzania required state planning mechanisms to set price levels. This problem added to EAC conflicts.

Finally, the EAC failed to successfully manage its regional balance of payments adjustment problems. There was no framework for allowing imbalances to float for extended periods and therefore any intraregional commercial ventures were hindered in their need for financial transaction liquidity.

ECOWAS could look at these shortfalls as problem areas that should be accounted for to help insure the possibility of success for a third world integration scheme.

ECOWAS also had the example of another Second Generation
integration effort, CARICOM, a Caribbean regional body, to consider. Essentially CARICOM's problems have been in the area of income adjustment due to trade imbalances and in the area of intraregional trade. ECOWAS officials met with CARICOM representatives to discuss the potential problems presented by integration efforts.²⁰

More at home, ECOWAS also had the example of earlier integration attempts within West Africa to consider. The many bilateral and multilateral schemes have been typified by one critic as "regionalism by declaration."²¹ But new schemes are acting to capitalize on the experience gained in earlier efforts at integration. Efforts that are to be valued for the experience they afforded the growing cadre of national bureaucrats in dealing with international negotiations and relations.²²
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III


7Renninger, Cooperation in West Africa, p. 22.


10Renninger, Cooperation in West Africa, p. 31.


12Gruhn, "Inching Toward Interdependence," p. 249.


19Hazelwood, "Lessons of EAC," p. 44.


CHAPTER IV

OBSTACLES TO ECOWAS SUCCESS

The ECOWAS treaty proposes:

The creation of a homogeneous society, leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of all types of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons.¹

Through an economic union the treaty members hope to improve the standard of living in their respective states. While the realization of this union is fraught with physical and political roadblocks, it can be seen from the issues which received immediate attention in the ECOWAS body where the priority issues lie. Transport, communications, and the establishment of a Customs Union were the key topics in early negotiations.²

As physical barriers to increased interaction the problems of transport and communications are paramount.

Colonial infrastructure was designed solely to facilitate transport of goods to and from the heartland to the major trading posts. There were no infrastructure provisions linking the various colonial outposts. Many of the existing roads follow a route designed to circumvent areas of differing colonial heritage or currency zone.³

The telecommunications network remains similar to that of colonial days. In many cases cross-colonial region
telephone calls must be routed through London and Paris.⁴

The serious repercussion from this problem is that intraregional trade development is hobbled as transportation and communication costs prohibit economies of scale to be realized.⁵ Comparative advantage for production is lost in high transportation costs, serving to turn market processes inward toward the national economy and decreasing the attractiveness of a region-wide economic scheme.

What has ECOWAS done to address these pressing topics?

A telecommunications project is in fact the first major accomplishment of ECOWAS. The first ECOWAS Fund loan went to Mali after the 1983 ECOWAS summit meeting in May. The loan is to fund the first phase of a regional telecommunications network. Other regional members are also scheduled for fund allocations.⁶

Progress has also been made on the free movement of persons between all ECOWAS states. Today citizens of any ECOWAS state have the right to travel to fellow member states without the special entry visa required of other international travelers. This privilege is similar to that enjoyed by the citizens of the EEC states.

It is within the context of the Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons that the most significant test of the ECOWAS organization to date was played out. This conflict was the expulsion by Nigeria of an estimated 2 million aliens in January and February 1983. The expulsion was principally
aimed at one million Ghanaians who had remained in Nigeria beyond the limits of their legal welcome. The incident is significant for several reasons which actually look positive for ECOWAS as a regional organization.

Nigeria couched its announcement of expulsion in the terms of the protocol, according to which citizens of ECOWAS states may enter co-member countries for up to ninety days without a visa, providing they do not seek employment. The millions of aliens, who had come to Nigeria for a share of the oil financed economic boom in the early 80's, had broken the terms of the protocol on both counts, seeking employment and remaining over ninety days. The action taken by Nigeria therefore was carried out within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law.

It was rumored that internal political considerations led to the expulsion. August elections required a happy, employed electorate. With oil prices slipping and employment dropping, the aliens were ejected to make jobs for Nigerian citizens.

Within the ECOWAS body the significance of this action is seen in the reaction of Nigeria's fellow members. While outcry centered on the harsh conditions of the order - immediate enforcement - there was only limited objection to the legal nature of the order. At all times Nigeria followed the terms of the protocol and acted within its confines.

At the ECOWAS summit meeting held in May there was no
official condemnation of the act and in terms of intramember relations the affair has been dropped.8

Thus we have witnessed the significant application of Regional Law which, while causing hardship to many member states, was essentially supported by those it was directed against. Through this action we may be witnessing the evolution of a community spirit that endorses collective agreements even at the expense of individual gain.

Economic integration implies the importance of trade relationships. Here ECOWAS has acted to balance the many divergent features of the region in an effort to improve the groundwork for intraregional development.

Theoretical discussion of integration considers relations as potentially difficult between the following conditions in West Africa:
1) Richer and Poorer States
2) States divergent along linguistic, colonial and political lines
3) States who are also members of other West African regional groupings.

There are also issues of trade adjustment payments to be considered.

To deal with the relations between the "rich" and poor states, ECOWAS has established a Compensation Fund designed to make financial adjustments to those states who experience
economic loss due to the elimination of tariff barriers.\textsuperscript{9}

Although no claims have been made against it yet, the very existence of the Compensation Fund should be of importance to the poorer states as they are expected to suffer short-term loss from the Customs Union due to reduced production levels and lost state revenues. One analyst typified an ECOWAS without a compensation fund as a "fool's market" for the poorer states.\textsuperscript{10} This is one issue area where the EAC failed but where ECOWAS, learning from the mistakes of earlier integration efforts, may succeed.

The elimination of tariffs, which began in early 1982, is one area where planning and foresight were required to work out an equitable system of financial distribution of costs. Tariffs have served as a major source of income for many of the ECOWAS states and their elimination will require compensation if the various governments are to cooperate with the plans of the integration design (see Table II).

The ECOWAS formula for redistribution is a function of GNP and population. States are assessed payments based on their ability to pay. The funds collected are redistributed based on need and loss of revenue.
TABLE II

IMPORT DUTIES AS PROPORTION OF REVENUES FOR SOME
ECOWAS STATES FOR SELECTED YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1973</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>55.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Renninger, Multinational Cooperation in West Africa, p. 49)

Some states find themselves in allegiance with other, smaller regional organizations as well as ECOWAS.

The CEAO is the strongest of these and the organization with which ECOWAS must settle its differences. This collection of francophone states is designed to promote regional development among its members through an eventual Customs Union and reduction in tariff barriers. Problems arise when considerations of trade between CEAO/ECOWAS states and ECOWAS states is involved.

Unlike ECOWAS, the CEAO framework maintains some tariff structures between member states. There is a potential for trouble here. Intra-CEAO trade may be subject to tariff considerations while CEAO member trade with the larger group
of non-CEAO ECOWAS states in some goods will pass tariff-free.\textsuperscript{11}

While ECOWAS members are compelled to "eliminate the incompatibilities established" by membership in other sub-regional schemes, the continued developments of CEAO may eventually pose a problem as ECOWAS becomes fully operational in the late 1980's.\textsuperscript{12}

Official CEAO statements and publications by the CEAO are conspicuous by their complete failure to mention ECOWAS and the potentials for conflict and cooperation that exist. The CEAO fails to consider ECOWAS as a cooperating partner in a list which includes dozens of other international organizations.\textsuperscript{13}

Many of the CEAO states are also members of the CFA, a currency union. These close ties have led some analysts to suggest that the CEAO may be the West African organization with the best chance of success.\textsuperscript{14} However, in early 1983, francophone regional leaders, Sekou Touré of Guinea and Abdou Diouf of Senegal, publically suggested that the CEAO be phased out to make room for ECOWAS.\textsuperscript{15}

ECOWAS has shown some advancement in settling the problem of balance of payments adjustments among the member states, an advance that may neutralize to some degree the unique relationship shared by the CFA states.

Again due to their colonial heritage, the ECOWAS states have been hampered in their efforts to promote intraregional
trade by the fact that many of their national currencies were linked directly to their colonial powers, even after independence. In West Africa, currencies were not directly convertible to other regional currencies.\textsuperscript{16}

Like telephone links, monetary exchanges often required payment adjustments to be performed through the European capitals.

Today there exists the West African Clearing House, which is designed to facilitate intraregional trade by making exchange possible through the utilization of a West African Unit of Account monetary unit, which is equivalent to the World Bank's Special Drawing Right Unit.

Through the Clearing House, national Central Banks settle exchange transactions by a system similar to the clearing function performed by national Central Banks clearing checks submitted by commercial banks.\textsuperscript{17} This procedure saves on much needed foreign exchange which can now be employed to settle debts with extra-regional states.

Osagie notes this system has actually been a substantial inroad against national sovereignty in the area of international finance. The official exchange rates of the member states are now determined by a regional, ECOWAS affiliated, organization.\textsuperscript{18}

The Clearing House too is hindered in its duties by the problem of infrastructure. In a perfect example of regional project linkage, communications problems have kept Clearing
House achievements lagging behind potential. Basic communication difficulties have kept exchange settlements strapped to a three month adjustment period once funds are submitted for transfer.\(^{19}\)

Until the basic problems of communication are settled, it would appear that further developments in trade will continue to fall below expected goals. The ECOWAS telecommunications scheme may have strong forward linkages for these development goals.

Much has been made of the divergent nature of the various ECOWAS states. Some offer those differences as substantial factors for failure of ECOWAS, while others gloss over them and suggest that there is political motivation to overcome these hurdles.\(^{20}\)

ECOWAS states differ along lines of political ideology. This difference was not found among the EEC states where homogeneity may have aided in its establishment and relative success.\(^{21}\) Among the ECOWAS states we find communist, socialist, military, and democratic states, in a variety of constitutional combinations. While these differences have not appeared as a problem in specific ECOWAS statements there would seem to be at least a potential for conflict because of this divergence.

In the context of extra-regional relations, the ECOWAS states have recently failed to demonstrate any unified policy position. Division is occurring along lines analysts are
calling "Moderates and Radicals." 22

The most recent evidence of this failure to present a unified front, a failure endemic among the African states in general, is the record of the 1982 Sessions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In both August and November, scheduled meetings of the OAU could not be convened because a quorum could not be generated. 23

Under the chairmanship of Quadaffi of Libya, intensely sensitive issues were presented, embodied in credentials conflicts. In August, the question was the right of representation of Spanish Sahara. In November, the divisive issue was the de jure leadership for Chad.

These questions split the ECOWAS states. Those who were considered "moderates:" Nigeria, Niger, Gambia, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, refused invitations to be seated. 24 Some states refused to appear, others would not register as official delegates.

While pushed to the apparent brink of crisis, the OAU rift was mended, for a time, by ECOWAS initiative. Preceding the third attempt to convene a quorum in June 1983, Sekou Touré, the chairman of ECOWAS at the time, sent to the OAU a resolution of the ECOWAS states pledging to appear at the scheduled meeting in Addis Ababa. 25 At this point the political questions of Southwest Sahara and Chad had been surpassed by issues of basic African solidarity. In the
final moment ECOWAS was able to speak out in a unanimous and collective voice in support of the OAU. It is significant that the decision to attend the OAU conference by the sixteen states was made within the context of ECOWAS solidarity and that the announcement to attend was made collectively, with one voice speaking for all.

This action may be an indication of ECOWAS solidarity, despite earlier displays of brinksmanship, and an affirmation of a true regional spirit.

What is clear, however, is that on such occasions where unity as a symbolic gesture is at issue, the ECOWAS states are today slow to present a unified position. This may serve as a symbol of the deep chasm that politically divides the ECOWAS states, as well as the continent in general. These differences could become institutionalized if the predicted establishment of a "Radical" African organization is actually brought about by Quadaffi. If this occurs it would probably split ECOWAS along Radical-Moderate lines. To date, however, divisions have not been pushed to this point.

As if the political divisions were not difficult enough, a further complication in West African intra-regional relations stems from the almost remarkable political instability of many of the member states.

In November 1982, both Upper Volta and Ghana experienced coup attempts. For a time both states closed their borders, even to fellow ECOWAS states. In 1980 the present leader of
Liberia, Staff Sergeant Doe was refused admission to the ECOWAS summit meeting because of his rise to power through assassination.\textsuperscript{27}

ECOWAS states in conflict do not always seek out ECOWAS involvement, even when looking for solutions through international constitutional channels. A border dispute that has continued for eight years between Mali and Upper Volta has been placed before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a ruling. Significantly, however, the two states are expected to nominate a single ad hoc judge from Senegal, a fellow ECOWAS member, thus demonstrating a willingness to deal collectively with a regional peer.\textsuperscript{28} The ad hoc judge will be forced to take sides on the merits of the case. More contentious states would have avoided the ICJ or at least would have appointed individual ad hoc judges.

Political instability may, however, make this smooth legalistic solution impossible. Repeated coups in Upper Volta may drastically affect that government's ability to draft an effective compromis for presentation to the Court.\textsuperscript{29}

Since the founding of ECOWAS, a number of other regional incidents have checkered the relations among the ECOWAS states. Below is a sampling of incidents from 1980 to present:

Guinea/Guinea-Bissau . . . Conflict over territorial waters
Cape Verde/Guinea-Bissau . . Unification plans broken
Liberia. . . . . . . . . . . . . Temporarily banned from ECOWAS.
SUMMARY

This overview of the prevailing relations in the ECOWAS region, its problems of infrastructure and politics, should serve as an example of the difficult obstacles which ECOWAS will face if it is to be a successful integration scheme. It has many hurdles to pass over before it can establish itself as an institution in West African regional relations.

As was observed earlier, the extended time span over which the ECOWAS plan is layed out may serve as an adjustment period during which the many differences which separate the ECOWAS states can be papered over.

These divisions do not doom ECOWAS to failure, and the experience of the EEC demonstrates that relations can continue along lines of agreement while other policy lines are not followed through. While political integration is seen as the ultimate step in the ideal integration process, not even the EEC has approached that level of cooperation and there is little chance that they will ever choose to politically integrate. There are, however, various degrees of integration that can be accomplished within the EEC and ECOWAS.

The remaining chapters of this study will attempt a profile of ECOWAS integration through quantitative analyses of several integration indicators. It is hoped that these indicators will aid in the assessment of the state of
integration in West Africa today as well as serve as a set of base line values for further analysis as ECOWAS becomes fully operational in later years.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

1Headnote of ECOWAS treaty, May 25, 1975, Reproduced in International Legal Materials 14 (September 1975): 1200.

2Renninger, Cooperation in West Africa, p. 36.


117African Development, November 1975, p. 95.


12ECOWAS treaty, Article 59, paragraph 3.

13Jeune Afrique, 17 Octobre 1979, p. 73.


15Africa News 7 April 1983.


22 Times (London), 25 November 1982. Also FN #7, Chapter 7.


29 Interview with Mr. Roy S. Lee, Senior Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Council, Office of Legal Affairs, Office of the General-Secretary, United Nations, New York, 5 August 1983.
CHAPTER V

TRADE PATTERNS OF THE ECOWAS STATES

It is the hope of the sixteen member states that participation in an economic community will enhance their potential for development through a "determined and concerted policy of self-reliance."¹

Regional self-reliance implies a strong network of trade between the member states. In turn an integration of decision making processes in the areas of economic production and development may arise.²

This chapter will focus on intraregional trade as a transaction indicator, indeed the indicator that has been employed for measuring the strength of regional integration, or at least regional interdependence.³ It will be argued that by disaggregation of trade information a more accurate method for assessing ECOWAS integration potential and achievement is developed.

Clearly trade relations and their intensity stand as intuitively appealing measures of interdependence. Alker and Puchala demonstrated the validity of the use of trade data as an indicator of political integration.⁴

Do increasing levels of trade cause expanded regional integration? The answer remains unclear, none-the-less these analysts maintained that trade data could serve as a general
indicator of the strength of regional relations as well as their adjustment and change.

Of course another reason analysts have relied on trade data in assessing regional interdependence intensity is their availability.\(^5\)

Trade data are among the few aggregate indicators that are readily available for the ECOWAS states. This availability allows up-to-date reporting of some trade features and the ability to employ over-time analysis for the evaluation of ECOWAS integration.

It should be cautioned that these data, while useful for comparative measurement, at this time will serve best as a collection of base line values for later study. By ECOWAS Treaty provision official trade liberalization began only three years ago (1981) with the elimination of protective tariffs between member states (see below).

The following table demonstrates the schedule as provided for by the ECOWAS Treaty.

### TABLE III

**TRADE LIBERALIZATION TIME TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Elimination of Protective Internal Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Elimination of Import Duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Establishment of Common Customs Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Alignment of National Tariffs to Common External Customs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: *West Africa* 25 May 1981, p.1159)
Recent theoretical work in the area of interdependence measurement has expanded even further into the realm of economics. It has been argued that a better indicator of interdependence is the association of price determinants. If one state's economic policies, trade levels, and commodity prices, effect the price levels of another state, and vice-versa, then this is held to be an indication of interdependence between the states so affected.6

The validity of this assertion has been argued back and forth in successive publications and one suspects that the argument is not over.7 This continued controversy serves to question the utility of an in-depth factor price study here; what eliminates it is the lack of data.

In the context of third world integration schemes it has been argued that most are doomed to failure because intra-regional trade is negligible when compared to extra-regional trade.

The implication is that without high intraregional trade states have no compelling reason to further their integration efforts. Ties will be tenuous at best.

In most third world states, economic output is heavily based on primary product exports. These states maintain a largely monoproduct trade relationship with one or several developed states, exporting raw materials and importing finished products. Intraregional trade is low because the regional states often produce the same products and little else.
In the case of the ECOWAS states the level of intra-regional trade can be seen in Table IV. Each cell presents the percentage of bilateral trade as measured by imports and exports for the years 1975 and 1981, computed in constant dollar figures.

The figures are percentages and present measures of relative strength. Thus, imports of a "rich" state of equal dollar value to those of a poorer state will be noted in a smaller percentage figure. Interpretation of percentage figures requires that the data be read along the rows for each state.

Clearly the figures show that intraregional trade, as a percentage of the region's overall world trade, is not very high. There are some interesting bilateral relationships that display rather strong trade, of particular note are the high percentages of trade some poor states display with other, relatively better off states. Upper Volta and Mali trade heavily with Ivory Coast.

While trade levels are often low, Table V demonstrates that at least some trade is occurring in many of the possible bilateral combinations; (+) denotes recorded trade less than one percent of the state's total trade. It is evident that many avenues of trade are open.

J.C. Aghaji maintains that international trade in the ECOWAS region remains divided along linguistic lines of colonial heritage. Tables IV and V do not bear this out.
Legend: Tables IV and V

01 02
03 04

01 = 1975 Imports
02 = 1975 Exports
03 = 1981 Imports
04 = 1981 Exports
TABLE IV
ECOWAS STATES’ REGIONAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR WORLD TRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Guinea-Bissau</th>
<th>Ivory Coast</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Upper Volta</th>
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## TABLE V

### ECOWAS BILATERAL TRADE PATTERNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Guinea-Ivory Coast</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Upper Volta</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ghana does have many small trade avenues open with the francophone ECOWAS states. Also, Nigeria's export patterns, due to its important oil resources, do not support Aghaji's contentions.

Nigeria is the major oil supplier for eight of the ECOWAS states.\(^{10}\) It may, however, be surprising to learn that some regional states import their oil from Venezuela and Kuwait instead of from neighboring ECOWAS member Nigeria.\(^{11}\)

In the final assessment, however, intraregional trade, as a percentage of overall trade is very low, less than 4%.\(^{12}\)

Analyses of this sort have been conducted for most integration schemes and their focus on overall trade interaction invariably leads to conclusions similar to those of H. Monte Hill in his study of the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN).\(^{13}\)

Hill employed RA analysis, developed by Savage and Deutsch, to measure integration by the quantitative indicators: mutual trade, student exchange levels, and tourist destinations.\(^{14}\) His negative conclusions concerning ASEAN integration in trade were explained as evidence of, the need of those Nations for manufactured products which are not produced in the region.\(^{15}\)

He summarizes his study with the conclusion that, There appears to be no movement whatsoever toward regional community formation among the five ASEAN countries as reflected in their relative acceptance scores.\(^{16}\)

Hill's conclusion may be true, but I think it leads us
to an improper evaluation of a developing state integration scheme. We could not expect transactions of this kind to be high among states at such low levels of development.

To look at overall trade intensity when the states under study produce principally the same commodity exports for developed markets; student exchanges between countries with few universities, none of which compare to the better universities in the developed states; and to examine tourism between poor countries when more attractive visits to developed states are available, leads us to improper conclusions. These measures are invalid because they employ indicators of integration which misrepresent the context of third world integration schemes.

One could argue that limitations of this magnitude doom integration efforts which exhibit these characteristics. Analysts often assess integration schemes in absolute terms, it may, however, be more realistic and fruitful to weigh integration efforts by their potential for degrees of interdependence.

Potential degrees differ among various regions and it is the relative level that should rest as the mark by which individual nation groupings should be judged.

Cantori and Spiegel consider an element of this in their calculation of economic complimentarity in a number of geographic regions. Their ranking is as follows:
West Europe
Latin America
The Middle East
West Africa
Southeast Asia


By their comparative analysis West Africa has a very low level of complimentarity. We can therefore expect absolute potential to be very low, yet within this analysis there is some range of activity where these nations can interact. They can develop their potential for trade, possibly increasing that potential as the region develops.

Turning to consideration of potential for degrees of interdependence, it may be a better avenue of analysis to follow the lead of R.J.G. Wells.17

Wells notes the continued reference to low overall intraregional trade and the production of similar primary products among the members of ASEAN. Wells, however, opens up new avenues of analysis with his proposition:

if a degree of disaggregation is carried out it is possible to detect differences in resource endowments and to provide evidence of complimentarity.18

If this point of view is carried over to an analysis of the ECOWAS states it can be observed that while these nations often produce the same primary products, which have little utility for non-industrialized states, there are still avenues of potential trade open.

The following figures show the ECOWAS states are not
all equally oriented toward monoproduct output. It will be shown that the more diversified states participate more fully in intraregional trade.

To turn to Wells' notion of complimentary products, we ask: is there an intraregional demand for the nonprimary product exports of the ECOWAS states?

This analysis may help us to assess the degree of interdependence in ECOWAS that has been achieved in the past leading to a measure which can be employed in the future as a base line for further analysis.

The information for this portion of the study is derived from the U.N. publication, Commodity Trade Statistics. Published each year, its goal is to collect trade data from all member states.

Even this publication suffers from inadequate data from the ECOWAS states. Balancing the need for comprehensive coverage and a recent time period, a compromise was reached in reporting data for 1972.

Trade figures for the following states are included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Niger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau had not achieved independence from Portugal in 1972 this study accounts for nine of the fourteen independent states for that year.

Later editions for subsequent years report the trade
figures for independent Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Strict comparability is not possible because of the time differential. However, the data retain validity as a series of base line measures. Figures for Guinea and Cape Verde have not been reported during the period 1970-1980 and therefore none are included. Ultimately information for fourteen of the sixteen member states was considered in the study.

By removing the Primary Product exports of the ECOWAS states we can consider the trade patterns of the member states' other export products, noting intensity and direction. For most states what remains are Basic Manufactures, Machines, and Transport Equipment. Two of the more advanced states, Senegal and Ivory Coast, also export Chemical Products, while Niger and Upper Volta export Food Products to their regional partners.19

Of those states under consideration it is basically the "rich" states, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone and two of the poorest states, Mauritania and Gambia, which display very low percentage levels of exports within the region.

The link between these states is the fact that they read as a near complete list of states with high levels of single product exports; see table above. Only Liberia, also a strong monoproduction exporter, upsets the list by also exporting a notable measure of trade within the ECOWAS region.

It can still be noted that these states as well as
Guinea all import from a number of ECOWAS states, these imports are included as other member's exports.

Considering the ECOWAS states' exports in this way, some very revealing information appears. Table VI demonstrates the export percentages of the ECOWAS states among themselves and to other states and state groups.

### TABLE VI

**SELECTED COMMODITY TRADE FOR 9 ECOWAS STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Extra-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>African</td>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau*</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1976 data

Only Togo and Liberia export a notable percent of the goods under consideration to an extra-regional group, in this case developed states other than France.

Among the African markets the ECOWAS states do not trade with extra-regional states to any appreciable level. Some African trade appears in the category "Unknown African," no knowledge of destination is available for these percentages, or how to divide them among regions. Fortunately this unaccounted for category does not represent a sizeable share of the trade percentages.
Overall compilation in Table VII shows that 69% of the non-primary product trade was within the ECOWAS region in 1972.

TABLE VII

1972
DIRECTION OF TOTAL TRADE
FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>Unknown African</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Other Developed States</th>
<th>Extra-Regional African</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analysis of course makes no pretension to present this figure as evidence of successful integration or strong interdependence among the ECOWAS states. It does, however, point out that the states do trade with each other in identifiable patterns and exports of secondary domestic production tend to go to the neighboring ECOWAS states.

This may say something for the level of potential trade within the West African region in 1972 and the level of that potential that was achieved.

I will be quick to note that this trade accounts for a small percentage of the ECOWAS states' overall trade and therefore the level of economic impact of these relations is likely to be small at this time. The figures do, however, serve as an indicator of what is needed for increased interdependence among the member states.

The avenues of trade are open. It is low industrial output and the problems that inhibit distribution that appear to be
the restraints to further trade. This trade does not need to be redirected--turned inward toward the group--rather the levels of overall production need to be increased.

It may be that through increased governmental cooperation within the ECOWAS framework this increase in production will begin.

There are physical barriers to increased interaction. Problems of transport and communications are paramount. The installed colonial infrastructure was designed solely to facilitate transport of goods to and from the heartland and major trading ports. There were no infrastructure provisions linking the various colonial outposts. Many of the existing roads follow a route designed to circumvent areas of differing colonial heritage or currency zone.\textsuperscript{20}

The telecommunications network remains similar to that of colonial days. In many cases cross colonial-zone telephone calls must be routed through London and Paris.\textsuperscript{21}

The serious repercussion from this situation is that the potential for increased intraregional trade development is hobbled.

Transportation and communication costs prohibit economies of scale, concentrating large production processes at the site of raw materials and supplying region-wide markets, to be realized.\textsuperscript{22} Comparative advantage for production is lost in high transportation costs, serving to turn market processes inward to the national economy and decreasing the attractiveness
of a region-wide economic scheme.

Analysis of what ECOWAS has done to relieve these infrastructure problems may be an avenue for assessing the progress of ECOWAS.

With the present information we can conclude that at least some of the ECOWAS members reached a respectable fulfillment of their potential for intraregional trade. This measure of interdependence may serve as a base line value for future assessments of ECOWAS interdependence.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1Headnote of the ECOWAS Treaty, International Legal Materials 14 (September 1975): 1200.

2This is the neo-functionalist view of the integration process. For an analysis of this view see: Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), Chapter 3.


8ECOWAS has divided the member States into two groups, the poorer States: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta; and the relatively more advanced States: Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Senegal.


Ibid.


Hill, "ASEAN," p. 574.

Hill, "ASEAN," p. 575.


Commodities considered for each State; the numbers correspond to major SITC Classifications. United Nations, *Commodity Trade Statistics, 1972-1976.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>SITC Code Exports</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1, 6, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-B.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory C.</td>
<td>0, 5, 6, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>5, 6, 7, re-exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0, 4, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0, 1, 4, 6, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1, 3, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>6, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper V.</td>
<td>0, 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


22 Ibid.
CHAPTER VI

TREATY RELATIONSHIPS OF THE ECOWAS STATES

Because nations formalize many of their mutual associations in the form of treaties it should be instructive to investigate the treaty patterns of the ECOWAS member states.

Treaties as data may be analysed in a number of ways. Individual treaties can be examined, their textual provisions noted for specific features which may imply particular relationships between the signatory states. Treaties may also be used as a source of quantifiable data. Here one could observe the direction and frequency of a state's treaties.¹

Quantitative analyses of treaty data have been performed concerning several states and regions of the world.² Here, treaty analysis will be used to establish the treaty patterns of the ECOWAS states. These patterns should aid in the assessment of the potential for success of the ECOWAS integration scheme.

Peter Rohn suggests that treaty data offer a refined view of the relations of the world's states. They offer a data set which has: universality, all nations make treaties; meticulousness, treaties are not haphazard associations but specific documents which outline a state's relationship with other nations; and parsimony, treaties are a rarified activity
which encapsulates a state's relationships with the world in concise fashion.³

Subject to qualification, treaty data satisfy the requirement of availability for the states of West Africa. Article 102 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that member states must register any treaty they are party to with the Secretariate of the U.N., who in turn is obligated to publish all treaties registered.⁴ For a variety of reasons not all treaties are registered with the U.N. or any other data source.⁵

Beyond this general problem which is shared by all members of the U.N. in varying degrees, there are exceptional registration problems exhibited by third world states in general and African states in particular.⁶

While this problem might effect any advanced statistical investigations it should still be of some utility to note the treaty patterns of the ECOWAS states. Are there clear-cut patterns which may offer evidence of the magnitude and importance of the members' relations with other nations of the world?

Of special interest will be extra-regional treaty patterns with former colonial powers, ideologically aligned states and states of religious affinity. Of course intra-regional patterns will also be investigated. The treaty data will be investigated in toto and over time.

An examination of the EEC experience displays an interesting
phenomenon. During the post-war period of the late 1940s and early 1950s there was a marked increase in the number of bilateral treaties established between the future EEC member states. The European states found that increased interaction required an expanded network of formalized relationships. Once the framework of the regional organization was established, however, there was actually a drop in the absolute frequency of bilateral treaties drafted among the member states, as can be seen from Figure 1.7

![Figure 1. Treaty frequency of European Community Six](image)

Apparently those international relationships that were once formalized by treaty began to fall within the range of competence of the EEC machinery.8 The supranational organization now serves as a sort of permanent bargaining table where relations can be formalized in an institutional framework.

Clearly this is an example of the integration process at work and a phenomenon that could be investigated in the case of ECOWAS.

Observing the model presented by the EEC states we
could expect an increase in the magnitude of intra-regional treaty making before the signature of the ECOWAS multilateral treaty in 1975.

With regard to the ECOWAS states, however, the nature of treaty registration precludes the effective investigation of this rise-drop phenomenon of treaty frequency to be performed at this date. Registration with the U.N. Secretariat is a lengthy process, public knowledge of existing treaties falls far behind their date of signature. In 1977 there was a seven year lag between initial treaty reporting and actual publication in the United Nations Treaty Series.9

Complications extend to the record of many states in reporting their treaty activity. Peter Rohn speaks of a "pipeline effect." Treaties often go unreported to the U.N. For any given year there is a lag between the time treaties are established and their promulgation. Most treaties are reported in the first year, the remainder trickle in at a decreasing rate. For any given year he estimates the "pipeline effect" to be about seven years.10

For this study no valid quantitative judgements can be made about treaty distribution after 1975, the year ECOWAS was created. Any comparative study would bias the results against those states who are tardy in reporting their treaties or who do not publish their own treaty series. For the nations in question this would most likely overrepresent those treaties signed with developed states, as they have a better reporting
Due to the pipeline effect this analysis is restricted to investigating the possible appearance of an increase in intra-regional treaty activity through 1975. Analysis of the expected post-1975 decline in activity will require further investigation at a later date.

The ECOWAS states produce only two percent of the world's treaty volume. Any quantitative analysis must therefore rely on rather large time period divisions. This study will examine the periods pre-1965, 1965-1969, and 1970-1975.

To investigate the continued process of increased relations among the ECOWAS states, intra-regional treaties will also be noted for the period after 1975. However, their frequency will not have absolute statistical validity because we can expect other treaties of this period to be reported at a later date.

Table VIII shows that there is little reported treaty activity between the member states, both in the aggregate and for any of the three time periods. Many nations display no bilateral treaty activity prior to 1976, and there is rarely evidence of any increase over time. The only notable magnitude is between Gambia and Senegal, an obvious feature of their special geographic relationship (See Appendix).
**TABLE VIII**

ECOWAS BILATERAL TREATY RELATIONSHIPS

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**TABLE LEGEND**

- Pre-1965
- 1965 - 1969
- 1970 - 1975
As for the post-1975 period only three bilateral treaty relationships have been reported. Togo now has treaty activity with Guinea and Niger as well as two additional treaties with Benin. The only other reported change is a new Air Transport treaty between Upper Volta and Mali.\(^{14}\)

Table IX also demonstrates that many possible bilateral combinations show no treaty activity.

It should be noted that Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde report no treaty activity at all before 1975, the year of their independence from Portugal. These two states fail to report any bilateral treaties between themselves and the other ECOWAS states after 1975. This is a rather surprising situation considering they have no formal arrangement with their neighboring states save for the ECOWAS multilateral treaty.

Eliminating Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from further considerations, there are ninety potential bilateral treaty combinations within the region. Of this number, however, only 37 actual combinations have been reported.

There are too many empty cells and too few observations for a proper chi\(^2\) analysis to be performed but we can clearly see that two ex-British colonies, Nigeria and Ghana have the largest number of intra-regional treaty partners.
LEGEND

TABLE IX


Total  Percent of Total Extra-Regional Treaties
### TABLE IX

**EXTRA-REGIONAL TREATIES OF ECOWAS STATES**

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Ghana is associated with 79% of the ECOWAS states by bilateral treaty. Notably, one of the missing relationships is with another ex-British colony, Gambia. Other missing relationships are with Mauritania and Niger. These two states are at the low end of overall treaty frequency, with only three and two intraregional treaties respectively.

Nigeria also has association with 79% of the possible combinations; missing only Liberia, Mauritania, and Upper Volta.

Interestingly, the military governments of Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta, and the Marxist government of Benin have created the fewest number of treaty partners, and even have few treaties among themselves. On the other hand, Ghana, another military government, and a nation with the highest frequency of intraregional treaties, has no treaty ties with Mauritania or Niger.

Other potential groupings worth investigation failed to yield any patterned analysis. Muslim state interaction is low, save for Mali, yet Mali has high interaction with non-Muslim states as well.

37% of the actual treaty pairs are accounted for by three states of varying characteristics; Ghana, ex-British, military government; Nigeria, ex-British, democratic government (at present); and Mali, ex-French, democratic government. No pattern of treaty predominance can be discerned from this grouping.
An examination of the relationship between treaty volume and GNP found a very modest, statistically significant correlation of $r = .62$, $R^2 = .39$.

The above demonstrates that no overall explanation for the distribution of treaty pairs within the region exists. Patterns are not along lines of colonial heritage, religious background, or government type. Economic factors consider only a modest source of variation. What can be said is that the ECOWAS states have very little treaty interaction among themselves. Overall treaty figures are very low and they do not appear to be growing over time.

77% of all actual treaty related nation pairings are linked by a single treaty. Most of the states who have displayed any treaty activity at all between themselves have entered into only one bilateral treaty in fifteen years.

Of the ten multi-treaty relationships in the ECOWAS group, Togo accounts for half.

The ECOWAS states did not display a treaty pattern even remotely similar to that of the EEC. If the assumption that most interstate affairs, especially trade relationships, are regulated by treaty is true, we must conclude that the ECOWAS states have displayed little treaty activity which an analyst could consider as evidence of an increased will to even interact with regional states, let alone to participate in an integration scheme.\(^{15}\)

As treaty formation is a relatively easy activity and
one that is necessary for establishing a network of formal relationships for potential integration we must conclude that there is compelling evidence against the possible success of the ECOWAS integration scheme. Intra-regional relationships are at a minimum and do not appear to be developing over time.

Extra-regional relationships remain the most numerous for the ECOWAS states. Table IX displays these relationships.

Scholars of colonial relationships claim that upon independence many states maintain their closest international relationships with their ex-rulers. The following table shows the percentage of overall treaties six ECOWAS states have with their ex-colonial powers. Liberia's special relationship with the U.S. is also demonstrated through treaty frequency.

TABLE X
PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL TREATY FREQUENCY FOR SELECTED ECOWAS STATES WITH THEIR EX-COLONIAL POWERS AND LIBERIA-U.S. TREATIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Ivory Coast</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of interest is the variation displayed by the states who do not follow this typical pattern of treaty relations. Socialist Guinea shows in Table IX a large percentage of its treaty relations to be with communist states. Marxist Benin, on the other hand, has retained its strongest treaty links with France.
Two military states, Ghana and Mali, have an even-handed relationship with both East and West.

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde show 33 treaties together with Portugal, at the same time reporting no treaties with ECOWAS states.

Table IX also demonstrates that it is the ex-French and Portuguese colonies who have maintained close ties with their ex-rulers while three ex-British colonies have attracted relations with other nations of the world.

This study has ignored multilateral arrangements because bilateral activity is a better gauge of interstate relationships. Yet it should be noted that the ECOWAS states do have a number of multilateral treaties linking the region into a variety of sub-regional associations. And of course ECOWAS itself was formed by a multilateral treaty.

The ECOWAS treaty in fact established a blanket Most Favored Nation Status for all signatories. But it is evidence of the weak hold of ECOWAS in the region that some member states have asked for a suspension of that provision for the time being.

Table XI demonstrates these multilateral relationships. Again the criticism is voiced that most of these relationships are examples of "regionalism by declaration," efforts that were easier to draft than to implement.
### TABLE XI

**MULTILATERAL TREATY RELATIONSHIPS OF THE ECOWAS STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Through this examination of treaty patterns of the ECOWAS states it should be clear that they have not established a base of treaty interaction among themselves. Many states have no more than a few bilateral treaties spread among the entire group of 16 states and no nation has established bilateral treaty relations with all of its regional partners.

In comparison with the experience of the EEC states, the pattern of increased treaty magnitude before the implementation of the EEC machinery, the magnitude of treaties with future partners, and the treaty partner rankings of the future members, we have the record of the ECOWAS states.
Their record presents no evidence of increased intra-regional relationships through the examination of treaty data. This evidence may suggest that West Africa had not prepared a fully operational framework of associations by 1975. Regardless of the good intentions the West African states may have had in founding ECOWAS it can be expected that the lack of organizational infrastructure will increase the task ahead necessary for success.

Later analysis will be required to observe any possible change in treaty frequency over time, mindful of course that treaty activity may diminish as a result of successful co-optation of duties by ECOWAS institutional machinery. The evidence would suggest, however, that treaty formation was still found necessary within the EEC and the magnitude was many times over that of the ECOWAS members.

Of course the observation that ECOWAS may have formed prematurely, before an adequate base of inter-state relations had been developed, does not doom ECOWAS to failure. Further activity may develop after 1975. We may observe, however, that up to 1975 that involvement had not occurred and any success will be in spite of this situation and not a result of it.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI


3 Rohn, Treaty Profiles, p. 9.

4 Article 102-Every Treaty and every International Agreement entered into by any member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

5 Scott, Chinese Treaties, p. 10.


8 Rohn, Treaty Profiles, p. 23.
Mala Tabourg, "Recent Developments in United Nations Treaty Registration and Publication Practices," American Journal of International Law 86 (April 1982): 353. She reports the process to be, "the verification of the Treaty; the establishment of a Registration file and preparation of the entry to appear in the Register of Agreements and in the Monthly Statement; the legal decision to register; the coding by computer of Treaty related data and the verification of computer tests; the printing of the Monthly Statement; and the dispatch of the registration certificate." p. 351. Following that comes the problems of UNTS publication.


Figure derived from data in Peter Rohn, Treaty Profiles.


The nature of treaties makes a Column and Row table report the same treaty twice. Thus a treaty between Ghana and Ivory Coast would appear in both the Ghana Column and Ivory Coast Column. For clarity read the table along the Columns for each State.

Scott, Chinese Treaties, pp. 3 and 227.


Rohn, Treaty Profiles, p. 27.

ECOWAS Treaty, Article 20.


CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF ECOWAS STATES' VOTING RECORD
IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The record of the United Nations General Assembly Roll Call Votes would appear to be another empirical referent for measuring community formation among the ECOWAS states. The Record offers a yearly updated body of information on how states present themselves in the international arena of the General Assembly.

We may hypothesize a relationship, "when states are successfully integrated they will tend to act with increasing solidarity in their international relations with extra-regional states." This hypothesis may be tested by examining the Voting Records of the General Assembly as reported in the Index to the Proceedings of the General Assembly. If the ECOWAS states present an identifiably unique voting pattern in relation to other African states we can say that ECOWAS has reached a level of consensus that could facilitate integration, or more boldly, be evidence of integration.

We will be satisfied to accept the former conclusion.

Over time studies may be employed to demonstrate change in voting patterns.

The European Economic Community (EEC) may serve as an example of a well established, institutionalized effort to
maintain a united voting policy in the General Assembly. Among the EEC members voting is coordinated through a Political Committee and a Correspondent's Group.¹

Early examinations of U.N. voting data present a variety of advanced statistical measures designed to identify issue areas and nation blocs that offer evidence of grouped voting patterns.²

The work of Bruce Russett, Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations, established a new standard for Roll Call vote analysis.³

Employing the Q-factor variant of factor analysis, Russett investigated the voting data for patterns of issue alignment and state bloc voting. This method assures total freedom from prejudged assumptions. Q-factor analysis presents a basis for comparison and judgement that is: inductive, interpretable, and offers gradations.⁴

Of interest for this study are the voting patterns of the EEC members and the future members of ECOwAS discovered by Russett.

Russett's analysis presented empirical evidence for dividing the U.N. members into six distinct groups.

Those members of the EEC who voted in the General Assembly, 18th Session (1963) presented themselves in a unified factor group. This alignment was found within the general grouping Russett termed "Western Community." This "Community" shared a common Western heritage. It also
included many South American states as well as Nationalist China, Iran, and Japan.

The future ECOWAS states, on the other hand, were divided into different "communities," roughly along lines of colonial heritage.

TABLE XII
GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING BLOCS:
FUTURE ECOWAS STATES, 18th SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazzaville Africans</th>
<th>Afro-Asians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey (Benin)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The appearance of francophone Mali among the Afro-Asian states may be explained in part by its affiliation by religion and location with the North African states: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, who also appear in that group.

Powers examined the voting records of the 30th Session (1975). Employing the same methodology as Russett, his analysis is perfectly compatible for comparison with Russett's and allows for analysis of over time change.

Powers cautions that factor scores are not useful measures for explanation or prediction. Rather, factor analysis is an exploratory tool useful in making preliminary identification of grouped variables, a "psycometric barometer
of prevailing attitudes."

The examination of the 30th Session identifies a new bloc of interest to this study. Powers labels this new bloc the "Developing World."

All ECOWAS states fall into this factor group except Mauritania, which demonstrated a pattern of votes similar to the "Muslim Community." Other ECOWAS states: Cape Verde, Gambia, Ivory Coast, and Liberia, were considered unclassifiable.

Failure to fit within any specific factor group was, for Cape Verde and Gambia, due to excessive absences. For Ivory Coast and Liberia the explanation is more interesting. They held factor scores balanced between the "Developing World" and "Western" factors. A position that is today echoed in their role as "moderates" within the OAU.

In the 30th Session the expanded EEC is again found within the "Western" factor group, while the Latin American states voted in a distinct pattern of their own.

An empirical study of regional voting focused on the EEC found that the community members voted together from 58 to 62.5 percent in the 30th, 31st, and 32nd Sessions. Not surprisingly, where the voting differed was on the "big" issues.

The EEC states, with a homogeneous membership and an elaborate bureaucratic establishment designed to manage the intricacies of negotiating and maintaining a common voting position, could not muster a higher consensus than 62.5%
agreement.

If U.N. voting analysis is a proper measure of a nation group's level of consensus among themselves and their ability to present a unified position to the other members of the United Nations, we must conclude that the EEC has not achieved an integration level of complete agreement.

Yet we may also conclude that, as the most successful integration scheme to date, the institutions and voting record of the EEC establishes a base measure by which other integration schemes may be weighed.

Turning to the ECOWAS states we find that features present in their voting record do not allow any advanced statistical operations to be performed.

Analytical problems stem from two distinct features. One, the ECOWAS states are part of the third world, which in the last decade has constituted an "automatic majority" in the General Assembly. This majority has tended to vote in an essentially solid bloc on most issues subject to roll call vote. Two, voting variation, when it occurs among ECOWAS members as well as among other African nations, is registered in Abstention Votes.

No previous study has addressed the nature of the Abstention Vote in any detail. There is little evidence to show the intent of the Abstention Votes, which makes quantitative interpretation difficult.

Are they cast to express mild disagreement with the
proposed resolution or to express mild support? They are probably used for both purposes, but how can an analyst be sure each time that he has determined the intent correctly? The coding employed by Russett demonstrates the ambiguity of the Abstention Vote.\textsuperscript{11}

With these complications it is impossible to utilize Abstention Votes as a measure of voting variation within an analysis and maintain any level of confidence in the results.

In 1976, 65 percent of all resolutions passed by roll call vote were unanimously approved by the African states. Of the remaining 35 percent most diversions were registered in Abstention Votes.

An examination of the Abstention Votes presents no discernible patterns among the ECOWAS states which distinguish them from the other African nations. Intra-regional Abstentions again reveal no interesting patterns along the lines of colonial, religious, or governmental differences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS MEMBER NO VOTES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL ASSEMBLY 31st SESSION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mauritania | Resolution 31/53 |
| Niger      | Decision 31/1413 |
| Upper Volta| Decision 31/1413 |

Mauritania voted No on The Question of Timor. This can be explained as a reaction to the colonial independence issue involved in the resolution. Mauritania's involvement in the Spanish Sahara dispute made its concern for this issue
area different than other ECOWAS states. Other African states with similar situations in their past also voted No.\textsuperscript{12}

No votes on Decision 1413 were distributed throughout a seemingly disparate group of third world states.

In comparison with the 31st Session, the 35th Session marked an increase in the incident of Abstention and No votes. There was a 36 percent reduction in unanimous votes among the African states. In 1976 only 41 percent of the Resolutions passed by unanimous vote.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{ECOWAS MEMBER NO VOTES GENERAL ASSEMBLY 35th SESSION (1981)}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Resolutions & Decision \\
Benin & 144c & 190 & 213 & 35/446 \\
Nigeria & 190 & 35/446 \\
Senegal & 123 & 35/446 \\
Upper Volta & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

This examination of the 31st and 35th Sessions of the General Assembly cannot establish the existence of a discernable voting pattern related to ECOWAS states. The fact that No votes are rarely employed by the African states makes elaborate analysis of their individual voting patterns impossible. They represent a homogeneous voting bloc in the General Assembly.

Possibly the evidence suggests a degree of concern among the ECOWAS members which stands above that of the EEC. But the fact that this consensus is developed around a greater pole, that of the third world voting pattern, makes it
impossible to infer within this group as to how regions have voted within it.

We can say that as a base measure for further analysis that the ECOWAS states do not present a distinct voting bloc as of the 35th Session of the General Assembly.

Within the subregion the ECOWAS states seem to corroborate the findings of Rai. His examination of global voting patterns among third world states revealed no differentiation between those states along lines of differing religious belief. For West Africa we can add that there are also no differences along lines of colonial heritage.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII


7 See Chapter IV, pp. 42 - 44.

8 Foot, "The European Community," p. 351.


11 Russett, "Discovering Voting Patterns," Yes = 2, Abstain = 1, No = 0.

12 Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guyana, Malaysia, Pakistan, Somalia, and the United Republic of Cameroon.

13 Smyth, "The Global Economy and the Third World."

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to demonstrate the level of integration among the ECOWAS member states. This aim was to be accomplished through the use of several quantifiable indicators of integration.

The review of the literature considering integration indicated that it has been the attitude of past writers on the subject that integration efforts among third world countries hold less than encouraging potential for success. Because of the low levels of commercial and political interaction among third world countries, even those states who are regionally related, it has been suggested that the dynamic rationale for integration is not as strong in third world circumstances as it was in the European context. This paper has demonstrated, however, the new logic for integration among third world countries. This logic suggests that in the context of import substitution efforts for development there is potential for success in third world integration models if the effective markets for regional products are expanded and the net result of the community is trade creation. The concentration on markets demonstrates the important economic aspects of the regional integration schemes.
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The goals of this work were to illustrate the level of integration in ECOWAS; and the selection and application of data sets that may prove useful to the analysis of third world integration schemes. This paper has shown mixed results toward the attainment of those goals.

The work has demonstrated that, with some qualifications, the data sets presented offer a more useful information base than has been considered by other works analyzing third world integration efforts. The data sets are useful principally because of availability. Treaties, trade data, and U.N. General Assembly Voting Records provide some of the clearest data sets that are readily available. Because the data are universal they allow ready analysis of intraregional relations among nations as well as comparative measures of member states' global relations. Each of the data sets have been employed previously in various studies of the integration potential and performance of the EEC. Thus, the rationale for the use of the data sets has become established within the literature.

The present work has added to that literature by presenting a refined variation of the analysis of trade data. By refining the analysis of third world state trade data a better glimpse of international commercial relations between third world states is developed. In the case of the ECOWAS member states it has been demonstrated that, when
primary product commodity exports are eliminated, the remaining exports: basic manufactures, transportation goods, food, etc., can show localized trade patterns often obscured by concentration on overall trade percentages which are heavily influenced by primary product exports.

In the case of the ECOWAS states, application of this refined approach demonstrated that the member states are strongly related in their non-primary product export trade. While this trade, overall, is but a minor source of revenue to the member states, the analysis does demonstrate that the non-primary trade the member states engage in is largely within the region. The states are developing a functional relationship through trade that may be setting a pattern for future, more important, regional relations.

The available data for treaty making was inconclusive in establishing degrees of integration within ECOWAS. The data did seem to indicate that the relatively young independent African states had not developed a tradition of formalizing their relations by treaty to the degree found in developed countries. It may be that this feature is in part due to the fact that the ECOWAS states have weak intraregional commercial relations. The findings from treaty data would tend to suggest that ECOWAS states have a limited level of integration. They certainly did not develop the intensified treaty relations before the formation of the regional organization as was demonstrated by the original six members of the EEC.
Treaty data should, however, be useful for the study of other regional integration efforts. At least they should be applied in other studies to determine if the pattern of intensified relations demonstrated in Europe was unique. Research of other regional integration efforts may also allow a comparative study of the employment of treaty making among various third world regions.

Quantitative analysis of the United Nations General Assembly Voting Record to discern patterns of international relations is also well established in political science literature. As with the other data sets, variations of analysis have been turned to regional integration measures. Again, work on the EEC established the theoretical rationale, specialized techniques, and benchmark values, for relating voting patterns of states to regional integration.

In the case of ECOWAS, voting pattern analysis could not yield information on the state of integration in West Africa. Due to the prevalent use of the Abstention vote in lieu of the No vote by the self declared non-aligned states the discovery of voting patterns among nations has become difficult.

The use of the Abstention vote may plague voting studies of third world regional patterns for some time to come. If the non-aligned movement begins to evolve or break up into more diverse component parts a new criteria by which voting patterns can be considered may develop. Until that
time, however, there may be little to gain from quantitative considerations of U.N. General Assembly voting patterns. Individual voting relationships may continue to be of interest but sophisticated statistical analysis is precluded.

Earlier quantitative analysis saw a change in the alignment of African states which found many of the future ECOWAS states within the same groups identified by factor analysis. After 1975, however, further change was difficult to chart due to the shift to Abstention votes by the non-aligned states.

Some minor distinctions were revealed by this study but the isolated nature of these differences makes them difficult to analyze. While it could be said that any No vote would be unusual and therefore of interest there is no way to discern voting patterns as indicators of the level of community integration with so few votes that deviate from the standard pattern.

Votes within the community were no different from those found in Africa as a whole. Useful conclusions would be difficult to draw from the results presented, save for the negative conclusion that U.N. voting records may not be as useful for analysis as they once were.

QUALITATIVE FEATURES OF ECOWAS INTEGRATION

Perhaps the most interesting features of the ECOWAS scheme and the interrelations of its members are qualitative.
The member states have been demonstrated to be young states, with poor economies and weak national traditions. Cooperative patterns are still developing within the states, and domestic relations remain more important than regional ones.

While the organization has been established for over eight years there have been few physical achievements posted by ECOWAS. This is in stark contrast to the experience of the EEC, but not much different than the experience of other third world integration efforts. At least, in distinction to the EAC, ECOWAS has remained intact and members are still giving nominal support to the ECOWAS scheme.

Institutions such as the West Africa Clearing House and the telecommunications project administration are in place and ready for an "administrative takeoff" but national politicians have not made the urgent call for implementation of increased duties by ECOWAS. As it remains impossible to measure the resolve of national elites, the will to implement ECOWAS machinery remains unclear. Some hints to this resolve can be extracted from the experiences at the OAU meetings in the summer of 1983 as well as the history of the expulsion of the foreign nationals from Nigeria in January 1983. There appears to be a desire to maintain the organization at some level; that level, however, appears to be much lower than the broad plans outlined by the founding treaty.

It may be that the ECOWAS scheme will continue to
increase its responsibilities and powers. The regional organization remains, however, little more than an outline of its potential and has accomplished less, functionally, politically, and economically, in its first eight years than the six European states managed with just the establishment of the ECSC.
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APPENDIX

ECOWAS MEMBER STATES

1. Mauritania 9. Ivory Coast
2. Mali 10. Liberia
3. Niger 11. Sierra Leone
7. Ghana 15. Senegal
8. Upper Volta 16. Cape Verde Islands