1997

Robert Francis Kelley and the Eastern European Division of the State Department: 1917-1933

Agnes Eileen Olsen
Portland State University

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds

Part of the Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation

10.15760/etd.5710

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
THESIS APPROVAL

The abstract and thesis of Agnes Eileen Olsen for the Master of Arts in History were presented July 7, 1989, and accepted by the thesis committee and the department.

COMMITTEE APPROVALS:

Bernard V. Burke, Chair

Franklin C. West

David A. Johnson

John J. Damis
Representative of the Office of Graduate Studies

DEPARTMENT APPROVAL:

Gordon Dodds, Chair
Department of History

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ACCEPTED FOR PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY BY THE LIBRARY

by on 8/13/98
ABSTRACT


Title: Robert Francis Kelley and the Eastern European Division of the State Department: 1917-1933.

This study traces the career of Robert Francis Kelley and his influence on American-Russian Relations during the nonrecognition period (1917-1933). The focus of this examination is Kelley's role in formulating, implementing, and sustaining America's anti-communist policy developed and solidified during the 1920s and 1930s. Particular attention is given to the senate recognition hearing of 1924, Kelley's training of future diplomats (George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, et al.), and his contributions to the preparations leading to the United States' recognition of Russia in 1933. Using Kelley's papers and personal correspondence, this study shows the growth of a man and the evolution of a policy.
ROBERT FRANCIS KELLEY AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DIVISION
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT: 1917-1933

by

AGNES EILEEN OLSEN

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
HISTORY

Portland State University
1997
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I    KELLEY FACES BORAH.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II   THE FORGOTTEN MEN</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III  THE KELLEY APPROACH</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV   THE KELLEY LEGACY</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V    THE KELLEY–ROOSEVELT CONFLICT</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOURCES CONSULTED</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This study has been a search for Robert Francis Kelley. Here, the goal has not been the acquisition of facts but rather the meaning of those facts, particularly as that meaning affected American-Russian relations during the nonrecognition period (1917-1933).

It has not been an easy task. Kelley's was an elusive personality -- his official writings are brilliantly cold, his collection of personal papers disappointingly thin, his diaries non-existent. His contemporaries labeled him "useful," "taciturn," and "legalistic." Historians have characterized him as "an astute student of Russian history," "a scholar by instinct and dedication," and "a bureaucratic genius."

Yet, despite the thinness of the available material, Kelley's role in formulating, implementing, and sustaining America's anti-communist policy, developed and solidified during the 1920's and early 1930's, has not been totally ignored. He has been assigned a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph by almost all historians of the period. As more information has surfaced, he has commanded more space, and the once-soft historical judgments have often hardened. Yet Kelley, the man, has remained an enigma.
There is nothing that whets the curiosity of the student of history more than a man of mystery. Thus the search began. The starting point was Washington, D.C. Here are found Georgetown University, home of Kelley's papers, and the National Archives, where the documents of the Eastern European Division of the State Department are stored. The papers of his friends, John Wiley (FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.) and Samuel Harper (University of Chicago, Chicago) were very helpful. A personal interview with the gracious and gregarious Earl Packer, Kelley's long-time associate and his assistant chief in the Eastern European Division, added to the Kelley mosaic. The DeWitt Poole, William Phillips, and Eugene Dooman Papers contained in the Oral History Collection at Columbia University provided further insights and background.

The nonrecognition period has long attracted historians. Every student of that period owes a huge debt to those scholars, who with fewer available documents, have recreated such accurate history. It must be stated -- however plagiaristically -- that if the present study has any merit, it is because its author stood on the shoulders of such giants. The pioneers include: Robert Paul Browder, *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy*; Donald G. Bishop, *The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements*; and William Appleman Williams, *American-Russian Relations*. Later studies include: Thomas R. Maddux, *Years of Estrangement: American*
Relations With the Soviet Union; Joan Hoff Wilson, *Ideology and Economics*; and John Richman, *The United States and the Soviet Union: The Decision to Recognize*.

These are historians before whom one stands in awe, and it is with a real sense of humility that this study has taken issue with some of their conclusions. It is realized that their searches and this search have been focused differently. They have sought to understand and explain a policy; to them Kelley was incidental to that policy. This study, more narrowly focused, has sought to understand the man in order to reexamine America's policy of the nonrecognition of Soviet Russia.

Yet there is always a danger when a writer attempts to recreate the life of a man, that an almost blind personal relationship will develop between that writer and her subject. A real effort has been made in this study to avoid this "protective mother" pitfall. On the other hand, an intellectual dilemma occurs when a 1980s liberal attempts to analyze objectively a 1920s conservative and his anti-communist stance. It offers little comfort to the writer to realize during the agonizing throes of writing that her subject most likely would have violently disagreed with her conclusions and would probably have disliked her. It is hoped that in this circumstance, Kelley would have reacted with the same humor and goodwill as the Irish playwright, Brendan Behan, who, while never forgiving his editor for
being English, was a big enough man to overlook the fact. With Kelley, one wonders.

This study has attempted to show the growth of a man and to explain the evolution of a policy. If in some small measure it has succeeded, that success is due to the author's fascination with her subjects.
CHAPTER I

KELLEY FACES BORAH

Even in Washington D.C. the hearing was not a front-page story. On January 21, 1924 the Washington Post ran two brief paragraphs on the second page under the heading, "First Hearing Today on Russian Question." Senator William Borah, chairman of the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had already received data from the State Department, the newspaper reported, data which supported Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes' position "in maintaining his policy of pronounced opposition" to recognition of the then six-year-old Soviet government of Russia. Hughes was not expected to appear at the hearing but had promised to send State Department representatives to answer questions."

Subsequent news stories excited even less attention. News of Lenin's death crowded coverage of the hearings off the front page, and inside it was forced to compete for space with surfacing reports of corruption in the cabinet of the beloved, recently-deceased president, Warren G. Harding. The Washington Post relegated its January 22 coverage to page four and headlined the story, "Hughes Transmits

'The Washington Post, January 21, 1924, p. 2.'
Documents to Link Soviets With Plots."\(^2\) Borah grabbed the *New York Times*’ headline: "Inquiry on Soviet Is Begun by Borah." This story, however, was positioned next to an overpowering ad for raccoon coats.\(^3\)

Three days after they began, the hearings were suspended. Although it was intimated at the time that uncertainty over Lenin's death prompted the suspension, it is more likely that Borah realized he had been outmaneuvered by Hughes.\(^4\) Eventually, the resolution to recognize the Soviet Russian government was shelved and with it the hopes of the pro-recognitionists. The recognition debate would not be resumed seriously until the advent of the Great Depression.

However obscured in 1924, the recognition hearings have not entirely escaped the prodding pens of historians, who have tended to view them as a disaster for Borah and his allies and a triumph for Hughes and his. This analysis, though accurate, is nevertheless incomplete. The hearings represented much more than a simple victory or defeat in a battle between two powerful men and their rival

\(^2\)The Washington Post, January 22, 1924, p. 4.

\(^3\)The New York Times, January 22, 1924, p. 4.

\(^4\)Marian C. McKenna, *Borah*, p. 295. Senator George W. Pepper, who served on the hearing committee, reported that the resolution was shelved with "a decent regard" for Borah's feelings. *Ibid.*, p. 295. Also see: Peter G. Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment*, pp. 91-92. Filene writes that the hearing was suspended because of scandals in Harding's cabinet.
philosophies. Nonrecognition in 1924 set the course of American foreign policy for the next nine years, years in which strong sentiments of suspicion and opposition towards communism, already present in the United States, hardened into a solidly anti-communist ideology. Also of decided significance, the hearings launched the career of a young foreign service officer, Robert Francis Kelley.

Preparation for the hearings had begun in late April 1923, when three men of diverse background and colorful personality -- Colonel Raymond Robins, Alexander Gumberg, and Senator William Borah -- met to devise a strategy to bring about recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States.⁵

Robins, an idealist from humble beginnings, had been in Russia during the November Bolshevik Revolution as a member of the Red Cross team appointed by President Woodrow Wilson in July 1917. A man of unusual courage, Robins, after the fall of Kerensky's Provisional Government, immediately forced a meeting with Trotsky to ask, "Can we [continue to] serve the Russian people without injury to our national interests...?"⁶ Robins later served as an

⁵James K. Libbey, Alexander Gumberg and Soviet-American Relations 1917-1933, p. 112.

⁶Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins Toward the Recognition of Soviet Russia and the Outlawry of War, 1917-1933, p. 20. Biographical information about Robins can also be found in Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, pp. 7-9; Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp. 27-30; Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and American
intermediary between the American ambassador, David R. Francis, and the Bolsheviks, and was thought to be closer to Lenin and Trotsky and the Bolshevik program than any other American in Russia at that time. Robins was not without his detractors. Historian and diplomat George Kennan wrote, "By nature a person wholly absorbed by contemporary realities, his image of Russia in late 1917 had been gained from a few intensive but brief and recent experiences and was lacking in historical perspective."

Robins returned to the United States in June 1918, determined to gain official recognition for the Bolshevik government, only to find himself labeled a radical. This was the period of the Red Scare, a time of near-national hysteria. Robins' statement, "We are engaged in the task of seeking to help the Russian people; not to support the Bolshevik program either here...or in Russia...," was either ignored or vilified. Robins was tenacious, however, and by April 1923 he felt the opportune moment had arrived.

Joining Robins in his optimism was his friend, Alexander Gumberg, a man often characterized as Robins' alter-ego. Gumberg, a Russian-American New Yorker, had traveled to Russia in the spring of 1917 as a sales

Foreign Policy, pp. 39-41; William Appleman Williams, American - Russian Relations 1781-1947, pp. 50, 80-82, 89-90.

'George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 63.

'Meiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 62.
representative for several American business firms. He soon severed his business ties in order to devote his energies to translating for the many foreign journalists assigned to Russia.\(^9\)

Gumberg remains the subject of some controversy among historians. His biographer, James K. Libbey, has taken sharp issue with Kennan's statement that Gumberg, upon his return to Russia in 1917, "thought of himself in those months, as a Russian citizen."\(^{10}\) Libbey writes, "The record indicates quite the opposite.... Gumberg became the interpreter of two societies, sympathetic to both, yet accepting their basic differences. Gumberg was able to exist in two dimensions."\(^{11}\)

Gumberg's wit was often sarcastic and he made enemies easily. The usually tenderhearted John Reed assigned Gumberg the pseudonym, "Trusishka" (which means "coward" in Russian) in his book, Ten Days That Shook the World.\(^{12}\) But whatever differences scholars may have concerning Gumberg's personality and motivations, they agree that he was an

---

\(^9\)Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 65; Meiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 22. Biographical information about Gumberg can be found in Maddox, William E. Borah, p. 198; Libbey, Alexander Gumberg; Williams, American-Russian, pp. 110-11; Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp. 88-89.

\(^{10}\)Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 66.

\(^{11}\)Libby, Alexander Gumberg, p. 18.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 19.
indefatigable worker in his efforts to mediate a reconciliation between America and Russia. By 1923 he had become "a critical figure in coordinating the public campaign for recognition."\textsuperscript{13} It was only natural that he would unite with the highest profile pro-recognitionist in America, Senator William Borah.\textsuperscript{14}

Borah was an Illinoisan by birth, an Idahoan by choice, and an individualist by tradition. His independence of thought he may have owed to one of his paternal ancestors, a German nun who left her convent to marry Martin Luther. His gift of oratory apparently developed early -- it was said that he addressed the farm animals in both poetry and Latin expletives.\textsuperscript{15}

Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and America's outraged reaction, Borah cautioned the Wilson administration: "It would be well to modify our pretensions of making the world safe for democracy."\textsuperscript{16} In 1919 he

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 103.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 104; Borah's career has been a popular subject of historians. See: Marian C. McKenna, Borah; Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and Foreign Policy; LeRoy Ashby, The Spearless Leader, Senator Borah and the progressive Movement in the 1920's; Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho; John Chalmers Vinson, William E. Borah and the Outlawry of War. For a contemporary view see: Walter Lippmann, "Concerning Senator Borah," Foreign Affairs, January 1926, Vol. IV, 2, pp. 211-222.

\textsuperscript{15}Maddox, William E. Borah and Foreign Policy, p. xiv; McKenna, Borah, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{16}Maddox, William E. Borah and Foreign Policy, p. 34.
attacked America's intervention in Russia: "I take the position that the Russian people have the same right to establish a socialistic state as we have to establish a republic." Borah continued to act as a vigilant critic of America policy and became the congressional leader in the battle for recognition of the Soviet government.

It was Gumberg who arranged the April, 1923, meeting. Along with Robins and Borah, he invited the former governor of Indiana, James P. Goodrich. Their immediate goal was to convince the highest government officials that the existing Russian policy needed to be revised. Goodrich was assigned the task of arranging a meeting with President Warren Harding. Robins was to prepare a detailed memorandum on the current situation in Russia, outlining the detrimental effects nonrecognition had already caused to American interests there and stressing the need for increased trade, and particularly the aid this would render to American farmers. Meanwhile, Borah was to rouse support among the press, around the country, and in Congress. Gumberg was to

"Ibid., pp. 43-44.

"Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, p. 112. James P. Goodrich was from Indiana, a grain-growing state. He was concerned with the farmers and felt recognition of the Soviet government would open grain exports to Russia. See: Meinburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, pp. 73, 77-78; Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, pp. 79-81, 95-98."
organize an "Unofficial Congressional Commission" which would visit Russia during the summer of 1923. 

In May 1923, Robins wrote a memorandum in which he urged a "review of the policy determining Russian-American relations." His justification for this review was "the critical conditions now existing in the economic relations between Russia and the rest of the world," which he felt to be unsound and "a continuing and growing menace to the economic welfare of America and the peace of the world." 

On May 31, Robins sent the memorandum with a letter to Goodrich. "Enclosed please find draft of suggestions for a letter to the big chief upon Russian-American relations." Robins lunched at the White House with President and Mrs. Harding on June 2, 1923. During the luncheon, Russia was discussed. Noted historian William Appleman Williams claims that at this meeting, Harding authorized Robins to make "a confidential trip to Russia" and, if Robins felt "conditions warranted recognition," Harding agreed "to reopen the

---

18 Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, pp. 109-110. The commission included Congressman James A. Frear of Wisconsin, Senators Edwin F. Ladd of North Dakota and William H. King of Utah. Upon their return, they were unanimous in their call for renewed trade relations with Russia, p. 112.


[Russian] question." Using Williams' research as evidence, other historians have restated the same finding. Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger, however, in recounting the event, writes that "Harding declined to reconsider the Russian question until he should return from the West." James Libbey, in Alexander Gumberg, openly takes issue with Williams' assertion and writes, "While Williams' thesis is interesting and logical, existing evidence is not supportive." This argument, while interesting, becomes inconsequential because, on August 2, 1923, during his Western trip, Harding died and was succeeded in office by his vice president, Calvin Coolidge.

Once again the group started fresh, but they were increasingly hopeful. They believed Coolidge would be less influenced than Harding by the two strongest architects of the anti-communist nonrecognition policy -- Hughes and the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover. Coolidge liked and respected Borah and often invited him to the White House to listen to his views. Then, on December 1, 1923, Robins was invited to have lunch with Coolidge, and they discussed the

\[\text{References}\]

22Williams, American-Russian Relations, p. 204. Maddox, William E. Borah cites Williams as his authority for the same statement, p. 200.

23Meiburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 89.

24Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, p. 113.
Russian question for two hours. Robins wrote later to Gumberg, "I felt Coolidge was really eager to act."  

On December 6, 1923, Coolidge did act. In his State of the Union message, he offered to the Soviet Government what was widely interpreted as an olive branch. "I do not propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity," he stated:

But while the favor of America is not for sale, I am willing to make very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia. Already, encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society can be detected. But more are needed. Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who are despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our Government, not by the Czar, but by the newly-formed Republic of Russia, whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appears [sic] works meet for repentance; our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure. We hope the time is near at hand when we can act.  

To the pro-recognitionists this message sounded conciliatory and they responded immediately. Robins prepared a soft reply for the Soviet government which was cabled to Moscow. They were aware that Hughes would be the greatest obstacle. "Hughes and Gompers will do all in their

---

25 Robins to Gumberg, Ibid., p. 115.

26 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited FRUS), 1:December 6, 1923, State of the Union Message.

27 Meinburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 94.
power to prevent the success of these negotiations," Robins wrote Gumberg:

Only by a more willing spirit on the part of the Soviet leaders...can we make good on this opening. I am bringing all the guns I can man into action to center on Coolidge....It is indispensable for our success that we get a favorable response from the Soviet government...With a generous response...we can win.  

On December 16, G. M. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram directly to Coolidge, which expressed the Soviet government's willingness "to establish at last firm friendship with [the] people and government [of the] United States." Conciliatory but not humble, the Soviets offered to open negotiations based on "mutual nonintervention" in internal affairs and stated that the financial claims of both governments should be recognized in order "to bring about the desired end of renewal of friendship with the U.S."  

The message was received December 17. That same day, Evan E. Young, head of the Division of Eastern European Affairs of the State Department, sent a letter to Hughes.

I venture to suggest that a reply be made by you....It seems to me that our reply should be brief and concise and of a nature which will not invite negotiations or further communications unless the Soviet authorities are, in fact, prepared to accept

---

28Robins to Gumberg, December 1, 1923, quoted in Mieburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 94. Samuel Gompers was president of the American Federation of Labor and a leading nonrecognitionist. See letter: Gompers to Hughes FRUS, 1923, Vol. II, July 9, 1923, pp. 758-760.

29FRUS, 1:1923, p. 787.
in full our three fundamental and essential conditions.\textsuperscript{30}

Young's letter has been largely ignored by historians, a fact which has obscured the importance of the Eastern European Division and its profound influence on United States' policy concerning Russia.

Hughes swiftly responded to Young's suggestion. On December 18, he sent Chicherin a brusque reply:

There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations. The American government, as the President said in his message to the Congress, is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them, they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obligations. Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. This government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{30}Evan E. Young to Secretary of State Hughes, December 17, 1923, U.S. Department of State, National Archives (hereafter cited as DSNA), Record Group 59, File 711.61/71.

\textsuperscript{31}FRUS, 2:1923, p. 788. Whether Hughes sent the message before or after consulting Coolidge remains unclear. There is a typed copy of the statement in the State Department files, dated December 18, 1923, with some hand-written corrections along with a note at the bottom in Hughes' handwriting which reads: "Read by the President and approved by him--December 18, 1923. CEH." There is also a letter of the same date from Hughes to the President which reads: "I enclose a copy of the statement which I have given to the press." There are no notations by Coolidge on either document. DSNA Record Group 59, File 711.61/71. Whether or not Hughes acted on his own roused considerable
Hughes' telegram shocked the pro-recognitionists. Borah was "dumbfounded" and returned battle in the newspapers and on the Senate floor. Robins naively hoped Hughes would be damaged enough to force his resignation. Gumberg was mystified. Undoubtedly in an attempt to support his harsh position, Hughes, on December 19, 1923, released a text of instructions to the Workers' Party of America. Supposedly intercepted and purported to have been issued by G. E. Zinoviev, president of both the Communist International and the Petrograd Soviet, the documents expressed the hope that the Workers' Party would "conquer the proletarian forces of America and in the not-distant future raise the red flag over the White House."

Although the Department of Justice had assured the State Department of the authenticity of the documents, they were swiftly branded as forgeries. "Secretary of State Hughes is seeking to victimize the whole country with a vicious frame up," C. E. Ruthenberg, Executive Secretary of

comment at the time and has teased the curiosity of historians since.

35 Maddox, William E. Borah, p. 20; Meinburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 97.
33 Ibid., p. 97.
34 Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, p. 115.
35 FRUS, 2:1923, p. 790.
the Workers' Party, wired the State Department on December 20.  

Borah lashed back at the State Department forces. In an article published in the New York Times on December 30, 1923, he argued that the question of Russia's recognition was one of a choice between "World Militarism or World Peace....Our people can and will easily withstand...propaganda...our people cannot well withstand another World War."  

On January 7, 1924, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Borah debated the issue on the Senate floor. Lodge argued that the Soviet government was making:

"efforts to cause disorder and dissension among the American people...which if successful would result ultimately in the radical alteration and perhaps the destruction of our present form of constitutional government."

Borah, quoting Henry Clay, argued that "recognition did not imply approval of the character of the government but rather recognition that a government exists." Borah continued:

"I am not interested in communism, I am not interested in socialism....I do not believe in either one of them; but I look beyond that..."
proposition. I wish to see if it is possible to adopt a course and a policy which will tend to minimize, destroy, and eliminate both theories. There is just one form of government in which we here believe, in which I believe and that is the blessed old Republic. I believe...that the best way to maintain American principles is to extend the doctrine of Americanism in so far as we can by precept and example. "Outlawry of a nation accomplishes nothing."  

Borah appended several documents to his remarks, including two letters written by Assistant Attorney General John W. H. Crim. Dated November 13, 1923 and December 4, 1923, the letters were written in answer to requests that communists in America should be prosecuted under the Logan Act. Crim wrote, "There has been a great deal of 'slush' coming to my attention with reference to this act, but not one single person has submitted a concrete statement of facts."  

Crim's replies made clear that the Justice Department did not have enough evidence to convict any communist in America of violating this act.

On January 9, 1924, the Washington Post ran the story, headlined, "Evidence of Soviet Plots Against U.S. Lacking, Crim Says." It was Hughes' turn to be outraged. He

---

40 Ibid., p. 620.

41 "Crim to Eben W. Burnstead, November 13, 1923; Crim to Everett P. Wheeler, Esq., December 4, 1923, reprinted in Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress, 1st Session, January 7, 1924, p. 621. The Logan Act forbids a citizen to correspond privately with any foreign government or its agents in order to influence its actions towards the United States.

42 Washington Post, January 9, 1924.
immediately sent a "Personal and Confidential" letter to Attorney-General Harry M. Daugherty. "I hope...you will be able to give a line to the press at once," he wrote. He then suggested a statement:

Apart from the question of prosecutions or of technical requirements to meet the provisions of particular statutes, it should be clearly understood that the Department of Justice has abundant evidence to support the position of the Department of State, with respect to communist propaganda, directed from Moscow in this country."

On January 10, Daugherty obliged. The Washington Post wrote, "Hughes' Anti-Soviet Charges Backed by Attorney General." The New York Times wrote, "Daugherty Confirms Moscow Propaganda." This serves as an example of the importance the State Department attached to the impending hearing.

The hearing convened on the morning of January 21, 1924. Outside, it was intensely cold. Northwest winds aggravated numerous chimney fires, and the temperature lingered around 10 degrees all day.

44 Washington Post, January 10, 1924.
45 New York Times, January 10, 1924. In his book, The Inside Story, Daugherty writes, "Mr. Hughes was grateful to me for the services I had rendered the Department of State and at the next Cabinet meeting he pressed my hand and said, 'You're a brick.'" p. 209. Daugherty, who would soon be forced to resign because of his part in the Harding scandals, was bitterly anti-communist. See pp. 210-214.
Inside, Evan E. Young, Chief of the Eastern European Division of the State Department, and his assistant Robert F. Kelley, faced a panel of Senators. After reading a brief statement from Hughes, Young introduced his assistant: "Mr. Kelley is the Russian expert of the division and he will give you the contents [of the documents] and will be able to translate from the Russian anything you desire." These documents, Young continued, "are submitted to show that the Russian Communist Party controls what is known as the Soviet government of Russia." Young then turned the presentation over to Kelley.

The individual who had been chosen to present the State Department's case appeared no match for the indomitable Borah. Not quite thirty years old, Kelley had been hastily summoned to the Eastern European Division on September 26, 1923, from his post in Calcutta, India.

---


47Ibid., p. 2.

48Kelley had been assigned to Calcutta in November 1922. Although unhappy with the post, he had prepared such excellent reports that letters of commendation had been sent to both the Department of Commerce and the Department of State. Letters and reports in Robert F. Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. (Hereafter cited as Kelley Papers).
Although Kelley was a newcomer to the department, he was well informed on Russia. At Harvard he had studied Russian history, literature, and language, and had planned to do research in Russia and write his dissertation on the Crimean War. The Bolshevik Revolution had shattered that dream. Kelley ended up in the army as a military attaché and observer assigned to the Baltic States.

There, on the Latvian-Russian border between 1920 and 1922, Kelley's view of the Bolsheviks and of communism first crystallized. He witnessed the "terrible economic ruin of the country" caused by a "brutal regime of terror and governmental suppression." He observed the peasant uprisings as "hunger increased in intensity." He saw the "deceived masses, still hungry, cold and oppressed, open their eyes." He viewed the reactions of the "American re-emigrants, who were terrified when they saw the reality of 'Socialistic Paradise.'" He met the cultured but bewildered emigrées who had left their palaces and jewels behind and now clung only to their memories. He interviewed courageous soldiers from the White armies, who were willing to risk their lives again if only the West would help.

In the end, Kelley became emotionally attached to these people as only an unemotional man can become attached

---

-- with his mind. He committed himself to them as he had committed himself to their history, language and literature during his student days at Harvard. It was a commitment the erudite scholar would honor all the days of his life. Though far less voluble in his expressions, Kelley held his convictions just as passionately as the Senator from Idaho.

At the time of the hearing, Borah commanded great prestige. "He knows what is theatrically effective," wrote Walter Lippmann, one of the best-known journalists of the day. "He has an air of common sense, a resourcefulness, and an eloquence which have made him the most successful debater in the Senate....For some subtle reason, Borah does not make enemies of his opponents."

Although Lippmann's description may have represented the majority view, Borah's popularity was not universal. "We were agin [sic] him. We thought he was nuts," recalled Earl Packer. "We didn't have any great fondness for him. We couldn't say he was unaware -- but we couldn't understand how a person with his opportunities wasn't more informed. We disagreed 100% with Borah. We wanted the best for our country vis-à-vis Russia and a lot of other countries. And

---

Borah was not willing to look at the facts with an open mind."

His skill at debate notwithstanding, Borah lost the initiative within the first five minutes. He was painfully unfamiliar with the simplest facts, while Kelley was fully informed. The following dramatizes the gap separating the two men's knowledge.

Senator Borah. You say it [Kelley's evidence] shows the control of the Soviet Government by the Communist Party?

Mr. Kelley. By the Russian Communist Party.

Senator Borah. Would it be equally true to say that it shows the control of the Communist Party by the Soviet Government?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Senator Borah. Why Not?

Mr. Kelley. Because the control is exercised by the Communist Party and not by the Soviet Government.

Senator Borah. If the parties are the same, neither one has a right to dictate to the other?

Mr. Kelley. But the one has a right to dictate to the other, because our proof will show that the activities

---

5 Interview with Earl L. Packer, Retired, formerly of the State Department, Division of Russian Affairs (became Division of Eastern European Affairs October 10, 1922) from 1921-1936. Interview held February 15, 17, 1989 in New York City. (Hereafter cited Packer Interview).
of the Soviet Government are determined by the Communist Party.

Senator Borah. Did it determine the new economic policy of the Soviet Government?

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Senator Borah. Did not Zinoviev oppose that policy?

Mr. Kelley. Certain members of the party opposed it.

Senator Borah. Did not Zinoviev oppose it bitterly?

Mr. Kelley. He did not oppose it bitterly; when the decision was made by the political bureau, Zinoviev dropped his opposition and supported Lenin.

Senator Borah. And he has continued to criticize it up to this day?

Mr. Kelley. No, Zinoviev has not.

Senator Borah. Are you sure of that?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Borah. You are satisfied of that, are you?

Mr. Kelley. Yes sir.\footnote{Hearings: Recognition of Russia, p. 5.}

Kelley's organizational plan was as brilliant as it was simple. The economic and diplomatic issues were ignored. Communist propaganda and the national security of the United States were the focal points. Kelley and the State Department presentation had three goals:
1. To prove the essential unity of the various groups at Moscow, whether under the name of the Third International, the Russian Communist Party, or the Soviet Government.

2. To explain the relationship between those groups and their subordinate groups in the United States.

3. To demonstrate the activities of the subordinate groups in the United States.\(^53\)

In order to accomplish these goals, Kelley never let the initiative slip from his control. In a masterful stroke, he introduced letters confirming that the "Red Flag over the White House" document was a forgery. Again and again, Borah was pushed into a defensive position. Worst of all, he was unprepared.\(^54\) Following the first day's noon recess, Borah insisted on reading into the record a portion of the constitution of "The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics." After the reading, Kelley said, "The constitution read by the Chairman is the constitution of the original Soviet Republic. That is not the constitution of

\(^{53}\)Ibid., p. 59. Also see Maddox analysis of hearings results, Maddox, William E. Borah, p. 207.

\(^{54}\)Hearings, Recognition of Russia. Also see: Klieforth to Harper, Harpers Papers, University of Chicago.
the Soviet Federation, which is the international entity.... I have the constitution of the Soviet Federation [USSR]."\textsuperscript{55}

The battle was brief and decisive. Had Borah admitted that the Soviet Government was an atheistic class dictatorship which deserved recognition simply because it was the de facto government of Russia, perhaps the result would have been different. Instead, he became an apologist for the regime, based on the proposition that positive changes were occurring in the Soviet government. Kelley's testimony and evidence at the hearing destroyed Borah's argument.

In a penetrating analysis, historian Peter Filene has written that failure to take up the "amoral" argument provokes "the suspicion that perhaps at heart [Borah, Robins, et al.] too wanted to recognize only a liberal and democratic Soviet regime."\textsuperscript{56}

For Kelley, the Eastern European Division, and Hughes, the hearings were a success. They had put the question of

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{56}Filene, \textit{Americans and the Soviet Experiment}, p. 92. Also see: Christopher Lasch, \textit{The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution}, p. 217, and Joan Hoff Wilson, \textit{Ideology and Economics}, p. 30, footnote 19. It is of some interest that the reports Borah requested from Hughes were never sent to the hearings. (The State Department claimed they were lost.) The reports requested were written by William Boyce Thompson, Col. Raymond Robins, General Graves, Governor J. P. Goodrich, Major Slaughter and Major Faymonville. All these men had sent formal reports in the past to the State Department which Borah felt supported his position. See Borah's request in \textit{Congressional Record}, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress, 1st Session, January 7, 1924, p. 626.
recognition to rest, at least temporarily, and they would now be able to concentrate on protecting the United States from Soviet propaganda, which they feared threatened to "overthrow the political and economic structure of the country."  

On January 25, 1924, Hughes wrote Kelley a letter of commendation: "Both the preparation of the case, as well as the manner of presentation, left nothing to be desired, and I know, both from my own experience, as well as from what Mr. Young tells me, how important a part you played throughout."  

Young's review of Kelley was no less laudatory. "Mr. Kelley possesses unquestionably an usually fine and well disciplined mental equipment,..." he wrote. His reports "are marked by an orderly and logical method,...a thoroughness which leaves nothing to be desired. The foregoing is, of course, unusually high commendation, but judged squarely by his work, I can say no less."  

From the date of the hearing, Kelley's fate was determined. He was, as Young wrote, "One of the few outstanding students of Russia..." in the country.

---

57 Packer Interview, February 17, 1989.
58 Hughes to Kelley, January 25, 1924, Kelley Papers.
59 Evan Young to Mr. Eberhardt, Personnel, November 1, 1924, pp. 1-2. Kelley Papers.
60 Ibid., p. 2.
Unofficially awarded the title of Russian expert of the State Department, it was only a matter of time until he would be appointed Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs.
CHAPTER II
THE FORGOTTEN MEN

State Department officials were stunned by events in Russia in 1917. In March, revolutionaries seized control of the Czarist government, and within days the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty vanished. An untried, unstable republic emerged in the form of a provisional government -- a government President Woodrow Wilson characterized as "a fit partner" for the United States. While the government and people of the United States joyfully embraced the new order, emotionally, ideologically and economically, the State Department was ill-prepared to cope with the speed and complexity of unfolding events in Russia. Then, on April 6, 1917, the United States entered the World War, which only compounded the confusion. Unprepared to manage effectively the escalating diplomatic disorder, State Department officials responded to the crisis on October 16, 1917, by creating a special section -- the Division of Near Eastern Affairs -- Russia.61 The section was barely functional,

61This section evolved into the Russian Division (August 13, 1919) and later the Division of Eastern European Affairs (October 10, 1922). As the youngest politico-geographic division, it "didn't rank in the same category as the Latin American or Western European Divisions. We had to prove ourselves as being an important department for matters in our bailiwick." Packer Interview, February, 1989. Also
when, on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks captured control in Petrograd and formally announced the overthrow of the provisional government.

From that moment, the officers of the new Russian Division were assigned the task of comprehending this second revolution which President Wilson and the rest of the State Department already had rejected on its face as incomprehensible. The rhetoric reverberating from the Bolsheviks called for an end to the War, preached the overthrow of legitimate governments everywhere, advocated the destruction of capitalism and all the bourgeoisie, and urged a universal dictatorship of the proletariat. That one of the last great empires of Europe, with a population of 140 million people, was now in the controlling clutches of a little band of revolutionaries was simply not to be understood. And certainly not by a president or a country fighting a war "to make the world safe for democracy."

The challenge facing the officials of the Russian Division was two-fold. First, was the difficulty of obtaining accurate information on the rapidly changing and often confusing events occurring inside the vast country of Russia. Even more frustrating was the fact that once a

---

see: "Division of Eastern European Affairs," The American Foreign Service Journal, May-June 1934, pp. 54-61, copy in Kelley Papers, Georgetown University. Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, implies that the division was established as a direct response to the Bolshevik Revolution. In this instance, he is in error, pp. 18-19.
reliable information network had been developed, the officials found that their recommendations were often ignored. Eventually, however, their dedication was rewarded, and they became the State Department's acknowledged experts on American-Soviet relations. The contributions of these men were significant, for their actions and opinions were instrumental in establishing the ground rules for the United States' recognition of Soviet Russia -- rules which translated effectively into a policy of nonrecognition. Moreover, they set a precedent which the division would follow throughout its existence, one of employing only officers who had previously served in the Eastern European field. This was the policy and the department which Kelley would inherit and personalize with his own high standards. Kelley's predecessors are largely forgotten now, their achievements ignored, their biographies unwritten. Nevertheless, they left their imprint on both the policy and the department, and for that reason alone, if for no other, they deserve at least a brief mention in this narrative.

Basil Miles was appointed head of the Russian Division at the time of its creation. Miles possessed all the usual qualifications of an early twentieth century United States

---

Between 1917 and 1934 there were thirty-three officers assigned to the Russian Division. Of these, all but seven had had "field" experience in the Eastern European area. The American Foreign Service Journal, May-June 1934, p. 55.
diplomat: a wealthy eastern seaboard family --
Philadelphians, in Miles' case, a fine education, which had
included travel and study abroad, correct manners and social
connections. After a brief bout with business (1899-1901),
and an equally short stint teaching at a private academy
(1901-03), Miles had begun his public career in 1905 as
personal secretary to George von Lengerke, Ambassador to
Russia under President Theodore Roosevelt. Miles stayed in
Russia after Von Lengerke's departure as Third Secretary of
the Embassy.  

Miles came back to the United States in 1907, then
returned to Russia as Special Assistant to Ambassador David
Francis in charge of Austro-Hungarian and German interests.
He surrendered these duties in April, 1917, as a consequence
of the United States' entry into the War. Subsequently, in
May and June 1917, Miles served as Secretary of the Special
Root Mission to Russia. He predicted at that time that
hunger in Petrograd was sufficiently severe to be considered
a political factor which could bring about "the downfall of
the present regime and ... possibly the total withdrawal of
Russia from the war."  

---

63Biographical information about Miles can be found in
William Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations, 1781-
1947, pp. 87, 108; Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the
Diplomatic Mind, p. 147.

64The Root Mission was a goodwill mission headed by the
aged, distinguished, conservative Elihu Root, who had been
appointed by President Wilson. Its purpose was to encourage
the Provisional Government to continue the Russian War
the Root Mission, Miles returned to Washington to assume new duties in the Russian Division.

During the two years Miles was chief of the division, United States' relations with Russia were "dominated by considerations arising out of the World War." These considerations, as later summarized by Kelley and DeWitt Poole, included the Bolshevik revolution, armistice with the Central Powers, repudiation of foreign state loans and abolition of private ownership of real estate, evacuation of Petrograd, and intervention. 66

The overriding question, however, was whether the United States should recognize the Bolshevik government. It was to this question that Miles directed his keenest attention, and it was upon this proposition that he effected the most influence. At no time did he favor even de facto recognition of the Soviet government. In all probability,

65Kelley to DeWitt C. Poole, February 2, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

66Poole to Kelley, January 19, 1933; Kelley to Poole, February 2, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. This is only a partial list which Poole and Kelley outlined in preparation for a proposed history of American-Russian Relations.
his recommendations were seriously considered when policy was made. The high esteem in which he was held by President Wilson, who considered him "capital," supports this argument. Secretary of State Robert Lansing also had great confidence in Miles. At Lansing's request, Miles screened visitors, interpreted the rapidly changing events in Russia, and prepared reports.

Miles likewise made it difficult for anyone who attempted to undercut his position. Worried that Ambassador Francis might be unduly influenced by Raymond Robins, who was actively working to bring about recognition, Miles suggested firm "instructions" be sent to Francis. Miles' disdain for Robins' position was so pronounced that upon Robins' return to the United States, Miles virtually throttled Robins' plans to present his case to top-level State Department officials. Miles even arranged to have Robins' luggage searched upon his arrival in Seattle.

Nevertheless, while Miles opposed de facto recognition, there is some evidence that he favored "contact" with the Bolsheviks. In February 1918, in a memo to Lansing, he wrote that "all observers returning from

---

68 Ibid., p. 137.
69 Ibid., p. 146.
70 George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 385-86.
Russia seem agreed that the unbending adherence to this policy of holding absolutely aloof has been aggravating, has even tended to throw the Bolsheviks into the hands of the Germans." In an earlier memo he had suggested that the time had come "to deal unofficially" with all parties in Russia, including the Bolsheviks." This sleight of hand diplomacy was as unworkable as it was dishonest, and only led to confusion for the Americans still officially and unofficially inside Russia.

DeWitt Poole replaced Miles as chief of the division on October 1, 1919, following his return from Moscow and Archangel, where he had been assigned as Consul General. Poole had been in Moscow at the time of the November Revolution, which unlike the relatively bloodless uprising in Petrograd, had been the scene of a bitter battle for control. The fighting had lasted nearly a week, and although in grave personal danger, Poole had valiantly protected the Americans remaining in Moscow. He was later commended for heroism by the State Department.  

71National Archives, State Department File 861.01/14\frac{1}{2}, quoted in Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 393.

72George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 392.

73Ibid., p. 74. For more on Poole's activities in Russia during 1917-1918 see Ibid., pp. 170-183, 447-448, 472. Also see: Williams, American Russian Relations, 1781-1947, pp. 119, 145, 151. Poole actually served in the Russian Division from October 1, 1919 until March 20, 1920 when he went on an extended leave of absence. He returned April 27, 1921 and served until September 30, 1923. (Evan Young was officially appointed chief on July 3, 1923, but
The son of a military man, Poole's courage under fire and his dedication to public service were ingrained in childhood. Speaking of his family, he later recalled that "I grew up in genteel poverty, compensated for very largely by a sense of the distinction of public service. We were aware of, I think it's fair to say, a certain well-bred snobbery, in that we were, after all, in the aristocratic tradition of public service." Poole prided himself on being an independent thinker and traced this trait also back to his upbringing. "We were not," he said, "very affected by fashions of thought." He was often a severe critic of his fellow diplomats. In describing a colleague, he once said, "[He was] a typical diplomat, a man of charm and considerable ability...[but] he lacked imagination and was unready for anything outside of routine at a higher level."

In a comparison of Russians and Americans, Poole echoed observations made by Alexis de Tocqueville a century earlier. "That is the great distinction between the Russians and the Americans. We have terrible social tyranny here. We have to like the same theatres, movies, music....

due to illness was unable to immediately assume his duties.) The American Foreign Service Journal, May-June, 1934, pp. 54-55.

DeWitt C. Poole, Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York City, p. 4. (Hereafter cited as Poole's Oral History.)

Ibid., p. 4.

Ibid., p. 450.
Russia, throughout history, has had political tyranny but social liberty, at least up to the Bolshevik Revolution."

Under Poole's tutelage, the Russian Division became an academic center for "collecting, collating and interpreting information about Russia." Samuel N. Harper, a professor from the University of Chicago, and one of the few scholars of Russia in the United States, served as a special assistant in the department during Poole's tenure. Harper described the department as "a kind of embassy-in-exile." There, Harper and the officers of the division translated Russian newspapers, studied documents, and analyzed reports made by Russian refugees. Their goal was to gain an understanding of the "fundamental Bolshevik principles, methods, and aims -- covering the character of their rule, the economic results of Bolshevik control, and the program of world revolution."  

Between October 1919 and October 1920, the division published three detailed memoranda, whose contents were

---

77Ibid., p. 4.

78Samuel N. Harper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 126.

79Ibid., p. 126. Poole said of Harper, "We all loved him." The Oral History Collection. Poole's Oral History, Columbia University, New York. The Samuel Harper Papers, University of Chicago, are also indispensable for their insight into the thinking of the officers of the Russian Division. The collection has a large number of semi-official and personal letters which were exchanged between Harper and the staff members of the Russian Division.

80Ibid., p. 128.
communicated to the Congress and the American people, in order that they might better understand the leadership's policy of nonrecognition. These original academic studies became a blueprint for later research. Actual communist documents were collected which demonstrated the Soviet's ambition to export communism world-wide. The linkage between the Bolsheviks, the Russian Soviets, and the Communist International was sharply illustrated. In addition to serving as an exposé of Soviet intent, the memoranda developed a justification for the State Department's unyielding nonrecognition policy. Two years after the Revolution, it had become increasingly difficult to characterize the Bolshevik leaders as simply a little group of unstable, unrepresentative insurrectionists. Consequently, with the passage of time, the State Department sought a new rationale to justify its persistent refusal to recognize officially the despised regime. The Soviets obligingly provided such a rationale by grinding out revolutionary communist propaganda exhorting the "wage slaves" of the world to rise up against their capitalist masters.

The communists' propaganda was carefully skewed to appeal to the American masses -- the underpaid workers, the

---

oppressed Negroes -- and the utopian intellectuals. If the atheistic rulers of the new Russia wrapped a Christian message -- however unintentionally -- around their radical rhetoric, it was uniformly ignored in the United States. The American public was not disposed to accept criticism graciously, and its business and political leaders dismissed with anger and contempt any disturbance of their collective conscience.

And so the policy makers rose in majestic arrogance and refused to acknowledge the existence of the Soviet Government. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes personified this attitude. Harper once showed him a cartoon from a Moscow newspaper which pictured Hughes trembling as he studied Moscow propaganda. Hughes laughed, Harper reported, "...then, turning serious, [Hughes] remarked that one of the troubles was that Moscow thought we were afraid of its propaganda and did not realize that it was simply a matter of self-respect. We didn't like it, and we weren't going to stand for it." 82

Hughes was not only architect of the policy but champion of the nonrecognitionists. Hughes' biographer, Betty Glad, argues that Hughes' position was based on the realization that the United States had become a "major power." As the "leading creditor nation of the world" it was incumbent upon the United States to establish

82 Samuel N. Harper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 130.
international standards for the protection of private property rights." Thus, reasoned Hughes, the Soviets' repudiation of the debts incurred by the Provisional Government and the confiscation of property of American citizens, explicitly demonstrated that they were ineligible for "membership in the family of nations." 

Hughes, whom William Castle has characterized as "the most perfect mental machine in the world," was a demanding taskmaster, yet he commanded the respect of all the officials of the Russian Division, even the liberal Socialist, Arthur Bullard.

Bullard was Chief of the Russian Division from November 1920 to March 1921. By profession a journalist and novelist, Bullard was a cosmopolite, well-read and widely traveled. He has been characterized by the astute critic, George Kennan, as "a genuine idealist." Long interested in Russian affairs, Bullard had been Secretary of the American Friends of Russian Freedom, a group of American liberals who actively supported efforts to bring about political liberty in Czarist Russia. A small, diffident man, Bullard was thirty-eight at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and was, in the words of Kennan, "the best American mind

---

83 Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence, pp. 312-313.

84 Ibid., p. 98. Castle served as assistant Secretary of State.

85 George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 47. Also see: Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933, pp. 31-33.
observing on the spot the course of the Russian Revolution."\textsuperscript{86} Despite his socialist leanings, Bullard advised against recognizing the Bolsheviks. He judged them to be "cold-blooded in their disregard for the truth" and as "undemocratic... as the former Tsar."\textsuperscript{87} Although at no time did he favor even \textit{de facto} recognition, he, like Miles, concluded that some contact with the Bolshevik Government was desirable.

Bullard's analyses were coolly intellectual and his opinions universally respected by State Department officials. He had little ambition to pursue a career as a diplomat. "Personally I would rather be engaged in molding public opinion at home than in registering its decisions as a diplomat," he said.\textsuperscript{88} Bullard's tenure as chief of the Russian Division was brief but his judgments were grounded on firm scholarship and his influence should not be overlooked.

While Bullard has been described as an idealist, Evan Young, who was appointed Chief of the newly expanded Russian Division on July 3, 1923, is best described as a realist. As a young man, Young had served in the military, and, following his education, had briefly practiced law. In 1905 he had opted for a career as a foreign service officer, and

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., p. 49.

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., p. 270.

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid., p. 28.
at the time of his appointment in 1923, Young was regarded as one of the most knowledgeable Americans on matters concerning the Bolsheviks. After the withdrawal American diplomats from Russia in 1918, the capable and experienced Young had been instructed to set up an observation post in Riga, Latvia. Here, between 1918 and 1922, Young supervised the collecting and analyzing of information on the activities of the Bolsheviks.

Based upon this research, Young accurately predicted the durability of the Bolshevik government. On July 23, 1920, he wrote the Secretary of State, "In submitting certain suggestions regarding our policy... I wish to emphasize the fact that the Soviet Government... is now [far] stronger than for months past and that there is no sign either external or internal of force or movement which might eventually bring about its overthrow." One of Young's greatest strengths was his ability to recognize and recruit able men to serve in the Division, and he was instrumental in the recruitment of both Kelley and Loy Henderson to the Russian Division.

---

89 Propas, see note 34, pp. 31-32.


91 FRUS, 2:1920, p. 652.
The respect accorded Young by his colleagues is illustrated by a letter Earl Packer wrote from Reval, Estonia in 1922, following Young's departure from the Baltics:

The field work has been very interesting under Mr. Young's very able direction. He is very, very sound on the Russian situation—a close, sane and careful student.92

The high esteem with which Young was regarded by State Department officials is revealed by his appointment as Chief of the Russian Division after its expansion. On October 10, 1922, following recognition by the United States of the new states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Division of Russian Affairs had become a full-fledged politico-geographic division with the designation "Division of Eastern European Affairs. Under a State Department order of October 10, 1922, the Division had assumed general supervision of matters pertaining to Russia, Finland and Poland, in addition to the three newly established Baltic republics. Young's career has been neglected by historians, but the available evidence supports the argument that his contributions to the Russian Division and to the observation post in Riga were immeasurable and that the importance the department subsequently achieved is directly traceable to his able leadership.

Several other personalities formed the group which made up the early members of "EE," as the division was called. Foremost among them was the gregarious Earl Packer, who was in Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution, and who spent time in Riga and in the Russian Division. Packer was a man with a whimsical nature. In 1917, at twenty-three, while serving with the War Department, he impulsively volunteered to go to Petrograd as a military clerk. While there, he became an assistant to an American military attaché and eventually ended up at the Riga observation post. Like Kelley, Packer's commitment to the displaced Russian émigrées would last a lifetime.

While in Petrograd, Packer met Alfred Klieforth, another "EE" member. During 1917, they roomed together in an apartment owned by three Russian sisters, one of whom Klieforth later married. Unlike Packer, Klieforth could not be considered a true Sovietologist, nevertheless his contributions to the department broadened the informational base of the Russian Division during its formative years.

Klieforth had served as a clerk in the American Embassy in Petrograd in 1916 and as a passport control officer in Finland during and after the War. Between 1920

---

Packer Interview; Also see: Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey, editors, The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow, Monographs in International Affairs (Coral Gables: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975) pp. 157-163. (Hereafter cited Long Timers)
and 1924, he was assigned to the Russian Division and later was sent to the observation station at Riga.  

During 1921 and 1922, Klieforth was responsible for analyzing the "economic content of all the recent 'new measures,' the alleged economic concessions," then being implemented within Soviet Russia. It will be remembered that during this period the concepts of "private property," "capitalistic methods" and "individualistic conceptions" were in a period of flux in Russia. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was being initiated and tested, albeit reluctantly. Lenin, in defense of this shift in policy, had said, "It is necessary to permit the capitalism which we have permitted; if it proves unsatisfactory and bad, we can correct it, because we have authority in our hands, and therefore we have no reason to fear." The officers of the Russian Division viewed this shift in policy with suspicion. Klieforth warily charged that the NEP had "communist strings" attached. "I think... the government definitely

---

94 Propas, "The State Department...", p. 77.

95 Harper to Klieforth, June 81, [sic] 1921. Harper Papers, University of Chicago.


97 Ibid., Harper is directly quoting Lenin.
and with serious forethought attaches strings,"98 he wrote Harper in May 1922.

A stern anti-communist, Klieforth had little patience with writers who disagreed with the department's position. Commenting on a contemporary book, he wrote, "Ross' book is among the worst in our Zoo of atrocities."99 Kleiforth was also actively involved in the recognition hearings of 1924. Pleased with the results, which heralded a victory for those opposing recognition, he wrote, "The show went off beautifully."100 After leaving Washington in 1924, Klieforth was assigned to Riga for two years. He later served in Germany and throughout Europe, but his personal correspondence reveals that his interest in Soviet Russia never diminished.101

Loy Henderson was another of the early officers who staffed the Russian Division. His name is most often associated with events following recognition of Russia, when

98Ibid. Klieforth, as requested by Harper had made personal notes and comments in the margins of the research paper.


100Klieforth to Harper, February 4, 1924, Harper Papers, University of Chicago.

101John Wiley to Klieforth, December 22, 1933, Wiley to Klieforth, February 21, 1935, John Wiley Papers, General Correspondence I-K, Box 7, Franklin Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park. (Hereafter cited, Wiley Papers.)
he was assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow, but his unshakable anti-communist views were first formulated during his early training in Riga and in the Department of Russian Affairs. He never wavered in either his distrust of the Soviets nor in his feeling of utter repugnance for their socialist philosophy. 102

There were others, often faceless personalities, associated with the Department during those early years -- Felix Cole, Preston Kumler, Orsen Nielsen. Fragments of history, their names fleetingly appeared on the official records, but now their stories are lost. Some of them sought anonymity in their own time. Two such men were Ray Murphy and an elusive "Carter." Years later, Packer attempted to explain their activities:

Carter studied communist activities in the United States. He had a room somewhere in the department... sub rosa, probably. Ray Murphy? Oh, yes, he's another one. I have a hard time defining the scope of Ray's activities. I suspect that Ray Murphy and Carter succeeded one another--without knowing the facts. It's too remote. 103

102 Henderson to Wiley, December 19, 1939, Wiley Papers, FDR Library. Henderson wrote, "The feeling against the Soviet Union has reached a high pitch. For the first time in many years the American people are really commencing to understand something about the Soviet Union." Also see, Long Timers, p. ix. Henderson's views are stated throughout this colloquy.

103 Packer Interview, February 1989, New York City.
A former State Department officer described Murphy as Kelley's "gumshoe man." Murphy compiled files on Soviet propaganda and subversion agents in the United States.\textsuperscript{104}

It is significant that although the first chiefs of the Russian Division had diverse backgrounds, they shared a common distrust of the Bolsheviks. Miles, the professional diplomat, disliked the Bolshevik's approach to social justice.\textsuperscript{105} Poole believed the Bolsheviks betrayed the war effort and the Allies and were in collusion with the Germans. Bullard mistrusted the Bolshevik's intentions and methods, and Young realized that the Bolshevik revolution represented a permanent political and social change in Russia. In accordance with these attitudes, they saw the new government as representing an enemy who must be studied. At no time did they contemplate recognition as a viable option. It is understandable, then, that they were united in their promotion of the United States' policy of nonrecognition.

In contrast to the elusiveness which plagues the researcher striving to uncover and understand the thinking

\textsuperscript{104}Thomas F. Troy, "Ah, Sweet Intrigue! Or, Who Axed State's Prewar Soviet Division?", \textit{Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene}, Vol. 3, No. 5, October 1984, p. 2, copy of article, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University.

\textsuperscript{105}Basil Miles to Harper, April 22, 1920. Miles was commenting on strikes in America as a viable method to re-adjust "social conditions which our Bolshevik friends are so anxious to accomplish at once for mankind by force." Harper Papers, University of Chicago.
and motivation of the forgotten men of the Russian Division, their policy recommendations appear straightforward and definite. They can be summarized as follows:

Recognition was impossible as long as Soviet Russia 1) refused to settle the debts contracted by the Provisional Government, 2) refused to compensate Americans whose property inside Russia had been confiscated, and 3) refused to stop sending communist propaganda into the United States. This would continue to be the position of the United States government until 1933.

The nonrecognition policy will be analyzed in the following chapter. Suffice it to state at this point that the policy was firmly in place by the time Kelley was appointed chief of the Division in 1925, and that it would be Kelley who would have to face the first serious challenge to that inflexible policy. Ironically enough, it was the United States courts which would compel that reevaluation.
On November 22, 1924, an unexpected cable from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia jarred the solid foundation upon which the officers of the Eastern European Division had erected their nonrecognition policy. Not since the recognition hearings of the previous January had the State Department been faced with a more lethal challenge to the legitimacy of its position in denying diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Government. That this unexpected defiance had originated in the United States courts only added to their dismay. The officers' reactions ranged from frustrated indignation to outright apprehension. The offending cable read: Judgment of American Supreme Court Alleged to Imply Recognition of the Sovereignty of the S.S.S.R.  

The judgment in question concerned the case of Max Wulfsohn et al., v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet

106 J. C. White, Chargé d'Affaires, American Legation, Riga to State Department, "Report No. 606." October 28, 1924, DSNA, Record Group 59, File 711.61/95. Also see: 361.1153 W 95.
Republic, Appellant, a case which had been argued in the New York Supreme Court in 1922 and 1923. The question before the Court had been "Can the defendant [S.S.S.R.] which has not been recognized as a sovereign state by the United States government be sued in the courts of this state [N.Y.] as a foreign corporation?" The majority opinion, written by Judge J. Andrews and supported by five concurring justices with only one dissenting, stated that "The Russian Federated Soviet Republic is the existing de facto government of Russia...it is a matter of common knowledge."

The cable from Riga concerned this case and contained a translation of an article from Izvestia which read:

The judgment of the Supreme Court in the Wulfson [sic] Case confirms the judgment of the New York Court which rejected Wulfson's [sic] suit against the Soviet government; this judgment of the Supreme Court constitutes an authoritative precedent for all courts in the United States, and it recognizes the Soviet Federation as a sovereign State which in virtue of this fact cannot, without its consent, be proceeded against in American courts.

---


109 Ibid., p. 374.

110 Izvestia was the official Soviet newspaper. Article No. 237, October 16, 1924.

The article went on to quote New York attorney Charles Recht, who had represented the defendant:

Regardless of the political position taken by the Department of State, the judgment of the Supreme Court constitutes a definite and authoritative legal recognition of the sovereignty of the Soviet Federation, in that it accords to the S.S.S.R. the same rights as are enjoyed by all other sovereign foreign states which, in the view of American law, cannot be proceeded against without their consent in American courts of law.  

In the past, State Department officials had carefully skirted the historical and legal issues surrounding the entire recognition question and had elected to base their arguments on emotional, economic, and political considerations. Now, the American courts were forcing the State Department to reevaluate this fixed, inflexible approach: the legal issues would simply have to be addressed. Quite naturally, the responsibility for this analysis fell on the shoulders of the newly-proclaimed Russian expert in the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Robert Kelley.

Kelley's response to this compelling challenge was historically significant for a number of reasons. First, it laid bare the ambiguities of a foreign policy in which politics triumphed over law and emotion conquered reason. Second, it brought into focus the critical question of what role self-interest -- whether of a nation, a department, or an individual -- played in the formulation of foreign

---

"Ibid., p.2."
policy. Finally, Kelley's approach was demonstrative of the modus operandi with which he not only tackled this challenge but would attack future problems. Here, the search has not been for the facts of Kelley's life but rather for the meaning of that life. Historians are widely agreed on the importance of Kelley's role in formulating and sustaining America's policy of nonrecognition. The questions they have not fully answered are why and how. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to provide those answers by analyzing Kelley as he faced the serious legal challenge to the State Department's nonrecognition policy.

To understand the seriousness of this challenge, it might be well to review the development of that policy which, by 1924, had been in place for seven years.

As has already been shown, the Bolshevik Revolution caught Washington by surprise. The bewildered State Department was first stunned and then outraged by the inflammatory social propositions emanating from the Bolshevik leadership. Wounded, feeling itself to be a good friend betrayed, the United States government retreated to a moral high ground. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby emphasized this position on August 10, 1920, in a note to

---

the Italian Ambassador at Washington, Baron Camillo Avezzana:

It is not possible for the government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained. This conviction has nothing to do with any particular political or social structure which the Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace. It rests upon a wholly different set of facts. These facts, which none dispute, have convinced the Government of the United States, against its will, that the existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or individuals. ... In the view of this Government, there cannot be any common ground upon which it can stand with a power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense.\(^1\)

Colby's emotional argument would continue to be used in official support of nonrecognition until 1933.

In spite of Colby's castigation of the Soviet Government, it is worth mentioning that a month before this note was sent, on July 8, 1920, the Department of State had announced the "removal of the restrictions which had stood in the way of trade and communications with Soviet

---

\(^1\)FRUS, 2:1920, Colby to Avezzana, August 10, 1920, pp. 463-468. For a history of Colby's note see: Ronald Radosh, "John Spargo and Wilson's Russian Policy, 1920, The Journal of American History, Vol. 52, 1965, pp. 548-565. Radosh argues that John Spargo, who was closely associated with the Russian Division of the State Department, wrote the first, and nearly unchanged draft of the policy statement. Spargo was in close contact with John A. Gade, who was briefly and at that time, chief of the Department of Russian Affairs.
Russia." The department, while officially cooperating with business interests, continued to emphasize that "individuals or corporations availing themselves of the opportunity to trade with Russia would do so on their own responsibility and at their own risk." The careful historian, Joan Hoff Wilson, has convincingly argued that "although business spokesmen did sometimes criticize the policy of nonrecognition as irrelevant or shortsighted, there is no evidence that organized business pressure prompted recognition." The State Department's ambiguity in allowing, and in some cases even facilitating, trade with an unrecognized government helps to explain why there was no groundswell of support for recognition from the American business community. As Wilson points out, however, trading with the communists caused a dilemma for more thoughtful business leaders because, as long as the Soviets refused "to conform to U.S. standards of economics and politics," trading with them remained "ideologically unacceptable." State Department officials, however, appeared to remain unmoved by this ethical conflict.


116 Ibid., p. 3.

117 Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology and Economics, p. 112.

118 Ibid., p. 110.
The adroit diplomat, Charles Evans Hughes, who replaced Colby as Secretary of State in 1921, advanced more sophisticated economic and political arguments. On March 21, 1923, in an address before the delegation of the Women's Committee for Recognition of Russia, he said, "...the fundamental question in the recognition of a government is whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge international obligations. ...Of what avail is it to speak of assurances," Hughes demanded, "if valid obligations and rights are repudiated and property is confiscated?" Hughes saved his most compelling political argument for the end of his remarks. He began by quoting from a particularly inflammatory speech given by Leon Trotsky the previous October. "'That means, comrades, that revolution is coming in Europe as well as in America, systematically, step by step, stubbornly and with gnashing of teeth in both camps. It will be long protracted, cruel, and sanguinary!'" -- Hughes softly concluded, "We want to help...but the world we desire is a world not threatened with the destructive propaganda of the Soviet authorities, and one in which there will be good faith and the recognition of obligations and a

---

19 FRUS, 2:1923, March 21, 1923, pp. 756-757. For a Russian historical perspective on these policies see: Nikolai v. Sivachev and Nikolia N. Yakovlev, tr. Olga Alder Titelbaum, Russia and the United States, pp. 75-118. Hughes was characterized on September 26, 1924, by Soviet Commissar Chicherin, as a man, "who express(es) the will of the big bankers and trusts of America." Ibid., p. 80.
sound basis of international intercourse."\textsuperscript{120} This speech was reprinted and copies were distributed to support the State Department's position. The speech also marked a subtle shift in policy, in that greater emphasis was placed on Soviet propaganda as a reason for denying recognition to the Communists.

In July 1923, Hughes again had an opportunity to enunciate his views and to further solidify the State Department's anti-communist stance. In a widely quoted reply to Samuel Gompers, President of the A.F.L., Hughes wrote in defense of the Department's position: "What is most serious is that there is conclusive evidence that those in control in Moscow have not given up their original purpose of destroying existing governments wherever they can do so throughout the world. ...the sentiment of our people is not deemed to be favorable to the acceptance into political fellowship of this regime so long as it...cherishes, as an ultimate and definite aim, the destruction of the free institutions which we have laboriously built up...."\textsuperscript{121} Hughes's firm statements won broad public support within the United States. Meanwhile, the Eastern European division "was largely occupied in supporting the nonrecognition

\textsuperscript{120}FRUS, 2:1923, March 21, 1923, p. 758.

\textsuperscript{121}FRUS, 2:1923, July 9, 1923, pp. 763-764.
policy of Mr. Hughes."\textsuperscript{122} This hostile stance was bitterly resented by the Soviets, and Russian historians have viewed the period as a time when America "proceeded from the assumption that in the postwar economic, political, and moral world only the Americans could make demands while only others were obligated to respond."\textsuperscript{123}

As indicated in Chapter I, Hughes had coolly rebuffed the Soviet overture which followed President Coolidge's somewhat moderate address to Congress in December 1923. The pro-recognitionists' bitter defeat at the hands of the Eastern Europeanists during the recognition hearings had further served to secure the State Department's hostile, immoveable position. And if there were ambiguities in allowing trade with a government whose existence was denied, those ambiguities were ignored; if there were contradictions in a policy which denied \textit{de facto} recognition to a government which had been in place for seven years, those contradictions were disregarded; and if there was paradox in an entire State Department division devising a stratagem to prevent recognition rather than assisting to bring recognition about, then the acknowledgement of that paradox was suppressed. But now the legal question demanded an

\textsuperscript{122}John C. White, official in Eastern European Division, Oral History Collection, Columbia University, p. 69, cited in Nikolai v. Sivachev and Nikolia N. Yakovlev, \textit{Russia and the United States}, p. 80, footnote No. 15, p. 278.

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid., p. 82.
answer. It was impossible to ignore, disregard or suppress. An analysis of that demand and the method by which Kelley arrived at an answer presents an ideal opportunity to examine what in this paper is called "The Kelley Approach."

Kelley's approach to problem solving owed much to his background. By birth he was ill-equipped to compete in the aristocratic world of twentieth century American diplomacy, which tended to be dominated by Anglophiles who were Protestant, wealthy, cultured and suave. Kelley, on the other hand, was Catholic, Irish, unpolished and poor. They had been born in family mansions; Kelley had been raised in a modest cottage. They were the sons of professionals, business tycoons, large landowners and military commanders; Kelley was the son of a respected hard-working janitor at the local high school. They spent their youth at private prep schools or studying abroad; Kelley spent his attending public schools. Their fathers donated money to create college scholarships; Kelly was awarded one.\textsuperscript{124}

Nor was wealth the only determinant. Years of exposure to high culture -- leather-bound books and European

\textsuperscript{124}The material for this biographical sketch has been gathered from many sources. Most helpful were Kelley's papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. and the memoirs of his contemporaries (listed in bibliography). Samples of his personal correspondence are available in The John Wiley Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York; The Samuel Harper Papers, University of Chicago, Illinois; and the Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. For a discussion of the aristocratic attitudes of early twentieth diplomats see: Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club; Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind.
music, imported china and hand-cut crystal, clever repartee and serious conversation -- had provided these offspring of the elite with the patina which separates ordinary men from gentlemen. If indeed America had an aristocracy, it was embodied in her early twentieth century diplomats. In that snob-riddled company, Kelley was a misfit. In short, he was the perfect antithesis of the ideal diplomat.

Kelley unlike other diplomats from middle class families, either made no effort or was unable to remodel his behavior after the prevailing aristocratic mode. He adopted neither the tastes nor the manners of the refined patricians of the diplomatic corps but remained a plebeian nonconformist. He was a noisy baseball fan and an expert poker player. Although he played tennis -- a sport of gentlemen -- he did so without grace, preferring to smash the ball across the net rather than return a smooth volley.

Physically, he had a wide face dominated by a big nose and a high forehead. His hair was thinning, his neck thick. He had the watchful eyes of an outsider and the thoughtful countenance of a scholar. A society columnist once described him, rather unkindly, as "not overly chatty, plump, pleasant, subtle, (though he doesn't look it)." Even in a starched white shirt he appeared rumpled, his coat unbuttoned, his tie awry, his trousers wrinkled. He had the

---

125 Helen Essary, *Town and Country*, February 1936, Kelley Papers, Scrapbook, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
damp look of a man plagued by a perpetual perspiration problem. Above all, Kelley lacked that near essential prerequisite of all diplomats -- the intangible, elusive element of style.

Yet Kelley endured. His intellectual prowess easily balanced his other deficiencies, for Kelley was indisputably a great intellect. Born with innate intelligence, he had honed that natural gift into a formidable mental machine. Proud, stubborn, and pragmatic, he had learned to cloak insecurity with arrogance, sensitivity with abruptness, and he had replaced his lack of social patina with a hard intellectual veneer which eventually earned him a position close to the center of diplomatic power in America. It was no small achievement and one which rendered eloquent testimony to the opportunities inherent in a democratic society. Understandably, it also inculcated in the achiever the belief that the democratic system was the best in the world. For such a person, any repudiation of that system had to be viewed almost as a personal affront. Kelley's upbringing and his personal, laudable achievements must therefore be considered when examining his acrimonious views towards the Soviet Government. The communist philosophy cast an anathema, after all, on his own accomplishments, and the world-wide triumph of that philosophy might very well have pulled him down from the tall, steep ladder he had so fiercely and so painfully climbed.
The path of Kelley's climb was foreshadowed from childhood. "Robert never had to be urged to study," his father recalled. "His home lessons while in grammar and high schools here and at Harvard were his first concern."\textsuperscript{126} His research skills had been refined while an undergraduate. "On being given a subject," Kelley wrote, "the first thing to do is to ascertain the subject scope and date of the event."\textsuperscript{127} A flaw which would later surface in Kelley's analyses for the State Department is hinted at in the comment of one of his professors. "You might do more with Italy...[by also considering her]...military and diplomatic history."\textsuperscript{128} During his diplomatic career, Kelley frequently ignored pertinent evidence and concentrated on those facts and events which tended to sustain his own preconceived conclusions. During his college days, Kelley already showed signs of being able to bend ethical concepts. He once recopied, in his own handwriting and with only minimal alterations, one of his own "A" papers for submission by a

\textsuperscript{126}George Abala, Interview with Mr. & Mrs. James H. Kelley, \textit{Washington Daily News}, January 20, 1931, Kelley Papers, Scrapbook, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{127}Robert Kelley, "Sources to be used in the Compilation of a Bibliography of the Crimean War," \textit{History} 25, Kelley Papers, Folder 1, Box 1, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid.
fellow student. This same disregard for established rules would reemerge in 1927, when Kelley recommended that foreign policy decisions made by the State Department not be committed to writing but rather delivered verbally. By the time Kelley graduated from Harvard, he had developed a style of thought and writing which would be his personal mark for the rest of his life.

Kelley had an organized and logical mind. Neither a wordsmith nor a phrasemaker, his official writings were distinguished by sleek, cold prose. He frowned at adjectives and scowled at adverbs. This was in contrast to his personal correspondence, which was remarkable for its warm earthiness. He was fond of simple metaphorical word play. Commenting on Coolidge's presidency, Kelley wrote Samual Harper in March, 1925, "The new pilot has now taken the wheel, or rather is directing the helmsman, and the ship of state continues its course as charted out and will continue." In a letter to his close friend, the diplomat John Wiley, he wrote concerning Wiley's numerous reports on the Bolsheviks' activities in Germany, "I hope that you will

129Robert Kelley, "Roman Occupation of Spain," History 3.B., compare with, "The Romanization of Spain," Folder 1, Box 1, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

130Robert Kelley, Memorandum, October 28, 1927, DSNA, Record Group 59, File 861.51 AM 3; quoted in Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology and Economics, p. 40.

not conclude that you have been feeding us too well, for as you know, we are very fond of rich food." But Kelley often commented on a political situation and ended with the quizzical phrase, "What say you?" But as Kelley prepared to provide an answer to the legal questions which had been raised by the American courts, the warmth disappeared and his cold and logical mind dominated.

Although Kelley lacked formal training in law, he was undoubtedly aware of the legal tenets of de facto recognition. A letter in the Eastern European file clearly outlined the legal and historical theories which the United States government had accepted from the time of American independence and could be summarized as follows:

1. Thomas Jefferson developed the de facto principle of recognition. "He conceived recognition to be an independent act depending not upon the whim of the recognizing state but conditioned solely by the governmental stability of the new organization..."

2. "This de facto theory of recognition had been followed by a long course of precedents in the United States State Department."

3. "This doctrine had subsequently become the general practice in Europe."

---


4. "The real basis upon which any recognition is granted is the existence of a de facto government, whether or not it is founded upon any juristic basis."[^34]

If these arguments had been accepted, it would appear that the Soviet government should have been recognized, for any other decision would have been inconsistent with the law—a law Americans proudly traced back to Thomas Jefferson.

The American courts now were forcing the State Department to openly reevaluate the inconsistencies of its anomalous position. Kelley did so in a paper dated December 17, 1924, entitled "The Case for the Recognition of the Soviet Government." The paper was eleven typed pages long without corrections or notations. Its authorship was clearly established by the heavy, unmistakable initials "R.F.K."[^35] Stripped bare of emotion, the arguments concentrated only on the legal, political and economic evidence. The opening paragraph contained both a political and a legal argument:

> The recent celebration of the seventh anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet regime and the fact that during the past year full recognition has been accorded to the Soviet government by nine European states, including some of the most important, (thereby bringing

[^34]: Frederic R. Kellogg to F. M. Dearing, Assistant Secretary of State, May 20, 1921. DSNA, Record Group 59, File 311.6154 C94/3., marked: "Ack. by DW Poole, 6/2/21." Kellogg was an attorney associated with the New York law firm of Kellogg, Emery and Cuthell.

the total of European states that have granted recognition to sixteen out of twenty-five), would seem to have cleared the way for the recognition of the Soviet government by the United States. ...It can hardly be denied that the Soviet government has succeeded in maintaining itself against all adverse claimants and that it is in possession of the machinery of state and administering government without substantial resistance to its authority. Neither can it be gainsaid that it is in a position to fulfill all the international obligations and responsibilities incumbent upon a foreign state under treaties and international law. Such being the case, it would appear that, in view of the significance of the act of recognition in international practice, the Soviet government deserves, in fact, recognition by this government.¹³⁶

Kelley expanded the legal argument by explaining that recognition did not affirm approval of a form of government but merely admitted, "that this government really exists and is capable of entering into international obligations. In the long run, he reasoned, "it is not the constitutionality of a government which makes it legitimate, but its effective power -- its stability..." He argued that in the past the United States government had only been concerned with the "stability" of a foreign government and not with "its qualities or methods." Any "deviations from this sound international practice," he wrote, "have generally been attended with unwelcome complications and disagreeable consequences."¹³⁷

The legal and economic ramifications of nonrecognition were then examined. "The difficulties," Kelley wrote,

¹³⁶Ibid., pp. 1-2.
¹³⁷Ibid., pp. 2-3.
"...wherein the de facto conditions are ignored by the political authorities, are made manifest in the decisions of the judicial authorities."\textsuperscript{138} The courts, Kelley argued, had been forced "to accord to an unrecognized de facto government, ...the attributes of a recognized government."\textsuperscript{139} Three cases were cited in support of Kelley's argument: the Wulfsohn case, Luther v. Sagor and Company, and Sokolov v. National City Bank.

The Wulfsohn case concerned the seizure of furs which the plaintiff [Wulfsohn] had stored in Russia and which were alleged to have been confiscated by the Soviet government. The New York Supreme Court, Kelley wrote, "had accorded to the unrecognized Soviet government, the rights of a government...recognized de jure in that it held that the Soviet government cannot, without its consent be proceeded against in an American court."\textsuperscript{140} Judge Andrews had written:

[Our courts] may not bring a foreign sovereign before our bar...because he has not submitted himself to our laws. Without his consent he is not subject to them. Such is not the proper method of redress if a citizen of the United States is wronged. The question is a political one, not confided to the courts but to another department of government. Whenever an act done by a sovereign in

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 5.
his sovereign character is questioned it becomes a matter of negotiation or of reprisals or of war.\textsuperscript{141}

The case of \textit{Luther v. Sagor and Company} which was argued in November and December 1920, was cited by Kelley as his second example. He cited this case to illustrate "the injurious effect, on private rights and on the security of commercial transactions [which resulted from] the policy of nonrecognition."\textsuperscript{142} It is somewhat strange that Kelley cited this case at all as it was argued before the King's Bench in England. The case is a lengthy one which concerns the confiscation of a private sawmill in Russia and touches on questions of international law, jurisdiction, the statues of the Russian Soviet Republic, Recognition of Sovereignty and Confiscatory degrees. On the point of recognition, the court held, "that if a foreign government or its sovereignty is not recognized by His Majesty's Government the courts of this country will not recognize such foreign government or its sovereignty."\textsuperscript{143} The point Kelley was making, of course, was, that this ruling left business interests which had legitimate claims against the Soviet government without redress.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{141}Wulfsohn v. Russian Republic, January 1923, 234 N.Y., pp. 372-373.
  \item \textsuperscript{142}Robert Kelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, p. 5, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
  \item \textsuperscript{143}A. M. Luther v. James Sagor and Company, November 29, 1920 - December 8, 1921, Common Law Reports, K. B. 1921, pp. 456, 474. Cited quote can be found on page 456.
\end{itemize}
The third example Kelley mentioned was the case of Sokolov v. National City Bank. He wrote, "The judge pointed out the necessity of passing beyond the legal fiction created by a policy of non recognition and establishing the actual situation in Russia."144 This case concerned deposits made by the plaintiff, Sokoloff, into the Petrograd Branch of The National City Bank of New York. Judge J. Cardozo in a majority opinion found for the defendant, Sokolov. In his decision Judge Cardozo wrote:

Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may be viewed as no government at all, if the power withholding recognition chooses thus to view it. In practice, however, since juridical conceptions are seldom, if ever carried to the limit of their logic, the equivalence is not absolute, but is subject to self-imposed limitations of common sense and fairness...foreign governments which, though formally unrecognized have notoriously an existence as governments de facto.145

The implications of these judgments are worth attention. The courts had been forced to view the Soviet government as the de facto government of Russia. Historically the United States government had based its decision to recognize a new government upon "de facto conditions and not upon any de jure or legitimacy theory."146


146Kellogg to Dearing, May 20, 1921, p. 3. DSNA, Record Group 59, File 311.6154 C94/3.
The logical conclusion was that the United States had recognized Soviet Russia, or at least that one branch of government had.

As Kelley pointed out, America's international trade was also often adversely affected by these legal decisions. In a particularly cutting comment in the November 1924 issue of *Harvard Law Review*, Alfred Hayes wrote:

> It is amazing that at a time when there is a persistent effort to have public international controversies determined judicially, the pecuniary claims of private litigants are left to the expensive, dilatory, and inefficient action of diplomatic officers. The courts have the necessary machinery for securing and sifting evidence and disposing of such claims on their merits. In the field of diplomacy the merits become involved with political considerations.

Kelley was aware of these implications. These decisions, "rising out of the necessity of the judicial authorities to face realities," he wrote, "reveal the confused situation created through the misapprehension of the real nature of the act of recognition in international law."

---


Kelley then presented the economic argument. He called the absence of recognition "a stumbling block" to business interests. "As long as normal relations do not exist, trade will tend to fall into the hands of speculators and non reputable business concerns." 149

Finally, he listed the political arguments: disputes between the United States and Russia could "best be settled," the Bolsheviks would be "deprived of the argument...that they are severely handicapped in the sphere of economic construction by the hostility of foreign governments," and recognition would "permit freer exchange of information" which would be beneficial to both sides." 150

Finally, Kelley concluded:

It must not be forgotten that recognition will tend to encourage the people of Russia to realize that the responsibility for future development in Russia rests upon them alone and that foreign states have definitely abandoned any intention of imposing their will upon them. 151

This curious document, which was clearly authored by Kelley -- a man who personally did not favor recognition of the Soviet government -- raises a number of questions. Why was it written, by whom was it ordered, and most importantly, why were the forceful arguments outlined in the


150 Ibid., p. 7.

151 Ibid., p. 11.
document, rejected? In the absence of indisputable supporting evidence, it can most likely be concluded that the legal arguments raised by the position of America's courts forced a reevaluation of the State Department's policy. Kelley's emphasis on those arguments tends to support this thesis. There had also been some discussion of a change in policy during the latter months of 1924.

There seems little doubt that the document was written at the request of Secretary of State Hughes, who like Kelley was staunchly anti-Bolshevik, but who in this instance, was driven to response by outside pressures. The broader question of why these arguments were rejected is more difficult to answer, yet for historians, it remains the key question in the center of the storm. A simplified answer is that the United States could maintain greater leverage by not recognizing the Soviet government.

Leverage of course, could be supplied by either recognition or nonrecognition: it was a choice between the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{152}}\]

For a different analysis see: Frederic Propas, "The State Department, Bureaucratic Politics and Soviet-American Relations 1918-1938," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982), p. 36. Propas writes, "...Kelley's memo was an exercise setting forth the case for the other side and anticipating rising opposition to the policy of nonrecognition." This is speculation which is unsupported by the content of the paper. Moreover, this reason is highly unlikely judged by Kelley's consistent approach to problem solving. Propas' hesitancy is evident from his later comment. "...it is worthwhile to examine other explanations of this memo." Ibid., p. 36.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{153}}\]

Williams Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations 1781-1947, p. 207.
carrot or the stick, but nonrecognition had the added advantage of always being reversible. Whether or not the Soviet government could have been won over by friendship remains a matter of speculation because the United States did not test it. Both pride and fear may have played a part in the State Department's policy. The leadership was arrogantly disinclined to follow Europe's lead and recognize the Soviets or to forget old betrayals. There were some State Department officials who sincerely feared that the communist propaganda carried the seeds of potential world revolution. However, the single element which carried the greatest weight in explaining the reason nonrecognition remained the "policy of choice" was an economic one.

Despite the American public's desire for the adoption of a policy of isolationism, the leaders realized that the United States had become the greatest creditor nation in the world and that commercial intercourse was a necessity if the capitalistic pattern of life was to continue. Not only were outside markets necessary, but there must be one single international standard to settle debts and arrange credit. The expanding Russian market, however attractive, was not the primary factor. What was needed was a set of rules which would guarantee global economic conformity. The disruption of trade and repudiation of debts were simply intolerable to American statesmen. America's prosperity depended on expanding trade. The communist anti-
capitalistic philosophy and their unwillingness to accept America's rules was a disturbing influence on the continuation of American's affluence.

It is evident from Kelley's evaluation that he and the State Department were aware of the legal and historical rightness of recognizing the Soviet government. Obviously, they chose to ignore these arguments. Emotional, economic, and political concerns won the battle with legal and rational considerations. For Kelley, the document is illustrative of his strength of mind and his pragmatic nature, for never in his long career was he comfortable with the communists or the Soviet government. Furthermore, the Eastern European Division, made up of hand picked anti-communist researchers, was dedicated to uncovering the menace of communism and any shift in policy might well have terminated that department.

Once again, the anti-recognitionists had triumphed, this time by simply burying the legal and historical issues. In the future the propaganda issue would be the rationale used to fuel the popular fear of the Soviets and thus keep the preferred policy in place.

As for Kelley, in 1925 at age thirty-one, he would be named the youngest chief ever of a geographical division of the State Department. From that position he would be able to chart the direction of Russian-American relations. Equally as important, he would be able to establish a
program to train America's future Sovietologists -- a younger generation of Russian experts -- whom the unmarried, childless Kelley affectionately called, "my boys" and to whom he willed his legacy of distrust of communism and of the Soviet government.
CHAPTER IV

THE KELLEY LEGACY

At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution there was little debate among State Department officials on the probable durability of the communist experiment. They expected it to fail. This judgment, persisted even after the Russian Civil War further entrenched the communist political leaders and continued following the New Economic Policy (NEP) which redirected and stabilized Russia's economy. Most State Department officials interpreted the political entrenchment as temporary and the economic reforms as a swing towards capitalism. Holding these views, America's political elite deemed it irrelevant to study the language or history of Russia or to understand Bolshevism, whose radical concept of world order they detested as inimical to Western civilization and an affront to America's heritage and traditions which they proudly traced back to the Greeks.

Robert Kelley deduced a different meaning from these events. He believed that the communist ideology posed a present and possibly permanent threat to democracy and to America's cherished ideals. Recognizing the importance of American-Russian relations, he urged the State Department to
allow him to initiate a program to instruct young foreign service officers in Russian language and history. "I was convinced of the need for a group of officials in the Department of State who understood and spoke Russian," Kelley recalled:

I had the feeling that to learn the language is not sufficient, because language was an expression of the people of the country. So if you really wanted to know the language you had to know about the country. And that meant knowing thoroughly the history of Russia, including the background of the Bolsheviks.\textsuperscript{154}

Supported by Secretary of State Hughes, Kelley's proposal was accepted, funds were allocated, and the training of America's future Soviet experts began.

The young students, hand-picked by Kelley from the ranks of the newly-accepted foreign service officers, studied for four years under Kelley's direction and tutelage. The views the budding diplomats absorbed during their formative days had a far-reaching effect on future American-Soviet relations, for following recognition in 1933, many of these young men staffed America's embassy in Moscow and two of them later served as America's ambassadors to Russia.

Whether these views had a negative influence on the development of a more harmonious relationship between the two countries is the subject of some controversy among

\textsuperscript{154}Robert Kelley, recorded at Colloquy, \textit{Long Timers}, p. 164.
historians. There is, however, no argument on the question of the importance of Kelley's role and influence in the training of America's future Sovietologists. A point less understood is how Kelley -- however strong his personal convictions, however stern his discipline -- was able to fashion these bright, well-educated young men into a dedicated group of anti-communists. The evidence will show that Kelley's program actually discouraged the study of Sovietism or communist ideology. Instead, Kelley encouraged the future diplomats not to hate the Russian Present, but rather to value Russia's Past. That the students became as anti-communist as Kelley was a natural, predictable, result. Years before, Kelley too had been lured into emotional and intellectual captivity by the literature, the history, and the language of Old Russia. As Kelley had hoped, the American students came to think and feel like pre-revolutionary Russian aristocrats. They, too, came to believe that the communist philosophy threatened not only the destruction of their native American home but had already violated their spiritual home, Old Russia.

This chapter will examine Kelley's Russian specialization program and will analyze the effect of that program on America's future Russian experts. In addition, it will show the influence Kelley had, not only on his "boys," but on all the foreign service trainees at that time, by his participation in the Foreign Service School.
Finally, it will discuss the possible ramifications of that influence.

After gaining approval and funding for the Eastern European language and area specialization program, Kelley searched for schools which could provide the type of academic training he envisioned. At that time there were few universities in the United States which offered any courses in Russian studies and only a handful of American Russian scholars. Samuel Harper was teaching at the University of Chicago; Kelley's former teacher, Bruce Hopper, was still at Harvard; A.C. Coolidge was at Columbia; and Malbone Graham and Robert Kerner were instructors at the University of California. However, these professors were isolated from one another and the programs they offered were not as advanced as those available in Europe. Kelley therefore ruled out American universities.

Great Britain had several universities with departments of Slavonic Studies -- the best known at the University of London under the direction of Sir Bernard Pares. Kelley felt Pares underestimated the dangers

---


156 For biographical information on Pares, see Ibid., pp. 37-38. Also see: Harper-Pares Correspondence, 1906-1942, Harper's Papers, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.; Names of instructors and courses offered at the University of London can be found listed in Slavonic Review, 1926-1927.
inherent in the communist ideology and was an apologist for the Bolsheviks. For this reason, Kelley was disinclined to expose America's future Russian experts to Pares' instruction.\footnote{157}{Frederic Propas, "The State Department, . . . .," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982), p. 109.}

Several other programs were available in Europe, and in December 1927, Kelley asked American consular officers stationed in Prague, Berlin, and Paris to report on the Russian academic programs offered in those cities. There were numerous institutes in Prague which had been established by Russian emigrees. Many of these instructors had been exiled in 1921 and viewed the communist experiment with a certain -- and to Kelley, dangerous -- ambivalence.\footnote{158}{Ibid., p. 106. Harper claimed that there was a "difference in psychology between the [Russian] emigrant [1918] and the exile [1921]." Also see: Samuel Harper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 155.}

Kelley felt uneasy about exposing his impressionable students to the Russian emigrees. Furthermore, it was doubtful that most of the candidates would have been proficient enough in the Czech or Russian languages to benefit from the programs. Nor were Germany's universities chosen, probably because of the students' lack of German language proficiency.\footnote{159}{Frederic Propas, "The State Department, . . . ., (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982), p. 107.}
Kelley eventually selected the Langue Orientale Vivante in Paris, which was under the direction of Paul Boyer. This choice was not surprising given the fact that both Kelley and his friend Samuel Harper had studied under Boyer. Undoubtedly the final decision was based more on ideological than academic considerations, for as Kelley recalled, "I was fortunate in Paris; the head of the Langue Orientale Vivante, Boyer, sympathized with us and promised assistance and went out of his way to accomplish what I had in mind." With the location decided, the next step was to determine the structure of the four-year program. First, the students were assigned for approximately eighteen months to an American embassy or legation in Eastern Europe: in most cases the Baltic States or Prague. "The idea of sending us to the area first was to make sure that we could cope with the local liquor and local girls," recalled George Kennan, who was one of the first two candidates chosen.

The Baltic States at that time were miniatures of old Tsarist Russia and had been part of the Russian Empire until

---

160 Long Timers, p. 164; also see: Harper-Boyer Correspondence 1904-1939, Harper Papers, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

161 Robert Kelley, recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers.

162 George Kennan, recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, pp. 164-166.
the Bolshevik Revolution. In his Memoirs, Kennan described Riga, Latvia, where he was sent, as "a minor edition of St. Petersburg . . . one of those cases where the copy had survived the original." The legation was staffed by Russians from the old American embassy at St. Petersburg. A flood of Russian emigrees had escaped to Riga, and everywhere there was a sense of sadness, a mixture of despair, nostalgia, and sentimentality, masked by a translucent gaiety. An ethereal mood of yearning for the past haunted the city. Riga in the 1920's and early 1930's was the perfect place for young American students to gain an appreciation of Old Russia. Conversely, it provided an ideal atmosphere in which to learn to dislike the New Russia and to distrust her communist overseers.

Another candidate chosen by Kelley was the affable Charles Bohlen, who was assigned to Tallinn, Estonia for two summers. He rented rooms from two sisters who had emigrated from Leningrad. Bohlen wrote in his memoirs that they "undoubtedly followed the centuries-old style of the leisure

---

163 George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 29.
164 Ibid., p. 28-30.
165 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969, p. 10. Note: Different names were used to identify the same city by Kennan and Bohlen. The city was known as St. Petersburg (1703-1914) but after Russia declared war on Germany in 1914 Emperor Nicholas II changed the German name to Petrograd. After Lenin's death in 1924, the city was renamed Leningrad in his honor.
class of Czarist Russia."\textsuperscript{166} The sisters were "strongly anti-Bolshevik," Bohlen wrote, "and lived in the hope that someday the nightmare would pass away and they would return to Old Russia, complete with Czar and aristocracy."\textsuperscript{167} Even if the future officers were not assigned to the Baltic States during their probationary period, they often were sent there during the summer breaks in order to improve their language skills, to assist with the diplomatic work at the legation, and for exposure to the local culture. On other occasions, they returned to Washington, D. C. and worked in the Eastern European Division under an exacting taskmaster, Kelley.

After successfully completing the probationary period, the students were sent to Paris to study Russian language, literature, and history. At the Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, the students' first area of concentration was the Russian language. Boyer conducted these classes, Bohlen recorded, "with brilliance and a sardonic wit. Possessed of an \textit{esprit gaulois}, he gave a slightly indecent twist to many Russian expressions."\textsuperscript{168} In addition, the students were taught Russian history, customs, geography, and economics. Almost all the required readings

\textsuperscript{166}Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{167}Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{168}Ibid., p. 10
were from "anti-communist" books. Another of Kelley's students, Norris B. Chipman, criticized the second year of the Paris program for spending too much time on the translating of old Russian texts. B. Eric Kuniholm, in a later review of the school's curriculum, gave high praise to the first year's instruction but felt the last two years should have concentrated more on Soviet subjects.

Because he was fluent in German, Kennan was the only student granted permission to study at the University of Berlin's Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen. He recorded that his studies stressed "basic linguistics, literary and historical studies, not . . . Sovietology." At one time, Kennan wrote Kelley and requested permission to enroll in classes on contemporary Soviet subjects. Kelley refused: "No, I don't want you to take those courses. I want you to get the equivalent grounding in Russian history and literature and language as a Russian who had finished one of the Czarist universities before the Revolution would have

---

169 Ibid., p. 10.


171 Ibid., p. 123.

172 In the 1880's Bismark had founded this school to educate German's diplomats. Ibid., p. 123; George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 31.

had. And all this about the Soviet Union can come later."¹⁷⁴
Kennan, recalling Kelley's instructions, said, "This was the
best advice ever given to me, and it shows with what
enlightenment and wisdom this language training was run at
that time by Bob Kelley."¹⁷⁵

A bond close to kinship had developed between Kelley
and these young men. He was their mentor; they were his
students. He guided them; they respected him. He advised
them; they listened to him. In time, he came to love them;
in time, with their achievements and in their memoirs, they
honored him. They were the sons he might have had and for
their accomplishments he felt the blush of a father's pride.
In an emotional moment at the colloquy held in Miami in 1975
only one year before his own death, Kelley asked those
assembled to remember "his boys" whom he had trained forty-
five years earlier:

May I bring up a subject which I think ought to be
mentioned? It's a matter that, when I think of it,
I almost start weeping. And that is of the fourteen
Russian-language specialists whom we trained and
developed—all are dead except George Kennan ... I
thought we ought to bring this up in memory. . . . ¹⁷⁶

Kelley's softer side of sentimentality was usually
hidden, however, and he was better known in the department

¹⁷⁴George Kennan, recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, p. 167.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 167.

¹⁷⁶Robert Kelley recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, p. 23.
for the erudite scholarship he expected and the exacting discipline he demanded from both his students and those he supervised. His reputation was not undeserved. A letter Wiley wrote to Kelley in 1932 illustrates this point:

Flack and Armstrong were in a state of acute melancholy as a result of the last informal comments from your division. You certainly tore the pants off of them. I persuaded them, however, not to do the swan-dive of despair into the Vistula. . . . They have both been working very hard . . . and, as they both have been really extremely industrious and eager to please, I think it would not be a bad idea to find a pretext to give them a little pat on the back.  

Kelley was pleased with the results of the program. "I think the program turned out very successfully . . . [and] was absolutely indispensable to the development of our relations with the Soviet Union in those early years," Kelley later recalled. "Some of these officers spoke as well as any Russian."  

In addition to the four-year formal academic program, Kelley established a program to train other Eastern European specialists at the United States legation at Riga. These officers transferred often between Riga and the Eastern European Division in Washington, D.C. Loy W. Henderson, who played a major role in Soviet-American relations in the 1930's, became a Russian specialist in this way. His

---


178 Robert Kelley recorded at Colloquy, Long Timers, pp. 164-165.
devotion to Kelley was life-long, and it was Henderson's sad task to write Kelley's obituary for the Washington Post in June 1976.¹⁷⁹

As can be seen, Kelley forecasted accurately America's need for foreign service officers who spoke fluent Russian. He was able to establish the Russian cultural studies program he envisioned, and the success of that program was testified to by his students and fellow officers. Charles (Chip) Bohlen and George Kennan, the only students to write published memoirs, were loud in their praise of the program. Even Russia's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, said that, "Mr. Kelley's young men were in many ways better-trained in Russian history than anyone in the Soviet diplomatic service."¹⁸⁰

The program was not without some detractors. In a discussion of which diplomats should be sent to Moscow following recognition, one newspaper columnist wrote:


¹⁸⁰James Reston, "Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy Retires, " New York Times, photocopy of article in Kelley Papers, Box 9, Folder 9, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Date of article unknown. Hand-written note reads, "Bob-Just want to make sure you see this." signed, "SW" Reston also writes that "Mr. Kelley was a taciturn disciplinarian . . . ."
The State Department's career boys are arguing about the type of diplomat that should be sent to assist Ambassador Bullitt in Russia. The bespatted Personnel Board wants to send men trained in the neighboring countries of Latvia, Estonia, Poland . . . It claims these men know Russia . . . Others claim that these men stationed in these neighboring countries have been trained under the Old Deal to hate Russia . . . .

The question of which other foreign officers could have been sent was not addressed by the columnist. Indeed, it would have been difficult at that time to have found anyone in the service who had not been influenced by Kelley's anti-communist bias.

A more puzzling criticism, and one which raises some question of Kennan's veracity, was made in a personal letter Kennan wrote to John Wiley on November 3, 1938:

... I think a real effort should be made to get away from the feeling, that the function of the Russian Section is to give the department ammunition with which to protect itself against attacks from irate Congressmen and pro-Soviet elements in the country. This was the atmosphere under which Kelley's division functioned for a good ten years, and some of us have not yet been able to eradicate it entirely from our minds.

This sharp comment was made in the context of whether or not to continue the anti-communist analysis performed at Riga, a function which had been an intrinsic part of Kelley's training program. Kennan's remark becomes more intelligible if one considers that the Eastern European Division had been

---


abruptly dissolved in 1937 and the Russian desk assigned to the supervision of the Western European Division. Kennan occupied that desk for one unhappy year, during which time he charged that the "Western European Division, obviously, was serious in its determination 'not to take Russia too seriously.'" Subsequently, Kennan was critical of the shabby treatment Kelley and "EE" had received. At the time however, 1937-1938, he, too, appears to have been disillusioned with certain aspects of Kelley's program.

In addition to the language training program, Kelley was actively involved with the Foreign Service School authorized by the Rogers Act of May 3, 1924. The school was responsible for instructing new foreign service recruits in the art of diplomacy. The term of instruction was one year, and anyone failing to meet the required standards was dismissed at the end of this probationary period. It was hoped that the "common training of the students" would eliminate rivalry between the diplomatic and consular branches of the service, build morale, and provide the students with the fundamentals of diplomacy.

---


Joseph Grew, Undersecretary of State and one of the driving forces behind the school, welcomed one of the classes. "I think one of the finest things in the service is the building up of the great esprit de corps, the great solidarity of the ranks, close contact between men in the Department with men in the field." While this attitude encouraged the young diplomats to think of themselves as a special professional class, conversely it discouraged independent thought or behavior.

The training was divided into two categories. The first area was concerned with practical matters: extradition, passport laws, visas, use of English in diplomatic correspondence. The second area dealt with foreign policy analysis. These lectures were delivered by experts from the Department of State. In the case of American-Russian relations and related subjects, all the lectures were prepared and delivered by officials from the Eastern European Division. Between April 20, 1925, and January 15, 1927, thirteen lectures were delivered by these Russian experts. Evan Young, then chief of the Eastern European Division, delivered a lecture entitled "Russia" on


Joseph Grew, Undersecretary of State, speech delivered to new students, November 2, 1925, lectures to the Foreign Service School, 1925-1930, 7 Vols., State Department File 623, Record Group 59, National Archives of the United States. (Hereafter cited FSS)
June 24, 1925. Preston Kumler, who was assigned to "EE" and responsible for gathering information on communist activities in the United States, spoke on "Activities of the Soviet Regime in the United States" on January 6, 1926. Earl L. Packer, assistant chief of "EE", delivered his lecture, "The Russian Revolution of 1917," on December 22, 1925. The remaining ten lectures were all prepared and delivered by Kelley. The topics ranged from "The Baltic States and Russia" (June 19, 1925) to "Essential Factors Involved in Establishing Normal Relations with the Soviet Union" (January 7, 1926).

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze Kelley's lectures individually, an effort will be made to isolate and analyze the common themes. Kelley's lectures may be divided into three broad categories: 1) history of Russia, the Baltic States, and Poland; 2) foreign and

---

186 Evan Young, "Russia," June 24, 1925, FSS.
187 Preston Kumler, "Activities of the Soviet Regime in the United States," January 6, 1926, FSS. This lecture was very poorly organized.
188 Earl Packer, "The Russian Revolution of 1917," December 22, 1925, FSS. Packer made the interesting point that "the Allied intervention" was "instrumental in assisting the Bolsheviks to consolidate their hold . . . [by appealing] to Russian nationalism and patriotism." p. 15.
189 Robert Kelley, "The Baltic States and Russia," June 19, 1925, FSS.
190 Robert Kelley, "Essential Factors Involved in the Establishment of Normal Relations with the Soviet Regime," January 7, 1926, FSS.
domestic policies of the Soviet Union; 3) the position of
the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet government.

In the history category, he delivered four lectures,
three of which traced the dismemberment of the Russian
Empire following the Bolshevik Revolution and the World War.
"Five new independent entities -- Finland, Esthonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland -- [were] all created out of territory
of [the] former Russia Empire." Kelley stressed in these
lectures that the new, struggling states felt threatened by
"their common danger from the East." While there was not
"a formal military alliance among these states," he said,
there existed a "moral union," and in case of attack from
the East, "in that moment of danger all will act conjointly
... even in the absence of written treaties." The theme
of these lectures was that the newly-established states
distrusted and feared the Bolsheviks and for valid reasons.
Kelley's judgments were very subtle yet are implicit in his
choice of words, e.g. "During 1922, the Bolsheviks
suppressed the uprising with great severity," "The
Russian efforts to crush Lithuanian. . . ." "persecution

---

191 Robert Kelley, "The Baltic States and Russia," June 19, 1925, p. 1, FSS.

192 Robert Kelley, "Baltic States [II] (continued)," December 19, 1925, p. 16, FSS.

193 Ibid., p. 16.

194 Robert Kelley, "Baltic States [I]," December 18, 1925, p. 7, FSS.
directed against . . . Catholics," and "Polish religion persecuted." He did not explicitly state his personal opinions. His research was far-reaching and impressive, his organization flawless in its logic, his message understated yet clear.

The final lecture in the history series was entitled an "Outline of Russian History," in which he analyzed the evolution of the Russian State. He argued that, historically, "the fate of Russia was largely determined by its geographical position," that there was "a complete absence of natural frontiers, seas, or mountains," with the result that, "constant military preparedness was the sine qua non of the very existence of such a state." The Bolshevik Revolution was successful, Kelley argued, because, "the Russian state and social organization had become an anachronism," which was unable to meet the challenges presented by the modernization of other world powers, particularly in "the carrying on of successful war." This was a thoughtful lecture, very much as one might expect from

---

196Robert Kelley, "Outline of Russian History," December 21, 1925, FSS.
197Ibid., p. 2.
198Ibid., p. 1.
199Ibid., p. 19.
200Ibid., p. 19.
a historian. Only in the closing paragraph is Kelley's bias revealed:

Although . . . we have a tremendous expansion and growth of the external power and prestige of the Russian state, there was no progress in the internal political, economic or cultural development of the Russian people, and it was this internal backwardness of the Russian people that explains the rapidity and extent of the debacle of 1917.  

It is of some interest that the thesis Kelley advanced in explanation of Russia's belligerence and hostility towards her neighbors foreshadowed Kennan's "X-Article." This article was the cause of fierce debate at the time, and remained the subject of historical inquiry for years. Both Kelley's lecture and Kennan's essay argued that throughout her history, Russia had lacked secure borders, had been surrounded by enemies, and had suffered the constant threat of invasion or intervention. The result had been that "all the resources of the country had been placed at the disposal of the national defense" so as to impress any adversaries with Russia's military strength. The scholarly Kennan may

---

201 Ibid., p. 19.
203 Robert Kelley, "Outline of Russian History," December 21, 1925, p. 1, FSS.
204 This was a familiar thesis of Kennan's. See: "The United States and Russia," written Winter 1946, reprinted in ANNEX, Memoirs, pp. 560-565. "The Russians, throughout their history, have dealt principally with fierce hostile neighbors. Lacking natural geographical barriers . . . ." p. 560.
we have arrived at these conclusions through his own studies, and here the point is merely to suggest the possibility of Kelley's influence on the future reasoning of diplomats who were exposed to his sagacious observations.

In the second category, governmental policies, Kelley delivered seven lectures. He analyzed the Soviet leaders as "disciples of Marx" for whom the "question of boundaries is always of minor importance," and therefore, he stated, "slogans of self-determination" were used by the leadership "purely as a tactical movement."\(^{205}\) He explained the communist doctrine of class struggle and claimed that the union of legislative, judicial, and executive power resided in a body of twenty-one men, and further claimed that the object of that doctrine was "to insure dictatorship of those in power."\(^{206}\) Kelley cautioned students that it would be "a grievous mistake to conclude" that this government is "a sovereign political body deriving its authority from the sovereignty of the people."\(^{207}\) The political organs merely legalized the "activities of the real governing power -- the Russian Communist Party."\(^{208}\)

\(^{205}\) Robert Kelley, "Soviet Union," June 22, 1925, p. 2, FSS.

\(^{206}\) Ibid., p. 2.

\(^{207}\) Robert Kelley, "Territorial and Political Organization of the Soviet Government," December 31, 1925, p. 15. FSS.

\(^{208}\) Ibid.
The development of the Russian Communist Party and the Third International was the subject of another lecture. The presentation on the Third International was a particularly impressive piece of scholarship. Kelley made his points by quoting extensively from the speeches and writings of communist leaders and allowed his students to reach their own conclusions. In his final remarks, Kelley offered some guidance. "The relationships between the so-called Soviet Government and the Third International is neither fortuitous nor accidental," he said. "The bond between the two arises not merely from the fact that there exists a mutual solidarity of material interests, but rather from the fact that they represented to a certain extent coordinate organs whose functions are different."\textsuperscript{209} This, of course, was the same point Kelley had made during the recognition hearings in January 1924; to wit, that the only real distinction between the Soviet Government, the Russian Communist party, and the Third International was in the names, and in all three power was vested in the same leaders.

The lecture on "Economic Aspects of the Bolshevik Regime" explained the reasons for the communists' shift from the period of "military communism" to the period of the "New

\textsuperscript{209} Robert Kelley, "Third or Communist International," January 5, 1926, p. 25, FSS.
Economic Policy" or "State Capitalism." The lecture on "Foreign Policy of the Bolshevik Regime" was delivered in two sessions and addressed the development of the Bolsheviks' foreign policy, beginning on November 7, 1917, when the communists came to power: Kelley repeatedly underscored the point, "Although the ultimate aim of the Soviet regime has remained the same -- world revolution and the establishment of a whole Soviet republic -- its immediate foreign policy -- that is, its tactics -- has undergone considerable changes." In this presentation, Kelley again made use of communist writings to reinforce his points. He concluded with a personal judgment: "A spirit of menace and reprisal pervades the foreign intercourse of the Soviet Government." According to the Soviet leaders, Kelley said, "the world is divided into two warring classes .. .," and while the communist leaders might accept a temporary *modus vivendi* with capitalistic countries, their goal "remains the same -- world revolution."

---


211Robert Kelley, "Foreign Policy of the Bolshevik Regime," December 29, 1925, p. 4, FSS. The second section of this lecture was entitled, "Foreign Policy of the Soviet Regime (continued)," December 30, 1925, FSS.

212Ibid., p. 17.

213Ibid., p. 6.
Kelley's third category concerned the "Problem of Recognition of the Soviet Union." In analyzing this issue, he stated that "recognition" held a different meaning for the Soviet regime than for the states of Western Europe. To the former, recognition represented "a temporary expedient" essential until the "advent of the world revolution." To the Western States, recognition entailed settlement of debts, the question of confiscated property, and cessation of propaganda. Even if the Soviets agreed to these conditions, Kelley felt they could not be trusted to honor their promises. The experiences of Great Britain and France following those governments' recognitions of Soviet Russia were discussed. Kelly restated the position of the United States. "If I am correct in my interpretation of its attitude," he said, the government of the United States "does not propose to enter into relations with a regime which repudiates obligations" and continues "subversive activities" in the United States. The Soviet government simply had not, in Kelley's view, met "the acid test of good faith."


\[215\] Ibid., p. 1.

\[216\] Ibid., p. 3-20.


\[218\] Ibid., p. 26.
Kelley's lectures were typed, double spaced, on two hundred and twenty-one pages of legal size paper. That measurement is easily calculated. What is more difficult to quantify is how much influence the lectures had on the students at the Foreign Service School. When Earl Packer was asked this question, he shrugged, "It would be a tremendous task to demonstrate the impact of the Foreign Service School on the thought of the diplomatic trainees." The conclusions the students formed concerning World-Russian relations and particularly American-Russian relations as a result of Kelley's lectures are not definitely known. What can be shown is that the only viewpoints presented to the trainees on the Soviets were the antipathetic views of Kelley and the Eastern Europeanists. Particularly because there were few scholars of Russian Affairs in the United States, these lectures may well have been the first and only academic discussion to which young officers were exposed before they were assigned to the field. With the passage of the Rogers' Act, all newly-accepted officers were required to attend the school, and since Kelley remained the State Department's resident Russian expert until 1937, it is likely that his influence was significant.

That said, in fairness it must be added: these lectures are impressive historical documents. They were well-researched, logical, and representative of the thinking.

219 Packer Interview, February, 1989, New York City, N.Y.
and the position of the State Department at the time. The nonrecognition policy was, after all, not Kelley's policy, but rather, as Kelley wrote, "a Wilson-Colby-Harding-Hughes-Coolidge-Kellogg one."\(^{220}\) Kelley simply perpetuated that policy. He was instrumental in planning and organizing the training of Russian language specialists. He influenced all the trainees who attended the Foreign Service School. Moreover, copies of all his lectures were sent to American Embassies and legations around the world as a means of educating the staffs at those locations and making it possible for America's diplomats to speak with one anti-communist voice.\(^{221}\)

****

After sixteen years, in 1933, a new and determined president made the decision to recognize officially Soviet Russia. Kelley, who knew "all the dots and commas of Bolshevik documents of the past,"\(^{222}\) was asked to draft the recognition agreement. One may be sure that the irony of this situation did not escape Kelley. Yet whatever his personal misgivings, he remained silent. Kelley was, after all, and as has often been written, "a taciturn man," and

\(^{220}\)Kelley to Harper, March 10, 1925, Harpers Papers, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

\(^{221}\)Most of Kelley's lectures are stamped "Confidential" and are stamped with the instructions: "Copy for Consul at ___. To be delivered by personal messenger or other safe means as opportunity offers; not to be transmitted by mail."

now he simply rededicated himself to protecting America and American interests from the Soviets.
CHAPTER V

THE KELLEY-ROOSEVELT CONFLICT

For months the officials of the Eastern European Division had followed with avid attention and not a little apprehension the maneuvers of the new president and his special assistant, William Bullitt, who had, at first surreptitiously and later openly, promoted America's official recognition of the Soviet government. The press release on the afternoon of October 20, 1933, which announced the exchange of messages between President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin merely confirmed their suspicions.

Roosevelt, in a first step toward ending sixteen years of official silence, had acknowledged "the present abnormal relations" between "the hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the hundred and sixty million people of Russia." The difficulties between the two nations were not "insoluble," the President wrote, and could be "removed only by frank, friendly conversations....I shall be glad to receive any representative you may designate to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between

---

Kalinin's prompt reply termed the past situation "regrettable." The difficulties, "present and arising," the Soviet President wrote, "...can be solved only when direct relations exist...they have no chance for solution in the absence of such relations." Kalinin promised to send Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to discuss the situation.

The ordinarily unflappable Kelley was visibly frustrated and, as his friend Harper recorded, "serious, as well as much excited." Kelley and Secretary of State Cordell Hull had both urged Roosevelt to arrange private, "informal conferences" in order to resolve the questions which separated the two countries. They recommended that this be done before any public overtures were made to the Soviet Government.

Roosevelt had decided otherwise. Bypassing normal State Department channels, he had communicated directly with the Russians and planned to handle the negotiations himself. Clearly, Kelley's myriad memoranda had gone unheeded. Kelley was further alarmed because Russia would be represented by a man whose career Kelley had followed for

---

225 Ibid., p. 18.
226 Harper, The Russia I Believe In, 200.
years. Maxim Litvinov had a reputation as a shrewd horsetrader, and as Kelley well knew, that reputation was not undeserved. To Kelley and the Eastern Europeanists, the future appeared ominous.

The United States' long delayed recognition of the Soviet Union has been the subject of many books and numerous articles. These studies have tended to focus on the question of why Roosevelt chose to recognize the Soviets. Some historians have argued that he hoped to increase trade in order to aid America's suffering economy. Others have advanced the thesis that recognition was meant to serve as a subtle warning to the Japanese to reconsider any aggressive plans she might have in the Far East. There is evidence to support the validity of each argument, but which carries the greater weight continues to be the subject of some controversy.

A question less frequently addressed in these studies and the one Roosevelt posed in 1933, was: Why not recognize

---


229 See citations throughout study.
Soviet Russia? After all, the official reasons given for nonrecognition had always been repudiated debts, confiscated property, and anti-capitalist propaganda. Yet, after sixteen years, the debts remained unpaid, the property had not been returned, and the communist propaganda continued.

Roosevelt determined that the interests of America would be better served by official recognition of the Soviet government. The time for "negative leverage -- the stick," had passed. Furthermore, Roosevelt believed that the "sentimental prejudice against the U.S.S.R. [was] nonsense," and he certainly had no fear that any communist conspiracy could succeed in overthrowing the government of the United States. This was a man, after all, who in his recent inaugural address had said, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." Roosevelt believed that most outstanding problems between the two countries would be resolved during "the frank, friendly conversations" and that any others could be decided following formal recognition.

This was the point of departure between Kelley and Roosevelt. Kelley was convinced that all "serious obstacles" between the two countries should be resolved prior to public meetings and certainly before official recognition. These divergent points of view and the actions of the two men who espoused them provided much of the drama surrounding the events leading to recognition.

Historically, the prominence of Roosevelt's role has been fully documented. Kelley is generally credited with also having made important if begrudged contributions. Often Roosevelt is characterized as the liberal and triumphant protagonist while Kelley is portrayed as the hardened and obstinate anti-communist antagonist. The evidence suggests, however, that by 1933, Kelley, like Roosevelt, was reconciled to the inevitability of official recognition of Soviet Russia. Each man worked toward the same goal, though their methods differed and their approaches to problem solving were in conflict. The evidence further implies that if Kelley's approach had been followed, while recognition might have been delayed, the eventual relationship between the two countries might well have been stronger. In any event, in this situation Kelley's role was pivotal and is deserving of closer examination.

The six men who planned the recognition conference shared at least one characteristic: they were all ambitious statesmen who possessed and enjoyed the use of power. Kelley had perhaps the most enigmatic personality and because he left no diaries and few personal letters,231 his motives remain shrouded in mystery. A simplified explanation has often been given in order to explain his

---

231 See Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
actions. For example, nearly all historians write that Kelley opposed recognition in 1933. Some writers have cast him in the role of Cassandra, one who was right but not believed. Others have insisted that Kelley was so adamantly opposed to recognizing the Soviets and so convinced that recognition represented a foolhardy policy that his actions guaranteed its failure. Consequently, they write, Kelley bears the responsibility for the uneasy relationship which has existed between America and Russia ever since. 232

This is a heavy charge for one man to bear, but before attempting to answer that charge it may be illuminating to look at the man Kelley had become by 1933. It has already been established that Kelley was young, brilliant, hard-working and dedicated. He was also ambitious, though money was not his primary goal. In a 1933 interview, Kelley's father, James Kelley, spoke of his son:

Some years ago, it seemed to me that he had equipped himself for a business or professional career, where the remuneration would be greater than the army or the Consular Service. He listened to me and said that money was not everything in the world. He liked his work in the State Department and association with such men as Charles Evans Hughes and Colonel Stimson, Secretary of State was more to him than a big salary. 233

232 See: Maddux, Years of Estrangement, Bibliographical Essay, pp. 207-212.

233 Boston Globe - October 29, 1933 "R.F. Kelley of Somerville and West Roxbury is State Dept's Expert on Russia," copy in Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
This interview establishes that Kelley enjoyed associating with politically powerful men, but what were his own ambitions? His rise had been very rapid when he first entered the foreign service, but by 1933 he had held the position of Chief of the Eastern European Division for eight years without advancement. Did he have further ambitions?

A copy of a letter written by Constantine McGuire to Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana provides some insight into Kelley's aspirations. McGuire, a former Harvard professor and one time teacher of Kelley, was an influential figure in Washington, D.C. who preferred to work behind the scenes, but who nevertheless wielded considerable political clout.

Walsh, a close political associate of Roosevelt's, had recently been chosen as the Attorney-General-Designate by the newly elected president. McGuire wrote Walsh that Kelley was "admirably qualified to serve as Assistant Secretary of State." After outlining Kelley's impressive qualifications, McGuire added:

---

234 Constantine McGuire to Senator Thomas Walsh, January 25, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.; McGuire apparently left instructions that his personal papers were to be destroyed after his death; biographical information on Senator Thomas Walsh can be found in: James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story The Roosevelt Years, pp. 17, 21, 28, 33.

235 Constantine McGuire to Senator Thomas Walsh, January 25, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
...as you can well imagine, the gentry who run the State Department have had him around because they had to have someone qualified to do what he does—not because of his race, religion, or social background....Kelley is wonderfully discreet and diligent,....But I suppose that you would have to ask for it very definitely from Mr. Roosevelt, inasmuch as the "white-spat brigade" are banking upon Sumner Welles to distribute these jobs among them. 236

This letter was dated January 25, 1933. Unexpectedly on March 2, 1933 Senator Walsh died -- and with him one would suppose, Kelley's hopes for being named Assistant Secretary of State. 237

A clue to what may have been Kelley's fondest ambition was found in a letter John Wiley wrote Loy Henderson three years after recognition and immediately following Bullitt's reassignment to Paris from Moscow. In the context of discussing who would be appointed as the new American ambassador to Moscow, Wiley wrote, "[Bob thinks:] When a new ambassador is appointed; he will probably...be carefully handpicked. In consequence, Bob doesn't think there is any chance of Bob's appointment." 238 Another example of Kelley's interest in assignment to Moscow can be found in a letter from Arthur Bliss Lane, Minister to the Baltics, to R. Walton Moore, assistant secretary of state. The letter

236Ibid.

237James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story The Roosevelt Years, p. 36. It is interesting to note that Walsh, McGuire and Kelley were all Irish Catholics.

dated June 18, 1937, expresses Lane's opposition to Kelley's transfer to the Moscow embassy. These letters establish Kelley's interest in a Moscow assignment and although supportive evidence is lacking, it may be speculated that Kelley had perhaps aspired to be appointed the first ambassador to Russia following recognition.

Kelley was not only ambitious, he was pragmatic. Having reconciled himself to the inevitability of the United States' recognition of the Soviets, he was determined not only to protect the interests of the United States but to advance the careers of his friends. On January 30, 1933, in a confidential letter to John Wiley, Kelley wrote:

> The question [of diplomatic assignments] might just present itself in the form of selecting some officers to accompany a mission to Moscow....Don't forget, also, that it is not a bad thing to be where the spot light is playing and after we reestablish relations with Russia the spot light is going to play on Moscow for some little time.  

Kelly was suggesting that Wiley might well be one of the officers. Undoubtedly, Kelley foresaw this "mission" as the private conference which would settle the outstanding problems between the two countries prior to recognition. It

---

239 Lane to Moore, June 18, 1937. Cited in Maddux, Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941, footnote 22, p. 192. Lane and Kelley had disagreed in the past over the Russian section at Riga. This letter was written at the time the Eastern European Division was eliminated.

would be interesting to know if he saw himself heading that
delegation.

There is some evidence that the activities of the
Japanese in Manchuria in 1931 may have softened Kelley's
opposition to cooperation between America and the Soviets.
Boris Skvirsky, who was a Russian agent of AMTORG and
Russia's unofficial ambassador, wired Moscow on April 20,
1932, "Even Kelly declared in a chat with me that the
existence of normal relations between the United States of
America and the U.S.S.R. would have a favorable influence on
the Far East." Kelley's view of the Japanese must have
been at least partially based on the information he received
from John Wiley, whose letters from Warsaw reported a
possible "Japanese-Polish offensive agreement," a rumored
"expropriation of the Chinese Eastern Railway" by the
Japanese, "the continuation of the Sino-Japanese conflict"
and the "démarche of the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo."

---

241 AMTORG was an acronym for American Russian Trade
Organization.

242 Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR [Foreign policy
documents of the USSR], 22 Vols, (Moscow, 1957-77) 1:488-89;
quoted in Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev, tr.
Olga Adler Titelbaum, Russia and the United States, p. 103.

243 John Wiley to Robert Kelley, December 14, 1931; John
Wiley to Robert Kelley, April 4, 1932; John Wiley to Robert
Kelley, October 10, 1931; Ibid. Also see: John Wiley to
Robert Kelley, April 29, 1932; March 21, 1932; January 27,
1932; December 22, 1931; October 30, 1931; Wiley Papers, FDR
Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
The Japanese clearly were making the Russians very nervous. Russian sentiment was summed up nicely by Walter Duranty, the New York Times correspondent stationed in Moscow:

...I'm inclined to think that the line taken by Stimson [Secretary of State] in his letter to Borah was quite an encouragement to people here and reduced to some extent their feeling of isolation. However remote the USA might be diplomatically, there is no denying a certain similarity or parallel of attitude between the two countries on the Far-Eastern question in general and Manchuria in particular. 244

Kelley was not unaware of these attitudes. Kelley's relaxation towards the Soviets was noted by news columnist, George Abala on January 20, 1931 in the Washington Daily News:

The most conservative of the ultra conservative State Department clique is Robert Kelley....Usually he can spot the pink tinge of a communist a mile away. But he didn't even blink when Boris E. Skvirsky, Washington

244 Walter Duranty quoted by John Wiley in a letter to Robert Kelley, March 21, 1932, Wiley Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Duranty was a much respected English reporter who had covered Russian affairs from the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. For background on Duranty see: Walter Duranty, I Write As I Please, and Walter Duranty, USSR. The letter referred to, is Stimson's letter to Borah dated February 23, 1932 and concerned the draft treaty laid before the Washington Conference. Stimson wrote, "The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world...by the solution of...problems...particularly in the Far East." Eugene Dooman, Oral History Collection, p. 26, Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. Dooman served as Counselor of Embassy in Tokyo for many years and argues that if the advise of Ambassador Joseph Grew had been heeded, the American-Japanese War might well have been avoided. Albeit a partisan view, his history is most helpful in understanding the Far East conflicts in the 1920's and 1930's.
agent of AMTORG recently called him. He greeted Boris like an old friend.

This columnist, like so many others, totally misunderstood Kelley, who loved Russians as much as he hated their communist ideology. He drank vodka, ate in Russian restaurants and enjoyed the double entendres possible in the Russian language.

The Russians apparently felt the same affection for Kelley. In 1935, at a time when the American-Russian relationship had again soured to a state of official distrust, Kelley visited Moscow. Loy Henderson wrote John Wiley at that time: "Kelley is leaving Moscow tonight after a month's stay. I think that he has enjoyed himself....The Russians made a great fuss over him." To Kelley, the Russian communists were his beloved enemies, and by 1933 he realized that they could be diplomatically ignored no longer.

Of all the statesmen involved, Roosevelt needs the least introduction. Here, it is only important to remember

---


246 Samuel Harper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 201; Also see: Letter of invitation to attend colloquy in Miami, 1975, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; Harper-Kelley Correspondence 1925-1040, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

that this was the prewar Roosevelt. He had served as a New York state senator until President Woodrow Wilson appointed him assistant secretary of the navy. He was elected Governor of New York in 1928, and President of the United States in 1932.

A bold and confident popular leader, Roosevelt possessed great charm and a ready wit. In the field of domestic policy he had experience and a plan; in the area of foreign policy, he had minimal experience, no plan, and little confidence in career diplomats, whom he considered "wealthy young men who got entirely out of touch with American affairs."^248 Roosevelt compared their work "with the mating of elephants: a lot of noise and motion, but it took eighteen months to produce anything."^248 In his journal, the diplomat, Jay Pierrepont Moffat wrote, "What apparently struck Hoover and Mills [Ogden L. Mills, Secretary of the Treasury] was his [Roosevelt's] ignorance of the general problems facing the Administration, particularly in the foreign field."^250

---

^248Henry Stimson, Personal Diary, entry of 1-9-33, p. 103, Yale University Library, quoted in John Richman, The United States and the Soviet Union, p. 11.


Members of Roosevelt's own cabinet were likewise critical of his handling of foreign policy and his total disregard for normal diplomatic channels. "Numerous occasions were later to arise," wrote Cordell Hull, "when the President preferred...to communicate directly with the heads of other governments....I doubted the wisdom of this course."\textsuperscript{251} William Phillips, Roosevelt's Under Secretary of State, recalled, "I felt that we would have been in a much better position to negotiate if the President had not taken the initiative."\textsuperscript{252} Roosevelt was determined to recognize Russia, however, and once his presidency was secured he began to act.\textsuperscript{253} The best explanation of why, is perhaps the one advanced by Earl Packer, who was assistant chief of "EE" at the time. "The impression I have," Packer recalled, "is that Roosevelt wanted to do something striking in the area of foreign affairs. I still carry the impression that it was primarily Roosevelt's decision."\textsuperscript{254}

Roosevelt's distrust of career diplomats led him to choose William Bullitt as his tutor in foreign affairs. As

\textsuperscript{251}Cordell Hull, \textit{The Memoirs of Cordell Hull}, Volumes I-II, p. 298.

\textsuperscript{252}William Phillips, Oral History Collection, p. 104, Columbia University, New York City, N.Y.

\textsuperscript{253}That Roosevelt had made this decision before his inauguration was well known by insiders at the time and is documented throughout the contemporary literature.

\textsuperscript{254}Packer Interview, February 17, 1989, New York City, N.Y.
a result, Bullitt came to play a dominant part in the preparations for the recognition conference and was subsequently rewarded by being named Ambassador to Russia. Only forty-two years old, Bullitt was a charming, witty, ambitious and well educated man possessing a winsome nature and a bright spirit.

In 1919 Bullitt had traveled to Russia with the approval of President Wilson and had arranged terms for a truce with Lenin. Upon his return to Versailles, Bullitt's efforts to gain approval for the truce were spurned. Angered, Bullitt resigned and publicly testified at a Senate Hearing attacking Wilson and the Versailles agreement. Many career diplomats had never forgiven him this childish, disloyal and unprofessional behavior. Roosevelt however, found Bullitt engaging company, and the two developed a close social and professional relationship. Roosevelt, chose Bullitt to be his "Russian expert," and since Bullitt lacked much knowledge of Russian affairs, he in turn was forced to find his own Russian expert. It was in this way that Bullitt came to rely on Kelley.255

255 For further information on Bullitt see: Orville Bullitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt; William C. Bullitt, The Bullitt Mission to Russia; Kelley/Bullitt Correspondence, 1934-1935, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (Bullitt's letters may not be photocopied as of this date (1989),); Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and Soviet Russia; John Richman, The United States and the Soviet Union, Chapter II; Will Brownell and Richard N. Billings, So Close to Greatness, A Biography of William C. Bullitt; also see:
Secretary of State Cordell Hull's role in the preparations and actual negotiations was minor; some have suggested by Roosevelt's design. In his diary the former Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, described Hull as a man who lacked "vitality and vigor."\footnote{Henry Stimson, Diary, entry for 2/25/1933, pp. 96-97, quoted in John Richman, \textit{The United States and the Soviet Union}, p. 11.} The career diplomat, Eugene Dooman, described him as a politician who "came...from the ordinary people," was "legalistic" in his approach to international problems, and "was lacking in that flexibility and that knowledge which distinguished such men as Hughes and to some extent Stimson."\footnote{Eugene Dooman, Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York City.} In his diary, Hull wrote that he told Roosevelt, "I favor recognizing Russia." Hull made quite clear, however, that he favored informal conferences as a first step.\footnote{Cordell Hull, \textit{The Memoirs of Cordell Hull}, p. 297. For a further discussion of Hull's position see: Robert E. Bowers, "Hull, Russian Subversion in Cuba, and Recognition of the U.S.S.R.," \textit{Journal of American History}, 53, June-March, 1966-67. It has been claimed that Roosevelt chose weak men for the top positions in the State Department because he wanted to be his own Secretary of State. John Richman, \textit{The United States and the Soviet Government}, p. 11. It seems more likely that Hull was appointed because he had originally, and with some reason, expected to be Roosevelt's running mate but to secure the nomination, Roosevelt chose John Nance Garner instead. James Farley, \textit{Jim Farley Story}, p. 25, 33.}
William Phillips was Under-Secretary of State in Roosevelt's cabinet. In his memoirs, Phillips wrote that he "regretted" that Roosevelt had made the first overture to the Soviets because that put the United States on the "defensive."\textsuperscript{259} Phillips was more critical of Roosevelt in his oral history, although he saved his greatest wrath for the Soviets. "We didn't know then that we could never trust a Soviet official around the corner."\textsuperscript{260}

Judge Walton Moore was appointed Assistant Secretary of State following the early resignation of Raymond Moley from Roosevelt's cabinet in September 1933.\textsuperscript{261} Moore was a bachelor, described by a society columnist as "a Virginia gentleman of the old school, intelligent and flattering. Another columnist wrote, Walton Moore, while "charming was a novice at foreign affairs."\textsuperscript{262} Moore and Hull, both Southern Democrats, had often worked together in Congress to promote the interests of their region. Moore and Bullitt's father had been roommates while at law school, and during 1933

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{256}William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, p. 74.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{259}William Phillips, Oral History Collections, p. 105, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{261}For information on Moley see: Raymond Moley, After Seven Years. (New York, N.Y., 1937) Moley's pejorative comments on William Bullitt are often cited in studies of the period. See: Ibid., p. 137.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{262}Helen Essary, Town and Country, February 1936; Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, "Merry-Go-Round," The Daily Washington, 1934 exact date uncertain, both articles in Kelley Papers, Georgetown, Washington, D.C.
Bullitt developed a relationship with Moore which continued for years.

These intertwining relationships strengthened the negotiation group and, although their approaches varied, by the time of Litvinov's arrival, these six men represented a formidable and cohesive combination. Most importantly, with the possible exception of Roosevelt, they had all come to rely on Kelley for information on Russian affairs. Roosevelt turned to Bullitt, but since Bullitt's knowledge was limited, he too was forced to depend on Kelley. This then was the situation in the summer and early fall of 1933 as the American team prepared the terms for recognition.

Roosevelt, who was determined to recognize the Soviet government, used Bullitt for the initial contact. Bullitt had been named as Assistant to the Secretary of State and attended the London Economic Conference which was held in

---

June-July 1933.\textsuperscript{264} While there he held two friendly discussions with Litvinov, to smooth the way for future meetings between representatives of the two countries.\textsuperscript{265} Bullitt's correspondence to Roosevelt while attending this conference is demonstrative of his wit and his bravura. His observations also call into question his judgment. Bullitt was, after all, writing as an official representative of the United States to the President of that country, which suggests that some degree of decorum and protocol should have been observed. Plainly, it was not. In these letters, Bullitt repeated a remark, likening the British Prime Secretary, Ramsey MacDonald, to a "squirming eel" and wrote that the French Premier, George E. Bonnet, "is as cooperative as a rattlesnake." Bullitt saved his meanest cut for John Simon, Britain Foreign Minister, of whom Bullitt wrote, "The trouble with Simon is that when they

\textsuperscript{264}Bullitt's successful plan to join the Roosevelt administration can be easily traced. See: Louis B. Wehle, Hidden Threads of History, pp. 110-115; Orville H. Bullitt, editor, For the President: Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, pp. 17-33; Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, pp. 135-137.

\textsuperscript{265}Bullitt to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1: January 1933-February 1934. Bullitt wrote, "I told him [Litvinov] that of course you would require an absolute pledge from the Russian Government to refrain from all propaganda directed against our institutions...." p. 292.
circumcised him, they threw away the wrong piece." Bullitt often made rash public statements during the conference. This was typical of Bullitt's behavior and as a result he was little respected in the international community. But while Bullitt might be viewed in Europe with disdain, he was one of the few men who enjoyed the confidence of Roosevelt in the months preceding recognition.

As a logical conclusion of this confidence, it was Bullitt whom Roosevelt designated to make the initial contact with the Soviets. On October 11, 1933, he went to the office of Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to meet Boris Skvirsky, Moscow's unofficial ambassador, who lived in Washington, D.C. Bullitt gave Skvirsky an unsigned carbon copy of Roosevelt's invitation to Kalinin. Skvirsky was instructed to transmit the text in "his most private code to Moscow" and upon receipt of "a satisfactory reply" from

---

266 Bullitt to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933, pp. 3, 5, 6 FDR Library, PSF, London Economic Conference, Box 156, Hyde Park, N.Y., quoted in John Richman, The United States and the Soviet Union, p. 29. The "eel" and "rattlesnake" quotes are included in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. I: January 1933-February 1934, Letter, William C. Bullitt, Executive Officer, American Delegation, London Economic Conference to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933, pp. 289-294. The derogatory comment on Simon is omitted although there are no ellipses to indicate the omission. Simon however is discussed and in less than glowing terms. p. 292.

267 Morgenthau, whom Roosevelt had appointed head of the Farm Credit Administration, was a close personal friend of Roosevelt's and one of his intimate advisors. In May 1933, Morgenthau was placed in charge of Russian trade negotiations. In this way he became involved in Russian loan negotiations.
Kalinin, a signed copy of Roosevelt's invitation would be delivered to Skvirsky. Bullitt cautioned Skvirsky that there should be "absolutely no publicity" and that President Roosevelt "should control the time and form of any publicity" should Moscow's reply be satisfactory.\footnote{For the President: Personal and Secret, Bullitt to Hull, October 11, 1933, pp. 42-43. For other accounts see: Thomas R. Maddux, Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941, pp. 15-16; Robert Paul Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, pp. 116-117; Donald Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements.}

Kalinin's reply was judged to be acceptable and Roosevelt signed the original copy of his message which Bullitt then delivered to Skvirsky on October 18, 1933. Skvirsky, in turn gave Bullitt a signed text of Kalinin's message and Roosevelt announced the exchange of messages at his regular press conference on Friday, October 20, 1933.

Roosevelt made it very clear to the newsmen that these letters did not imply recognition. "This is a request and an acceptance of the thought of sitting together at a table to see whether we can devise means for settling various problems that exist between two great nations, two great people."\footnote{Roosevelt at Press Conference, October 20, 1933. Edger Nixon, editor, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1: January 1933-February 1934, pp. 434.} When reporters asked which problems, Roosevelt became vague. "...there are a lot of them that have come up in the past sixteen years...."\footnote{Ibid., 435.} Although Roosevelt chose
not to discuss these specific questions with reporters, by October 20, 1933, he had a pretty well defined list of those problems which he had concluded must be arbitrated before formal recognition was confirmed. His list fell far short of the full resolution of all outstanding problems and certainly failed to satisfy State Department officials, particularly Kelley.

In the months which preceded the exchange of letters, Kelley and the Eastern European Division had produced hundreds of pages of reports. The reports were a combination of background information, problems to be resolved, and analysis.

As early as July, 1933, Kelley prepared a report entitled, "Problems Pertaining to Russian-American Relations Which in the Interests of Friendly Relations between the United States and Russia, should be settled prior to the Recognition of the Soviet Government." A copy of this memorandum was handed by Acting Secretary of State Phillips to Roosevelt on July 27, 1933.

The opening paragraph of the memorandum was a warning and, retrospectively, a prophecy. Kelley cautioned that the removal of all "serious obstacles" between the two governments was necessary prior to recognition if "friendly

---

27 FRUS, The Soviet Union 1933-1939, pp. 6-11. This report was requested by Harry Franklin Payer who was an assistant secretary of state until November 1934 when he was appointed chief of the Foreign Export Division.
cooperation" between the two governments was to develop. Otherwise, he wrote, "in view of the extraordinary nature of these obstacles," official relations became "the source of friction and ill will rather than the mainspring of cooperation and good will." He cited the unsatisfactory experiences of other countries who had recognized the Soviet government. If formal diplomatic relations were established without "mutual understanding and common principles," Kelley argued, the results would be useless to both Russia and America and only lead to "friction and rancor." 272

Kelley analyzed the three major problems, which in his view required solutions in the interest of "the establishment of harmonious and mutually beneficial relations" to both countries. The first and "fundamental obstacle" was the "Problem of Communist World Revolutionary Activities." The second "serious difficulty" was the "Question of Repudiated Debts and Confiscated Property." The third was the "Problem of Bridging the Differences Between the Economic and Social Structure of the United States and Russia." 273

The first two problems were ones which Kelley had addressed many times before and the wording differed very little from his previous studies. His one notable addition in analyzing the revolutionary activities of the communists

272 Ibid., pp. 6, 7, 9.
273 Ibid., pp. 6, 7, 9.
was the sentence: "Even when these activities do not constitute a present menace to the established order, the systematic interference of a foreign power in the domestic affairs of a country constitutes ipso facto a source of deep resentment and unavoidable friction." Most likely this sentence was inserted in response to the increasingly popular argument that communist activities had persisted for sixteen years without serious consequences to the social or economic structure of the United States.

In discussing the repudiated debts and confiscated property issues, Kelley reinforced his earlier arguments by insisting that while these issues remained unresolved "the basis of ordinary credit to the Soviet government" would severely handicap "the development of commercial relations between Russia and foreign countries." In reality this had not been the case during the nonrecognition period, as businessmen in the United States were skilled at the art of creative finance and commercial relations between the two countries had prospered. Kelley listed the dollar losses the United States had suffered as a result of debt repudiation and property confiscation. The gross figure listed was six hundred and twenty-eight million dollars ($628 million) but of greater significance was the fact that in parentheses after repudiated obligations were two words:

\[274\text{ Ibid.}, \text{p. 8.}\]

\[275\text{ Ibid.}, \text{p. 8}\]
"principal only."\textsuperscript{276} The issue of interest apparently was not discussed during the recognition sessions and understandably would cause major repercussions later. After all, even a small percentage of interest on a debt of this amount calculated over a period of sixteen years would have amounted to a sizeable sum of money.

Kelley urged that the debt problem be solved prior to recognition. In another prophetic statement he wrote, "It is to be especially emphasized that if the questions of repudiated debts and confiscated property are not settled prior to recognition, there is little likelihood that subsequent negotiations would result in a mutually satisfactory settlement."\textsuperscript{277} Kelley urged that safeguards should be included in the recognition agreement so that there would not be "any retroactive effect which would be prejudicial to American interests."\textsuperscript{278} In this instance Kelley had in mind counter claims the Russians insisted were due them as a result of damages inflicted during America's military intervention fifteen years earlier.

The third problem was one which Kelley had not examined as closely in the past, and his conclusions were based on studies of Russian-European relations. Kelley argued that individual businessmen forced to do business

\textsuperscript{276}Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{277}Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{278}Ibid., pp. 9-10.
with a state monopoly were at a distinct disadvantage. Moreover, the laws of Russia, and "the communist conception of justice is so alien" to other countries, that problems had arisen, particularly in the area of "economic espionage." This was but the first of many papers Kelley sent to the White House in 1933. Following Roosevelt's announcement of the invitation to Moscow, Kelley sent several expanded studies dealing with different aspects of each problem. These studies had some influence. If the writings of Hull, Moore, Phillips and Bullitt are closely analyzed they show the imprint of Kelley's reasoning. For example, the word "weapon" is often used as a metaphor for "loans and credits." In connection with this, it is interesting, in view of the subsequent argument over the terms "loans" and "credits" and the United States assertion that the terms were used synonymously, to note that Kelley in a memo dated September 25, 1933, wrote, "in the form of loans or credits."

The debt issues were the ones which would later cause the greatest rancor between the two governments. The manner

278 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

280 For an in depth analysis, see: Richman, The United States and The Soviet Union, 113-124. Kelley's reports are listed on p. 263, footnote 13, National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, No. 1 8001.51 W89 U.S.S.R/13-3/4; 10/20/1933; No. 2 861.51/2622-1/2, 10/20/1933; No. 3, 461.11/198-1/2, 10/20/1933; No. 4, 811.00B/1608, 10/20/1933; No. 5, 361.11/4089-1/2 10/20/1933.

in which the preparations for the meetings was handled and the way in which the negotiations were conducted, almost guaranteed that result. In this instant, Roosevelt and Kelley must both share blame. Once Roosevelt had made the decision to recognize the Soviet government, his principal concern was the reaction of the American public. By insisting on religious freedom for Americans in Russia and a cessation of communist propaganda in America, the public supported Roosevelt's position. Roosevelt finally settled the debt issue by signing a "gentleman's agreement," the details of which were to be worked out later. Roosevelt most probably would have been willing to agree to a token payment which would have allowed the two countries to start a fresh relationship. But of course, this was not possible with Kelley lobbying to exact full payment plus interest.

Nor was Kelley the only member of the negotiating team who felt that way. By November 1933, Kelley had successfully convinced Hull, Phillips, Moore, and even Bullitt, of the correctness of his position. The situation had developed into a war of personalities. An unwritten compromise was accepted by Roosevelt and Kelley. Roosevelt recognized the Soviet government without settling all the outstanding problems. Kelley forced further negotiations to bring about a just settlement of the debt issue. Given the personalities involved, any other solution was impossible. Perhaps if either man had been free to follow his natural
inclinations, America's new relationship with the Soviets would have been different. Kelley might have hammered out an agreement in private conferences prior to recognition. Roosevelt would possibly have accepted some token amount in order to satisfy the American public. As it was, the debt issue was not settled and the ensuing problems angered both governments and further aggravated the old fears.

There was a broader issue at stake during the summer and autumn months of 1933. The United States was finally accepting the fact that it was possible for two different economic and political systems to peacefully coexist in the world. That was a mental as well as diplomatic breakthrough. There is something ironic in the fact, that in the depth of a depression, America at last gained enough confidence in herself to believe that a capitalistic country and a socialistic country could peacefully share the same planet. There is also a historical sadness that it took America sixteen years to make that discovery, for the compounded distrust of those years made the future sharing of the same planet difficult. The anti-communist and anti-capitalist philosophies, which had developed as a result of this diplomatic isolation, had become deeply imbedded in the collective psyche of the peoples of both countries. Under these circumstances, official recognition had little chance of erasing sixteen years of distrust. Neither Roosevelt nor
Kelley seemed aware of this in November 1933. To them, future Russian-American relations appeared promising.
SOURCES CONSULTED

PRIMARY SOURCES

Official Documents


Robert Kelly Papers: Lauinger Library: Georgetown University. Washington, D.C.


______. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States 1917-1933. Washington, D.C.


______. Department of State. Record Group 59. National Archives of the United States. Washington, D.C.


______. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States. Relations With Russia. 68th Congress, 3rd Session 1921.
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Recognition of Russia. 68th Congress, 1st Session. 1924.


Legal Cases


Diaries, Memoirs, Autobiographies, and Letters


**Dissertations**


**Newspapers**

*Boston Globe.* Boston.

*The Daily Washington.* Washington, D.C.


*St. Paul Dispatch.* Minnesota.

*Times Herald.* Washington, D.C.

*Town and Country.* Washington, D.C.


*Washington Herald.* Washington, D.C.

*Washington Star.* Washington, D.C.

*Washington Times.* Washington, D.C.
SECONDARY SOURCES


