2-25-2022

Immigration Federalism in the United States: Constructing a Contemporary Institutional Framework Centered on Local Communities through a Case Study Approach

Sara Kuehlhorn Friedman
Portland State University

Immigration Federalism in the United States: Constructing a Contemporary Institutional

Framework Centered on Local Communities Through a Case Study Approach

by

Sara Kuehlhorn Friedman

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Public Affairs and Policy

Dissertation Committee:
Craig W. Shinn, Chair
Masami Nishishiba
Jason Jurjevich
Alex Stepick

Portland State University
2022

Abstract

This research study presents a new model of immigration federalism which integrates existing theories into a framework that emphasizes agency at the local level. Unlike dominant models of federalism that observe the cascading effect of higher-level policy on lower levels of government, this research focuses on empirical evidence at the local level to understand its relation to policy at higher levels. Immigration federalism is receiving substantial interest in scholarly work and in practice, but it lacks a cohesive and comprehensive theory explaining variation at the community level. There is little reason to expect sweeping changes in immigration policy at the federal level anytime soon, but immigration policy continues to change in practice. Understanding changes in immigration policy, particularly at the state and local levels of government, is valuable, and a comprehensive theory of immigration federalism focusing on lower levels of government expands perspectives of federalism.

The research for this study follows a nested case study design that involves collecting and analyzing secondary and primary data at the federal, state, and local levels. Secondary data were collected at three levels of government—federal, state, and local— for each case study. Semi-structured interviews of public administrators and community leaders were conducted at the local level. This primary data were analyzed using grounded theory and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The five case studies that result from data collection and analysis frame immigration policy at the federal level, across 50 U.S. states and in Oregon particularly, and in the Oregon cities of Sandy, Nyssa, and Madras. These case studies are compared within and across levels of government to construct a new model of immigration federalism.

Following this nested approach, I created and refined a theory of immigration federalism by constructing an overarching framework reflecting the institutional context of immigration policy at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Each level yielded understanding which informed, modified, and optimized information gathering at the next level, so construction of the framework was recursive throughout the research project. The resulting model emphasizes a policy's connection to the public at the local level and highlights the role of governance in balancing rather than resolving tensions. This immigration federalism model helps describe the dynamic nature of the intergovernmental influence and the reality of independent local authority in the United States that results in different policy outcomes locally depending on polity perspectives and civic capacity of the community. Therefore, this model offers a new perspective that encourages scholars and practitioners to value local diversity and the knowledge and expertise—even of complex and controversial policy issues like immigration—inherent in the local community context.

The findings of this study reveal that there are more differences than similarities in the capacity of local-level jurisdictions, which ensures that the experience in each jurisdiction will be unique. With this known, the response to federal and state-level immigration policy changes can differ in different localities. The findings of this study also highlight the significance of factors relevant to civic capacity, which can impact immigrants and immigration at the local level. Finally, the study finds that, where local-level public administrators and civic leaders take the initiative to understand their city's historical, racial, ethnic, and immigrant dynamics, informants in the community expressed greater awareness of cross-cultural challenges. The study offers

recommendations for public administrators for improving social equity across cultural groups, building civic capacity, and building leadership capacity.

The theoretical framework for immigration federalism explains observed relationships between and among levels of government while taking history and the realities of local-level diversity into account. The immigration federalism framework is born of empirical observation and drives theory that is empirically testable, so the framework as it exists now can be built upon by constructing additional state and local-level cases and making comparisons. The functionality of this model has implications for understanding civic capacity and social equity in local jurisdictions and is transferable to policy domains beyond immigration. Environmental policy, including climate change policy, health policies such as maternal health policy, and Indian child welfare policy, are a handful of examples of policy domains for which this model of federalism would be helpful.

Acknowledgements

I owe thanks to a village or more of individuals who supported my work and who kept me motivated throughout the process. To Professor Craig Shinn, my advisor and guide throughout the dissertation creation process, a big thank you. I appreciate your willingness to allow me to start big and for being available with encouragement, especially in the overwhelming moments. To Professor Masami Nishishiba, who not only served on my dissertation committee but also served as my guide and advisor throughout my graduate school experience, I thank you for your guidance and motivation. Thank you also to Professor Jason Jurjevich. Your enthusiasm for demographics and geography inspired this work early on, and your detailed feedback improved this manuscript. And thank you to Professor Alex Stepick, whose feedback also guided my work and whose sociological perspective was valued.

To my informants, the twenty individuals who sacrificed a bit of their time on various afternoons in early 2021, this work belongs to you.

Several people helped me find resources and helped me edit pieces of this work. I thank Rick Mikulski for his services as a government documents and social sciences librarian—I could not have found many resources for this work without your assistance, and your enthusiasm for this work helped to motivate me. Thanks to Will Bauer, who volunteered to copy edit chapters, apparently *for fun*. I also thank colleagues and friends, too numerous to thank individually here, for reviewing case studies and bouncing around ideas in development.

Finally, thank you to my family. Thanks to my father, who moved cross-country to live with us and help provide childcare during the first winter of the COVID-19

pandemic. Thanks to my mother, who flew in to provide support when babies were born and when I wrote field exams. Thanks to my partner in all things, Sasha. Your patience and enthusiasm for my endeavors keep me moving forward. And to Lillian and Eleanor, who were not here when this all began, but who have proven to be the greatest of motivators. Thank you for being here now.

v

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background for the Study

In the context of federalism in the United States, there is conflict among legal and political scholars, public administrators, and the general public regarding where authority lies in immigration policy. Before the Civil War and the Naturalization Act of 1870, states regulated who could immigrate into their respective jurisdictions (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Restricted entry was most often related to an individual's lack of property ownership, actual or perceived ill-health status, or race. From 1870 until 1965, the federal government wrested authority for immigration regulation from the states, most often citing federal dominance in immigration based on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Waters & Pineau, 2015). During this period, U.S. immigration policy was highly restrictive and limited entry to individuals based on national origin through various legislative acts.

Since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also referred to as the Hart-Celler Act) abolished national origin quotas and replaced earlier restrictive measures with a visa system, state involvement in immigration policy development and implementation has returned, albeit at a less autonomous level than before 1870. The return to immigration federalism and shared or dual responsibilities for immigration policy has exacerbated institutional and fiscal tensions between the federal and state governments. Federal-level policy decisions in 1986 (the Immigration Reform and Control Act) and 1996 (the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) created room for state participation in immigration enforcement and integration policies while allocating little federal funding for such participation (Waters & Pineau, 2015).

Finally, changes to immigration policy made with the movement of Citizenship and Immigration Services to the Department of Homeland Security after the September 11 terrorist attacks have led many states to involve themselves in immigration policy development and implementation while the federal government has failed to reach bipartisan support for further immigration reform. As states push for more autonomy for immigration policy in their jurisdictions, the courts have responded at times amiably and at times claiming preemptive rule for the federal level, where states remain frustrated by what they observe as a lack of federal action on immigration reform.

Authority for immigrant policy remains in question, yet scholars observe a dramatic increase in state and local-level immigration policy since the turn of the twenty-first century. There lacks consensus regarding the drivers of such policy. Some scholars claim demographic change instigates state-level immigration policymaking (Ybarra, Sanchez, & Sanchez, 2016; Chavez & Provine, 2009; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013). Spiro (2001) points more directly to the common assumption that federal-level inaction on the topic has pushed states to act. Others have looked at industry interests (Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011) or the political ideology of policymakers and of the public as playing an integral role in immigration policy initiation and design at the state level (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015). A number of the scholars cited above have utilized the Reports on State Immigration Laws compiled annually for all 50 U.S. states since 2005 by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 2020b), a dataset deemed by these scholars as invaluable to the exploration of contemporary immigration federalism. All of the elements these scholars point to likely play a role in policy

decisions surrounding immigration, but an accurate assessment of how and under what circumstances remains unclear.

The role of political ideology, ideological interest groups, and public opinion in immigration policy deserves further explanation in the current politically divergent and emotionally charged public atmosphere because they are potentially linked to changing demographics across the country. Changing U.S. racial demographics are closely tied to narratives about immigration across the country and can be linked to various anti-immigrant and pro-white constructions of the issue of immigration today (Hochschild, 2016; Norris, 2018; Root, 2019).

Because immigration policy is inherently attached to a group of people who are immigrants, the process of identifying a problem and conceiving solutions involves the framing, or the construction, of a narrative for that group of people. Schneider and Ingram (1997) argue that the social construction and false or misleading framing involved in policy design, including implementation, can affect democracy in multiple ways. First, the resulting framing invariably defines the group regardless of how inaccurate it may be, thus marking an entire population unfairly. Second, framing creation is vulnerable to the influence of interest groups serving alternative interests. Third, once institutionalized, constructed narratives framing a group of individuals are difficult to perceive, much less alter, increasing inequity in policy implementation.

Interest in immigration federalism present in the scholarly literature mirrors a presence in grey material such as newspapers, magazines, and online news outlets and is also represented as a subject for syndicated TV shows and a topic of discussion on social media. The broad level of interest in immigration policy—and more specifically in

understanding how immigration policy is created and implemented in a federalist context—suggests that the institutional structure for immigration policy is in flux and, therefore, vulnerable to change. According to Jordan (1993), "self-conscious examination seems to be a characteristic of systems undergoing change" (p. 45). While inevitable from a constructionist perspective, institutional change is inherently complex and has real ramifications for individuals served by those institutions.

Further complicating the understanding of immigration federalism is that the function of federalism in the United States itself is disputed. Stewart (1982) compiled and categorized 326 metaphors and models of federalism to illustrate the difficulty scholars and practitioners have simply thinking about federalist institutions. Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) describes various perspectives of federalism, including forced federalism, dual federalism, cooperative federalism, and interactive federalism. Each type of federalism maintains different assumptions about the relationship between federal and state or local rulemaking. Incidentally, Wright (1988) criticizes the broad use of adjectives preceding the term federalism, claiming it interferes with the overall intergovernmental, or federalist, perspective. For this reason, Wright (1988) argues that "intergovernmental relations" is a more accurate term for what most scholars label federalism. The term intergovernmental relations also redirects the focus from relationships with the federal level toward relationships with more local levels of decision making and policy implementation.

Immigration policy in the United States is a wicked problem. Rittel & Webber (1973) define a wicked problem as not solvable. It is impossible to define because identifying the problem is mainly dependent on the perspective and needs of the group

defining it. The history of immigration policy in the United States indicates that the policy domain has never been free from the pressures and tension created by a plurality of interests and values. However, like Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn (2019) argue, wicked problems are becoming more typical in a public landscape made more complex by the devolution of governance and the rise of interdependence, globalization, and ideological shifts within and among populations.

The notion of wicked problems creates a new challenge for public administrators and others tasked with the responsibility to design, interpret, and implement efficient, effective, and equitable public policy. If unsolvable, then wicked problems "are only re-solved—over and over again," Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 168) argue. The implication for U.S. immigration policy is the recognition that what some deem the immigration problem, presumably with a (singular) solution, is an ongoing policy issue rather than a situation fixable with infrequent, albeit drastic, policy shifts. As a wicked problem, U.S. immigration policy should be managed in an ongoing fashion, an improbable strategy under the organization of federal-level institutions responsible for immigration policy development and management (Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, & Meyers, 1998; Jayapal, 2021).

As a domain, immigration policy in the United States is inherently challenging because of plurality and dogmatic ideologies. Immigration emerged as a national policy issue through the early twenty-first century, and the Trump administration amplified it from 2017 through 2020. In the space of four years, the Trump administration banned nationals of eight mostly majority-Muslim countries and reduced refugee admissions allowances, increased arrests of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. interior, attempted

to cancel Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), ended temporary protected status for some nationals, and poured funds into building a wall on the United States-Mexico border. Much of this policy occurred via executive order and, therefore, without bipartisan Congressional support for immigration reform, which creates an ever more unsure context for federal immigration policy going forward. However, it is essential to note that earlier administrations, including the Obama and G.W. Bush administrations, were unsuccessful in achieving immigration reform and led immigration policy through executive order. A profoundly complex situation reveals itself when the federalist history and contemporary federalist context of immigration policy are considered.

Without strong Congressional agreement, federal-level immigration policy is left to the will of the executive administration in power. The contemporary political climate is growing more polarized, making such bipartisan agreement unlikely soon. While federal-level immigration policy changes from one presidential administration to another, state policy may temper the effects of federal-level policy changes while simultaneously responding to the needs and values of the electorate. Compounding the challenge is the increase in local-level immigrant-related policy, a high level of activity from various interest groups to affect policy at each level of government, and the issue framing that occurs when an issue is presented to stakeholders via traditional and modern modes of communication.

Immigration policy is balanced within a federalist system of institutions that appears to be reorganizing while the pressures of plurality and public interest intensify. A precise analysis of contemporary theories of federalism is an integral part of understanding how immigration federalism has been considered until now. Developing

an institutional approach to immigration federalism will most clearly illustrate how various levels of government interact in the immigration policy domain.

The contemporary context of immigration federalism opens many questions. There lacks a theoretical framework to understand the federalist dynamic. For example, how do immigrant individuals at the local level survive and thrive in the face of federal and state immigration policy presumed by scholars to be driven by 1) ideology, 2) population change, or 3) industry and other interest groups? Do socially constructed narratives of immigrants align with beliefs and actions taken by individuals at the local level? Are we implementing community values within the context of a federalist system? If so, how does this manifest itself? These questions lead to inquiries about the institutions of immigration policy. I outline my research agenda and structure in the next section and follow it with an explanation of the value of this study.

Research Problem

The academic goal of this research was to develop a theoretical framework for contemporary immigration federalism that identifies immigration policy mechanisms more accurately than current theories and illustrates complex relationships among levels of government and policy stakeholders, particularly at the community level. The framework and the research are organized by three levels of government (local, state, and federal) and by the three pillars of institutions outlined by Scott (2014) (socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural). In doing so, the framework incorporates elements tested by other scholars of immigration federalism and which are deemed significant causal mechanisms for immigration policy action (e.g., demographic change, political ideology, industry interests). The research goal was to integrate these aspects of

immigration federalism and build a theory that incorporates the level of interaction inherent to such a complex institutional system.

The framework is divided into three primary levels of government (federal, state, and local) to understand how immigration policy at one level affects policies and actions at other levels. The following research questions drive this research:

1) When the history and institutional context of federal, state, and local-level immigration policy are observed and compared, what conclusions can be drawn about the impacts and influences of one upon the other?

2) Is immigration policy at the local level generalizable in the United States, or are local contexts so diverse that generalizations about immigrants and immigration cannot be reliably constructed?

The following sub-questions help to frame the path toward answers to the first two questions:

a. What role does historicity have in federal, state, and local-level policy as it relates to immigrants and immigration?

b. What impact, if any, does demographic change have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

c. What impact, if any, does political ideology have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

d. What impact, if any, do local representation and leadership have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

e. What impact, if any, do local industry and the foreign-born labor force have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

f. What are the overarching narratives relating to immigration at the national, state, and local levels, and do they reflect or conflict with one another?

The strength of the resulting framework will be the ability to observe policy interactions and shifts in the attitudes and actions of the public and public administrators among various levels of government between 2005 and 2019 while also illustrating the current context of immigration federalism as a snapshot of how institutions are functioning today. The 2005-2019 time period is optimal for representing the current context of immigration federalism for four reasons.

First, the time frame begins shortly after post-9/11 era changes in immigration enforcement at the federal level, which invited an increase in state-level participation in immigration policy and continues to the present. Covering 15 total years of policy development provides a substantial period for analyzing policy dynamics resulting from the aforementioned change in federal and state relationships. Second, the NCSL dataset, which includes all enacted state immigration policies, covers these years (NCSL, 2020b). The selection of this timeline and this dataset serve my broader interest in exploring the relevance of the dataset to immigration federalism. Third, an increase in scholarly publications on state and local-level involvement in immigration policy within this period reflects its significance to the federalism discussion. Many studies employ the NCSL dataset, making its use here relevant. Finally, the time period is recent enough that local actors, including public administrators and community leaders, can refer to it.

The outcome of this research reveals multiple histories and contemporary contexts driven by the broad differences in the realities and experiences of U.S. communities. One aspect of analysis for this research is to identify whether an updated history can facilitate

the development of inferences about the link to narrative, ideology, and policy practices relating to U.S. immigration or whether the nature of immigration federalism is simply too complex to achieve such goals. The study explores state and local-level immigration policy intimately while basing its exploration on a somewhat more static context of federal immigration policy. Thus, this research offers a new perspective that will encourage scholars and practitioners to value the knowledge and expertise—even of complex and controversial policy issues like immigration—deeply rooted in the community context. While a natural next step for this research would involve an opportunity to test and operationalize the new model using deductive research strategies, such an activity is outside the scope of this study.

Significance of this Study

Immigration federalism is a topic receiving substantial interest in scholarly work and in practice, but it lacks a cohesive and comprehensive theory integrating the community level. There is little reason to expect sweeping changes in immigration policy at the federal policy level anytime soon. Because immigration policy is expected to continue developing in practice via policy formation at multiple levels, an attempt at comprehensive theory building for improved understanding is worthwhile.

Demographic change in the population, particularly changes in racial demographics, is a known mechanism for immigration policy initiation and decision making. By 2050, the U.S. population is projected to be no longer majority white for the first time in American history. (Frey, 2015), and this fact has already led to various social and political narratives framing immigrants and immigration in ways that directly impact immigration policy at federal, state, and local levels. Finally, climate change is expected

to exacerbate immigration (and migration) issues worldwide, and the United States will not be immune to the resulting demographic pressures climate change causes (Blitzer, 2019; Ferris, 2015). With these developing challenges in mind, the urgency of the present study cannot be overemphasized. Perhaps more significant to the field of public administration, demographic change and its impacts on culture are already prompting many public sector organizations to take action to increase diversity and cultural awareness (Nishishiba, 2012).

The research proposed in this study integrates an institutional perspective into the immigration federalist literature, which assists scholars in viewing the broader federalist context and reminds us that local interactions between and among individuals and public administrators are significant to understanding policy development and outcomes.

The research proposed in this study also emphasizes policy's connection to the public and highlights the role of governance in balancing tensions rather than resolving tensions. Current immigration federalism theory typically explores policy in a macro-vacuum that stops short of observing affected populations directly, or at least in relation to the institutions that affect them. Immigration policy decisions at state and local levels are discussed in the literature. Still, the actions and thoughts of public administrators and residents are not explored in relationship to the broader institutional context(s). Constructing a comprehensive theory focusing on the public takes the spotlight off policy itself and refocuses it on the populations that policy is meant to affect. This approach provides scholars and others interested in immigration policy with a more efficient and accurate understanding of the domain.

Definitions

This research study centers around the capacity of U.S. places to serve immigrants, the population of individuals in the United States who were not born with legal U.S. citizenship, regardless of their documentation. This study employs the terms *immigrant* and *foreign-born individual* synonymously. Foreign-born and U.S.-born are used as adjectives to describe the nativity of individuals in this study because these terms are frequently used in U.S. Census data to refer to these populations. The U.S.-born label includes all individuals who have been U.S. citizens since birth, regardless of whether they were born on U.S. soil or not.

This research study frequently uses standard labels to refer to populations of specific ethnic and racial backgrounds. In this study, *Latino* and *Hispanic* are terms used interchangeably to refer to individuals in the United States whose common language is Spanish and whose countries of origin are in Latin America and Spain. This label is imperfect at best. The decision to use Latino and Hispanic in this work rests in the resources used for this historical review. Some sources cited for this case study refer to this minority group as Hispanic while others refer to this group as Latino, so the case study follows. See Mora (2014) for an in-depth exploration of the term Hispanic in the United States and Vidal-Ortiz and Martinez (2018) for further discussion regarding the evolution of Latin American identity, including a more recent term, Latinx, used among academic and activist circles.

Indigenous American and *American Indian* are interchangeably used in the research case studies to refer to those native to the land eventually settled as the United States. Wherever possible, the names of specific tribes are used in this study. Lastly,

Anglo refers to white U.S. Americans whose first language is English, regardless of ethnicity. I chose to use this term in this research because it is common in literature relaying the history of the American west, the location of my state and local case studies. Several of my interview informants also used the term to describe their populations. As with other labels used to delineate populations, it is imperfect. However, the use of the term throughout this research project by many who self-identify as Anglos gives credence to its respectful use.

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature

Federalism in the United States

There can be no question that federalism in the United States is an intentionally constructed governing system. Before the Constitutional Convention, self-governed U.S. states struggled to thrive in a union without sufficient authority to levy and collect taxes and lacked the legitimacy to compel citizens to participate in efforts to support an army. A national government with the power to do these things as well as to negotiate foreign relations on behalf of all union members seemed ideal. Yet, existing states remained wary of what would be lost if they handed control to a unified government.

The founders of the United States and the writers and debaters involved in constructing the Constitution and, thus, the nation, understood the diverse interests of the citizenry of their states and localities. Still, they also understood the need to balance various interests to keep the public peaceful and prosperous (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). Federalist thought, advocated for by Founders Madison and Hamilton, relies on procedure, highly trained and elite administrators, and assumes expertise in policymaking and implementation (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). Federalist governing practices are intended to protect society from the tyranny of the majority and from dictatorial leadership through a complex system of checks and balances and multiple branches of government. Anti-federalist thought, most notably supported by the Founder Jefferson, views democratic governance from a bottom-up perspective, valuing local governance that involves citizen participation and decision making (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). The U.S. federalist system incorporates the anti-federalist value of local knowledge and participation into governing while at the same time

entrusting the federal government with the authority to manage particular affairs as outlined in the Constitution.

Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2013) point out that the U.S. Constitution is flexible, although challenging to change. This flexibility intentionally allows for interpretations to change with the needs of the people in a given time (p. 73). The nation's Founders recognized that the proper form of government depends on the values and character of the people, which invariably change over time (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013, p. 3). The Constitution divides authority among three branches of government. It outlines the extent of the federal government's authority, but in a federalist context, the boundaries of this authority are often unclear and frequently tested. The conflicting notions of federalism and anti-federalism are still alive and well among the U.S. citizenry today, as reflected in the fact that many Americans continue to participate actively in their local communities. Yet, they remain frustrated with organized politics, especially the national government (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013).

To build on the ambiguity of boundaries of authority, U.S. Courts since the 1990s have been observed to interpret the Constitution in such a way that provides states with a more substantial role to play in the U.S. federalist system (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). This point illustrates how the separation of powers into three branches of government can continuously shift the federalist context in one direction or another. Shifting roles at the state level invariably results in increased tension and confusion in policymaking at other levels of government; this is a symptom of any system in flux. Single-issue interest groups often take advantage of the tension and confusion of a system in flux to influence policy decisions at various levels of government and multiple points

of policymaking. At the local level, however, the *experience* of the public remains unchanged, and the likeliness that the public is aware of or interested in shifting roles within the governance system is low, especially when the anti-federalist propensity of the people to distrust organized government is considered.

The preference for local-level policy-making is strong throughout the United States. While participatory and collaborative governing processes are still nascent in many localities, their value for managing challenging policy decisions grows stronger (Sirianni, 2009). However, Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2013) remind us of the added challenge of *hyperpluralism*, where the persuasive power and flexibility of single-issue interest groups can undermine the capacity of citizens to think and act with the larger community in a manner more conducive to the common good (p. 75). Colbern and Ramakrishnan (2021) outline the perceived "dark side" of U.S. federalism as an agent of racial and other inequities (p. 6) while also highlighting the relatively robust literature covering progressive federalism, which understands that "states serve as political and policy laboratories that function to advance the rights and interests of disenfranchised populations" (p. 9).

The historical context of U.S. federalism notwithstanding, Krane (1993) observes little convergence between policy studies and federalism, arguing that federalism is rarely integrated into models of policy formation. Furthermore, Krane (1993) argues that the states' role is not recognized among public policy scholars as having the policy impact that scholars of federalism know states to have.

Federalism is a complex and dynamic system. Three levels of government negotiate their respective policy-making authority within this system of shared power.

More than 560 federally recognized sovereign Indian Nations in the United States play a role in the U.S. federalist system (Wilkinson, 2005). And while not governing bodies, interest groups and related policy-making opportunists will invariably present themselves in a system as dynamic as the federalist system for the benefit of their respective causes.

Theories of Immigration Federalism

A thorough history of immigration policy throughout the nineteenth century illustrates the development of the federal government's interest and power in immigration policy. It explains the "continually contested division of labor" between national-level and state and local-level governments (Law, 2013, p. 3). Contemporary scholars of immigration federalism explore two aspects: (1) types of immigration federalism that express the policy-making relationships between federal and subnational governments and (2) recent shifts in the U.S. federalism context due to globalization.

Spiro (2001) outlines the nature of central government hegemony, cooperative federalism, and devolutionary federalism as they relate to immigration federalism and argues that the United States, once a central government hegemony, is now functioning under cooperative federalism. The cooperative federalist model allows for some level of policy-making participation from subnational entities (i.e., states), although the central government maintains primary policy-making power. Spiro (2001) points to the 1996 immigration reform act as an effective changer of the U.S. institutional context for immigration policy because, under this law, states and localities are invited to play a role in defining eligibility for some services.

Spiro (2001) illustrates the strength of local sentiment in passing immigration policy at the federal level. California's Proposition 187 passed in 1994 and prohibited

undocumented individuals from using many state public services, including public schools and healthcare. The policy was never enacted because courts found it unconstitutional, but Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 only two years later. This federal-level legislation targeted undocumented immigrants and expanded how states and local governments could coordinate with federal enforcement agencies to enforce immigration policies. With this in mind, Spiro (2001) suggests that even in a central government hegemony state, U.S. immigration policy is impacted by state and local sentiments.

The author asks if further unwinding authority for immigration policy to the state and local levels to the point of devolutionary federalism is possible and preferable, noting two institutional constructs whose changes may impact immigration federalism. With today's less hostile foreign relations context, Spiro (2001) argues, national-level immigration controls intended to manage contentious foreign relations issues are no longer necessary. In addition, state and local-level decisions are less likely to be interpreted as national-level decisions by an act of extension than they would likely have been in the past. Given the shifts in institutional constructs and the United State's history of local influence in immigration policymaking, Spiro (2001) predicts greater immigrant rights with devolution to a shift of greater authority to the local level.

Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) rejects the notion of states as "laboratories of democracy" in the context of immigration federalism (p. 1673). In the article, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) describes the functionality of governance constructs under dual federalism and cooperative federalism, two constructs common among federalist scholars. Under dual federalism, the federal government and states each have authority.

The boundaries between what falls to the federal government's purview and what falls to states are evident. States act as sovereigns in this model of federalism. Under cooperative federalism, states work in service to the federal government, primarily delivering services and carrying out federal programs. In this fashion of federalism, state governments have little authority regarding policy development and act not as sovereigns but as servants.

Cunningham-Parmeter's (2011) findings claim that states cannot act as sovereigns because they act under the constraints of federal policy. This fact alone prevents states from acting with sovereignty, but constraints also hamper state innovation on many levels. States do not work as servants Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) claims since they often act in defiance of the wishes and mandates of the federal government. Analyzing the functions of federalism through the domain of immigration policy, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) describes a different context altogether.

Forced federalism, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) claims, is "a division of powers between the two levels of government in which subnational jurisdictions attempt to force the federal government to accept state-defined immigration enforcement schemes" (p. 1673), and comes as a result of the devolution of enforcement responsibilities to state and local governments. Spiro (2001) highlights this in his example of California's influence on federal immigration policy. However, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) argues this type of federalism is often ineffective as a bottom-up policymaking strategy. Instead, forced federalism creates a context in which state governments attempt to push their preferred policies on the federal government while being limited by federal requirements in their policy creation. Overall, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) describes a context for immigration federalism that is both limiting and uncooperative.

Globalization, and therefore transnational politics, directly impacts U.S. immigration and policy. Yet, at the same time, local communities are experiencing immigration from a perspective of local—not transnational—politics. Rosenblum (2004) observes a difference in policymaking at national and grassroots levels that results in different immigration policies at each level. The author introduces a two-level policy production "game" that illustrates this difference in policymaking and illuminates a stark contrast among the policy focus of various governing levels.

Rodriguez (2008) appears to support the notion of contrasting policy directions explored by Rosenblum (2004), stating, "global forces, as exemplified by the migration of people across borders, are putting pressure on the national in ways that require multiple forms of disaggregated decision making" (p. 642). Here, Rodriguez (2008) expresses her understanding that globalization has led to a more significant divergence in the interests and responsibilities of national and local-level policymakers, a notion that shows the author to be a strong proponent of conferring greater authority to the local level where immigration policy is concerned.

Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998) take a functional approach to immigration federalism and argue that the location of immigration policymaking institutions at the federal level, both historically and at the time of publication, were too stratified and, therefore, too weak for consistent and effective policymaking. This is in line with Neuman's (1993) and Law's (2013) historical reviews. Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998) argue for the nation's immigration function to be consolidated in a single agency dedicated to immigration policymaking. While a shift of the immigration functions at the federal level occurred in 2003, the institutions

responsible for immigration policy continue to be stratified across three separate agencies within the Department of Homeland Security. Jayapal (2021) outlines strategies for reorganizing immigration functions for more efficient and effective service and emphasizes the value of creating a cabinet-level department for immigration services and integration.

Theories of State-Level Immigration Policy

The steam-valve theory is an early theory claiming to predict the development of state-level immigration policy. The steam-valve theory assumes that demographic changes at the local level cause disruptions and tension among groups of citizens (Spiro, 2001). This tension rises to the state level, where politicians are pressured to provide relief in the form of policy changes, in large part, it is argued, because of federal inaction. Therefore, state immigration policymaking serves as a steam valve, releasing tension felt at the local level by providing some semblance of political response to the stress citizens feel. Once released, citizens begin to normalize their new demographic reality, and the pressure at the state level is relieved for the time being (Spiro, 2001).

The polarization change model introduces an alternative theory (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015). The polarization change model states that demographic changes have little to do with state immigration policy and that, instead, the dominant state political ideology drives immigration policy (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015). Under the polarization change model, state immigration policy is initiated by ideologically driven interest groups that target states with similar ideological views. The process counts on the federal government's inaction since action on immigration policy at the federal level would potentially hinder the work of the interest groups at the state level.

The polarization change model reflects policy process theories such as multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium since interested actors seek to enter into a state policy-making context at the right time to integrate their pre-packaged policy options into the system. Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) note that the federalist context provides many places for issue entrepreneurs to shop and test their ideas (p. 93). So the authors' observation of ideologically driven immigration policy development extends to the local and state levels. Issue entrepreneurs are, for Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015), individuals who are closely connected to political actors and who seek to change policy by framing challenges, disseminating information (sometimes disinformation), and networking across jurisdictions (p. 97), and they are a crucial element to the functionality of the polarization change model.

Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) argue that weighting state-level restrictive and integrative immigration policies equally is an error. Restrictive policies, the authors argue, are born of group stereotypes and misperceptions and are typically structured to impact specific groups. In contrast, integrative policies tend to be structured for universal impact and avoid the harms of identifying particular groups based on stereotypes and misperceptions. In a context more ideologically driven as the political context responds to demographic changes, policy framing plays a more significant role in understanding the institutional context of state-level immigration policy (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015).

A weak point in both the steam-valve theory and the polarization change model involves their place in the policy process itself. While the steam-valve theory suggests that local demographic changes initiate state immigration policy action, it does little to

22

describe the process and policy decisions themselves. The theory has little to say regarding whether demographic changes of a particular type or intensity result in more or less restrictive or integrative policy. The polarization change model argues that different state ideologies will result in more or less restrictive or integrative state policies. Still, the details regarding how policy change is initiated are less clear. The theory suggests that issue entrepreneurs act as initiators but work in those states ideologically primed for their success. Yet, the process of framing challenges and disseminating (dis)information requires several additional actors, not all of whom are likely to submit to the claims and requests of issue entrepreneurs.

Research intending to describe and understand state immigration policy related to immigration federalism has increased along with the expansion of state immigration policymaking in the past decades. I reviewed one group of such studies, which I will discuss in the next section. The review reveals a wide variety of research interests and findings, emphasizing the need for more theorizing and structured discussion. Existing theoretical explanations for immigration federalism deserve further exploration.

Understanding State-level immigration Policy Drivers

The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 2020b) has published yearly reports covering state legislation, including resolutions related to immigration and immigrants for all 50 states since 2005. The data are available to the public and are presumed to be comprehensive, giving scholars and individuals interested in exploring state-level immigration policy decision-making a dataset covering 13 years of state legislation. Several scholars have employed this NCSL dataset as an assessment tool for state immigration policy analysis. Yet, the lack of cohesive theory and the lack of

inspection of the broader context of federalism (most studies look at state policy concerning federal policy or state policy concerning other state policies) leaves some question about the utility of research outcomes.

A recent search for academic policy research employing the NCSL data resulted in 14 studies published between 2005 and 2017. These studies are reviewed in-depth in this section to outline the perceived value of the NCSL dataset in understanding immigration federalism and the broad and sometimes disjointed theoretical context in which scholars are working on the subject.

Four studies are Ph.D. dissertations (Hendrick, 2017; Marquez, 2017; Silva, 2016; De Trinidad Young, 2018), and one is a published book (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan 2015), while the remainder are articles published in peer-reviewed journals. The studies all join the NCSL data with additional data relating to demographics, citizen and legislator political ideology, health statistics, or other population-related statistics as called for in individual studies. Therefore, census data, American Community Survey data, citizen ideology scores, and several other data sources were employed for various projects.

All the studies recognized the need to differentiate restrictive legislation from integrative legislation, although the terms used for these policy types varied in the literature. The purpose of the studies also varied to some extent, thus impacting research outcomes. Four studies looked at the impact of legislation on immigrants, while the remainder focused on the causes or triggers of state immigration policy decision-making.

Two studies explored the effect of restrictive immigration policy on demographics (Leerkes, Leech, & Backmeier, 2012; Carter-Chau, 2012), while two others explored the

impact state immigration legislation had on health outcomes (De Trinidad Young, 2018) and immigrant homeownership (Allen & Ishizawa, 2015). In their findings, both Leerkes, Leech, and Backmeier (2012) and Carter-Chau (2012) claim that there is no substantial evidence that restrictive immigration policies affect demographic change. States with more restrictive state immigration policies do not observe a decrease in immigrants moving in, nor do they cause immigrants to move out of those states.

Newton and Adams (2009) questioned the nature of immigration federalism by asking whether state immigration legislation indicates cooperation or conflict with the immigration policies of the federal government. The authors claim that states appear to cooperate with federal policies rather than in conflict with them in their findings. While the authors point out that "even states that have taken the hardest line on immigration—Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma—all have passed laws that attempt to increase cooperation with federal authorities" (p. 426), they do not take into account the fact that it will likely be those states who take the hardest line with immigration policy who choose to work with the federal government for enforcement purposes. Newton and Adams (2009) point out that conflict exists predominantly around fiscal matters, which makes sense given the proliferation of unfunded mandates from the federal level (including in areas other than immigration). Newton and Adams (2009) is the only study in the review group that directly explores the relationship between state immigration policy and federal immigration policy. Its results are found unsupportive of assumptions claiming that states work in defiance of federal policy or out of frustration of federal inaction.

Another study in the review group focuses on public opinion and interest groups and claims that these institutions shape immigration policy at the state level (Hendrick 2017). It appears, however, that the influence of these factors is inversely related. The author states, "where interest groups were strong and active, policy climates tended to be more welcoming. Where they were weak, public opinion dominated the tone of the immigration policy climate" (p. 116). This statement also indicates that public opinion is more likely to lead to restrictive or unwelcome policy than policy influenced by strong interest groups. This research outcome appears in tension with other studies, including Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan's (2015) polarization change model, which suggest that interest groups play a significant role in disseminating ideological perspectives like the ones theorized to drive state immigration policy (which is restrictive as often as it is integrative). Reconsidering the impact of public opinion and interest groups on state immigration policy outcomes with the guidance of a more comprehensive theory describing immigration federalism would improve our understanding of the influence of these factors on policy.

Both Preuhs (2005) and Silva (2016) examined how citizen initiatives, a common tool of direct democracy, effectively curbed minority representation and immigration rights. It should be noted that Preuhs (2005) employed earlier NCSL data covering the years 1984-2002 and focused only on "English only" laws in the states. While the data used by Preuhs (2005) is not included in the dataset currently accessible to the public, the methods and questions are in line with other studies discussed in this section.

Five of the remaining studies (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015; Chavez & Provine, 2009; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Marquez, 2017; Ybarra, Sanchez, &

Sanchez, 2016) were interested in understanding the drivers of immigration policymaking, or policy decisions, seeking primarily to identify whether demographic change or ideology acted as a strong driver of state immigration policy decisions. The focus on ideology and demographic change reflects the two overarching theories of immigration federalism discussed in the previous section. Of the five studies reviewed, four stated that demographic change is the driving force behind immigration policy at the state level. One of these studies argues that citizen ideology is as influential as demographic change, while another claims citizen ideology does not affect immigration policy. The Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) study claims state political ideology is the driver. Most of the scholars focusing on demographic change limited their exploration to changes in the Hispanic population of states. However, some studies also employed more comprehensive foreign-born statistics as a constant variable.

The final study in the review group considers the strength of industry in influencing state-level U.S. immigration policy and finds industry influence to be more significant to policy outcomes than citizen ideology and public opinion (Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011). Another important finding in this research is that state immigration policy is as likely to benefit immigrant groups as it is to attempt to restrict them.

This review does not discuss statistical outcomes for specific studies in the group, but noting the reported outcomes substantiates the following argument calling for more attention to theorizing before modeling factors for state immigration policy outcomes. While all the reviewed studies employed quantitative inferential analysis using the NCSL dataset, only ten included details relating to the statistical results in the publications.

Model variances for these studies varied widely and were reported as low as .17, explaining a mere 17% of the model variance. This is not unexpected in social science research. Still, the variety of variables explored in the review group indicates room for improvement with greater focus and a more developed theoretical perspective.

The review of these studies clarifies two critical factors relating to understanding immigration federalism and state immigration policy in particular. On the one hand, there is significant and broad-based interest in understanding the role of states in immigration policy, both in terms of their position within the institution of U.S. federalism and more directly in their relationship to local institutions and civil society. It also appears that the NCSL dataset has proven a valuable tool in analyses relating to state immigration policy. On the other hand, the studies represent multiple models for testing the influence of various variables relating to the development of state immigration policy (to name only those defined as significant influencers in the studies in this review group: state political ideology, citizen ideology, Hispanic population change, non-Hispanic white population change, foreign-born health outcomes, U.S.-born health outcomes, foreign-born population change, Hispanic homeownership, Asian homeownership, legislative professionalism, minority representation among state legislators, citizen initiatives, industry influences). To develop their respective models for analysis, researchers employ various theories, culling from legal, political, and other social science resources and outlining support and direction for their work. While this process is valid and well tested throughout the history of social science research and practice, there also comes a time when substantial interest in a topic area builds enough literature to go the next step in theory development.

Furthermore, to date, there is a growing number of publications and dissertations focusing on the role of state-level legislation in the immigration policy arena. But in a federalist system, the state cannot be discussed in isolation of the federal and local policy spaces related to it. While there is value in examining state-level immigration policy in isolation for some purposes, it does not help make claims about how state policies interact within the greater federalist context and how they affect the overall perspectives on federal or local immigration. For a broader picture of the context of immigration federalism, exploring institutions at all levels of government and creating an institutional structure from which one can more accurately theorize the challenges, opportunities, and existing relationships in the functioning of immigration federalism will be helpful.

Local Immigration Policy

Rodriguez (2008) and Parlow (2007) argue for greater authority to manage immigration policy at the local level, citing the nature of plurality in the United States and the inherent difficulty in creating policy to fit every locality as a driver for this preference. This notion reflects the anti-federalist impressions of citizen-centered policymaking espoused by Jefferson (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). The legal argument against such devolution of immigration policy to local or even state levels can be linked to an interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. While the federal government is typically assumed to hold total authority over U.S. immigration policy based on a preemptive structural interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, Huntington (2008) outlines an argument that supports initial authority for immigration policy at both the local and state levels, leaving preemptive powers to the federal level only when deemed necessary or desired. The presence of this legal

perspective in the immigration federalism literature makes room for broader discussions about the role of various levels of government in immigration policy decision-making. Still, it does not help define or frame the institutional context in which immigration federalism exists today.

Rodriguez (2008) argues that local immigration regulations, including state and municipal regulations, carry greater significance in contemporary and global contexts than in the past. While the author does not discount the federal government's role in controlling who may and may not enter the country, she warns against taking federalist norms for granted in a changing and increasingly global context. "Strong local institutions and local power have become necessary," Rodriguez (2008) claims, "both to integrate immigrants into the body politic and to manage the human and social consequences of a federal immigration policy full of contradictions" (p. 641).

Lynch's (2011) examination of U.S. incarceration rates through a federalist lens illustrates the extent to which even *micro-locale* matters when it comes to framing criminal policy "premised on and promulgated by a single, local, sensationalized, crime case" (p. 683). Miller (2008) points to such framing as a clear equity issue and argues that only local-level criminal justice policy reforms will serve disproportionately victimized and targeted minority populations who lack influence at higher levels of the policymaking process. The federalist perspective of criminal law is considered in this review because it is a fitting parallel to immigration law due to similarities in their impacts on minority populations.

A critical perspective on immigration federalism and the consequences of the devolution of authority to state and local governments is expressed by Varsanyi (2008),

who argues that the nature of devolution limits states and communities to discriminate against immigrants rather than develop innovative policy fitting of their communities. The unwinding of responsibility for immigration policy to lower levels of government provides an opportunity for individual localities to either provide sanctuary or become more exclusive in their immigration policies, thus, discriminating in a fashion once reserved for the federal government alone (Varsanyi, 2008, p. 892). Varsanyi (2008) argues that this effectively creates a second class of citizens, which, the author notes, works against the democratic values of the United States and poses challenges to equity.

Reich (2019) and Farris and Holman (2017) also examine the nature of policymaking at the state and local levels and find potential for institutional divergence in the face of federal level inaction. Broad policy differences and policy conflict are likely in a context where states and smaller communities are granted authority to—or lack penalty of—independent immigration policymaking (Reich, 2019).

Where Varsanyi (2008) posits that devolution of authority to lower levels of government makes it more likely that those governments will discriminate against immigrants, Reich (2019) frames a context in which lower levels of government make policies they deem necessary in the absence of coordinated action from the federal level. Either way, the persistence of immigration policymaking at lower levels leads to two challenges over time: the federal government consistently loses validity as the controller of immigration policy, and the high instance of variability from one locale to the next becomes long-lasting through institutionalization.

Conlan and Posner's (2016) study of the effects of growing partisanship on federalism focuses on policy differences in states becoming institutionalized. The authors

introduce the notion of "variable speed federalism" (Conlan and Posner, 2016, p. 299), in which the federal government permits states to act on new policies at their own pace. This creates a context in which the federal government allows for more significant divergence with the intention of reaching policy convergence among states over time. Conlan and Posner (2016) argue this practice could lead, instead, to the institutionalization of state policy differences.

Public attitudes and opinions are most salient at the local level. Farris and Homan's (2017) findings that a sheriff's ideology and personal characteristics play a significant role in shaping their attitudes around immigration and, therefore, directly affect their decisions relating to immigration policy enforcement serve to exemplify the overwhelming power some individuals have in immigration policy implementation at the local level.

Local immigration policy perspectives illustrate the tension among governing institutions in a federalist state while highlighting the ability of such a system to overcome inevitable contradictions by allowing multiple forms of disaggregated decision-making to occur at various levels of government (Rodriguez, 2008). Rodriguez (2008) calls for a shift in thinking about federalist institutions, arguing against increased control of immigration policy beyond authorization for entry at the federal level and for greater appreciation of local immigration policymaking. Schuck (2007a) concurs, suggesting that Congress leaves to the states the authority to manage "employment-based admissions, enforcement, and employer sanctions" (p. 59). State immigration policies, Schuck (2007a) argues, tend to be less hostile to immigrants than policies passed by Congress, and they tend to reflect state interests more directly.

Meeting Rodriguez's (2008) call for greater reliance on state and local

immigration policy requires a broader understanding of immigration policy decision

making and exchange at the state and local levels, which, invariably, also requires a

deeper understanding of institutional aspects of state and local-level policymaking

relating to immigration.

Institutions and Polity

Immigration is a value-laden issue in the United States and globally.

Understanding how values relating to the issue are constructed and then reified requires

an awareness of institutions and the local context in which they exist. Scott (2014) views

institutions as the organizers of social life. They maintain our traditions and customs and

help us navigate social interactions, whether public or private. In essence, institutions

shape societal values. However, traditions, customs, and values do not come out of

nowhere. Members of society construct them. The social construction of knowledge

claims that reality and knowledge result from a dialectical relationship between society

and the members of that society (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Through interaction,

individuals and society create meaning together, resulting in shared world views, values,

and norms. This meaning is ever-evolving, assuming interaction is continuous. Ideas are

shared and, once habituated, become integrated into societal expectations so firmly to

become taken for granted and, thus, institutionalized (Scott, 2014).

The explanation above illustrates the evolution of ideas into institutionalized

assumptions and the dialectic nature of the relationship between individuals in society

and the institutions in which they live their lives. Still, it does little to explain how

assumptions, expectations, and political perspectives can so greatly diverge that it feels as

if they have been constructed in different realities. Selznick (1994) takes on a naturalist perspective that posits values emerge or are discovered rather than imposed upon an individual or group.

Therefore, institutions do not exist autonomously from *the people* for the purpose of framing their norms and values. Instead, as is in line with the dialectical nature of social construction, the public experiences existing institutions in the context of their own broader expertise, and from that, their values emerge, ready to be pressed back onto the institutions in the process of legitimating (or challenging) those institutions as they stand. Similarly, Perrin (2014) argues that government and institutions form the constraints within which citizens derive meaning and develop values and norms (p. 12). The social construction of knowledge contends that meaning and value are constructed in a dialectical context where the institutions forming constraints are continuously reified as citizens interact with, and at the same time, are shaped by the same institutional conditions (Berger and Luckmann, 1976).

There is little reason to expect interactions between institutions and residents of a large urban area to emulate the interactions between institutions and those living in very rural areas. The federalist system allows such localities to implement policy according to their unique values. This is a fact, Selznick (1994) argues, that results in federal and state-level policies that become functionally different policies at the local level. The institutions managing policies are, in turn, different because they are based on different values and norms and because they serve different populations.

Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2013) emphasize the importance of the role of public administrators and public servants in the local context since they are the arbiters

of local values and norms at the institutional level. Frederickson (2010) also emphasizes the public administrator's role in equitable policy interpretation and implementation. Those providing services have a unique position in the institutional dialectic because they serve the public while also representing the institutions themselves, a particularly challenging task in increasingly diverse and demographically changing jurisdictions.

A similar notion of dialectic is also present in Perrin (2014), who asserts citizenship is a social process resulting from mutual obligations between a society and members of that society (p. 12). Perrin (2014) views democracy as a cultural and social construct that only later becomes political in nature, thus, emphasizing a polity perspective. *Polity* refers to the interorganizational relationships that facilitate service delivery in a resource-tight and network governance context, and *polity-making* is the process of constructing and maintaining these relationships (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). The result is a complex combination of systems and relationships in which public administrators must interpret embedded values and norms by making meaning out of the confusion of polity. Only with shared meaning will public administrators and citizens be able to work together toward common goals. Without a shared meaning of governance and its processes, communities are more likely to find meaning and create value elsewhere, sometimes with incongruent and inequitable goals as a result.

A necessary element of functional polity and successful meaning-making is a healthy *civil society*. Civil society consists of various informal organizations and programs that fill in service gaps where governance has not (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). These informal institutions also provide an essential conduit for citizens

to engage in social activities and participate in meaning-making and value construction. Putnam (2000) and Skocpol (2003) find evidence that Americans are participating in voluntary associations and other informal institutions with less frequency than in the past, which is problematic for the health of civil society, particularly in the disjointed context of immigration federalism. Again, only by engaging with polity do citizens have the opportunity to share in meaning-making.

Through civic engagement, citizens declare their commitment as members of society and agree to a shared system of governance (Perrin, 2014, p. 50; Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson., 2013, p. 49). Perrin (2014) further develops the complexity of citizens' role in meaning-making from their position in civil society, observing that citizen preferences originate not from *wanting* but from *wanting to want*; thus, citizens project the values of a group or community they may not yet be a member of (p. 61). The author argues that by engaging in political activities that reflect the person they believe they are or want to be, citizens help to evolve social reality in accordance with their perceived group identity (Perrin, 2014, p. 77). This process can strengthen shared values within civil society and ties directly to discussions surrounding the integration of immigrants in local communities (Waters & Pineau, 2015).

Civic capacity is the ability for a community to face change and solve problems in ways that influence the impact of change (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson., 2013, p. 49). Civic capacity includes not only social capital (Putnam, 2000) but also the social requirements for successful democratic governance, thus, representing the relationship among polity, a healthy civil society, and all participants (Shinn, 1999). Perhaps the most challenging aspect concerning civic capacity is that it is best observed when values and

norms are being tested in times of change. Public Administrators will find the need to construct associations and build trust in the polity-making world to ensure that civic capacity is robust and resilient. Public administrators can facilitate civic capacity by facilitating trust and participation in informal organizations (increasing social capital), developing the level of citizen commitment and awareness (improving civic competency), and encouraging a willingness to act creatively and with flexibility (building civic enterprise) (Shinn, 1999).

Changing demographics across the United States challenge public administrators' role in fostering civic capacity on all levels. Because the effects of history play a significant role in meaning-making, the values and norms that a locality embodies have roots in institutions constructed so far in the past that community members are not aware of where they originate. Sometimes these influences become ideologies of which individuals are hardly aware and that harm integrative community building.

Institutions and Institutional Change

Scott (2014) outlines the three pillars of institutions, including the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. He argues that the three elements are integral to the success of an institution and its legitimacy. The three elements and their respective rationale for legitimacy illustrate the different ways in which an organization may come to a decision ("complying out of expedience, from a moral obligation, or because its members cannot conceive of alternative ways of acting," Powell, 2007, p. 2). The institutional mechanisms are present in varying degrees over time, and institutional analysis requires understanding which mechanisms are serving to reinforce or deteriorate the prevailing institutional order at a given time (Powell, 2007).

This could be challenging in the federalist U.S. context since understanding the institutional position of each of the 50 states is a great task. Furthermore, immigration policy has never been central to federal policy, meaning that the offices responsible for immigration policy are not housed within the same agency, a fact bemoaned by scholars interested in functional immigration reform (Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, & Meyers, 1998). Is, then, federal immigration policy subject to an overarching institution of control and command at the federal level? And, if so, what does that mean?

The Regulative Pillar

The regulative pillar is defined by the extent to which institutions constrain and regularize behavior, most often employing coercive mechanisms related to rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities (Scott, 2014, p. 59). Regulative processes are legally sanctioned, providing them legitimacy while also engendering the fear of guilt in actors. Examples of the regulatory pillar at work in immigration policy exist heavily at the federal level, where requirements for obtaining a visa and eligibility for naturalization are the basis for legal processes. At the state level, policies relating to driver's licenses and occupational licensing fall into the arena of the regulative pillar. A challenge to the regulative pillar, of course, is the cost of monitoring for compliance and the enforcement for incompliance. This challenge is observed in discussions about the estimated 10.5 million undocumented immigrants in the United States (Budiman, 2020).

Institutional theorists argue that the regulative pillar may be functional for outlining values and collective interest through coercive, legal mechanisms. Still, they suggest reliance on the mechanisms of the normative and cultural-cognitive pillars may be more functional than coercive mechanisms for obtaining compliance (Scott, 2014, p.

62). In this way, the pillars work together to maintain the structure and integrity of the institution.

The Normative Pillar

The normative pillar is based on a collective sense of social obligation and appropriateness. Where the regulative pillar is legally sanctioned, the normative pillar is morally governed and induces feelings of shame or honor depending on how actions relate to norms (Scott, 2014). Under the normative pillar, behaviors are expected according to norms typically codified in certification and accreditation processes. While such documents do not legally bind individuals to act in a particular manner, they represent the collective concept of what is right and good.

Inherent in values and norms is the development of roles particular to specific individuals in society (Scott, 2014). Roles serve as societally defined prescriptions about what an individual in a particular position should do and how. While the normative pillar can be constraining, it is also empowering because values and norms grant rights and responsibilities and privileges and duties to individuals across society (Scott, 2014, p. 64). Advocates of the normative perspective place shared values and norms as the foundation of human collectivism and institutionalization, or overall social order.

What happens to the integrity of institutions, then, in the context of social plurality? Where values and norms drift apart to the extreme, how do states and local public administrators understand their mandate to fulfill the normative expectations of their positions? Does the presence of active interest groups affect the determination of policy outcomes? Immigration policy is a distinctly well-positioned policy domain for exploring such questions in the United States.

The Cultural-Cognitive Pillar

Compliance under the cultural-cognitive pillar is based on a shared understanding that is taken for granted. Participants only assume that beliefs and logics of action are shared due to orthodoxy and habit. Actions under the cultural-cognitive pillar are legitimized by being universally recognized and culturally supported (Scott, 2014). Social construction is observable at the institutional level through the cultural-cognitive pillar of institutions. Scott (2014) links cultural and cognitive influences to the construction of reality when he states, "internal interpretive processes are shaped by external cultural frameworks" (p. 67).

Social roles are perceived differently by theorists supporting the cultural-cognitive perspective than by normative theorists (Scott, 2014). The cultural-cognitive perspective argues that roles develop as the result of an interrelationship between existing roles present in a given institution and the individuals who fill those roles; the theory presumes that the individuals taking on the roles will act following their interpretation of the set obligations and actions that come with that role. In this sense, an individual's internal understanding of a role affects the expected outcome.

This shared construction of reality in an institutional setting does not rely solely on the institutional interpretation of a role, on the one hand, and an individual's interpretation, on the other hand. If this were the case, it could be assumed that in a context such as that under U.S. federalism, different states and localities would, over time, develop vastly different understandings of their social reality. It must be remembered that "wider institutional frameworks that provide prefabricated organizing models and scripts" operate at various stages of the social structure (Scott, 2017, p. 69).

Federalism as an institution serves to constrain the cultural-cognitive pillar in one way, and diffusion and adaptation of policy from state to state and from locality to locality serve as mechanisms for maintaining or sharing interpretations across jurisdictions.

The Three Pillars of Institutions

Scott (2014) emphasizes that, while some theorists focus on an individual pillar to frame their perspective on institutions, the reality is that all three pillars are typically at work in institutional forms, albeit at different levels. The author argues that, where the three pillars are aligned, an institution is likely to be stable and its strength tremendous. However, where the pillars are not aligned, interest groups and other political influences can utilize resources available via a given pillar to pursue their interest, potentially leading to institutional change (Scott, 2014, p. 71).

Minimal literature integrates institutional effects into immigration federalism research. Silva (2016) and Preuhs (2005) explore the influence of institutional rules at the state level, finding that referendum policies directly affect immigration policy. Still, neither of these studies analyze the effects of the state-level referendum process as it relates to federal or local contexts of immigration policy. Jiang (2018) aptly explores institutional dynamics in Illinois and Arizona and notes how state-level institutional dynamics in immigration policymaking have been influenced by federal-level institutional action in the courts. The local-level institutional context is left unmentioned.

The current state of immigration policy in the United States leaves institutions vulnerable to change. As regulatory changes become less predictable and more volatile at the federal level, state and local-level policymakers scramble to create policies that meet the demands of the public while providing an overall sense of normalcy based on values

and norms within that jurisdiction. This may lead to institutional creation for jurisdictions that have not worked on immigration-related policy in the past. For jurisdictions with a history of immigration policy, policy development will be vulnerable to the framing of immigrants and immigration by interest groups and other political influences hoping to change existing institutions to suit their preferences.

The Framing of Immigrants and Immigration through Public Opinion

Public opinion as it relates to immigration policy has been difficult to generalize. Segovia and Defever (2010) claim that public opinion of immigration policy is divided, yet overall confidence in policy makers' ability to handle immigration is decreasing. Public opinion is significant to the understanding of immigration federalism in the United States because it links the policy domain to society, and it also helps to contextualize intergovernmental relationships.

Schuck (2007b) points out that immigration law scholars, interest groups interested in immigration rights, the American Bar Association, and other entities with a political interest in immigration almost all support expansion policies while the opinion of the general U.S. public tends to support restrictionist policies. The 2019 Public Research Religion Institute survey suggests the public opinions of Democrats now endorse expansion policies more frequently while Republicans remain loyal to restrictionist policies (Jones, Jackson, Orcés, & Bola, 2020). This "political disconnect," as Schuck (2007b, p. 1) calls it, leaves to question what informs the public opinion.

Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell (2013) explore the public's conflicted attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the United States and the impact of this on immigration policy choices. The authors find that the public perceives all immigrant

groups not as monolithically good or bad, but rather, all groups are seen both positively and negatively by the public. This makes immigration issues less polarizing and more ambivalent because a community member's attitude toward or position on a given immigration-related topic may depend on the stereotypes linked to it. An example from the article is illustrative:

> If people endorse both positive and negative stereotypes about these groups, then whichever stereotypes are salient might affect the policies toward which people lean. Children of illegal immigrants who wish to attend college or serve in the military might remind people of stereotypes suggesting hard work or intelligence. Images of the inhumane conditions that migrant workers often endure might trigger sympathy toward the overall group, making them appear more exploited and in need of protection. On the other hand, news reports of terrorist attacks around the globe or crime in the Latino community might prioritize very different stereotypes, making more negative attitudes salient and the desire to protect the country more urgent (Reyna, Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013, p. 351).

According to this work, the priming of public opinion through public narratives about immigrant groups and individuals is significant, making survey responses only one piece of understanding public opinion. Important events, media representation of immigrants and immigration, and administrative messaging are reviewed here to add depth to the nature of public attitudes about immigrants and immigration in the United States.

The Center for Inclusion and Belonging finds that when a perceived threat interferes with one's social identity, as immigration frequently does, policy stances become sacralized, or non-negotiable (Argo & Jassin, 2021). The authors argue that Americans have become sacralized in their attitudes toward immigration, in many cases along political party lines, to the extent that political discourse of any kind is not possible.

Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan (2016) argue that the language and attitudes with which immigrants and immigration are discussed in news coverage and by policymakers and interest groups greatly influence the public's opinion of immigrant populations and immigration policies. The authors call how an issue is talked about *framing* and suggest that, because public opinion is poorly developed on its own, the influence of the framing of immigration policy on public opinion is significant. Furthermore, individuals will be most influenced by the ideological perspective of the media outlets they choose to watch the most. Due to their observed influence of framing on public opinion, Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan (2016) call for greater attention to understanding the framing of immigration policy and questions relating to public opinion of immigration.

While Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan (2016) focus attention on the increase in attention paid by the media and policymakers to the undocumented immigrant population in the last decade, Chavez (2001) analyzes popular media images relating to immigration more generally from 1965 through the end of the twentieth century. Chavez's (2001) work illustrates the framing of various immigrant populations and shows that public sentiment shifts over time.

General public opinion of immigration is rarely positive. In a study reviewing the public opinion of immigrants in seven countries, including the United States, negative impressions about immigrants dominated within every population (Simon and Lynch, 1999). In the United States, more recently arrived immigrants were typically viewed by the U.S.-born population more negatively than immigrants who had arrived some time ago (Simon and Lynch, 1999). Fouka, Mazumder, and Tabellini (2018) suggest that the

arrival of new groups whose social ranking is lower than the ranking of the existing groups can lead to assimilation and greater social acceptance of the existing groups. Evidence suggests that the greater the social difference between an immigrant group and the native society, the more negatively the native society views the immigrant group (Simon and Lynch, 1999).

Related to the native population's responses to the presence of socially near or socially distant immigrant groups is the concept of "compositional amenities" (Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012). "Compositional amenities" refer to the geographical presence of new immigrant arrivals and is shown, in Europe, to influence public opinion of immigrants negatively to a greater extent than even economic factors do (Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012). The notion of "compositional amenities" would be interpreted, from the U.S. perspective, as inherently race-based since the composition, or visual make-up, of neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces (Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012, p. 78) is at risk of change in these cases. Jones and Brown (2019) examine the government's reinforcement of racialization through immigration policy, finding that "individual state institutions may do different work as race makers, but race-making efforts by federal, state, and local actors interact to produce both racialized subjects and racial hierarchies" (p. 531).

The framing of immigrants in a country as racially and geographically diverse as the United States has implications for how values and policies are interpreted and who has access to relevant institutions. Tenants of old institutionalism claim that institutions impose values, while new institutionalism suggests a more nuanced relationship in value making, where values embodied in the culture and history of a place constrain institutions

(Powell, 2007). In a homogenous context, the notion of culture and history as shapers of institutions is entertaining. However, in the contemporary United States, where minority populations are increasing faster than the politically dominant white population and where values and interests are diverging, the answers to questions relating to institutional change become unendingly complex.

Considering the divergent effects of intersectionality (see Crenshaw, 1989), the increasingly diverse U.S. population suggests the presence of multiple interpretations and patterns of adaptation of policy and institutions challenge the dynamics of framing in a context of competing values. Based on the literature, one could posit that the framing of various populations serves to ensure dominance over institutional influence while, at the same time, promising or limiting access based on the nature of the framing. Friedman (2007) observes the need for engaging framing for deliberative purposes over persuasive purposes in a democratic context and explores practices that would adjust the nature of framing for more equitable outcomes.

Chapter 3: Research Methods

This chapter introduces the methodology for this study and the study design. It also describes the research instruments and data sources. First, I outline the research objective, including research questions. Next, I describe the nested, multi-level approach selected for this research, which involves case study development. Finally, I share a summary of my methods for data collection and analysis at each level of government. I close with a concluding discussion highlighting the design and quality of this research strategy.

Research Objective

This research aims to explore, understand, and codify immigration federalism from the perspective of the local community level from 2005 through 2019. The framework will integrate elements tested by other scholars of immigration federalism, which are deemed significant causal mechanisms for immigration policy action (e.g., demographic change, political ideology, industry interests). In addition to these elements, the framework will include details specific to local-level policy attitudes and actions of the public, public administrators, and other public leaders. Finally, the framework will be organized by types of institutions.

The framework is divided into three significant levels of government (federal, state, and local) to understand how immigration policy at one level affects policies and actions at other levels. The following research questions drive this research:

1) When the history and institutional context of federal, state, and local-level immigration policy are observed and compared, what conclusions can be drawn about the impacts and influences of one upon the other?

2) Is immigration policy at the local level generalizable in the United States, or are local contexts so diverse that generalizations about immigrants and immigration cannot be reliably constructed?

The following sub-questions help to frame the path toward answers to the first two questions:

    a. What role does historicity have in federal, state, and local-level policy as it relates to immigrants and immigration?

    b. What impact, if any, does demographic change have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

    c. What impact, if any, does political ideology have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

    d. What impact, if any, do local representation and leadership have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

    e. What impact, if any, do local industry and the foreign-born labor force have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?

    f. What are the overarching narratives relating to immigration at the national, state, and local levels, and do they reflect or conflict with one another?

The strength of the resulting framework will be the ability to observe policy interactions and shifts in the attitudes and actions of the public and public administrators among various levels of government between 2005 and 2019 while also illustrating the

current context of immigration federalism as a snapshot of how institutions are functioning today.

Research Approach

I employed a nested case study design involving collecting and analyzing secondary and primary data in this study. Methods of analysis include grounded theory and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014). Following this nested approach, I can refine a theory of immigration federalism by constructing an overarching framework reflecting the institutional context of immigration policy at three levels of government: federal, state, and local. Each level yielded understanding which informed, modified, and optimized information gathering at the next level, so construction of the framework is recursive.

Figure 3.1 depicts the nested approach employed for this research. The solid arrows indicate the direction of the overall data collection process, while the patterned arrows indicate the iterative and reflexive nature of data collection. As the figure suggests, research focuses on the dynamics of immigration policy at the federal, state, and local levels. At the state level, I review immigration-related legislation and demographic statistics in all 50 U.S. states and then create a deep-dive case study for one U.S. state based on findings from that review. The state case study data collection and case study development process informed my interest in local-level case study locations. Based on current demographics and historical immigration histories, several counties and cities in the state were identified as interesting.

Figure 3.1

The Nested Approach for Case Study Data Collection and Framework Development

Note. In this nested approach, research focuses on the dynamics of immigration policy at the federal, state, and local levels. The small arrows indicate the direction of the overall data collection process, while the large arrows indicate the iterative and reflexive nature of data collection. At the state level, data are reviewed for all 50 U.S. states, and then, based on findings from that review, the focus turns to a deep-dive case study for one U.S. state. The state case study data collection and case study development process inform interest in local-level case study locations.

The approach at the local level in the case study state is twofold. First, I conducted semi-structured interviews with public administrators and other local leaders in six localities in the case study state. I began by interviewing a city manager (in five of the cities) or the mayor (in one of the cities) and built out my list of interviewees based on recommendations from the individuals I had already spoken with. I also followed up on critical organizations identified as significant through reviews of local news outlets and internet searches or mentioned in interviews when contact names were not shared. In three cities, I interviewed multiple individuals (five, three, and nine, respectively). I

interviewed only one city manager (two current and one former, respectively) in each of the remaining three cities. Semi-structured interviews in this study help construct a picture of civic capacity and immigrant populations through individuals responsible for working closely with and serving the public (Yin, 2018).

In-depth case studies were constructed for three of the cities. I collected secondary data and statistics for these cities, similar to those collected at the state level. The purpose for doing so is to build a snapshot of the prevailing local perspectives on immigration that can be compared with the snapshots reflecting immigration at the state level while also reflecting on the federal institutional context. The nested approach results in five case studies representing immigration federalism in the United States from 2005 through 2019. The nested approach allowed for recursive observations and adjustments throughout the process of data collection, case study construction, analysis, and theory generation for this research.

Part 1: Research Methods Summary—Data Collection by Level of Government

This section outlines data collection practices for each level of government, beginning with the federal level and followed by the state and local levels, respectively. After explaining data collection for a given level of government, I discuss the case development process involving that data. The data collected at each level varies somewhat from other levels. Still, one aspect all cases have in common is a historical review of immigration policy and history at that level and in that place. Lloyd (2003) argues, "the present has to be understood as historically contingent, continuous and transformative… Historicity is at the very core of social reality in all its complexity and multi-dimensionality" (p. 86). This notion is carried through my research. The process for

cross-case analysis, relevance to the study, and reflective journaling are also discussed in this section.

I utilize a variety of reports and data sources for observing demographic change, including data downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau via Social Explorer, Migration Policy Institute (MPI), American Immigration Council (AIC), and Pew Research Center. All of the sources employed in this research to observe demographic change utilize U.S. Census data to prepare their reports. I chose to use MPI data in many cases instead of working directly with U.S. Census data as I did in some cases because MPI is a trusted data resource. Also, MPI regularly calculates and publishes comparisons of foreign-born and U.S.-born demographics. U.S. Census data are available via Social Explorer and accessible at Portland State University. It provides foreign-born population numbers but does not provide foreign-born data cross-tabbed by race, education, income, or other demographic details. However, cross-tabbed foreign-born Census data are accessible through other data tools. Furthermore, institutional shutdowns caused by the COVID-19 pandemic limited me to the search mechanisms and statistical capacity I had on my home computer. So utilizing the MPI reports allowed me to access high-quality demographics data of interest and saved me time in the process.

One point regarding the nature of the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) should be highlighted in light of the multi-level data collection and analysis process I outline in this chapter. The margin of error, or the measure of possible variation around the statistic value, for ACS data increases as the population studied decreases (Fuller, 2018). That is, the statistical data I report in this study at the county and local levels are less reliable due to margin of error than the

statistical data I report at the national and state levels. While each of the data statistics used in the case study development and analysis for this project has a margin of error, I do not examine these values as part of my analysis. This is mainly because my interests here concern how statistics change over time and against one another and do not use the data to observe statistical significance or analyze inferential statistics.

For this study, U.S. Census data are downloaded via Social Explorer, where decennial census data are available for 2000, and 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates are available for 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and 2015-2019. Where decennial census data reflect a snapshot in time because all data were collected in the target year, 5-year ACS estimates reflect data pooled over five years (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a). In brief, the U.S. Census collects ACS data for geographic areas with populations greater than 65,000 each year, resulting in 1-year ACS estimates. For 5-year estimates, the U.S. Census pools data collected over five years to sufficiently represent the populations present. This affects the precision of the data since it includes outdated statistics and is, in part, why the margin of error for smaller populations is greater (Fuller, 2018). Yet, it remains sufficiently reliable for this research study. In fact, for geographic areas with a population smaller than 65,000, like most Oregon counties, utilizing the 5-year ACS estimates to explore demographic statistics is the only available option (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a).

One outcome of Part 1 is the completion of a comprehensive framework for immigration federalism, depicted in Appendix A, and the development of five discrete case studies, one federal-level case, one extended state-level case, and three local-level cases. Part 2 of this chapter explains the cross-case analysis and employs Qualitative

Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014) and other strategies for qualitative

analysis, which are described in turn.

Federal-level Case Study

The federal-level case study opens with a historical review of immigration policy

in the United States. While the focus of this study is limited to 2005 through 2019,

understanding a fuller history of immigration policy at the federal level provides the

necessary context for what we observe at other levels of government more recently. The

historical review reflects a comprehensive inspection of federal immigration legislation

history. It illustrates shifts in the federal government's claim to preemptive authority

relating to the policy domain throughout U.S. history. The review also serves as a

literature review for the history of federal-level immigration policy and national

sentiment from the nation's inception through the 1990s. It draws on a wide variety of

existing references to contextualize the federal government's role in immigration

federalism at various points in time.

Data collected for the analysis of federal-level policy from 2005 through 2019

include a full review of administrative policy shifts and executive administration, an

assessment of court cases challenging federal-level immigration rules and actions, and

executive and legislative representation. State and local policies are expected to work

within the space constructed by federal policies. The extent to which state and local

policies align with or are in tension with the federal policies should be observable. In this

section of the study, federal-level policies are linked to national statistics relating to

socio-economic and demographic change, industry trends, and national trends in public

attitudes and opinions toward immigrants and immigration.

Federal-level case Study Data Collection

Both the historical perspective of immigration policymaking in the United States and the contemporary context of political gridlock in Congress make understanding the practice of executive administration critical. I first accessed all presidential documents signed from 2005 through 2019 via the National Archives Federal Register Reader Aid (National Archives, n.d.). I reviewed presidential documents, including executive orders, proclamations, determinations, memoranda, notices, and orders, by title and then flagged rules or notices that related in any way to immigrants or immigration under the name of the president who signed them. I built a database for each president by document type and noted trends I observed while searching every kind of document under each president.

Search practices for each document type included reviewing at least two years of presidential document titles to identify keywords employed in the document type. Once a list of keywords was developed, the search function was used to find and review all documents. When new keywords were identified under other presidents, it was added to the list of keywords, and all documents were examined again. Documents that included keywords were reviewed more closely for their significance to immigrants and immigration policy. This process ensures that documents directly affecting immigrants or immigration policy are captured in the data pool. There may be some uncaptured documents that distantly affect immigrants or immigration policy. This is acceptable since this work aims to identify those orders that would trigger a policy response or a response in public attitudes or opinions related to immigrants and immigration.

I also included documents that targeted inclusivity or diversity more generally because such policy shifts indirectly impact immigrant populations. Once presidential documents were organized by year and according to the signing president, observations could be made regarding policy trends throughout the 2005-2019 timeline. Conclusions could be drawn about each president's overarching immigration policy direction, allowing for a detailed analysis of presidential executive administration from 2005 to 2019.

The review of presidential documents revealed that executive documents from federal agency heads (e.g., the Secretary of Homeland Security) could also have a significant impact on immigration policy, so I followed the analysis of executive administration of presidential documents with a review of literature relating to executive administration through agency heads. The scope of this project does not leave room for an in-depth review of agency-led executive administration during the target timeline. Still, two examples are included in the case study analysis to exemplify just how significant such rules can be to federal-level immigration policy. The 2012 memorandum facilitating Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), signed by Secretary Janet Napolitano (Napolitano, 2012), and the 2018 memorandum including a citizenship question on the 2020 decennial census, signed by Secretary Wilbur Ross (Ross, 2018), provide context to the federal-level case study.

The second data source was civil court cases challenging federal-level rules affecting immigrant rights. These data were collected and explored to provide context for trends indicated in the previous section. Three active legal organizations serving immigrants' rights at the national level in the United States were selected: the American

Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the American Immigration Council (AIC), and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC). In this research, the activities of these organizations serve as indicators of federal-level policy trends as they relate to immigrant rights. I reviewed the number of cases for each of these organizations from 2005 through 2019 resulting from searches in Nexus Uni on June 2, 2021. The purpose of doing so is to identify to what extent legal challenges to federal-level policies were present throughout the target timeline. The work of the AIC and NILC is limited to immigration, so my search in Nexus Uni was restricted only by the dates of interest, federal-level cases, and the names of those organizations. The ALCU, however, interests itself in civil rights more generally, so I used the search term "immigra*" to limit Nexus Uni search returns for ACLU cases involving immigrants and immigration.

The search included in this study is precursory at best. It signifies the level of litigious activity for each of the three organizations centering their work on immigrants' rights during the target timeline. Still, it does not describe the types of rules being challenged. I analyzed ACLU case filings accessible to the public through the organization's website (American Civil Liberties Union, 2021a) for a closer look at what federal-level rules are challenged from 2005 through 2019. The ACLU is among the most prolific civil rights organizations in the country and has a trove of case data relating to immigrants' rights accessible online. The organization leads litigation but also joins many other organizations, including but not limited to the NILC and AIC, in supporting cases in various ways. For these reasons, it is assumed that the ACLU cases reviewed for this case study are representative of the kinds of rules being challenged by immigration rights organizations in the United States.

The organization's online index includes all cases the ACLU was involved in, whether the organization served as a primary attorney or submitted an amicus brief for an existing case. Many of the cases challenge state-level laws or actions taken at the local level, and they are not relevant to this case study. I first downloaded all federal-level court cases from 2005 through 2019 that the ACLU site indicated related to immigrants' rights.

All relevant cases downloaded from the ACLU website were organized in a single spreadsheet and analyzed for the outcome, if available, the rule challenged in the case, related administrative rules of note, and other related court filings. A significant amount of the analysis described here was less impactful for the federal-level case study. Still, it proved valuable to understanding the nature of non-presidential executive administration mentioned in the previous section of data collection.

Each case was connected to the executive administration that initiated the rule being challenged. Due to an observation that piqued my interest, I created a typography of types of defendants named by case. Federal level civil cases challenging the administration directly named defendants as one or more of the following 1) a U.S. agency or department as an entity, 2) the secretary, or head, of an agency, 3) the U.S. attorney general, 4) the United States as an entity, or 5) the president of the United States. I analyzed defendant trends in cases from 2005 through 2019 and reported on findings in the federal-level case study. This analysis was of interest because of the shift in trends observed throughout the timeline.

Executive administration and civil court cases, instead of being reflected as a chronological narrative, are each described in the context of the G.W. Bush, Obama, and

Trump administrations, respectively. Policy changes and policy preferences under each administration were reviewed and coded for their restrictive or integrative nature. The nature of how each president appeared to employ mechanisms for executive administration is compared and discussed in depth.

The third kind of data collected for the federal-level case study relates to federal-level executive and legislative representation. Having a clear understanding of racial and gender representation at the federal level is significant to this research because it frames, to some extent, the nature of federal-level executive and legislative leadership. I utilize membership profile reports regularly prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) for this research study. I have attempted to use the report released most recently for each year. This is the last report released before the change over to the new Congressional class in most cases. However, because the reports represent Congress at a specific place and time, vacancies and party membership are reflected in a fashion that may conflict with other sources whose snapshot of Congressional membership represents a different moment. Such discrepancies are minor and not significant to the observations made in this case study. Delegates and resident commissioners are not included in this data except in the case of Asian and Pacific Native Islander representation in the House of Representatives in the 112th, 114th, 115th, 116th, and 117th Congresses. This is due to the nature of the CRS data and does not affect the direction of discussion or outcomes for this project.

The rationale for collecting details about political representation is that the literature highlights state-level representation as one mechanism for initiating and directing immigration policy decisions. Awareness of party divisions and representation

during significant federal immigration policy changes may prove helpful in understanding party ideology in policy decisions over time, particularly when compared to state-level representation trends. On the other hand, the balance of federal-level executive representation and Congressional representation at a given point in the timeline may indicate strategies taken to reach policy goals. These two possibilities make gathering and exploring representation details valuable to this study.

Fourth, I collect and analyze statistics relating to national socio-economic status and demographic change for the target timeline from 2005 to 2019. Because immigration policy scholars observe population change as an influencer of immigration policy (Ybarra, Sanchez, & Sanchez, 2016; Chavez & Provine, 2009; Marquez & Schnaufnagel, 2013) and because the U.S. population is currently experiencing unprecedented demographic changes (Frey, 2015), including data that represents population change and race/ethnicity in this research is imperative. Given the history of racialized immigration policy in the United States and because Latinos have accounted for more than half of U.S. population growth between 2000 and 2008 (Fry, 2008) and again between 2010 and 2019 (Krogstad, 2020a), a focus on the Latino population in the United States is noteworthy to this research.

Since policy actions do not respond to population change immediately, I review U.S. Census data reflecting national demographics from as early as 1990 through 2019 to help contextualize any relation to policy actions taken between 2005 and 2019. In this way, demographic change is essentially a lag variable in this research study. The data sources that I use for data collection relating to demographics include the U.S. Census Bureau via Social Explorer for data concerning U.S.-born, foreign-born, and

Hispanic/Latino populations in 2000, 2010, and 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; 2021b, 2021d) and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) State Immigration Data Profiles (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021) for data concerning U.S.-born, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations in 1990. Reports from the American Immigration Council (AIC), the Pew Research Center, and information published by the U.S. Census Bureau are referenced in the case study where they add context. In conjunction with this data collection section, I also completed a literature review on the racialization of immigration in the United States to contextualize findings relating to demographic change.

I am also interested in trends in the socio-economic status of foreign-born and U.S.-born populations in the United States for the federal-level case study. Income and education levels are common proxies for an individual's socio-economic classification. I observed the change in the educational attainment of foreign-born and U.S.-born populations in 1990, 2000, and 2019 via the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) State Immigration Data Profiles (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021) and Grieco (2012) for data concerning the education attainment of U.S.-born, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations in 2010. Of the population over the age of 25, I was interested in what percentage held less than a high school diploma, held a high school diploma or GED, had a bachelor's degree, or had a graduate or professional degree in each of the four years observed. If educational attainment changed over time, it would be essential to speak to these changes for immigrants and immigration in the United States.

I sourced data for the median household income for foreign-born and U.S.-born populations from the Foreign-born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics reports published annually by the U.S. Department of Labor (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,

n.d.). The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releases an annual report comparing the foreign-born labor force to the native-born labor force, using data collected as part of the Current Population Survey (CPS). These data are far more detailed than data I could have accessed from the U.S. Census via Social Explorer. Data from BLS Labor Force Characteristics news releases for the years 2005 through 2019 are used in this case study to illustrate the role of immigrants in the U.S. workforce. The reports include data for foreign-born and U.S.-born populations by race, which allows me to compare the weekly wage earnings and labor force participation rates of those populations by race and provides more context than simply comparing foreign-born to U.S.-born populations.

Fifth, understanding the role of immigrants in the U.S. workforce is informative to the federal-level case study. Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) find that industry interest groups may significantly impact the immigration policy process at the state level, so including a snapshot of national industry trends for immigrant workers from 2005 through 2019 is worthwhile. The same BLS reports I used to analyze immigrant and U.S.-born income are utilized in this section focusing on industry. Additional reports explaining immigrant workers in the United States are included where it has been deemed helpful.

My initial data collection and analysis for industry included comparisons of foreign-born and U.S.-born labor force participation rates, details relating to employment rates by occupation, and top immigrant employing industries in the United States. The details relating to participation rates by occupation were informative for my understanding of U.S. industry. Still, I excluded it from the final case study because it

was less helpful for the comparative analysis process. This is due to the kinds of data available at the states and local levels.

The federal case study includes a review and discussion of foreign-born and U.S.-born labor force participation rates from 2005 through 2019 by race and ethnicity, which allows for connections to be drawn to the previous section focusing on demographic change and the literature discussing the racialization of immigrants. I also collect and discuss national industry statistics for the top immigrant worker industries in the United States in 2019. I was unable to find comparable immigrant employing industry data for earlier years. This data prompts a conversation around the over- and underrepresentation of immigrants in specific industries. The overarching purpose for understanding which industries rely on immigrants at the national level is to compare the state and local levels later in the research process.

Sixth, I selectively sampled to the point of saturation polling and research reports relating to immigration policy and attitudes and opinions toward immigration and public political ideologies at the national level during the target period. This section is constructed through the comparison of results from multiple polling and survey tools, including the General Social Survey (GSS) and PRRI's American Values Atlas, to observe repeated trends if they exist, and it includes literature framing our understanding of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the United States. Including such literature is necessary to contextualize this complex aspect of immigration federalism.

News media coverage is also integrated when it reflects a public sentiment that may not be directly linked to executive-led policy changes, and non-partisan

organizational reports are included to provide depth of understanding that mainstream media may not achieve. Collecting such reflections of public opinion on the national level helps me connect public sentiments to the dominant political ideology of Congress and the executive administration mentioned above. Furthermore, a national-level picture of public opinion and political ideology will provide a point of comparison with state and local levels.

Saturation in qualitative research is defined as the point at which enough information is gathered that the study can be replicated at another point in time (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Reaching saturation helps to ensure that qualitative research remains valid and without undue bias. The saturation of news sources for this project was almost immediate. I carried out this research during the years of 2020 and 2021, a volatile period for the United States when "fake news" became a frequent point of discussion, the restrictive and racist Trump-era policies were heavily responded to by scholars (Milkman, Bhargava, & Lewis, 2021), and other scholars found voice in openly challenging the legacy of white supremacy in the United States (Jones, 2020). This atmosphere affected my research in multiple ways. Still, where the utilization of media is concerned, I include media references only where an article helps to exemplify a point indicated by statistics or another data indicator. Otherwise, I rely on scholarly articles and texts that speak to specific issues in this research to ensure that I am including balanced and legitimate information.

Data collection for the federal level is detailed and multi-faceted. Table 3.1 illustrates the breadth of data collected at the federal level. Data collected in each step of this process, while they may resemble variables for quantitative analysis, are treated in

this study as sensitizing concepts and are continuously refined and interpreted to build a historical case study for immigration policy at the federal level during the years 2005 through 2019. The writing of the federal-level case study began with case data collection and continued throughout the data collection process and the writing of other case studies. Weick (2007) describes the value of the comparative approach to the evolution of richness in case studies. My iterative case study development process ensures I reach the maximum amount of richness. Richness, in turn, allows for a deeper kind of knowing on the part of the reader.

The eventual goal of this research is to have a collection of sensitizing concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) for three levels of government, which can then be compared to one another, allowing for the observation of hierarchical policy influences passed from the federal and state levels to the state and local levels, respectively, and allowing for the observation of recursive influences from lower levels to higher levels that may be present. The notion of influences mentioned here is unobservable without comparing the federal-level data to the state and local-level data. The following sections outline state-level data collection and local-level data collection. The process for formulating case studies for this research study is detailed in this chapter after the state and local-level data collection descriptions.

Table 3.1

Schematic for Federal Level Data Collection

	Institutions								
	Socio-political				Socio-Economic			Socio-Cultural	
	Law/Policy	Courts	Legislative Representation	Interest Groups	Industry (Int. Grp)	Income	Education	Population Change	Ideology/political opinion
Federal (1)	Literature Review National Archives	Review significant cases (ACLU, AIC, NILC)	Congressional Research Service	Media and Interest Group Grey Material	BLS	BLS; Census; ACS	BLS; Census; ACS	MPI Census; ACS	PRRI PEW GSS Other Sources

Note. This table illustrates data collection and institutional influence in the comprehensive state-level data collection process and in the deep state-level data collection process.

66

State-level case Studies

State-level data collection is organized in two ways in this study:

1) Comprehensive coverage of all 50 states, including the collection of

enacted immigration legislation, state legislative partisanship, grey

material, and some demographic statistics,

2) Deep coverage of one state, including a more comprehensive collection

of grey material, media output, and demographic statistics.

A comprehensive analysis of immigration policy, industry trends, and

demographic change in all 50 states provides a broader backdrop for understanding the

nature of federalism in the United States. If I limited my data collection and analysis to

only one state, I would have only a siloed perspective to draw theory from. With this

research design, I can make observations about the diversity (or lack thereof) at the state

level, utilize those observations to select a case study state, and then reflect on

comprehensive coverage in the process of constructing a case with a deep range.

As is the case with the federal level, the deep coverage of the state of Oregon

includes a historical review of immigration policy and the treatment of non-Anglo

populations more generally in the state. The focus of this study is limited to 2005 through

2019, but understanding a fuller history of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration

in Oregon provides the necessary context for what observations are made at other levels

of government.

State policies are expected to work within the space constructed by federal

policies. Yet, noting the conversations around policy at the state level is valuable because

this space is ambiguous. Local policies are expected to work within the space constructed

by federal and state policies. The extent to which policies align with or are in tension with one another should be observable. In this section of the study, state-level policies are linked to state-level statistics relating to socio-economic and demographic change, industry trends, and state trends in public attitudes and opinions toward immigrants and immigration.

State-level case Study: Comprehensive Coverage Data Collection

The comprehensive coverage of all 50 states was designed with two purposes in mind. First, it is a strategy for informing decisions regarding focus in the deep coverage state-level case studies. Second, the results of this analysis provide a backdrop for understanding the diverse nature of federalism in the United States. Data of interest for case study selection and, therefore, explored in this section included data about legislative sentiment toward immigrants and immigration, statistics relating to the socio-economic status of the foreign-born population in the state (population change over time, median household income, and changes in education levels of immigrants), the presence of immigrant workers in the state's industries, legislative control in the state over time, and public opinion across each state. I collected data for all 50 states to construct a broad picture of state-level immigration in the United States from 2005 through 2019. This process allowed me to identify states and regions of the United States that are particularly interesting for the case study development and analysis process.

First, I downloaded all relevant legislation data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) Immigration Laws and Current State Immigration Legislation searchable database (NCSL, 2020b). The NCSL publishes annual reports that cover state legislation related to immigration and immigrants for all 50 states since 2005, including

resolutions. The data are available to the public and are presumed to be comprehensive,

giving scholars and individuals interested in exploring state-level immigration policy a

dataset covering more than 15 years of state legislation. For this study, only enacted

legislation, not resolutions, from 2005 through 2019 are included in the data analysis. I

also chose to eliminate bills that passed through the state legislature but were then vetoed

by the state governor, thus, having never gone into effect.

I organized the NCSL legislative data in an Excel spreadsheet that included

details of each bill such as state, the bill's name, the year enacted, the bill's title, the

author and author's political affiliation, any associated bills, and a summary of the bill.

NCSL also categorizes each bill as one or more of 11 groups: budgets; education;

employment; health; human trafficking; identification, drivers' licenses, and other

licenses (identification); law enforcement; legal services; miscellaneous; public benefits;

and voting and elections.

Organizing the data was tedious, as the fashion in which NCSL stored data has

developed over the years. For years 2005 through 2007, data were available in separate

pdf reports published by NCSL. For years 2008 through 2019, I downloaded all

applicable legislation into a single pdf file. I programmed Excel to read the information

on the larger pdf and transpose it onto a spreadsheet. The content from 2005 through

2007 was not overwhelming, so I input that data by hand. With minor adjustments, I

organized all 2,452 bills passed at the state level in a searchable spreadsheet.

Once legislation for each state was organized, I described it and noted how many

laws each state passed and when. I also reviewed each piece of legislation and coded it as

restrictive, integrative, or neutral. In this research, restrictive laws are those laws that add

a barrier to achieving the goals of full participation in society. An integrative bill is a bill that reduces barriers to full participation in society. A neutral bill has no apparent impact on immigrant populations in the state. Some of these are, for example, bills creating a specific fund or agency. If the bill summary does not clarify the intended impact of the new creation, then it is labeled neutral for this research. The way a bill is marked depends, in part, on the direction of the language in that bill. Consider AL S 286 (2013), labeled integrative because it expands gun permits to lawfully present non-citizens. AL S 115 (2012) is labeled restrictive because it limits applicants for electric licensure to be a citizen or legally present. The same population is affected, but the presumably intended outcome leaves that population either more or less limited than before.

Because some states pass several laws in a given year and no state passes solely restrictive or solely integrative laws, it could be challenging to assess the extent to which a state is overall restrictive or integrative without further calculation. For this reason, I calculated a ratio effect value (Hendrick, 2017) or sentiment score (Marquez, 2017), as other scholars have done, to represent the extent of a state's sentiment toward immigration policy in a given year. Following Marquez (2017), I calculated a sentiment score by subtracting the number of restrictive laws from the number of integrative laws by state each year. Marquez (2017) calculates one score for each state over the breadth of his target timeline, but since my interest, in part, is observing change over time, calculating a state score for each year from 2005 through 2019 provides more comparative value. To reach a sentiment score, the total number of restrictive laws for a given state is divided by the total number of restrictive laws for all states in a given year. Next, the total number of integrative laws for a given state is divided by the total number

of integrative laws for all states in a given year. The integrative output is subtracted from the restrictive output, and the total is multiplied by 1000 to yield a whole number. The resulting value represents the overall intensity and direction of enacted immigration policies each year, with a score of 1 being very restrictive and -1 being very integrative. A sentiment score of 0 is neutral. The equation used to calculate state sentiment scores is as follows:

$$\left(\frac{\text{State \# of restrictive legislation in } year\, X}{\text{Total \# of restrictive legislation in } year\, X} \right) - \left(\frac{\text{State \# of integrative legislation in } year\, X}{\text{Total \# of integrative legislation in } year\, X} \right) *1000 = \text{Sentiment}$$

(Marquez, 2017)

Once calculated, sentiment scores were added to the state-level working spreadsheet where calculations relating to sentiment were stored. I used sentiment scores to identify the intensity with which a state is integrative or restrictive and compare states over time.

Following a descriptive explanation of state sentiment scores, I explored population and socio-economic change in foreign-born populations in each state, including the change in income and education levels from 2005 through 2019. Data were collected from Migration Policy Institute's (MPI) State Immigration Data Profiles (2020-2021) between November 16, 2020, and November 20, 2020, and updated in October 2021. Collecting demographic data from the same MPI source as I used in the federal-level case study ensures compatibility in comparing trends.

Singer (2013) and Suro and Singer (2002) discuss geographic shifts in immigrant settlement. Those locations that were once common landing points for immigrants to the United States are less popular contemporarily. Some areas of the country that historically saw very little immigrant settlement are now experiencing much more significant

increases. These authors find that new immigrant regions respond to changes differently, so exploring whether state sentiment correlates with heavy increases in immigrant populations is of interest in my research study. For this reason, I assessed which states experienced a foreign-born population increase of more than 100% between 1990 and 2000 and again between 2000 and 2019 and then charted the extent of each state's population growth from 2000 to 2019 against the state's sentiment score. The goal was to assess whether there was a correlation between foreign-born population change and state sentiment.

In addition to population change, I explored the socioeconomic status of the foreign-born population in each state. Like I did at the federal level, I used education and income to proxy for socioeconomic status in this section. I calculated the percent change in the foreign-born population *with a college degree or higher* and *without a high school degree or GED* from 2005 through 2019. I felt it was essential to identify correlations between education level and state sentiment score, so I graphed the output in both cases. I did the same for the foreign-born population median household income. MPI only makes the latest year income data available, so my analysis here compares the 2019 median household income to the overall 2019 state sentiment score to observe whether there may be a relationship between immigrant wages and state sentiment. This relationship is viewed with caution in this study since the opportunity for longitudinal bias increases with only one reference year. Additional descriptive statistics were analyzed, including a comparison of foreign-born median household income to U.S.-born median household income in each state. In many ways, exploring these data allowed me to develop a snapshot of recent immigration history in each state.

Next, I collected employment-related and industry statistics for the industries employing the most immigrant workers in each state in 2019. Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) consider industry's strength in influencing state-level U.S. immigration policy and find industry influence may be more significant to policy outcomes than citizen ideology and public opinion, so this section is integral to testing that notion. Changes in the foreign-born population in the labor force in each state were calculated using data from MPI State Immigration Data Profiles and then charted against state sentiment scores to observe correlations.

Industry statistics were collected from the American Immigration Council's State by State Fact Sheets (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b, n.d.-c), the same source used to record federal-level top employing industries in 2019. The data result in a list of the top five immigrant-employing industries in each state and include the percent make up of immigrant workers in each industry. The nature of these data did not lend them to statistical analysis, so these data could only be compared visually to one another. To compare them, I printed each state's top five industries and the percent of their worker populations that were immigrants on a card. I organized the cards based on similarities or differences with the national level example. I paid attention to the volume of the immigrant worker population and the industries that employed the most immigrants overall. Data relating to demographics, labor participation, and industry statistics were stored in the state-by-state assessment spreadsheet.

Fourth, I attempted to collect data reflecting political ideology in each state for the target years to explore the theory that political ideology drives state-level immigration change via what Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) name the Polarization Change

Model. To do so, I reviewed legislative control in each state from 2005 through 2019. Because historical trends are significant to understanding a state's specific political-ideological leanings, I reference legislative control reaching back to 1992. Data relating to legislative control by state were collected from Ballotpedia.org, a digital encyclopedia of American politics and elections created to provide unbiased and accurate information about politics at all levels of government since 2007.

Legislative representation by state and over time was recorded in the state-by-state assessment spreadsheets. I had also hoped to utilize an additional NCSL dataset that detailed representation by gender and race in state legislatures, but this dataset proved incomplete to the extent that it was not helpful for this research. In each state, historical trends in party dominance were analyzed, categorized, and then included in the state-by-state assessment spreadsheet. Once in the spreadsheet, correlations can be drawn between dominant party ideology and state sentiment.

A related object of my interest in this work is identifying which states permit mechanisms for direct democracy, particularly through ballot initiatives. Silva (2018) argues that those states with direct democracy mechanisms in place may observe more significant action on the part of the state legislature because lawmakers are more motivated to prevent citizens from acting on their own through ballot initiatives. The author would expect the states without direct democracy mechanisms to have passed fewer statutes than those with direct democracy mechanisms. So I included an analysis in this section of my research assessing which states have direct democracy and the nature of their immigration policy-making.

Finally, I reviewed the public opinion of immigrants by state in two areas highlighted in the 2015 Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) American Values Atlas survey. The first area I focus on is the support of a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants and the second is whether one thinks that immigrants strengthen America. PRRI was one of few reports I found that had a clear breakdown of public opinion of immigrants and immigration by state (Jones, Cox, Cooper& Lienesch, 2016). The items I focused on for the comprehensive coverage of 50 states are also the same as those I focused on at the federal level. However, the federal-level data include public opinion perspectives from multiple years in the target timeline. The comprehensive state-level case is limited to the 2015 snapshot provided by the PRRI report. While this is less than ideal, the 2015 snapshot of state-by-state public opinions toward immigrants offers two advantages to this work. First, it provides a preliminary comparison to federal-level public opinion trends. Second, plotting public opinion regarding these two survey items against the 2019 sentiment score in each state allowed for the observation of possible trends in how public opinion may correlate to state-level policy sentiment later in the timeline.

My initial intention with this research project was to use the comprehensive coverage of the 50 states to assess which states were of greatest interest and select a state for the next section of my research: the deep coverage state case study. When I developed and ran through the case study selection process after compiling and synthesizing the comprehensive 50 state coverage data results, Oregon was identified as one of six top prospects along with Washington, Colorado, Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Dakota. Adding convenience as a criterion in the period of COVID restrictions was pragmatic and

warranted, so I chose to focus on my home state of Oregon for the deep coverage data collection and case study development. The next section of this chapter discusses the state-level deep coverage data collection process and methods in detail.

State-level case Study: Deep Coverage Data Collection

The purpose of delving deeply into one state after reviewing state-level data for all states is to provide a specific example of state-level policy mechanisms in action from 2005 through 2019 and to observe potential historical influences reflected in the comparison between the federal-level case and this state-level case. Also, in the nested study design, in-depth coverage of the state informs the selection of local cities and guides data collection within the state at the local level. This framework is intended to allow eventual deep coverage of several states and selected local communities, thus facilitating the development of additional local-level case studies and further framing the contemporary context of immigration federalism.

I focused on the state of Oregon in part out of convenience, as Oregon is currently my home state and the COVID-19 pandemic prevented travel of any kind during the data collection process for this research. An in-depth review of a familiar state allowed me greater perspective and resources for making connections at the local level. Indeed, when I reached out to potential informants for interviews at the local level, my initial list included the names of contacts known to me personally or to professors I work closely with. This would not have been the case in many other states. In-depth coverage of Oregon includes the collection of statistical data and collecting grey material from which to build a historic case. I completed a literature review including journal articles and dissertations that spoke to the histories and the movement of specific immigrant

populations in Oregon. I maintained a running list of localities mentioned to identify local case study sites of interest.

Data specific to the state of Oregon that were collected during the comprehensive coverage of all 50 states are discussed in depth in the Oregon case study. I reviewed Oregon state legislative data from the NCSL State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants database by topic group and year to identify trends in integrative and restrictive law-making over time. I also discuss industry data collected during the comprehensive coverage process in the Oregon case study, and I integrate industry data for Oregon counties collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.

Next, I collected demographics for 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019 at the county level from the U.S. Census via Social Explorer (Social Explorer Tables 2021a; 2021b; 2021c; 2021d). Initially included in the data reviewed for the in-depth coverage of Oregon were total population by race, Hispanic or Latino population by race, educational attainment of the total population over the age of 25, employed workers by industry, median household income by race and ethnicity (in 2019 dollars), and nativity. Data reflecting the foreign-born population's education attainment, industry participation, and median household income are not available from Social Explorer at the county level. Still, analysis of the data collected for the total state population was presumed to be a helpful reflection of which Oregon counties are experiencing population changes relating to immigrants and immigration over time.

After a basic descriptive analysis of demographics-related variables at the county level, it became clear that counties in Oregon are so diverse that a thorough review of all 36 of them would be less valuable for this deep coverage case study. Instead, the deep

coverage state-level case study reports county population by percentage of immigrants and percentage of Hispanics in 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019 to identify the counties with the largest immigrant populations by percentage. I also confirm assumptions about immigrant populations by detailing the percentage of each county population that speaks a language other than English at home. As I have mentioned elsewhere, I include statistics reflecting Hispanic populations in my analyses to help frame the context for the immigrant experience in those places because the most populous immigrant population in most Oregon counties is Hispanic. While Asians now comprise the largest share of immigrants in the United States compared to people from Central and South America (Budiman, 2020), substantial Asian immigrant populations in Oregon are centered in the urban areas of Washington and Multnomah counties and near university campuses in Benton and Lane counties. This case study project was interested in exploring more rural spaces, so focusing on statistics about Hispanic demographics in the state is worthwhile.

Next, I chose to review educational attainment and median household income data at the state level rather than at the county level for two reasons. One was for the value of data, and the other was for the preservation of time. As noted earlier, the initial descriptive analysis of income and education levels at the county level was not revealing. In addition, remaining at the state level felt like a more legitimate choice because I was limited to using the Hispanic population to proxy immigrant incomes and education levels. Finally, I reported the study of top industries for four counties selected from the 12 counties identified to have the largest immigrant populations in the state by percentage. Limiting the analysis to these four counties allowed me to sample industry trends in more populous and diverse counties while saving time. I chose to look into

Hood River and Malheur Counties because of their frequent mention in the literature about immigrants in Oregon (Tamura, 1993; Ng, 1989; Rojas-Burke, 2014; Sifuentez, 2016; Garcia & Garcia, 2005). I also chose to look at Washington County because it is among Oregon's most populous and diverse counties. Finally, I decided to look at Jefferson County because it was representative of central Oregon.

Census data are downloaded via Social Explorer, where decennial census data are available for 2000, and 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates are available for 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and 2015-2019. The 5-year estimates have been released only since 2009, prohibiting a comparable 2005 data set. 1-year ACS estimates have been available since 2005, but there are reasons that this data does not suffice for the work at hand. First, 1-year estimates represent the smallest sample size of all available U.S. Census estimates and are only available for areas with a population of greater than 65,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a). This leads to many Oregon counties being omitted from the 1-year estimate. The 1-year estimate 2005 data, for example, includes data representing only 15 of 36 counties in Oregon. The 5-year ACS estimates are the only U.S. Census option for demographic statistics in the smallest of my target geographies (Oregon cities) due to their small populations.

For reasons described here, the population change assessment for Oregon includes decennial U.S. Census data for the year 2000 as a baseline year and 5-year ACS estimate data for the years 2010, 2015, and 2019. It should be noted that the utilization of 5-year estimates requires that data in the 2019 estimate overlaps data in the 2015 estimate since the former also includes the ACS data collected in 2015. This overlap is not expected to

cause an issue in providing a snapshot of the state's demographic change since I do not intend to explore the data with inferential statistical analysis.

Once population data were downloaded, I calculated the average foreign-born population by percentage of the total population in each county in 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019. I chose to use the average to identify a baseline for counties of interest to my local-level case study selection because I intended to look more closely at counties with percentages above the state average each year. Looking at the foreign-born population by percent of the total population is preferred to observing the change in whole numbers because population increases of any number will be absorbed more efficiently in a more populated county like Washington County (pop. 589,481 in 2019) (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d) and more noticeable in counties with smaller populations, like in Malheur County (pop. 30,412 in 2019) (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).

Next, I calculated the percent change in the foreign-born population in each county from 2000 to 2019. This analysis allowed me to observe where foreign-born populations were increasing, decreasing, and staying the same by the percentage of the total population in each county. I explored the Hispanic population in each county in Oregon in the same fashion as the foreign-born population, focusing on the counties with the highest percent Hispanic population each year. Correlations observed between increasing foreign-born and Hispanic populations are discussed by county in the Oregon case study.

I downloaded and explored data reflecting levels of education and median household income by county. These data were not available for the foreign-born population by county, and levels of education were not available by race via Social

Explorer. Therefore, these data may be helpful to provide context in the state of Oregon once the framework is constructed. Still, I chose to remain at the state level, where I had data specific to the foreign-born population for initial research. Data relating to immigrant education levels and median household income in Oregon are sourced from Migration Policy Institute's State Immigration Data Profile for Oregon (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021). This is the same source I utilized for the comprehensive coverage for the state level.

To provide a point of comparison with federal and local-level leadership representation, I attempted to identify Oregon state legislative representation by gender and by race from 2005 through 2019. This proved rather unfruitful. The NCSL tracked legislative representation in all 50 states in 2015 and 2020, but the 2020 data for race are largely missing (NCSL, 2020b). What evidence of legislative representation at the state level is available through triangulation of news articles is included in the Oregon case study.

Finally, I reviewed to the point of saturation major news outlets discussing immigrants or immigration in Oregon and other grey material for messaging relating to immigration policy and attitudes or opinions toward immigration at the state level during the target time period. Resources for immigrants in Oregon, including legal and advocacy organizations, were identified through internet searches and cataloged within a timeline, so it was clear when each organization was established. Doing this served to frame the nature of advocacy in the state over time. I also searched for details relating to immigrant detention facilities in the state to understand where and when Oregon may have housed immigrant detainees for the federal government.

As with the federal level and comprehensive coverage for state-level data collection processes, the in-depth coverage of the state-level data collection process is detailed and multi-faceted. Table 3.2 illustrates the breadth of data collected at the state level with comprehensive and deep coverage detailed separately. The writing of the state-level case study began, as the federal level did, with the initial data collection and was developed iteratively to allow for the evolution of richness (Weick, 2007) and the realization of sensitizing concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The case study development process is discussed thoroughly in a later section of this chapter after the local case study data collection is exhausted.

Table 3.2

Schematic for Comprehensive and Deep Data Collection at the State Level

	Institutions								
	Socio-political				**Socio-Economic**			**Socio-Cultural**	
	Law/Policy	Courts	Legislative Representation	Interest Groups	Industry	Income	Education	Population Change	Ideology/political opinion
State comprehensive (50)	NCSL Data		Ballotpedia (NCSL data)		AIC/MPI	Census & MPI	Census & MPI	Census & MPI (state)	PRRI
State deep (1)	Pertinent reports, grey material, etc. Media collection and review				AIC/MPI	Census (county)	Census (county)	Census & MPI (county)	PRRI Grey Material

Note. This table illustrates data collection and institutional influence in the comprehensive state-level data collection process and in the deep state-level data collection process.

83

Local-level case Studies Data Collection: Sandy, Nyssa, and Madras

The case study development at the local level included the collection of new primary data in concert with secondary data. The study is exploratory in nature and was limited by COVID restrictions at Portland State University. Therefore, data collection relied on accessible resources and convenience. The logic of purposeful sampling drove case study site selection and allowed comparative analysis to observe differences. This section explains data collection methods before detailing the case study location identification and interview processes.

The case study method for this research is informed by the data collected relating to federal immigration policy and the analysis of national and state demographics collected in the first sections of this study. A literature review and collection of local reports, historical and contemporary news articles, and other grey material deemed helpful in constructing a historical review of case study cities was completed in a fashion similar to that at the federal and state levels. I also targeted grey material to help me understand local industry trends and information accessibility within the city. I interviewed public administrators and local leaders to understand how the community functions concerning immigration policy at the local level.

The process of data collection at the local level was particularly iterative. Initial analyses were completed before I completed interviews, and then additional and more targeted data collection was completed after interviews. In some cases, a thorough review of city council meeting minutes, committee reports, and other government documents was deemed necessary only after informant interviews were completed. I developed six local-level case studies for this research study. I collected primary data in the form of

interviews and completed light coverage of secondary data collection in all six cities. In three of the cities, I exhausted secondary data collection and developed rich case study narratives which are presented in the case study chapter.

The population statistics employed in the development of case studies in this research are drawn from the 2000 decennial Census (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a) and 2010 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables, 2021b) and 2019 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables 2021d). ACS 5-year estimate data are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau continuously over five years and then pooled to create a 5-year estimate. I reviewed guidelines for comparing ACS data to confirm that the 2000 decennial census is compatible with the ACS 5-year estimate data for the items discussed in this case study (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020b). For case study cities, data were downloaded from the U.S. Census by 'place,' which means the statistics reflect populations living within Sandy, Nyssa, and Madras city limits. Where it is applicable for descriptive purposes, county statistics are also included in the case studies.

I downloaded and reviewed historical population growth in each city from 1910 to the present and included a descriptive analysis of the foreign-born population in 2000, 2010, and 2019. The foreign-born population in all of my case study cities was predominantly Mexican, and the Latino population in each city was also increasing. For this reason, I also included a descriptive analysis of the Hispanic population in 2000, 2010, and 2019. Foreign-born industry participation rates were not available for this study, but I included a discussion of industry trends for the overall population in each case study city. I can draw inferences about foreign-born worker trends from the

triangulation of historical work practices, known foreign-born industry and employment trends at the national and state levels, and industry trends for the overall population in the city.

Primary data collection involved 20 interviews in six Oregon cities with public administrators and other local leaders using a semi-structured interview format and with the intent to produce knowledge through interaction (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). Appendix B includes sample interview probes, although interview questions were adapted for each community and were altered based on informant expertise and direction due to the semi-structured nature of the process. Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2013) identify city administrators and other public administrators as integral to meaning-making at the local level. Furthermore, public administrators act as facilitators of robust and resilient civic capacity through increasing social capital, improving civic competency, building civic enterprise (Shinn, 1999). Therefore, talking directly with city administrators and other local leaders helped me assess civic capacity in the city, gain perspective relating to public opinion about immigrants and immigration within the community, and probe to identify other local insights into immigration policy at the local level.

I employed purposive sampling in each case study community to identify interview subjects. Patton (2002) describes purposive sampling as the selection of subjects based on what is "'information rich' and illuminative" (p. 40). With the understanding I gained about the community context that emerged from my secondary data collection and analysis process, I built a list of possible contacts, including city and county managers, other city administrators, and non-profit administrators in each of these locations that

could facilitate conversations that produced knowledge and induce meaning. I reflected on early case learning and refined my interview process as I worked. I built case momentum by ending each interview with an inquiry into who else I should talk to about the topic and then reaching out to those individuals with interview requests. The first location where I gathered community case study data led to early case learning, resulting in targeted guidance for the following cases. Throughout my process, I thoughtfully and cautiously designed and implemented case study interviews to avoid the problems of groupthink or extremely deviant examples—both of which would be unrepresentative of the community in question.

I recorded each interview with the informant's agreement. Eighteen of the interviews occurred via zoom and were recorded on that platform, and two interviews were conducted by telephone and audio recorded with a phone app. I took notes during each interview, and after each interview, I transcribed audio files in total.

Data collection at the local level was recursive in that what I learned from informants directed what I searched for online to build a community case study. For example, I looked for supporting evidence of events, meetings, or organizations in local news publications, city council meeting minutes, or elsewhere within the community when they were mentioned during an interview. This practice of combing secondary data in tandem with the creation of primary data revealed aspects of social capital (Putnam, 2000; Skocpol, 2003) and community resilience (Shinn, 1999) deemed significant in the civic capacity literature. More explicitly, through this practice of recursive data collection and analysis, I recorded the kinds of social interactions likely to produce social capital (Johnson, 1999).

Table 3.3 illustrates the breadth of data collected at the local level. Local-level data analysis directed the iterative data collection and analysis process back to state-level and federal-level data. In some cases, data needed to be refined or updated based on what was available at the local level. Once cases studies were constructed, the three levels were compared and analyzed to identify conceptual categories and conceptual properties significant to immigration federalism. The analysis process at this stage resulted in a more complex narrative of federalism and highlighted the diversity present among and within U.S. localities. The methods chapter moves next to data analysis, beginning with a qualitative analysis of interview data followed by case study methods and, finally, a review of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014) employed in the comparison of case studies.

Table 3.3

Schematic for Data Collection at the Local Level

	Institutions								
	Socio-political				Socio-Economic			Socio-Cultural	
	Law/Policy	Courts	Legislative Representation	Interest Groups	Industry	Income	Education	Population Change	Ideology/political opinion
Local (3)	Case Study				Case Study	Census; ACS	Census; ACS	Census; ACS	Case Study
	Local level: Explore ideological response to policy and examine actions to policy; observe similarities/differences. • Collect local policy history relating to immigration • Collect Media and Interest Group Grey Material • Assessment of civic capacity at local level (general population and immigrant specific)								

Note. This table illustrates data collection and institutional influence in the local-level data collection process.

Part 2: Methods of Analysis: Case Study Development and QCA

This section describes methods of analyzing five case studies, beginning with a cross-case analysis of local-level case studies. A qualitative analysis of interview data and a description of my methods for case study construction are included. The comprehensive framework analysis is broken into two sections. The first focuses on local-level cross-case analysis employing QCA (Ragin, 1987/2014). The second describes the analysis of state and federal-level cases against each other and the local cases.

Qualitative Analysis of Interview Data

Once interviews were transcribed and before constructing local-level case studies, I uploaded 19 of the interview transcripts to ATLAS.ti, the qualitative data analysis software. An important note regarding the qualitative analysis of interview data at this stage must be included. I chose to omit one interview from the analysis because the informant did not fit the definition of serving as a local government or community leader. Instead, this individual was an entry-level employee who was recommended as a valuable informant due to their unique position within the community. Indeed, the interview was informative, and the informant is cited in the relevant case study for this reason. However, the initial qualitative analysis of interviews using ATLAS.ti does not include their interview data, so only 19 of the 20 interviews I completed are represented in the initial qualitative data analysis.

Following grounded theory analysis practices outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), I used an inductive analysis approach to code each of the interviews to identify *conceptual categories* and *conceptual properties* as they emerge from the datasets

(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 36). I also explored co-occurrence using ATLAS.ti software to assess whether I might observe interaction among conceptual categories. The precursive qualitative analysis was informative in the case study development process.

Methods for Case Study Development

Yin (2018) defines case study research as the following:

A case study is an empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the "case") in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident (p. 15).

The problem laid out in the introduction of this study outlines the lack of overall understanding of immigration federalism and the context within which it works, suggesting that, according to Yin's (2018) definition, a case study structure may be a good fit. Furthermore, the boundaries and the context of immigration federalism are ill-defined, and the research surrounding immigration federalism lacks an in-depth review of the domain. The task of unwinding the parts at play in contemporary immigration federalism is quite complex. The case study method offers the opportunity to nest one piece of the puzzle into the next, resulting in several state and local perspectives from which one can draw meaning.

A case study approach for this project's federal, state, and local levels is appropriate because I am interested in the context of immigration federalism and in illustrating immigration policy responses and reactions and demographic details *and how they interact* at different levels. Showing the relationships between and among these elements is possible through the construction and comparison of case study narratives. Throughout case study development, I constructed a history of immigration federalism

within which the case studies are framed and, indeed, a part. Finally, case studies are a powerful research method for theory building because they serve the researcher in illustrating "the rich, real-world context in which phenomena occur" (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25), thus highlighting the empirical nature of the phenomena (Yin, 2018).

For each of the five case studies constructed for this project, I first constructed a historical review of the case using literature and grey material to help me frame a contemporary context. Neustadt and May (1986) argue for the concept of thinking in time-streams and emphasize the value of working with the full knowledge of the past rather than allowing an idealized past to guide one's understanding of the present and direct one's interests in the future. Looking back at history is as crucial to understanding the present and imagining the future as is looking around at the present.

Next, I wrote the results of demographic and other statistical analyses in a narrative format, being sure to note where contemporary trends spoke in any way to movements of the past. Triangulation of first-person informant comments, local news articles, government documents, scholarly publications, and historical references helped me avoid tunnel vision or the narrating of only one perspective (Patton, 2002). Lastly, I used conceptual categories identified in the qualitative analysis of interviews to guide my construction of a narrative of federal and state-level immigration policy (in the federal and state-level cases) and civic capacity related to immigrants and immigration (in local-level cases). The writing process was iterative. With each completed case study draft, I returned to previously written case studies to ensure data sources were comparable across cases and information was parallel where it could be. Through this iterative writing

process, I was able to envelope myself in my data to ensure discipline and objective analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) in my work and to foster a richness (Weick, 2007) not otherwise possible.

My final step in the local-level case study writing process was to review interview transcripts and highlight responses that spoke to the topic at hand. Then I checked the case studies to ensure that those notions were included, and I added them where they were missing. An editing team reviewed Local-level case studies before I sent them to my informants for comments. In instances where informants responded with edits or further information, I researched and integrated information where appropriate. Cases (federal, state, and local) were considered completed when iteration ceased. Much like the saturation of data in the collection process, the construction of cases eventually grows silent when cases have said all they need to say to one another.

Comprehensive Framework Analysis: QCA of Case Studies

The constructed case studies at three levels of government serve as the dataset from which a case for contemporary immigration federalism is drawn. The schematic for the complete dataset for this study is located in Appendix A. At completion, I have five case studies to explore: one federal-level case study, one state-level case study, and three local-level case studies. Analysis proceeded within and across case studies, employing qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014) practices at the local level and comparative description across other levels of government. The analysis process is described in this section.

QCA is a data analysis technique designed to identify which logical conclusions a data set supports. It is based on set relations and Boolean algebra rather than statistical

correlations (Ragin, 1987/2014). The goal of the data analysis in this part of the study is to explore the combinations of characteristics present in each case and compare them to other cases present in the framework to explain any observed variation between cases. Conceptual categories revealed in the qualitative analysis of informant interview transcripts indicate likely variables for QCA at the local level. Still, the cases themselves were coded through inductive analysis to draw out the variables used for QCA. QCA is an appropriate method of analysis for this research due to its qualitative and comparative nature (Ragin, 1987/2014).

QCA involves exploring each case as a combination of characteristics, which, Ragin (1987/2014) argues, is an essential element of the qualitative tradition. Where quantitative research following statistical methods treats relevant conditions as independent of one another, qualitative case analysis investigates combinations of conditions holistically (Ragin, 1987/2014, p. 15). QCA serves as an important bridge between qualitative and quantitative analyses because, with it, one seeks to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given phenomenon (Legewie, 2013). A necessary condition "is a condition that must be present for the outcome to occur, but its presence does not guarantee that occurrence" (Rihoux and Ragin, 2012, p. 22), while sufficient conditions (usually combinations of conditions) must always produce the expected outcome (Ragin, 2000). Once an exhaustive explanation of the phenomenon under investigation is complete, characteristics identified via QCA as necessary and sufficient can then be analyzed through quantitative techniques to ask what influence a characteristic has on the phenomenon in question (Legewie, 2013), thus closing the gap between qualitative and quantitative methods.

The bridge between qualitative and quantitative analysis is significant to the goal of this study because existing research in the area of immigration federalism, and research employing the NCSL state legislation dataset, in particular, is overwhelmingly quantitative. The settings for these works are firmly seated in the established theoretical practices of the researchers' respective fields (i.e., political science, criminal justice, etc.). Legewie (2013) points out that quantitative analysis, particularly in regression-type analyses, assesses the influential power of a causal factor on some variable given the presence of other factors rather than evaluating the complex causality of a phenomenon (p. 2). This study employs QCA to test whether supposed causal mechanisms for immigration policy development identified in existing research are present in the combinations of conditions that produce immigration policies of various types in the context of the developed framework. Thus, subsequent quantitative analyses will be more confidently representative of the empirical setting(s) of immigration federalism.

While QCA is a qualitative method, it is also clearly comparative. Ragin (1987/2014) argues that a comparative approach is required to explain variation in combinations of characteristics and their outcomes. One does this through a case-oriented method like QCA. QCA assumes complex causality and requires in-depth case knowledge from the researcher (Legewie, 2013), which means the utmost care needs to be employed when making methodological decisions—even those as seemingly simple as defining terms used to represent conditions (Ragin, 1987/2014). Because QCA makes research more systematic and transparent (Legewie, 2013), methodological decisions can be justified clearly and easily monitored when needed.

Finally, QCA is an appropriate method of analysis for this study because it is ideal for cross-case comparisons for medium-N data sets). Both Legewie (2013) and Ragin (1987/2014) argue that case analysis methods such as QCA can lead to the development of new substantive theories, which is the desired outcome of this study. Local-level case studies are analyzed using QCA, and state and federal-level cases are cross-analyzed using descriptive methods.

Local-Level Cross-Case Analysis Employing QCA

Before the cross-case analysis, all local-level case studies were inductively reviewed and coded to highlight aspects of the case that impacted civic capacity related to immigrants or immigration. Because the case studies were constructed with this topic in mind, the coding process drew out influential elements, or sensitizing concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), for comparison. Sensitizing concepts could be identified as pairs of conceptual categories and conceptual properties. For example, historicity and economy were identified as critical conceptual categories impacting a city's civic capacity related to immigrants and immigration. Within historicity, conceptual properties include agriculture, the Bracero Program, the forced removal of tribes, and several others.

The QCA process is designed to qualify which of these conceptual properties are present in which local contexts. Sensitizing concepts in each case study were added to a truth table, a valuable tool for QCA (Ragin, 1987/2014). The truth table created for QCA analysis for this project is included in Appendix K. Once the truth table is complete, it is possible to identify and discuss sensitizing concepts that are present in all three local case studies, present in only two of the three case studies, or present in only one of the studies.

Cross-Case Analysis of Federal and State-Level Trends against Each Other and the Local Cases

I analyzed federal-level immigration policy trends against Oregon state trends in immigration policy through a qualitative descriptive analysis of the two case studies. I used a timeline comparison approach. I mapped federal-level policy changes onto a timeline, added the Oregon state events and policy changes, and described my observations. For the target period of 2005 through 2019, I wrote out trends for all federal-level factors that could be made visual, including trends in executive administration, trends in the number of court filings made, changes in legislative representation, various demographics, and industry and employment trends. I completed the same process for the state-level data and described my observations of the comparison. This proved to be an effective way to observe times-streams (Neustadt & May, 1986) at the federal and state levels and, more importantly, an effective way to explore how they might interact.

Once the federal-level data were compared against the state-level data, I integrated the local-level data into the timeline comparison analysis. In effect, I visually observed all five cases within the space and timeline. Because I had already analyzed similarities and differences at the local level, and because I had compared the federal and state levels, I felt entrenched enough in the data and the process to observe and record any interactions present. The cross-case analysis of federal and state-level policy and demographic trends against each other and the local cases culminated the analysis for this study. The chapter briefly turns to the vital role journaling played in my work before noting points significant to the research quality of this project.

Journaling

Journaling is included here as a subsection because it is an integral aspect of my research project from beginning to end. Journaling is reflective practice and imperative to inductive qualitative research, particularly where one attempts to build theory from a context as unclear as that of U.S. immigration federalism. Jordan (1993) describes examples of researcher interference in qualitative case study research she carried out in the Yucatan and then reflects on those experiences in her writing in ways that lead the reader to appreciate the complex nature of being the researcher recognizing her own interference in the research. Ben-Ari and Enosh (2011) discuss the benefit of employing reflexive practices like journaling for understanding others' perspectives and interpretations of culture. Whether seeking to understand one's level of interference or seeking to understand different interpretations of culture, journaling presents itself as a useful and valuable tool in qualitative research.

Given the breadth and generative nature of this research project's data collection and analysis processes, my commitment to a journaling regime is essential. Particularly at the local level, where I enter the field to interview community members, I need to be entrenched in a practice that helps me observe my own bias in the process and understand the perspectives and lived context of others. Ortlipp (2008) uses journaling and reflective practice to create transparency for her academic audiences, claiming that journaling makes her thoughts and feelings about the work visible. Thus, the author's interpretations and deductions are left open to the audience's scrutiny. Journaling, therefore, assists the researcher in holding close to the data and helps to ensure a disciplined and objective analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

Research Quality

Patton (2002) claims that "methods, no less than knowledge, are dependent on context" (p. 12), meaning that there is no single, ideal standard regarding how qualitative research ought to be designed and how qualitative data ought to be analyzed. The researcher is left to make decisions based on the imperfect interaction between and among "resources, capabilities, purposes, possibilities, creativity, and personal judgements by those involved" (Patton, 2002, p. 12). With this in mind, I attempt to qualify my research design decisions in this section.

Federalism in general, and immigration federalism more specifically, is inherently complex. The nested construction of this design is a logical attempt to organize the more common levels of government (federal, state, and local) to examine their relationships to one another more closely. The collection of various data aids in triangulation, or the capturing and respecting of multiple perspectives for analysis (Patton, 2002). While this research design covers a broad range of data, the case study approach allows for in-depth analysis and understanding of state and local contexts.

As mentioned in an earlier section, Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) find case studies a valuable research method for theory building and empirical observation. Where multiple cases are analyzed and compared (as is the case in this research project), the case study method benefits from replication logic, or the ability for each case to serve as a distinct experiment (Eisenhardt, 1989), which, in turn, holds the researcher close to the data and helps to ensure discipline and objective analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

Finally, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) note that inductive theory building through case studies is popular within the social sciences in large part because such

theory provides a solid link to deductive research. The authors argue that inductive and deductive research mirror one another in the service of developing theory and then creating a space within which it can be tested. The inductive nature of this research project is expressly intended to lead to a testable theoretical model that lends itself to deductive research. Furthermore, the theory developed through this research is itself constructed from comparative observations of complex empirical settings rather than existing purely on inference.

Research quality depends on the criteria by which it is being assessed, and these criteria depend on how the assessor perceives truth (Patton, 2002). For my part, I have designed the project with criteria for *traditional scientific research* in mind. Yet, *social constructivist* and *artistic and evocative* criteria are also considered in the design of this project. Criteria for traditional scientific research include objectivity of the researcher, systematic field procedures, reliability of coding and pattern analyses, correspondence of findings to reality, generalizability, and contributions to theory (Patton, 2002, p. 544), all of which are reflected in this methods section.

While I reflect on how I met such criteria throughout the project in this paper, I have also included design elements that acknowledge and serve to ease the tension between these criteria for research and criteria from alternative perspectives. For example, the integration of a process for reflective journaling throughout data collection and analysis serves to balance the need for objectivity from the traditional scientific research perspective with the call for subjectivity from the social constructivist perspective by acknowledging awareness of researcher bias and creating a context in which that bias may be explored, and a more objective truth derived. Additionally, in my

desire to create a narrative for contemporary immigration federalism, the artistic and evocative perspective values interpretive vitality and output that *feels* true or authentic (Patton, 2002). The notion of *feeling* true over *being* true puts this latter perspective at odds with the values of, and, therefore, the criteria for quality of the project's dominant perspective, traditional scientific research.

Throughout the data collection and analysis process, I have committed to a reflective journaling process to understand better how the many parts of this research interconnect. This reflective journal allowed me to consider the following steps and record decisions made, thus making my process transparent. I intend to form a reasonable representation of the institutional context of immigration federalism through broad data collection. My theory building was guided by Glaser and Strauss (1967). They refer to a "continual intermeshing of data collection and analysis" that closes when the researcher has expired her ability to draw new and meaningful knowledge from the material (p. 224).

Finally, the interview process was illuminating, sometimes for unexpected reasons. I had not anticipated the stark divide I experienced between informants who understood the history and social and economic interests of immigrant populations and those who seemed unaware that immigrant populations may have different social and economic interests or that history or their interests would affect service delivery needs. When talking with informants of color, I was humbled by the privilege they granted me as a witness to their experiences. I was surprised at my own emotions leading me to understand my whiteness differently. I am a white, U.S.-born American woman whose research training is dominated by traditional scientific research methods. I am, however,

also an individual whose educational and professional career has spanned four continents, involved the learning and use of at least five languages to various capacities, and always centered on cross-cultural understanding and service to others. I have struggled to understand my role as a meaning-maker for this project, yet I have not doubted for a moment that I could do it justice. Nevertheless, this pause I was granted through the experience of working with diverse informants encouraged in me a more sophisticated awareness of race as a social construct and the extent to which "society responds to an individual's racial identification" (Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, 2008, p. 7). I have attempted to center the richness of my informants' many voices and the tension among them in my work.

Constraints of my research design invariably limit my findings in specific ways. As Patton (2002) argues, every design comes with trade-offs, and no design is perfect (p. 223). My findings section reflects this sentiment by representing the context of my research closely, meaning that any constraints dependent on particular situations, effects of my timeline, or the selectivity of document sampling in data collection will be reflected as limitations of my findings. My resulting case studies are presented in the next chapter, followed by the findings and discussion chapter.

Chapter 4: Case Studies

This chapter presents the six case studies that I constructed after data collection and analysis at each level of the institutional framework designed for this purpose. The chapter is divided into three levels of government: federal, state, and local. In the federal-level case study section, I present one case study that focuses on immigration policy at the federal level. The state-level section includes two sub-sections. The first covers all 50 states in a comprehensive review case study, and the second is a focused case study covering immigration policy in Oregon. The final section of this chapter focuses on the local-level. Three community case studies describing immigration policy and local civic capacity are located in this section.

Federal-Level Case Study

This federal-level case study provides a foundation against which state and local policies and actions can be compared from 2005 through 2019. The federal policy level serves this purpose since the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted as granting the federal government preemptive authority over issues relating to immigration and citizenship. For this reason, state and local policies are expected to work in the space constructed by federal policies. With the following analysis of the federal immigration policy context, the extent to which state and local policies align with or are in tension with federal policies and sentiments should be observable.

This case study begins with a review of the historical context of U.S. federal-level immigration and policy from the founding of the United States to the present day. The historical review is followed by a comprehensive review of factors relating to

immigration at the federal level from 2005 through 2019. The case study closes with a summary of federal-level immigration policy in the United States.

The Historical Context of Federal-level immigration and Policy

The history of immigration policy in the United States is well documented, at least from the perspective of the roles and responsibilities of the federal government and its relationship to state governments. Waters and Pineau (2015) include such a history in the report, *The Integration of Immigrants into American Society*, edited for a research panel organized by the National Academy of Science. Neuman (1993) focuses historical attention on the first century of U.S. immigration law, reporting the development of immigration federalism from 1776 through 1875. Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, conversations around immigration became more focused on the effects of immigration on the U.S. population, the role of racism in immigration law, and, more generally, demographic change. Smith and Edmonston edit a panel report on the economic, demographic, and fiscal effects of immigration (National Research Council, 1997). Okrent (2019) examines historically racist laws that banned Jews, Italians, and certain European immigrants from the United States, while Frey (2015) takes a demographic-focused perspective in outlining how racial demographics are changing the nation. This section of the proposal references these scholars and others to frame the contemporary context of federal immigration policy and demographic change in a way that serves as a foundation for the development of a theoretical framework for immigration federalism and this research going forward.

Before the end of the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery in the United States, states and localities were the primary immigration regulators of their

jurisdictions (Neuman, 1993). The Naturalization Act of 1790 that granted state and local common law courts the authority to naturalize citizens within their jurisdictions, caused a wide variation of naturalization regulations (Waters & Pineau, 2015). It also reflects the relative unimportance of immigration status and citizenship at the outset of the young nation.

At the state and local levels, immigration regulations were created to allay public health concerns brought on by new arrivals carrying contagious diseases, taxes were levied to prevent the entry of individuals without financial means, and rules were designed to keep out individuals of certain races and ethnicities. Neuman (1993) argues the shift toward federal government control of immigration came only after the close of the Civil War because of slave states' adamant insistence on maintaining state control over the movement of free Blacks (p. 1866).

While this proposal does not include the treatment of the Black population in depth, it is important to recognize the link between early U.S. state immigration regulation and restrictions on the movement of the Black population already present, often since birth, in the nation. While southern slave states designed policies to prevent Blacks from leaving their jurisdictions, northern states designed policies to prevent Blacks from entering their jurisdictions. Furthermore, many states with ports along the Atlantic coast designed restrictions to prevent Black seamen from disembarking while their ships docked in local harbors (Neuman, 1993). The literature shows the reasoning behind such regulations as being seated in the fears of the existing, white, protestant population and parallels twentieth century policy confrontations relating to racism,

fairness, and equity (Neuman, 1993; Kendi, 2016), a fact that will be considered throughout this research project.

Federal control over citizenship and naturalization processes evolved rapidly after the close of the Civil War and the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, in which the federal government defined U.S. citizenship for the first time. In 1868, the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed U.S. citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil, regardless of race. The first federal bureau relating to immigration regulation was established in 1890, more than a century after the signing of the Constitution (Waters & Pineau, 2015).

The increase in immigration policy participation at the federal level quickly led to limitations at the state level, thereby initiating the complex relationship of immigration federalism that we continue to see today. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Chy Lung v. Freeman* (1876) granted the federal government exclusive control over people entering the United States and introduced the differentiation between immigration law (the exit and entry of individuals into and out of the country and entirely the purview of the federal government) from alienage law (relating to how citizens and noncitizens may be treated differently) (Waters & Pineau, 2015). After *Chy Lung v. Freeman* (1876)*, it appeared that states would remain limited to alienage law in their authority to enact immigration policy. However, a later court decision in *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* (1886) acknowledges dominance of the federal government authority as it relates to alienage, leaving only limited room for the creation of state and local laws treating citizens and noncitizens differently (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Such laws are subject to review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but this requirement does not eliminate the ambiguity stemming

from the decision and courts continue to struggle with the delineation of federal and state and local authority in alienage law.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 granted citizenship to Black individuals in the United States, but exclusion based on race continued at the federal policy level. The Page Act of 1875 was intended to prevent unfree laborers and women who worked as prostitutes from entering the United States, but its language more broadly prohibited entry to anyone brought to the country for "lewd and immoral purposes" (Waters & Pineau, 2015). The rule was effectively utilized to prohibit entry to immigrants from various Asia countries, primarily China. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was more explicitly race-based (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Asian exclusion laws, and Chinese exclusion laws in particular, were largely the consequence of lobbying by California and they gained the support of other states throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. Even though state immigration policy-making had been truncated, states that had the ability to influence federal level decision-making continued to do so. Neuman (1993) describes the efforts of states to exclude individuals of certain origins as embarrassing to the federal government because these state laws sometimes conflicted with existing treaties designed to promote commerce and friendship at the national level. Courts were again asked to define the unclear boundaries between federal and state authority in immigration policy.

Restrictive policies were not limited to the perceived threat of Asian migration to the west coast of the United States. From 1850 through to 1914, the majority of immigrants to the United States came from Ireland, Italy, Spain, and eastern Europe (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). This was a drastic demographic shift from the

arrivals of previous decades. Between 1800 and 1860, almost 90% of immigrants to the

United States were British or German, but the rise of the industrial age and the need for

workers led many industries and businesses to seek willing overseas employees in yet

untapped European markets (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). Okrent (2019) describes

the role that eugenics and racism played in framing the newly arriving populations as

degenerate, unclean, and undesirable. Coupled with the presence of an immigrant

population that *looked* different than the previous immigrant population was the fact that,

between 1861 and 1920, the United States experienced the largest immigration numbers

in its history, granting entry to around 30 million people. By 1920, the U.S. Census

showed that 13.2% of the total U.S. population was foreign-born (Castles, De Haas, &

Miller, 2014), an overwhelming statistic for much of the nation's existing population.

National anxiety concerning immigration is illustrated by the passage of the

Immigration Act of 1917, which further restricted immigration from Asian regions and

introduced a literacy test requirement, and the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, which set

into motion a system for establishing annual numerical limits on new entries by national

origin (Okrent, 2019). The passage of the 1924 Immigration Act formalized national

origin quotas and greatly reduced immigration numbers and affected demographics over

the following years. Okrent (2019) describes Ellis Island one year after the passage of the

1924 act. Where twenty ships had docked every day to disembark passengers a year

earlier, only two per day did so by 1925 (Okrent, 2019, p. 2). In 1921, 76% of all

immigrants had come from southern and eastern European nations, while by 1925, those

nations accounted for only 11% of immigrants (Okrent, 2019, p. 3). Historians recognize

that demographic changes alone did not cause exclusionary or restrictive immigration

policy in the United States, but rather, it was demographic changes coupled with the historical and false social constructs on racial and biological differences among populations (Okrent, 2019; Kendi, 2016).

At the federal level, immigration policy often reacts to perceived threats driven by national ethnocentric ideologies, while states are left with the fiscal costs of integrating immigrants who choose to settle within their jurisdictions. As the foreign-born population increased dramatically in the early twentieth century, states — that had no control over who settled within their jurisdictions once allowed into the United States — bore the brunt of the fiscal burden of immigration. Some states responded by limiting immigrant access to licenses, public employment, benefits, and other aspects important to successful integration. While limiting the ability of immigrants to integrate in a certain jurisdiction was intended to reduce costs to the existing population and deter immigrant settlement in those jurisdictions, creating barriers to integration often resulted in higher costs without reducing the immigrant population (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Ironically, preventing immigrant integration prevents civic participation, which is a key aspect of an immigrant's ability to support themselves financially and socially (Batalova, Fix, & Bachmeier, 2016), thereby increasing social and economic costs for the existing population and likely heightening ethnocentricity in the process.

The 1924 Immigration Act played a role in changing the face of immigration in the United States, in part by slowing the flow of immigrants. The total foreign-born population in the United States dropped to 11.6 million in 1940 (representing 8.8% of the total U.S. population) and 9.7 million by 1960 (representing 5% of the total U.S. population) (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). By 1965, the notion that the United

States was being overwhelmed by immigrants was not as pervasive as it had been at the passing of the Immigration Act of 1924. In addition, the United States was experiencing major shifts in thought and action related to race and poverty. President Lyndon B. Johnson launched proposals for the Great Society, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished existing immigration restrictions based on national origin.

Other federal-level policy changes of the Civil Rights era have had a lasting impact on the lives of immigrants in the United States. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) calls for the non-discriminatory education of all children in the United States. To ensure that migrant children and their families benefit from the benefits of the ESEA, the Office of Migrant Education administers grant programs to facilitate continuity in education for the migrant population in the United States (Department of Education, 2021).

Perceived threat or lack thereof may facilitate a population's thoughts and feelings about immigrant populations and immigration more generally, but institutional tensions resulting from the relationships involved in immigration federalism also have a significant impact on the overall context. One federal-state institutional tension has evolved from the dual challenges of enforcing immigration rules and integrating immigrants into society. While this paper has already noted the federal government focus on immigration enforcement and the states' responsibility to integrate immigrants, the boundary is by no means clear. The passage of the 1980 Refugee Act established formal criteria for the entry and placement of refugees and constructed an asylum system. This remains the only integration-focused federal immigration law and remains the only

program with direct federal oversight (Waters & Pineau, 2015). State, local, and non-governmental organizations are tasked with the responsibility of implementing integration programs for refugee groups within their jurisdictions but receive federal funding. In other areas of immigration law and policy, the reality of state responsibility is not as clear.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also known as the Hart Celler Act) changed the context of U.S. immigration by eliminating origin quotas and expanding the potential for new immigration. What followed was the introduction of numerous visa statuses and laws relating to these statuses that effectively made immigration policy more complex and in greater need of enforcement. Since the 1965 law went into effect, the federal government has occasionally limited state and local government ability to respond with jurisdictional policies and sometimes encouraged such policymaking at those levels of government (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Further complicating the landscape of immigration policy in the United Sates was that the creation of visa statuses inadvertently created the undocumented status, which represents those immigrants who are not covered under a legal visa program (Waters & Pineau, 2015).

Federal level laws enacted in the 1980s and 1990s reflect some of the challenges that resulted from growing numbers of undocumented immigrants, in addition to the lasting intergovernmental tensions surrounding immigration policy. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) provided a path to legal status for three million undocumented persons, sanctioned employers of undocumented workers for the first time, and granted states permission to penalize businesses employing undocumented workers by restricting operating licenses (Waters & Pineau, 2015). The law also provided

for an increase in enforcement resources along the U.S.-Mexican border and in the U.S.

interior. However, a New York Times journalist reported that lawmakers considering

similar legislation in 2007 argued that sanctions and enforcement never came through

after the passage of the 1986 law, and while the hope was that the undocumented

population would be absorbed through the documentation process, deportation, or

voluntary return, the 2007 undocumented population total stood at fourfold the 1986

number (Pear, 2007). The IRCA was introduced with no enforcement mechanisms to

effect change, yet the enforcement-related permissions would be expanded in later

legislation.

The number of immigration statuses expanded again in the 1990s when new high-

skilled labor categories were introduced along with the diversity lottery, temporary

protected status for individuals from certain countries of origin, and an expansion to the

program to reunite families (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Due to the legal and institutional

developments over the past decades—including a proliferation of immigrant statuses,

each with different allowances in terms of permanence and security in the United

States—states have born the greater fiscal burden of immigration (Smith & Edmonston,

1997). Federal immigration policy changes in the latter half of the 1990s and into the

twenty-first century would open opportunities for states and localities to cooperate more

readily with the federal government on issues relating to immigration enforcement, and

changes in demographics and the political mood would strain different parts of the

country in different ways.

By 1980, the foreign-born population in the United States was estimated to be

14.1 million, 6% of the total population, and by 1990, the foreign-born population had

risen to 19.8 million, representing 7.8% of the total population (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). Meanwhile, the undocumented population continued to grow and public sentiment becoming increasingly concerned by this relatively new group was reflected in popular images and national discourses (Chavez, 2001). The foreign-born population, reaching 39.9 million and 13% of the total population by 2010 (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019), continues to increase in relation to the total population, and the national sentiment toward the undocumented population in particular and immigration more generally continues to garner media attention and that of policymakers and the greater public, even as the undocumented population declines (Budiman, 2020).

The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsiblity Act (IIRCA) expanded border protections and interior enforcement while allowing cooperative agreements between federal, state, and local authorities to aid immigration enforcement (Waters & Pineau, 2015). The 1996 law also opened the door for federal, state, and local governments to coordinate action and information relating to undocumented immigrants, a concept expanded in the 2008 Secure Communities legislation (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Yet, tensions remain between federal, state, and, more frequently, local governments.

The modern era of immigration federalism is defined by state and local policies designed to manage immigration in one of two capacities: assisting with enforcement of federal laws and applying restrictions to or enabling immigrant integration. Waters and Pineau (2015) report unprecedented increases in federal funding, technology, and personnel directed toward immigration law enforcement since the 1980s. While the United States has experienced an increase in deportations since 1990, courts continue to

block the majority of attempts to pass enforcement laws at the state level (Waters & Pineau, 2015). The federal government continues to dominate the domain of immigration enforcement, seeking only cooperation from states and localities to support existing federal laws.

While states lack the authority to pass immigration enforcement legislation, they have significant leeway in determining immigrant access to social benefits (Waters & Pineau, 2015), which results in state-level immigration legislation that can be logically separated into restrictive and integrative policies. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) annual immigration legislation reports cover state-level immigration legislation for all states since 2005 and show a steady increase in enacted state-level immigration legislation. Some states have passed resolutions and policies allowing local law enforcement to cooperate with federal agencies (for example, Arizona State Bill 1070) while others have passed resolutions and policies prohibiting local law enforcement to assist federal agencies (for example, Oregon Revised Statute 181A.820), thereby acting in defiance of the federal government's request to cooperate. In general, enactment of restrictive legislation was more common at the state level prior to 2012, while the frequency of integrative legislation lagged until that year (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015). To date, no one has comprehensively updated how states are utilizing restrictive and integrative immigration legislation, although my research indicates integrative legislation has continued to increase since 2012, an updated perspective would help to describe the current landscape of immigration federalism.

Waters and Pineau (2015) describe "enforcement federalism," dominated by the federal government (p. 2-8) and "integration federalism," managed at the state level (p. 2-

12). Under enforcement federalism, Waters and Pineau (2015) explain, the list of removable offenses for immigrants has continually increased to the point that anyone not naturalized may have reason to feel at risk of deportation. Most recently, administrative discretion directs to what extent enforcement is carried out at the federal level, which means the nuances of how immigration policy affects various immigrant populations changes with the U.S. president's policy preferences. For example, President Barack Obama focused enforcement efforts at the U.S.-Mexico border rather than in the interior via work raids and other actions that interrupt the efforts of integrative policy (Waters & Pineau, 2015). When President Donald Trump came into office, immigration enforcement strategies became considerably more aggressive, and President Joe Biden then attempted to "undo" some of Trump's policies and processes. The extreme shifts occurring over the past few administrations stress state and local systems as they respond to differing directives. Such administration-driven immigration policy shifts are common in the institutional landscape of contemporary immigration federalism.

At the federal level, there seems to be an effort to "fix" the problem of immigration while ignoring immigration as a regular function of national maintenance. The history of federal immigration policy is interspersed with major policy shifts across time rather than regularly managed, incremental policy changes, and the structure of federal institutions designed to manage immigration support such dispersed processes. From its inception in 1864, the position of Commissioner of Immigration was housed under one of many other federal agencies, initially the State Department, then the Treasury Department, and later the Department of Commerce and Labor (Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, & Meyers, 1998). Most recently, immigration functions are divided into three

115

agencies housed with several other agencies unrelated to immigration in the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Jayapal, 2021). Papademetriou, Aleinikoff,

and Meyers (1998) illustrate how historical institutional structures stratified immigration

functions to such a degree that coordinated and long-term planning could not take place.

Jayapal (2021) outlines strategies for reorganizing immigration functions for more

efficient and effective service and emphasizes the value of creating a cabinet level

department for immigration services and integration, just as Papademetriou, Aleinikoff,

and Meyers (1998) suggested more than 20 years prior.

The federal government has traditionally held authority for defining regulations

relating to citizenship and permission for entry while state and local governments have

been responsible for facilitating the integration of immigrants within their jurisdictions.

Laws regulating access to citizenship, a domain of the federal government, directly affect

an immigrant's opportunities for political integration and indirectly affect opportunities

for social and economic integration, outcomes for which states absorb the costs (Waters

& Pineau, 2015). The success or failure of achieving social and economic integration has

important fiscal impacts on state and local governments in the form of social cohesion

and tax revenue, and in a country as demographically diverse as the United States,

federal-level policy can impact different localities differently.

Looking to the future, the Pew Research Center (2015) projects that by 2065 the

United States will be home to 78 million immigrants, making up about 17% of the total

population. By 2050, the United Sates will—for the first time in history—no longer be

majority white, meaning the total population will be less than 50% white (Frey, 2015).

Increasing racial diversity is an almost certain aspect of the country's future. History tells

us that immigration is tightly woven into the patterns of racist expression in the United States, and so examining the context of contemporary immigration federalism from an integrative and institutional approach will help frame a new understanding of immigration policy as it relates to this history and the future.

Federal-level immigration reform last occurred in 1986 with the IRCA, while additional regulations and allowances related to enforcement and border protection were passed in the 1996 IIRCA. Since then, changes in immigration policy have occurred through executive administration at the federal level, via policymaking at the state level, and through policy implementation and reactions at the local level. Court decisions have played a large role in policy outcomes during this time, particularly at the federal and state levels. The following section explores the shifts in policy and sentiment at the federal level between 2005 and 2019 and serves as the federal-level case study for the immigration federalism framework.

U.S. Immigration Policy: 2005-2019

This research recognizes that policy is born of a wide variety of administrative and political decisions, and that policy is also interpreted differently depending on various aspects of the political atmosphere, including but not limited to demographics and public opinion. For these reasons, this federal-level case study involves more than a comprehensive review of administrative policy shifts as indicated by executive orders, presidential proclamations or memos, and fact sheets related to immigration policy from 2005 through 2019. This case study also integrates major court challenges to administrative policy shifts during the target time period and a comprehensive review of available grey material such as pertinent legislative reports, select reports from study

groups, commissions, congressional committees and other panels, and whitepapers related to immigration policy published by policy experts within the target timeline to assist in framing the context of federal immigration policy changes. Demographic population changes and legislative and executive representation are considered for the target years, and public attitudes and opinions toward immigrants and immigration and related narratives represented in major news media outlets are touched on.

Executive Administration: Policy Shifts

The question of executive administration, or government by decree, has been taken up by scholars interested in understanding the significance of and the extent to which U.S. presidents have utilized their policy-making power via mechanisms such as executive orders and proclamations (Cooper, 1986; Kagan, 2001). Mayer (1999) and Moe and Howell (1999) explore the use of executive orders as a mechanism for unilateral policy-making by presidents. Cooper (1986) and Kagan (2001) each reflect on historical context and the foundational arguments of the framers of the nation, but note that the use of mechanisms for executive administration increased considerably with the Reagan and Clinton administrations, respectively. Furthermore, Kagan (2001) argues, employment of presidential power is not limited to presidential-level mechanisms but includes coordination with federal agency leaders to effectively govern via executive order, memoranda, and proclamations. The constitution states little regarding presidential power and unilateral action (Moe & Howell, 1999), and what it does state is open to interpretation (Kagan, 2001). However, the robustness of the literature on this topic suggests that reviewing presidential documents issued within the target timeline will help frame the federal-level context of immigration federalism in the United States.

This section reviews executive administration practices undertaken by federal level leadership from 2005 through 2019. Since Congress was unable to pass immigration reforms within this time period and update systems that impact immigration in the United States, policy shifts came as the result of executive orders, memoranda from the president or federal agency leadership, and proclamations. It should be noted, however, that the executive administration of immigration policy is not a recent development in U.S. immigration policy. Under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9066 ordered the internment of individuals of Japanese descent, including U.S. citizens, from 1942 to 1945 (U.S. National Archives, 2021) and the Bracero Program was created by executive order in 1942 to avoid wartime labor shortages in agriculture (Bracero History Archive, n.d.). The Bracero Program was eventually formalized with Public Law 78 in 1951, but the effects of these immigration programs initiated by executive order have had substantial impacts on U.S. immigration history.

Presidential documents such as proclamations, executive orders, and determinations, memoranda, notices and presidential orders for the years 2005 through 2019 are reviewed in the following section. In some cases, memoranda from the heads of federal agencies outside of the executive office have caused significant changes to the immigration processes. Selected memoranda are discussed in this section as well. The aim of this review is to assess if and how executive administration practices have been employed to direct immigration policy at the federal level throughout the target time period. This comparison in policy-making practices among three presidents offers insight into the mechanisms available and the evolution of their use for immigration policymaking.

Executive Orders—2005 through 2019

Presidential executive orders are issued to manage the operations of the federal government (Georgetown University Law Library, 2021). From 2005 through 2019, 533 executive orders (EO) were signed by Presidents Bush (120), Obama (276), and Trump (137). EO titles were reviewed for indications that the order may affect immigrants of immigration policy. Where a title indicated potential impacts to immigrants or immigration policy, the order was reviewed in full to ensure this was the case. EOs indicating support for diversity and inclusion more generally are also included in the findings.

Bush EOs (2005-2008)

Of 120 executive orders issued by President George W. Bush from 2005 through January 2009, three were found to impact immigrants or immigration policy in the United States, and they are shown in Table 4.1. In 2006, Exec. Order No. 13404 called for the establishment of a Task Force for New Americans within the Department of Homeland Security. The sentiment of the order is considered integrative in this case study because it seeks to improve access to information and resource for new immigrants to the United States.

Table 4.1

President Bush EOs Impacting Immigrants or Immigration Policy 2005-2008

Year	Citation	EO No.	EO Title
2008	73 FR 33285	13465	Amending Executive Order 12989, as Amended
2007	72 FR 56165	13445	Strengthening Adult Education
2006	71 FR 33593	13404	Task Force on New Americans

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

In 2007, President Bush issued Exec. Order No. 13445 titled *Strengthening Adult Education*, sought to increase efforts to help new Americans to improve English language proficiency. Adult Basic Education is the primary federal funding source for English as a Second Language (ESL) classes in the United States as enacted in Title II of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. Exec. Order No. 13445 is not expressly supportive of immigrants because it benefits adult learners more generally. However, it is integrative in nature for the support that it does indirectly offer immigrants in English language learning.

Finally, President Bush signed Exec. Order No. 13465, Amending Executive Order 12989, as Amended in 2008. Executive Order 12989 was issued in 1996 and entitled Economy and Efficiency in Government Procurement Through Compliance with Certain Immigration and Naturalization Act Provisions. The 2008 amendment integrates the use of an electronic employment eligibility verification system, also known as E-Verify, for the purpose of economy and efficiency in government procurement. The implementation of E-Verify is observed as restrictive because it increases barriers to entering the workplace for some immigrants.

Of three EOs issued by President Bush between 2005 and 2009, two were directed at immigrants and immigration and the third was indirectly supportive of immigrants. Bush's 2006 and 2007 EOs were integrative in nature and focused on supporting immigrants' access to information and materials that would aid their integration in the United States. Bush's 2008 EO implements a compliance tool that increases barriers for some employers and some immigrants.

Obama EOs (2009-2016)

Over the span of two terms, President Obama issued three EOs directed toward the support of specific racial groups and one EO promoting diversity and inclusion more generally, although none of these orders are explicitly directed at immigrants or immigration policy. Table 4.2 shows EOs signed by President Obama that may relate to immigrants or immigration policy from 2005 through 2019.

Table 4.2

President Obama EOs Impacting Immigrants or Immigration Policy 2005-2019

Year	Citation	EO No.	EO Title
2012	77 FR 45471	13621	White House Initiative on Educational Excellence for African Americans
2011	76 FR 52845	13583	Establishing a Coordinated Government-Wide Initiative to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce
2010	75 FR 65415	13555	White House Initiative on Educational Excellence for Hispanics
2009	74 FR 53635	13515	Increasing Participation of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in Federal Programs

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

In 2009, Exec. Order No. 13515 intends to increase participation of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in federal programs. This order was amended in 2011 and 2013 and continued through 2017. The White House initiative on educational excellence for Hispanics was created by Exec. Order No. 13555 in 2010 and continued through 2017. This was followed in 2012 by Exec. Order No. 13621, the White House initiative on educational excellence for African Americans. Lastly, Exec. Order No. 13583 establishes a coordinated government-wide initiative to promote diversity and inclusion in the federal workforce in 2011. Earlier EOs targeted to increase opportunity for individuals with disabilities to be employed in the federal government (e.g. Exec.

Order No. 13078 and Exec. Order No. 13171) served as a framework for the 2011 EO issued by Obama.

All Obama-era EOs found to potentially impact immigrants and immigration policy are inclusive in nature because they seek to integrate individuals of diverse backgrounds into federal programs and the federal workforce, and they seek to elevate the educational success of Hispanics and African Americans. These EOs are, in fact, not related to immigrants or immigration policy other than the fact that they serve as mechanisms for the expansion of inclusivity at the federal level.

Trump (2017-2019)

From 2017 through 2019, President Trump issued 137 EOs, 13 of which have ramifications for immigrants or immigration policy. Table 4.3 shows EOs signed by President Trump that relate to immigrants or immigration policy from 2005 through 2019. Three of the Trump issued EOs (Exec. Order No. 13899, 2019; Exec. Order No. 13898, 2019; and Exec. Order No. 13872, 2019) reflect notions of inclusivity, but they are not directed explicitly at immigrant populations. One is designed to combat anti-Semitism, another to establish a taskforce on missing and murdered American Indians and Alaskan Natives, and the third focuses on the economic empowerment of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, respectively. Exec. Order No. 13872 (pertaining to the economic empowerment of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders) supersedes Obama's Exec. Order No. 13515 (increasing participation of Asian American and Pacific Islanders in federal programs).

The supersession of a new EO over an old EO is common and necessary, and a comparative analysis of the language in Exec. Order No. 13872 and Exec. Order No.

13515 is beyond the scope of the current project, but an initial review suggests that there is value in looking more closely at the construction and function of such taskforces under different administrations. The Obama EO defines the mission of an advisory commission on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in terms of ensuring access to federal programs and funding, while the Trump EO references economic success as a more general mission of a commission.

Table 4.3

President Trump EOs Impacting Immigrants or Immigration Policy 2005-2019

Year	Citation	EO No.	EO Title
2019	84 FR 68779	13899	Combating Anti-Semitism
2019	84 FR 66059	13898	Establishing the Task Force on Missing and Murdered American Indians and Alaska Natives
2019	84 FR 52355	13888	Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement
2019	84 FR 33821	13880	Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in Connection With the Decennial Census
2019	84 FR 22321	13872	Economic Empowerment of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders
2018	83 FR 29435	13841	Affording Congress an Opportunity To Address Family Separation
2017	82 FR 50055	13815	Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program With Enhanced Vetting Capabilities
2017	82 FR 28747	13802	Amending Executive Order 13597
2017	82 FR 18837	13788	Buy American and Hire American
2017	82 FR 13209	13780	Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States
2017	82 FR 8977	13769	Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States
2017	82 FR 8793	13767	Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements
2017	82 FR 8799	13768	Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Trump issued a decidedly more restrictive EO directing federal agencies to *Buy American and Hire American* (Exec. Order No. 13788, 2017). This order details visa

requirements for hiring practices and may result in restrictions for certain types of non-immigrant work visas. It calls for the rigorous enforcement of section 212(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which defines inadmissible aliens to the United States. Exec. Order No. 13788 is restrictive in nature, particularly in relation to immigrant workers.

The remaining nine EOs issued by President Trump involve actions or practices affecting the ease of entry to the United States. These were, in many cases, criticized in the media. Exec. Order Numbers 13768 (2017) and 13767 (2017) call for increased border security and also describe individuals seeking to cross the southern border into the United States, as well as those who enter the country legally and overstay their visa, as devious and dangerous. Exec. Order Numbers 13769 (2017) and 13780 (2017) are both constructed to protect the nation from foreign terrorist entry into the United States. The first is designed to initiate a review into the adequacy of information provided by foreign governments of their nationals who seek entry into the United States and the second is designed to prevent entry to nationals whose countries are deemed insufficient in terms of the information they provide. These EOs are precursors to Trump's Presidential Proclamation 9645, which calls for *Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats* (2017). This document is discussed further in the following section, but it is significant to note that President Trump coordinated his use of executive tools to achieve goals related to immigration policy in ways that other presidents did not. Later in 2017, Exec. Order No. 13815, *Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program with*

Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, addresses "the risks presented by certain categories of refugees" (2017).

In 2017, President Trump amends Exec. Order No. 13597 by deleting subsection (b)(ii), which "ensures that 80 percent of nonimmigrant visa applicants are interviewed within 3 weeks of receipt of application, recognizing that resource and security considerations and the need to ensure provision of consular services to U.S. citizens may dictate specific exceptions" (Establishing Visa and Foreign Visitor Processing Goals and the Task Force On Travel and Competitiveness, 2017). This effectively removes the burden from federal agencies to process visa applications within a reasonable time frame, thereby restricting entry to individuals.

Exec. Order No. 13841 titled *Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family Separation* (2018) shunts blame for family separations at the border to Congress, arguing "it is unfortunate that Congress's failure to act and court orders have put the Administration in the position of separating alien families to effectively enforce the law". Days before this EO was issued, national media outlets reported on the separation of families and were largely critical of the Trump administration for initiating and supporting this policy (Domonoske & Gonzales, 2018; Rizzo, 2018).

Two Exec. Orders issued in 2019 relate to the 2020 U.S. Census citizenship question and state and local government rights and preferences regarding refugee settlement. Exec. Order No. 13880 follows the striking of U.S. Attorney General William Barr's memorandum calling for a citizenship question to be included on the census and directs the Department of Commerce "to strengthen its efforts, consistent with law, to

obtain State administrative records concerning citizenship" (Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in Connection With the Decennial Census, 2019).

Finally, Exec. Order No. 13888 recognizes state and local-level responsibility in refugee settlement processes and requires state and local elected officials to affirmatively opt in if they wish to receive newly arriving refugees. The EO is entitled "Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement," and it furthers the Trump administration's narrative about refugees being financially burdensome while offering state and local governments the agency to accept or deny refugee settlement within their jurisdiction. Migration Policy Institute reports that a majority of U.S. governors, both Republicans and Democrats, affirmatively opted into the refugee resettlement program after the issuance of Exec. Order No. 13888, much to the surprise of the White House (Chishti & Pierce, 2020).

Presidents Bush and Obama invested little in immigration reform via executive orders. Obama, the only democrat, engaged in immigration policy by EO in an indirect manner. Bush used EOs to support the integration of New Americans but also to implement the use of E-Verify technology in federal contracting. Trump's utilization of EOs is vastly different and more aggressive than his predecessors, and he engaged in primarily restrictive immigration policymaking via executive orders. The following discussion covering executive use of presidential proclamations further outlines the uniqueness of the Trump administration's employment of executive documents in immigration policy-making.

Presidential Proclamations—2005 through 2019

According to the Georgetown University Law Library (2021), a presidential proclamation is typically limited to the recognition of ceremonial events and days of remembrance, but some proclamations have substantive effects on policy. A total of 1,890 presidential proclamations were signed from 2005 through 2019. President Bush signed 484 proclamations over four years, President Obama signed 1,000 over eight years, and President Trump signed 406 over three years. Proclamation titles were initially scanned for key words indicating a focus on race or ethnicity or immigration and suspension of entry, and a keyword search strategy was later employed to ensure all relevant instances were recorded.

In each of these three presidencies, a number of proclamations that reference American ethnic groups or other aspects of American heritage are present. Most of these (Irish-American Heritage Month, Jewish Heritage Week, National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day, for example) recur each year. Table 4.4 illustrates the proclamations related to ethnicity and race in the United States. The list includes those proclamations honoring African American and Black heritage in the United States, since it has been noted that this history relates to the discussion of immigration in the United States. A check mark is present if a president created a proclamation for a given topic during his presidency. In most cases, presidents made such proclamations every year. However, there are two relevant proclamations unique to President Bush for *Black Music Month* and *National American Indian Heritage Month*. There is a proclamation unique to President Obama, the *National Hispanic-Serving Institutions Week*, and four relevant proclamations unique to President Trump, including the *Days of Remembrance of Victims*

of the Holocaust, *National Day of Patriotic Devotion*, *National Historically Black*

Colleges and Universities Week, and *Missing and Murdered American Indian and Alaska*

Natives Awareness Day.

Table 4.4

Presidential Proclamations and Use by Presidents 2005-2019

Proclamation Topic	Bush 2005-2008	Obama 2009-2016	Trump 2017-2019
National Hispanic Heritage Month	✓	✓	✓
National Hispanic-Serving Institutions Week	--	✓	--
National African American History Month	✓	✓	✓
Irish-American Heritage Month	✓	✓	✓
Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek and American Democracy	✓	✓	✓
Jewish Heritage Week	✓	✓	✓
Asian/Pacific American Heritage Month	✓	✓	✓
Black Music Month	✓	--	--
German-American Day	✓	✓	✓
National American Indian Heritage Month	✓	--	--
Martin Luther King, Jr., Federal Holiday	✓	✓	✓
National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day	✓	✓	✓
The Centennial of Korean Immigration to the United States	✓	na	na
Caribbean-American Heritage Month	✓	✓	✓
Days of Remembrance of Victims of the Holocaust	--	--	✓ (3)
National Day of Patriotic Devotion	--	--	✓ (1)
National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week	--	--	✓ (3)
Missing and Murdered American Indians and Alaska Natives Awareness Day	--	--	✓ (1)
Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Responsible for…	2	2	3
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation 9645, 2017)	--	--	1

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

The proclamations noted in the previous paragraph are largely symbolic in nature

and many honor immigration history in the United States. For Example, President Ronald

Reagan issued the first proclamation for German-American Day in 1983 (German-American Hall of Fame, 2021), and in 1987 Congress codified the day of honor when it passed a joint resolution honoring "the contributions made by German immigrants to the life and culture of the United States" since the first arrival of German immigrants 300 years prior (A Joint Resolution, 1987). Since most of the proclamations honoring individuals, heritages, or ethnicities are repeated throughout all administrations, it can be assumed these days and months of remembrance and honor are expected by and popular with the U.S. public.

Some proclamations call for the suspension of immigrant or non-immigrant entry of people who, most often, support a particular political regime. Proclamations of this nature typically affect only small, specific populations attempting to enter the United States, are political in nature, and are not typically intended to control immigration to the United States. President Trump's Proclamation 9945 is an exception to this norm. Proclamation 9945, titled *Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will Financially Burden the Unites States Healthcare System, in order to Protect the Availability of Healthcare Benefits for Americans* (2019), prevented entry to individuals who were unable to show proof of adequate healthcare insurance or sufficient funds to cover potential healthcare costs while in the United States.

In 2017, President Trump also utilized a presidential proclamation to follow Exec. Order No.s 13780 and 13769, which temporarily suspended entry to the United States by nationals from specific countries and called for a review to ascertain which nationals of foreign countries might pose a security threat to the United States. Proclamation 9645, titled *Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into*

the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (2017), placed long-term restrictions on nationals of eight foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing information about their nationals was deemed inadequate by the Trump administration deemed inadequate. The use of a presidential proclamation for such a substantive rule is highly unusual and unique to the Trump administration throughout the target timeline for this case study.

Determinations, Memoranda, Notices and Presidential Orders—2005 through 2019

Determinations, memoranda, notices, and presidential orders signed by George W. Bush in the years from 2005 through 2008, Obama from 2009 through 2016, and Trump from 2017 through 2019 were reviewed for this case study and documents indicating direct relevance for immigrants or immigration policy were analyzed.

Presidential Determinations

Determinations are mostly international in scope, and the employment of presidential determinations appears to be uniform across the G.W. Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. Of 132 determinations from 2005 through January 2009, President G.W. Bush signed 13 determinations, including the term "refugee." Four of these respond to unexpected and urgent refugee and migration requirements related to specific geographic locations outside of the United States, four are determinations regarding annual refugee admissions numbers, and five are pursuant to the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 allowing for the release of funds "to provide contributions to international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, and, as necessary, for administrative expenses of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and

Migration" (The White House, 2006). There are no other references to immigration outside of those referring to refugees in Bush presidential determinations.

President Obama signed 137 determinations throughout both his terms in office. Twenty-two determinations relate to refugee admissions numbers and authorizations. Sixteen of the 22 determinations relate to "unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs," 11 of which are linked to refugee populations from a specific geographic location outside of the United States. There are no other references to immigration outside of those referring to refugees.

From 2017 through 2019, President Trump signed three presidential determinations, all relating to refugee admissions for the fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020, which was signed in 2019.

Presidential determinations are the mechanism by which annual refugee admission numbers are set. Table 4.5 shows the annual refugee allowance numbers indicated by presidential determinations from 2006 through 2019. The refugee admission numbers oscillated between 70,000 and 80,000 through 2015 before being increased to 85,000 and 110,000 by the Obama administration in 2016 and 2017. Trump reduced refugee admissions to record lows since the refugee resettlement program was enacted with the Refugee Act of 1980. And although actual refugee admissions typically fall below the established ceiling values (Baugh, 2020), Trump's significant reductions were reportedly criticized by immigrant and human rights groups as an abdication of the nation's position as a global leader and an indication of national xenophobia (Miroff, 2020; Hesson, 2019).

Trump's administrative use of presidential determinations is not unusual in function when compared with how other presidents employed this mechanism, but Trump's stark reductions to refugee allowances are in line with executive orders and proclamations that are aggressively more restrictive toward immigrants and immigration policy than his predecessors.

Table 4.5

Annual Refugee Allowance as Indicated by Presidential Determinations 2006-2020

Year	President	Annual Refugee Allowance
2006	Bush	70,000
2007		70,000
2008		80,000
2009		80,000
2010	Obama	80,000
2011		80,000
2012		76,000
2013		70,000
2014		70,000
2015		70,000
2016		85,000
2017		110,000
2018	Trump	45,000
2019		30,000
2020		18,000
*2005 allowance set by 2004 determination and not included in this dataset		

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Presidential Memoranda

Presidential memoranda are primarily used for the assignment of functions or designation of officers to various administrations or agencies. Of 75 Bush memoranda, none include references to key words or topics related to immigrants or immigration as

could be ascertained by document titles. All but three of the 2005-2008 memoranda were assignments of functions, many related to various Acts or reporting activities.

Table 4.6

Obama Presidential Memoranda Indicating the Value of Inclusion and Diversity and in Support of New Americans (2009-January 2017)

Citation	Year	Obama Memoranda
82 FR 6179	2017	Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in Our National Parks, National Forests, and Other Public Lands and Waters
82 FR 7623	2017	Continuing To Expand Opportunity for All Young People
81 FR 95849	2016	Supporting New American Service Members, Veterans, and Their Families
81 FR 69993	2016	Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in the National Security Workforce
81 FR 26993	2016	Promoting Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals
79 FR 70765	2014	Creating Welcoming Communities and Fully Integrating Immigrants and Refugees
79 FR 70769	2014	Modernizing and Streamlining the U.S. Immigrant Visa System for the 21st Century
79 FR 12923	2014	Creating and Expanding Ladders of Opportunity for Boys and Young Men of Color
78 FR 7987	2013	Coordination of Policies and Programs To Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women and Girls Globally

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Obama utilized presidential memoranda more broadly than Bush, signing 257 such documents during his eight-year tenure. Obama memoranda include a variety of documents indicating the value of inclusion and diversity, expanding opportunity, and supporting New Americans, a population that includes not only newly naturalized U.S. citizens but also individuals anywhere in the process of naturalization. Nine Memoranda fall into these categories and are shown in Table 4.6. While inclusion and diversity might not directly impact immigrants, a broad focus on inclusion and diversity across

generations, racial groups, and geographies inherently benefits immigrants because they make up a significant portion of the diversity in the United States. Three of the Obama-era Memoranda are specifically directed at immigrant populations. The modernization of the U.S. immigrant visa system, the creation of welcoming communities and the integration of immigrants and refugees, and support for immigrant service members and veterans were points of focus in Obama's memoranda. Obama's use of Memoranda is overarchingly positive and integrative in nature.

Eighty-eight memoranda were signed by President Trump from 2017 through 2019, including three documents relating to immigration. The three memoranda focus on curbing overstay rates, implementing heightened screening and vetting for visas and other benefits, and ending "catch and release" practices. Table 4.7 includes the titles and Federal Register citation for each of Trump's memoranda of note. The memoranda signed by Trump are decidedly more restrictive than those signed by Obama. The 2017 Trump memorandum calls for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to "submit to me a report detailing the estimates long-term costs of the United States Refugee Admissions Program as the Federal, State, and local levels, along with recommendation about how to curtail those costs" (Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening…, 2017), which reflects an anti-refugee sentiment similar to that shown in his stark decreases in annual refugee allowances conferred through presidential determinations. Tellingly, the Trump administration rejected the requested OMB report when findings showed that from 2005-2014 refugees brought in $63 billion more through taxes than it cost the government to resettle them (Davis & Sengupta, 2017). Once again, Trump's

coordinated utilization of presidential documents is observable in a way that is not seen under Bush or Obama.

Table 4.7

Trump Presidential Memoranda Indicating the Restrictive Immigration Preferences (2017-2019)

Citation	Year	Trump Memoranda
84 FR 19853	2019	Combating High Nonimmigrant Overstay Rates
83 FR 16179	2018	Ending ``Catch and Release'' at the Border of the United States and Directing Other Enhancements to Immigration Enforcement
82 FR 16279	2017	Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening and Vetting of Applications for Visas and Other Immigration Benefits, Ensuring Enforcement of All Laws for Entry Into the United States, and Increasing Transparency Among Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government and for the American People

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Presidential Notices and Presidential Orders

Neither presidential notices nor presidential orders were found to impact immigrants or immigration policy in the United States during the target timeline. Presidential notices primarily relay continuations of national emergencies and, on occasion, to express the intention of entering a free trade or similar agreement with a given nation. President Bush has 82 Notices on file, President Obama has 210, and President Trump has 83. No notice was found that related to immigrants or immigration policy.

There are only two presidential orders included in the target timeline, one under President Obama and one under President Trump. Neither order relates to immigration.

Executive Documents from Agency Heads

Some rules that have greatly impacted immigrants and immigration policy are memoranda signed by heads of federal agencies and then supported by the president.

Kagan (2001) recognizes coordination between the president and independent agency leadership as a common strategy for executive administration, while Shah (2020) claims that independent executive agency leaders also seek control at times and do not always work in tandem with the executive administration.

The memorandum allowing for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is one such document signed not by the president but by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano in 2012. The memorandum sets forth how "in the exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should enforce the Nation's immigration laws against certain young people who were brought to this country as children and know only this country as home" (Napolitano, 2012). The rule continues to face political contention, and the rights conferred on childhood arrivals by the 2012 DHS Memorandum remain at risk without Congressional action to solidify the rights of these immigrants to remain in the U.S without fear of deportation.

Evidence of such administrative rule-making that has an impact on immigrants or immigration policy is also present in the Trump administration. For example, the memorandum entitled Reinstatement of a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Decennial Census Questionnaire (Ross, 2018) served to include the citizenship question on the 2020 decennial census. The question was later eliminated when the U.S. Supreme Court found the administration's reasoning for including it to be inadequate (Department of Commerce v. New York, n.d.), but the memorandum can be seen as having helped move the Trump administration agenda forward by raising the salience of this issue in public opinion.

Concluding Thoughts on Presidential Documents and Immigration Policy

The overall tendencies and attitudes of a certain administration toward immigration policy appear to be indicated through the review of presidential documentation. Some of the most significant policy changes may not be represented in presidential documents, and the scope of this research does not include memoranda of all other administrative leaders throughout the target timeline, so a concise representation of all policies relating to immigrants and immigration policy cannot be expected. Even so, the review of presidential documents completed in this section sufficiently provides an overall gist of each administration's goals to illustrate how sentiment toward immigrants and immigration may change over time at the federal level.

The Bush administration employed presidential documents for immigration policy in limited yet traditional ways. Bush used EOs to support the integration of New Americans and to implement E-Verify. His use of proclamations, determinations, and memoranda were quite usual and limited to honoring traditional heritages and ethnicities through proclamations and setting refugee allowance numbers through determinations. Obama employed presidential documents more widely for the purpose of facilitating inclusion and diversity within and throughout federal institutions. There is evidence of the use of memoranda between him and agency heads for the purpose of granting rights to some immigrant populations, and these actions are integrative in nature.

Trump's use of presidential documents for making immigration-related rules stands out as untraditional and overwhelmingly restrictive in nature. Trump not only employs EOs, proclamations, memoranda, and determinations in immigrant policy rule-making, he does so in a coordinated manner in which one document references another

document, which is linked to yet another document. This manner of policy building is simply not viewed in the Bush or Obama administrations where immigration policy is concerned. The striking changes observed in the Trump administration's employment of executive power are paralleled by the way courts were utilized to challenge administrative decisions related to immigration from 2005-2019.

Executive Administration: Responding Legal Challenges

Because the U.S. Constitution says little about the executive powers of the presidency to govern unilaterally, policies created through executive administration are vulnerable to legal challenges. Kagan (2001) outlines some of the history involved in challenging presidential orders. Because the review of executive orders and proclamations makes clear that executive actions taken by President Trump have a significant impact on immigrants and immigration policy, while the actions of President Bush and President Obama do not, reviewing the legal response that each administration garnered is a worthwhile activity for framing the context of immigration federalism.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the American Immigration Council (AIC), and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC) are three active legal organizations that seek to advocate for immigrants' rights at the national level in the United States. Other organizations provide legal assistance to immigrants and in relation to immigration policy in the United States, but this review is limited to three organizations prominent at the national level. This section reviews the case numbers for each of these organizations from 2005 through 2019 as represented in Nexus Uni on June 2, 2021. The purpose of doing so is to identify to what extent legal challenges to federal

level policies were present throughout the target timeline. Table 4.8 illustrates case activity at the federal level for all three of the organizations of interest.

The NILC, established in 1979, defends and advances the rights of low-income immigrants (National Immigration Law Center, n.d.). A Nexus Uni search for "National Immigration Law Center" showed a total of 230 federal-level cases filed by a representative of the organization between 2005 and 2019, with four cases in 2005 alone. The number of cases increased in 2010 (5), 2015 (9), and 2019 (33). Each year the number of NILC cases increase, but the number of cases in 2019 (33) is more than 3.5 times the number of cases in 2015, just four years before.

Table 4.8

Federal-Level Case Activity from 2009-2015, NILC, AIC, and ACLU

Organization Name	Search Term	Total 2005-2019	2005	2010	2015	2019
"National Immigration Law Center"	n/a	230	4	5	9	33
"American Immigration Council"	n/a	137	1^	2	27	57
"American Civil Liberties Union"	immigra*	1,067	22	50	49	171
^American Immigration Council first reports in 2006						

Note. Data sourced from Nexus Uni, June 2, 2021

The mission of the AIC is more broadly directed at "shaping how America thinks about and acts towards immigrants and immigration" (American Immigration Council, n.d.-a) and litigation appears to have begun in 2006 when the organization brought one federal-level case. In 2010, the AIC brought only two cases. The number of cases jumped substantially to 27 in 2015, and in 2019, the AIC brought 57 cases to federal circuit courts. In total, the AIC brought 137 federal-level cases from 2005 through 2019.

The ACLU was created in 1920 and has "evolved in the years since…into the nation's premier defender of the rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution" (American

Civil Liberties Union, 2021b). Because the ACLU litigates for civil rights more generally, the Nexus Uni required that the search term "immigra*" be included in order to limit cases to those with a focus on immigrants or immigration. From 2005 through 2019, the ACLU was responsible for 1,067 federal-level cases related to immigration. In 2005, the ACLU brought 22 immigration-related cases to federal circuit courts. In 2010 and 2015, the number of cases increased to 50 and 49, respectively. In 2019, the ACLU brought 171 cases relating to immigrants or immigration to federal circuit courts.

The number of cases brought by all three organizations litigating for the rights of immigrants in the United States markedly increased from 2005 to 2019. For the AIC, some of this drastic increase is due to it being a new organization. Other notable factors include the increase in the salience of immigration as a policy issue during the same timeline. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. national sentiment toward immigrants and immigration shifted (this factor is discussed in depth in a later section reviewing public attitudes) and presidential administrations responded to this shifting sentiment differently, Obama with more broadly inclusive policies and Trump with more restrictive immigrant-focused policies.

The search included here is precursory at best. It signifies the level of litigious activity for each of three organizations centering their work on immigrants' rights during the target timeline, but it does not describe the types of rules being challenged or even whether they challenge local, state, or federal rules. ACLU case filings, accessible to the public through the organization's website, are analyzed for a closer look at which federal-level rules were challenged from 2005 through 2019 and how.

From 2005 through 2020, the ACLU has 132 records of cases related to immigrants' rights in their online search index (ACLU.org, initially accessed November 22, 2020 and updated June 2, 2021) that were brought to court. The organization's online index includes all cases the ACLU was involved in, whether the organization served as a primary attorney or whether the organization submitted an amicus brief for an existing case. Many of the cases challenge state-level laws or actions taken at the local level and they are, therefore, not relevant to this case study. The only records included were those in which the defendants included 1) a U.S. federal agency or department as an entity, 2) the secretary, or head, of a federal agency, 3) the U.S. attorney general, 4) the United States as an entity, or 5) the President of the United States. During the target timeline, 59 cases directly challenged the executive administration.

The number of cases brought against the executive administration each year confirms the trend observed in the review with NILC and AIC, in which cases relating to immigration increase over the case study timeline. Because the courts move slowly, cases are sometimes decided years after an administration has left power, but this analysis reveals that cases are frequently brought speedily when rules perceived to be unfair have been implemented through executive administration.

Table 4.9 shows the number of relevant ACLU cases in each case study year. From 2005 through 2013, there were no more than three cases brought in a given year and 2011 and 2013 have no relevant cases brought against the executive administration. In 2014 the ACLU had a role in five cases that were brought against the executive administration. In 2017, however, 10 immigration related cases are brought against the executive administration. 2018 and 2019 follow with five and eight cases, respectively.

An additional 10 cases brought in 2020 are included in this review because they help to support an observed evolving trend. The number of immigrants' rights cases brought against the executive administration held steady during the end of the Bush administration (2005-2008) through the Obama administration (2009-2016), but it skyrocketed during the Trump administration.

Table 4.9

The Number of ACLU Immigrants' Rights Cases Challenging Federal Level Rules by Year (2005-2019)

Year	Federal Level Immigration Rights Cases (ACLU)
2020	10
2019	8
2018	5
2017	10
2016	4
2015	2
2014	5
2013	0
2012	2
2011	0
2010	3
2009	3
2008	2
2007	3
2006	1
2005	1
TOTAL:	59

Note. Data sourced from ACLU.org

All defendants named in the cases brought from 2005 through 2008 were federal agency or department leaders or the serving U.S. attorney general. A case in 2009 is the first case in this dataset to include an agency as the defendant rather than the secretary or another leader of that agency. In 2010, 2012, and 2015 a total of four immigration related

cases were brought against the United States rather than an agency or individual executive leader. In 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020, the ACLU had a role in cases in which President Trump was named as the defendant. There are no incidents of Bush or Obama being named as the defendant in immigration-related cases during the target timeline for this case study.

This analysis is an imperfect snapshot of litigation against federal-level immigration policies, but it is not without value. The ACLU is among the most prolific civil rights organizations in the country and has a trove of online case data relating to immigrants' rights. The organization leads litigation but also joins many other organizations, including the NILC and AIC, in supporting cases in various ways. For these reasons, it is assumed that the ACLU cases reviewed for this case study are representative of the kinds of rules being challenged by immigration rights organizations in the United States.

This case study does not include a review of cases brought by the executive office of the federal government against state governments for the purpose of challenging state-level laws affecting immigrants or immigration, but it should be noted that at least some examples of this have occurred and are relevant to this framework for immigration federalism. In 2010, the Department of Justice under President Obama sued Arizona for enacting AZ SB 1070, arguing that the law "conflict[s] with and undermine[s] the federal government's careful balance of immigration enforcement priorities and objectives," (Gerstein, 2010). The Act was partially enjoined (Arizona v. United States, n.d.). In 2018 and 2020, the Trump administration sued California and other states and

local governments for the enactment of so-called sanctuary laws (Benner & Medina, 2018; Benner, 2020).

Federal Level Executive and Legislative Representation

Understanding executive and legislative representation at the federal level is of interest in this study because policy choices matter to people living at the local level. This is particularly true in an era when immigrants and their families are left to manage frequent administrative changes relating to immigration policy in lieu of lasting Congressional action on immigration reform. A 2015 The Atlantic Magazine article cites the Pew Research Center in claiming that the 114th Congress had the fewest immigrant members in the last 40 years (Gao et al., 2015). Pew's infographic shows a decreasing share of Congressional membership held by immigrants from a peak in 1887 to a historic low—almost 0%—in 1967. Immigrant membership remains below 2% through the 114th Congress, according to Pew (Pew Research Center, 2015). Yet, four years later, Pew Research Center reports that 13% of 116th Congressional members are immigrants or the children of immigrants (Geiger, 2019). The metric by which the share of immigrant representation has changed to include the U.S.-born children of immigrants, but rightly so. Where questions of political representation arise, the children of immigrants are well suited to serve as a conduit for communicating the unique needs and desires of a changing population.

The significance of political representation is well documented regarding gender and race. Swers (1998) finds that women are more likely to vote for women's issue bills than their male counterparts. Celis et al. (2008) agree, but push for a more holistic practice of policy exploration that acknowledges and seeks to identify the various actors

acting for women throughout a given problem-solving process. Tate (2001) asks "Does Race Matter?" where the political representation of Blacks in Congress is concerned. The author finds that race does matter. This study is unique in that Tate (2001) turns to constituents to understand their personal perspectives on the work of Black representatives regardless of their voting patterns, rather than analyzing representatives' voting patterns and making assumptions regarding how constituents value those votes.

Latino representation has been found to be direct and indirect (Kerr & Miller, 1997), not unlike Celis et al.'s (2008) observations of women's representation. Griffin and Newman (2007) explore the descriptive and substantive representation of Latinos, finding that Latinos are largely underrepresented and that Congressional representatives demonstrate voting practices that are more frequently in line with the political preferences of their white constituents than their Latino constituents. In a more recent study, Wallace (2014) finds that partisanship is the main driver of voting behavior for Latino representatives and an increase in the Latino constituent population does not influence this behavior. Moreover, Wallace (2014) suggests that African American and Democratic legislators may serve Latino interests as substantive representatives.

While only a fraction of social science scholarly work relating to political representation is included in this case study, it is clear that political representation does matter. While this study doesn't aim to explore *how* representation matters to immigrants and their families, the organization and analysis of how it has changed throughout the target timeline is a significant aspect of the framework. Beyond individual political representation, Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2015 argue that the political ideology of policy makers plays an integral role in immigration policy initiation and design at the

state level. For a sound case study comparison, awareness of the political ideologies of federal legislators for the target time period is necessary.

Awareness of party divisions and representation during major federal immigration policy changes may prove helpful in understanding party ideology in policy decisions over time, particularly when compared to state-level representation trends. On the other hand, the balance of federal level executive representation and Congressional representation at a given point in the timeline may prove indicative of strategies taken to reach policy goals. These two possibilities make gathering and exploring representation details even more valuable to the baseline federal case study in this research.

In general, executive representation for the target years begins with George W. Bush, a Republican, in office from 2005 through 2008. The following eight years see a Democrat-controlled executive level with Barack Obama in office. Donald Trump, a Republican, held the presidency from 2017 through the end of the target timeline. Table 4.10 shows the target timeline and illustrates administrative control in the column titled *executive*.

Data concerning diversity and representation in each Congress falling within the target timeline for this study is collected from the Congress membership profile reports prepared by the Congressional Research Service. I have attempted to utilize the report released most recently; in most cases this is the last report released prior to the change over to the new Congressional class. However, because the reports are representations of Congress at a specific place and time, vacancies and party membership are reflected in a fashion that may be in conflict with other sources whose snapshot of Congressional membership represents a different moment. Such discrepancies are minor and not

significant to the observations made in this case study. Delegates and resident

commissioners are not included in this data except in the case of Asian and Pacific Native

Islander representation in the House of Representatives in the 112th, 114th, 115th, 116th,

and 117th Congresses. Details regarding the inclusion of these numbers are discussed

below.

Table 4.10

U.S. Administrative and Legislative Control from 2005 through 2019

			SENATE				HOUSE			
Year	EXECUTIVE	Congress	R	D	I/L	Total	R*	D*	I/L*	Total
2005	R	109	55	44	1	100	230	202	1	433
2007	R	110	41	57	2	100	180	255	0	435
2009	D	111	41	57	2	100	180	255	0	435
2011	D	112	47	51	2	100	241	192	0	433
2013	D	113	45	53	2	100	234	201	0	435
2015	D	114	54	44	2	100	247	187	0	434
2017	R	115	51	47	2	100	236	197	0	433
2019	R	116	52	46	2	100	195	233	2	430
2021	D	117	50	48	2	100	212	219	0	431

Note. Grey boxes indicate party in control. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports
(Amer, 2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; I/L--denotes independent or libertarian

Party control of the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate are also illustrated

in Table 4.10. In 2005, the 109th Congress was controlled by the Republican party, but

this level of control flipped in the 110th Congress in 2007, when Democrats took majority

of the House and, due to independent senators caucusing with democrats, gained a slim

majority in the Senate. Control of the House again shifted to the Republicans in 2009,

where it remained until the 116th Congress in 2019 became majority Democrat. The

Senate, on the other hand, remained majority Democrat until the 114th Congress in 2015,

when it came under the control of the Republican party. Table 4.10 reflects these shifts,

with shaded boxes denoting the party in control of the Senate and House in a given

Congress. The 109th, 114th, and 115th Congresses were majority Republican in both the

Senate and the House, while the 110th Congress was the only Congress dominated by

Democrats during the target timeline. All other Congresses between 2005 and 2019 were

split between Democrat and Republican control.

Table 4.11

Representation of Women in U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019

Year	EXECUTIVE	Congress	SENATE			HOUSE			% Senate	% House
			R*	D*	Total	R*	D*	Total		
2005	R	109	5	9	14	25	43	68	14.0%	15.7%
2007	R	110	5	11	16	20	52	72	16.0%	16.6%
2009	D	111	4	13	17	17	56	73	17.0%	16.8%
2011	D	112	5	12	17	24	50	74	17.0%	17.1%
2013	D	113	4	16	20	19	61	80	20.0%	18.4%
2015	D	114	6	14	20	22	62	84	20.0%	19.4%
2017	R	115	6	17	23	23	64	87	23.0%	20.1%
2019	R	116	8	17	25	13	88	101	25.0%	23.5%
2021	D	117	8	16	24	31	87	118	24.0%	27.4%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer, 2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data

This case study returns to administrative and party control in the section that

follows in which administrative policy shifts are more closely reviewed via an analysis of

executive orders and other policy-making mechanisms. Before moving to those policy

shifts, however, understanding the gender and racial diversity in each Congressional class

during the target timeline is valuable to understanding representation more broadly. Table

4.11 reflects consistent increases in the share of Senate and House seats occupied by

women since the target timeline began with the 109th Congress, where 14% of senators

and almost 16% of representatives were women, and ending with the 116th Congress,

where 25% of senators and 23.5% of representatives were women.

The Congressional Research Service reports note that each successive Congressional class reached a new historical high in terms of women's representation in Congressional membership. While every class had republican and democrat members, women were more often democrats. No women were identified as independent or libertarian party members.

Based on 2019 U.S. Census estimates, women make up 50.8% of the overall population in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). While scholarly discussions surrounding the significance of descriptive representation do not argue that representation necessarily need be the same ratio as that found in the overall population, it should go without saying that, having only achieved 25% representation of women in the 116th and 117th Congresses, the nation has a way to go before women will be *over*represented. Current Census statistics are utilized in this discussion to provide a baseline for what "representation" might look like.

Representation by Black members in the House of Representatives also increased throughout the target time period, although it did so at a slower rate. Table 4.12 shows Black representation in the House rising from 9.2% in the 109th Congress to 12.8% in the 117th Congress. Representation in the Senate, however, remains quite low at 3%. Individuals who identify as Black or African American alone or in combination made up about 14% of the overall U.S. population in 2019 (Tamir, 2021). While Black representation in the House is approaching a level reflecting the share of Black individuals in the overall U.S. population, the Senate remains far behind.

Table 4.12.

Representation of Black Individuals in U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019

Year	EXECUTIVE	Congress	SENATE			HOUSE			% Senate	% House
			R*	D*	Total	R*	D*	Total		
2005	R	109		1	1		40	40	1.0%	9.2%
			Women:		0			14	0.0%	3.2%
2007	R	110		1^	0		42	42	0.0%	9.7%
			Women:		0			12	0.0%	2.8%
2009	D	111		1	1		39	39	1.0%	9.0%
			Women:		0			12	0.0%	2.8%
2011	D	112			0	2	40	41	0.0%	9.5%
			Women:		0			13	0.0%	3.0%
2013	D	113	1	1	2		41	41	2.0%	9.4%
			Women:		0			14	0.0%	3.2%
2015	D	114	1	1	2	2	44	44	2.0%	10.1%
			Women:		0			18	0.0%	4.1%
2017	R	115	1	2	3	2	45	47	3.0%	10.9%
			Women:		1			19	1.0%	4.4%
2019	R	116	1	2	3	1	51	52	3.0%	12.1%
			Women:		1			22	1.0%	5.1%
2021	D	117	1	2	3	2	53	55	3.0%	12.8%
			Women:		0			24	0.0%	5.6%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer, 2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data
^Barack Obama resigned from the senate on November 16, 2008

The vast majority of Black representatives in the House were democrats and most in the Senate were as well. The representation of black women in Congress, while increasing, is moving much more slowly and remains at 5.6% in the House in the 117th Congress. There are only two Congresses during the target timeline, the 115th and the 116th, in which a black woman represented constituents in the Senate. No Black representatives were identified as independent or libertarian party members.

Table 4.13

Representation of Latino Individuals in U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019

Year	EXECUTIVE	Congress	SENATE			HOUSE			% Senate	% House
			R*	D*	Total	R*	D*	Total		
2005	R	109	1	2	3	5	21	26	3.0%	6.0%
			Women:		0			7	0.0%	1.6%
2007	R	110	1	2	3	4	22	26	3.0%	6.0%
			Women:		0			7	0.0%	1.6%
2009	D	111	1	2	3	3	21	27	3.0%	6.2%
			Women:		0			7	0.0%	1.6%
2011	D	112		1	1	4	22	26	1.0%	6.0%
			Women:		0			6	0.0%	1.4%
2013	D	113	3	1	4	7	24	31	4.0%	7.1%
			Women:		0			9	0.0%	2.1%
2015	D	114	3	1	4	9	23	32	4.0%	7.4%
			Women:		0			9	0.0%	2.1%
2017	R	115	3	2	5	10	29	39	5.0%	9.0%
			Women:		1			9	1.0%	2.1%
2019	R	116	3	2	5	8	35	43	5.0%	10.0%
			Women:		1			13	1.0%	3.0%
2021	D	117	3	4	7	12	32	44	7.0%	10.2%
			Women:		1			13	1.0%	3.0%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer, 2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data

The share of Latino Congress members, shown in Table 4.13, increases over time in a similar fashion to the share of women and Black individuals. Latino representation in the House lags slightly behind Black representation, but more Latinos are members of the Senate. The vast majority of Latino representatives in the House are members of the democratic party, while Latino senators lean slightly Republican. The 115th Congress was the first to see a Latina represent constituents in the Senate, a trend that has been maintained into the 117th Congress. Latina representation in the House has increased slowly but consistently throughout the target time period. No Latino representatives were

identified as independent or libertarian party members. In 2019, 18.5% of the total U.S. population identified as Latino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019), proving Latino representation in Congress to be quite behind, particularly in the Senate.

Table 4.14

Representation by Asian Pacific American Individuals in U.S. Congress 2005-2019

Year	EXECUTIVE	Congress	SENATE			HOUSE			% Senate	% House
			R^	D^	Total	R^	D^	Total		
			0	2	2	1	4	5	2.0%	1.2%
2005	R	109								
			0	2	2	0	5	5	2.0%	1.2%
2007	R	110								
			0	2	2	2	7	9	2.0%	2.1%
2009	D	111								
			0	2	2	1*	9*	8	2.0%	1.8%
2011	D	112	Women:		0			4	0.0%	0.9%
			0	1	1	0	10	10	1.0%	2.3%
2013	D	113	Women:		1			6	1.0%	1.4%
			0	1	1	1*	11*	10	1.0%	2.3%
2015	D	114	Women:		1			7	1.0%	1.6%
			0	3	3	1*	14*	13	3.0%	3.0%
2017	R	115	Women:		3			8	3.0%	1.8%
			0	3	3	1*	16*	14	3.0%	3.3%
2019	R	116	Women:		3			7	3.0%	1.6%
			0	2	2	3*	16*	16	2.0%	3.7%
2021	D	117	Women:		2			9	2.0%	2.1%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer, 2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
^R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data
*Delegates are included in these numbers

Table 4.14 shows Congressional representation by Asian Pacific American individuals, including those who are of Asian, South Asian, or Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander ancestry. About 6.8% of the U.S. population identifies as Asian alone or in combination (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020c), and another 0.4% identify as Native

Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander alone or in combination (Health and Human Services, 2021). As with other groups, House representation of Asian Pacific Americans in Congress has steadily increased from the 109th Congress to the 119th Congress, yet still falls short by holding at the 3.7% mark. (A quick note regarding Table 4.14—delegates are included in the republican and democrat House values for the 112th and 114th-117th Congresses, but the delegates are not included in the House total value and, therefore, are not reflected in the overall representation by percentage. This is due to the nature of the CRS data and does not affect the direction of discussion for this project.)

Asian Pacific American women have only been represented since the 112th Congress but have gained seats in both the Senate and the House since then. Finally, while there have been a handful of republican House members who identify as Asian Pacific American, the majority are members of the democratic party and no Asian Pacific American senators have been republican. No Asian Pacific American representatives were identified as independent or libertarian party members.

American Indians and Alaska Natives alone or in combination make up only 1.7% of the overall U.S. population (Health and Human Services, 2022), and their representation in the House has increased from 0.2% (one member) in the 109th Congress to 1.2% (five members) in the 117th Congress. Table 4.15 shows representation of American Indians and Alaska Natives in the U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019. No senators during the target time period represent American Indian individuals. American Indian representatives tend to be members of the republican party, although increased representation gained in the 116th and 117th Congresses are owed to Democrat

representatives. Women are not represented among American Indian Congressional

representatives in this data.

Table 4.15

Representation of American Indian and Alaska Native Individuals in U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019

Year	EXECUTIVE	Congress	SENATE			HOUSE			% Senate	% House
			R^	D^	Total	R^	D^	Total		
2005	R	109	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.0%	0.2%
2007	R	110	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.0%	0.2%
2009	D	111	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.0%	0.2%
2011	D	112	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.0%	0.2%
2013	D	113	0	0	0	2	0	2	0.0%	0.5%
2015	D	114	0	0	0	2	0	2	0.0%	0.5%
2017	R	115	0	0	0	2	0	2	0.0%	0.5%
2019	R	116	0	0	0	2	2	4	0.0%	0.9%
2021	D	117	0	0	0	3	2	5	0.0%	1.2%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer, 2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
^R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data

When all representation data is analyzed, women and representatives who identify

as a race other than white are 4.8 times more likely to be Democrat than Republican

when elected to the House and 2.3 times more likely to be Democrat than Republican

when elected to the Senate. Only two senators elected to office during the target time

period are foreign-born (U.S. Senate, n.d.), meaning they were born abroad and not to

parents who were themselves U.S. citizens. Reflecting again on Geiger's (2019)

celebration of immigrant diversity in the 116th Congress, it is clear that the House of

Representatives remains a more accessible venue for diverse representation.

Current U.S. Census statistics have been utilized in this discussion to provide a

baseline for what "representation" might look like in the Congress, but there are three

cautions to be noted. First, Individuals who identify as being two or more races are not included in those counts and, therefore, risk being overlooked in this discussion. These are individuals who may look to Black *or* Asian Pacific American representatives or Latino *or* American Indian representatives, for example. Some representatives also identify as more than one race. In these cases, these representatives are included in the tables for each race included in their identity. The greater the diversity of the U.S. Congress, the greater the chance that individuals may feel represented. It is for this reason that the overall diversification of representation observed in the 109th-117th Congress data is valuable to minorities, including immigrants, in the United States.

Second, it can be misleading to rely on overall group populations in a country as large as the United States because groups are not evenly dispersed throughout the country. When one considers that American Indians and Alaska Natives make up only 1.3% of the overall U.S. population, it could be easy to assume that little representation is needed. However, when one considers that in a small city such as Madras, Oregon (population 7,051) American Indians represent 9.5% of the population, it is easier to see how necessary representation is.

Finally, integration of the concept of political representation and Census data into this discussion is functional and designed to help the reader make sense of the context of representation in the United States during the target time period. It should by no means serve as a suggestion that increases in the representation of women or of people who are not "white alone" should stop when representation in the Congress is a descriptive copy of representation in the overall population. On the contrary, surpassing these values should be celebrated. White men have been trusted to serve as substantive representatives

for all other groups throughout history and there is no reason that representatives from any groups discussed in this section, who are not men or are not white, could not substantively represent the whole. The data detailed in this section show that immigrants of color and their descendants in the U.S. continue to lack representation in Congress at parity with their representation within the U.S. population.

National Socio-economic and Demographic Change

Because immigration policy scholars observe population change as an influencer of immigration policy (Ybarra, Sanchez, & Sanchez, 2016; Chavez & Provine, 2009; Marquez & Schnaufnagel, 2013) and because the U.S. population is currently experiencing unprecedented demographic changes (Frey, 2015), discussing population change and socio-economic trends during the target timeline is imperative to framing the federal-level case in this study. In this section, U.S. Census data reflecting national demographics from as early as 1990 through 2019 are reviewed to help contextualize any relation to policy actions taken between 2005 and 2019.

The data sources for this section include reports from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), reports from the American Immigration Council (AIC), the Pew Research Center, and reports and data from the U.S. Census Bureau. All sources utilize U.S. Census data to prepare their reports although the methods of analysis may differ.

In the past 30 years, the share of the U.S. population comprised of foreign-born individuals has increased from 7.9% in 1990 to 13.7% in 2019 (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021). In actual numbers, the foreign-born population in 2019 (44,932,901) is twice the size that it was in 1990 (19,767,316). The share of the foreign-born population that have become naturalized U.S. citizens has also increased over this

time period. In 1990, fewer foreign-born individuals were U.S. citizens (40.5%) than were non-citizens (59.54%), while in 2019, 51.6% of the foreign-born population were naturalized and 48.1% remained non-citizens (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021). Table 4.16 shows population change, including nativity and citizenship from 1990 to 2019.

Table 4.16

Foreign Born and U.S.-born Citizenship, Including Latino Origin 1990-2019

Year	2019	2010	2000	1990
U.S.-born	283,306,622	269,393,835	250,314,017	228,942,557
% of total population	86.31%	87.08%	88.95%	92.05%
Foreign Born	44,932,901	39,955,854	31,107,889	19,767,316
% of total population	13.69%	12.92%	11.05%	7.95%
Naturalized	23,182,917	17,476,082	12,542,626	7,996,998
% of FB population	51.59%	43.74%	40.32%	40.46%
Noncitizen	21,749,984	22,479,772	18,565,263	11,770,318
% of FB population	48.41%	56.26%	59.68%	59.54%
Total U.S. Resident Population	**328,239,523**	**309,349,689**	**281,421,906**	**248,709,873**
Latino Origin	60,481,746	50,740,089	35,305,818	22,354,059
% of total population	18.43%	16.35%	12.55%	8.99%
Latino Origin (U.S.-born)	40,639,701			
% of U.S.-born	14.34%			
Latino Origin (Foreign Born)	19,842,045			
% of Foreign Born	44.16%		45.50%	

Note. 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2019 U.S. Census statistical data were sourced from Social Explorer Tables 2021e; 2021a; 2021b; 2021d, respectively.

The number of immigrants as part of the overall U.S. resident population has gained steadily since the 1970s, an effect of federal-level immigration policy changes introduced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The share of immigrants to the total population is, for the first time since the 1924 Immigration Act was enacted, approaching 15% and continues to rise. The United States first collected data on the nativity of the population in the 1850 decennial census and, since that time, the share of

immigrants to the total population has not exceeded 15% (Gibson & Jung, 2006).

Between 1870 and 1910, the foreign-born population reached a sustained high of 14.4%

to 14.8% before decreasing substantially after the introduction of the 1924 Immigration

Act and further enforcement of other exclusionary laws like the Chinese Exclusion Act of

1882. Okrent (2019) describes an early twentieth century U.S. social context that was

riddled with anxiety about the rising number of immigrants and fearful of losing a

common social order. The author's description shares parallels with the contemporary

U.S. social context.

As the number of Irish, Italian, Jewish, and eastern European immigrants

increased, Okrent (2019) explains, the study of eugenics gained support as a method for

qualifying individuals as superior or inferior based on nativity. The practice was blatantly

racist, as white individuals from northern and western European countries were labeled

superior, and all others, including the ethnic white groups named above, were labeled

inferior. Eugenics, therefore, played a significant role in the creation and enforcement of

the 1924 Immigration Act and served as the rationale for limiting entry by individuals of

all races other than the preferred white race. Coupled with Asian exclusion laws, the 1924

Immigration Act served to decrease the share of immigrants in the United States to record

lows.

The contemporary United States has experienced similar social anxieties as the

immigrant population increases into the twenty-first century. Political deadlock in

Congress and the inability for Democrats and Republicans to balance an agreement on

immigration reform is one indicator of an electorate whose divisions on the issue of

immigration are entrenched in difference. The popularity of President Trump's derisive

comments about Latinos, Muslims, and Asians, and his executive orders excluding entry

to individuals from certain Muslim-majority countries are another indicator that national

anxiety around immigration is reaching a tipping point. What is more, Trump's

incendiary comments are directed not toward immigration as a construct but, rather,

directly toward racial and ethnic groups. Political rhetoric, specifically that from the

forty-fifth president and his supporters, has served to qualify all individuals not perceived

to be white as inferior. The history of eugenics in the United States continues to play a

role in racist immigration practices as observed in recent allegations of sterilization

forced on immigrant women in an ICE detention center (Manian, 2020). These practices

mirror the sentiment portrayed through the immigration -related policy decisions of the

Trump administration such as the executive orders and proclamations discussed in the

section of this paper reviewing executive administration.

Given the history of racialized immigration policy in the United States, and

because Latinos have accounted for more than half of U.S. population growth between

2000 and 2008 (Fry, 2008) and again between 2010 and 2019 (Krogstad, 2020a), a focus

on the Latino population is noteworthy to this discussion. Frey (2015) identifies the

Latino population as the driver of the most significant demographic changes over the

coming years, even as growth of the Latino population is slowing due to a recent decrease

in immigration from Latin America and decreases in fertility rates (Noe-Bustamante,

Lopez, & Krogstad, 2020).

The share of the total U.S. population that identifies as being of Hispanic or

Latino origin has increased from 1990 (9%) to 2019 (18.4%) (Social Explorer Tables,

2021e; 2021d). About two thirds of the Latino population was U.S.-born in 2019, while

the remaining one third was foreign-born. Foreign-born Latinos made up about 44% of the total foreign-born population in the United States in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d), a slight decrease from 2000, when foreign-born Latinos made up 45.5% of the foreign-born population (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a). Refer again to Table 4.16 for data and sources relating these demographic details.

The story of immigration in the United States is one constructed not of nativity but rather one constructed of race. While only one third of Latinos in the United States are immigrants, the impact of racist rhetoric and policies that are directed toward that population and limit access to services are also felt by Latinos who are not immigrants. This follows for other racial and ethnic groups in the United States. For example, anti-Asian (Cai, Burch, & Patel, 2021), and anti-Semitic (Graham & Stack, 2021) violence is drastically increasing in the United States at the time of this writing in response to the origins of the COVID-19 virus from China and attitudes about recent clashes in Israel and the Gaza strip, respectively. The violence observed is not directed toward individuals known to carry actual responsibility for either situation and it is not limited to individuals who are or were present in the parts of the world where each situation unfolded. Instead, violence is directed at any individual who looks to be of East Asian decent and at all Jews in the United States, reinforcing the notion that national boundaries hold far less weight than race and ethnicity in terms of who belongs in the United States.

Education attainment—Population 25 and older

In general, immigrants and people born in the United States are better educated today than in the past. Table 4.17 shows educational attainment for foreign born and U.S.-born residents over the age of 25 in 1990, 2000, and 2019. Throughout the target

timeline, an increasing percentage of the foreign-born population has attained a graduate or professional degree at a greater rate than has the U.S.-born population. It should be noted, however, that recredentialing degrees and professional licenses earned abroad can prove challenging for immigrants in the United States, so the type of employment an immigrant holds may not reflect their level of education attained (Friedman, 2018). The remaining percent of individuals not represented in Table 4.17 are those who have completed some college beyond high school but have yet to complete a bachelor's degree. The facts regarding the U.S. educational attainment of immigrants counter stereotypes of immigrants as predominantly undocumented and uneducated.

Table 4.17

Educational Attainment for Foreign-Born and U.S.-born Residents Over Age 25 by percentage of the population

Educational Attainment	2019		2010	
	Foreign-Born	U.S.-Born	Foreign-Born	U.S.-Born
Pop (age 25 and older)	**39,553,892**	**185,344,676**	**na**	**na**
Less than HS diploma	26.3%	8.2%	31.7%	11%
HS diploma or GED	22.3%	27.9%	22.5%	29.7%
Bachelor's Degree or More	32.7%	33.2%	27%	28.4%
	2000		1990	
	Foreign-Born	U.S.-Born	Foreign-Born	U.S.-Born
Pop (age 25 and older)	**24,363,109**	**157,819,105**	**15,267,154**	**143,244,094**
Less than HS diploma	38.2%	16.7%	41.2%	23%
HS diploma or GED	19.2%	30.1%	19.7%	31.1%
Bachelor's Degree or More	24%	24.4%	20.3%	20.4%

Note. 1990, 2000, 2019 data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021); 2010 data sourced from Grieco (2012)

The percentage of foreign-born individuals in the United States who have less than a high school diploma has fallen from 41.2% in 1990 to 26.3% in 2019, while the percentage of those with a bachelor's degree or more has increased from 20.3% to 32.7%

over the same time period (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021). Since 1990, the percentage of the foreign-born population that has completed a bachelor's degree has only been slightly behind the percentage of the U.S.-born population with the same degree, but a greater percent of foreign-born individuals has attained a graduate or professional degree than have U.S.-born individuals.

Median Household Income

Based on data published in the annual Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release relaying details about labor force characteristics, median weekly earnings for all workers have risen since 2005, although at different rates. For foreign-born earners, White, non-Hispanic and Asian, non-Hispanic employees have observed a faster increase in pay than Black, non-Hispanic and Hispanic employees. Foreign-born Hispanic workers earn the lowest median income. A similar trend is reflected in median weekly earnings for U.S.-born workers, although U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanics earnings outpace White non-Hispanic earnings throughout the target timeline and U.S.-born Hispanic workers earn a fraction more than U.S.-born Black non-Hispanic workers. See Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for details related to weekly wage earnings.

When foreign-born and U.S.-born median earnings are compared by race and ethnicity, distinct trends become visible. Figure 4.3 shows foreign-born and U.S.-born median earnings as compared by race and ethnicity. Foreign-born Hispanic employees yield distinctly lower median weekly earnings than all other groups, while the foreign-born Black non-Hispanic, the U.S.-born Black non-Hispanic, and the U.S.-born Hispanic worker populations earn almost $100 more per week. Foreign-born White non-Hispanic

Figure 4.1

Weekly Wage Earnings of Foreign-born Workers from 2005-2019

Note. The figure reflects weekly wage earnings of four foreign-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) in 2019 dollars from 2005 to 2019. Data sourced from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

Figure 4.2

Weekly Wage Earnings of U.S.-born Workers from 2005-2019

Note. The figure reflects weekly wage earnings of four U.S.-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) in 2019 dollars from 2005 to 2019. Data sourced from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

workers, foreign-born Asian non-Hispanic workers, and U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanic

workers are the highest median wage earners throughout the timeline. U.S.-born White

non-Hispanic workers earn increasingly less in comparison to the top three groups. In

2005, U.S.-born White non-Hispanic workers earned a median weekly wage of $720,

while the top three groups earned $740 (foreign-born White non-Hispanics), $747

(foreign-born Asian non-Hispanics), and $777 (U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanics). By

2019, the gap grew significantly. U.S.-born White non-Hispanic workers earned a median

weekly wage of $1,016, while the top three groups earned $1,141 (foreign-born White

non-Hispanics), $1,198 (foreign-born Asian non-Hispanics), and $1,168 (U.S.-born Asian

non-Hispanics).

The data visualized in Figure 4.3 help underscore several main points. First,

racial/ethnic wage disparities are based on nativity but to different degrees by racial

group. For example, foreign-born Hispanic workers earn consistently less than all other

groups, including U.S.-born Hispanic workers, while foreign-born Black non-Hispanic

workers' and Foreign-born Asian non-Hispanic workers' earnings are closer to parity

with, and often more than, their U.S.-born counterparts. Second, the data reflect the

underlying differences in the labor market of individuals by race and nativity. Foreign-

born and U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanic workers and foreign-born and U.S.-born White

non-Hispanic workers earn significantly more because they dominate employment in

high-skilled work. Employed Black non-Hispanic and Hispanic counterparts, regardless

of nativity, populate low-skilled positions and earn less. The disparities in earnings

discussed here have direct ties to current immigration policy, including the availability of

visas and perspectives about temporary workers and the undocumented population.

Figure 4.3

2005-2019 Foreign-born and U.S.-born Median Earnings Compared by Race and Ethnicity

Note. The figure reflects weekly wage earnings of four U.S. and foreign-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) in 2019 dollars from 2015 to 2019. Data sourced from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

National Industry Statistics for Immigrant Workers

Understanding the role of immigrants in the U.S. workforce is informative to the federal-level case study. Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) find that industry interest groups may have a significant impact on the immigration policy process at the state level, so including a snapshot of national industry trends for immigrant workers from 2005 through 2019 is worthwhile. Data from BLS Labor Force Characteristics news releases for the years 2005 through 2019 are used in this case study to illustrate the role of immigrants in the U.S. workforce. All BLS reports were sourced as pdf files from the

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.). Additional reports explaining immigrant workers in the United States are included where it has been deemed helpful.

The U.S. labor force is complex and the target timeline for this case study is punctuated by the Great Recession, which affected the labor force significantly in 2008 and in the following years. This case study reviews general trends in occupational roles of the foreign-born population and compares these trends to those of the native-born population. The case study also reflects on the impact the Great Recession had on the foreign-born population in comparison to the native-born population.

Since 1990, the percent of the U.S. foreign-born population in the civilian labor force has increased from 63.9% to 66.7%, while the percent of the U.S.-born population in the civilian labor force has decreased from 64.4% to 62.4% (Migration Policy Institute 2001-2021). During that time, the share of foreign-born individuals participating in the civilian workforce grew greater than the share of U.S.-born individuals participating in the civilian workforce in the United States. This shift likely reflects the fact that the foreign-born population is younger on average, while the U.S.-born population is growing older with decreasing fertility rates (Frey, 2015). It is, nevertheless, confirmation that the U.S. labor force is changing, and that immigrants and their children are expected to play a significant role in the nation's future labor force (Wilson, 2014).

A closer inspection of labor force participation rates for foreign-born and U.S.-born populations is noteworthy. The CPS includes data for Black, non-Hispanic, Asian, non-Hispanic, White, non-Hispanic, and Hispanic respondents. From 2005 through 2019, the foreign-born Black, non-Hispanic civilian workforce population had the highest participation rates of all racial and ethnic groups, ranging from 70% to 74.6%. Foreign-

born Hispanics followed with participation rates ranging from 67.9% to 71.5%. The foreign-born Asian, non-Hispanic population held the third highest participation rate throughout the target time period, ranging from 62.6% to 68.2%. The foreign-born White non-Hispanic population held the lowest participation rates, ranging from 58.7% to 61.4%. At no point during the target time period do the participation rates overlap. All groups experienced a slight downturn in participation rates during the recession, but the White, non-Hispanic population suffered the smallest decrease in labor force participation and maintains a 2019 participation rate that is almost identical to the population's 2005 participation rate. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the comparison of foreign-born and U.S.-born labor force participation rates by race and ethnicity.

Trends for U.S.-born labor force participation by race and ethnicity look quite different from their foreign-born counterparts. First, the participation rates for the four groups are more similar than they are in the foreign-born population, meaning that the rates overlap frequently. In 2005, the U.S.-born White, non-Hispanic population held the greatest rate of participation in the labor force at 66.3%. The U.S.-born Hispanic (65.6%), Black, non-Hispanic (63.1%), and Asian, non-Hispanic (61.2%) populations followed, respectively. Of the U.S.-born population, only the White non-Hispanic group held a higher participation rate in the labor force than its foreign-born counterpart in 2005.

All groups suffered a decrease in labor force participation during the recession that began in 2008, and the Asian, non-Hispanic and Hispanic groups saw a return to 2005 participation rates by 2019. By the end of the target timeline in 2019, the U.S.-born Hispanic population's labor force participation rate stands at 65.5% and the U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanic participation rate exceeds the 2005 value at 63%. The U.S.-born

Figure 4.4

2005-2019 Foreign-born Labor Force Participation Rates by Race and Ethnicity

Note. The figure reflects labor force participation rates of four foreign-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) from 2015 to 2019. Data sourced from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

Figure 4.5

2005-2019 U.S.-born Labor Force Participation Rates by Race and Ethnicity

Note. This figure reflects labor force participation rates of four U.S.-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White non-Hispanic) from 2015 to 2019. Data sourced from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

White, non-Hispanic and U.S.-born Black, non-Hispanic populations have fared less well since the recession. The U.S.-born Black, non-Hispanic participation is steadily rising but remains lower than the 2005 rate at 61.1%. The U.S.-born White, non-Hispanic may only have stabilized in 2019. The group's participation rate fell to a low of 62.2% in 2018 and rests at 62.2% in 2019, behind the U.S.-born Hispanic and U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanic populations in that year.

Foreign-born jobs gains with U.S.-born jobs losses have been observed and explored in a report published by the Pew Research Center (Kochhar, Espinoza, & Hinze-Pifer, 2010). The report suggests that foreign-born groups may fare better in economic downturns for reasons related to worker flexibility, employment volatility, or demographic changes, but notes that reasons for differences in post-recession participation rates of the foreign-born as compared to the U.S.-born are not clearly understood. The U.S.-born White non-Hispanic labor force participation rate response to the recession is striking because it is the only group to suffer a sustained decrease in participation for a decade following the start of the recession. During this period of sustained disconnect from the labor force, the United States also experienced an increase in pro-white and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Foreign-born workers made up 17% of the U.S. workforce in 2019 (American Immigration Council, 2021). The American Immigration Council (2021) reported that in 2019, immigrants made up 26% of the agriculture, fishing, and forestry industry workforce. Immigrants made up 23% of the administrative support and waste management and remediation services workforce, 22% of the construction industry workforce, 20% of the workforce in other services (not public administration), 19% of

the transportation and warehousing industry workforce, and 19% of the accommodation and food services industry. Table 4.18 shows the share of immigrant workers in each of the six top immigrant-employing industries in the United States in 2019. These statistics are significant when considering that foreign-born individuals only made up 13.7% of the U.S. population in the same year (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021).

Table 4.18

Share of Foreign-Born Workers in the Six Top Immigrant-Employing Industries in the United States in 2019

Industry	Immigrant Share (%) (of all industry workers)
Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry	26
Administrative support and Waste management and Remediation services	23
Construction	22
Other services (not public administration)	20
Transportation and Warehousing	19
Accommodation and Food services	19

Note. The six industries listed here employ greater numbers of immigrants than other industries in the United States. The share of each industry that immigrant employees make up is reflected in the 'immigrant share' column. Source: American Immigration Council, 2021

Immigrants are over represented in both high-skilled and low-skilled occupations, and their representation in the workforce is on the rise. Frey (2015) argues newcomers will not only be responsible for growth in the U.S. labor force between 2010 and 2030, their presence will actually prevent the U.S. labor force from shrinking, a challenge many advanced countries like Japan and Germany are facing due to a decrease in natural fertility rates in those countries. Immigrants in the U.S. workforce also have an increasingly significant impact on the nation's overall economic position. Immigrant

households contribute billions of dollars in taxes to the federal and to state and local governments each year, and consumer spending power of immigrant households is estimated to be over a trillion dollars and rising (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b). As the U.S. workforce evolves and immigrants and their children make up an increasing percentage of it, public attitudes and opinions about immigrants and immigration will also evolve.

National Trends in Attitudes and Opinions toward Immigration

A broad understanding of the attitudes and opinions toward immigration at the national level during the target time period is integrated into this federal-level case study through the review of a selective sample of national polling reports and non-partisan organizational reports to understand the messaging relating to immigration policy. News media coverage is also integrated where it is found to reflect a public sentiment that may not be directly linked to executive led policy changes and non-partisan organizational reports may provide depth of understanding that mainstream media might not achieve. Such details will be valuable when exploring the state and local-level contexts against the federal level baseline.

Research focusing on public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration reveal that individual attitudes toward immigration are diverse and contradictory (Reyna, Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013; Dempster, Leach, & Hargrave, 2020). On the one hand, public attitudes are found to be relatively fixed to an individual's values and worldview (Dempster, Leach, & Hargrave, 2020), making them difficult to change. On the other hand, individual attitudes are found to be complex enough that they can be altered with

adequate priming as long as priming is in line with that individual's values (Reyna,

Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013).

A number of surveys and assessment tools engage the U.S. public in an effort to

understand public opinion about immigrants and immigration over time. Dempster,

Leach, and Hargrave (2020) warn that public opinion surveys can be unreliable

depending on question wording, ordering, and changes in timing but that such data can

also be valuable for assessing general public sentiment with certain datasets. This case

study relies on data collected by the General Social Survey (GSS) (GSS Data Explorer,

2018) and reports from the American Values Atlas and the Pew Research Center to create

a snapshot of national public sentiment about immigrants and immigration from 2005 to

2019.

While this case study does not discuss the undocumented immigrant population in

detail apart from the greater immigrant population in the United States, data around

public attitudes make clear that undocumented immigrants are viewed more negatively

than immigrants overall except for the DREAMERS, individuals brought the United

States as children and raised in the country without documentation. Granting legal status

to immigrants brought to the United States without documentation as children is broadly

supported by U.S. respondents (Krogstad, 2020b). More than three quarters (77%) of

immigrants currently in the United States are documented (Budiman, 2020), yet polls

suggest that more U.S. American respondents believe that most immigrants are in the

country illegally (45%) than legally (35%) (Pew Research Center, 2018). These data

reflect a respondent population that is simply unaware of facts relating to the immigrant

population in the United States, a fact which could further influence respondent attitudes and opinions about immigration.

The GSS has monitored societal change since 1972 and provides a consistent observation of public attitudes over time (GSS Data Explorer, 2018). In 2004 and 2014, the GSS included two items related to attitudes toward immigration in the United States, each asking respondents to identify to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statements:

a) Immigrants are generally good for America's economy.

b) America should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.

Responses to these items are explored in this case study for two reasons. First, they make a comparison of attitudes toward these issues at the beginning of the case study timeline (2004) and in the middle of the case study timeline (2014) possible. And, second, the first item primes respondents to consider an aspect of immigration positively, while the second primes respondents to consider an aspect of immigration negatively. The GSS does not make immigration-related data available after 2014, so additional resources that consider attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the United States are also discussed to provide broader context for the target timeline.

The analysis of responses for the noted GSS items reveals that in 2004 and 2014 a majority of respondents agreed that immigrants are generally good for America's economy and agreed or strongly agreed that America should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants. There is no statistical difference in respondent outcomes from 2004 to 2014, which indicates public attitudes on these topics remained static throughout

the decade. These findings illustrate positive attitudes toward immigrants in the United States but also reflect values relating to the enforcement of the rule of law.

A 2019 report exploring how Americans view immigrants illustrates a public far more supportive of immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, today than in the past. The PRRI American Values Atlas has collected public opinion data about attitudes toward immigrants and immigration regularly since 2013. The breadth of data collected for the American Values Atlas makes attitudes toward immigration by age, religious group and political party affiliation observable over time (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020). Jones, Jackson, Orcés and Bola (2020) reports that attitudes toward immigrants are overall positive in the United States and consistent regardless of partisanship, ideology, religious affiliation, age, education, and race (p. 16).

On issues related to immigration reform, PRRI's American Values Atlas reports that a majority of Americans (67% in 2019) believe immigrants who currently live in the United States should have a path to citizenship, while 13% say immigrants in the United States without documentation should be allowed to become permanent legal residents but not citizens. Only 20% of respondents believe that undocumented immigrants should be identified and deported, and the remainder did not respond to the survey item (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020).

While Democrats are more likely to support a path to citizenship (with 71% in favor in 2013 and 80% in favor in 2019), Republican support has also remained steady (with 53% in favor in 2013 and 51% in favor in 2019). The response to this item has held steady since 2013 for all political party affiliations, age groups, and religious groups (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020, p. 21).

The PRRI report illustrates the complexities of public attitudes toward a policy issue like immigration, reporting that since 2010 agreement that immigrants strengthen American society has increased among Democrats from 55% to 79% but not among Republicans (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020). In 2010, 35% of Republicans agreed that immigrants strengthen American society while 31% agreed in 2019. The report also notes that white Americans were less likely than Americans of any other racial background to agree that immigrants strengthen America. In 2019, 53% of white Americans agreed that immigrants strengthen society, while 78% of Hispanic Americans, 65% of black Americans, 68% of multiracial Americans, 67% of Americans of other races agreed with the sentiment (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020). And among white Americans, those without a college degree were the least likely to agree that immigrants strengthen society at 44%, compared to 70% of white Americans with a college degree (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020).

Religious affiliation and age matters, too. According to PRRI, white evangelical Protestants are the least likely religious group to agree that immigrants strengthen America, and Americans under the age of 30 are more likely to view immigrants as strengthening America (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020). Taken together, survey sources suggest that an individual's attitude toward immigration may be impacted by age, religion, party affiliation, and other aspects of identity, although these views do not change much over time.

Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell (2013) argue that narratives about immigrant groups and immigration policy prime public opinion in particular contexts, making survey responses only one piece of understanding public opinion. Significant events and

the representation of immigrants and immigration in public spaces, through the media and administrative messaging, are reviewed here to add depth to the nature of public attitudes about immigrants and immigration in the United States.

Significant to this case study are findings from Hitlan et al. (2007) showing that since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, attitudes toward Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim immigrants have grown increasingly negative in the United States Hitlan et al.'s (2007) findings suggest that public attitudes about immigration can be influenced by shared national experiences or perceived threats. Immigration became a focal point of the Trump administration, beginning with campaign messaging in 2015 and escalating through policy changes and rhetoric through 2019. During this time period, the administration's messaging relating to immigrants and immigration increasingly framed immigration as a threat to the United States, and it appears that this shift in narrative may have shifted at least some public attitudes on immigration in the United States.

A 2019 National Immigration Forum report showed that American attitudes on immigration remained steady but that they were showing more partisan divides (National Immigration Forum, 2019). Overall, the report found, the United States public increasingly agrees that immigrants are good for the country and fewer respondents support a reduction in immigration numbers (National Immigration Forum, 2019). However, Democratic and Independent respondents are more likely to follow these trends, while Republican respondents are less likely to agree that immigrants are good for the country (National Immigration Forum, 2019), which suggests that the negative narratives pushed by the Trump administration successfully influenced a segment of the population who identifies as Republican.

Lastly, the 2019 PRRI Immigration Report also includes a finding that 56% of all Americans surveyed support restrictive immigration policies (PRRI, 2020, March). This was the first time PRRI included items asking specifically about attitudes relating to support for restrictive immigration policies. Furthermore, four survey items that PRRI indexed to create the composite score on attitudes toward restrictive immigration policies were reflective of high-profile immigration policies implemented by the Trump administration, including:

- Passing a law that places stricter limits on the number of legal immigrants coming to the United States,
- Temporarily preventing people from some majority-Muslim countries from entering the United States,
- Building a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico, and
- Passing a law to prevent refugees from entering the United States

(PRRI, 2020, p. 30)

Without a measurement of public attitudes to serve as a point of comparison, we have no tool to gauge if public response to these items would have been similar prior to the policy actions and public rhetoric of the Trump administration. However, there is good reason to infer that the actions of the Trump administration and presence of those actions within the media served as a kind of priming discussed by Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell (2013). PRRI, as a nonpartisan research and education organization, has been interested in public attitudes and opinions relating to immigration since its founding in 2009.

It can be assumed that they had not included items relating to restrictive immigration policies in earlier surveys because the topic did not appear to be salient to the public. Only after the Trump administration did they observe the issue as salient. The public response suggests that the topic is indeed salient, but it is unclear if public attitudes

are simply reflecting the sentiment of the message (in the case of the Trump administration the message was forceful and negative) against personal values. Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell (2013) may argue that contemporary attitudes toward restrictive immigration policy in the United States are more a function of respondents' response to the past several years of priming on the topic, led by executive administration and helped by the media. The PRRI finding exemplifies the complex nature of public attitudes and opinions, but it also suggests that political ideology, when communicated with the public broadly, can have lasting impacts on public opinion.

Case Study Closing Comments

A comprehensive review of factors relating to immigration at the federal level help to frame immigration policy and national sentiment toward immigrants and immigration nationally from 2005 through 2019. A historical review of immigration policy is included to serve as a backdrop to immigration federalism and the contemporary policy context.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 resulted in the reversal of decades of isolationist immigration policy in the United States and initiated an increase in the national diversity of incoming immigrant populations. International worker programs such as the Bracero Program had already laid the groundwork for chain migration from Mexico and other countries in Latin America, and the expansion of visa programs under the 1965 law created a context in which being undocumented was possible for the first time. By the 1990s, federal immigration policy was inviting states to cooperate in the enforcement of some federal immigration laws, but substantive immigration reform remains elusive at the federal level through to the present.

In lieu of comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level, presidents have

increasingly engaged in the executive administration of immigration policy. While

Presidents Bush and Obama differed in the substance of their executive administration

practices (Bush tended toward more traditional policies supporting the integration of

immigrants while Obama focused additionally on policies that would diversify the federal

government more broadly), their use of executive orders, proclamations, and other

presidential documents for immigration-related tasks was banal. President Trump

employed presidential documents far more frequently and his work was found to

coordinate more readily with rule-making documents created by agency leaders within

his administration. Immigration-related rules created via executive administration by the

Trump administration were overwhelmingly more restrictive than rules created under

Bush or Obama, and a dramatic increase in litigious action challenging new rules can be

observed as a response during the period of the target timeline that Trump was in office.

Representation of people of color and women in the House of Representatives and

the Senate is increasing, albeit slowly. The House of Representatives is diversifying more

rapidly than the Senate, and those who identify as democrat are more likely to be women

and/or people of color than are those who identify as republican. This diversification is,

however, fairly recent, and no racial group is represented at parity with that group's level

of representation within the U.S. population more broadly. Furthermore, the growth in the

rates of representation parity are divergent, since representation within the general

population is increasing more quickly than representation in Congress.

Demographic change in the United States is altering what it means to be

represented. More Americans are identifying as *more than one race*, and the nation is

expected to be majority non-white by 2050, meaning that understanding representation

may require a more nuanced approach than leading scholars have allowed for in the past.

Both foreign-born and U.S.-born individuals are better educated than in the past, and,

while wages have increased for all groups, two clear groups—high wage earners and low-

wage earners—are notable throughout the target timeline. Among high wage earners,

U.S.-born White non-Hispanics earn less than foreign-born White non-Hispanics, U.S.-

born Asian non-Hispanics, and foreign-born Asian non-Hispanics. Among the low wage

earners, foreign-born Hispanics earn less than U.S.-born Hispanics, U.S.-born Black non-

Hispanics, and foreign-born Black non-Hispanics.

As demographics are shifting, so are public attitudes toward immigrants and

immigration. Data suggest that immigration is becoming more politicized and, therefore,

a more challenging topic to discuss outside of ideological framing. Because state and

local policies are expected to work within the space constructed by federal policies, the

extent to which state and local policies align with or are in tension with federal policies

and sentiments should be contextualized within this case study.

State-Level Case Study

The state-level case study is presented in two sections. First, a comprehensive review of all 50 states frames the diverse nature of state-level policymaking and demography inherent to U.S. federalism. Next, a deep coverage review of the state of Oregon is included to provide a case for comparison against local-level cases and the federal-level case.

Comprehensive Coverage State-level Case Study

A thorough review of materials relating to the comprehensive coverage of the 50 states informed my decisions regarding case study states because the comprehensive coverage step may reveal some details important to the selection of target cases. Criteria of interest for case study selection included 1) the presence of substantial immigration legislation enactment (states with very little immigration legislative history are not expected to be revealing) and legislative sentiment, 2) statistics relating to socio-economic status of the foreign-born population in the state (population change over time, median household income, and changes in education levels of immigrants), 3) the presence of immigrant workers in the state's industries, 4) legislative control in the state over time, and 5) public opinion about immigrants and immigration across each state.

Legislative Sentiment in the States

Legislative sentiment refers to the level to which a state's immigrant-related policies enacted by the state legislature are restrictive (1) or integrative (-1). Between 2005 and 2019, the 50 U.S. states passed 2,452 bills that impacted immigrant populations in the states in some way. States varied, however, in the number and nature of bills passed. California passed the most bills (n = 300) within this time period, while Alaska

and Wisconsin each passed the least (n = 7). The average number of bills passed per state is 48.7 and the median is 34.5. At first glance, it may be logical to eliminate for case study consideration the states with the lowest number of bills passed or to focus more on the states nearest the average or median. However, creating a framework for understanding immigration federalism is not a function of averages, and outliers cannot be easily eliminated. Table 4.19 shows U.S. states according to the number of immigrant-related policies their legislatures passed between 2005 and 2009. The categories reflect each state's relationship to the median and the average (which fall roughly 14 bills apart). In Table 4.19, the states falling closest to the median and average for bills passed are presented in bold.

Table 4.19

U.S. States by Number of Immigration-Related Bills Passed from 2005 to 2019 and in Relation to the Average and the Median Number of Laws Passed

Below Median	Median +/-7	Average +/-7	Above Average
Alaska (7)	Rhode Island (27)	Nevada (42)	Missouri (60)
Wisconsin (7)	North Dakota (28)	Maine (47)	Florida (62)
Wyoming (11)	New Jersey (28)	**Minnesota (48)**	Maryland (62)
Ohio (12)	New Mexico (28)	Louisiana (51)	Texas (66)
Delaware (13)	Mississippi (29)	Tennessee (51)	Georgia (67)
Kentucky (14)	South Carolina (29)	Arkansas (52)	New York (70)
South Dakota (14)	Alabama (30)	Michigan (56)	Oregon (70)
Montana (21)	Hawaii (31)		Washington (83)
West Virginia (21)	Iowa (32)		Virginia (96)
Massachusetts (23)	Idaho (33)		Colorado (97)
New Hampshire (23)	Kansas (33)		Utah (105)
Vermont (25)	**Pennsylvania (34)**		Arizona (108)
North Carolina (26)	**Nebraska (35)**		Illinois (110)
	Connecticut (37)		California (300)
	Indiana (40)		
	Oklahoma (41)		

Note. The average number of bills passed per state = 48.7; The median number of bills passed per state = 34.5. Data sourced from NCSL (2020b).

Once all bills were coded as restrictive, integrative, or neutral, a sentiment score (Sentiment score = ($\sum$restrictive-$\sum$integrative) / $\sum$bills enacted), adapted from Marquez (2017), was calculated for each state by year. The scores presented in this document represent the culminating sentiment score for each state in 2019. Not all states pass immigrant-related legislation in every year. When a state does not pass such legislation in a year, the sentiment score remains the same as in the previous year. For the purposes of developing a state-level case study for this project, 2019 sentiment scores are analyzed since they represent the culmination of bills passed over time so far. Table 4.20 shows state sentiment scores from the most integrative to the most restrictive and includes the average and median values for reference. The 2019 U.S. sentiment score was calculated using all of the bills at once.

I also compare the extent to which a state's sentiment has change since 2005. For example, California begins with integrative legislation in 2006, earning the state a sentiment score of -1, and ends with an overall sentiment score of -.81, still very integrative, although less so. There are few peaks throughout the period to suggest segments of more restrictive sentiment in California over this time period, and a calculation of the range of sentiment from 2008 to 2019 shows that the difference between the state's highest sentiment and the state's lowest sentiment within that time period is quite low at 0.15. Missouri, on the other hand, begins with integrative legislation in 2005 (sentiment score = -1), is rather restrictive in bills passed in 2007 (sentiment score = 0.67), and ends with an overall score of -0.12. The range for Missouri sentiment scores reflects a 0.58 difference between the state's highest and lowest scores. For this reason, California is recognized in the data as having changed little over time,

while Missouri is recognized as having changed more over time. Table 4.20 depicts

changes in state sentiment scores from 2008 through 2019. The table includes the score

for the United States, which was calculated using the same equation but included all

2,452 bills.

Table 4.20

*State Sentiment Scores in 2019, Including the United States Sentiment Score for
Comparison*

Integrative		Restrictive	
Connecticut (-0.92)	Wisconsin (-0.43)	Virginia (0.01)	Oklahoma (0.24)
California (-0.81)	Delaware (-0.38)	North Dakota (0.04)	Montana (0.29)
Washington (-0.72)	Ohio (-0.33)	North Carolina (0.04)	Mississippi (0.41)
New Jersey (-0.71)	Iowa (-0.28)	New Hampshire (0.04)	West Virginia (0.52)
Illinois (-0.65)	Pennsylvania (-0.26)	Arkansas (0.06)	Tennessee (0.53)
Rhode Island (-0.63)	Louisiana (-0.22)	Kansas (0.06)	Wyoming (0.55)
Maryland (-0.63)	**United States (-0.21)**	Texas (0.06)	South Carolina (0.59)
New York (-0.61)	Florida (-0.15)	Kentucky (0.08)	Arizona (0.59)
Massachusetts (-0.61)	**Missouri (-0.12) [avg]**	Hawaii (0.1)	Alabama (0.63)
Vermont (-0.60)	Maine (-0.09)	Nebraska (0.11)	
Nevada (-0.57)	South Dakota (-0.08)	Alaska (0.14)	
Oregon (-0.56)	**Colorado (-0.07) [med]**	Indiana (0.15)	
Minnesota (-0.50)	**Utah (-0.07) [med]**	Idaho (0.18)	
New Mexico (-0.43)	Michigan (-0.04)	Georgia (0.22)	

Note. States are listed in order of sentiment scores. The closer to -1, the more integrative the state
sentiment. The closer to 1, the more restrictive the state sentiment. State sentiment data is sourced from
NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

It should be noted that the first year of sentiment is a stilted observation of state

sentiment due to lack of data. States that pass few bills in their first year on record in the

present data will appear unnaturally integrative or restrictive because the sentiment score

reflects a small number of bills passed. As time goes on, a state's sentiment score

becomes more representative of actual state sentiment since it carries along with it the

history of previous years' sentiment. To avoid misrepresenting the extent to which a state

changes sentiment over time, Table 4.21 reflects the range of sentiment by state between

2008 and 2019. This allows for state sentiment scores to normalize somewhat.

Table 4.21

Range within State Sentiment Scores from 2008-2019, Organized for Each State by Level of Restrictiveness

Consistently Integrative	Shifting less integrative	Shifting less restrictive	Consistently Restrictive
California (0.15)	South Dakota (0.25)	Virginia (0.17)	Indiana (0.09)
Connecticut (0.15)	Pennsylvania (0.32)	Maine (0.3)	Mississippi (0.14)
Illinois (0.15)	Texas (0.4)	Georgia (0.3)	South Carolina (0.16)
Washington (0.21)	Michigan (0.4)	Ohio (0.33)	West Virginia (0.17)
Minnesota (0.3)	Delaware (0.44)	Colorado (0.35)	Montana (0.21)
Maryland (0.33)	North Carolina (0.54)	Utah (0.38)	Tennessee (0.22)
New Mexico (0.35)	Alaska (0.75)	Idaho (0.39)	Wyoming (0.23)
Vermont (0.38)	North Dakota (0.72)	Nebraska (0.44)	Alabama (0.23)
New Jersey (0.38)	New Hampshire* (1.38)	Florida (0.44)	Arizona (0.23)
New York (0.41)		Kansas (0.54)	Oklahoma (0.24)
Massachusetts (0.41)		Missouri (0.58)	Hawaii (0.25)
Oregon (0.56)		Kentucky (0.61)	
Nevada (0.58)		Louisiana (0.82)	
Rhode Island (0.63)		Arkansas (0.94)	
Iowa* (0.67)			
Wisconsin (0.75)			

Note. States are grouped according to sentiment trends ("consistently integrative" states have become more integrative over time while "shifting less integrative" have become more restrictive over time) and ordered by range of sentiment. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.
* Range from 2010-2019 due to lack of earlier data.

In general, enactment of restrictive legislation was more common at the state level prior to 2012, while the frequency of integrative legislation lagged until that year (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015), and the sentiment scores calculated in this project reflect this trend. When calculated all together, the total number of bills passed at the state-level between 2005 and 2019 result in a national level sentiment of -0.21, a value slightly more integrative than both the average and median of the 2019 state sentiment values. This indicates that state sentiment is somewhat more integrative than it is restrictive when taken as a whole. At the same time, it is important to note that many

states appear to reflect consistently integrative or restrictive sentiment and other states reflect movement from integrative to restrictive and vice versa over time.

Overall state sentiment and sentiment range over time is not sufficient information for observing inferential trends or identifying deep coverage state case study states. The following analysis uses overall state sentiment to explore other factors significant to the state-level immigration policy and the state case study decision-making process. First, I explored statistics relating to change in the socio-economic status of the foreign-born population in each state. Next, I reviewed legislative control in each state over time and made note of other law-making mechanisms that may affect how the state legislature works. Third, I discuss public opinion of immigrants and immigration in each state. Finally, I examined top immigrant employing industries in each state.

Change in socio-economic status of the foreign-born population in each state

In this section I look at the percent change in the foreign-born population in each state from 2000 to 2019. Because changes in policy often have a delayed effect, I also look at the change in the foreign-born population from 1990 to 2000 to identify which states have experienced greater population change over longer durations. Change in the foreign-born population is historically presumed to drive changes in public opinion and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, presumably resulting in changes in the sentiment of state policies. Several scholars explore this notion, yet only in the past two decades have scholars begun to explore more readily the complexity of the state immigration policy process by looking beyond demographic change for influences on state immigration policy.

Population change data were collected from Migration Policy Institute's (MPI) State Immigration Data Profiles. Singer (2013) discusses geographic shifts in immigrant settlement in the United States from 1900 through 2010 and finds that those locations that were once common landing points for immigrants to the United States are less popular today, and areas of the country that historically saw very little immigrant settlement are experiencing much greater immigrant population increases today.

Table 4.22

Foreign-Born Population Increases of More Than 100% by State (1990-2019)

1990-2000: 100% or greater increase		2000-2019: 100% or greater increase
Oklahoma	Arizona	**Arkansas**
Alabama	Colorado	**North Carolina**
Delaware	Nebraska	**Delaware**
Oregon	**Tennessee**	**Kentucky**
Iowa	Utah	**Tennessee**
Kansas	**Arkansas**	**South Carolina**
Idaho	Nevada	South Dakota
Minnesota	Georgia	North Dakota
South Carolina	**North Carolina**	
Kentucky		

Note. States listed in bold appear in both groups, meaning the foreign-born population in those states more than double from 1990 to 2000 and then again from 2000 to 2019. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

I chose to focus on states in which the immigrant population increased by more than 100% within each time frame in this research study. This value is arbitrary but convenient for assessing which states experienced greater population increases than other states. Trends of population change greater than 100% are observed in 19 states between 1990 and 2000 and in eight states between 2000 and 2019. Table 4.22 lists states that experienced significant immigration population growth from 1990 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2019. Six states are represented in both time periods, which are identified in bold in Table 4.22. While the list makes it clear that the growth of immigrant populations was far

more expansive in the ten years between 1990 and 2000, it also reveals that the following

19 years, from 2000 to 2019 brought steady increases. All states experience increases in

their immigrant population in both time frames. In the United States, the overall change

in the foreign-born population from 1990-2000 was 57.4% and from 2000-2019 it was

44.4%.

Awareness of the historical immigrant population change in each state is valuable

when plotted against each state's 2019 sentiment score. Figure 4.6 plots the change in the

immigrant population by percent in each state from 1990 to 2000 against that state's 2019

sentiment score. Figure 4.7 plots the change in the immigrant population by percent in

each state from 2000 to 2019 against that state's 2019 sentiment score. The scatterplots

indicate that states that experienced greater increases in immigrant populations in both

time periods also have more restrictive 2019 sentiment scores.

Overall, more restrictive states (12) observed an immigrant population increase of

greater than 100% from 1990 to 2000 than integrative states (7), but the 1990-2000

population changes appear not to be indicative of lasting restrictive sentiment. Only four

of the restrictive states remain *consistently restrictive* today. The remaining states that

experienced significant foreign-born population change from 1990-2000 have become

less restrictive in sentiment, and most integrative states in 2019 that experienced

significant population change from 1990-2000 have remained *consistently integrative*.

Table 4.23 depicts the change in state sentiment scores like Table 4.22 does, but it also

includes immigrant population percentage change details so comparisons can be made.

Figure 4.6

Scatterplot Representation of Percent Change in Foreign-born Population by State from 1990 to 2000 by 2019 State Sentiment Score

Figure 4.7

Scatterplot Representation of Percent Change in Foreign-born Population by State from 2000 to 2019 by 2019 State Sentiment Score

Table 4.23

Range within State Sentiment Scores from 2008-2019, Organized by Level of Restrictiveness and with Added Population Change Details for 1990-2000 and 2000-2019

Consistently Integrative	Shifting less integrative	Shifting less restrictive	Consistently Restrictive
California (0.15)	***South Dakota (0.25)***	Virginia (0.17)	Indiana (0.09)
Connecticut (0.15)	Pennsylvania (0.32)	Maine (0.3)	Mississippi (0.14)
Illinois (0.15)	Texas (0.4)	Georgia (0.3)	***South Carolina (0.16)***
Washington (0.21)	Michigan (0.4)	Ohio (0.33)	West Virginia (0.17)
Minnesota (0.3)	***Delaware (0.44)***	Colorado (0.35)	Montana (0.21)
Maryland (0.33)	***North Carolina (0.54)***	Utah (0.38)	***Tennessee (0.22)***
New Mexico (0.35)	Alaska (0.75)	Idaho (0.39)	Wyoming (0.23)
Vermont (0.38)	***North Dakota (0.72)***	Nebraska (0.44)	Alabama (0.23)
New Jersey (0.38)	New Hampshire*	Florida (0.44)	Arizona (0.23)
New York (0.41)	(1.38)	Kansas (0.54)	Oklahoma (0.24)
Massachusetts (0.41)		Missouri (0.58)	Hawaii (0.25)
Oregon (0.56)		***Kentucky (0.61)***	
Nevada (0.58)		Louisiana (0.82)	
Rhode Island (0.63)		***Arkansas (0.94)***	
Iowa* (0.67)			
Wisconsin (0.75)			

Note. States that experienced >100% foreign born population change 1990-2000 are underlined; states that experienced >100% foreign born population change 2000-2019 are italicized; states that appear in both 1990-2000 and 2000-2019 population change lists are bolded. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.
*Range from 2010-2019

If changes in the immigrant population drive policy at the state-level, then we may expect to observe similar shifts in sentiment among the eight states that experienced greater than 100% immigrant population increases from 2000 to 2019. Returning to Table 4.22, which reflects the range of state sentiment scores from 2008 to 2019, the eight states do not fall into the same sentiment category and their sentiments scores have shifted at different rates. South Dakota, Delaware, North Dakota and North Carolina are shifting more restrictive, but they are doing so at different rates. Kentucky and Arkansas

192

are growing more integrative over time, and Tennessee and South Carolina are consistently restrictive.

Because demographic change is prominent in the literature as having an influence on state-level immigration policy and, more broadly, on public opinion and attitudes about immigrants and immigration, noting the states that have experienced more drastic increases in the immigrant population is meaningful to the process of identifying case study states. In addition to population change, change in foreign born education levels over time and median household income are explored in this case study decision analysis.

I was interested in trends relating to the percentage of the adult immigrant population that did not complete high school in 1990, 2000, and 2019 as well as the percentage of the adult immigrant population that completed a college degree or more in the same years. Data from MPI State Immigration Data Profiles were used for this analysis (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021). While having a 2010 data point would have been convenient for comparison, MPI does not make this statistic available in their publicly accessible data profiles.

Overall, the immigrant population in U.S. states is more educated than in the past. From 1990 to 2000, nine states recorded a decrease in the percentage of the adult immigrant population with less than a high school degree. From 2000 to 2019, 12 states saw a decrease in the percentage of adult immigrants without a completed high school education. Restrictive and integrative states observe decreases in less than high school education attainment in both time frames. Of the 12 states in which a decrease in the percent of foreign-born individuals who have not finished high school are observed from 2000 to 2019, eight have an integrative sentiment score and four are restrictive. Of those

that are integrative, six states are very integrative with sentiment scores falling over the -0.6 mark. Maine and Michigan have sentiment scores closer to neutral at -0.09 and -0.04, respectively. The restrictive states with falling "less than high school" rates by percentage of the immigrant population tend to be less restrictive with Hawaii (0.10), Alaska (0.14), Montana (0.29), and Wyoming (0.55).

In both time periods, every state observed an increase in the percentage of the immigrant population that holds a bachelor's degree or higher. The states that experienced greater increases in immigrant populations during the 1990s or from 2000 to 2019 also experienced greater increases in the percentage of immigrant adults without a high school degree or with a college degree or more in the same time period. The level of education attainment new arrivals have can indicate the nature of their work and construct a fuller narrative of what changes in the immigrant population looks like at the state-level.

Adult immigrants without a high school education are overwhelmingly low-wage workers and may be migrant workers, whereas immigrants with a college degree or more are more likely to have stable employment. A descriptive analysis of adult immigrant education attainment is valuable to understanding this dynamic in each state. Of the 19 states that experienced immigrant population changes of more than 100% from 1990 to 2000, 18 of them saw more than 100% increase in the percentage of the adult immigrant population that had not attained a high school education. In North Carolina, the percentage of adult immigrants that had not attained a high school education increased by 457%, the immigrant population increased by 274%, yet the percentage of adult

immigrants that had attained a college degree or more increased by only 153%

(Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021).

Figure 4.8

Scatterplot representation of 2019 Foreign-born Median Household Income by 2019 State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

Six of the states that experienced immigrant population changes of more than

100% from 1990 to 2000 were integrative states and the remaining majority were

restrictive. Scatterplots showing the change in educational attainment from 1990 to 2000

and from 2000 to 2019 against 2019 state sentiment scores are included in Appendix C.

The figures indicate that more restrictive states may observe greater increases in the

percentage of the adult immigrant population with less than a high school degree, but I

did not run a statistical analysis to confirm that this was the case or that the percent

change in immigrant population was not a co-occurring variable. The scatterplots for

education attainment for college or more do not indicate a relationship to the state

sentiment score.

Finally, I explored 2019 median household income for the immigrant population in my state-by-state demographics review. Publicly available MPI data only include median household income for the year 2019, so this section looks for trends in median household of the foreign-born population relative to each state's 2019 sentiment score. Figure 4.8, showing immigrant median household income against 2019 state sentiment scores, shows evidence of a trend suggesting that integrative states yield higher earning immigrant households than restrictive states.

Immigrant households in Maryland have the highest median household income at $84,256 and immigrant households in New Mexico have the lowest at $38,877. Both of these states have integrative state sentiment scores. The U.S. immigrant median household income is $63,550, and the median value of all U.S. state immigrant median household incomes is $58,006. Table 4.24 reflects the breadth of immigrant median household income values across the 50 states.

Table 4.24

2019 Foreign-Born Median Household Income

High	$84,256	Maryland
U.S. immigrant median household income	$63,550	(average)
Median	$58,006	Rhode Island
Low	$38,877	New Mexico

Note. 2019 foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

A comparison of immigrant median household income to U.S.-born citizen median household income in each state proved revealing. Table 4.25 lists the states in which median household income is higher among naturalized citizens than for U.S.-born citizens and those states in which immigrant median household income is overall higher than that for U.S.-born citizens. In 27 states the median household income of naturalized

citizens is greater than the U.S.-born median household income for that state.

Furthermore, there are seven states in which the foreign-born median household income

is higher than the U.S.-born citizen median household income.

Table 4.25

2019 Median Household Income by citizenship and birth place

Naturalized citizens median household income higher than U.S.-born		Foreign-born median income higher than U.S.-born
Alabama	New Jersey	Delaware
Arkansas	North	Georgia
Delaware	Carolina	Michigan
Georgia	Ohio	Mississippi
Illinois	Oregon	Virginia
Indiana	Pennsylvania	Washington
Kentucky	South	West Virginia
Louisiana	Carolina	
Maryland	Tennessee	
Michigan	Texas	
Mississippi	Virginia	
Missouri	Washington	
Montana	West Virginia	
New	Wisconsin	
Hampshire	Wyoming	

Note. 2019 foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

Of the seven states in which the immigrant median household income is higher

than the U.S.-born citizen median household income, Mississippi (0.41) and West

Virginia (0.52) are rather restrictive, Georgia (0.22) is moderately restrictive, and

Virginia (0.01) is almost neutral but restrictive. Michigan (-0.04), Delaware (-0.38), and

Washington (-0.7) are integrative, although Michigan is only slightly integrative.

The descriptive relationship between state sentiment and immigrant household

median income completed for this case study decision analysis does not provide an

explanation for why immigrant household median income exceeds U.S.-born household median income in seven states or why naturalized citizen median household income exceeds that of U.S.-born citizen households in 27 states. While it may be that in some states immigrant median household income is skewed higher due to multiple families living (and working) under one roof, this is less likely to be the situation for naturalized citizens than for migrant non-citizen immigrants and it is not likely to drive the observed data in so many states. The observations relating to immigrants in median household income do not follow the common narrative of immigrants as poor, and the data explored in the section of this document focusing on education do not support assumptions that most immigrants are uneducated. A close look at immigrant participation in industry by state provides an even broader context for understanding how immigrants are employed in different states.

Top immigrant employing industries in each state

Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) consider the strength of industry in influencing state-level U.S. immigration policy and finds industry interest groups may influence state-level policy outcomes more than citizen ideology and public opinion. In addition, immigrants in the United States are overrepresented in certain industries (Brookings Partnership for a New American Economy, n.d.). This section examines changes in the percent of the immigrant population in the labor force in each state and explores top immigrant employing industries. The goal in this section is to understand where immigrants impact industry most and also to identify the states in which the presence of immigrant workers may be more visible due to rapid increases or by making up significant portions of the labor force. I chose to limit this review to labor force

changes from 2000 through 2019 and the percent of immigrant workers in the 2019 work

force in order to focus attention on the target timeline of 2005 through 2019.

Figure 4.9

Percent Change in Foreign-born Workers Employed in U.S. Labor Force from 2000 to 2019 by State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

All states observed an increase in the percent of immigrant workers in the labor

force from 2000 to 2019. Illinois reflected the lowest percent change and North Dakota

observed the highest percent change. These data points correspond to a relatively low

immigrant population change in Illinois (only New York has a lower rate of change based

on that state's immigrant population) and a 157% immigrant population increase in North

Dakota, the greatest percent change of all states except South Dakota (169% change).

The United States experienced a 71.4% increase in the percentage of immigrant workers

in the labor force from 2000 to 2019. Figure 4.9 shows 2019 state sentiment and the

percent change in the immigrant labor force by state from 2000 to 2019. The figure

shows no trend in the rate of change experienced by states based on the state's sentiment.

Somewhat more interesting to the state-by-state analysis are Figures 4.10, 4.11,

and 4.12 when taken together. Figure 4.10 shows the percent of the labor force that is

made up of immigrant workers in each state in 1990 and this is plotted against the 2019

state sentiment score. Figure 4.11 shows the same data in 2000, and Figure 4.12 shows

the data in 2019.

Figure 4.10

Percent of the U.S. Labor Force that is Made Up of Immigrant Workers in Each State in 1990 by State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

Figure 4.11

Percent of the U.S. Labor Force that is Made Up of Immigrant Workers in Each State in 2000 by State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

Figure 4.12

Percent of the U.S. Labor Force that is Made Up of Immigrant Workers in Each State in 2019 by State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

In Figures 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12, the states in which immigrants make up a greater portion of the labor force tend to be more integrative than restrictive in 2019. Immigrants' share of the labor force increased somewhat from 1990 to 2000 and more so from 2000 to 2019, a length of time almost twice as long. This finding is descriptive evidence that demographics through immigrants' growing presence in the U.S. labor force could influence state-level integrative legislative sentiment because while some integrative states were integrative prior to 2019 many others states became more integrative throughout the target timeline.

Table 4.26

Sample of Top Immigrant-Employing Industries by State in 2018

National	Alabama	Arizona
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (26%) 2. Construction (23%) 3. Admin Support; Waste Mgmt.; Remediation Services (22%) 4. Other Services (21%) 5. Accommodation and Food Service (20%)	1. Construction (8%) 2. Other Services (6%) 3. Accommodation and Food Service (6%) 4. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (5%) 5. Manufacturing (5%)	1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (40%) 2. Admin and Support; Waste Mgmt.; Remediation Services (27%) 3. Construction (27%) 4. Manufacturing (21%) 5. Other Services (20%)

Note. Data for top-immigrant employing industries by state in 2018 sourced from American Immigration Council (n.d.-b).

Comparing industry data by state presents many challenges due to the diversity of geographies, populations, and resources across states. In this section, I look at which industries employ the greatest percentage of immigrant workers by state and compare those percentages to the industries in which immigrant workers populate the greatest share of the work force in the United States. Industry data for this portion of the state-by-state analysis are collected from the American Immigration Council's State by State Fact Sheets (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b, n.d.-c). At the time of initial data

collection and decision analysis, the fact sheets utilized 2018 U.S. Census data, so this discussion references that year. In this analysis, the specific industry is not what is of interest. Rather, the percentage of the work force across the top five industries in a state is important to understanding immigrants in industry by state. Table 4.26 illustrates top immigrant-employing industries at the national level as compared to the top immigrant-employing industries in U.S. states.

At the national level, immigrants make up between 20% and 26% of each of the top five industries in the nation. This means that for U.S.-born individuals working in these industries, one in five to one in four of their workmates is foreign born. I compare the top five immigrant employing industries in each state to these percentages. In Alabama, the percentage of immigrant workers employed in the top immigrant-employing industry in that state is 8%. This suggests that in the most immigrant-populated industry in the state, fewer than one in ten employees is an immigrant. Industry in the state of Arizona is more representative of the national workforce, except that 40% of that state's top immigrant employing industry is made up of immigrants. The workplace is an important point of contact for many U.S.-born citizens to engage with and become aware of immigrants in their communities, so one might expect that public opinion or sentiment in states with very low levels of immigrant workers, like Alabama, is different than in states where immigrant contact in the workplace is high, like in Arizona.

Table 4.27 shows the breakdown of states by the percentage of immigrant employees present in the state's top immigrant-employing industry in 2018. There are a couple of things we might expect given the lists presented in Table 4.27. First, we might

expect states with higher percentages of immigrant workers employed in top immigrant-employing industries to have higher foreign-born populations overall since higher populations likely yield more workers. This is indeed the case with some exclusions.

Table 4.27

States by Percentage of Foreign-born Workers Employed in Top Immigrant-Employing Industries in 2018

Up to 10%	11-20%	21-30%	31-40%	41% and over
Mississippi (7%)	West Virginia (11%)	Colorado (21%)	Connecticut (31%)	Florida (41%)
Maine (7%)	Michigan (11%)	Georgia (23%)	Montana (31%)	Washington (42%)
Wyoming (8%)	Pennsylvania (12%)	N. Carolina (23%)	Hawaii (33%)	California (63%)
Ohio (8%)	Iowa (13%)	New Hampshire (23%)	Texas (27%)	
Alabama (8%)	North Dakota (13%)	Virginia (26%)	Nevada (37%)	
Missouri (8%)	Louisiana (13%)	Illinois (26%)	Alaska (38%)	
Wisconsin (10%)	S. Carolina (14%)	**U.S. National (26%)**	New Jersey (38%)	
Vermont (10%)	Tennessee (14%)	Massachusetts (27%)	New York (39%)	
Kentucky (10%)	Arkansas (14%)	New Mexico (28%)	Arizona (40%)	
	Minnesota (16%)	Oregon (28%)		
	Oklahoma (16%)	Rhode Island (29%)		
	S. Dakota (16%)	Idaho (29%)		
	Indiana (17%)	Maryland (30%)		
	Kansas (18%)			
	Utah (19%)			
	Delaware (19%)			
	Nebraska (20%)			

Note. Data for top-immigrant employing industries by state in 2018 sourced from American Immigration Council (n.d.-b).

Pennsylvania has a relatively large immigrant population (922,585), while immigrants make up only 12% of the top immigrant-employing industry in that state. This may suggest that the state's economy is better diversified and that immigrant workers are diverse in terms of work-related skills, so immigrants are more dispersed throughout the state's workforce. Alaska, on the other hand, has an immigrant population of only 60,784, yet immigrants make up 38% of that state's top immigrant-employing

industry, indicating that the state economy is more limited for immigrant workers and that the immigrant population is more homogeneous in terms of skills.

The effect of immigrants in the workforce is nuanced and, like so many other aspects of immigration federalism, dependent on many other factors. First, with the given data, it is unknown if immigrants are employed in several industries beyond the top five listed or if the bulk of the state's immigrant population is employed in those five industries listed. Understanding more clearly a state's overall top industries and to what extent immigrant workers play a role in each of them will help to frame the context of industry and immigration in each state. The broad nature of my initial state-level data analysis limits me from assessing all 50 states against multiple factors. This is better suited for the deep coverage of case study states. For now, it is important to recognize which states have industry trends similar to the overall national trends and which states appear to function quite differently.

Legislative control in each state over time

Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) argue that political ideology drives state-level immigration change via the Polarization Change Model. The authors suggest ideological interest groups work across states to lead immigration policy change, but for such interest groups to gain traction, a state legislature sentimental to such ideologies is necessary. In this section, I review legislative control in each state focusing my review from 2005 through 2019. Because historical trends are significant to understanding a state's specific political ideological leanings, I reference legislative control reaching back to 1992. Data relating to legislative control by state was collected from Ballotpedia.org, a digital encyclopedia of American politics and elections created to provide neutral and

accurate information about politics at all levels of government since 2007 (Ballotpedia, n.d.-a).

A detailed review of dominant political parties in state senates, houses, and governorships reveals a list of states that are historically and remain Republican and others that are historically and remain Democratic. These states are likely to govern under a trifecta, or a single party government that occurs when both chamber of the legislature and the governor share a political party. All of the Republican states include at least 16 years of Republican trifecta except Florida, which includes one year of Democratic trifecta since it appears to have flipped from Democratic control in the early 1990s. States falling into the Democratic column include at least 10 years of Democratic trifecta except Illinois, which includes two years of Republican trifecta. In short, these lists illustrate the states in which partisan control can be confidently assumed from year to year. Other states fall into several categories in between these two categories. Table 4.28 shows a break-down of partisan control in the 50 state legislatures.

In Table 4.28, Republican dominant states are those states in which Democrats have not held much control, but where they have had a greater and more consistent presence than those states listed in the Republican column. Republican dominant states have at least 10 years of Republican trifecta but also include more Democrat representation in governorship and/or legislative chambers between 2005 and 2019. Democrat dominant states are similar. Maryland and Massachusetts stand out as unique in that their legislative chambers are significantly Democrat controlled while their governorships are historically Republican except for during 2007-2014.

Table 4.28

Dominant Political Control by State from 1992 to 2019

Republican	Republican Dominant	Flip D to R*	Bipartisan	Democrat Dominant	Democrat
Arizona	Indiana	Mississippi	Virginia	Maine	Oregon
Idaho	Kansas	Missouri	Iowa	Maryland[α]	Washington
North Dakota	Pennsylvania	North	Colorado	Massachusetts[α]	Rhode Island
Florida (since	Michigan	Carolina	Nevada		Connecticut
'93)	Wisconsin	Louisiana	Minnesota		Delaware
Wyoming	Montana	Arkansas	New	**Flip R to D 2002**	Illinois
Utah		Tennessee	Hampshire	New Jersey	Hawaii
South Dakota		Oklahoma	New York		California
South Carolina		Alabama			Vermont
Ohio		*Texas*			New Mexico
Alaska		*Georgia*			
Nebraska[¥]		*West Virginia*			
(since'99)		*Kentucky*			

Note. Data relating to political control by state sourced from https://ballotpedia.org/States
*These states shifted from D to R in 2012 under the Obama administration except: Texas, which made the shift in the late 1990s, Georgia flipped in 2002, West Virginia flipped in 2015, and Kentucky appears to be in the process of making this shift since 2017.
[¥]Nebraska's legislature is nonpartisan so only the governor's political party is represented here.
[α]Maryland and Massachusetts are both states dominated by Republican governors while legislative chambers remain under Democratic control.

The column labeled Flip D to R represents states that follow a trend of shifting from partisan Democrat to partisan Republican during the Obama administration. Most of this shift occurred in 2012 but four of the states included in this column shifted at other times. Table 4.28 describes the various shifts within the group. Only one state, New Jersey, shifted from predominantly Republican to predominantly Democrat, and this state did so before the target timeline for this study in 2002. The final column lists states that appear to be more or less bipartisan because they have fewer trifecta years or a balance of Republican and Democrat trifecta when they are present. Minnesota appears the most bipartisan because only two of the last 29 years were dominated by Democrats and there were no Republican trifectas in Minnesota. Colorado, on the other hand, experienced 8 Democrat trifectas and 4 Republican trifectas in the last 29 years. While this reflects 12

years of partisanship within the state, the nature of partisanship continues to remain in flux. Therefore, Colorado and the other states in the Bipartisan column of Table 4.28 are the most likely of the states to experience shifts in partisan control of their state legislature and governorship.

Of the 13 Democrat or Democrat dominant states, only Hawaii has a restrictive sentiment score. All other states in Democrat or Democrat-dominant groups have integrative scores. Delaware is the only state in this group to experience demographic change of the foreign-born population in that state of more than 100% from 2000 to 2019. Of the 17 Republican or Republican dominant states, 10 have restrictive sentiment scores and seven have integrative sentiment scores. Three of these states have experienced a foreign-born population change of more than 100% from 2000 to 2019. Five of the seven bipartisan states are integrative, while the remaining two are slightly restrictive. None of the bipartisan states have experienced drastic changes in their foreign-born populations.

New Jersey is the only state to have flipped from Republican controlled to Democrat controlled, and the state has an integrative sentiment score (-0.71) with a 40.5% increase in the foreign-born population from 2000 to 2019. The twelve states that flipped from Democrat to Republican are predominantly southern states and have predominantly restrictive sentiment scores. Only Louisiana and Missouri have integrative scores in the group that flipped from Democrat to Republican, yet the restrictive sentiment scores of other states in the group reach from slightly restrictive to very restrictive. All states in this group experienced increases in the immigrant population of greater than 40% and Kentucky and Tennessee have each seen an increase of greater than 100% from 2000-2019.

The trends noted here suggest that Republican-controlled states tend to be more restrictive than Democrat-controlled states. Given the many states that shifted from Democrat control to Republican control in the past decade, it may also be that restrictive states are better drawn to Republican control than to Democrat control. For the purpose of this study and, more specifically, for the selection of case study states, considering states with historically stable partisanship separately from those with more recent shifts or unsettled partisanship could prove beneficial for comparative purposes.

Table 4.29

States with Direct Democracy Mechanisms (Citizen-Initiated Statute)

YES: citizen-initiated statute		NO: citizen-initiated statute	
Alaska	Nebraska	Alabama	New Hampshire
Arizona	Nevada	Connecticut	New Jersey
Arkansas	North Dakota	Delaware	New Mexico
California	Ohio	Florida	New York
Colorado	Oklahoma	Georgia	North Carolina
Idaho	Oregon	Hawaii	Pennsylvania
Maine	South Dakota	Illinois	Rhode Island
Massachusetts	Utah	Indiana	South Carolina
Michigan	Washington	Iowa	Tennessee
Missouri	Wyoming	Kansas	Texas
Montana		Kentucky	Vermont
		Louisiana	Virginia
		Maryland	West Virginia
		Minnesota	Wisconsin
		Mississippi	

Note. Data relating to direct democracy (citizen-initiated statute) by state sourced from
https://ballotpedia.org/Forms_of_direct_democracy_in_the_American_states

Related to legislative control is direct democracy. Silva (2018) argues that those states with direct democracy mechanisms in place may observe greater action on the part of the state legislature because lawmakers are more motivated to prevent citizens from acting on their own through ballot initiatives. Table 4.29 lists 21 states in which direct

democracy mechanisms allow citizens to initiate statutes and 29 states in which citizens are not permitted to do so.

Silva (2018) would expect the states without direct democracy mechanisms to have passed fewer statutes than those with direct democracy mechanisms, and this is the case when average and median numbers of laws passed per state are compared. On average, direct democracy states passed 59 laws (median = 42) while no direct democracy states passed only 41 laws (median = 32). My analysis is not sufficient to confirm statistical significance but it suffices to suggest that expected trends are present and that direct democracy mechanisms will be worth exploring once case study states are decided upon.

Public opinion of immigrants and immigration in each state

Public opinion is significant to the understanding of immigration federalism in the United States because it links the policy domain to society, and it also helps to contextualize intergovernmental relationships. In this section of the document, I review public opinion of immigrants by state in two areas highlighted in the 2015 Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) American Values Atlas survey (Jones, Cox, Cooper, & Lienesch, 2016).

PRRI publishes findings relating to attitudes toward immigration with some frequency, but the 2016 report is the most recent report to include state-level findings. The first area examined is support of a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants and the second is whether one thinks that immigrants strengthen America. In all states except for South Dakota, more than 50% of respondents support a path to citizenship. Figure 4.13, depicting the relationship between *support for a path to citizenship* and *2019*

state sentiment, shows a slight trend of increasing support for a path to citizenship with increased integrative sentiment. The most restrictive states are the least supportive, excluding South Dakota.

Figure 4.13

Percent of Respondents Who Support a Path to Citizenship for Unauthorized Immigrants in 2015 by 2019 State Sentiment

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Public opinion data sourced from Public Religion Research Institute (Jones, Cox, Cooper, & Lienesch, 2016).

A similar trend is observed in response to the question "Do immigrants strengthen America?" Figure 4.14 shows that the most restrictive states are the least likely to believe immigrants strengthen America. Hawaii and Arizona stand out as restrictive states in which an unusually high number of respondents see immigrants as strengthening the country. More than 50% of respondents in Arizona, a very restrictive state, see immigrants as strengthening the country. And Hawaii, also restrictive although not as restrictive as Arizona, has the highest percentage of respondents who support the idea

that immigrants strengthen the country. Massachusetts, an integrative state, ties with

Hawaii for the highest percentage of respondents (60%) who support of the idea that

immigrants strengthen the country. Otherwise, the most integrative states are the most

likely to feel immigrants strengthen America. Hawaii and Arizona have particularly

unique immigrant histories in the United States, which may affect how residents in those

states engage with ideas and narratives about immigrants and immigration.

Figure 4.14

Percent of Respondents Who Agree That Immigrants Strengthen Society in 2015 by 2019 State Sentiment

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Public opinion data sourced from Public Religion Research Institute (Jones, Cox, Cooper, & Lienesch, 2016).

The 2019 PRRI Immigration Report does not show state-level attitudes relating to

immigrants, but the national-level findings show that 67% of Americans surveyed

support the creation of a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants in the United

States and 60% of Americans surveyed agreed that immigrants strengthen America

(PRRI, 2020, March). There is a growing difference in the level of support among Republicans and Democrats which indicates that immigration is becoming a more partisan issue across the United States.

Discussion and Case Study Selection

The state-by-state data collection process was broad reaching and only touched the surface of each area of interest impacting the domain of immigration in the United States. This section describes my process for case selection and two points are worth noting. One, I completed the initial case study decision and analysis a year prior to the completion of this project, so the demographics data used for the analysis and discussion reflects 2018 U.S. Census outcomes. This is due to the fact that the Migration Policy Institute released their State Immigration Profiles updated with 2019 data after I completed the decision-making analysis. I have since returned to the source and updated my data analysis and charts with 2019 data. This is why the prose in previous sections references 2019 U.S. Census data from MPI but the analysis that follows does not. Two, the decision-making process is designed to cull states from the list that are "not so interesting" for the purposes of examining their relationship to immigrants and immigration more closely. In truth, every state is a point of fascination for this project, yet, alas, decisions must be made to eliminate most states, and so I explain my process for doing so in this section.

I constructed a point system to analyze which states stand out as most interesting in the context of this study, keeping in mind that the final selection of case study states should reflect regional and/or socio-economic diversity in comparison to other selected states. In this analysis, I took into account the number of laws passed and the nature of

the 2019 state sentiment score. States were highlighted for having consistently integrative or restrictive sentiments and also for having a sentiment near the average U.S. sentiment score. For each category a state fell into, the state was assigned a value of '1'. My analysis document consisted of one spreadsheet with all states listed in rows. Points of interest for analysis were identified as column headers.

Other areas incorporated into the point system include those states that experienced either a decrease or the greatest increase in the percent of the immigrant population that has less than a high school education or a college degree or more, those states with the highest immigrant median household income, and states in which naturalized citizens or the immigrant population had a median household income higher than that of the U.S.-born population in that state. States that had very high, very low, or close to national average rates of immigrant presence in top immigrant-employing industries got a point. States that flipped legislative control under the Obama administration or states that continue to be bipartisan were granted a point as were states whose political leanings were overarchingly Republican or Democrat. Direct democracy states also received a point. In total, 20 categories were included in the count analysis, and points were tallied for each state.

Tennessee and South Carolina each topped the list with seven points. Nine states had six points and seven states had five points. The remaining 32 states had four (20 states), three (five states), two (six states), or one (one state) point. Table 4.30 lists the top 18 point-earning states after the initial decision analysis process. The purpose of the point analysis was to sort out states that were poorly representative of the topics that are

presented as significant to state-level immigration policy in the literature. The second
step of the analysis involves only the top 18 point-earning states presented in Table 4.30.

Table 4.30

Top 18 States after Initial Point Analysis for Case Study Decision Making

State	TOTALS	State	TOTALS
South Carolina	7	Washington	6
Tennessee	7	Wyoming	6
Arkansas	6	Alabama	5
Delaware	6	California	5
Idaho	6	Colorado	5
Illinois	6	Connecticut	5
Kentucky	6	Missouri	5
Mississippi	6	Oklahoma	5
North Dakota	6	Oregon	5

Note. This is the list of states remaining after count analysis one. The purpose of the point analysis was to
sort out states that were poorly representative of the topics that are presented as significant to state-level
immigration policy in the literature.

Regional diversity is an important aspect of this project. I am interested in case
study states that represent different geographies of the United States in order to explore
the impact of regional culture, history, and governance practices. For this reason, I
organized the top 18 point-earning states into seven common U.S. geographic regions:
Southeast, Pacific, New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Southwest, and Rocky
Mountains. Each region is represented by at least one state in the list. Table 4.30 shows
the top 18 states divided into U.S. geographic regions.

My next step was to eliminate those states that have not passed a sufficient
number of immigration-related laws for an in-depth case study within the target timeline.
Three states, Kentucky (14 laws), Delaware (13 laws), and Wyoming (11 laws) were
eliminated in this fashion and Table 4.31 notes this with strikeouts through those states.
Waiting until this stage of analysis to eliminate these states allowed me to observe them

for the presence of properties more closely related to immigration policy, and their

presence in the initial count analysis list suggests they may be states to observe going

forward as immigration case study states in development.

Table 4.31

Top 18 States by Region after Count Analysis One

Southeast	Pacific	New England	Mid-Atlantic	Midwest	Southwest	Rocky Mountains
South Carolina Tennessee Arkansas Mississippi Alabama ~~Kentucky~~	Washington Oregon California	Connecticut	~~Delaware~~	Illinois Missouri North Dakota	Oklahoma	Idaho Colorado ~~Wyoming~~

Note. Regional diversity is an important aspect of this project, so the top 18 point-earning states are organized here into seven common U.S. geographic regions: Southeast, Pacific, New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Southwest, and Rocky Mountains.

Finally, I repeat the point system analysis, limiting this round to seven categories,

including the most and least integrative or restrictive, those shifting sentiment the most,

those reflecting stark relationships between sentiment and population change, changes in

education levels, immigrant employment trends, political ideology, and direct democracy.

Once points were allocated, I selected the top point-earners from each region. Table 4.31

shows the top point-earners by region from the second round of decision analysis.

Tennessee and Arkansas in the Southeast, Washington and Oregon in the Pacific, North

Dakota in the Midwest, and Colorado in the Rocky Mountain region stand out as states of

greatest interest. Connecticut and Oklahoma are represented in Table 4.31 as top states in

their regions, but they were eliminated from the analysis for having the fewest points. In

the Pacific region, Washington and California exhibited the same outcome for the second

analysis, but Washington was selected over California because it carried a 6-point score

from the first count analysis and California carried a 5-point score.

The six remaining states listed in Table 4.32 are initial case study states, and a

definitive decision will be made only after initial inquiry into each of these states is made.

It is expected that I will select one state from the Southeast and Pacific regions and select

either North Dakota or Colorado. This section closes with a discussion about the data

collected in the state-by-state analysis as it relates to these six states in particular. A

closer look at demographic change at the county level within each state and a search for

the presence of public opinion and attitudes relating to immigrants or immigration in

local news outlets and by local interest groups also helps to direct my final case study

selection.

Table 4.32

Top Eight States by Region after Count Analysis Two

Southeast	Pacific	New England	Midwest	Southwest	Rocky Mountains
Tennessee	Washington	~~Connecticut~~	North Dakota	~~Oklahoma~~	Colorado
Arkansas	Oregon				

Note. This table depicts the outcome of count analysis two which assessed states against seven categories: the most and least integrative or restrictive, those shifting sentiment the most, those reflecting stark relationships between sentiment and population change, changes in education levels, immigrant employment trends, political ideology, and direct democracy. Connecticut and Oklahoma are top states in their regions, but they were eliminated from the analysis for having the fewest points of all eight states.

Pew Charitable Trusts (2014), in an analysis of foreign-born population changes

across U.S. counties since 1990, designates Washington and Colorado as new immigrant

destination states, while overall population decreases occurred in several counties in

North Dakota. North Dakota sees overall population loss in most counties and heavy

increases due to the immigrant population only in Dunn County, an area heavily involved

in oil processing and agriculture. Colorado sees substantial growth in population due to

immigrants in most counties. Initial searches for immigrant-related news in each state reveal that immigrants and refugee settlement have only become hot topics for discussion in North Dakota since the Trump administration has taken office. Prior to the Trump administration, there was little conflict relating to attitudes about immigrants expressed in local news. Colorado has a broader representation of perspectives on immigrants and immigration throughout the target timeline. Where industry is concerned, Colorado has a stronger representation of immigrant workers in the state workforce than North Dakota has. Finally, Colorado is the only state listed in Table 4.32 with a state legislature that is more or less bipartisan. North Dakota is historically a Republican state.

Washington sees heavier gains due to immigrant population growth than Oregon, and these gains are not limited to the metro area, as they are more readily in Oregon (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). The presence of immigrants in top immigrant-employing industries in Washington is higher than the national average, while Oregon observes average levels of immigrant employment in top immigrant-employing industries. Both states are integrative, although Washington state ranks as one of the most integrative of all states. Oregon's immigrant population increased by more than 100% from 1990-2000, although Washington has long had an overall larger immigrant population than Oregon. Washington's top immigrant-employing industry is 42% immigrant workers, which is far above the national average. However, the next top immigrant-employing industry in the state falls back to 23%, which is in line with the national average. Oregon's representation of immigrant employees in top immigrant-employing industries is in line with national averages.

Arkansas and Tennessee are restrictive states that both see immigrant driven population increases, but Arkansas has several more counties that suffer overall population decreases. Arkansas' population loss was slowed by immigrant population gain in those counties. Representation of immigrants in top immigrant-employing industries is lower than average with immigrants making up 14% of the top industry in each state. This is in line with most other southern states. Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia have immigrant representation in top immigrant-employing industries that is closer to national averages, while Alabama and Mississippi have much less representation in top immigrant-employing industries. Both Tennessee and Arkansas experienced a flip in their state legislatures from Democrat to Republican during the Obama administration, but Tennessee is the only state of the six listed in Table 4.32 to not have a direct democracy mechanism in play. Finally, Tennessee stands out in the analysis as one of only four states to experience 100% foreign-born population growth from 1990-2000 and 2000-2018.

Conclusion to Comprehensive Coverage

Initial analysis suggests that Tennessee, Colorado, and Oregon or Washington are best suited as case study states for this study. Out of convenience, I chose to begin with data collection in Oregon. As my home state and as a state in which my professional network includes many connections at the local level, Oregon is a logical starting point. Two significant factors limited me from exploring the list further for this research study. The first is the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented my ability to travel and collect data in person for this project. The second is scope. The richness of data

collected at the state and local levels in Oregon proved extensive and sufficient enough

for structuring the immigration federalism framework and for subsequent theory building.

Deep Coverage Case Study: Oregon State

This Oregon state case study includes detailed coverage of demographic data and

a collection of grey material resulting in an historic case of immigrants and immigration

for the state. An assessment of demographic change over the target timeline employs U.S.

Census data from 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019 at the county level. I report the change in

total population by race and ethnicity, total population education attainment, employment

status and industry for employed civilians, median household income, and nativity and

the year of entry for the foreign-born population. Statistical data for the foreign-born

population is available at the county level, but population data cannot be cross-tabbed by

other statistical factors.

I chose to focus first on the state of Oregon because it was one of the six top states

of interest after the comprehensive state-level case analysis was completed and because

Oregon is currently my home state. An in-depth review of a familiar state allowed me

greater perspective and resources for making connections and drawing conclusions. I

reviewed to the point of saturation major state news outlets, reports from influential

interest groups and foundations at the state-level, and other grey material for messaging

relating to immigration policy and attitudes or opinions toward immigration at the state-

level during the target time period. When sourcing news media at the state and local

levels, I remained cognizant of the fact that many smaller news outlets are now owned by

national conglomerates and likely carry the sentiments espoused by those larger

corporations. Efforts were made during data collection to identify media outlet ownership and record known ideological perspectives wherever possible.

As with other case studies in this project, I begin with an historical review of Oregon in order to frame the context of immigration policy in the present day. Next, I discuss demographic change, including population changes from 2000 through 2019 by county. I also review the NCSL State Legislation data specific to Oregon in detail this case study.

Oregon State Historical Review

The history of people in what is today the U.S. state of Oregon begins thousands of years ago and was maintained by the oral traditions of the more than 60 indigenous tribes whose territory spanned the diverse environmental regions that make up today's Oregon state in the Pacific Northwest (Cain & Rosman, 2017; Robbins, 2002). The implementation of the "Doctrine of Discovery", initiated when Christopher Columbus happened upon the Americas in 1492, also framed the future for indigenous populations across the United States (Cain & Rosman, 2017). The region was explored by European traders approaching from the coast since the early 1500s, including by the Spanish beginning in the mid-1500s (Reinhardt, 2020). The explorers Lewis and Clark reached the Pacific Coast from inland in 1805, opening the west to pioneer settlement from the eastern United States. The decades following Lewis and Clark's exploration saw travelers to Oregon territory first by foot and then, when the Oregon Trail had been developed sufficiently, by wagon.

Oregon joined the Union as a state in 1859, a time during which the federal government prioritized the freeing of lands in the west for the purpose of white settlement

(Robbins, 2002). Congress passed the Oregon Donation Land Law of 1850 to serve as a mechanism for the dispossession of indigenous people from their land and for white settlement (Robbins, 2002). And a number of treaties were negotiated with Oregon Tribes in 1855, resulting in the creation of reservations and the forced removal of indigenous populations from their ancestral lands (Robbins, 2002). These actions reflect the notion provided by the authority of the Doctrine of Discovery that "the newly arrived United States has an overriding sovereignty over the sovereignty of the indigenous groups, tribes, nations" (Miller quoted in Cain & Rosman, 2017).

Oregon's geography is diverse and consists of several distinct regions. The state's geographical diversity plays a significant role in the lifestyles and experiences in each region. The Oregon coast experiences drastically different weather than the Willamette Valley in northern central Oregon or the High Desert in the Eastern half of the state, and mountains have prevented easy travel among regions for much of history. The evolution of agricultural industries in the state can be attributed to its diverse geographies, which, in turn, has influenced migration and immigration throughout the history of the state. The fertile lands of the Willamette Valley and Hood River required additional workers to sustain production especially at harvesting times early in the settlement of the state (Sifuentez, 2016; Ng, 1989). And the development of dams in the early twentieth century along the Columbia, Snake, and Willamette River valleys increased agricultural production in eastern Oregon, which resulted in a need of farm hands in the east (Garcia & Garcia, 2005).

Oregon is a state of demographic contradictions. It is viewed as one of the most racially homogenous states in the United States, and much of this homogeneity, scholars

222

argue, is owed to the exclusionary design of its institutions and the continuous reification thereof (Bussel and Tichenor, 2017). Recent demographic assessments put the foreign-born population in Oregon at 9.7% of the total population in 2019 (MPI, 2001-2021). This is almost twice the percentage of the population that was foreign-born (4.9%) in 1990 (MPI, 2001-2021). While it is correct to say the state's immigrant population has increased significantly since the late twentieth century, a more comprehensive view of the state's demographic history reveals substantial racial and ethnic diversity throughout Oregon's statehood.

The land we now know as Oregon, along with the rest of the U.S. west coast, was populated by Anglo settlers throughout the nineteenth century, primarily via teams of wagon trains crossing the Oregon Trail. With newcomers came new diseases. The devastating effects of diseases such as small pox, measles, diphtheria, and typhus had, by the early twentieth century, already ravaged indigenous populations as far west as the Pacific Ocean in a series of what is estimated to be 90 separate epidemics of European diseases that crossed what is the United States today (Wilkinson, 2005). The region's indigenous populations had already been decimated by disease and violence over the course of two centuries when wagon trains began to arrive en masse (Barber, 2019; Wilkinson, 2006). Therefore, indigenous populations had a considerably less imposing presence upon the arrival of pioneer settlers to Oregon, giving greater strength to myths of European superiority for those new arrivals.

Bussel and Tichenor (2017) review 150 years of Oregon history and outline a lasting debate regarding immigration in Oregon. On one side are those espousing a Euro-American settler-colonialist traditional sentiment. Over time, these individuals have

preferred immigration to be limited to "the best" immigrants, defined as those who could

integrate successfully and often limited to Germans, Scandinavians, and other Northern

European immigrants (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017, p. 464). The founding of the state as a

non-slave state, while also constitutionally excluding Black people, served to support the

Euro-American settler-colonialist traditions throughout history. Thee institutional

boundaries supporting the supremacy of Anglo Oregonians set the stage for how the state

would evaluate internal and external migrants from the outset (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017).

Ramsey (2003) points out that Oregon has no major city bearing an indigenous name

(*Klamath* Falls or *Coos* Bay are the state's best examples). In comparison, Washington

accepted native names for major cities such as Seattle, Tacoma, Spokane, and Yakima (p.

xxi).

On the other side of the immigration debate in Oregon are those espousing more

tolerant attitudes, celebrating diversity, and valuing the progress immigrants have

achieved in their communities and for the state's economies and societies. The voices for

these more supportive attitudes were often led by immigrants themselves through groups

such as Siempre Adelante and Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN), but

Oregon state senators in the 1950s and 1960s and more recently have also been vocal in

their support for robust immigration and immigrants' access to services (Bussel &

Tichenor, 2017, p. 473).

Bussel and Tichenor (2017) describe the friction between these two sentiments

into the modern day. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent shift toward

national security concerns at the federal level have left this tension palpable in Oregon.

Organizations seeking limits to legal immigration and harsher action against unauthorized

immigrants have gained support, while pro-immigrant rallies have grown in number and in impact, and industry support for immigrants participating in such rallies has blossomed (Bussel and Tichenor, 2017, p. 478). In 2017, Bussel and Tichenor reported that Oregon has taken the middle ground in terms of state-level immigration policy (2017, p. 480), yet very recent legislation at the state-level indicates that the state is growing more accessible for immigrants. At the local level, Oregon immigrants continue to arrive, work, and organize. How immigrants reach Oregon has been impacted by point of departure, point of arrival, workforce needs, and, in some ways, by federal-level policy.

Migrant farmers and loggers were sought out by early Oregonian leaders to help settle the state and strengthen industries (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Trice, Martinez & Ho, 2017). As one example, in Maxville Oregon, a logging town in northeast Oregon, migrants from Arkansas were invited to migrate to harvest big timber in the 1920s. Gwen Trice tells the story of how her African American family came to be in Oregon, logging in the state with Japanese, Greek, Hawaiian, Latino, Guamanian, Native, and Chinese loggers (Trice, Martinez & Ho, 2017, p. 599). Oregon's lumber industry is owed to the work of migrants, immigrants, and native people of color, yet all were excluded by state law from the right to own land (Barber, 2019).

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 placed restrictions on importing Chinese labor, resulting in an increase in Japanese labor in Oregon in the late 1800s for the purpose of building railroad infrastructure throughout the state (Ng, 1989). Ng (1989) reports the Japanese immigrants also found work in agricultural, fishing, and lumber industries. Many first-generation Japanese immigrants settled in the Hood River area where they labored removing stumps from previously felled trees in exchange for the

privilege to become tenant farmers. Some Japanese immigrants afforded to buy their own land, while others continued to labor for local land owners (Ng, 1989). Ng (1989) suggests that the Hood River orchard industry familiar to us today is a result of the Japanese farm land owners' decision to plant fruit trees there in the early twentieth century.

As is the case with many immigrant populations, men arrived first in the Hood River valley. Japanese women immigrated primarily after 1910 and prior to the Immigration Act of 1924, bringing with them the opportunity for the development of community among the Japanese in the Hood River valley (Ng, 1989). The presence of several Japanese halls and churches as well as Japanese community groups by 1925 is evidence of strong and growing immigrant communities. Ng (1989) describes initial acceptance of Japanese immigrants in industry groups such as the Hood River Fruit Grower's Association, which resulted in important economic integration for the population. This security was later eroded with the establishment of exclusionary organizations and laws that limited the advancement of Japanese farmers at the federal level and at the local level. In 1923 Oregon passed the Alien Land Law, designed to restrict the ability of Japanese immigrants to own or lease land in the state (Nishihara, 2007).

In 1942, following the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Executive Order No. 9066 called for the internment of all Japanese Americans, including American citizens (National Archives, 2020). Many Japanese in Oregon at this time were U.S.-born children of Japanese immigrants (Ng, 1989). The state of Oregon was active in its interest to incarcerate Japanese residents. At the Salt Lake City Governor's meeting on April 7,

1942, the executive secretary to the governor of Oregon presented the state's plan "for the forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II" (Densho Encyclopedia Contributors, 2020). Known as the Oregon Plan, it was responsible for the establishment of the first Japanese labor camp in Nyssa, Oregon.

The internment order was kept in place until 1945 and forced Japanese and Japanese American Hood River residents to leave their land and their lives for internment camps throughout the Pacific Northwest. The War Relocation Authority, influenced by the aforementioned Oregon Plan, provided for at least one alternative to internment in the sugar beet fields of eastern Oregon (Sifuentez, 2016). Instead of internment, Japanese were permitted to assist in the harvesting of beets and onions on farms near Ontario and Nyssa, Oregon and across the border in Idaho (Sifuentez, 2016). Many moved their families to camps in the region and many, eventually finding a niche in onion farming after the internment order was lifted, never left (Sifuentez, 2016).

The same year Exec. Order No. 9066 ordered the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans, the Mexican Farm Labor Program, colloquially known as the Bracero Program, was signed, initiating the importation of Mexican laborers for agricultural work in the United States (Bracero History Archive, n.d.). Sifuentez (2017) presents the impact of the Bracero Program in the Pacific Northwest, illustrating the ways in which early Mexican migrant workers challenged unfair systems while taking pride in their work. The Bracero Program was a guestworker program initiated as an agreement by the governments of the United States and Mexico during World War II, when many able-bodied American men left the fields and rural areas of the United States to participate in wartime production.

Sifuentez (2017) explains how the Bracero Program, lacking proper resources for ensuring that growers paid agreed upon wages and provided reasonable housing, pushed many Mexican workers into undocumented status when they broke contracts deemed unfair. While this occurred nationwide, it led to unique outcomes in the Pacific Northwest. In Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, migrant workers were far from the Mexican border and, therefore, far from replacement workers. This meant that their value and their ability to organize for higher wages was far greater than migrant workers' elsewhere in the country who were more easily replaced.

The distance also served to keep workers in the area longer, leading to the development of strong migration networks. In the Pacific Northwest, Sifuentez (2017) found, the Bracero Program led to an increase in the number of undocumented workers as well as in increase in the number of rooted Mexican-American communities in Oregon. Most notable in Sifuentez's (2017) article is the fact that, while Mexican migrant workers found the Bracero Program to be unfair and, in many ways, inhumane, they also used the program to connect to alternative opportunities, develop skills, and put down roots. And in eastern Oregon, Mexican farmworkers found support from Japanese American residents who arrived while the internment order was in place and who chose not to leave once the order was lifted. Where Mexican workers experienced obstinance and mistrust from many Anglo growers, second generation Japanese growers were often willing to rent housing and loan money to Mexican workers (Sifuentez, 2016), providing Mexican workers with a foothold toward economic security in the United States.

Nagae (2012) reminds us that Portland, Oregon had the second largest Chinese community in the United States after San Francisco in 1890. Nagae's (2012) work

focuses on the trials of immigration and citizenship in Oregon for Asian women, and her article provides ample context for understanding the restrictions faced by Asians overall in Oregon. Oregon's constitution excluded Chinese from the right to vote in 1857, and in 1866 "marriage between white persons and persons with a quarter or more of 'negro blood,' including Chinese and 'Kanaka,' or native Hawaiian" was prohibited by the Oregon legislature (Nagae, 2012, p. 348). Nagae (2012) illustrates several cases in which legal recourse won some Asians their right to citizenship in Oregon, but "the twin evils of racism and sexism" were experienced from one generation to the next (p. 350).

Another immigrant population whose economic and cultural contributions in Oregon often go unrecognized are the Roma. Roma were first mentioned in an Oregon newspaper in 1893 and most every mention of Roma since that time racializes the group, blatantly othering them as dangerous and untrustworthy (Silverman, 2017). Initially living nomadically in family groups, the Roma were observed to rent storefront space in downtown Portland in which they would live and work, often selling wares and services. Over time, the Roma population settled, buying homes in southeast Portland and continuing to offer services from their homes. Silverman (2017) reviews a complex Romani history which centers on Roma in Oregon and links the racist underpinnings of Oregon Romani history directly to the state's negative sentiments toward Asian American and African American populations (p. 525). In an anthology centered on the racialization of indigenous populations and other ethnic minorities in Oregon, Xing et al. (2007) find that immigrant groups face challenges that parallel those faced by non-immigrant people of color in the state.

American Indians, who had been forcefully removed from their ancestral lands in Oregon for the purpose of releasing land for Anglo settlement in the nineteenth century (Robbins, 2002), were continuously dispossessed of their land and of their culture throughout Oregon history until the restoration of sovereignty in the 1970s (Fixico, D. n.d.). When the termination of tribes was initiated in 1953 by House Concurrent Resolution 108, calling for a legal end to reservations, an end to tribal sovereignty, and for the final integration of American Indians into mainstream American society, Oregon lawmakers were on the front end of submitting bills of withdrawal of trust to Congress (Fixico, D. n.d.). The Klamath Tribe was among the first in the nation to succumb to termination and the Siletz, Grand Ronde, Coquille, Coos, Lower Umpqua, Siuslaw, and others followed in 1954 (Fixico, D. n.d.).

Termination was initiated under the guise of freedom, "mak[ing] the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, and to end their status as wards of the United States" (Fixico, D. n.d., p. 1), but it led to the loss of tribal land rights and health and education services, and in Oregon it forced control of vast natural resources including timber from American Indians to the federal government and into non-Indian private ownership (Wilkinson, 2005). In Oregon and across the United States, termination instigated the awareness of the need for self-actualization within and among Indian populations. By the mid-1960s, the modern tribal sovereignty movement was well underway across the United States. American Indian tribal leaders worked, often on united fronts, to break the BIA's paternalistic hold,

enforce treaty rights, and achieve economic progress while preserving ancient traditions, yet in Oregon and elsewhere, so much had already been lost (Wilkinson, 2005).

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) also encouraged Indians to relocate to urban centers during the termination time period, which occurred reluctantly and resulted in new relationships and identities (Wilkinson, 2005). Today, Portland, Oregon is home to the ninth largest urban Indian population in the United States and includes 28 Native organizations (Curry-Stevens, Cross-Hemmer, & Coalition of Communities of Color, 2011). American Indians in contemporary Oregon are resilient in the face of this recent history which continues to impact their population today in the form of poverty, unemployment, and poor graduation rates (Curry-Stevens, Cross-Hemmer, & Coalition of Communities of Color, 2011), challenges faced most significantly in Oregon by populations of color, including immigrants.

More recently, Guatemalan immigration to Oregon serves as a reflection of the strength of transborder communities, which are defined by Stephen (2017) as "the foundations for multi-generational networks connecting settled communities in the United States with home communities" (p. 561). Stephen (2017) outlines specific connections between Oregon and Guatemala, pointing to established Guatemalan communities in the Portland Metro area, Woodburn, St. Paul, and other rural areas linked to agricultural work (p. 560), and tying Guatemala's history, particularly its history of violence against indigenous groups through the 1980s and into the present, to triggering the immigration of Guatemalans to Oregon.

Attention to Latina history and citizenship in Oregon is notably slim (Mendoza, 2012). The work of women in constructing and maintaining community is an oft

overlooked aspect of immigration that is significant to the sustainability of existing communities and to the development of transborder communities that support the integration of existing immigrant populations and encourage further migration. The success of immigrants in Oregon is, in many ways, owed to the success of the immigrants who preceded them. Transborder communities (Stephen, 2017) serve as passageways for arrival, but inter-immigrant group networks are also an important part of Oregon's immigration story. A more detailed description of Latino immigration and migration to Oregon is necessary because the population covers a broad range of cultures and is not monolithic.

While the Bracero Program brought Mexican guestworkers to Oregon in significant numbers through 1947, the social networks constructed during this time encouraged Tejanos, U.S.-born Latinos primarily from Texas, to migrate to the Pacific Northwest (Sifuentez, 2016). The groups were culturally different, yet shared in the experience of indifferent and sometimes poor treatment by Anglo growers. In time, newcomer migrant families settled and found work alternatives to farm work, which left growers once again in need of importing labor (Sifuentez, 2016). The trend of settling and then shifting into non-migratory occupations is observed among Asian immigrant populations as well (Ng, 1989).

The presence of Latino farm workers in the United States and in Oregon has long been known. Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Nordoeste (PCUN), Oregon's only farmworker union, was founded in 1985 and is the outcome of years of successful organizing for migrant worker's rights. PCUN was initiated by Mexican workers throughout Oregon and the Pacific Northwest (Sifuentez, 2017). The organization and

others like it have served to create *cultural citizenship* for some Oregon immigrants through grassroots organizing around immigration and other issues. Cultural citizenship is a worthwhile concept for considering the place of immigrants in the state of Oregon. Where *legal citizenship* labels immigrants as legal or illegal, cultural citizenship provides a model for recognizing immigrants as "legitimate political subjects claiming rights for themselves and their children based on their economic and cultural contributions regardless of their official legal status" (Stephen, 2003, p. 27). Cultural citizenship serves to illuminate the value of all immigrants in Oregon, including women and their children.

One point is noted in several resources, which is the fact that, where industry requires workers, those immigrants otherwise considered "less valuable" to society were welcomed into the state of Oregon, albeit with limitations designed to ensure the maintenance of their lowly positions (Barber, 2019; Sifuentez, 2017; Trice, Martinez & Ho, 2017; Stephen, 2017; Bussel and Tichenor, 2017). Immigrant and migrant groups—and the children thereof—are not unaware of the societal challenges that they face as newcomers to Oregon, yet each group's history reflects a lasting effort to take opportunity as it comes and to persist.

While Xing et al. (2007) point out Oregon's lack of leadership in questions relating to civil rights legislation for its minority populations, the state is known as the first state to pass a sanctuary state bill prohibiting the use of state and local resources to enforce federal immigration law (Wilson & De La Torre, 2017). The law has been in place since 1987 and was designed, as sanctuary laws are, to ensure due process on the part of federal law enforcement agencies. The law was passed with no organized opposition (ACLU of Oregon, 2002), and it has been amended somewhat with various

unsuccessful attempts to repeal it, most recently in 2018 (Oregonians for Immigration Reform, 2017).

The history of immigrants and immigration in Oregon is rich and complex, and it is also reflective of national and state sentiments toward populations of color from its inception. From this point, I shift to an explanation of population change in Oregon with a focus on the target timeline for this case study project: 2005 to 2019.

Oregon State Demographics by County 2005-2019

In this case study, I explore population change in Oregon by county. The goal of this analysis is in part to understand the geography of Oregon's contemporary immigrant populations in order to build a rich case study for the state, but it is in larger part intended to direct the identification and selection of community-level case study locations.

U.S. Census data for this case study are downloaded via Social Explorer where decennial census data are available for the year 2000 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a) and 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates are available for the years 2006-2010 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021b), 2011-2015 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021c), and 2015-2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). The 5-year estimates have been released only since 2009, prohibiting a comparable 2005 data set. 1-year ACS estimates have been available since 2005, but there are several reasons that this data does not suffice for the work at hand (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a). First, 1-year estimates represent the smallest sample size of all available Census estimates and only sample areas with a population of greater than 60,000. This leads to some counties being omitted from the 1-year estimate. The 1-year 2005 data, for example, includes data representing 15 of 36 counties in

Oregon. The 1-year data are the most current, but they are also less reliable than the 5-year estimates, which include data for all population areas.

For reasons described here, the population change assessment for Oregon includes decennial U.S. Census data for the year 2000 as a baseline year and 5-year ACS estimate data for the years 2010, 2015, and 2019. It should be noted that the utilization of 5-year estimates requires that data in the 2019 estimate overlaps data in the 2015 estimate, since the former also includes the ACS data collected in 2015. This overlap is not expected to cause an issue in providing a snapshot of demographic change in the state.

Once I downloaded the total population and the immigrant, or foreign-born, population for each county, I calculated what percent of the population of each county was foreign-born. Then, I calculated the average foreign-born population by percentage of the whole for each county to use as an arbitrary baseline value to help organize counties of interest. I would begin by looking more closely at counties that had foreign-born populations above the average by percentage in 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019. The majority of contemporary Oregon immigrants are Latino, so changes in Latino populations by county in Oregon are observed in this case study as well. In addition, and as I have done elsewhere in this project, I use the Hispanic/Latino population as a proxy for gauging the presence of individuals who, regardless of nativity or citizenship status, may be presumed to be immigrants by other residents.

The average foreign-born population increased from 2000 to 2010 from 5.57% to 6.44% and then dropped slightly to 6.33% and 6.34% in 2015 and 2020, respectively. In 2000, 13 counties had a foreign-born population that was, by percentage, larger than average compared to the total population. These 13 counties maintained above average

immigrant populations by percentage through 2019 with the exception of Jefferson

County, whose 2019 immigrant population fell 0.1% shy of the average percentage in

that year. Table 4.33 shows the 13 counties with above average immigrant populations by

percentage in 2000. Values for each of those counties in 2010, 2015, and 2019 are also

included in Table 4.33.

Table 4.33

Oregon Counties with Consistently Higher Than Average Foreign-born Populations by Percentage from 2000 through 2019 And the Percent Change from 2000 to 2019

FIPS	County Name	2000 (5.6%)	2010 (6.4%)	2015 (6.3%)	2019 (6.3%)	Change 2000-2019
41003	Benton County	7.62%	8.29%	9.67%	9.80%	2.17%
41005	Clackamas County	7.12%	8.47%	8.17%	8.17%	1.05%
41027	Hood River County	16.44%	17.29%	14.81%	15.99%	-0.44%
41031	Jefferson County	9.91%	8.93%	7.05%	6.18%	-3.73%
41045	Malheur County	8.22%	9.81%	10.99%	9.51%	1.29%
41047	Marion County	12.63%	14.14%	13.18%	12.58%	-0.04%
41049	Morrow County	14.52%	15.92%	16.70%	16.68%	2.16%
41051	Multnomah County	12.71%	13.74%	14.19%	13.82%	1.10%
41053	Polk County	6.45%	7.07%	7.47%	7.77%	1.32%
41059	Umatilla County	8.41%	10.19%	10.53%	10.41%	2.00%
41065	Wasco County	6.17%	9.16%	8.08%	8.03%	1.86%
41067	Washington County	14.24%	16.76%	16.90%	17.71%	3.47%
41071	Yamhill County	7.57%	7.99%	8.74%	8.08%	0.51%

Note. U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021b; 2021c; 2021d).

The percentage of foreign-born individuals by total population appears to be

steadily increasing in some counties (Benton, Washington and Polk Counties, for

example) and to drop in other counties (Marion and Jefferson counties, for example),

although this study cannot definitively claim whether there is an increase or decrease

without looking at the accompanying details relating to the margin of error for these data.

Hood River County experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of foreign-born

individuals from 2010 and 2015 and has since observed an increase. Overall, this data

confirm that Oregon's immigrant population is dynamic.

Table 4.33 also shows the overall change in the foreign-born population by

percentage from 2000 to 2019. Washington County experienced the greatest increase,

with the county's 2019 value 3.5% greater than the 2000 foreign-born percentage.

Jefferson County, on the other hand, experienced one of the smallest overall shifts with

the county's 2019 value 3.73% less than the 2000 foreign-born percentage.

I explored the Hispanic population in each county in Oregon in the same fashion,

focusing on the counties with the highest Hispanic population by percentage in each year.

Table 4.34 presents nine counties in which an above average percentage of the population

identifies as Hispanic or Latino in each recorded year. All counties recorded an increase

in the percentage of denizens identifying as Hispanic or Latino from 2000 through 2019,

but Morrow and Umatilla Counties observed the biggest leaps.

Table 4.34

Oregon Counties with Consistently Higher Than Average Hispanic Populations by
Percentage from 2000 through 2019 And the Percent Change from 2000 to 2019

FIPS	County Name	2000 (7.7%)	2010 (10.2%)	2015 (11.3%)	2019 (12.1%)	Change 2000-2019
41027	Hood River County	25.02%	28.40%	30.54%	31.42%	6.40%
41031	Jefferson County	17.74%	19.50%	19.60%	19.97%	2.23%
41045	Malheur County	25.62%	30.31%	32.69%	33.73%	8.11%
41047	Marion County	17.10%	23.12%	25.34%	26.58%	9.48%
41049	Morrow County	24.43%	29.81%	34.01%	36.50%	12.07%
41053	Polk County	8.78%	11.55%	12.83%	13.90%	5.12%
41059	Umatilla County	16.11%	22.25%	25.25%	26.79%	10.68%
41067	Washington County	11.17%	15.03%	16.15%	16.66%	5.49%
41071	Yamhill County	10.61%	14.04%	15.43%	15.87%	5.26%

Note. U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021b; 2021c; 2021d).

All of the counties included in Table 4.34 are also included in Table 4.33 which suggests that the dominant immigrant populations in these nine counties are likely Hispanic. Benton, Clackamas, and Multnomah counties, then, can be expected to reflect more diverse immigrant population growth. I confirmed this by reviewing statistics relating to the language spoken at home for each of these counties in 2019. Populations in Benton, Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington counties are more linguistically diverse than populations in the other counties listed in Tables 4.33 and 4.34. The latter three counties are also the most populated counties in the state of Oregon. In all counties listed in Table 4.33, Spanish is the most common language other than English spoken at home. Appendix D details the percentage of each county population that speaks a language other than English at home in 2019 and includes Oregon state data for comparison.

I cross referenced these counties with the names of cities and regions referenced in literature discussing immigrants and immigration in Oregon, finding that locations in Hood River County (Tamura, 1993; Ng, 1989), Marion County (Nelson, 2008; Nelson; 2007; Nelson & Hiemstra, 2008; Kissam, 2007), Malheur County (Sifuentez, 2017), Polk County (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017), and the counties making up the Portland Metropolitan area (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Jurjevich & Dann, 2012) are among those mentioned consistently. This means two things for my work. First, these counties could be of interest because there is a history on record to use as a springboard. Second, other counties could be of interest because there is not a history on record for immigrants in these regions.

Median household income dropped in the state of Oregon after the great recession. Table 4.35 shows the median household income for the whole population and for the Hispanic population in state of Oregon in 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019. In 2000,

the statewide median household income was $62,980 and in 2019 it lagged at $62,818.

All income is adjusted to reflect 2019 dollars. In 2010 the median household income was

$57,885 and in 2015 it was $55,287. Oregonians are not better off in 2019 than they were

in 2000, but the Hispanic population is doing comparatively better now than in 2000. In

2000, Oregon Hispanics earned a median household income of $49,124, 78% of the

statewide median household income. Hispanic incomes also fell after the recession years

(to $43,945, 76% of the statewide median, in 2010 and $43,774, 79% of the statewide

median, in 2015), but have recovered more efficiently to $52,537, or 84% of the

statewide median household income, in 2019.

Table 4.35

Oregon Median Household Income and Hispanic Householder Median Household Income in 2000, 2010, 2015, And 2019 And Including the Ratio of Hispanic Earnings as Compared to Earnings Overall

Year	Dollars adjusted to reflect 2019 values	Median Income	Hispanic Income Divided by Statewide Income
2000	Oregon Median Household Income	$62,980	
	Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder Household Income	$49,124	78.0%
2010	Oregon Median Household Income	$57,885	
	Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder Household Income	$43,945	75.9%
2015	Oregon Median Household Income	$55,297	
	Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder Household Income	$43,774	79.2%
2019	Oregon Median Household Income	$62,818	
	Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder Household Income	$52,537	83.6%

Note. U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021b; 2021c; 2021d).

The income analysis for this case study does not explore whether this is a function

of changing household living situations, but it is in line with national trends observed in

the federal-level case study that suggest Americans have struggled to return to pre-

recession workforce participation and wage rates. The analysis also does not assess

whether citizenship status impacts the median income of foreign-born householders in

these counties, which is a known factor in median income outcomes (Jurjevich & Dann,

2012). In some counties in Oregon, Hispanic householders earn more by measures of

median household income than the total population in that county. Appendix E includes a

table that compares the overall median household income to Hispanic median household

income by county and the state of Oregon. The percent difference between the values is

included in Appendix E. These data are not discussed in detail in this section because

they did not have an impact on community case selection, but it may be of interest to

some readers to see the income diversity across Oregon counties.

Table 4.36

Educational Attainment for the Adult (25 Years and Older) Population in Oregon in 2000
And 2019, Including the Hispanic Population in 2000

Educational Attainment for Population in Oregon 25 Years and Over	2000		2019	
Population 25 Years and Over:	2,250,998		2,898,950	
Less than High School	334,811	14.9%	269,250	9.3%
Bachelor's Degree or more	564,566	25.1%	975,920	33.7%
Hispanic or Latino population 25+ years:	125,163			
Less than High School	64,058	51.2%		
Bachelor's Degree or more	12,050	9.6%		

Notes. 2000 and 2019 U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021d).

The analysis of educational attainment in Oregon from 2000 to 2019 is in line

with national trends. Table 4.36 shows the educational attainment for Oregonians 25

years and older in 2000 and 2019. The percentage of the adult population without a high

school education fell from 15% in 2000 to 9% in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a;

2021d). In 2000, the Hispanic population was considerably less educated than the

statewide population. Fifty one percent of the adult Hispanic population in Oregon did

not finish high school in 2000, and only 10% had a college degree or more (Social

Explorer Tables, 2021a). All Oregon counties observed a decrease in the percentage of

adults who did not finish high school from 2000 to 2019 and only two counties, Morrow

County and Sherman County, observed a decrease in the percentage of their population

that had a bachelor's degree or more (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; 2021d). All other

counties experienced gains in the percentage of adults with a college degree or more.

Morrow County is of particular interest here because it is one of Oregon's most heavily

immigrant-populated counties and it is also one of Oregon's most heavily Hispanic-

populated counties.

The data thus far illustrate a diverse state in which national trends are observed to

play out. First, immigrant and Hispanic populations are growing but more so in some

areas of the state than others. Second, the great recession had an impact on household

income and suggest that, after a dive before 2010, the 2019 median income is again at

parity with the 2000 median income. Again, however, the shifts in income appear to

occur at different rates for different ethnic groups. Third, adults in Oregon are better

educated in 2019 than in 2000.

Immigrants' employment in industry in Oregon is also in line with national

trends. Table 4.37 shows the top five immigrant-employing industries in the United

States and in Oregon. These data were collected from the American Immigration Council

and reflect industry trends in 2018 (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b). In the United

States and in Oregon, the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry is the top

employing industry for immigrants. Immigrants make up 26% of employment in this

industry nationally and 28% in Oregon. Construction (23% in the United States and 14%

in Oregon); Administration support, waste management, and remediation services (26%

in the United States and 18% in Oregon), and Accommodation and food services (20% in

the United States and 16% in Oregon) are three additional industries that are top

immigrant-employing industries at the national and Oregon state-levels.

Table 4.37

Comparison of Top Immigrant-Employing Industries in the United States and Oregon in 2018

United States		Oregon	
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting	26%	1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting	28%
2. Construction	23%	2. Manufacturing	21%
3. Admin Support; Waste Mgmt.; Remediation Services	26%	3. Admin and Support; Waste Mgmt.; Remediation Services	18%
4. Other Services	21%	4. Accommodation and Food Services	16%
5. Accommodation and Food Service	20%	5. Construction	14%

Note. Data sourced from American Immigration Council (n.d.-b): Immigrants in Oregon Fact Sheet for 2018

Immigrant-employing industry data were not available for this research project at

the county level, but an analysis of available industry details at the county level allowed

me to ascertain which Oregon counties are supported by the top industries listed in Table

4.37. In order to observe any visible industry shifts from 2000 to 2019, I compared data

in these two years. In 2000, the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry

employed more than 10% of the population in 14 counties in Oregon, including four

counties with the greatest immigrant population by percentage noted in Table 4.33: Hood

River County, Jefferson County, Malheur County, and Morrow County (Social Explorer

Tables, 2021a). In 2019, only 10 counties employed more than 10% of the population in

the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry, and Jefferson County was no

longer represented here (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).

Manufacturing employed more than 10% of the population in 26 Oregon counties in 2000 and only 17 counties in 2019. In 2000, four of these counties employed more than 20% of their working population in manufacturing, but by 2019 the highest manufacturing-employing county was Washington County at 17.5%. The share of workers in the construction industry fell from 2000 to 2019 in most counties, but the number of counties that observed growth in the arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food service industry was significant, as was the growth in the professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services industry.

This superficial review of Oregon industry trends from 2000 to 2019 lacks nuance. The analysis does not serve to illustrate immigrant employing industries in Oregon counties, but it does relay some important information to help frame what one might expect at the local level. Of the five 2018 top immigrant-employing industries in Oregon, three of them are decreasing in their presence at the county level and two are increasing. This analysis does not take into account population change or the impacts of changing populations on industry, but it does clearly indicate that immigrant-employing industries in some Oregon counties are dynamic.

A closer look at county dynamics could direct community case study selection, so this section reports the top industries in 2000 and 2019 for four counties selected from the 12 counties identified to have the largest immigrant populations in the state by percentage and presented in Table 4.33. This limited analysis includes Hood River and Malheur Counties, two counties frequently mentioned in literature about immigrants in Oregon. Washington County is included because it is among the most populous and most racially

and ethnically diverse counties in Oregon. Finally, Jefferson County is included as a representative county of central Oregon.

The top employing industries in four Oregon counties (Hood River, Malheur, Washington, and Jefferson Counties) in 2000 and 2019 are presented in Appendix F and discussed here. In Hood River County, the top employing industries in 2000 are also the top employing industries in 2019. Educational, health and social services continues to be the county's top employing industry and agriculture-related industries the second. Retail trade fell behind Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services, and, while manufacturing fell by almost 0.5%, it remains the fifth top employing industry in the county. Three of Hood River's top employing industries are also among Oregon's top immigrant-employing industries: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting, Manufacturing, and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services.

The percentage of the population employed in Jefferson County's Manufacturing industry fell from 2000 to 2019 from 20% to 14% and participation in Education, health, and social services increased from 16.5% to 21%. The two industries effectively switched places in the Jefferson economy. Retail trade and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services both saw an increase in the percentage of the population employed in these industries, although Retail trade saw a more substantial increase. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting is no longer among Jefferson County's top employing industries. Public administration took the place of agriculture on the list of top employing industries in the county. In 2000, Jefferson County's top employing industries included the same three immigrant-employing industries that Hood River continues to include: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting, Manufacturing,

and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services. In 2019, this list only included two: Manufacturing and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services.

In Malheur County, Educational, health, and social services remained a stable top employing industry from 2000 to 2019. Retail trade increased its presence by almost two percent of the population employed in that industry while Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting decreased by almost two percent. Manufacturing decreased by one percent, and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services overtook Public administration as the fifth top employing industry in the county. In 2000, Malheur County's top employing industries included two that are also Oregon's top immigrant employing industries: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting and Manufacturing. By 2019, Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services was also a top employing industry in Malheur County.

Washington County, the most populated of the counties in this sample, saw decreases in the percentage of the population employed in manufacturing. This is a trend observed in all of the sample counties. Educational, health, and social services are now Washington County's top employing industry. Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services increased by its percentage of the population employed by this industry. Retail trade decreased by a few points of a percent but remains the fourth top employing industry in the county. Finally, Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing dropped sufficiently enough that Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services moved into the chart as the fifth top employing industry in the county. In 2019, Washington County's top employing

industries included three of Oregon's top immigrant-employing industries: Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services, Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services, and Manufacturing.

In closing, the state of Oregon and its counties are dynamic. Populations are growing, becoming better educated, and managing through economic challenges. Industry is responding to these changes, too. The community level case study will be an opportunity to explore these variables at a more intimate level. For now, this case study turns back to the state of Oregon to examine immigration policy at the state-level from 2005 through 2019.

NCSL Oregon State Legislative Data 2005-2019

This case study reviews data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) database of State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants (NCSL, 2020b) for the state of Oregon from 2005 through 2019. The NCSL "tracks and reports on state laws and resolutions that address legal immigrants, migrant and seasonal workers, refugees and unauthorized immigrants" (NCSL, 2020b), and so the dataset is useful for observing legislative trends within and among U.S. states.

The state of Oregon has passed 70 bills related to immigrants and immigration from 2005 to 2019. The calculated sentiment score, which is outlined in the comprehensive 50-state review of state-level legislation, for the state of Oregon is -0.56, indicating integrative preferences. Figure 4.15 reflects the shift of sentiment in Oregon toward more integrative policies after 2012, which is in line with expected trends noted by Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015). There are no enacted laws relating to

immigrants or immigration in Oregon on record in 2005 or 2006, so the sentiment score for the state is initiated in 2007.

NCSL categorizes legislation into 11 groups: budgets; education; employment; health; human trafficking; identification, drivers' licenses, and other licenses (identification); law enforcement; legal services; miscellaneous; public benefits; and voting and elections. Table 4.38 outlines the number of laws passed in Oregon in each NCSL legislation category and identifies how they were coded for sentiment.

Figure 4.15

Trends of Oregon State Sentiment Score from 2007 through 2019, Where -1 Is Integrative and +1 Is Restrictive

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

The NCSL State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants data include all legislation that the organization deems impactful to any immigrant population in the United States, so it can be expected that some laws are impactful on a lesser scale than others. For example, in 2013, OR H 2948 authorized dentists licensed in other countries

247

to participate in educational dental activities for up to five days a year under certain

conditions. While the impact of this law appears to be in reparation of a technicality and

to the benefit of a handful of individuals in the Unites States for short-term visits, it is

labeled integrative in the sentiment coding process because it broadens the definition of

who qualifies for dental licensure in the state for a particular purpose.

Table 4.38

The Number of Laws Passed in Oregon by NCSL Legislation Category

NCSL Legislation Category	No. of Oregon Laws enacted 2007-2019		
	Integrative (-1)	Restrictive (1)	Neutral (0)
Budgets	1		
Education	16	1	
Employment	4	4	
Health	11	1	
Human trafficking	2		
Identification, drivers' licenses, and other licenses	5	5	1
Law enforcement	8	3	
Legal services	1		
Miscellaneous	3		
Public benefits	3		
Voting and elections			1

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

Human trafficking laws are another example of laws that have an impact on a

small population of some of the most marginalized non-citizens in the Unites States. In

Oregon, a law passed in 2007 specifies the definition of some forms of human trafficking

and another law in 2017 clarifies that a prostitution conviction can be vacated where

evidence of human trafficking is present. Both of these laws are coded integrative

because they intend to make identification of human trafficking and recovering from

human trafficking more possible. The following discussion about laws impacting

immigrants in Oregon highlights trends observed in the direction of legislation over time, while attempting to illuminate some of the laws carrying more significant impacts for immigrants in Oregon.

In Oregon from 2005 through 2019, education (17) is the most common type of legislation affecting immigrants and immigration in Oregon, with health (12), identification (11), and law enforcement (11) coming in close behind. Eight laws relating to employment were passed in Oregon from 2007 through 2019. Miscellaneous and public benefits each include three laws passed, two laws related to human trafficking were passed, and budgets, voting and elections, and legal services each include only one law passed in Oregon since 2007. The impact of each of these state laws varies depending on the type of rule implemented and the population targeted. Individual laws and groups of laws are discussed here to contextualize the role of immigrant and immigration-related legislation in Oregon.

Education

Laws enacted in Oregon relating to education have been overarchingly integrative. Of 17 laws enacted from 2007 through 2019, only one related to education is restrictive. In 2007, OR H 2208 restricted eligibility for state financial aid to non-citizen veterans enrolled in part-time coursework or professional training. Rules passed in 2007 and 2010 allocate funds for the education of migrants and providing resident qualification to foreign exchange students, respectively. In 2011, two laws related to education signal a more comprehensive and progressive strategy for understanding immigrant representation in the state. OR H 2939 (2011) requires submission of an annual report detailing the use of physical restraint and seclusion and including demographic information including

migrant status and English language proficiency. OR S 242 (2011) broadens eligibility to serve on the Oregon Student Access Commission to any Oregon resident, rather than only citizen residents. Taken together, these laws indicate an awareness of the need to know how and why various populations are impacted by school policies and an initial acknowledgement of the value of immigrant representation.

From 2013 through 2019, the Oregon state legislature slowly rolled back restrictions to resident tuition, state financial aid, and access to scholarships for immigrants in the state. By 2019, many non-citizen residents can access higher education, including graduate education, at in-state tuition rates. This includes a 2017 law (OR S 20) exempting non-citizens and non-lawful resident students from paying non-resident tuition under certain conditions.

Other education-related laws expand equity to education by requiring cultural competency oversight at institutions of higher education (OR H 2864, 2017), defining social minorities to include refugees and immigrants (OR H 2845, 2017), facilitating the creation of school-based health centers with immigrants and refugees among the focus populations (OR H 3165, 2019), or requiring curricular inclusion relevant to immigrant and refugee populations (OR H 2023, 2019).

Health

The first health-related legislation included in the NCSL data for the state of Oregon during the target timeline was passed in 2013. Four bills were passed in that year and one of them was the only restrictive health-related bill included in the data through 2019. OR H 2859 (2013) prohibits self-attestation of immigration status for the purposes of receiving medical assistance, meaning one must have proof of eligibility to receive

assistance. Also in 2013, OR H 2134 required that the Oregon Health Authority and the Department of Human Services adopt uniform standards for the collection of demographic data to learn how to better serve the health needs of refugees and immigrants. This law was the first of many designed to improve health services to immigrant populations.

In 2014, funds were allocated to the Oregon Health Authority to study the feasibility of a basic health program intended to include immigrant populations in Oregon (OR H 4109). 2015 saw laws passed requiring the use of qualified health care interpreters to ensure accurate communication (OR H 2419) and limited licenses to practice medicine for individuals licensed in other states or abroad (OR S 684). Each of these rules expanded access to care or information. Finally, in 2016 and 2017 saw expansions to health care for some immigrants meeting certain criteria (OR H 4017, 2016), all women (OR H 3391, 2017), and all children (OR S 558, 2017), regardless of immigration status. As with education-related legislation, health-related legislation expands its focus on equity and serving immigrants from 2013 through 2017 to provide some health services to undocumented residents in the state.

Identification and Driver's Licenses, Other Licenses

Eleven laws relating to immigrants and identification and driver's license or other licenses (identification) are passed in Oregon from 2005 through 2019. Through 2011, identification-related laws passed in Oregon are restrictive (5) or neutral (1) in nature, while all laws passed in 2013 and thereafter are integrative (5). Much of what is restricted in relation to driver's licenses, permits, and identification cards before 2012 is then voided with more integrative laws after 2012. For example, a 2008 law requires proof of

legal presence and a social security cared to obtain a driver's license or identification card

(OR S 1080a), while a 2019 law eliminates the requirement of proof of legal presence for

a driver's license or identification card (OR H 2015). The only law in this category not

related to state driver's licenses or identification cards is a 2011 law requiring that any

applicant for a hand gun must be a U.S. citizen or a permanent legal resident in the

process of acquiring citizenship status (OR S 68).

Law Enforcement

Of eleven law enforcement-related laws passed in Oregon from 2009 through

2019, three are restrictive and eight are integrative. In 2009, the state of Oregon restricted

the governor from pardoning a deportation without agreement from the U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (OR H 3508), and a 2012 law requires that the individual

hired for a newly created role or liquor enforcement inspector be a U.S. citizen (OR S

1528). The third restrictive rule, enacted in 2017, prohibits the appointment of

immigrants to various types of police officer positions in Oregon (OR H 2954).

The following law enforcement-related laws passed in 2013 and 2016 are

designed to prevent individuals seeking immigration services from being taken advantage

of by unqualified individuals, and they are coded as integrative. A common law

enforcement-related rule across states in the United States requires that a notary public

may not act as an immigration consultant and, more specifically, that a State Bar or

federal authorization is required of anyone offering immigration consultation. In Oregon,

these rules were introduced in 2013, and a 2016 law amplified the significance of the

rules by clarifying that "acting as an immigration consultant" is defined as obstruction of

government and "instilling fear of immigration status" is defined as extortion (OR H 4128).

Three integrative laws passed in 2019 are designed to protect immigrants involved in the legal system from discrimination. OR S 962 aids individuals seeking U nonimmigrant visa status by directing agencies to verify to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services any assistance provided in investigating criminal activity on the part of the individual seeking status. Another rule prohibits the court from inquiring about an individual's immigration status at any time during a criminal proceeding (OR H 2932). Finally, OR H 3224 requires that the district attorney of each county in Oregon consider certain collateral consequences, including immigration consequences, in the development of policies relating to charging decisions and sentencing. Taken together, these three laws indicate a conscious effort on that part of the Oregon legislature to safeguard individuals whose immigration status is tenuous or undocumented from undue discrimination.

Employment

As with other categories in the NCSL data, employment-related laws in Oregon have grown more integrative over time. Two laws were passed in 2007, one of which was integrative. The law requires farm labor contractors to provide workers' compensation insurance to farmworkers (OR S 202, 2007). Enacted in the same year, OR H 2247 restricts individuals in violation of U.S. immigration laws from collecting workers' compensation in contexts unrelated to farmworkers.

An additional three laws were passed in 2011 and 2013, and all were restrictive. OR H 2743 (2011) is very specific as it relates to the workers' compensation of only podiatric physicians and surgeons. Nonetheless the law specifies that some immigrants

not residing in the United States are not included in certain claims benefits. OR H 2743 is an example of restrictive legislation that has little impact on the general immigrant population in Oregon, yet it is coded and included in the data all the same. OR H 2094 (2011) has a decidedly greater impact on immigrant employees in Oregon because it allows for workers' compensation payments to be discontinued if the recipient is in violation of federal immigration laws. In 2013, OR H 3315 requires notification to the U.S. Department of Labor of noncompliance with H-2B visa regulations in specific contexts.

In 2019 three integrative laws were passed, each designed to reduce barriers to employment for immigrants. OR S 855 (2019) requires professional state licensing boards to reduce barriers to recredentialing for skilled immigrants and OR S 854 (2019) requires professional state licensing boards to accept an individual taxpayer identification number for employment instead of a social security number. These rules are designed to ease the process by which skilled immigrants obtain employment in Oregon. OR S 370 (2019) is designed to provide immigrants who may be working in violation of U.S. labor regulations with timely information that a federal agency is inspecting their employment eligibility verification credentials.

Other Oregon Legislation Relating to Immigrants and Immigration

The remaining 11 bills passed in Oregon from 2005 through 2019 that relate to immigrants and immigration fall into one of six categories: budgets, human trafficking, legal services, public benefits, voting and elections, or miscellaneous. One integrative law relating to budgets is included in the NCSL dataset. In 2010 OR H 5100 included increases in funding services related to workplace and community transition training and

for costs of incarcerating illegal aliens. Two human trafficking laws, on passed in 2007 and another passed in 2017, intend to make identification of human trafficking and recovering from human trafficking more possible. The law passed in 2007 (OR S 578) specifies the definition of some forms of human trafficking and the law passed in 2017 (OR S 249) clarifies that a prostitution conviction can be vacated where evidence of human trafficking is present.

One law related to legal services (OR H 2356, 2007) states that active Oregon Bar status is required by those providing immigration consultation. This law is complementary to laws categorized under law enforcement that are discussed earlier in this section. Three public benefits related laws were passed in 2009 (2) and 2019 (1), all of which are integrative. In 2009, OR S 630 created a task force on Disproportionality in Child Welfare Foster Care and requires that one representative of the Refugee Child Welfare Advisory Committee be included on the task force and OR H 2508 (2019) appropriated funds to support refugee populations in Oregon. Another law in 2009 relates specifically to procedures involved in intercountry adoptions (OR S 10, 2009).

A single Oregon law potentially impacting immigrants and immigration relates to voting and elections and was coded as neutral because it is a procedural change that is limited to individuals who qualify as voters in the state. Three rules falling into the miscellaneous category were passed in Oregon in 2007 (1) and 2015 (2). The 2007 law allows for the Governor to prohibit price gouging during a "declaration of abnormal disruption of market" including an emergency crisis of increased migrant population unmanageable to a county (OR S 118). One law in 2015 creates a task force on

immigration consultant fraud and another outlines requirements for demonstrating a foreign adoption is legal and valid.

Contemporary Oregon is largely an integrative state where immigration policy is concerned. This is in line with Colbern and Ramakrishnan (2021), who find Oregon to be among the top five most inclusive U.S. states. The data reviewed in this section illustrate that the Oregon state legislature has used lawmaking in primarily integrative ways for issues affecting immigrants and immigration from 2007 through 2019. This is, however, not the result of a legislature inherently benevolent to the needs and concerns of immigrants. Oregon has a robust collection of organizational institutions working for the rights of immigrants, which is explored in the next section of this case study.

Oregon was identified in the comprehensive coverage for this case study as a solidly Democratic state, so more integrative legislation can be expected. The racial representation of the Oregon state legislature also appears to follow expected trends for Democrat dominant legislatures, but data covering the race and gender of state legislators are not robust. The NCSL published state legislator demographics in 2015 and 2020, but the data available for Oregon is missing substantial amounts of data regarding race. From 2015 to 2020, the Oregon state legislature shifted from 31% female and 69% male to 40% female and 60% male (NCSL, 2020a). At the same time, NCSL reports Oregon's state legislature shifted from 94% white in 2015 to 84% white in 2020 (NCSL, 2020a). Details regarding the race of the 16% of legislators who are not white in 2020 is not available.

Oregon State Support and Organizational Resources for Immigrants 2005-2019

A 2000 New York Times article refers to a time when Asian countries referred to Portland, Oregon as *Deportland* because of an Oregon-based immigration official's extraordinarily high rate of deportations (Verhovek, 2000). Yet, it seems that from legislation to programs for immigrants facilitated by the state, Oregon supports the integration of immigrants. Where the state government is itself inactive, nonprofit organizations and the citizenry fill the gaps and push the state to act.

First, federal funds are administered through states for Migrant Education programs and Adult Basic Education, which includes courses to improve English language proficiency. In theory, these programs are mandated in all states by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), but the extent to which a state makes them accessible may vary. There are currently 18 school districts and Educational Service Districts (ESD) with Migrant Education Programs in the state of Oregon (Oregon.gov, n.d.), and the Migrant Education service was mentioned as a beneficial program in informant interviews at the local level. There are no state agencies dedicated to immigration policy in Oregon, but some state legislators have explored the functions of Offices for New Americans in other U.S. states with the intention of developing such an office in Oregon (Friedman, 2018).

Second, Oregon is known as the first state to pass a so-called sanctuary state law in 1987, but it is also the state in which, in 2014, a federal magistrate judge clarified that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainers are requests rather than mandates (Semple, 2014). This ruling had a nation-wide effect on how local law enforcement

responded to ICE requests and strengthened the understanding of and the utility of the Oregon sanctuary law (Informant Communications, 2021).

Related to relations with ICE is the notion of the detention of immigrants for purposes relating to deportation. In 2005 there were 12 detention facilities that were used to detain immigrants in the state of Oregon and in 2019 there was one, which ceased the detention of immigrants that year. All detainees are currently transported to Tacoma, Washington or elsewhere outside of Oregon for detention. Oregon's various county jails which once served as detention centers ceased detentions between 2008 and 2019 (Global Detention Project, 2021).

Third, the state is home to a variety of advocacy organizations and other resources intended to assist immigrants' access to services. As discussed earlier, immigrants' rights and advocacy organizations have long flourished in Oregon, and the current list of immigrant-serving organizations is robust. Appendix G includes a list of active Oregon advocacy and rights organizations and a list of legal support programs available throughout the state. The list focuses on programs serving the entire state of Oregon, so it does not include a multitude of local and regional advocacy and community centers, such as the Latino Community Association of central Oregon, Centro Cultural, serving the greater populations of Washington County, Unete in Southern Oregon, or Comunidades, a community organization based in the Columbia River Gorge. While the list in Appendix G is undoubtedly incomplete, it is indicative of the organizational network that has grown from the advocacy work of immigrant communities in Oregon's early and mid-twentieth century. It is also indicative of the developing advocacy relationship

among Oregon immigrants, people of color, and the rural poor because many of the organizations on the list intentionally serve intersecting populations.

Conclusion to Deep Coverage Oregon Case Study

This deep coverage case study of the state of Oregon frames a context for immigration at the community level in the state. The history of Oregon is one of exclusion and Anglo settlement, and it is a state with dueling sentiments toward that history. The infrastructure for organizing and advocating for the rights of immigrants is well established in the state.

Despite exclusion efforts, Oregon has been a home to immigrants since its inception. From 2000 through 2019 the immigrant population has continued to increase and the state's population has diversified. The great recession led to economic distress that impacted industry and from which some populations were still recovering in 2019.

Oregon's more recent legislative history shows a commitment to integration for immigrants in the state. This deep coverage case study helps frame the nature of a state more fully than was possible with the comprehensive coverage alone and will be fundamental to the analysis of contemporary immigration federalism in this research study.

Local-Level Case Studies

This section includes three local-level case studies that reflect the historical context and current situation of the following cities in Oregon: Sandy, Nyssa, and Madras. Case study development at the local level included review of existing data and the collection of primary data by using semi-structured interviews with public administrators and local leaders to gain an understanding of how the community functions in relation to immigration policy. The purpose of these case studies is primarily to illustrate civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration from 2005 through 2019. However, many of my informants' relationships with their respective cities began several years before the target timeline and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and social unrest in 2020 are undoubtedly represented in their responses. It is clear that history plays a significant role in informants' perspectives of civic capacity, which means that a historical review is also included in each city case study. In each case, the historical review is followed by a comprehensive review of factors relating to immigration policy from 2005 through 2019.

The population statistics used in the development of these case studies are downloaded from the 2000 decennial Census (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a), the 2006-2010 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables 2021b) and 2015-2019 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). ACS 5-year estimate data is collected continuously over the course of five years and collated into the values that are presented here. The 2000 decennial census is compatible with the ACS 5-year estimate data for the items discussed in this case study (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020b), but with smaller populations it is important to keep in mind

that the 5-year estimates are not reflective of a population snapshot for a given point in time. Instead, it is useful to consider trends observed over time in order to understand the nature of population change.

The case studies frequently use common labels to refer to populations of certain ethnic and racial backgrounds. In these case studies, *Latino* and *Hispanic* are terms that are interchangeably used to refer to the minority group in the United States whose common language is Spanish and whose countries of origin are in Latin America and Spain. The author admits that this label is imperfect at best. The decision to use Latino and Hispanic in this work rests in the nature of resources used for this historical review. Some sources cited for this case study refer to this minority group as Hispanic while other sources refer to this group as Latino, so the case study follows. See Mora (2014) for an in-depth exploration of the term Hispanic in the United States and Vidal-Ortiz and Martinez (2018) for further discussion regarding the evolution of Latin American identity, including a more recent term, Latinx, used among academic and activist circles.

Indigenous American and *American Indian* are interchangeably used in this case study to refer to those people native to the land that was eventually settled as the State of Oregon. Wherever possible, the names of specific tribes are used in this paper. Lastly, *Anglo* refers to white U.S. Americans whose first language is English, regardless of actual ethnicity. As with other labels used to delineate populations, it is imperfect. However, the use of the term throughout this research project by many who self-identify as Anglos gives credence to its respectful use in Oregon.

Sandy, Oregon

The city of Sandy, Oregon is located in Clackamas County, around 27 miles east of Portland, Oregon's largest city. The city is named after the Sandy River, whose banks meander near its eastern boundary. Although originally a logging and sawmill town, more recently Sandy boasts a diverse economy that relies heavily on professional occupations, management, sales, and construction, but also supports occupations in the local agricultural industry (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). Sandy is bisected by Highway 26, and therefore serves as a gateway to recreation activities on and around Mount Hood and the Cascade Range, while also supporting the city's economy as a transportation throughway connecting the Portland metropolitan area to central and eastern Oregon, and to the rest of the contiguous United States. The city is surrounded by farms and landscaping nurseries, and migrant farm workers have long been a part of the fabric of the community.

Sandy, Oregon: Historical Context

Sandy was incorporated in 1911. The founding pioneers would have preferred to incorporate earlier, but the city struggled to reach the state's minimum population requirement of 200 people for several years (Suter-Warner, n.d.). Prior to the arrival of European settlers, the land that is now Sandy was included in the frequented territories of the Clackamas Indians and several other Indian tribes now affiliated with the Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde (Oregon State University, 2020). Throughout the nineteenth century, indigenous tribes in the Pacific Northwest experienced continuous conflict with Anglo settlers and repeated exposure to European diseases such as smallpox, both of which served to reduce their populations (Pacific Oregon University,

2021). By 1843, the population of pioneer settlers in Oregon surpassed that of indigenous

populations due to the arrival of Anglos on the Oregon Trail, as well as indigenous deaths

caused by exposure to disease and conflict (Pacific Oregon University, 2021). The forced

removal of Tribal members by the U.S. government between 1853 and 1855 also served

to significantly reduce barriers to entry for the Anglo population to the region now known

as Sandy (Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde, 2021).

Prior to incorporation, Sandy served as a pioneer trading post, with the city's first

hotel built around 1873. From 1846 through the 1880s, an estimated 50,000 Oregon Trail

pioneers passed through what is now Sandy through the Barlow Road, originally an

Indian Trail running along the south side of Mount Hood that was utilized and broadened

by pioneers to serve as a last leg of the Oregon Trail. By the latter half of the nineteenth

century, railroads had eliminated the need for the Barlow Road, but its several decades of

use substantially contributed to the settling of cities like Sandy across the western United

States as we know it today (Suter-Warner, n.d.).

Migrant loggers were sought out by early Oregonian leaders to help settle the

state and strengthen industries (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Trice, Martinez, & Ho, 2017).

As one example, in Maxville, Oregon, a logging town in northeast Oregon, migrants from

Arkansas were invited to come harvest big timber in the 1920s. Gwen Trice tells of how

her African American ancestors came to be in Oregon, logging in the state with Japanese,

Greek, Hawaiian, Latinx, Guamanian, Indigenous American, and Chinese loggers (Trice,

Martinez, & Ho, 2017). In this sense, the city is no different than other early Oregon

logging towns that experienced success because of migrants and immigrants coming to

the region to take advantage of employment opportunities. While, a detailed history of

Sandy's logging industry, and thereby the city's early immigration history, was unavailable for this study, one informant for this case study reported that the city's early housing stock indicates the community was socio-economically diverse and integrated rather than segregated into class-based neighborhoods (Personal Communication, 2021). Sandy continues to be a gateway between Oregon's rugged and rural east and the metropolitan west, and the city continues to employ what locals refer to as the "pioneer spirit" to drive innovation and progress in the city today.

Sandy, Oregon: Case Study Introduction

Five informants shared insights, experiences, and memories to help frame the context of civic capacity in Sandy, Oregon from 2005 to 2019 for this case study. All informants served the city of Sandy as a public administrator or elected official for a period of time during the target timeline. Additionally, all informants were asked to speak of experiences occurring during the years 2005 to 2019, but in each case an informant's broader experience with the city informed their understanding of Sandy during the target timeline. Informants one, two, three, and four were longtime Sandy residents by 2005, and informants two, three, four, and five remained Sandy residents at the time of the interviews.

Informants were asked to share stories that illustrate the city's capacity to meet the needs of residents more generally, as well as to reflect on the city's policies and processes as they related to serving and engaging immigrants. Informant interviews revealed a commitment to moving public services forward in the face of consistent population growth and limited resources. The four informants who spoke of Sandy as early as 2005 each shared a similar narrative about Sandy from their own perspective.

These individuals worked closely with one another to bring about service changes that remain integral to the day-to-day functions of the city of Sandy today. Informant five corroborates this history while highlighting the challenges and demands of governance under substantial changes in leadership and the unexpected pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Sandy, Oregon: 2005-2019

When asked to reflect on Sandy as it relates to immigrants and immigration, informants noted a diverse yet small population of foreign-born individuals primarily from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. An increasing Spanish-speaking population in Sandy was evident to a number of informants who pointed to the 2004 construction of Sandy Vista, a farmworker housing complex developed within the city limits, as evidence of expanding international migrant communities in the area. Yet, informants also spoke of Sandy's founding as an Oregon Trail terminus whose earliest non-indigenous settlers were also migrants from elsewhere, searching for settlement. This comparison was not intended to negate the challenges contemporary incoming immigrants may experience, but it served to illuminate the nature of Sandy as a community under constant population change.

Sandy, Oregon: 2005-2019—Demographic Change

The population of Sandy, Oregon has grown steadily since the city was incorporated in the early twentieth century and it is expected to continue experiencing substantial growth through at least 2067 (Jurjevich, Chun, Rancik, & Proehl, 2017). Sandy is a city that has experienced constant population growth throughout its history, barring a slight decrease in population in the early 1900s. Table 4.39 shows that every

decade since 1920 has brought a population increase to the city of Sandy at an overall average increase of about 50% each decade. This rate of growth makes governance unique in Sandy because of the continuous need to look to the future to ensure capacity keeps up with demand.

Table 4.39

Sandy Oregon Population 1900-2019

Sandy, Oregon Historical Population 1910-2019		
Census	Pop.	%±
1900	96	—
1910	250	160.4%
1920	242	−3.2%
1930	284	17.4%
1940	473	66.5%
1950	1,003	112.1%
1960	1,147	14.4%
1970	1,544	34.6%
1980	2,905	88.1%
1990	4,152	42.9%
2000	5,385	29.7%
2010	9,570	77.7%
2019 (est.)	11,070	15.7%
Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial Census; 2019 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates		

This section of the case study reviews changes in Sandy's foreign-born population from 2000 to 2019 to construct a context for who makes up this population and how it relates to the overall city population. While the data indicate a decrease in recently arriving immigrants to Sandy, they also show that the Sandy economy and community can support both established and new-coming immigrants.

The foreign-born population in Sandy is slowly rising, although it substantially declined in 2010 population estimates. Table 4.40 shows Sandy's foreign-born population estimates in 2000, 2010, and 2019. In 2000, Sandy's foreign-born population was 309, or

5.8%, of the city's total population. 2010 5-year American Community Survey estimates record a drop in the foreign-born population by percentage and by real numbers. In 2010, the foreign-born population fell to 221, representing only 2.5% of the overall population. Such declines in foreign-born populations were not uncommon in the United States following the 2007-2009 great recession and have been observed to increase again as local economies strengthen. In 2019, the foreign-born population in Sandy is estimated to have increased to 750, or 6.8% of the total population.

The year of U.S. entry for foreign-born individuals in Sandy is also illustrated in Table 4.40 and illustrates the fact that the city of Sandy supports both long established and newly arrived immigrants. In 2019, 29% of the population arrived before 1990, 30% arrived between 1990 and 2000, and 33% arrived between 2000 and 2010. Only 7% of the foreign-born population in Sandy arrived in the United States since 2010.

This research study does not calculate the margin of error of ACS data, so the numbers reflected in Table 4.40 should be viewed with caution. Looking across the decades, the arrival period for foreign-born residents appears to change dramatically. In 2010, no foreign-born residents who entered the United States from 1990 to 1999 were estimated to reside in Sandy, while in 2019, 228 individuals were estimated to have arrived within the same time period. Earlier, in 2000, 186 foreign-born individuals resided in Sandy who had entered the United States between 1990 and 1999. According to this data, 186 immigrants left Sandy by 2010 and then 228 immigrants moved into the city by 2019. There is a possible explanation for this oddity, which relates to the nature of the ACS 5-Year estimate data leaving room for inaccuracies, especially where small populations are concerned.

Table 4.40

Year of Entry for Foreign-Born Population in Sandy 2000, 2010, and 2019

2000		
Year Of Entry for The Foreign-Born Population	Pop.	% of FB Pop.
Foreign-born Population:	309	
1995 to March 2000	82	26.5%
1990 to 1994	104	33.7%
1985 to 1989	10	3.2%
1980 to 1984	11	3.6%
1975 to 1979	32	10.4%
1970 to 1974	6	1.9%
1965 to 1969	29	9.4%
Before 1965	35	11.3%

2010		
Year Of Entry for The Foreign-Born Population	Pop.	% of FB Pop.
Foreign-Born Population:	221	
2000 or Later	42	19.0%
1990 to 1999	0	0.0%
1980 to 1989	36	16.3%
Before 1980	143	64.7%

2019		
Year Of Entry for The Foreign-Born Population	Pop.	% of FB Pop.
Foreign-Born Population:	750	
2010 or Later	53	7.1%
2000 to 2009	249	33.2%
1990 to 1999	228	30.4%
Before 1990	220	29.3%

Note. This table shows how year of entry for foreign-born individuals varies in each year presented. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2006-2010 and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021b, 2021d).

While we cannot know if there were no foreign-born residents in Sandy in 2010

who had arrived in the United States between 1990 and 1999, we can assume that there

were far fewer than in either 2000 or 2019, which is of interest to understanding civic

capacity as it pertains to immigrants and immigration in Sandy. The year of entry data

leave open the possibility that Sandy serves at least some immigrant populations as a

gateway city to employment and settlement, just like it has historically served the broader

population. An analysis of the most common birth places for the foreign-born population

in Sandy indicates how the geographic and cultural origins of the city's immigrant

population have changed since 2000.

The most common places of birth for the foreign-born population in Sandy are

different in each decade. This fact supports the notion that Sandy deals with constant

population change even where the immigrant population is concerned. From a

perspective of public service delivery and governance, Sandy faces an additional

challenge of maintaining equitable and accessible services for a growing immigrant

population whose cultural and language backgrounds consistently change over time. Data

pertaining to the birthplaces of immigrants in Sandy from 2000, 2010, and 2019 are

discussed here. See Appendix H for the table reflecting this data.

In 2000, a majority (52%) of Sandy's immigrants were from Europe, while only

10% were from Asia and 38% were from Latin America. Ukrainian immigrants were the

largest immigrant group in Sandy, making up 33% of the total immigrant population.

2010 shows a decline in the European population to 35% of the overall immigrant

population in Sandy reporting no Ukrainian-born immigrants. Immigrants born in Asian

countries increased to 19% of the immigrant population in 2010, and Latin Americans

dropped to 21% of the immigrant population. A substantial Australian population is

reported to make up 25% of the Sandy immigrant population in 2010. In 2019, Europeans

make up 33% of the foreign-born population, Asians account for 23%, and Latin Americans make up 40%. North Americans born in Canada account for the remaining 3% of the foreign-born population in Sandy in 2019.

Sandy's substantial apparent changes in the makeup of its immigrant population from 2000 to 2019 are undoubtedly due in part to the data's statistical margin of error discussed at the open of this section. The abrupt appearance and disappearance of a substantial Australian population was, for example, unfamiliar to my interview informants. Yet, the fact that some groups decrease over several 5-year estimate time periods and others steadily gain in population, lends credence to the notion that Sandy's immigrant population is dynamic.

In 2000, Sandy's largest immigrant group was Ukrainian-born, but this group's population fell to 4% of the city's immigrant population by 2019. Mexican-born immigrants, who made up 28% of the immigrant population in 2000, were the largest foreign-born group (39% of the immigrant population) in Sandy by 2019. At the same time, the Asian immigrant population increased and diversified to include East Asians (from Hong Kong and Japan), South Eastern Asians (from Vietnam), and South Central Asians (from a broad region including Iran, India, and other surrounding countries). These groups are culturally and linguistically diverse and fundamentally change the needs related to service delivery and accessibility.

Finally, the Latino population in Sandy increased substantially from 4.1% of the population in 2000 to 10.2% of the population in 2019. Table 4.41 shows Sandy's Hispanic population in 2000, 2010, and 2019. This can be compared to the 2.7% of the overall Sandy population that was both Latino and foreign-born in 2019. Considering

changes in the overall Latino population in conjunction with changes in the immigrant

population is valuable because racial and ethnic discrimination is a common challenge in

communities that experience immigration, particularly in the contemporary United States

where media attention to immigration since the early 1990s has been observed to

influence negative attitudes towards immigration and the Latino population more

generally (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). Therefore, while the population of Latino

immigrants in Sandy remains minimal at 40.2% of the immigrant population and 2.7% of

the overall population, the presence of Latinos is substantially higher. In some cities,

other racial or ethnic backgrounds can be considered in relation to immigrant populations

of similar racial and ethnic backgrounds. In Sandy, however, where 83% of the

population was White non-Hispanic in 2019, no other race included in the ACS makes up

a substantial percentage of the population (Black or African American and non-Hispanic

(0.6%), American Indian and non-Hispanic (0.5%), Asian and non-Hispanic (2.3%), and

Two or more races and non-Hispanic (3.5%).

Table 4.41

Sandy Hispanic Population 2000, 2010, 2019

Sandy, Oregon Hispanic Population 2000-2019		
Year	Pop.	% of total pop.
2000	220	4.1%
2010	884	9.2%
2019	1,134	10.2%
Source: 2000, 2010 U.S. Decennial Census; 2019 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates		

In short, population change in Sandy is familiar, the presence of immigrants in the

city is moderate, and the overall population is predominantly Anglo. The city leaders who

acted as informants for this study expressed community tension as a result of demographic changes but concurred that immigration was not a driver for this tension. Instead, the overall population growth brought U.S.-born families and individuals looking for a more affordable lifestyle than what could be achieved in nearby urban areas where the cost of housing had substantially increased. The friction between the desires of new arrivals and those of longstanding homestead residents is reflected in one city manager's comments reflecting on the city early in the target timeline (around 2005), as well as the current city manager's observations about Sandy in 2019 and 2020, but neither of the reflections involves sentiment—positive or negative—toward foreign-born immigrants. As a city in a perpetual state of population growth, it seems Sandy can expect growing pains as a reflection of moderate change over time.

Sandy, Oregon: 2005-2019—Industry Trends

Industry trends for Sandy, Oregon are stable. There was little change in top employing industries in the area from 2000 to 2019. Data shown in Table 4.42 indicates that the most employed Sandy residents aged 16 and over worked in education, healthcare, and social services (18% in 2000 and 19% in 2019). Manufacturing and retail trade were also both strong employers in 2000 and remained so in 2019. Manufacturing supported the employment of 13% of the working population in 2000 and dropped slightly to 11% in 2019, while retail trade increased from 11% to 14% in the same timeframe. Agricultural and finance industries and public administration each increased about 2.5% from 2000 to 2019, while the share of workers employed in wholesale trade dropped by just over 2%. The percentage of the population that was employed in construction and arts (including entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food

services) experienced the greatest declines from about 10% to about 6% of the working

population. Employment in other industries changed by fewer than two percentage points

in the target timeframe.

Table 4.42

Percent of Civilian Population 16 Years and Over Employed by Industry in Sandy,
Oregon in 2000 and in 2019, Including the Percent Change Over Time

SE:T85. Industry By Occupation For Employed Civilian Population 16 Years And Over	2000	2019	% Change
Employed Civilian Population 16 Years And Over:	2,609	5,583	
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining	1.6%	4.1%	2.5%
Construction	10.0%	6.1%	-3.9%
Manufacturing	12.7%	11.3%	-1.4%
Wholesale trade	6.4%	4.2%	-2.2%
Retail trade	11.2%	14.2%	3.0%
Transportation and warehousing, and utilities	6.9%	5.9%	-1.0%
Information	0.7%	0.8%	0.1%
Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing	7.9%	10.4%	2.5%
Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services	6.9%	8.2%	1.3%
Educational, health and social services	18.3%	19.2%	0.9%
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services	10.4%	5.7%	-4.7%
Other services (except public administration)	4.0%	4.5%	0.5%
Public administration	3.0%	5.6%	2.6%

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).

While these numbers show the industries in which Sandy residents work, it would be an error to assume all residents work in Sandy proper. Therefore, an increase in one industry does not necessarily suggest that that industry is on the rise in Sandy. Table 4.42 does, however, reflect changing employment trends in the region, which could be indicative of the economic direction in which Sandy is moving. Given that Sandy's overall employed population aged 16 and over increased by 214% from 2000 to 2019, one might expect the data to reflect more change in terms of where newcomers found employment. This is not the case in Sandy. Instead, employment trends show Sandy's existing industries can support substantial population growth. Data that specifically outlines where Sandy's immigrant population is employed is unavailable due to the city's small size and concerns about anonymity, but immigrants are undoubtedly a part of the 214% growth since 2000.

Sandy, Oregon: Governance and the Integration of Immigrants

The target timeline for this case study begins just as the Sandy Vista migrant worker housing complex was completed and as the number of Latino immigrants began to rise in Sandy. These factors are reflected in informant comments about official discussions surrounding the need for increased programming to support migrant workers who were most often Spanish-speakers and from Latin America. While the earlier immigrant population was predominantly Russian-speaking and fewer in number, the challenges highlighted by case study informants involved engaging the Latino population. The topic is necessarily complex because the populations are complex.

Repeated efforts to bring the Latino community into the city's inner-workings had proven successful in Sandy. A city forum specifically designed to address issues related

to how the city could better integrate Latino residents into the civic society was recalled

by two informants as having been a successful event for engaging ideas and advancing

awareness of population needs within the broader community. This forum occurred early

within the target timeline, when the Latino population was experiencing its initial growth,

but details regarding the exact date or notes relating to the outcomes were unavailable. A

city manager also recounted details about a summer internship program for high school

students and noted that one of his interns, the son of Mexican immigrants, is now a Sandy

police officer.

Table 4.43

Median Household Income and Median Income for Hispanic/Latino Householders in Sandy, Oregon in 2000 and 2019 (in 2019 Dollars)

2000		2010		2019	
Median household income	$64,825	Median household income	$60,687	Median household income	$73,443
Hispanic/Latino householder median income	$36,557	Hispanic/Latino householder median income	$77,059	Hispanic/Latino householder median income	$76,250

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2006-2010 and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021b, 2021d).

Informants note that they frequently observed Latino immigrants and their

children, once settled, leaving migrant work to take up year-round positions and, in some

cases, start their own restaurants, construction companies, and other businesses. In Sandy,

the median household income for Hispanic or Latino householders increased dramatically

from $36,557 in 2000 to $76,250 in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; Social Explorer

Tables, 2021d). The median household income for the overall population in Sandy was

$64,825 in 2000 and $73,443 in 2019, indicating that Latino households may have

surpassed parity with the overall median income. Table 4.43 shows these data, which are adjusted to reflect 2019-dollar values.

While anecdotes were common about immigrants or the children of immigrants achieving academic, economic, and professional success in Sandy, one informant warned that positive outcomes resulted from "a lot of guidance, a lot of time invested, and a lot of trust" (Personal Communication, 2021). Guidance, time, and trust are required for the success of any child, but the story that informants tell in Sandy suggests that while city leadership made headway into breaking down barriers by facilitating bilingual materials and programs and by attempting to facilitate Latino participation in community and governance, there remained less visible cultural barriers to successful long-term engagement.

The governing leadership team in Sandy recognized a need for Spanish language services so that this growing community within Sandy could access information and participate more readily. Spanish language guides were created for public busses, and the parks department began collecting data via Spanish language surveys early on. In addition, the city manager and mayor invited and encouraged a bicultural community member to run for city council. She eventually did so, and she won the seat in 2008. An experienced multi-cultural communicator and advocate for underserved communities, this informant expresses pride for the work Sandy leadership has put into learning about serving immigrant populations but has sobering reflections on the challenges that seem to continuously go unacknowledged.

First, the informant estimated that 2%-3% of Latinos in Sandy do not speak Spanish or English, leaving a small segment of the population without direct access to

information in a context where general leadership assumed they *did* have direct access because the complexities of the Latino population and their social networks are misunderstood. Second, the lack of cultural understanding on the part of the broader Sandy community impeded the engagement of Latinos in the city. Although, the lack of Latino participation at cultural events and volunteer appreciation events was repeatedly mentioned in frustration, an informant argues that the broader Sandy community was unable to make the cultural shift necessary for the Latino population to truly feel welcomed engaging. Third, and related to the previous challenge, is the fact that some Latino immigrants are undocumented, which leaves them particularly vulnerable to engaging safely in the broader community.

One informant describes an effort to open the police and fire departments to youth through volunteer programs that would focus on activities like washing official vehicles. The intention was to provide a low security activity for any student interested in an opportunity to engage with police in a safe and friendly manner. Neither the police nor the fire department could permit such engagement without proof of identification through a social security number, a requirement that bars undocumented students from even considering participating and one that serves only to further isolate those students.

There are several other indicators of immigrant integration that are present throughout the Sandy community. Sandy's high school website provides translation via Google into multiple languages and the Clackamas County website can be accessed in 16 languages (Sandy High School, 2021; Clackamas County, 2021). *Radio Lineup*, an online guide to local radio stations, indicates that eight Spanish language radio stations reach Sandy (Radio Lineup, 2021a). The site also indicates four additional stations identified as

"ethnic" can be accessed in Sandy, but the nature of the programming is unclear and presumed to be in the English language.

The role of churches in cultivating social capital among immigrant congregants has been explored to better understand how religious institutions can serve in bridging social and cultural differences in surrounding communities (Stepick, Mahler, & Rey, 2009), so attention is also paid to local church services. Sermons are offered in Spanish at St. Michael's Catholic Church in Sandy, but Spanish language services at other places of worship were not ascertainable. There might be little reason to expect Spanish language services elsewhere. Only 2% of Clackamas County's population identifies as Hispanic and Catholic, while only 1% identifies as Hispanic and Protestant, according to the latest Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) Census of American Religion (Jones, Jackson, Orcés, & Huff, 2021). It should be noted that Hispanic identity is synonymous with neither non-English speakers nor Spanish speakers, but the statistics undoubtedly indicate where a need for Spanish language support may be greatest.

One informant points out that, overall, the Sandy community has a robust network for civic engagement and that was not immigrant directed but did not exclude immigrant residents. The informant notes that institutions like the Chamber of Commerce, the historical society, and Kiwanis were active organizations engaging the community regularly. The Community Action Center, which runs the local food bank and a thrift store, serves the community and engages residents through volunteer opportunities. Yet the comments of another informant regarding the Kiwanis Club's resistance to the establishment of a Spanish language Kiwanis Chapter indicates the continuous challenge of eliminating barriers to entry for some residents (Personal Communication, 2021). A

review of the Sandy Chamber of Commerce website also revealed no evidence of directing services toward Latino business owners or entrepreneurs or immigrants with limited English language proficiency (Sandy Area Chamber of Commerce, 2018).

A valuable practice for assessing the extent to which an immigrant population has integrated into the fabric of a community is to observe the extent to which that population is represented in leadership positions. While an official assessment is not possible of the birthplace or citizenship of current city council members or other city leaders, a search for newspaper articles and city documents that reference individuals' race, ethnicity, or nativity can be a helpful indicator of diversity in leadership. There is little evidence of immigrant representation or U.S.-born Latino representation in top administrative or elected positions in Sandy save one city council person, who resigned their seat in 2018 after almost 10 years serving the city (Allen, 2018a). This individual holds a unique and integral position as a bridge between the mainstream and Latino cultures in the city, and every other informant for this project mentioned this individual's name as the point person in engaging and understanding the needs of the Latino community.

The sentiment toward immigrants from the perspective of governance in Sandy appears to have shifted from one of active efforts to integrate a population of newcomers into civil society in the early years of the target timeline (2005) to one where services for immigrants are folded into overall efforts to ensure government is accessible and inclusive. This is to say that the immigrant population has not been forgotten in Sandy, but rather it has been reprioritized in the face of other rising pressures.

Sandy, Oregon: Current Challenges and Civic Capacity

Governance in a small Oregon city involves formal and informal networks, and how a city leader attains information for decision-making can be indicative of the breadth of governance networks. Informants for this case study reported obtaining information from formal sources such as newsletters, the League of Oregon Cities, a variety of other organizational meetings that relate to the management of cities, and their counterparts in other West coast cities. Informal conversations with connections within Sandy and elsewhere were also reflected on positively. One city manager remembered connecting with leaders in Beaverton and Hillsboro, two Oregon cities with ethnically diverse populations, to learn about their best practices for facilitating engagement with Latino immigrant residents. Another city manager offered that most cities are experiencing similar challenges around working with their existing population's sentiment toward continued population change, but also notes that a lot of city policy development has been dominated by emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, election-related matters, and the increase in civil unrest.

Two unique projects were mentioned as significant representations of Sandy's civic capacity by all five informants. First in 1999, the city of Sandy was allowed to exit the regional transportation district, making way for the city to create the Sandy Area Metro (SAM), a bus system reliably connecting the town to nearby urban centers with greater efficiency than the service provided by the transportation district (City of Sandy Oregon, n.d.-a). The second project was the creation in 2002 of SandyNet, a utility providing internet service to residents of Sandy and the outlying area (City of Sandy Oregon, n.d.-b). By 2005, both these projects had been institutionalized as affordable

services that increased residents' accessibility to employment, social activities, and information. One informant pointed out that SandyNet was integral to education equity and access throughout 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic shutdown in the state of Oregon, so the efforts made at the turn of the century continue to impact the region's capacity today.

Informants who participated in the creation of SAM and SandyNet seemed to anchor their assessment of Sandy's capacity to serve residents in the success of these projects. In describing the context leading to the development of SandyNet, for example, one informant stated that there was a sense among city leadership that "we [the Sandy community] deserve this." Other programs developed in the years prior to 2005 include the city's Summer Sounds program which coordinates music and movies in Meinig Park throughout the summer (City of Sandy Oregon, n.d.-c). The idea to develop Summer Sounds was borrowed from other west coast cities that were introducing such programming at a similar time, and it reflects a common sentiment throughout informant interviews that Sandy residents *deserved* certain services. This sentiment was expressed when informants shared their memories of creating SAM and SandyNet. Where leadership observed the city *deserved* a new service, they employed creative solutions to achieve their goals.

This deserving attitude was not limited to city leadership. In 2008, residents voted to approve a $115 million education bond that facilitated the building in 2012 of the new Sandy High School (Fuggetta, 2012). This new school replaced the original high school, which was over 100 years old and had less than half the space of the new school. The success in passing this education bond was expressed by an informant as a unique

episode of the whole community coming together to make something positive happen for the area, stating, "it was like everybody decided "yeah, we deserve this, our kids deserve this, our teachers deserve this" (Personal Communication, 2021).

When describing their memories of how these projects came about, from ideation to implementation, informants, who were interviewed separately, consistently referenced one another and their respective roles. City leadership seems to have grown and worked as a team, but, years later, these individuals continue to express great respect for the roles that others played in the tasks that they had achieved together. The four informants present in Sandy from 2005 through at least 2010 spoke of the other informants as "being go-getters" interested in asking questions and getting things done.

Contemporary challenges have shifted the city's focus to issues relating more directly to infrastructure and overall capacity. Many of Oregon's cities are feeling the pressure of demographic change as U.S. residents migrate to desirable climates in the Pacific Northwest. There are simply more people in the region than ever before. While the population is growing, the city government is small. The current city manager describes department heads as "working department heads" who are writing staff reports, managing projects, and supervising staff at the same time (Personal Communication, 2021). Overall capacity is a concern in a city with consistent growth projections.

In addition, an increase in population puts an additional strain on existing infrastructure and constant development stresses the community's expectations. Sandy is currently working on rebuilding their wastewater treatment plant, the largest project the city has ever undertaken (Personal Communication, 2021). Tradeoffs are also common in small cities. Sandy recently added a public safety fee to utility bills in order to cover

increased costs, but this led to a pause on reopening an aquatics center that would also require a fee or other source of revenue to reopen.

Sandy Oregon: Local Governance under Regulation

Any city in Oregon is subject to state regulations, but Sandy's geographical position causes unique governance challenges. For one, Highway 26 serves as the city's main thoroughfare. Highway 26 is also managed by the Oregon Department of Transportation, which puts some traffic control options largely out of the city's hands. A 2018 article in the Sandy Post outlines the complexities of transportation management in Sandy and amplifies the value of public transportation as a solution to traffic issues (Allen, 2018b).

State-mandated land use regulations are frequently a point of tension in relation to how cities manage growth, and Sandy is not an outlier in this respect. In a 2010 Oregonian article introducing the city's first new mayor in 17 years, the then city manager Scott Lazenby is quoted as saying, "Navigating Oregon's laws will be one of [incoming mayor] King's major hurdles to clear," adding that "council members often find that their hands are tied by state government," (Allen, 2010). However, a Sandy informant also acknowledged the benefit of the city's geography falling just outside of the jurisdiction of Metro, a regional government serving greater Portland. This situation allows Sandy to grow without the additional limitations of the Metro urban growth boundary, while still being physically close to the Metro economic area.

Sandy, Oregon: Conclusion

Interview informants described a city growing under the pressures that come with such growth. Tensions between the desires of newcomers and long-time residents and

friction around how to achieve growth are expressed but not overwhelming in the minds of city leaders. Sandy is increasingly attractive to families looking to settle in a location with rural connections, urban amenities, and more affordable housing options as compared to the Portland metropolitan area.

This case study provides reason to believe that a coordinated leadership team can positively impact civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration in a small U.S. city. Whether coordination and motivation to create new opportunities began at the leadership level and spread to the greater population in Sandy, or whether the greater population sought such coordination and motivation in their leaders, is not knowable based on the data collected for this case study. What is knowable is that the work the city put into creating sustainable and functional bus and internet services, and the effort individuals made to build a new high school are investments providing added capacity amidst the challenges of today. The elected and administrative team that created this added capacity also worked intentionally to pull the voices of immigrant residents into positions and places of power. As members of that team moved into other roles, some leaving the community altogether, a reduction in the immigrant voices heard in positions and places of power was observed.

Nyssa, Oregon

Nyssa, Oregon lies on the eastern border of Oregon, across the Snake River from Idaho. The city is part of the Ontario Micropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), which consists of Malheur (Oregon) and Payette (Idaho) Counties. The city's location is remote when considered in the context of the state of Oregon, but its proximity to the state of Idaho and the Boise metropolitan area proves this small city to be economically tied to—and not remote from—the state at its eastern border. This case study reviews Nyssa's history, population, and the city's governance priorities to describe the city's civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration.

Nyssa, Oregon: Historical Context

Nyssa was incorporated in 1903, although European pioneers had arrived in the area as early as the mid-1800s. Early frontier families came in the search of gold and wealth, and many eventually settled to farm lands off of the Snake and Owyhee Rivers. Prior to the arrival of European settlers, the land that is now Nyssa was included in the frequented territories of the Paiute Indians (Oregon State University, 2020). Throughout the nineteenth century, indigenous American tribes in the Pacific Northwest experienced continuous conflict with Anglo settlers and repeated exposure to European diseases such as smallpox, both of which reduced their populations. In the Snake River region including the area where Nyssa now lies, the forced removal of American Indians initiated the Snake War (1864-8) and the Bannock War (1878) between Paiute, Shoshone, and other American Indian tribes and the U.S. federal government (Pacific Oregon University, 2021). The latter is known as the last "Indian War" in Oregon and few references to American Indians in the Nyssa region are noted after this time.

With European settlement, large-scale agricultural industries developed rapidly, made possible at first by private irrigation projects and then expanding and advancing with the support of the federal government after the passage of the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 (Oregon History Project, 2021). Among the first reclamation projects to be completed in the United States was the Owyhee Dam in 1932, which significantly increased the agricultural capacity of the region surrounding Nyssa.

Sugar beets, onions, russet potatoes, corn, wheat, and mint are currently among the top agricultural products in the Nyssa area, but sugar beets and onions are among the most significant to Nyssa's immigration history. The Amalgamated Sugar Company planted sugar beets in 1935, and soon after, the company built a processing factory (Bachman, 1962). Throughout the 1930s, farmers migrated from U.S. regions affected by the Dust Bowl to settle and farm in the Nyssa area. Little information is available regarding who these earliest migrant farmers were, but they often arrived with the support of a federal Farm Security Administration program offering low-interest loans and other aid (Tucker, 2002). Migration resulted in a 125% population increase in Nyssa during the 1930s and is reflected in Table 4.45.

In the 1940s, World War II affected the U.S. labor force in both urban and rural locations while straining supply chains at the same time. In Nyssa, men left the region to work elsewhere in factories outfitted to support the war effort, which left fields without workers during a time when supply chains made staples such as sugar scarce across the country. Farmers turned to migrant workers and farm worker programs to fill the labor gap.

Oregon's agricultural and industrial interests relied on there being hands available for harvesting crops. When the Mexican Farm Labor Program, known as the Bracero Program, launched in 1942, it increased Mexican migration to the United States, including to the Pacific Northwest. Many Mexican migrant workers who were stationed in Nyssa found sufficient work year around, which allowed communities to settle and continuously draw in new migrants (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). Thus, the Mexican Farm Labor Program led to substantial Mexican immigration, just as efforts to bring migrant workers to the Pacific Northwest from other areas of the United States frequently led to the permanent settlement of those workers and their families.

At the same time that Mexican migrants flowed into the area to work the land during wartime, Japanese Americans were being forced from their homes and into internment camps. Some were provided the option to relocate to a worker's camp in Nyssa as an alternative to internment. In this camp they also served the agricultural industry in the region (Sifuentez, 2016). Many of these individuals were second generation Japanese Americans whose families had farmed in the Hood River region, yet they were forced from their homes and into internment during World War II just as those Japanese who were not U.S.-born citizens were. While in Nyssa and the surrounding area, some Japanese Americans recognized a niche in onion farming and, after internment programs ended, they chose to remain rather than return to the region they were forced from years earlier. The Japanese American population settled in large part in Ontario, 12 miles north of Nyssa and the largest city in Malheur County, and their presence proved integral to the success of later Latino migrants to the area.

The Bracero Program ended in the Pacific Northwest in 1947, ending the flow of new migrants from Mexico and once again leaving the agricultural industry in need of workers (Sifuentez, 2016), but the demographic context of the area surrounding Nyssa had changed. Some Mexican migrant workers found year-round work and settled in the area, bringing with and creating families on the way, and the Japanese American population found success in onion farming and property ownership in the region. The presence of these populations laid the groundwork for Tejanos, or migrant Latinos from Texas, to follow in the wake of the Braceros Program in Oregon.

Tejanos were U.S.-born Latino Americans. In many cases, their families had lived in Texas since statehood or earlier (Sifuentez, 2016). However, like Japanese Americans who settled in the region, Tejanos were U.S.-born citizens who were often treated by mainstream society as if they were immigrants who did not belong. While culturally quite different from the Mexican migrants who worked the fields in Oregon before them, the Tejanos benefited from the fact that the region was familiar with and considerably less resistant to Latinos and Spanish speakers working the fields.

The Japanese American population was often willing to rent housing to Tejano families when the local Anglo population would not. Likewise, the Japanese American farm owners were quicker to hire Tejanos for year-round work and allowed Tejano social events in their event halls (Sifuentez, 2016). Through these practices, Tejanos experienced reduced barriers to housing, work, and social life because the Japanese American population did not resist engaging with them in the same fashion the Anglo population often did. Nyssa's current ethnic diversity is owed primarily to second

generation Japanese Americans and the Tejano migrant workers who settled after Mexican Bracero Program laborers.

The migrant worker population in the Pacific Northwest was unique from the start in its capacity to organize for better pay and safer housing (Sifuentez, 2016). In 1953, Mexican immigrants in Nyssa formed *Siempre Adelante* (Always Forward), a rights organization, in response to the killing of a Mexican by a young Anglo (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). This is reflective of the organizing capacity observed among Mexican migrants and their descendants across the Pacific Northwest through the 1970s and into the 1980s, which resulted in the formation of Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN), the only farmworker union in the state of Oregon (Sifuentez, 2016).

The presence of successful organizing suggests two things about the immigrant population in Oregon and by relation Nyssa. First, it suggests that pay, housing, and the general treatment of workers and their families was frequently unsatisfactory. Indeed, there are numerous historical reviews of Mexican migrant workers taken advantage of by employers and treated as unwelcomed nuisances beyond the work they carried out in the fields (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Garcia & Garcia, 2005; Loprinzi, 1991). Second, the presence of organizing also suggests that the immigrant population attained and maintained the social and economic capacity to coordinate their efforts, share information, and move into spaces of agency and ownership. The remainder of this report looks at Nyssa's contemporary history, focusing on 2005 through 2019, to explore and describe the city's current capacity as it relates to immigrant residents.

Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019

Nyssa, Oregon, known as the Gateway to the Oregon trail, proudly wears its pioneer heritage as many cities do in the western United States. In Nyssa, however, the feeling of dedication to hard work and community self-reliance is not only reflective of the city's past. It is also an ever-present fact of life in the small eastern Oregon town. Nyssa lies almost 400 miles from the Oregon state capital in an economic region that competes primarily with neighboring communities in Idaho. Most of Malheur County, including Nyssa, runs on Mountain Standard Time, while the rest of Oregon follows Pacific Standard Time. The physical distance between Nyssa and the state capital only serves to amplify the cultural and economic distance city leaders in Nyssa observe in state policy decisions. In particular, state regulations surrounding doing business and building practices in Oregon frequently restrict or limit Nyssa from competing more aggressively with communities in nearby Idaho (Personal Communication, 2021).

In an interview with the Nyssa city manager in 2021, the benefits and challenges of competing with Idaho were expressed. On the one hand, business is less costly and less time consuming to establish in Idaho than it is in Oregon, so Nyssa is sometimes at risk of losing the production facilities and other established businesses who may be tempted to move over the border into Idaho. In many ways, state restrictions feel like barriers to Nyssa's full participation in economic competition in their region.

On the other hand, Idaho's increased housing prices have also more recently pushed housing values up in Nyssa, which could benefit city revenue as new construction also increases over time. Many in the Nyssa community work in nearby communities, including across the border in Idaho. Interstate travel for employment goes both ways,

and farmworkers in Oregon typically earn better wages than in Idaho, pulling many farmhands from Idaho into Oregon fields.

Members of the Nyssa community see themselves and their city as integral to the U.S. food production cycle—what is grown must be harvested and what is harvested must be prepared and shipped before planting begins again. Local news sources report that when the annual harvesting work picks up, family members and friends of farming families step in to help out wherever they can (Cockle, 2001), and migrant workers still fill an important niche in the production cycle (Personal Communication, 2021). In 2005, the city lost 190 permanent jobs and about 500 seasonal jobs when the Amalgamated Sugar Beet factory closed, shifting sugar beet processing to remaining factories over the border in Idaho (Meyer, 2005). The sugar factory had been a Nyssa institution since the 1930s, the pulse of the city beating to the thrum of the beet harvest and the factory's annual production campaign, so the impact of this loss in terms of jobs, as well as local pride and purpose, was substantial.

The Argus Observer reported that when the factory closed, the school district and other local employers reached out to family members of factory employees to ensure they had sufficient social support when the news of layoffs hit (Keller, 2005). This closure affected the entire community intimately, and references to the Amalgamated Sugar Company in local news articles and academic reports about Nyssa serve as evidence of the significant role the factory played throughout the city's history. The loss of almost 700 jobs, 500 of which were seasonal, almost certainly affected immigrant workers in the area, but none of the sources found and referenced for this case study mention the affect the factory closure had on immigrants and their families in Nyssa.

Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019—Industry Trends

In 2000 and 2019, agriculture, manufacturing, retail trade, and occupations related to education, health, and social services were Nyssa's top industries by occupation for the employed population over the age of 16. (In this section, the 2000 census data are used as the baseline year because the 2005 census industry related data are not as complete.) The industrial landscape in the city changed substantially in this period. In 2000, manufacturing was Nyssa's top industry and employed 18% of the working population in the city. By 2019, the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing had dropped to 15%. On the other hand, educational, health, and social services was Nyssa's number two employing industry in 2000, when 16% of the employed population worked in this industry. In 2019, the percentage of employed civilians in Nyssa working in education and health related industries has increased to 22%. Retail trade was and remains Nyssa's third most common industry for employment. In 2000, 12% of the working population was employed in this industry, while 16% of the employed population was working in retail trade in 2019. Industries related to agriculture experienced a 2% increase in employment from 2000 (when 11% of the employed population worked in this industry) to 2019 (when 13% of the employed population worked in this industry). Table 4.44 illustrates the total number of Nyssa residents over the age of 16 and in the civilian population by industry in 2000 and in 2019 and presents the percentage of that working population in each industry.

Table 4.44

Percent of Civilian Population 16 Years and Over Employed by Industry in Nyssa, Oregon in 2000 and in 2019, Including the Percent Change Over Time

Industry By Occupation for Employed Civilian Population 16 Years and Over	2000	2019		
Employed Civilian Population 16 Years and Over	1,096	1,233	% Change	
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining:	10.6%	12.7%	+	2.10%
Construction	4.7%	1.4%	-	3.30%
Manufacturing	18.4%	14.8%	-	3.60%
Wholesale trade	6.1%	5.9%	-	0.20%
Retail trade	12.0%	16.2%	+	4.20%
Transportation and warehousing, and utilities:	4.2%	6.2%	+	2.00%
Information	0.9%	0.0%	-	0.90%
Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing:	3.2%	4.9%	+	1.70%
Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services:	4.7%	3.6%	-	1.10%
Educational, health and social services:	15.8%	21.7%	+	5.90%
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services:	6.4%	8.3%	+	1.90%
Other services (except public administration)	3.7%	1.7%	-	2.00%
Public administration	9.4%	2.7%	-	6.70%

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021d).

Other industries that experienced a moderate shift between 2000 and 2019 include construction, which fell from 5% in 2000 to 1% in 2019, and public administration, which fell from 9% in 2000 to 3% in 2019. Other industries grew or declined by no more than 2% of the employed population during the target timeframe. While these numbers show the industries in which Nyssa residents work, it would be erroneous to assume that all residents work in Nyssa proper. Therefore, an increase in one industry does not

necessarily suggest that that industry is on the rise in the city of Nyssa. Table 4.44 does, however, reflect changing employment trends in the region, which could be indicative of the economic direction in which Nyssa is moving.

Data specifically outlining where Nyssa's immigrant population is employed is unavailable due to the city's small size and concerns about anonymity. However, in the United States in 2010, immigrants were overrepresented in three of Nyssa's top four industries: manufacturing, construction, and agriculture (Brookings Partnership for a New American Economy, n.d.). It stands to reason that the Nyssa workforce includes immigrants across industries, and, perhaps, concentrated in Nyssa's most valuable industries.

Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019—Demographic Change

Nyssa's population has grown steadily decade on decade from about 450 residents in 1910 to 2,862 residents in 1980, when the population fell to 2,629 in 1990. By 2000, however, the population had rebounded to 3,163, a 20% increase. As is true in many rural towns in Oregon and across the United States, Latinos, both new immigrants and the U.S.-born Latinos, helped to bolster the Nyssa population during the late twentieth century and into the twenty-first century (Rojas-Burke, 2014). The population grew again in 2010, and is estimated to have fallen slightly to 3,163 in 2019. The percentage of the population that is Latino has only grown. In 2000, 57% of the Nyssa population identified as Latino, while in 2019 69% did so.

The demographic make-up of Nyssa is of interest to discussions surrounding immigration expressly because the city remains dependent on immigrants and also because the city's large U.S.-born Latino population provide evidence of a history

steeped in the tradition of migrating to and then settling in Nyssa. Table 4.45 shows the

population of Nyssa over time and Table 4.46 shows the percentage of the population that

identifies as Latino since 2000.

Table 4.45   **Table 4.46**

Nyssa Oregon Population 1910-2019   *Nyssa Hispanic Population 2000-2019*

Nyssa, Oregon Historical Population 1910-2019		
Census	**Pop.**	**%±**
1910	449	—
1920	563	25.4%
1930	821	45.8%
1940	1,855	125.9%
1950	2,525	36.1%
1960	2,611	3.4%
1970	2,620	0.3%
1980	2,862	9.2%
1990	2,629	−8.1%
2000	3,163	20.3%
2010	3,267	3.3%
2019 (est.)	3,163	−3.2%
Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial Census; 2019 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates		

Nyssa, Oregon Hispanic Population 2000-2019		
Year	**Pop.**	**% of total pop.**
2000	1,809	57.2%
2010	1,976	60.5%
2019	2,169	68.6%
Source: 2000, 2010 U.S. Decennial Census; 2019 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates		

In 2000, 21% of the population was foreign-born, or immigrant, in Nyssa, and in

2019 the foreign-born population is estimated to be 20% of the total population. These

values indicate a continued dependence on new immigrants in the city. A closer look at

the year of entry for the foreign-born population in 2000 and in 2019 reveals that

immigration to Nyssa is slowing. That is, in 2000, new arrivals since 1990 made up close

to 50% of the immigrant population in that year. In 2019, on the other hand, the greatest

percent of immigrants arrived since 2000 and before 2010. Arrivals from 2010 through

2019 make up only 19% of the current immigrant population. Table 4.47 includes

Nyssa's 2000 and 2019 nativity by citizenship status as well as the year of entry for the

immigrant population.

Like most towns in the United States, Nyssa's history is rich with influence from a diverse array of cultures, but the continuous influence of Mexican immigrants remains significant. In 2000 and in 2019, 93% and 94% of the immigrant population in Nyssa was born in Mexico, respectively (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). Other countries of birth represented in the 2019 immigrant population in Nyssa, but in much smaller numbers, include Canada, Germany, the Philippines, China, and Brazil (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).

Table 4.47

Nativity by Citizenship and Year of Entry for Foreign-Born Population in Nyssa, Oregon in 2000 and 2019

Nyssa city, Oregon 2000			Nyssa city, Oregon 2019		
Nativity By Citizenship Status			**Nativity By Citizenship Status**		
Total Population:	3,180		Total Population:	3,163	
Native Born	2,525	79.4%	Native Born	2,538	80.2%
Foreign Born:	655	20.6%	Foreign Born:	625	19.8%
Naturalized Citizen	170	5.4%	Naturalized Citizen	187	5.9%
Not a Citizen	485	15.3%	Not a Citizen	438	13.9%
Year of Entry for the Foreign-Born Population			**Year of Entry for the Foreign-Born Population**		
Foreign-born Population:	655		Foreign-Born Population:	625	
1995 to March 2000	197	30.1%	2010 or Later	119	19.0%
1990 to 1994	129	19.7%	2000 to 2009	250	40.0%
1985 to 1989	81	12.4%	1990 to 1999	93	14.9%
1980 to 1984	72	11.0%	Before 1990	163	26.1%
1975 to 1979	44	6.7%			
1970 to 1974	15	2.3%			
1965 to 1969	32	4.9%			
Before 1965	85	13.0%			

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021d).

Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019—Governance and the Integration of Immigrants

Rojas-Burke (2014) reports that Spanish-speaking newcomers to Nyssa still face discrimination despite the long-established Latino population there. This is a common challenge in communities that experience continuous immigration, and it is a particular challenge in the contemporary United States, where continuous media attention to immigration since the early 1990s has been observed to influence negative attitudes toward immigration and the Latino population more generally (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). While newcomers and immigrants may encounter discrimination in the public arena, language support offered by agencies such as the Malheur County Health Department and the Nyssa School District serve as an indicator of the region's and city's awareness in terms of the need to support non-English speakers. This is not to say that the presence of language support eliminates bias or discrimination, but it may indicate the intention on the part of a governing body to reduce barriers to information and access to services.

A comprehensive audit of Spanish language or other language services in Nyssa was not practical for this study, but details collected from local news outlets and local organization websites indicate that some institutionalized bilingual practices exist in the city. The role of churches in cultivating social capital among immigrant congregants has been explored to better understand how religious institutions can serve in bridging social and cultural differences in surrounding communities (Stepick, Mahler, & Rey, 2009), so attention is also paid to local church services. Worship services are offered in Spanish at St. Bridget's Catholic Church in Nyssa, but Spanish language services at other places of worship were not ascertainable. There might be little reason to expect Spanish language

services elsewhere, since 14% of Malheur County's population identifies as Hispanic and Catholic, while only 2% identify as Hispanic and Protestant, according to the latest Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) Census of American Religion (Jones, Jackson, Orcés, & Huff, 2021). It should be noted that Hispanic identity is synonymous with neither non-English speakers nor Spanish speakers, but the statistics undoubtedly indicate where a need for Spanish language support may be greatest.

Radio Lineup, an online guide to local radio stations, suggests that four Spanish language radio stations reach Nyssa, all of which are licensed in Idaho cities (Radio Lineup, 2021b). Neither the Nyssa Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture nor the City of Nyssa government website include information in languages other than English. Furthermore, the Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture website includes no reference to Hispanic or Latino business support more generally.

A valuable practice for assessing the extent to which a non-Anglo or immigrant population has integrated into the fabric of a community is to observe the extent to which that population is represented in leadership positions. In a 1991 master's thesis, Loprinzi reports that as of 1985, neither the Nyssa school board nor the city council included more than one Latino at any time (Loprinzi, 1991). At present, the only Latina school board member in Nyssa lost reelection in May 2021 (Frankel, 2021), and the racial or ethnic diversity of the current city council is unconfirmed.

During the writing of this case study, a competitive school board election saw four incumbent board members defeated by newcomers and one incumbent successfully defend her seat (Malheur County Clerk, 2021). Two board positions were not up for reelection in 2021. Some candidates that ran for a school board seat in this recent election

identified as having immediate immigrant or migrant familial connections and was generationally diverse (Frankel, 2021). This heated election may serve as an indicator toward greater representation of the broader Nyssa population in leadership positions in the future.

In most cases, leadership positions through 2019 in Nyssa, whether elected or administrative, are not held by individuals who identify publicly as Latinos, as immigrants, or as the children of immigrants. Latinos and immigrants succeeding as leaders in the small business community in Nyssa have sometimes identified themselves as such (Rojas-Burke, 2014; Cockle, 2001). This suggests that, while 68.6% of the population in Nyssa are Latino and 19.8% are immigrants, these populations continue to lack representation in top leadership positions.

Nyssa, Oregon: Current Challenges and Civic Capacity

Governance in a small Oregon city involves formal and informal networks, and how a city leader attains information for decision-making can be indicative of the breadth of governance networks. The city manager reports obtaining information from formal sources such as newsletters from the Governor's Office, the League of Oregon Cities, and a variety of other organizational meetings that relate to the management of cities, yet most information emerges through informal conversations with connections in other local communities (Personal Communication, 2021). The city manager maintains friendships with local state senators and representatives and communicates regularly with city managers in nearby Oregon communities like Ontario and Vale. These relationships may serve as support for small communities like Nyssa, which may otherwise feel

underserved by a state government that directs more attention to the needs and desires of urban populations.

The city manager has observed some growth in businesses in Nyssa since 2017 and he argues that the city is focusing on their agricultural industry roots in terms of expected growth in the future. He is not interested in attracting businesses such as "big box stores" to Nyssa because residents who want such stores already travel north to Ontario or east to Boise, Idaho. Instead, as industry drives further population growth the city manager hopes to see a wider variety of stores that serve community niches. The Nyssa community is rich in pride for their city and for each other but financially poor. In 2019 the median household income in Nyssa was estimated to be $41,750, just 66.5% of the $62,818 median household income in the state of Oregon (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).

For city leadership in Nyssa, successful governance is about getting services to residents while on a tight budget. Being a small and remote city has added challenges when things need to get done. In 2017, high arsenic levels in the water system required a reconstruction of Nyssa's water system and the city manager had to garner the attention of potential contractors in person to get the project on their radar (Caldwell, 2018). The added effort resulted in multiple bids for the project that would otherwise have remained widely unknown to contractors, and the work was completed in 2018. Projects such as this do not call for the consideration of specific interests or needs from the perspective of Nyssa leadership. Rather, it is important to ensure all city residents have access to healthy water services, so special attention to the immigrant population, for example, is not needed.

Since the closing of the sugar factory in 2005, Nyssa has experienced a slowdown in both business and population growth. However, Capital Press reports that the city is looking to the future with plans to construct a reload center that will serve as an industrial park for transferring agricultural products from truck to train (Carlson, 2021). Not all of the city's endeavors to facilitate an increase in business are met with community support. The Malheur Enterprise reported this spring that residents objected heavily to a rezoning decision taken by the city council and intended to facilitate the construction of the reload center (Caldwell, 2021). This reported conflict of interest reflects civic engagement on the part of some residents and challenging decision making on the part of city leaders. Another governance challenge in Nyssa is the changing role of the federal government in rural U.S. towns.

Aid from the Farm Security Administration boosted Nyssa's agricultural industry in the 1930s and federal guest worker policies of the 1940s helped to sustain the industry through the war and beyond, but more recent federal level policies have created barriers for some rural cities. Nyssa's water treatment project was triggered by a 2001 change in Environmental Protection Agency standards for drinking water and came with little funding or implementation assistance for the community (Caldwell, 2018). The project resulted in a $12 increase per household per month in the baseline cost for water services in the city, a fact that was expressed with frustration by city leaders who were aware of the financial impact this has on residents. Federal level mandates of this type seem to contradict the federal level support Nyssa and its residents once enjoyed for their agricultural endeavors, and this can be an unsettling reality for a town with limited resources.

The anecdotes noted in this section serve as examples of the types of projects that take priority in Nyssa to ensure that the city can maintain basic functions and continue to support an agriculture economy. Immigrant populations are not called out in Nyssa governance practices and policymaking. Instead, city leadership perceives immigrants to be served as members of the greater community, just as other Nyssa residents (Personal Communication, 2021).

Nyssa, Oregon: Social Capital

Nyssa, known as the Thunderegg Capital of the World, hosts an annual festival to celebrate the geode-like rocks in July, and the Nyssa Nite Rodeo occupies the city for two days in June. These events celebrate a culture and pride based on Nyssa's unique geography and agricultural roots, and they likely serve to strengthen social capital among residents. Social capital is the network of relationships among people who live and work in a community which reinforce shared norms and values. Shared norms and values, in turn, reinforce civic capacity.

Social capital in Nyssa seems to translate into a "hardworking spirit" and a commitment to thriving. Individuals often fill in the gaps where they see a need in the community. In one example during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, a Nyssa resident created a space to facilitate online learning for the children of several families whose parents couldn't indefinitely take time off work (Cappelletti, 2021). Social capital appears to play a significant role in civic capacity in Nyssa, whether it be in the community's concern and support for families of the sugar factory when it closed or an individual resident opening their home to support students' learning.

302

What is less clear is to what extent social capital in Nyssa bridges groups otherwise closed off from one another. Immigrant families, who make up 19.8% of the Nyssa population, may be well connected to one another, yet they may have limited networks with the non-immigrant population which could limit opportunities to further integrate into the community.

Nyssa, Oregon: Conclusion

This case study reviews the city's history, population, and governance priorities to describe civic capacity, or the ability for a community to face changes and solve problems in ways that influence the impact of that change, as it relates to immigrants and immigration in Nyssa. The review frames a city deeply connected to its agricultural history and proud of its capacity to thrive, even under state and federal limitations.

Immigrants and immigration are as integral to the city now as they were at its inception, with almost 20% of the city's 2019 population being foreign-born. The in-migration of immigrants has served to prevent overall population decline in the city over the past two decades, and direct services for speakers of languages other than English, primarily Spanish speakers, are available in some contexts. Diverse representation of the population in government and special district positions, however, is limited.

Nyssa's population is driven by a "hardworking and community-centered spirit" which is amplified by the city's removed location. Governance priorities at the city level focus on providing services to all residents equally while facilitating an attractive place for businesses.

Madras, Oregon

Madras lies in central Oregon near the southeast border of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation and serves as the county seat of Jefferson County. Major industries in the area include manufacturing and seed and vegetable production made possible by twentieth century developments in irrigation technology. The latter drew the need for migrant labor in and around Madras from the mid-twentieth century to the present. The City of Madras has a uniquely diverse population with 40% of the population identifying as Hispanic and almost 10% of the population identifying as American Indian or Alaskan Native Alone in the 2019 American Community Survey. The 2019-2020 high school student body population was 36% Hispanic, 31% American Indian, and 29% White non-Hispanic (National Center for Education Studies, n.d.), an uncommonly diverse student population for a school serving rural Oregon.

Situated on the junction of State Highways 26 and 97, Madras serves as a transportation gateway for travelers from the Portland metro area and Interstate 84 from the north to southern central Oregon and eastern Oregon. Significant shifts in industry within the city and surrounding area, population dynamics, and the city's geographic position affect decision making in the city and test its civic capacity. This case study reviews Madras' history, population, and the city's governance priorities to describe the city's civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration.

Madras, Oregon: Historical Context

Madras was incorporated as a city in 1910 in the Willow Creek Basin, although Anglo pioneers had arrived in numbers to the area as early as the early-1800s. Two railroads, the Oregon Trunk Railroad and the Deschutes Railroad Co. both arrived in

Madras in 1911 (Ahern, n.d.), ensuring the city some geographical relevance early in the twentieth century. Prior to the arrival of European settlers, the land that is now Madras was included in the frequented territories of the Warm Springs, Wasco, Paiute, and other American Indian tribes (Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, 2021).

The devastating effects of diseases such as smallpox, measles, diphtheria, and typhus had, by the early twentieth century, already ravaged native populations as far west as the Pacific Ocean since the early sixteenth century in a series of what is estimated to be 90 separate epidemics of European diseases that crossed what today is the United States (Wilkinson, 2005). When a federal mandate called for the removal of American Indians from their native lands in the mid-1850s, tribes in the Pacific Northwest had already suffered substantial population loss. The Middle Oregon Treaty of 1855 created the 578,000-acre Warm Springs Indian Reservation. In accordance with the treaty, control of 10 million acres of Indian territory in today's northeast and middle Oregon was ceded to the U.S. federal government while the Warm Springs and Wasco bands of American Indians, and later the Paiute, occupied the reservation (Kratz, 2018). The land that is Madras was included in the 10 million acres once stewarded by American Indians and is situated only a few miles from the southeast border of the Reservation. Its proximity to the Reservation has influenced the city's cultural and demographic footprint in unique ways, yet the relationship between Anglo and American Indian in Madras remains one framed by the tensions inherent to the history of tribal sovereignty coupled with the complexities of U.S. federalism.

Created in 1824, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has managed the relationship between the U.S. federal government and Indian tribes. For most of its history, and

certainly in the decades following the Middle Oregon Treaty, the BIA had acted in a strongly paternalistic fashion toward tribes, controlling budgets, education, healthcare, and land management (Wilkinson, 2005). BIA officials also prohibited traditional celebrations, enforced the militaristic assimilation education of Indian children, and took charge of the allocation of land allotments authorized by the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Wilkinson, 2005). This act was in effect until 1934 and took land out of reservations, granting some lots to individual tribal members and other lots to non-Indians with the intention of converting the land for farming and taxation. The resulting effect was the enormous loss of reservation land throughout the United States, including, to some degree, on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation (Wilkinson, 2005).

As was common of many western towns at the turn of the twentieth century, Madras' initial Anglo population arrived as homesteaders hoping for success in creating life and community in agriculture. What they encountered was rough, dry land which yielded little after great effort. In New Era (2003), Jarold Ramsey describes the rugged lifestyle required of early settlers to Madras and its surrounding areas (Ramsey, 2003). The author recounts his family's relationships with American Indians who came off the Reservation to observe the arrival of newcomers who "seemed to be decent folks, but didn't know much of anything about the country and would probably need a lot of help" (p. 8). Ramsey's grandparents, who settled as homesteaders near Madras in 1902, learned to manage their land with the assistance of Jim Jackson, a Wasco leader who offered guidance and friendship. At the time of the writing of the book, the Ramsey and Jackson families were enjoying their fourth generation of friendship.

Ramsey reveals a sense of community in early Madras that is bound by the knowledge that the survival of each depends on the survival of all, and that, beyond survival, thriving is possible where values are shared and the land is respected as a sustaining factor of life. This was an Anglo community that would claim to be tied to the land. It is an example of the foundations of individualism in America, where communities proudly govern themselves and succeed, just as Thomas Jefferson argued they should at the founding of the United States. Ramsey's account, however, indirectly acknowledges that this community exists in a space made accessible to them only by the forced removal of American Indians to the Warm Springs Reservation and that success in this rough environment was reached with the help and shared knowledge of willing local Indians. Noting that "there have been local moments of relatively easy, co-equal interaction and interdependence between Indians and whites, within the long and mostly dismal history of their relations in the West" (p. 38), Ramsey recognizes the unique and special nature of his community's shared good will with the Indians of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation.

Land in the Madras area was rugged and difficult to farm until the Deschutes Irrigation project reached Jefferson County's North Unit Irrigation District in 1946 (Ahern, n.d.). Ample water reached communities across central and eastern Oregon only after the passage of the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 made large scale projects like the construction of dams possible (Oregon History Project, 2021). The central Oregon economy was difficult to sustain before the Pelton and Round Butte dams, built in 1958 and 1964, respectively, were constructed and the population in central Oregon, and in Madras in particular, began to swell. Ramsey (2003) depicts a rapid change in Madras

307

during this time, where the values of the Anglo homesteaders are quickly eroded by the values of incoming Anglos interested in land ownership and production defined as progress.

The relationship to the land can be construed as the greatest difference between these groups. Homesteaders, tied to the land and to their community for sustenance, have responsibilities to the land and to their community members to thrive. Respect for the land and commitment to shared values are significant to the survival of homesteaders. Those arriving after irrigation in the Madras region saw the land as a tool for production, and so their goal was to own land and then push it to produce as much as possible. This relationship was not without respect for the land, but it was starkly different from the earlier homesteader relationship, and it is the cultural shift Ramsey (2003) laments in his central Oregon narrative.

A discussion about the relationship to the land in central Oregon cannot exclude reference to the American Indian population and their relationship to the land, although this relationship is not highlighted in most published histories found to focus on the Madras region. Ramsey (2003) only briefly mentions that, while homesteaders felt tied to the land that belonged to them, American Indians, instead, belonged to the land. Wilkinson (2005) describes American Indians as a place-based people for whom the past is indelible in ways most Americans of the United States cannot understand. This is a notion of place that must reach so deeply into the earth and stretch 1,000 generations into the past to the effect that, when homesteaders felt their world was coming to an end in the 1950s, after a scant 40 years of working the land, the Reservation population observed the same time period as a blip in the history of this place.

While this is an imperfect explanation, and one conceptualized through an Anglo-centric upbringing where property is valued over coexistence, I hope that it is sufficient for the purpose of this case study to highlight a significant historical cultural shift that continues to impact contemporary culture and civic capacity in Madras. The cultural shift driven by irrigation in the 1940s and 1950s in central Oregon brought significant population growth and diversified Madras in terms of economic and social values, but homesteader communities initiated this cultural shift with the construction of communities based on land ownership in the space that was, only decades earlier, the territory of communities with strikingly different values and ways of living with the land.

In the 1940s, World War II affected the U.S. labor force in both urban and rural locations while straining supply chains at the same time. The presence of a World War II-era Army Air Corps base served to support the Madras economy during the war and prevented the city from being drained of eligible working men during wartime, which occurred in many other rural Oregon towns at the time. In fact, the Air Corps airfield contributed to a population increase in Madras of 305% from 1940 to 1950. Table 4.48 shows details relating to historical population growth in Madras. The need for farmworkers in the Madras area increased rapidly after the advent of irrigation within the years after the close of the war.

Today, Madras' Latino population is the most mature in central Oregon and was initially attracted to the region by agricultural work opportunities (Personal Communication, 2021). When the Mexican Farm Labor Program, known as the Bracero Program, launched in 1942, it increased Mexican migration to the United States, including to the Pacific Northwest. Many Mexican migrant workers stationed throughout

Oregon found sufficient work year-round, which meant that communities could settle and continuously draw in new immigrant migrants (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). Thus, the Mexican Farm Labor Program led to substantial permanent Mexican immigration, just as efforts to bring migrant workers to the Pacific Northwest from other areas of the United States frequently led to the permanent settlement of those workers and their families. The Bracero Program had ended in the Pacific Northwest in 1947, just as the need for additional farmworkers in Madras was growing. The thread of Mexican laborers already established in Oregon undoubtedly led to migration to the Madras area as well. The presence of these populations also laid the groundwork for Tejanos, or migrant Latinos from Texas, to follow in the wake of the Braceros Program in Oregon.

Tejanos were U.S.-born Latino Americans. In many cases, their families had lived in Texas since statehood or earlier (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). Although Tejanos were U.S.-born citizens, they were often treated by mainstream Anglo society as if they were immigrants who did not belong. While culturally quite different from the Mexican migrants who worked the fields in Oregon before them, the Tejanos benefited from the fact that, by the time of their arrival, the region was familiar with and considerably less resistant to Latinos and Spanish speakers working the fields (Sifuentez, 2016).

The migrant worker population in the Pacific Northwest was unique from the beginning in its capacity to organize for better pay and safer housing (Sifuentez, 2016). Details relating to the initial arrival of the Latino population to Madras are limited, but there is ample information available about the migration of migrant Latinos and other immigrant migrant workers to other areas of Oregon (Hood River, the Willamette Valley, Nyssa and Malheur County to name only a few). There is little reason to assume Madras

is outstanding in its history in this regard, so this case study assumes the likelihood that former Braceros and Tejanos played a role in establishing Madras' Latino immigrant population and thereby laid the foundation for the city's significant Hispanic population today.

The organizing capacity observed among Mexican migrants and their descendants across the Pacific Northwest through the 1970s and into the 1980s is substantial. This effort to organize resulted in the formation of Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN), the only farmworker union in the state of Oregon (Sifuentez, 2016). Over time, a number of organizations were created to serve and support Latino populations in various areas of Oregon. The Latino Community Association, founded in central Oregon in 2000 and that expanded into Madras in 2013, works to empower Latino families in Madras and other Central Oregon cities (Personal Communication, 2021).

The presence of successful organizing suggests two things of the immigrant population in Oregon, and by relation Madras. First, it suggests that pay, housing, and the general treatment of workers and their families was frequently unsatisfactory. Indeed, there are numerous historical reviews of Mexican migrant workers taken advantage of by employers and treated as unwelcomed nuisances beyond the work they carried out in the fields (Sifuentez, 2016; Garcia & Garcia, 2005; Loprinzi, 1991). Second, however, the presence of organizing also suggests that the immigrant population attained and maintained the social and economic capacity to coordinate their efforts, share information, and move into spaces of agency and ownership.

What is unique to Madras' history is that Anglo population growth and Latino population growth occurred at the same time. While Anglo homesteaders arrived in small

311

numbers in the early 1900s, the population of Madras failed to maintain itself or grow until the 1940s. For four decades, the rugged and isolated world Ramsey (2013) describes dominated the frontier. From 1940 to 1950, however, the city's population exploded by 205% (see Table 4.48). Most Anglos arrived in Madras with immigrant migrant workers simultaneously.

The 1950s were also significant for the Warm Springs Indian Reservation population. The reservation consists of little in arable land but it is dominated by timber, which the tribe began to harvest in 1942. Timber sales afforded tribal members small per capita payments, but overall income levels remained well below those in non-Indian communities (Wilkinson, 2005). When the termination of tribes was initiated in 1953 by House Concurrent Resolution 108, calling for a legal end to reservations, an end to tribal sovereignty, and for the final integration of American Indians into mainstream American society, the Warm Springs Reservation population was largely in poverty and facing elimination (Wilkinson, 2005). Then, in 1958, tribal members made a unified decision to revitalize their Reservation community. The tribe was due $4 million in compensation for the flooding of traditional fishing grounds on Celilo Falls, and such payments were typically paid to individual members on a per capita basis (Wilkinson, 2005). In this case, however, tribal members chose to grant the tribe three-quarters of the compensation funds for investment.

The Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs' investment led to the reacquisition of lands lost through allotment and productive financial enterprises, but perhaps more importantly, it carried the tribe into the post-termination era (Wilkinson, 2005). By the mid-1960s, the modern tribal sovereignty movement was well underway across the

United States. American Indian tribal leaders worked, often on united fronts, to break the BIA's paternalistic hold, enforce treaty rights, and achieve economic progress while preserving ancient traditions. The collective efforts that Warm Springs tribal members set into motion a decade earlier aided them in achieving sovereignty (Wilkinson, 2005).

After irrigation reached Madras, the city of migrants matured in tandem with the maturation of the neighboring Warm Springs Indian Reservation. Yet, a review of Madras' civic capacity today reveals lasting impressions about who belongs and who does not. Published literature, informant reflections, and demographic and employment trends reveal a community that remains racially and culturally divided. However, a close look at the cultural communities within the greater Madras community shows the effort made in recent years to construct pathways for non-Anglos, particularly Latinos, to local leadership positions. It is notable that many of those paths are forged by immigrants themselves. The remainder of this report looks at Madras' contemporary history, focusing on 2005 through 2019, to explore and describe the city's current civic capacity as it relates to immigrant residents.

Madras, Oregon: Case Study Informants

Nine informants shared insights, experiences, and memories to help frame the context of civic capacity in Madras, Oregon from 2005 to 2019 for this case study. All informants served the City of Madras or Jefferson County for a period of time during the target timeline for this project as public administrators, public servants, elected officials, or organizational leaders. Many are long-term residents of Madras or the nearby area and have personal experience with city government, businesses, and public schools. Each informant was asked to speak of experiences occurring during the years 2005 to 2019, but

in each case an informant's broader experience with the city and surrounding region informed their understanding of Madras during the target timeline.

Informants were asked to share stories that illustrate the city's capacity to meet resident needs more generally as well as to reflect on the city's policies and processes as they related to serving and engaging immigrants. Next, I review statistics relating to population change and industry trends in Madras in order to frame the more substantive conversation surrounding governance and the integration of immigrants in the city.

Madras, Oregon: 2005-2019—Population Change

Table 4.48 shows the evolution of Madras' population from 1910 to the present day. After the population boom in 1950, Madras' population has continued to grow steadily with each passing decade. In 2000, the population was 5,078, a 47.5% increase from the previous decade. By 2010, the population increased by 19% to 6,046 and in 2019, the population is estimated to be 6,777. Population increases have been smaller since 2000, but at 19% and 12%, growth in Madras remains substantial.

A thorough discussion of American Indian history and population change is integral to understanding civic capacity and impacts on immigrants and immigration in Madras, as is a discussion of the Hispanic population in the city. The history of immigration policy in the United States is defined by the nation's interpretation of race and policies framed to ensure the "othering" of races deemed incompatible with the dominant Anglo presence in the United States (King, 2001). While not meeting the working definition of foreign-born immigrant in this project, American Indians have, since the founding of the United States, been subject to race-specific assimilation tactics

and Americanization programs which parallel immigration policies implemented for the purpose of selecting and assimilating incoming New Americans (King, 2001).

Table 4.48

*Madras Historical Population
and Population Change 1910-2019*

Madras Historical Population		
Census	Pop.	%±
1910	364	—
1920	337	−7.4%
1930	291	−13.6%
1940	412	41.60%
1950	1,258	205.30%
1960	1,515	20.40%
1970	1,689	11.50%
1980	2,235	32.30%
1990	3,443	54.00%
2000	5,078	47.50%
2010	6,046	19.10%
2019	6,777	12.10%
Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial Census; 2019 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates		

Table 4.49

Madras Hispanic Population 2000, 2010, and 2019

Madras, Oregon Hispanic Population 2000-2019		
Year	Pop.	% of total pop.
2000	1,815	35.7%
2010	2,309	38.3%
2019	2,697	39.8%
Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial Census; 2019 American Community Survey 5-year		

The Madras population is growing more diverse with Hispanic and American Indian/Alaskan Native individuals making up an increasing majority of the population, while the foreign-born, or immigrant, population in Madras is decreasing. Table 4.49 depicts the Hispanic population in Madras from 2000-2019. In 2000, Hispanics made up 35.7% of the overall population in the city, while they made up 39.8% by 2019.

In the American Community Survey and other Census surveys, *Hispanic* is noted as an ethnicity, not a race, meaning any individual who identifies as Hispanic also identifies as one or more races. In Madras, the growth in the population of individuals who identify their race as White Alone has been driven by the Hispanic population at least since 2000. Table 4.50 shows that the percentage of the overall population that identifies as White non-Hispanic (referred to as Anglo elsewhere in this case study) has

Table 4.50

Madras Hispanic Population by Race (White, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Some Other Race) in 2000, 2010, and 2019

2000		
	Pop.	% of Total Pop.
Not Hispanic or Latino:	3,263	64.3%
White Alone	2,825	55.6%
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	258	5.1%
Some other race Alone	3	0.1%
Hispanic or Latino:	1,815	35.7%
White Alone	402	7.9%
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	54	1.1%
Some other race Alone	1,244	24.5%
2010		
	Pop.	% of Total Pop.
Not Hispanic or Latino:	3,725	61.7%
White Alone	3,011	49.9%
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	422	7.0%
Some Other Race Alone	0	0.0%
Hispanic or Latino:	2,309	38.3%
White Alone	1,647	27.3%
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	0	0.0%
Some Other Race Alone	574	9.5%
2019		
	Pop.	% of Total Pop.
Not Hispanic or Latino:	4,080	60.2%
White Alone	3,274	48.3%
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	543	8.0%
Some Other Race Alone	0	0.0%
Hispanic or Latino:	2,697	39.8%
White Alone	1,672	24.7%
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone	102	1.5%
Some Other Race Alone	820	12.1%

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2006-2010 and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021c, 2021d).

decreased from 55.6% in 2000 to 48.3% in 2019, while the percentage of the population

that identifies as White Hispanic has increased from 7.9% to 24.7%. At the same time,

Hispanics who identify as *Some other race Alone* decreased from 24.5% in 2000 to

12.1% in 2019. The reason for these shifts might simply be caused by increase in the

overall Hispanic population, yet it might also indicate a more significant shift in racial

identity within the Madras Hispanic population.

Another population that increased significantly in Madras since 2000 is the

American Indian/Alaskan Native population, which grew from 6% of the population in

2000 to almost 10% of the population in 2019. Table 4.51 shows the Madras American

Indian/Alaskan Native population in 2000, 2010, and 2019. Table 4.50 shows that while

the Hispanic American Indian population has increased in Madras, the majority of the

growth observed in the American Indian/Alaskan Native category has been from

individuals identifying as American Indian, non-Hispanic.

Table 4.51

Madras American Indian/Native Alaskan Population 2000-2019

Madras, Oregon American Indian Population 2000-2019		
Year	Pop.	% of total pop.
2000	312	6.1%
2010	422	7.0%
2019	645	9.5%
Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial Census; 2019 American Community Survey 5-year		

The Madras foreign-born, or immigrant, population decreased from 22.5% of the

city's population in 2000 to 13.2% of the population in 2019. For comparison, the

foreign-born population makes up 9.7% of the Oregon state population in 2019, while the

U.S. foreign-born population is 13.7% in the same year. While the Madras foreign-born

population remains at parity with the U.S. average in 2019, the city continues to have a

higher overall representation of immigrants than the state of Oregon.

Table 4.52

Nativity by Citizenship and Year of Entry for Foreign-Born Population in Madras,
Oregon in 2000 and 2019

Madras, Oregon 2000			Madras, Oregon 2019		
Nativity By Citizenship Status			**Nativity By Citizenship Status**		
Total Population:	5,011		Total Population:	6,777	
Native Born	3,882	77.5%	Native Born	5,883	86.8%
Foreign Born:	1,129	22.5%	Foreign Born:	894	13.2%
Naturalized Citizen	173	3.5%	Naturalized Citizen	385	5.7%
Not a Citizen	956	19.1%	Not a Citizen	509	7.5%
Year Of Entry for The Foreign-Born Population			**Year of Entry for the Foreign-Born Population**		
Foreign-born Population:	1,129		Foreign-Born Population:	894	
1995 to March 2000	152	13.5%	2010 or Later	23	2.6%
1990 to 1994	332	29.4%	2000 to 2009	83	9.3%
1985 to 1989	308	27.3%	1990 to 1999	351	39.3%
1980 to 1984	170	15.1%	Before 1990	437	48.9%
1975 to 1979	96	8.5%			
1970 to 1974	40	3.5%			
1965 to 1969	0	0.0%			
Before 1965	31	2.8%			

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).

Table 4.52 shows the nativity and year of entry for the foreign-born population in

Madras in 2000 and 2019. In 2000, the majority of foreign-born residents in Madras

entered the United States after 1985 and before 1995. This remains more or less the same

in 2019. Only about 12% of the foreign-born population in Madras in 2019 arrived in the

United States later than 2000. This data suggests that the growing Hispanic population in

Madras is no longer being driven by immigrant newcomers as it was in earlier decades, but the city's immigrant population remains substantial and is largely made up of Latino residents.

In 2000 and 2019, 90% of the foreign-born population in Madras was Latino. The remaining 10% of the foreign-born population was European or Asian. In 2000, there was also a fraction of the population from Australia (Oceania). In both years, more than 80% of the foreign-born population was from Mexico, making Mexican nativity dominant among the Madras foreign-born population.

Table 4.53

Place of Birth for Foreign-Born Population in Madras, Oregon in 2000 and 2019

Place Of Birth for The Foreign-Born Population (ACS Compatible Version)	2000		Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population	2019	
Foreign Born (excluding born at sea):	1,129		Foreign-Born Population:	894	
Europe:	29	2.6%	Europe:	57	6.4%
Asia:	72	6.4%	Asia:	30	3.4%
Oceania:	7	0.6%	Americas:	807	90.3%
Americas:	1,021	90.4%	Mexico	782	87.5%
Cuba	10	0.9%	Peru	25	2.8%
Mexico	919	81.4%			
El Salvador	24	2.1%			
Peru	68	6.0%			

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021d).

Like many towns in the United States, Madras' history is rich with the influence of a diverse array of cultures, but the continuous influence of Mexican immigrants remains significant. In 2000 and in 2019, 81% and 88% of the immigrant population in Madras was born in Mexico, respectively (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). Other countries of birth represented in the 2019 immigrant

population in Madras, but in much smaller numbers, included China, Vietnam, Peru, France, and the United Kingdom (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). These data are compiled estimates from surveys collected over the course of 5 years, so details regarding the size of the current Madras immigrant population may differ from the numbers represented in Table 4.53. However, the general trends and estimated shares of the population are representative of the Madras population.

Madras, Oregon: 2005-2019—Industry Trends

Industry trends and employment in Madras have substantially changed since 2000. Whereas *manufacturing* employed over 33% of workers in Madras in 2000, that industry employed 17.5% of workers by 2019. Employment in *Educational services, healthcare, and social assistance*, however, increased from 13% of Madras workers in 2000 to almost 25% in 2019. Table 4.54 outlines the percent of employees by industry in 2000 and 2019 and reveals a substantial shift in employment in the city throughout the target timeline for this project.

By 2019, almost 16% of workers employed in *manufacturing* in 2000 were no longer employed in manufacturing industries. *Other services*, not including public administration services, also decreased in their share of employed workers in Madras from 2000 to 2019 by almost 4%. *Educational services, healthcare, and social assistance* employed 12% more workers in Madras in 2019 than in 2000, and employment in construction increased by 4% of the population between 2000 and 2019. All other industries either increased or decreased at a rate of less than 1.5% from 2000 to 2019, save *Retail trade*, where employment increased only moderately by 2.4% of the population.

Table 4.54

Percent of Civilian Population 16 Years and Over Employed by Industry in Madras, Oregon in 2000 and in 2019, Including the Percent Change Over Time

	2000	2019	% Change
Industry By Occupation for Employed Civilian Population 16 Years and Over	2088	2856	36.80%
Manufacturing	33.3%	17.5%	-15.8%
Other Services, Except Public Administration	4.7%	0.8%	-3.9%
Finance and Insurance, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing	3.1%	1.7%	-1.4%
Wholesale Trade	1.0%	0.7%	-0.3%
Professional, Scientific, and Management, and Administrative and Waste Management Services	4.5%	4.3%	-0.2%
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, and Accommodation and Food Services	11.9%	12.0%	0.1%
Information	0.3%	0.6%	0.3%
Public Administration	4.7%	5.1%	0.4%
Transportation and Warehousing, and Utilities	1.6%	2.7%	1.1%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, and Mining	7.4%	8.8%	1.4%
Retail Trade	11.9%	14.3%	2.4%
Construction	2.5%	6.5%	4.0%
Educational Services, and Health Care and Social Assistance	13.1%	24.9%	11.8%

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021d).

The drastic shift in the economy is undoubtedly related, at least in part, to the loss of manufacturing and other industries in Madras during the Great Recession. In its recovery since the recession, the Madras economy is growing most strongly in construction and industries linked to education, healthcare, and social services. While the gain in employment in these areas, at 15.8% of the employed population, is at parity with the loss of employment in manufacturing, the industries are not necessarily parallel

employers. This means that those who lose work in manufacturing might not have easily attained work in education or healthcare. With a 36.8% increase in the overall employed population in Madras from 2000 to 2019, it may be safe to assume that new arrivals are primarily finding employment in education, health, and social service industries in Madras.

Even with great losses since 2000, manufacturing remains the second largest employer in Madras, employing 17.5% of the working population. Two interstate highway systems, a municipal airport, and continued rail services provide important infrastructure to the Madras industrial community. The St. Charles Health System and Mosaic Medical offer services in Madras and employ a growing number of professionals and healthcare support occupations, which have increased in their share of the employed population in Madras by 9.8% and 4%, respectively from 2000 to 2019.

Data outlining specifically where Madras' immigrant population is employed is unavailable due to the city's small size and concerns about anonymity. According to a 2010 Brookings Institution report, immigrants in the United States were overrepresented in three of Madras' top five industries: construction occupations, office and administrative support, and transportation occupations (Brookings Partnership for a New American Economy, n.d.). It stands to reason that the Madras workforce includes immigrants across industries, and, perhaps, concentrated in some of Madras' most valuable industries.

The production of irrigated seed crops, potatoes, and mint as well as hay and livestock operations remain healthy industries in the Madras area (Jefferson County, n.d.-b). Employment in farming occupations dropped by 1.8% from almost 6% in 2000 to 4%

in 2019. The decrease in employment in farming occupations could be an indicator as to why immigrant arrivals decreased during the same time period, since migrants who are immigrants tend to settle not only where social networks are strong, but also where work is prolific.

Two significant areas of immigrant employment are not captured in ACS data, including employment in private households, which is the most over-represented industry for immigrants in the United States (Brookings Partnership for a New American Economy, n.d.), and home-based businesses which are common particularly among Latino entrepreneurs in Madras (Personal Communications, 2021). The dearth of data in these areas makes it challenging to understand Madras' true economic situation, but the likely presence of informal economic networks supports the notion of the Madras population as divided in various ways. Informalization of economies occurs in contexts of growing inequality in earnings and profit-making capabilities, it involves both consumers and producers, and it is occurring in populations across the United States (Sassen, 1994).

An informant familiar with the Madras business community explained that the city's industrial corporations are generally well-entrenched in the community through multi-generational ties to the city and the surrounding Jefferson County region (Personal Communication, 2021). One example is the Bright Wood Corporation, a wood manufacturing plant that was mentioned by several informants as a significant employer and industry anchor in Madras. The company was established in the city in 1960 and, while it suffered its first employment setbacks in its history during the great recession

from 2007 to 2010, the company is a consistent entity in the Madras local economy (Stovall, 2010).

The Deer Ridge Correctional Institution, a state prison located in Madras, opened in 2007 with the expectation that its employment opportunities would draw skilled professionals to the city. As of yet, the facility remains below capacity for employment, and the decision-making process leading to its development has attracted the attention of scholars exploring economic development and prisons in the United States. In a 2013 article, Anne Bonds (2013) argues that Madras' intention in bringing a correctional institution to the area reflected "long-established power relations and assumptions that negatively position Latinos and Native Americans while reaffirming the social and economic status of whites" (p. 1393). Throughout informant interviews for this case study, shared anecdotes and resources affirmed the notion that racial divisions continue to exist in Madras and that the implementation of the city's economic development plan has not focused sufficiently on exploring or ameliorating this division.

Major industrial and light industrial organizations in Madras, such as Bright Wood Corporation, are most frequently Anglo owned and operated, as are most professional services in the city. Latinos, and immigrants in particular, are more likely to own and operate retail outlets and restaurants (Personal Communication, 2021). Anecdotally, employment of first and second-generation Latinos is concentrated in the service industry, healthcare industry and throughout the school district in staff and administrative positions (Personal Communications, 2021). The teacher and coach populations were reported by informants to be overwhelmingly white and two informants

mentioned that American Indians and Latinos who earn education degrees often seek work outside of the Madras area (Personal Communications, 2021).

While a number of manufacturing employers went out of business during the recession (between 2007 and 2010) and others experienced setbacks, retail and restaurant businesses are at an even greater risk of failure due to unexpected changes in lease agreements and environmental influences such as recessions, pandemics, and natural disasters. Informants reported a thriving Latino business community in Madras, but noted the challenges many of these business owners faced as the city strived to develop economically, resulting in rising rents and landowner neglect of rental property (Personal Communications, 2021). While the Latino immigrant community in Madras is well-established and intergenerational, there remains a need for support in navigating unfamiliar institutional systems like school and healthcare systems and urban renewal grant programs. Such programs are centered on helping small businesses make improvements and build wealth, but, one informant notes, if a business owner does not have the institutional knowledge surrounding how to learn about and then apply for such funds, they are left behind (Personal Communication, 2021). This is an example of an area where Madras immigrants in need of both language and cultural support relating to the economics and policy practices of the city lack access to opportunities for wealth development.

Racial divisions about the nature of healthcare resources are also identified by informants. When asked to share other organizations that may be of interest to me in learning about the immigrant experience in Madras, three informants suggested Mosaic Medical as a valuable resource for immigrants. Both St. Charles Health System and

Mosaic Medical have a significant presence in Madras, but Mosaic Medical centers itself in the service of individuals of all backgrounds in ways that St. Charles does not. This fact is indicated through the messaging on the organizations' websites. According to the Mosaic Medical website, the institution "welcomes all races, religions, countries of origin, languages, genders, abilities, sexual orientations, ages" and was created to serve "Central Oregonians from all walks of life" (Mosaic Medical, 2021) Information regarding who St. Charles serves is not clearly stated on the website and the organization's mission, "in the spirit of love and compassion, better health, better care, better value," fails to mention its service to individuals or communities (St. Charles Health System, 2021). Perhaps more significantly, it is highlighted in the shared experience of informants of color for this case study, whose experiences at St. Charles involved clear racial profiling in service delivery (Personal Communication, 2021).

This section covering the Madras economy is largely devoid of reference to employment of the American Indian population in Madras. This is largely due to the fact that informants were primed to consider interview questions in relation to immigrants in the city, and so the American Indian population was likely not considered in most responses. Secondly, occupational data by race is largely unreliable without calculations beyond the scope of this project, particularly for cities with a population of less than 65,000 like Madras. Therefore, my work in this respect is limited to informant data and information collected via local news articles, newsletters, and websites. With that stated, the lack of mention of American Indian employees or employers suggests that the population is not readily "seen" in Madras, either because of desired or undesired integration into the mainstream population, the lack of awareness of others, or not being

present in the workforce. Since American Indians make up almost 10% of the population of Madras, the latter seems unlikely.

Madras, Oregon: Major Amenities

Madras leadership has focused on economic development in the city throughout the target timeline for this case study, and the city has succeeded in bringing several amenities and attractions to serve its growing population. The following outlines only a brief representation of what the City of Madras has to offer. The Madras Aquatic Center Recreation District was formed in 2004 to serve the community with swimming and other sports recreation programs (MACRD, n.d.), and Desert Peaks Golf Club is a year-round municipal golf course in Madras. Since 2011, Madras has been home to a Central Oregon Community College Campus. A performing arts center, a well-developed trails and parks system, a new movie cinema, and the public library each play a role in Madras' capacity to engage a diverse population.

Madras' municipal airport is a unique amenity and owed to the fact that the Army Air Corps built training facilities in the area during WWII. Annual civic events like the Airshow of the Cascades have grown dramatically, attracting thousands where they previously attracted only hundreds. The Cascades East Transit Bus System connects Madras to Warm Springs and Redmond seven days a week. Within Madras city limits, the system provides rural dial-a-ride services on weekdays from 7am to 4pm (Cascades East Transit, 2016). The significance of the bus system to the greater Madras community is highlighted in the comments of a community member in city council meeting minutes for October 11, 2016 (The City of Madras, 2016a).

Such types of events and amenities serve to foster healthy communities, thus, increasing civic capacity, yet these amenities and events were not noted by informants during our discussions about immigrants in the community, nor were they mentioned in relation to a question posed about Madras' capacity to achieve goals more generally. The 2016 Madras Urban Renewal Action Plan honors these achieved goals and acknowledges the value of a diverse population in describing the "Madras Advantage," yet broader descriptions of diversity among the population, including where Latino and American Indian business interests lie and what their needs are, are missing (The City of Madras, 2016b). It is the intention of the remainder of this case study to address where interests and values lie among Madras' diverse citizenry and describe, if possible, the various notions of community that prevent these amenities from being top of mind.

Madras, Oregon: The Community Integration of Immigrants

The presence of various non-profit services for the Latino population and statements from several informants confirm that the Latino community, and by extension the Latino immigrant community, is well-established with strong social networks in Madras. Yet immigrant support, including accommodations for language and culture, are not broadly apparent in government activities, and opportunities for leadership in the greater community have proven to be hard won by Latinos. The process of building this case study revealed a knowledgeable and motivated immigrant population, largely Latino, striving for a meaningful voice in Madras decision making. This section of the case study describes ways in which the community supports (or does not support) the integration of immigrants through language support and institutional knowledge sharing.

Race and racism are also discussed in this section, since discrimination based on race serves to prevent individuals of that race from truly belonging to the broader group.

There was consensus among most informants that overt racism has become less common in Madras over time, although a rise in anecdotal evidence of overt racism had been observed by at least two informants since the years following the election of Donald Trump to President (Personal Communications, 2021). However, informants of color and at least a few Anglo informants recognized regular instances of covert racism, often in the form of microaggressions, in social, professional, and governance-related interactions.

Discrimination against long-established Latino populations can be a common challenge in communities that experience continuous immigration, and it is a particular challenge in the contemporary United States, where continuous media attention to immigration since the early 1990s has been observed to influence negative attitudes toward immigration and the Latino population more generally (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). Language support offered by local governments, school districts, and other institutions serve as an indicator of the region's and city's awareness in terms of the need to support non-English speakers. This is not to say that the presence of language support eliminates bias or discrimination, but it may indicate the intention on the part of a governing body to reduce barriers to information and services access.

The City of Madras and the Jefferson County websites have no clearly available Spanish language resources for city and county-related procedures or events (The City of Madras, n.d.-a; Jefferson County, n.d.-a). However, one informant noted that Spanish translations of the city website and other important documents was in the works (Personal

Communication, 2021). The Madras-JC Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Center website is English language only and includes no reference to Hispanic or Latino business support more generally (Madras-JC Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Center, n.d.). One informant familiar with Latino business leaders and entrepreneurs in Madras and Central Oregon noted that few Latino businesses participate in the Chamber of Commerce in Madras, Redmond, or Bend (Personal Communication, 2021). The informant suggested that this was primarily because Latino business leaders did not feel welcomed to do so but also notes a powerful secondary reason may be because many Latino business owners do not have the capacity to participate in Chamber activities effectively. In other words, for the time a business owner puts into Chamber membership, the benefits do not fit the needs of Latino business owners.

The Spanish language section of the Jefferson County Library website includes information in Spanish about obtaining a library card and book recommendations, but Spanish language details about other services and opportunities, such as computers and printing and volunteering, are not apparent (Jefferson County Library District, 2021). An informant familiar with the Madras government noted that, since a Spanish-English bilingual employee was hired to a city clerk position in 2019, the number of Spanish-speaking individuals who have engaged in understanding city and county processes has increased (Personal Communication, 2021). It should, however, be noted that this information was anecdotal. It does not appear that the city is collecting data relating to the race or ethnicity of those accessing services over time, so impacts to accessibility cannot be assessed by the public.

Jefferson County School District 509J, serving Madras, makes the district student handbook and other documents available online in English and in Spanish, but the vast majority of resources on the website are available only in English (Jefferson County School District 509J, n.d.). An informant who is an immigrant and grew up in Madras shared that at age seven they translated paperwork for their parents because materials and information were not available in Spanish (Personal Communication, 2021). This is not an uncommon task for young immigrants in the United States, but in a region whose Latino history is as old as its Anglo history, the lack of language support is significant. The presence of two Native American community liaisons, a Hispanic community liaison, and a homeless liaison on staff at the school district indicates an awareness of the need for support for students and families with cultural backgrounds and experiences outside that of the Anglo mainstream population.

A comprehensive audit of Spanish language or other language services in Madras beyond what is included above was not practical for this study, but details collected from local news outlets and local organization websites indicate that bilingual practices are uncommon where services are intended for the population at large in the city. (Where services are intended for primarily Latino audiences, like at the Latino Community Association (n.d.), bilingual—or Spanish language only—services are the norm.) *Radio Lineup*, an online guide to local radio stations, suggests that only one Spanish language radio station reaches Madras (Radio Lineup, 2021c).

Religious support for speakers of other languages can be an indicator of community civic capacity and several informants for this project emphasized that the faith community serves as a supportive resource for the Latino immigrant community in

Madras. The role of churches in cultivating social capital among immigrant congregants has been explored to better understand how religious institutions can serve in bridging social and cultural differences in surrounding communities (Stepick, Mahler, & Rey, 2009), so attention is also paid to local church services. Six percent of Jefferson County residents identify as Hispanic Catholic, while 3% identify as Hispanic Protestant, according to the latest Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) Census of American Religion (Jones, Jackson, Orcés, & Huff, 2021). Worship services are offered in Spanish in at least three places of worship in Madras: Iglesia Bautista Conservadora Bilingue, St. Patrick Catholic Church, and the Madras Free Methodist Church. Spanish language services at the many other places of worship in Madras were not evident, but there is also reason to believe the Spanish speaking faith community is largely informal in nature and, therefore, not directly accessible through online research practices. There may be faith-based organizations serving the community out of homes or using spaces otherwise occupied by other organizations and not traditionally advertised.

One informant noted that the Latino faith-based community and the Latino business community in Madras were significant outlets for the Latino population to develop leadership skills. It is far less common to see Latino representatives serve on local school, government, and non-profit boards than in the Latino faith or business communities (Personal Communication, 2021). From the perspective of Anglo leadership, however, this was poorly understood. Speaking to the role of faith communities in the strength of social networks in the Madras Latino community, one informant familiar with the city government suggested I talk to the Padre at St. Patrick Catholic Church to learn more (Personal Communication, 2021). Another informant, also

with the city government, stated "there isn't necessarily a pastor or priest here that we could connect to" as a resource to becoming familiar with Latino social networks (Personal Communication, 2021). Both of these informants identified themselves as Anglo, but the former noted that that in their role with the city, "I was the one who had both the time and the interest to put myself into a position to learn about these issues" (Personal Communication, 2021), suggesting that awareness of bridges to the Latino community required intentional outreach.

Throughout the analysis of informant data, it became clear that there are significant differences in the level of awareness individuals have about informal social and economic networks within the Madras community. Anglos who expressed greater understanding of Latino and immigrant communities also expressed intentional engagement directly with those communities, whether socially or professionally. Those Anglos who did not express an intentionality in their relationships with Latinos and immigrants were largely less aware of existing resources for those populations.

Research for this case study suggests that support for Madras' non-English speaking population is lacking during the target timeline for this project. In 2019, 16% of the Jefferson County population was estimated to speak a language other than English at home (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). The same statistic for Madras is unavailable, but existing statistics provide strong evidence that a significant number of Madras households are not primarily English-speaking households. Only 6.2%, or 1,529 individuals, of the Jefferson County population was foreign-born in 2019 compared to 13.2%, or 894 individuals, of the Madras population. This means that 60% of the county's foreign-born population resided in Madras in 2019, so it may be assumed that a

majority of Jefferson County's population that speaks a language other than English at home also lives in Madras.

Not all non-English speaking individuals are Spanish speakers, but given the statistics outlined in a previous section, Madras' foreign-born population largely hails from Mexico and Peru, two countries in which Spanish is a dominant language, and nearly 40% of the city's population identifies as Hispanic. While Hispanic identity is synonymous with neither non-English speakers nor Spanish speakers, the statistics undoubtedly indicate where a need for Spanish language support may be greatest. Furthermore, without visible support for the city's second most frequently spoken language, support cannot be expected for those who speak languages other than English or Spanish at home. Given the foreign-born population in Madras, this includes, at the very least, speakers of Chinese and languages indigenous to Mexico and Peru. Furthermore, while it is true that many households that speak a language other than English at home include family members who also speak English as a second language, it is not correct to assume that providing information in English is sufficient for tasks related to community building and facilitating community participation, both topics that can involve emotional responses and require trust. Opportunities to engage in your first language increase the potential for participation and an overall feeling of belonging.

Madras, Oregon: Leadership and Representation

A valuable practice for assessing the extent to which a non-Anglo or immigrant population has integrated into the fabric of a community is to observe the extent to which that population is represented in leadership positions. At the time that I researched Madras' city government in 2021, the city employed only one Latino individual who had

been hired as a customer accounting clerk in 2019. The history of elected positions in the city suggests the Latino community may be seeking greater diversity and struggling to obtain and then maintain it.

In 2006, Madras elected its youngest mayor, a 26-year-old who campaigned on transparency, business development, and "government for the rest of us." The election was also considered newsworthy at the time because Mayor Jason Hale was half Korean and bilingual, a first in Madras history (Gill, 2006). Hale was a political outsider when elected, and the sense was clear that Madras voters wanted a break from the status quo. Two years later, Melanie Widmer was elected mayor and at the time was the longest serving city councilor in Madras history with 12 years of tenure (Gill, 2012). At 38-years-old and being a woman, Widmer can be considered an elected official whose demographics do not fit the status quo of small city politics in the United States, which tend to be dominated by older white men. Widmer served three terms as mayor before stepping down.

Both Hale and Widmer faced competition when they won their initial mayoral elections, whereas Widmer's successor and the current mayor of Madras, both Anglo men, ran unopposed (Gill, 2015; Roberts, 2018). In the recent history of Madras mayoral races, greater competition has yielded greater diversity. A review of city council meeting minutes over the target timeline for this case study reveals that council positions are frequently initially filled by appointment and then appointed incumbents run for reelection when their appointed term is up.

City councils are historically made up of residents who are economically fairly well off and who hold positions of power, either as business owners or business

managers. Informants familiar with Latino communities across Oregon note that Madras'

Latino community does not have the same hold on power walking into council and board

positions that Anglos do (Personal Communications, 2021). Furthermore, mayor and

councilor positions are volunteer roles in most small cities, so those with greater external

responsibilities—including fulltime work, young children, and responsibilities to

extended family—are less likely to have time to commit to service positions.

In 2016, Denise Piza, a woman in her thirties and a mother of five, won

election as the city's the first Latina city councilor via a write-in campaign, breaking

many of the norms observed in small U.S. city government. Piza viewed her role as

elevating voices within the community that had historically not had access to city

government (Gill, 2017a), and her work in the Madras community left an impact on city

leaders and other community members (Personal Communications, 2021).

In 2017, Rosalind Canga was appointed to a Madras city council seat. An

immigrant from the Philippines, Canga cited her experience as a minority in the United

States as a strength to her role serving the Madras community (Gill, 2017b). At the

writing of this case study, Canga remains the only person of color on the Madras city

council. Piza left the council when family commitments pulled her from the Madras

community (Hogan, 2019) and her successor, Leticia Montano-Hernandez, also Latina

and appointed to council in October of 2019, left the council between December 8, 2020

and January 12, 2021.

In reflecting on these recent changes on the city council, one informant familiar

with the city government said "I feel really good about diversity there" (Personal

Communication, 2021), but others noted that Latina councilors who left before the end of

their terms found barriers to their participation frustrating (Personal Communication, 2021). No mention regarding their resignations is noted in council meeting minutes.

The Impact of Diversity

Piza's work on the council during her tenure was referred to by several informants and is notable in the discussion focusing on civic capacity in Madras. Informants who were local government leaders stated that diversity matters throughout their interviews and that including immigrant and Latino voices in decision making was important, but they also repeatedly noted that they were unable to facilitate engagement. They just did not know how to connect to minority populations in the city.

In November of 2017, Piza succeeded in passing Resolution No. 27-2017 "declaring the City of Madras a Welcoming City and affirming membership in the National Welcoming American Initiative" (The City of Madras, 2017a). While a resolution of this nature takes multiple parties to come into fruition, Piza is clearly a notable shepherd for this resolution. In council meeting minutes for October 10, 2017, Piza is recorded as calling for the council to "revisit the inclusivity resolution and get it on a work session or council agenda" and the October 24, 2017 council meeting minutes recorded a follow-up regarding the resolution before its passage at the following council meeting.

One of Piza's efforts to create a more inclusive council for Madras community members was the recommendation to create a community advisory committee whose role would be to engage Spanish speakers and serve as a Latino advisory board to the council. It was introduced in city council meeting minutes on April 24, 2018 (The City of Madras, 2018) but never came to fruition. The committee was described by one informant as

having been recommended by Piza and seconded by Mayor Embanks, yet broader support from other council members appeared to be absent (Personal Communication, 2021), and follow-up discussions are not apparent in later council meeting minutes. By the end of 2018, Mayor Embanks had stepped down as mayor to take a position as a city councilor and Piza's advisory committee idea was not picked up by the following mayor.

On several occasions in meeting minutes, Piza is recorded to have translated materials and interpreted for various community meetings, and informants noted that she was responsible for facilitating a meet and greet for the city manager and downtown Latino business owners (Personal Communication, 2021). Such activities indicate Piza's significance as a bridge between the Latino community and government processes in Madras.

One meeting Piza played a role in bears detailing in this case study. It was held in February of 2017, one month after Piza was sworn into office on the council. By the start of 2017, anxiety was high within Latino communities in central Oregon due to increased U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity in the area and the threat of deportation expressed by the Trump Administration. The City of Madras responded with a public meeting at which the Madras chief of police "provide[d] accurate information as it relates [to] federal and local roles, authority and responsibilities" regarding law enforcement (Personal Communication, 2021) and emphasized and clarified Oregon's sanctuary state law (ORS 181A.820).

The meeting was reported as a great success in city council meeting minutes and by several informants. The meeting was held in Spanish and those who did not speak Spanish were interpreted to through headsets, a first for Madras city government. One

informant aware of the unique nature of this meeting in Madras reported the meeting served as "a privilege for the mayor and for [the chief of police] and all of [the other city representatives in attendance] to be trusted with the stories of our community members" (Personal Communication, 2021). Anglo informants who were present at this meeting expressed appreciation for, and even enjoyment of, the novelty of attending a meeting at which their language was not the dominant language (Personal Communications, 2021).

Almost 70 people attended the meeting, according to the February 14, 2017, council meeting minutes, and Mayor Embanks is reported to have "indicated that he had apparently been underestimating Councilor Piza as he didn't think they would get that many people there" (The City of Madras, 2017b, p. 11). While the meeting minutes state that meetings of this nature would continue to occur, there is no mention of such meetings in following council meetings through 2019 and informants for this project referred to no additional Spanish language meetings, much less one of this scale. Thus, the Spanish-language-dominant community meeting has remained novel in Madras.

The meeting minutes reporting the details of this meeting reveal that the meeting was planned on very short notice, so much so that Mayor Embanks apologized to the council after the fact for not having invited everyone. The turnout for this meeting can only be credited to individuals trusted by the Latino community and willing and able to reach out household by household to disseminate information in Spanish and encourage attendance. Such individuals are invaluable as a bridge across cultural barriers and are often recognized by many in the community.

Almost all informants for this project named Piza directly or referenced her as "the first Latina councilor" and identified her as a cultural bridge during the time she

served the City of Madras. Blanca Reynoso was another individual recognized by multiple informants as a bridge to the Latino immigrant community. Reynoso is a Madras business owner and a long-time commissioner on the Madras Redevelopment Commission, but is also noted by informants as a community member integral to connecting people and communities (Personal Communication, 2021). One city employee, when describing how they work with the dynamics of the Madras population, said "we lean on folks like Blanca who can help us communicate" (Personal Communication, 2021).

Madras, Oregon: Trust and Race Relations

Data collected for this case study suggest that the actual experience of people of color in Madras is different from how Anglos who are in positions of power believe that experience to be. Informants personally familiar with Madras immigrant, Latino, or American Indian populations, either by identifying as a member of one of these populations or due to intentional and extended employment serving one of these populations directly, revealed a context in which non-Anglo leaders with knowledge, skill, and a desire to build community were met with doubt and incomplete efforts to engage populations. On the other hand, informants who were Anglo, and did not work with other racial or ethnic groups, directly emphasized the value and desire for diversity in the city government and describe the Madras population as ethnically mixed, where everyone is treated as equals.

An informant working in city leadership emphasized that participation from the Latino community was desired but "it seems like participation has been challenging, and I don't know why" (Personal Communication, 2021). This was echoed in the memories

of another informant, who shared that they had observed a frustration on the part of city employees who felt there were voices missing from the conversation in Madras, but how to get them into the conversation was unknown to anyone (Personal Communication, 2021). Individuals with direct connections to non-Anglo populations in Madras were equally frustrated, but they also understood and expressed a solution.

One individual referring to engaging the Latino community effectively commented, "you need to be visible in the community. You need to build trust" (Personal Communication, 2021). The informant offered the examples of going door to door to meet Latino business owners downtown and Spanish-language community meetings as trust building exercises. Another informant in the city government stated of relations with the Latino community, "we have a long, long history of eroding every opportunity for trust" (Personal Communication, 2021), and suggested that much work was yet to be done. There are overlays of cultural differences and different understandings of *what community is* in the City of Madras.

American Indian and Latino relations are also evolving in Madras. Informants with close connections to the Warm Springs Indian Reservation and the Madras American Indian population reported a notable rate of intermarriage among Indians and Latinos (Personal Communications, 2021), and within the American Indian community, reflections about past anti-immigrant and racist sentiments are beginning to garner more attention and are being discussed more openly (Personal Communication, 2021). Relations between American Indians and U.S. immigrants, particularly immigrants of color, have been fraught with complexities. On one hand, an informant explained, American Indians observed immigrants of color being negatively impacted by the

341

restrictive policies and practices of the dominant Anglo culture, much in the way that assimilation and allotment policies repeatedly deconstructed American Indian cultures. On the other hand, American Indians felt threatened by any further impact immigrant populations may have on resources already largely lost since the arrival of Anglo settlers (Personal Communication, 2021).

Traumas endured collectively can result in lasting and confusing or unclear tensions, and in the United States, those tensions are frequently expressed as racialized contexts. An informant who identified as an American Indian with ties to the Madras community outlined how U.S. federal policies effectively institutionalized the racialization of American Indian membership, using the blood quantum system as an example. Blood quantum, or the extent to which one is biologically related to a tribe, was a system initially designed by the U.S. federal government to limit tribal citizenship, thus, limiting the number of individuals with rights to sovereignty (Chow, 2018). Blood quantum rules have historically been arbitrary, yet such rules in the Warm Springs tribe continue to bar membership to individuals who grew up in the community but do not have sufficient 'Warm Springs blood' to be enrolled (Personal Communication, 2021). Federal policies recognized as having been detrimental to the American Indian population in the past continue to affect the population in unexpected ways today, leading one informant to say, "these federal policies were extremely effective in not only wiping us out, but giving us the weapons to wipe each other out" (Personal Communication, 2021). This example lays bare the fact that policies and procedures for governance carry forth history in ways that remain unseen without thorough introspection.

Reviewing informant data and other collected materials indicates two worlds. In one world, city leadership—almost all Anglo—successfully facilitates economic development and wonders why a majority of the Latino and American Indian residents are not heralding the latest investment or the introduction of a new brewery in town. While in the other world, Latinos and American Indians are seeing their communities' values misinterpreted and without representation, yet their efforts to manage those values for themselves are exhausting on an individual level and trust is continuing to deteriorate on a collective level. One informant framed the context exactly when they said, "I feel like that's maybe the piece that the city was missing is rather than trying to insert the Latino community into existing dominant culture models of governance and community engagement, flip it and you be open with the idea of engaging with them in what they are already doing. And giving them the power and control, the drive, the tools" (Personal Communication, 2021).

In a 2013 article exploring economic development, racialization, and privilege in Madras, the author illustrates the history of a racial hierarchy in Madras that is constructed and maintained by unchallenged policy processes and leadership narratives (Bonds, 2013). In discussions about race in Madras with informants for this project, it was noted that "the city government doesn't necessarily do things like combat racism, but it certainly upholds it" (Personal Communication, 2021). Another stated, "as soon as Latinos and Native Americans start to rise to positions of power, all of a sudden, things get a little less comfortable for the Anglos that have been there forever and, you know, really see it as theirs" (Personal Communication, 2021).

The conflicting values Ramsey (2003) alludes to in the post-homesteading era are paralleled in some ways in modern day Madras. There remains in Madras an overarching persistence of Anglo ownership that is supported by existing governance practices and norms. Different, however, are the stations of the immigrant and American Indian populations in the city today. The immigrant community has evolved since the 1940s into a sophisticated network of multigenerational families, new arrivals, and educated individuals with a clear understanding of what their communities need. The American Indian population has challenged the federal government and won their sovereignty once and for all. Together, immigrants and American Indians (including Alaskan Natives) made up over 22% of the Madras population in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).

Madras, Oregon: 2005-2019—Projects and Intergovernmental Relationships

While barriers to entry and a lack of action to recognize and remove those barriers was expressed throughout informant interviews and supported by secondary data analysis, what is also clear about Madras is that the city has the infrastructure, the interest, and the capacity to make things happen for the community. One informant noted "the potential for the coolest stuff is rife all over the place" (Personal Communication, 2021). The following section illustrates capacity in Madras using two recent achievements: a unique community event and the development of a housing district. The section is followed by a brief review of intergovernmental and interorganizational relationships, which are significant to city capacity because they illustrate how well-connected and how reliant the city is on other jurisdictions and organizations.

2017 Solar Eclipse—A unique opportunity

The Solar Eclipse event planning provides a unique opportunity for assessment of civic capacity in Madras. Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination are reflected in Madras City Council meeting minutes throughout the planning period prior to the August 2017 event, when city officials readied the town to accommodate up to 200,000 guests (The City of Madras, n.d.-b). From a public safety perspective, the Madras city police coordinated with county, state, and other local police departments to ensure traffic routes and safety protocols were appropriate. The city worked to coordinate medical emergency organizations and communicated regularly with ODOT to ensure traffic flow was maintained. The Madras airport closed to make their tarmac available for overflow parking, which required FAA approval. Food and grocery providers were among the many businesses the city worked with to ensure there would be sufficient food available for the course of the event. At least one city employee participated in a Regional Public Information Officers Group and participated in communications across the region to ensure media and stakeholders were updated appropriately.

One informant said the eclipse was transformative in how it changed the way people in Madras saw themselves (Personal Communication, 2021). The Madras Downtown Association was born of the eclipse event and the association's First Thursday events, noted as cross-cultural by one informant, continue after a necessary hiatus through the summer of 2020 (Madras Downtown Association, n.d.). The one-time event tested Madras capacity and resulted in lasting community events and connections.

2019 Madras Housing and Urban Renewal District

Madras passed the first urban renewal housing district in the state in 2019 (City of Madras, 2019). Housing has been a growing concern in Madras and throughout Jefferson County over the target timeline for this project (Personal Communications, 2021) and the renewal district was the city's response to land use challenges imposed on the county and city by state law. The housing district was noted as a success by informants with knowledge of its details (Personal Communications, 2021), with one informant stating it was "one of the most progressive, forward thinking, innovative housing action plans I have ever seen."

The city government was described by an employee as having very few silos, and when it came to the development of the housing district, city finance, community development, and public works departments worked well together to ensure communication was clear and that goals were met (Personal Communication, 2021). The heavy lifting for the housing district also came on the heels of the solar eclipse in Madras, which served as a primer for the community and for the city to feel confident about what they could achieve together.

Madras, Oregon: Intergovernmental Relations

Federal

One informant, whose work centers on the Latino community in central Oregon, detailed the limiting impact of federal immigration policy on Latino populations, noting that individuals with no immigration status have few opportunities to gain such status, and without status, access to benefits even for citizen family members is limited (Personal Communication, 2021). Federal policy limits the extent to which many

immigrants can engage and participate, which keeps families, particularly low-income families, from enjoying economic growth. Referencing the Trump Administration's strict interpretation of the public charge rule (USCIS, 2019), the informant notes that current federal policy puts individuals and families in communities like Madras at risk.

State and Local

The same informant noted, however, that many state-level barriers to immigrants have been removed in Oregon over the past several years. For example, since the enactment of SB 1563 in 2018 (Oregon Legislative Assembly, 2018) in-state tuition is now available to long-term residents regardless of immigration status, and proof of legal residence is no longer required to obtain an Oregon driver's license or state ID (Oregon Driver & Motor Vehicle Services, n.d.).

Intergovernmental relations are significant for building and development departments across central Oregon. The city of Madras relies on county building inspectors to approve projects throughout the city, which can slow work down significantly because the Warm Springs Reservation and other counties also rely on Jefferson County inspectors at times (Personal Communications, 2021). In general, there is a shortage of building inspectors in the states of Oregon, and this causes frustration for builders as well as for city administrators interested in seeing projects come to fruition more quickly.

County and city administrators suggested the relationships each jurisdiction has with the Warm Springs Reservation are minimal. In general, business to business relationships are more common than government to government relationships (Personal Communication, 2021). Yet, friction between local governments and the Reservation

were noted where property taxes and schools were part of the conversation. In 2012, a Jefferson County School District Bond Measure was approved for $26.6 million to build a K-8 school on the Warm Springs Reservation and a 600-seat performing arts center located at Madras High School (Ballotpedia, n.d.-b). One informant emphasized that there were likely great benefits to students living on the Reservation to be able to be educated on the Reservation through middle school, but that the situation is a source of friction within the broader Jefferson County community due to a perceived lack of parity in property tax payments (Personal Communications, 2021).

The Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 explains that the land of sovereign American Indian tribes, held in trust by the federal government, is immune from state taxation, so residents of the Warm Springs Reservation, as a sovereign nation, do not pay property taxes (IRS, 2021). At the same time, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965) (ESEA) calls for the non-discriminatory education of all children in the United States. In particular, Title VI of the ESEA notes "it is the policy of the United States to fulfill the Federal Government's unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people for the education of Indian children" (Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 1965).

A second example of city-sovereign intergovernmental relations was shared by a city administrator. In 2018, the Warm Springs Travel Plateau Center, located within Madras city limits, opened to serve the public. While the land was long owned by the Tribe, it was part of property annexed into Madras in 2003. In my initial discussion on the topic, an informant expressed tension around the provision of city services. Because the Tribes do not pay property taxes, an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) was

organized for the purpose of providing necessary city services and collecting payment for them (Madras Trust Site Redevelopment Intergovernmental Agreement, 2017). The relationship is unique in its governance structure, yet standard when observed through the IGA process. Still, the sentiment surrounding the project reflects lasting resentment toward Warm Springs for not paying for services through property taxes. Even as news outlets report that the land had been under Warm Springs' ownership for 40 years (Roberts, 2017), city officials understand the land to have been donated to Warms Springs with the City of Madras' cooperation prior to development (Personal Communication, 2021).

The friction noted in informant comments in relation to each of these examples reflects the nature of intergovernmental relationships involving local governments and sovereign nations in the United States and deserves greater exploration in future projects. For the purpose of the present case study, these examples illustrate the mechanical complexity of intergovernmental relations while also showing evidence of a more nuanced complexity relating to expectations of fairness and universal employment of institutions such as taxation.

Organizational

Madras is home to a variety of formal organizations that make up the fabric of the city's civic capacity, including Kiwanis and Rotary International. Latinos rarely participate as members of these groups (Personal Communication, 2021). Resources targeting Latinos in the Madras area include the Latino Community Association, the Oregon Human Development Corporation (with an office in Bend), and the Oregon Child Development Coalition Migrant Head Start. Migrant families in the Madras area are also

eligible to benefit from the Migrant Education Program, which is federally funded and designed to support the educational needs of children who move across school boundaries with their parents with some frequency (High Desert Education Service District, n.d.).

The Latino Community Association of Central Oregon has had a direct presence in Madras since opening a branch office there in 2013 and has served the Latino population across the region since 2000. An organization with the capacity and broad reach of the Latino Community Association is typically a boon to the communities in which it does its work because such organizations can often serve to bridge cultural and social differences that otherwise may keep populations from hearing one another's needs. In Madras, the Latino Community Association (n.d.) provides workforce education and training, promotes health programs, and organizes cultural events like the annual Latino Fest.

The Let's Talk Diversity Coalition (LTDC) served Jefferson County and the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs communities from 2011 until 2019 and was based in Madras. LTDC was a program supported by the Oregon State Office of Equity and Inclusion and intended to address issues relating to diversity, equity and inclusion (Let's Talk Diversity Coalition, n.d.).

It should be noted that, while the organizations listed here are integral to supporting community members, such formal organizations do not play a role in the local government. They do, however, serve to provide community members social outlets and opportunities for leadership development, which can translate into a more engaged public (Skocpol, 2003). The *Community* page of the website for the City of Madras lists local organizations including links to both the local chapter of Rotary and Kiwanis

International clubs, but no links to organizations specifically targeted to Latino or American Indian populations appear to be present (The City of Madras, n.d.-c).

Madras, Oregon: Conclusion

The story of Madras from 2005 to 2019 is a story of two cities. Madras through the lens of city leadership and governance is a typical rural U.S. city coping with the pressures of growth. A focus on economic development has improved a variety of recreational amenities in the city park system, beautified entry and exit ways to and from the city, and attracted a brewery, a cinema, and other popular businesses. Yet, in discussions with nine informants and a review of local materials including news articles and city and organizational meeting documents and reports, the non-Anglo population clearly faces barriers to participation and engagement.

Madras through the lens of advocates for the Latino population and non-Anglo leaders is a U.S. city that has not come to terms with the strength of its historical diversity. Indeed, much of the city's history and diversity was left unreferenced in informant discussions for this case study. Leaders of color have pushed their way into Madras city and regional government in the recent past, leaving lasting impacts on fellow council and committee members and on their communities. Yet, retention of diverse representatives has proven difficult for the City of Madras.

Madras shows great potential for high civic capacity given the broad range of amenities and a government whose planning has led to action in a variety of projects. At the same time, the city holds itself back in the form of maintaining barriers to full community participation for those whose values and needs are not met through contemporary practices of economic development and governance.

Informant interviews revealed a community held apart by conflicting values relating to what constitutes *community* and resulting in the prevention of participation by entire segments of the population. Significant efforts to improve this gap have been made in Madras and are discussed in this case study, but they are led predominantly by leadership rising from the Latino population in the city. The lack of diversity in government positions and the challenges facing non-Anglos who do engage in elected positions suggest that not only values but also institutional constructs hold communities apart in the city. However, Madras offers a robust social infrastructure that, if recognized and utilized, could, with the development of trust, build connections between divided communities.

Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion

This chapter reports the findings of this research study and discusses those findings in the context of immigration federalism and public administration. First, the findings section reveals the nature of the relationship between federal and state-level immigration policymaking and implementation. Second, the findings of the QCA analysis are reported to illustrate the diversity within and among the three local-level case study cities. Third, findings for the qualitative review report about factors relevant to civic capacity at the local level. Then the discussion section incorporates these findings into a framework for immigration federalism with an emphasis on the local-level context and closes with a note regarding social equity and public administration.

Findings

I construct a new narrative of immigration in the United States through this broad reaching and in-depth qualitative research study. First, a novel description of contemporary federal-level immigration policy integrated with an understanding of its relationship to state and local immigration policy actions presents a snapshot of the context of immigration federalism in the United States today. Second, the framework and resulting case studies reframe our understanding of the trends observed in federal and state-level policy creation and their impacts at the local level. Third, the case study analysis develops our understanding of the diversity of local communities and the position of local government and community leaders amidst the changing nature of demographics in the United States. Finally, the analysis adds to existing but nascent literature exploring the complex nature of rurality in the United States.

The framework for immigration federalism constructed to complete this research and outlined in the table in Appendix A includes three levels of government: federal, state, and local. The framework integrates socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural institutional mechanisms and shows if and how they relate to one another and to immigration policy at multiple levels of government, which provides a rich narrative of contemporary immigration federalism. Using the resources that the framework's structure provided, I created five case studies (one federal level, one state level, and three local level) to reflect the contemporary context of immigration federalism.

There are several things the framework and case studies help us do. First, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) results and qualitative content analysis of case studies clarify the relational variation observed in state immigration policy and responses to such policies among different communities. The framework and resulting case studies are a resource for discussing questions relating to what community characteristics or conditions lead to certain policy types or community responses. This study finds that, at the local level, policy decisions and community response are heavily dependent on historical framing and contemporary dynamics of power within residential populations and leadership.

This framework serves as a data warehouse from which answers to the research questions for this study can be drawn. The following section is framed around the research questions:

1) When the history and institutional context of federal, state, and local-level immigration policy are observed and compared, what conclusions can be drawn about the impacts and influences of one upon the other?

2) Is immigration policy at the local level generalizable in the United States or are local contexts so diverse that generalizations about immigrants and immigration cannot be reliably constructed?

First, I share findings from a comparative content analysis indicating the relationships between federal and state-level immigration policy. I pay attention to historicity, because the literature claims, and these data show, that history plays a significant role in understanding policy relationships (Neustadt & May, 1986) and in constructing social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). I also focus on the 2005-2019 timeline to align a contemporary perspective of immigration policy. Second, I focus on findings from the QCA process in which I compare all three local case studies to identify commonalities within and among the cases. The analyses in this section reveal that there are fewer similarities among the localities than there are differences. The impacts of federal and state-level policies are touched on where applicable. Third, findings relating to the presence of evidence concerning civic capacity in each local case study are drawn out after the more general local-level findings are shared. Finally, findings end by highlighting the impact, both historical and contemporary, of immigrants to the presence of each locality.

Relationships between Federal and State-Level Immigration Policy

A comparative content analysis of the federal-level, comprehensive coverage state-level, and deep coverage state-level case studies confirms that history plays a role in the making of place, and the federal government's indifference to constructing an overarching, robust vision of immigration has led to reactive policies enacted under the authority of executive order.

Admitted to the Union in 1859, two years prior to the start of the U.S. Civil War, the state of Oregon was founded from the start with a constitution that embodied anti-immigrant and racist sentiments (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). This reflects racialization at the national level, where southern slave states designed policies to prevent Blacks from leaving their jurisdictions and northern states designed policies to prevent Blacks from entering their jurisdictions (Neuman, 1993). Black individuals were constitutionally barred from residing in Oregon, and Chinese individuals were constitutionally prohibited from voting.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 defined the term 'citizen' for the first time at the federal level and granted citizenship to any individual born in the United States without regard to race or ethnic background. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 ensured birthright citizenship through the power of the U.S. Constitution. Yet in Oregon, interracial marriage was outlawed in 1866. The case studies and the analysis process for this project do not explore the development and culture surrounding the enactment of state laws of this nature. However, for this project, the alignment observed in the federal-level and state-level policy-making infers that the Oregon state law attempted to prevent people of color from declaring legal citizenship after the U.S. Constitution granted broad citizenship and other rights in 1866. Such policy response practices are in line with practices observed by Okrent (2019) to have prevented two generations of Jews, Italians, and other European Americans out of the United States. In the United States, national historicity framed how writers of state constitutions framed immigrants, indigenous populations, and other people considered to be suboptimal, or those not of northern European descent.

In the decades after the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted, the relationship between federal and state jurisdictions were shaped through the courts. *Chy Lung v. Freeman* (1876) and *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* (1886) granted the federal government control regarding who could enter the United States and defined laws relating to both immigration and alienage. Yet, the authority granted to federal and state governments to create laws affecting alienage remains murky, and the courts continue to be the avenue for further defining state rights in developing policy that affects immigrants.

There is record of politically powerful states directly influencing federal immigration rules, but such universal power from the state level is even less common today. Asian exclusion laws introduced in the 1870s and 1880s were largely influenced by the state of California's lobbying activities (Waters & Pineau, 2015), but their success at the national level reflected broad readiness on the part of U.S. Americans to racialize Asians, particularly the Chinese.

At the time the Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted in 1882, the city of Portland, Oregon was home to the second largest Chinese population in the United States after San Francisco, California. In the decades after implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Oregon Chinese population declined and the Japanese population increased dramatically, indicating that states will respond to exclusion rules with alternative and similarly skilled arrivals. The notion of state-level influences on federal immigration policy and the flexibility with which states are observed to fulfill their need for laborers confirms that federal-level policy concerning immigrants and immigration is not driven by a unified and long-term vision for immigration to the United States. Instead, immigration policy at the federal level is reactive, and it often results in unintended

outcomes. The lack of an overarching federal level conceptualization of immigration also led to policies that result in constructions of immigration that include undocumented, or illegal, statuses (Waters & Pineau, 2015).

Many influential federal-level immigration policies enacted since WWII have been introduced by executive administration through the authority of memoranda and executive orders, including rules forcing the internment of Japanese individuals and the creation of the Bracero Program, and more recent rules creating Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and limiting entrance to nationals of several Muslim-majority countries. This study shows the nature of federal-level executive administration has changed from 2005 through 2019, with the Trump administration, active from 2016 through 2019, becoming far more active in issuing immigration policy via executive order and agency memorandum. The policies enacted under Trump are not in line with broad public sentiment, and court systems have grown more active in response to the aggressive policies of the Trump administration. Finally, refugee admission numbers decreased dramatically under the Trump administration and this is reflected in steep decreases in refugee numbers at the state level during those years. The findings observed in this study are at odds with the assumptions inherent to the steam-valve theory, which argues that tension at the local level pushes up through the state level until policy action occurs at the federal level (Spiro, 2001). Instead, federal level immigration policy appears to be driven, at least in the case of the Trump administration, by political interests largely disconnected from the local level.

Demographic changes at the national-level and in representation within the federal government are similar to those at the state level in many cases, but this seems

more a function of overall population changes than one of state-level policy influence. Populations are growing more diverse through immigration and birthright across the country. Evidence suggests that women and people of color are diversifying the Oregon state legislature in a similar fashion to diversification at the federal level, although more data are needed to confirm this. The diversification of representation in leadership—or at least the attempt to diversify representation—at the local level is also observed in case study cities.

At the national level, wages stagnated during the target timeline for U.S.-born white workers while foreign-born white, foreign-born Asian, and U.S.-born Asian workers remained competitive with one another, even throughout the slump caused by the recession from 2008 to 2010. Furthermore, the U.S.-born White non-Hispanic labor force participation rate was the only group to suffer a sustained decrease in participation for the decade following the recession. During the same time period, the rise of the white Nationalist movement, touting anti-immigrant sentiments, is observed in national discourse while state policy sentiment grows more integrative overall.

Local Level Qualitative Analysis of Interview Data

Descriptive data about interview informants for this research study are included in Appendix I. At the outset of this research project, I was hoping the qualitative analysis of informant interviews at the local level might allow for at least a glimpse of hierarchical policy influences passed from the federal and state levels to the local level, and recursive influences from the local level to other levels of government. However, the results were diverse enough that drawing conclusions based on the qualitative analysis of interview data alone was unrealistic.

The qualitative analysis of 19 interviews resulted in 165 discrete codes, including 24 code groups and 27 independent codes, or codes that do not fit under the umbrella of the 24 code groups. Appendix J reports these codes. Twenty-four code groups can be interpreted as 24 conceptual categories, but the conceptual properties revealed in the analysis were so diverse that finding meaning among them was challenging through qualitative coding alone. This analysis, however, did serve me in the construction and writing of case studies.

My analysis of co-occurrence among conceptual categories in the interviews revealed that trust is observed to relate to cultural competence, and intergovernmental relations (IGR) is integral to a city's capacity to achieve goals. In three interviews focusing on three different Oregon cities, informants expressed the notion that cultural competence among the dominant culture and efforts to develop cultural competence within the dominant culture increase the level of community trust, particularly in immigrant and Latino communities. In three cities, informant interviews confirmed that IGR is a significant factor in achieving local government goals. And in multiple interviews in two case study cities, the feeling that "we, as a community, deserve this" served as a clear indicator of civic success.

The relationship between trust and cultural competence stands out in the case studies, as does the logical relationship between IGR and overall capacity to get things done. However, the qualitative analysis results indicate that the nature of local communities necessitates far more nuance than the comparison of interview data on the topic.

QCA of Local Case Studies—Sandy, Nyssa, Madras

The QCA analysis of three local case studies revealed that Sandy, Nyssa, and Madras shared 22 common conceptual properties categorized under 13 conceptual categories. Ten of these conceptual properties could be historical or present-day aspects common to any city in the United States like "Historicity: Tribal Territory" and "IGR: State land use laws". See Appendix K for the complete QCA truth table and output of conceptual categories and properties for this project. Coding for each city revealed 67 conceptual properties under 22 conceptual categories in Sandy, 71 conceptual properties under 17 conceptual categories in Nyssa, and 78 conceptual properties under 24 conceptual categories in madras.

I had hoped that the results of the QCA analysis would indicate what conditions are necessary and sufficient for local jurisdictions to engage in restrictive or integrative immigration policy practices, but the reality of local-level immigration-related policy practices are really much less intentional and arguably non-existent from the perspective of government leadership. The vast majority of conceptual properties contributing to a city's civil society are unique, or at least not ubiquitous in all cities. The universal history of the United States is that lands settled and cities established were once indigenous tribal territory, European settlement of these cities occurred only after the forced removal of indigenous populations from the territory, and the forced movement of indigenous populations continued through much of the twentieth century. The three Oregon cities were all incorporated in the early 1900s. None of them were founding cities, settled by the time Oregon achieved statehood in 1859, but they were settled in later decades when logging, agriculture, and the promise of land drew people to the western United States.

361

Infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and irrigation, plays a significant role in place-making in the early U.S. west, and all three city case studies reference the importance of various types of infrastructure to the city's early stability and progress. Nyssa and Sandy both take pride in their pioneer history as "gateway cities" along the Oregon Trail. Railways had connected all three cities to ports and industrial hubs by the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century, and this rail infrastructure continues to have a contemporary influence on industry in those cities.

In Madras and Nyssa, irrigation technology played a significant role in establishing agricultural industries and attracting stable populations. The Newlands Reclamation Act is directly responsible for bringing public irrigation to Nyssa in the 1930s and to Madras in the late 1940s. Access to irrigable land led to the expansion of agricultural industries, which also increased the need for farmworkers in these two cities. Sandy, established on the banks of the Sandy River and nestled into the foot hills of Mount Hood, was initially supported by logging and by serving the needs of travelers from the Oregon Trail.

Other similarities shared by the three case studies concerns recent functions of community maintenance and governance. First, each case study city is governed by the council/manager form of government. Therefore, the findings of this study cannot infer how form of government may impact immigration policy at the local level. Second, all three cities hold annual festivals that highlight and celebrate the community and its history. Informant interviews for this research study indicate that the extent to which these festival events are inclusive of all residents varies. Third, the three case studies provide examples of creative governance solutions to challenges in service provision and

362

all three provide clear evidence that both formal and informal networks serve governing leaders in the identification of problems and development of solutions. Finally, while inter-government relationships are common, most are experienced as mundane and a necessary and common function of local governance. In each case study, however, state land use laws stand out as limiting to a frustrating extent. In Sandy and Madras, land use laws are observed to exacerbate issues with housing availability and increase the cost of housing. In Nyssa, land use laws are perceived as a barrier to the local business economy because rezoning and building under Oregon's laws is much more difficult than in nearby Idaho.

One aspect of immigration that is common to all three case studies is that Mexican immigrants make up the largest percentage of the immigrant population and the Latino population is growing. This demographic trend, while not ubiquitous, is common across the United States. In all three cities, representation of immigrants and of Latinos within city government leadership and as public employees is extremely limited and quite recent. This may have implications for representation and identity.

Information and programs are available in Spanish in each of the cities, but the extent to which information is available varies greatly. City leaders in Sandy spoke frequently of creating surveys in multiple languages and including Spanish-speakers in their data collection staff. They mentioned the evolution of bilingual signage in municipal busses and noted the evolution of traveling library services designed to "meet the Spanish-speaking population where it was." Nyssa and Madras leaders did not speak so directly of municipal efforts to increase access to information in Spanish.

All of the cities have at least one church that provides regular services in Spanish, but Madras has several such churches. Several Spanish language radio stations are available in Nyssa and Sandy, but Madras receives only one Spanish language station. Immigrants and Latinos are represented in business and entrepreneurship in each of the three cities, although the extent to which city leadership appears aware of immigrant and Latino engagement varies by city and by individual. No city websites or Chamber of Commerce websites include information in Spanish or highlight the entrepreneurship of immigrants.

The final aspect shared by all cities is their awareness and insistence that Oregon law enforcement does not and cannot enforce federal law, citing Oregon's "sanctuary state" law (ORS 181A.820). This rule is front and center in discussions relating to ICE operations in each area, but beyond that, city leadership had little to reference regarding ICE.

QCA of Local Case Studies—Sandy and Nyssa

Sandy and Nyssa share four points in the case study data that are not present in Madras. Two points reflect improved access to information for Spanish speakers. County and school district websites in both cities utilize translation services to translate entire web pages, or they make Spanish language forms accessible. This is not a function of municipal decision-making since it is counties and school districts funding the services, but it is indicative of the influences these cities navigate. Additionally, and as noted in the section above, Nyssa and Sandy receive several Spanish language radio stations, whereas Madras receives only one.

Immigration is not a policy arena in municipal governance. In Nyssa and Sandy at least one government employee expressed the fact that "immigrants are just served equally" as part of normal small town governance functions, and a reference to tight municipal budgets was also employed as an indicator of why immigrants were not provided additional or separate consideration. In Madras, discussions with city and community leadership about immigrants and immigration revolve around the city's diverse demographics. In Madras, awareness that various populations interact with the city differently is top of mind. Even so, actions taken to understand or deliver immigrants' service needs are not present in the informant data.

The final commonality shared by Sandy and Nyssa is unique because it connects U.S. climate history to its future. Both cities are affected by climate migration, although Nyssa received climate migrants leaving behind the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, and Sandy is experiencing large population influxes influenced in part by climate changes experienced in other parts of the country, primarily in California.

QCA of Local Case Studies—Nyssa and Madras

In Nyssa and Madras, the arrival of new immigrants has subtly decreased in the recent past but the Latino population has grown in both areas. The Bracero Program of the 1940s was a driving influence in Mexican immigration. Braceros worked in Nyssa, whereas Madras received Mexican migrants after the Bracero program was effectively ended in the Pacific Northwest.

Industry plays a major role in the economic success of Nyssa and Madras, which both had anchor employers who created employment stability in the cities for decades but have left or reduced capacity since 2005. Madras has remaining anchor employers, while

Nyssa is struggling to create an anchor lost early in the timeline for this case study. The loss of employment experienced in the cities led to a significant redistribution of overall employment and, in Nyssa, a decrease in population. Employment in the *education services, healthcare, and social services* industry has increased and the *manufacturing* industry has decreased in both cities. Case study informants unanimously noted the value of immigrant employees to local industry, and demographic and industry statistics also support this.

QCA of Local Case Studies—Madras and Sandy

Madras and Sandy are both gateway cities that serve Oregon's broader economy. The cities are throughfares for recreation as well as the transportation of goods by highway and freight train. A level of team continuity or teamwork in approaching challenging projects is evident in at least some projects in each city. The early Sandy leadership team seems to be aware of this continuity, suggesting it was intentional, while the continuity observed in Madras was identified more through triangulation of informant evidence than through shared awareness.

In both Madras and Sandy, a small number (sometimes one) of independent Latina immigrants serve to bridge the mainstream Anglo culture and the immigrant population. This is a tenuous link in both communities and appears to be short lived where support for intercultural work is not valued and supported. Related to cultural bridges is the concept of trust, which is mentioned as a need and a challenge to working with immigrant populations in both Madras and Sandy.

Evidence of such community members and discussions relating to trust were not indicated in Nyssa, but this is also likely due to the fact that the case study was

constructed with the assistance of a single informant. Historical references to immigrant arrival in Nyssa support a context in which the dominant Anglo culture accepted Mexican newcomers with only limited support.

Qualitative Review—Factors Relevant to Civic Capacity

Historicity

The history of the United States is universal in that the lands settled and established as cities were once indigenous tribal territory, and European settlement of these cities occurred only after the forced removal of indigenous populations from the territory.

Infrastructure such as roads, railways, and irrigation play a significant role in place-making in the early U.S. west. Pioneer identity and historical connections to the Oregon Trail reify constructs about the supremacy of the Anglo population in the west. Railways had connected some Oregon localities to ports and industrial hubs by the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century, and this rail infrastructure continues to have an influence on industry in those cities near rail services today.

Logging played a significant role in early Oregon industrial and immigration history. In the arid eastern half of Oregon, irrigation technology established agricultural industries and attracted stable populations. The Newlands Reclamation Act is directly responsible for bringing public irrigation to eastern Oregon in the 1930s and the late 1940s. Access to irrigatable land led to the expansion of agricultural industries, which also increased the need for farmworkers in these regions.

Industry/Economy

This study reveals several observations regarding industry and immigration at the local level. The framework primes scholars for further studies relating to industry interest groups which will be able to confirm or challenge findings that suggest that these groups may have a significant impact on immigration policy outcomes at the state level (Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011). My findings are limited by the fact that my data collection process necessarily prohibited travel to and engagement with case study cities due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this section, I report aspects of industry and economics in these cities that would be of interest to explore more deeply for the purpose of understanding industry interest groups at the local level.

Sandy stands out among the case study cities because it appears to have a diverse enough economy that remained stable throughout the target timeline, including the Great Recession from 2008 to 2010. Nyssa fared considerably worse as the city was supported by a single large industry that left in 2005. Madras experienced some of the recession-related drawbacks that Nyssa experienced, but seemed to have a diverse enough economy that other industries managed to survive. In addition, as gateway cities, Sandy and Madras both likely benefit economically from nearby urban centers like Portland and Bend, respectively. Nyssa's economic region is smaller and is made more complex by interstate relationships.

This research study did not collect the demographic details of management within industrial workplaces, although there is evidence that at least one former Nyssa plant manager was an immigrant. In general, findings show that immigrant entrepreneurs tend to own and manage small businesses, often restaurants. Small businesses like those

owned by immigrants are more vulnerable to economic disruptions such as the recession (and COVID), but an assessment of small business losses during this timeline is unavailable for this research.

Informants, including city leaders, in Sandy described their observations of immigrants shifting (sometimes generationally, sometimes not) from farm work to indoor labor and to entrepreneurship. Such observations were not shared by city leaders in Madras or Nyssa.

Changing Demographics

Within cities, the pressure of demographic change is not immigrant driven but newcomer driven. This is particularly so in Sandy, where newcomers are "Californians" or individuals assumed to be migrating to Sandy from areas, frequently from California, where the price of housing is substantially higher than in Oregon. Housing is a pressure, but tight housing markets are not a function of immigrant presence, nor are they seen as such by locals.

In Madras, where 49.3% of the population is Latino or American Indian and 13.2% of the overall population is made up of immigrants, neither the immigrant nor the non-Anglo populations are viewed as a threat to housing or otherwise considered overwhelming. My case study data analysis suggests that they are for the most part ignored.

Intergovernmental Influences (Local—State, Local—Tribal, Local—Other)

Shifts in federal policy can cause anxiety at the local level, but little else changes in terms of an individual's day to day life. Policies targeting undocumented individuals are deeply personal and impact families with ties to undocumented individuals, but they

do not impact every immigrant. It is important to reiterate that the undocumented status exists in the policy void created by the federal level farmworker program in 1942 and various other immigrant statuses created in 1965 and in the 1990s. Federal level support for some immigrants comes in the form of grants to states and local agencies for the purpose of providing basic adult education and migrant children's education, but these benefits are mandated by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965) (ESEA) rather than a policy specific to immigrants or immigration.

Oregon's geography, coupled with changes made to the Bracero Farmworker Program in 1947, influenced the success of farmworker organizing in the state. When the federal government reduced federal support for the Bracero Program by requiring that farmers cover the cost of workers' transportation from the border, the Pacific Northwest was effectively eliminated from the program (Sifuentez, 2016). Oregon farms were simply too far away from Mexico for farmers to afford the cost of transportation. The success of Mexican farmworker rights groups like PCUN is directly related to the fact that Mexican workers already in Oregon, or those who made the trip on their own, had greater negotiating power due to the scarcity of labor (Sifuentez, 2016). This shows a more nuanced context than common arguments surrounding the evolution of state immigration policy in general and introduces the notion that immigrant activism preceded, and perhaps helped to usher in, today's existing progressive activism in Oregon.

Oregon state immigration policy tends to be integrative and it has been exceptionally integrative since 2012. Integrative state-level immigration policies can ameliorate the anxiety caused by restrictive or extreme federal level practices, especially

when those practices change with every presidential administration. Oregon's and other states' efforts to provide access to driver's licenses regardless of immigration status is an example of a rule that helps to limit risk for undocumented individuals and their families. Sanctuary laws are similar. Such laws do not prevent the enforcement of federal immigration laws, but they do help ensure that due process is observed. Oregon was the first state to create a sanctuary state law in 1987 in response to a discriminatory event that occurred in Independence, Oregon in 1977 (University of Oregon, n.d.).

State-level restrictions on land use and business impact how small cities function, but they also influence how well understood a small city feels by the state government. Where small cities feel exceptionally isolated with policies that do not seem to fit their needs, they are more likely to express greater animosity and skepticism toward the state government. Furthermore, the impacts of state land use and business restrictions likely have a greater negative impact on some immigrant populations overall since low-income and unskilled individuals face the steepest barriers to land, home, and business ownership.

In the case of Madras, historic generalizations appear to reign where city-tribal relations are concerned. Both city and county leaders express a sentiment of frustration when the fact that tribes do not pay property taxes arose. The capacity of the tribal population to actively participate in economic and social practices has increased dramatically since the 1970s, but acknowledgement of this is sparce during informant interviews. This could be explained by the fact that, because the case study focused on immigrants and immigration, informants were simply not primed to consider tribal relations at any level of depth. What is clear, however, is that the municipal-tribal

relationship is complex and quite different from the federal-tribal relationship, which is explored to a greater depth in the literature.

Also reflected in the Madras case study is a complex relationship between tribal communities and immigrant communities. An increase in American Indian and Latino intermarriage and a changing dialogue among tribal members regarding immigrants is challenging existing stereotypes and reframing past sentiments. Furthermore, the example of blood quantum rules shows that governing policies and procedures carry forth history in ways that can remain unseen without thorough introspection.

Information Networks—formal and informal

In general, the presence of formal and informal governance networks in case study cities is expected. The ubiquity of governance networks and confirmation of the complex nature of system dynamics involved throughout networks, including the value of network analysis to answer questions relating to power, are confirmed in the literature (Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2011; Wasserman & Foust, 1994). Also explored in the literature are models explaining the significance of community level groups to the greater network (Gulati, Lavie, & Madhavan, 2011), the role of public administrators in network governance systems (O'Toole, 1997), and the development of social capital through networks (Burt, 2004).

The analysis of local case studies shows that city managers participate in state and international management associations (examples include the League of Oregon Cities, Oregon City/County Management Association, ICMA, etc.), and confer with other cities dealing with similar problems (including demographic change and budgeting concerns, but also including housing). Some local government leaders rely on social media like

Facebook to understand what community members are discussing. Individuals in leadership positions report participation in local chapters of Rotary, Kiwanis, and similar social clubs where they are available. City leadership aside, cities supported different levels of formal and informal organizing for residents.

Rotary and Kiwanis clubs are English-language-only chapter organizations, so participation is limited and not linguistically accessible to some immigrants. Cultural barriers to entry are not considered here in depth because they can be facilitated only after the more significant language barrier is diminished. One informant from Sandy provides an example of struggling to open a Spanish language chapter that proved unsustainable. The informant found that finding participants was not a concern but training the participants in functional practices of chapter life, such as secretary and treasury skills, demanded significant resources. The club collapsed when she decided she needed to step back from it.

In Madras, the Latino Community Association (https://latinocommunityassociation.org/) provides information and access to resources to the Spanish-speaking and Latino communities in Madras. While organizational leadership was aware of and networked with social services provided locally, city leadership seemed entirely unaware of the organization's presence as a resource for the Latino and immigrant communities. Other cities were not found to have a similar organization as a resource for Latino and immigrant populations.

Capacity to achieve goals generally

All cities show a strong capacity for creative problem solving and for communities to come together to get things done. Where non-Anglos lead problem

solving activities in Madras, they are rarely acknowledged for having done so. In Sandy, informant memories frequently acknowledged non-Anglos who led various ideas. This may, however, be more reflective of the values shared amongst this particular leadership team than values shared within the governing institutions of the city since it was not reflected in informant interviews beyond the tenure of the individuals in this team.

Leadership

Coordinated and attributed leadership stands out as a significant factor in facilitating civic capacity and supporting immigrants at the local level. In Sandy and Madras, the notion of a team effort among city leadership was reflected in various activities, yet the shared effort appears intentional in one context and happenstance in another. In Madras, city leadership pulled together to prepare for a solstice event that brought upwards of 200,000 people into the city in a single day. A city without the capacity to pull resources to prepare for the health and safety of such a population would not have achieved the success that Madras achieved. Yet, at the same time, when discussing events and policy changes that directly affect the immigrant population, such as the 2017 public forum about local government's relationship with ICE or affirming membership in the National Welcoming American Initiative, the individuals responsible for success receive little or no recognition for their roles.

The 2017 public forum was designed to educate residents about the city police department's relations with ICE, and it was identified by several informants as a significant success that took leaders coordinating across the city government, and one that is directly related to the topic of immigrants and immigration. City council meetings contain limited details about the event but make it clear who was responsible for

successful outreach to the Latino immigrant community. Two of three informants who participated in the event, however, revealed very little connection to other event coordinators or facilitators and neither mentioned the individual, an elected city leader and an immigrant, who facilitated outreach. The leader who facilitated outreach was also an informant for this research, and their explanation of the event was detailed and mentioned other city leaders and the roles they played. Learning the extent to which this informant led the success of this forum and the extent to which they are not recognized for it by leaders who benefited from their efforts impacted the fashion in which I moved forward with my research in Madras. Instead of noting the 2017 forum as an effort by the city to engage the immigrant community, I spent additional time searching for reference to this unique event in the local press. I came across none. I also reviewed city council meeting minutes for references to planning or indicators of follow-up events, but the forum was only mentioned as a side note by the mayor after the event took place.

In Sandy, the achievement of goals like the municipal bus service, the municipal internet service, community surveys, and mobile library services were mentioned by several leaders present during the time of development but attributed to other leaders who had a role in their development. The leadership team worked with apparent intention to bring others into their leadership space and empower them to lead new initiatives. This is, in part, undoubtedly due to the fact that the team had worked with one another for a while. However, informants reflected an awareness of one another's strengths and abilities, a shared goal of creating community, and the intention to coordinate with one another and with the community at large.

Comparing the two cities, Madras' leadership was reactive, while Sandy's leadership was proactive in their engagement. It should be recognized that leadership teams change with time and the leadership team referred to in Sandy dissolved between 2011 and 2018 as people moved on to different opportunities. Awareness of the leadership team and intention to work together prompts attribution, which keeps leaders committed to the process, potentially preventing attrition. In both Madras and Sandy, attrition of immigrant and Latina leaders has resulted from a lack of recognition, a lack of the value of leadership skills and the bridging of cultures, and a lack of attribution for achievements.

Another point can be made from the informant data collected for this case study project. Women of color are breaking through leadership ceilings at the local level and are successfully engaging communities. They are also being held back from greater success by other leaders and communities that do not recognize the strength of their efforts for the broader community (not just immigrant communities). This is no surprise. Immigrant women are noted in the literature for having created strong communities in Oregon in the past (Ng, 1989), and women of color, including immigrants, are currently taking on state and federal level leadership roles in record numbers (Center for American Women and Politics, 2021).

Social Capital

Each of the three cities discussed in case studies have a small-town identity, although Sandy is all too aware that it is growing fast. A small-town feel may indicate strong social capital but does not guarantee it. In each city, local news articles revealed a notion of community that illustrated ways in which community members would reach out

to help others. This was particularly notable in Nyssa, the smallest and the most remote of the three cities. Yet, it remains unclear whether all Nyssa communities benefited from local outreach. Because there was limited reference to Nyssa's immigrant community in local news reporting, the level to which the community is integrated into mainstream social capital activities remains unknown.

Madras and Sandy both reflect divisions between the Latino immigrant communities and the mainstream Anglo communities. While Sandy worked to bridge the gap in several ways, Madras has not coordinated efforts to do so. Madras might have strong social capital within communities but that social capital infrequently extends across communities. This leaves Madras divided in its actions and efforts relating to civic capacity and it leaves those groups with less direct access to decision makers with overall less influence.

Discussion

The findings of this study reveal a landscape of immigration federalism that is neither top down nor easily explained by individual policy mechanisms. The case study analysis further confirms that the components of civic capacity are complex and vary from one local context to the next (Shinn, 1999). What the theoretical framework for contemporary immigration federalism resulting from this work allows for is the exploration of immigration policy mechanisms in context with other factors affecting immigrants in the United States. The framework illustrates complex relationships among levels of government and policy stakeholders and it tells a unique story at every turn.

This discussion section further explains the theory of immigration federalism drawn from the case study development and analysis processes, both by describing the

overall significance of the local-level context and by speaking directly to claims made by other scholars in regards to immigration policy mechanisms. The section closes with a discussion relating findings of this research to social equity. As the fourth pillar of public administration, social equity offers an important point of analysis for immigration federalism.

A Theory of Immigration Federalism: Context at the Local Level

Scholars of immigration federalism have already argued for refocusing attention from the role of federal-level immigration policy toward greater attention to state-level immigration policy (Spiro, 2001; Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015) and local-level immigration policy (Rodriguez, 2008; Parlow, 2007). The results of my research also deemphasize the role of federal-level immigration policy in two ways. First, history makes it clear that immigration has never been a major policy arena for the federal government. The Supremacy Clause may be the present-day reason for the federal government's exclusive claim to U.S. immigration law, but the federal government only staked that claim in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Federal-level immigration policy is observed as being reactive in that it responds to national sentiments in what feel like tumultuous times, such as at the close of the American Civil War, after the close of WWI and before the start of WWII, and after the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Second, tensions around immigration policy are rising again today, yet Congress is bound by political gridlock and seems unable to act. The federal-level case study for this research reveals that Congress has rarely been first to act on issues of immigration. Many significant immigration-related policies from the federal level were introduced by executive order, only some of which were then followed by legislation passed in

378

Congress. Today's inaction on immigration policy reform at the federal level is nothing new and, it can be argued, is to be expected. The historical primacy of executive administration in U.S. immigration policy directs the results of this research to deemphasize the role of federal-level immigration policy.

Local-level case studies reveal that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other federal law enforcement agencies and actions are a real threat to immigrants' livelihoods. Typically, however, policy shifts that occur with changes to executive administration will alter the intensity with which enforcement is carried out, rather than eliminating enforcement altogether. This distinction is reflected in one informant's comment that community members with connections to undocumented immigrants relaxed after President Trump left office in 2021 (Personal Communication, 2021). This perspective is nuanced but important to the overall understanding of immigration federalism and should not be interpreted as a claim that federal immigration policy is without impact or insignificant. The overarching claim is that the day-to-day local-level immigrant experience in the United States is considerably more affected by local-level experience and context than federal-level policy.

One point must be highlighted to frame this discussion for 2021. The analysis of executive administration relating to immigration from 2005 through 2019 reveals that Trump employed immigration-related presidential documents for more aggressive policy-making than previous presidents and for more aggressive purposes. The voracity with which the Trump administration reframed allowances for entry and the treatment of individuals and families at the U.S.-Mexico border, and the psychological impacts these actions had and have on individuals in the United States and outside the country are not

being denied or diminished. It remains to be seen what lasting impacts the Trump administration has on U.S. immigration policy, and this framework for immigration federalism is structured to be able to make that assessment with further research over time.

At present, this research indicates that executive administration policy changes infrequently have overarching or immediate effects on immigrant populations at the local level in the United States. For example, policies that focus on enforcement are largely targeted at undocumented individuals. Court records and interest group reports show that citizens and other documented immigrants suffer losses because of these policies, but an aggregated view of the local level suggests that broad impacts can be small and that local-level actions can reduce the fear that comes with the presence of such federal-level policies. However, due to heterogeneity among local jurisdictions, comfort levels in one jurisdiction may not be equal to comfort levels in a neighboring jurisdiction, and in areas highly populated by undocumented immigrants, "everyone is affected" (Parks, 2017).

The findings of this research compel a discussion about how institutional differences at different levels of government result in very different policy contexts and different ways of framing norms and values around belonging. As an example, the construct of citizenship has different properties at different levels of government in the United States, yet all interpretations of citizenship frame who has access to what. At the federal level, the notion of citizenship is a legal construct, defined in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and reified by the Fourteenth Amendment. Citizenship at the federal level informs who may enter the United States freely (U.S. citizens), who may enter under certain restrictions (e.g., certain visa types limit how long an individual may remain in

the country and others restrict an individual's ability to work while in the country), and who may endeavor to gain U.S. citizenship.

However, the examination of citizenship within the United States has resulted in various perspectives, each framed within the institutions significant to that perspective and each having different implications for different populations. At the state and local levels, Colbern and Ramakrishnan (2021) define citizenship as "the provision of rights by a political jurisdiction to its members" (p. 36). This definition involves political membership and has more to do *who is participating* than with what those individuals' legal citizenship status is. Under Colbern and Ramakrishnan's (2021) definition of citizenship, more than 800,000 non-citizen immigrants in New York City have gained citizenship through the recent expansion of voting rights to legal permanent residents in that city (Ashford, 2022).

Evidence of the provision of rights through political membership is clear in state level immigration policy. In some states, such as Oregon, undocumented immigrants can now obtain a driver's license, which confirms that even individuals without legal status can expand their presence as citizens and gain access to political rights (Colbern & Ramakrishnan, 2021). The notion of citizenship in relation to political membership is particularly significant at the state level because, as Waters and Pineau (2015) explain, success or failure of achieving the social and economic integration of immigrants has important fiscal impacts on state and local governments in the form of social cohesion and tax revenue. Therefore, states' immigration policy practices can be seen as strategies for optimal management of immigrant integration in the state, and increasing the citizenship and political participation of immigrants is one way of achieving these goals.

Decreasing the citizenship and political participation of immigrants is another strategy observed at the state level.

At the local level, the notion of citizenship becomes a social process resulting from mutual obligations between society and members of that society (Perrin, 2014). This is reflected in this research study in statements made by multiple city managers that argue immigrants are not different from other members of the community in terms of service provision, or "everyone here is equal." That is, citizenship, or access to city services, is granted to residents *because* they are participating members of the community and regardless of legal status. Similarly, Stephen (2003) observes cultural citizenship as the recognition of immigrants as legitimate political participants regardless of legal citizenship status. Framed in this way, the extent to which immigrants at the local level are granted the benefits of citizenship varies according to the shared values and norms of the greater community.

In the case study data for this research, immigrant populations lack direct representation in governing bodies and their efforts to remedy that are often met with resistance from non-immigrant Anglo individuals. The ability to represent one's population at the local level creates space for greater levels of citizenship in those representing as well as in those being represented. However, where resistance is experienced as covert racism or consistent micro-aggressions, as informants in Madras described resistance to be, patterns of broken mutual obligations among society members are difficult if not impossible to realize. Local institutions, then, may serve to maintain the status quo simply by failing to acknowledge the biases working against immigrant participation, which raises questions regarding the responsibility of local leadership to

identify and deconstruct the institutional bias that denies access to citizenship. Facilitating the integration of immigrant populations can reduce barriers and increase immigrant civic participation, which, in turn, increases individual's abilities to support themselves financially and socially (Batalova, Fix, & Bachmeier, 2016). When individuals and families are better able to support themselves financially and socially, economic and social costs fall for all community members, and ethnocentricity also recedes. This is, in effect, a localized explanation of Waters and Pineau's (2015) observations of immigrant integration at the state level.

The comparative analysis of the three local case studies provides a limited platform from which to draw concrete findings but reveals a valuable context for further exploration and research. Local level case studies reflect localities as places where institutions do not autonomously exist from the people for the purpose of framing their norms and values. Instead, and as Berger and Luckmann (1976) argue, the public experiences existing institutions in the context of their own broader experience and from that their values emerge, ready to be pressed back onto the institutions in the process of legitimating (or challenging) those institutions as they stand. This process illustrates the need for a strong understanding of local institutions for the purpose of observing civic capacity (Vizzini & Morgan, 1999) and is reflective of the notion that both civic and procedural republic traditions are at work at the community level (Vizzini & Morgan, 1999; Witt, 1999). However, in the context of this research, it is also illustrative of the barriers to participation that existing for populations whose access to institutions is limited and whose values and norms are, therefore, functionally different.

When a change in federal-level immigration policy is implemented, the community experiences it through the lenses with which they experience local life. This perspective is one of social construction, where the interpretation of policy will depend on the local context and the individual's place within that local context. In this respect, this research finds truth in Selznick's (1994) argument that local diversity results in federal and state-level policies that become functionally different policies at the local level. States and local jurisdictions respond to federal policy changes according to their historical and current cultural contexts and will, largely, respond in ways that provide the most stability for their constituents. However, social groups within local jurisdictions also interpret policies differently, largely because they are affected by policy differently. Where immigrants are presumed to be "equal to everyone else" in terms of their needs and expectations for service delivery, they are more likely to be left out of the conversation and left behind in terms of citizenship and participation. On the other hand, findings from this study indicate that where local jurisdictions seek out the voices of immigrant populations and where they acknowledge the value of cultural citizenship by facilitating bridges to participation in local governance, a shared understanding of values and norms may be more likely. Further exploration of this notion would be of value.

Connections between federal-level immigration policy and the construction of the Oregon state constitution and early sentiment toward people who are not European settlers in the state are observed in this research. There is little reason to believe such influences would not be observed in other states and among states joining the union at similar times, although, in keeping with a Selznick (1994) perspective, how those influences manifest in each state remains unknown without further inquiry. It was not

within the scope of the comprehensive review of 50 states included in this study to review the historical perspective on immigrants and immigration in each state, but this study illustrates that doing so is of value to further understanding the impact and influence of early federal and state-level immigration policy and sentiment at the local level.

The state of Oregon's restrictive beginnings have evolved into a state that passes predominantly integrative immigration policy and is known for having the oldest sanctuary state law on record in the United States. In Oregon, the state's foundations created an unwelcoming context for immigrant newcomers, particularly those individuals who did not fit the racial and ethnic norms of "acceptable" immigrants. Yet, the state's geographic distance from popular points of entry, including the Atlantic coast, the Mexican border, and the bay area of California, facilitated the establishment of strong immigrant communities and empowered workers and activists to challenge poor working conditions and low pay.

The consistent success of farmworkers in negotiating for higher wages and better living conditions is an example of cultural citizenship that reflects empowerment and agency, making it a valuable aspect of Oregon historicity in the context of understanding immigration in the state, and it is worth exploring in the context of activism in Oregon overall. Immigrants have had a direct impact on U.S. states. Their labor in lumberyards, on railroads, in countless agricultural fields, and their entrepreneurship helped build the infrastructure without which industry would not thrive today. The findings of this research give reason to believe that less tangible outcomes of the immigrant presence, including traditions of activism and resilience, could also have had substantial influence

on the development of the norms and values of the dominant culture in the state of Oregon.

Oregon's sanctuary state law provides an example for the strength of Selznick's (1994) argument that local diversity results in federal and state-level policies that become functionally different policies at the local level. Since 1987, Oregon has prohibited local and state law enforcement from using public resources to arrest or detain people without a warrant in cooperation with federal immigration enforcement officers (ORS 181A.820). The interpretation of this law, however, has varied over time and by place. Until a 2014 court case made clear that ICE retainers did not hold the force of a warrant, local law enforcement agencies across the state cooperated with ICE to different degrees. This varied practice increased the level of risk some immigrant and non-Anglo individuals faced moving throughout the state.

This research involved speaking to three law enforcement representatives in Oregon, all of whom noted that the sanctuary law prevents their agencies from assisting ICE to arrest individuals whose only crime is being without documentation in the United States. Yet, informants familiar with the perspective of the Latino and immigrant populations in central Oregon suggested that these populations lacked trust in relation to the sanctuary law where the local police department and the county sheriff's departments were concerned. The sanctuary law is interpreted differently depending on the values and norms held by the head of a given law enforcement department and may be swayed by the promise of resources including network connections or the threat of lost elections, in the case of a sheriff.

In the broader context of immigration federalism going forward, this research calls for caution in placing excessive value on ideology, demographic change, and industry or interest groups in immigration policy to focus on awareness and governance processes at the local level, particularly in small cities and in the rural United States. Azemun and Kruggel (2021) argue that the rural United States is too often presumed by progressive immigrant rights activists to be "lost" to the ideological right. This assumption means that these communities are ignored in national conversations on immigration and other issues. However, this research study provides evidence of how incredibly important immigration actually is to the rural United States, both in its history and in its future. An intentional focus on immigration policy in local communities matters, and, as Azemun and Kruggel's (2021) work shows, rural residents who are encouraged to consider immigration issues in interpersonal interactions frequently do so without ideological barriers.

My research shows that public sentiment against demographic change may not be a function of experiences at the local level. In Sandy, informants tied demographic change to increasing housing costs, and rapid growth seemed to make residents anxious about the future, but informants explicitly reported that the foreign-born population was not part of the equation. Likewise, in Nyssa and Madras, local foreign-born populations were more likely to be left out in discussions relating to service provision, but informants did not report that they were villainized or seen as a threat by other community members. Therefore, the findings of this research indicate that demographic changes at the local level do not inherently lead to anti-immigrant sentiment, but anti-immigrant sentiment can be constructed through narratives repeated at other levels of information sharing.

This finding speaks to the work of scholars that claim demographic change is a main driver of immigration policy at the state level (Ybarra, Sanchez & Sanchez, 2016; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Marquez, 2017). My work shows that demographic change may not cause state-level law makers or interest groups to campaign for restrictive immigration policy, but, rather, demographic change could influence other, more directly causal, mechanisms of immigration policy. Instead of creating a need for policy changes, I argue that demographic change is a fitting social phenomenon for legislators whose ideological position is already aligned with immigration policy preferences. Observing demographic change in their jurisdictions provides a logical reason to push for restrictive rules, and sharing anti-immigrant narratives is a helpful practice for gaining constituent support. Additional research is necessary to explore these ideas further.

With this in mind, this study's findings speak to the work of scholars claiming that ideology is a main driver of immigration policy (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015; Chavez & Provine, 2009) and, more specifically, that restrictionist immigration attitudes correlate with isolationist perspectives (Huber and Espenshade, 1997). My research gives credence to arguments that ideology drives immigration policy, but it adds nuance to understanding how. Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) emphasize the role of "issue entrepreneurs" in immigration policymaking at subnational levels. Issue entrepreneurs work off convenience and opportunism to reframe challenges and disseminate information—sometimes misinformation—as it serves their policy needs (p. 97). While Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) focus on entrepreneurs as political actors, it is logical that proponents of such actors would work to sway opinion at the local

level where the integration of populations is weak and in states where legislators are conservative. This is on balance with Azemun and Kruggel's (2021) findings: whosever ideology knocks first gets the greatest influence, particularly if the narrative they bring is framed in the context of local values (Reyna, Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013).

The case study analysis for this research reveals a complex field for civil society in which immigrant populations may or may not be integrated into the whole depending on the nature of civic capacity in their local context. Where communities are more segregated and structural holes to the social network (Burt, 2004) are unbridged, local sentiment can be assumed to be more vulnerable to the influence of issue entrepreneurs. As a Democrat-controlled state and one historically well-populated with pro-immigrant activist interest groups, issue entrepreneurs with anti-immigration sentiments are unlikely to successfully change policy in Oregon at the state level, but this research shows the opportunity to influence narratives about immigration at the local level may be ripe in some contexts. These inferences must be explored further by developing the framework through the addition of more state and local-level case studies.

It is of interest to study more closely if there is a connection between Sandy's diverse economy and immigrants' relative success in partaking in that economy. The data collection for understanding economy and industry in each of the case study cities is superficial, largely due to the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented me from visiting each location to observe the cities' functions and talk to individuals on the ground. However, the framework constructed for this research study could facilitate such future research. This study found indications that many organizations exist at the state and local levels whose missions include serving and supporting immigrant and

migrant families. While the limitations of this study prevent it from responding directly to

Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011), it does keep their inquiry close in mind.

Further research to understand any existing influence of industry interest groups in state-

level immigration policy decision-making would do well to explore relationships between

immigrant-serving organizations and industry as well as to observe information traveling

from national industry interest groups to groups working at the state level. The

framework is designed with just this kind of exploration in mind.

Agricultural industries have historically employed the immigrant populations in

the selected case study cities for this research study and many in these communities

continue to be so today. However, employment of immigrants in these communities have

diversified, and there are immigrant communities in Oregon and in other states that are

employed in high-skilled industries. As local-level cases are added to the framework, it

will be valuable to look at industry trends in communities that rely on diverse immigrant

workers because there may be a significant difference in the relationship between the

industry and the workers that affects how immigrants gain aspects of citizenship in these

communities.

The three local case studies developed for this project were identified by

informants as being rural cities, yet each was remarkably different in its rurality, which

brought light to questions about the plurality of the nature of civic capacity in various

U.S. rural communities. Two case study cities serve urban areas with recreation and

transportation options while the third is quite remote and maintains a smaller population.

Of the three case study communities observed in this research, none qualifies as rural

according to existing classification systems because they are all cities with several

thousand residents. The rural identity of folks living in these cities, however, reflect notions of pioneering and homesteading that keep identities connected to Anglo settlement narratives.

Mukerjee (2021) explores the notion of rurality in the United States, emphasizing the point that for most of U.S. history, *rural* has been defined as anything that is not *urban*. Furthermore, rural classification systems are not comprehensive enough to incorporate all non-urban communities conveniently. In her work exploring nonprofit networks, Mukerjee (2021) explores the imbalance in urban-rural interdependence and questions why rural networks rely heavily on urban networks when the reverse is not reported to be the case. In considering rural gentrification, Nelson and Nelson (2010) explore the possibility of a relationship between the migration patterns of high-wage professionals and low-wage immigrants to rural spaces in the United States. My work follows Mukerjee's (2021) in finding that understanding the role of rurality and rural spaces in the United States requires greater attention in the field of public administration and suggests that rurality is, in some cases, less a function of communities and more an identity within them.

The rural United States is not homogenous but, instead, quite heterogenous as Selznick (1994) posits. In this study, immigration policy at the local level is framed by the functionality of civil society. Civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration is a focus of this research because it is through robust and reliable civic capacity that civil society functions at its best (Friedman, 2021). In all three local case studies, the capacity to identify and achieve broad public goals was evident, but

immigrant populations' access to information and ability to engage in mainstream intermediate associations and social activities is quite limited and often unwelcoming.

Immigrant populations in the case study cities have access to bonding social capital but frequently lack bridging social capital. Putnam (2000) differentiates the two types of social capital by arguing that bonding social capital includes intragroup relationships that help keep you connected to your roots, but do not facilitate your achievement of greater societal goals. Bridging capital is instrumental in "getting ahead" both individually and as a society (Putnam, 2000). Immigrants, then, are effectively relegated to rely on their own communities within the broader field of civil society, largely disconnected from mainstream communities except by a few notable individuals who act as cross-cultural bridges. Burt (2004) explores network gaps at the level of organizations, finding that the most valuable individuals are those whose networks cross structural holes, or points of contact that the organization itself does not maintain. This is because those individuals have more relevant information, act more creatively, and broker deals between populations. Burt (2004) finds that such network bridges result in an increase in social capital for the organization overall and individuals in these positions are compensated better than individuals who do not serve as bridges in this way. In the case study cities, the presence, effectiveness, and value of bridges to cultural gaps is apparent, but the compensation for and recognition of that value is missing.

When cross-cultural bridges move out of town or are otherwise no longer able to function as a bridge, the immigrant community is functionally disconnected from mainstream civil society until another bridge emerges. In cities where this service is recognized and acknowledged, as it was for some time in Sandy, city leaders can play a

significant role in empowering and supporting the important service of the cross-cultural bridge. This research suggests that in some localities, immigrant populations maintain rather robust social and economic networks within an isolated space in the local field of civil society. Intentionally filling structural holes (Burt, 2004), or bridging cultural gaps, is an important lever to facilitating social capital and developing civic capacity and fomenting trust.

A Theory of Immigration Federalism: Social Equity and Public Administration

Immigrants faced and continue to face inequities in the United States, and scholars of social equity explore the policy domain in observation of barriers and promising practices (Medina, 2020), many of which are reflected in the local case studies developed for this study. Johnson and Svara (2011) define social equity as "the active commitment to fairness, justice, and equality in the formulation of public policy, distribution of public services, implementation of public policy, and management of all institutions serving the public directly by contract" (p. 282). More pertinent to the ongoing conversation about social equity in immigration federalism is Johnson and Svara's (2011) attachment to this definition, which outlines the responsibility for public administrators who are interested in advancing social equity:

> "Public administrators, including all persons involved in public governance, should seek to prevent and reduce inequality, unfairness, and injustice based on significant social characteristics and to promote greater equality in access to services, procedural fairness, quality of services, and social outcomes. Public administrators should empower the participation of all persons in the political process and support the exercise of constructive personal choice" (p. 282).

My study finds that, where local-level civic leaders take the initiative to understand the historical, racial, ethnic, and immigrant dynamics of their city, they express greater

empowerment to make cross-cultural connections and they expressed greater awareness of equity issues. While drawn from a limited number of case studies, the finding is significant in its potential impact to developing civic capacity and facilitating citizenship among immigrant communities at the local level. Therefore, further exploration of this notion is deemed important. This finding also gives credence to the efforts of organizations that take action to increase diversity and cultural awareness in service delivery (Nishishiba, 2012) and it embodies the notion that "administrators re-inhabit the locales they serve in order to become familiar with the informal as well as formal community resources" (Shinn, 1999, p. 116).

Medina (2020) recommends six strategies to administrators to encourage inclusion and improve service quality among immigrant populations (p. 132). These recommendations include being aware of existing immigrant populations and observing trends as they change. This means knowing what immigrant populations are present, how long they have been present, and what their general linguistic or cultural needs are. In only one of the case study cities did city leaders speak in detail to the immigrant population in their community, despite each city having a long and intimate history of immigration. Others lacked details and some informants conflated their city's Latino and immigrant populations.

Another recommendation from Medina (2020) is to communicate and form partnerships with organizations representing immigrants (p. 132). Again, in only one of the three case study cities did city leaders speak to organizations and institutions that serve immigrants in their communities. In other communities, city leaders actually

expressed frustration at the dearth of such organizations, even though such organizations have had a strong presence within the community for years.

The purpose of this section of the discussion is to emphasize the significance of public administration, and public administrators in particular, in local-level immigration policy and social equity. City leadership can pass a resolution declaring the city a Welcoming City, as Madras did in 2017 (The City of Madras, 2017a), or condemning racism and affirming a commitment to equity as Sandy did in 2020 (Sandy City Council, 2020), but without a leadership team to model the values presumed to be inherent in such resolutions, equity will exist on paper only.

Summary and Conclusion

This research study presents a new theory for immigration federalism. The study constructs a process for case study development and comparative analysis that integrates multiple levels of government for comparative analysis and is prompted by three elements: a plethora of state-level studies seeking to theorize about the origins of state immigration policy, the several perspectives on immigration federalism and the nature of federalism more generally, and the appearance within each existing theoretical frame that the only level of analysis of significance is the level in focus. This theoretical framework project aimed to construct a "middle-range theory" (Merton, 1949) for immigration federalism that explains observed relationships between and among levels of government while taking history and the realities of local-level diversity into account. In this way, we can explain the observable and empirical functions of immigration federalism more accurately and we can use the framework to assess the validity of others' claims.

There are limitations to this research. The COVID-19 pandemic caused the months-long shutdown of Portland State University, the state of Oregon, and much of the world, just as IRB approval for this study was being processed. Indeed, I was granted exempt certification to complete my research under the condition that "all in-person interactions for the purpose of conducting human subjects research is suspended until further notice" (Willis, 2020). As a result of the pandemic, my data collection was limited to interviews via video conferencing. In an ideal situation, I would have traveled to each cases study city and met with informants in person. I would have accessed local libraries where available to review news archives unavailable online. What I could have gained in the understanding of civic capacity and community presence from spending time in these cities is surely vast but also unknowable.

I completed primary data collection and case study construction during 2021, only one year after the onset of the dual pandemics of COVID-19 and racism leading to social unrest. This fact undoubtedly impacts my findings and my perspectives of local-level leadership more generally. The impacts of COVID-19 and social unrest on local governments came through in interviews, although, in keeping with Selznick (1994), in different ways and to different degrees depending on place. This experience has reframed the perceived roles of local leaders for some time to come, and this, again, depends by place.

One benefit in having focused the initial framework on 2005 through 2019 is that it provides the field with a solid foundation on which to build observations about the impacts on immigration policy and immigrant communities of COVID-19 and social unrest. Five years from now, I can return to these cases and build on them to assess the

lasting impact, if any, the pandemics have had on civic capacity and immigration populations.

Next, the sizable scope of this project serves as a limitation in itself. This project involved data collection and analysis of many areas of policy and institutions relating to immigrants and immigration. Any one of them could have been framed as a valuable research study on its own and I refrained from exploring any single element to that depth. Instead, the project is necessarily perfunctory in some ways without, I hope, being too shallow in my purpose.

One result of this broad scope is that my local-level analysis relies on only three case studies, representing localities in a country with nearly 90,000 local governments (Cooper, 2020). I recognize that generalizability to other local-level communities of different sizes, locations, or in different state contexts is not possible through this research, but I have attempted to remain close to theory in my work and the findings and implications drawn from these case studies provide value for going forward.

Finally, how I handle U.S. Census statistical data in this research impacts how confidently I can claim my observations at the local level. Because I do not account for margin of error in my analysis, observations relating to industry employment statistics, median household income, and population statistics are less reliable for basing claims on, particularly where populations are less than 65,000 (Fuller, 2018). Ignoring statistical uncertainty can have significant impact on policy decisions and outcomes, particularly at the local level in the United States (Jurjevich et al., 2018).

Scope as a limitation is also viewed here as a strength. The framework as it exists now can be built upon either broadly, by adding more suspected policy mechanisms for

analysis, or deeply, by constructing cases with the addition of more data where it is deemed applicable. This is beneficial to the study of civic capacity more generally because it allows for creativity and interpretation in the conceptualization of unit of analysis, which has long been a challenge in civic capacity research (Shinn, 1999).

The empirical and theoretical nature of this work is a point of its strength as a research product. The immigration federalism framework is born of empirical observation and drives theory that is empirically testable. Public administration and political science scholars, and others particularly interested in federalism, who hold an interest in the federal-state and state-local relationships within states other than Oregon can develop the framework further by constructing state and local-level case studies within their geographic and governance interests. A bigger catalog of cases at the community level to explore the extent of the diversity of local contexts would help us better understand the constraints history has on local place-making. This matters because, in cases where community pride relies on holding onto an identity that ignores the presence of other communities and even actively devalues them, the intentional remaking of a shared identity only occurs where awareness is widespread.

Similarly, given the institutional perspective integrated into the framework, social scientists interested in legal questions of federalism, representation in leadership, ideology and public opinion, and other socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural influences can develop the framework further in these areas. It would be of benefit for those who carry on this research to reconnect in a period of three to five years to exchange case findings and confer regarding significant observations relating to the framework.

Public administration scholars of social equity and those interested in public administration leadership will find this work valuable. While the strength of the framework rests in its capacity to integrate multiple levels of government, the richness of the local-level case study offers a tool for constructing broad institutional awareness of civic capacity and structural holes or cultural gaps at the local level. With these tools, leaders can confidently construct strategies for improving social equity across cultural groups, building civic capacity, and building leadership capacity.

Another strength of this framework is its replicability in other policy domains. Climate change policy in the United States is similar to immigration policy in that it is observed by some to suffer inaction at the federal level (Engel, 2006) and in that state and local governments have involved themselves actively in the domain of climate change policy (Engel, 2006; Gerber, 2015; Krause, 2011). As climate change persists and intensifies as an issue of U.S. public concern, implementing the present framework for federalism in the climate change policy domain could prove beneficial for observing and understanding the socio-historical nature of intergovernmental relations and the role of public administrators in facilitating civic capacity as it relates to climate issues.

Similarly, authors of an opinion article in the New York Times outline a remarkable difference in maternal health trends in the United States depending on a woman's local context (Sgaier & Downey, 2021). First, a woman's access to healthcare varies by state due to state-level legislation affecting women's health choices. Second, a woman's healthcare experience varies depending on her race, the median demographics and attributes of the physical environment of the area she lives, and the extent to which implicit bias affects her interactions with healthcare workers. The opinions of the authors

aside, the data referenced in the article make clear that a framework like this one, which de-centers state and federal-level policy decisions to focus on civic capacity at the local level can analyze healthcare concerns such as maternal health in a way that results in decisions tailored for a given local context. Any policy domain that observes a growing interest for policy development at subnational levels is prime policy material for this framework construction.

Finally, social scientists interested in the impact of policy decisions made at any level on small U.S. cities or the rural United States will benefit from the design and function of this framework. In each local-level case study, the impact of history on contemporary populations and the extent to which communities recognize each other and feel empowered to participate differs. The application of the nested framework can be employed to understand relationships between and civic capacity among various populations, including understanding Tribal history and the current state of Tribes and their relationships with local governance networks in the United States.

References

A Joint Resolution to Designate October 6, 1987, as "German-American Day", Pub. L. 100–104, 101 Stat.27 (1987). https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/100/sjres108/text

ACLU of Oregon. (2002, Fall). ORS 181.850 prohibits local law enforcement from acting as INS agents [Briefing paper]. Retrieved November 28, 2021, from https://www.aclu-or.org/sites/default/files/Oregon181Briefingpaper052610_final_.pdf

Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family Separation. 83 Fed. Reg. 29435 (2018). Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/06/25/2018-13696/affording-congress-an-opportunity-to-address-family-separation

Ahern, T. (n.d.). *Madras*. Oregon Encyclopedia: A Project of the Oregon Historical Society. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/madras/#.YQVWYI5Kg2w

Allen, B. (2010, December 24). Bill King gears up to be Sandy's first new mayor in 17 years. *The Oregonian*. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://web.archive.org/web/20111231000638/https:/www.oregonlive.com/clackamascounty/index.ssf/2010/12/mayor_bill_king.html

Allen, B. (2018a, April 11). Sandy councilor Gerberg resigns. *Sandy Post*. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://pamplinmedia.com/sp/68-news/392081-284013-sandy-councilor-gerberg-resigns

Allen, B. (2018b, August 22). Driving toward the future. *Sandy Post*. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://pamplinmedia.com/sp/68-news/404048-301189-driving-toward-the-future-pwoff

Allen, R. & Ishizawa, H. (2015). State-level political context and immigrant homeownership in the USA. *International Migration and Integration 16*, 1081-1097.

Amer, M. (2006, November 29). *Membership of the 109th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20061129_RS22007_1783035e9dfc8d40f36c67ac4a48b033f9d3d795.pdf

Amer, M. (2008). *Membership of the 110th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22555.pdf

American Civil Liberties Union. (2021a). *Search ACLU: Immigrant's rights.* Retrieved June 2, 2021 https://www.aclu.org/search/%20?f%5B0%5D=field_issues%3A270&f%5B1%5D=type%3Acase

American Civil Liberties Union. (2021b). *ACLU History*. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history

American Immigration Council. (2021). *Immigrants in the United States* (State Fact Sheets). Retrieved October 13, 2021, from

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/immigra
nts_in_the_united_states.pdf

American Immigration Council. (n.d.-a). *About the American Immigration Council.*
Retrieved May 21, 2021 https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/about/our-
mission.

American Immigration Council. (n.d.-b). *2018 State by State: State Fact Sheets*.
Retrieved September 5, 2020, from
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/state-by-state

American Immigration Council. (n.d.-c). *2019 State by State Fact Sheets*. Retrieved
October 13, 2021, from
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/state-by-state

Argo, N. & Jassin, K. (2021). *What immigration issues do Americans hold sacred?: A
psychological journey into American attitudes toward immigrants.* Center for
Inclusion and Belonging.
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/what_im
migration_issues_do_americans_hold_sacred.pdf

Arizona v. United States. (n.d.). *Oyez*. Retrieved December 1, 2021, from
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-182

Ashford, G. (2022, January 9). Noncitizens' rights to vote becomes law in New York
City. *The New York Times*. Retrieved February 6, 2022, from
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/09/nyregion/noncitizens-nyc-voting-
rights.html

Azemun, M. & Kruggel, A. (2021). "We have found the enemy and it is not each other":
Deep canvassing to change hearts and minds on immigration in rural and small-
town America. In R. Milkman, D. Bhargava, & P. Lewis (Eds.), *Immigration
matters: Movements, visions, and strategies for a progressive future* (pp. 271-
286). The New Press.

Bachman, J. R. (1962). *Story of the Amalgamated Sugar Company, 1897-1961*. Caxton
Printers.

Ballotpedia. (n.d.-a). *Ballotpedia: About*. Retrieved September 5, 2020, from
https://ballotpedia.org/Ballotpedia:About

Ballotpedia. (n.d.-b). *Jefferson County School District bond measure (May 2021)*.
Retrieved on October 14, 2021, from
https://ballotpedia.org/Jefferson_County_School_District_Bond_Measure_(May_
2012)

Barber, K. (2019). "We were at our journey's end": Settler sovereignty formation in
Oregon. *Oregon Historical Quarterly 120*(4), 382-413.

Batalova, J., Fix, M. & Bachmeier, J.D. (2016). *Untapped talent: The costs of brain
waste among highly skilled immigrants in the United States.* Migration Policy
Institute, New American Economy, and World Education Services.
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/BrainWaste-
FULLREPORT-FINAL.pdf

Baugh, R. (2020, September). *Annual flow report: Refugees and asylees: 2019*. U.S.
Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics. Retrieved
February 1, 2022, from

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/refugee_and_asylee_2019.pdf

Ben-Ari, A. & Enosh, G. (2011). Processes of reflexivity: Knowledge construction in qualitative research. *Qualitative Social Work 10*(2), 152-171.

Benner, K. & Medina, J. (2018, March 6). Trump administration sues California over immigration laws. *New York Times*. Retrieved December 1, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/politics/justice-department-california-sanctuary-cities.html

Benner, K. (2020, February 10). Justice Dept. sues over Sanctuary Laws in California, N. J., and Seattle. *The New York Times.* Retrieved December 1, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/justice-department-sanctuary-law.html

Berger, P.L. & Luckmann, T. (1967). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Blitzer, J. (2019, April 3). How climate change is fueling the U.S. border crisis. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved July 7, 2019, from https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-climate-change-is-fuelling-the-us-border-crisis

Bonds, A. (2013). Economic development, racialization, and privilege: "Yes in my backyard" prison politics and the reinvention of Madras, Oregon. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103*(6), 1389-1405.

Bracero History Archive. (n.d.). *About.* Center for History and News Media. Retrieved October 10, 2021, from http://braceroarchive.org/about

Brinkmann, S. & Kvale, S. (2015). *Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing* (3rd Ed.). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.

Brookings Partnership for a New American Economy. (n.d.). *Immigrant Workers in the U.S. Labor Force.* http://research.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/03/Immigrant_Workers_Brookings.pdf

Budiman, A. (2020, August 20). *Key findings about U.S. immigrants.* Pew Research Center. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/

Burt, R.S. (2004). Structural holes and good ideas. *American Journal of Sociology, 110*(2), 349-399.

Bussel, R. & Tichenor, D.J. (2017). Trouble in Paradise: A Historical Perspective on Immigration in Oregon. *Oregon Historical Quarterly 118*(4), 460-487.

Cai, W., A.D.S. Burch, & J.K. Patel. (2021, April 3). Swelling anti-Asian violence: Who is being attacked where. *The New York Times.* Retrieved February 15, 2022 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/03/us/anti-asian-attacks.html

Cain, E. & Rosman, J. (2017, March 10). Broken treaties: An oral history tracing Oregon's native population. *Oregon Public Radio*. Retrieved December 4, 2021, from https://www.opb.org/artsandlife/series/brokentreaties/oregon-tribes-oral-history-broken-treaties/

Caldwell, P. (2018, September 19). Nyssa water project nears end. *Malheur Enterprise*. https://www.malheurenterprise.com/posts/4767/nyssa-water-project-nears-end

Caldwell, P. (2021, April 23). Nyssa residents object to rezone decision. *Malheur Enterprise*. https://www.malheurenterprise.com/posts/8407/nyssa-residents-object-to-rezone-decision

Cappelletti, J. (2021, June 23). Munk named Nyssa's citizen of the year. *Malheur Enterprise*. https://www.malheurenterprise.com/posts/8563/munk-named-nyssas-citizen-of-the-year

Card, D., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2012). Immigration, wages, and compositional amenities. *Journal of the European Economic Association 10*(1), 78-119. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01051.x

Carlson, B. (2021, January 18). Treasure Valley reload center advances. *Capital Press*. https://www.capitalpress.com/state/oregon/treasure-valley-reload-center-advances/article_d459cbcc-5781-11eb-934b-83c0a37296dc.html

Carter-Chau, A. (2012). *The Impact of Punitive State Immigration Policies on Employment and Population Outcomes for Undocumented Immigrants* (Publication No. 1510330) [Master's thesis, Georgetown University]. UMI Dissertation Publishing and ProQuest Publishing.

Cascades East Transit. (2016). *Routes and Schedules*. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://cascadeseasttransit.com/routes-schedules/

Castles, S., De Haas, H. & Miller, M.J. (2014). *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world* (5th ed.). The Guilford Press.

Celis, K. et al. (2008). Rethinking women's substantive representation. *Representation 44*(2), 99-110.

Center for American Women and Politics. (2021). *Women of color in elective office 2021*. Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University. Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://cawp.rutgers.edu/women-color-elective-office-2021

Chavez, J.M. & Provine, D. M. (2009). Race and the response of state legislatures to unauthorized immigrants. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 623*, 78-92.

Chavez, L.R. (2001). *Covering immigration: popular images and the politics of the nation*. University of California Press.

Chishti, M. & S. Pierce. (2020, January 29). Despite Trump invitation to stop taking refugees, red and blue states alike endorse resettlement. *Migration Policy Institute*. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/despite-trump-invitation-stop-taking-refugees-red-and-blue-states-alike-endorse-resettlement

Chow, K. (2018, February 9). So what exactly is 'Blood Quantum'? *Code Switch: National Public Radio*. Retrieved September 13, 2021, from https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/02/09/583987261/so-what-exactly-is-blood-quantum

Chy Lung v. Freeman (1876) 92 U.S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550, 1875 U.S. LEXIS 1754

City of Sandy Oregon. (n.d.-a). *SAM History*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.ci.sandy.or.us/transit/page/sam-history

City of Sandy Oregon. (n.d.-b). *About SandyNet*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.ci.sandy.or.us/sandynet/page/about-sandynet

City of Sandy Oregon. (n.d.-c). *Sandy summer sounds & movies in the park.* Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.ci.sandy.or.us/community/page/sandy-summer-sounds-movies-park

Clackamas County. (2021). Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.clackamas.us/

Cockle, R. (2001, January 26). Sweet on sugar beets. *The Oregonian.* Retrieved June 16, 2021, from http://www.sweetbeet.com/growernet/News_Events/Articles/2001/012601_d.htm

Colbern, A. & Ramakrishnan, S. K. (2021). *Citizenship reimagined: A new framework for state rights in the United States.* Cambridge.

Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in Connection with the Decennial Census. 84 Fed. Reg. 33821 (2019). Retrieved May 21, 2021 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/16/2019-15222/collecting-information-about-citizenship-status-in-connection-with-the-decennial-census

Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde. (2021). *Our story*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.grandronde.org/history-culture/history/our-story/

Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs. (2021). *History*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://warmsprings-nsn.gov/history/

Conlan, T.J. & Posner, P.L. (2016). American federalism in an era of partisan polarization: The intergovernmental paradox of Obama's "New Nationalism". *Publius: The Journal of Federalism 46*(3), 281-307.

Cooper, P.J. (1986). By order of the president: Administration by executive order and proclamation. *Administration & Society 18*(2), 233-262.

Cooper, P.J. (2020). *Local government administration: Governance in communities.* Melvin & Leigh, Publishers.

Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum 1*(8), 139-167. Retrieved September 2019, from http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8

Cunningham-Parmeter, K. (2011). Forced federalism: State as laboratories of immigration reform. Hastings Law Journal 62(6), 1673-1727.

Curry-Stevens, A., Cross-Hemmer, A., & Coalition of Communities of Color. (2011). The Native American community in Multnomah County: An unsettling profile. Portland State University. Retrieved December 4, 2021, from https://www.coalitioncommunitiescolor.org/research-and-publications/the-native-american-community-in-multnomah-county-an-unsettling-report

Davis, J.H., & S. Sengupta. (2017, September 18). Trump Administration rejects study showing positive impact of refugees. *The New York Times.* Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/us/politics/refugees-revenue-cost-report-trump.html

De Trinidad Young, M.E. (2018). *Producing citizenship position through state immigration policies: An examination of the relationships between health, policy, citizenship, and race in the United States* (Publication No. 10824849) [Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Dempster, H., Leach, A., & Hargrave, K. (2020, September 14). *Public attitudes towards immigration and immigrants: What people think, why, and how to influence them* (ODI working paper 588). ODI. Retrieved October 10, 2021, from https://odi.org/en/publications/public-attitudes-towards-immigration-and-immigrants-what-people-think-why-and-how-to-influence-them/

Densho Encyclopedia Contributors. (2020, March 5). *Oregon Plan.* Densho Encyclopedia. Retrieved November 28, 2021, from https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Oregon%20Plan

Department of Commerce v. New York. (n.d.). *Oyez*. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-966

Department of Education. (2021, January 22). *Office of Elementary & Secondary Education: Office of Migrant Education.* Retrieved December 1, 2021, from https://oese.ed.gov/offices/office-of-migrant-education/

Domonoske, C. & Gonzales, R. (2018, June 19). What we know: Family separation and 'zero tolerance' at the border. *National Public Radio.* https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621065383/what-we-know-family-separation-and-zero-tolerance-at-the-border

Eisenhardt, K.M. & Graebner, M.E. (2007). Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges. *The Academy of Management Journal 50*(1), 25-32.

Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of Management Review 14*(4), 532-550.

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S. Code § 7401. (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/7401

Engel, K. (2006). State and local climate change initiatives: What is motivating state and local governments to address a global problem and what does this say about federalism and environmental law? *Urban Lawyer 38*, 1015-1029.

Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 85 FR 6699 (2017). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/02/05/2020-02422/improving-enhanced-vetting-capabilities-and-processes-for-detecting-attempted-entry-into-the-united

Establishing Visa and Foreign Visitor Processing Goals and the Task Force On Travel and Competitiveness. 77 Fed. Reg. 3373 (2017). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/01/24/2012-1568/establishing-visa-and-foreign-visitor-processing-goals-and-the-task-force-on-travel-and

Farris, E.M. & Holman, M.R. (2017). All politics is local? County Sheriffs and localized policies of immigration enforcement. *Political Research Quarterly 70*(1), 142-154.

Ferris, E. (2015, July 1). *Climate change, migration and the incredibly complicated task of influencing policy* (Conference keynote presentation). Brookings Institution Conference on 'Human Migration and the Environment: Futures, Politics, Invention', Durham University, Durham, UK. https://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/FERRIS-1-JULY-2015.pdf

Fixico, D. (n.d.) Termination and restoration in Oregon. *The Oregon Encyclopedia*. Retrieved December 4, 2021, from https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/termination_and_restoration/

Fouka, V., Mazumder, S., & Tabellini, M. (2021). From immigrants to Americans: Race and assimilation during the great migration. *Review of Economic Studies* 0, 1-32. doi:10.1093/restud/rdab038

Frankel, L. (2021, April 30). Nyssa school board openings draw dozen hopefuls. *Malheur Enterprise*. Retrieved June 13, 2021 https://www.malheurenterprise.com/posts/8432/nyssa-school-board-openings-draw-dozen-hopefuls

Frederickson, H.G. (2010). *Social equity and public administration: Origins, developments, and applications*. London: Routledge.

Frey, W. (2015). *Diversity explosion: How new racial demographics are remaking America.* Brookings Institution Press.

Friedman, S.K. (2018). *The re-credentialing of skilled immigrants in the United States: Barriers and pathways to the workforce and frameworks for success* [Policy report]. Oregon Advocacy Commissions Office. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.oregon.gov/oac/Documents1/Re-credentialing_of_Skilled_Immigrants_(Brainwaste)_Final_Report_(Friedman).pdf

Friedman, S.K. (2021). *Civic Capacity as the Foundation of Immigration Federalism in the United States* [Unpublished manuscript]. Department of Public Administration, Portland State University.

Friedman, W. (2007). *Reframing "framing"* (Occasional paper No. 1). Public Agenda's Center for Advancement in Public Engagement. https://www.publicagenda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Reframing-Framing.pdf

Fry, R. (2008, October 22). *Latino settlement in the new century.* Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2008/10/22/latinos-account-for-half-of-us-population-growth-since-2000/

Fuggetta, E. (2012). Sandy invites community to preview bright, spacious new high school Sept. 7. *OregonLive, The Oregonian*. Retrieved October 1, 2021 https://www.oregonlive.com/clackamascounty/2012/08/sandy_invites_community_to_pre.html

Fuller, S. (2018, April 18). *Using American Community Survey Estimates and Margins of Error* [PowerPoint slides]. United States Census Bureau. Retrieved January 31, 2022, from https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/programs-surveys/acs/guidance/training-presentations/20180418_MOE.pdf

Fusch, P.I. & Ness, L.R. (2015). Are we there yet? Data saturation in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report, 20*(9), 1408-1416. http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol20/iss9/3

Gao, G. et al. (2015, September 24). Congress has fewest immigrant members in 40 years: Pew analysis finds only six foreign-born lawmakers, mostly Democrats. *The Atlantic (Politics).* Retrieved May 20, 2021, from

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/congress-has-fewest-immigrant-members-in-40-years/432915/

Garcia, J. & G. Garcia. (2005). *Memory, community, and activism: Mexican migration and labor in the Pacific Northwest*. Julian Samora Research Institute and MSU Press.

Geiger, A.W. (2019, January 24). *In the 116th Congress, at least 13% of lawmakers are immigrants or the children of immigrants.* Pew Research Center: FACTTANK, News in Numbers. Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/24/in-116th-congress-at-least-13-of-lawmakers-are-immigrants-or-the-children-of-immigrants/

Georgetown University Law Library. (2021). *Presidential Documents Research Guide*. Georgetown Law Library. https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=365454&p=2468883

Gerber, B.J. (2015). Local governments and climate change in the United States: Assessing administrators' perspectives on hazard management challenges and responses. *State and Local Government Review 47*(1), 48-56.

German-American Hall of Fame. (2021, October 4). *October 6th—German-American Day.* http://gamhof.org/news/october-6th-german-american-day/

Gerstein, J. (2010, July 6). DoJ sues over Ariz. immigration law. *Politico.* Retrieved December 1, 2021, from https://www.politico.com/story/2010/07/doj-sues-over-ariz-immigration-law-039413

Gibson, C. & K. Jung. (2006, February). *Historical census statistics on the foreign-born population of the United States: 1850 to 2000* (Working paper No. 81). Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2006/demo/POP-twps0081.pdf

Gill, H.M. (2006, November 9). New mayor draws attention. *The Madras Pioneer*. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://pamplinmedia.com/component/content/article?id=138831

Gill, H.M. (2012, March 20). Madras Mayor Melanie. *The Madras Pioneer*. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://pamplinmedia.com/component/content/article?id=148962

Gill, H.M. (2015, January 21). Latest foray: mayor of Madras. *The Madras Pioneer*. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://pamplinmedia.com/msp/129-news/247932-115586-latest-foray-mayor-of-madras?fbclid=IwAR3ma4RxVjSHToBMjg3p2jhq-7lbiTdeZiHM8oN8Ozgj1nyNv0bZWwS0pZ8&wallit_nosession=1

Gill, H.M. (2017a). New councilor wins with write-in campaign. *The Madras Pioneer*. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://pamplinmedia.com/msp/129-news/342016-220270-new-councilor-wins-with-write-in-campaign?wallit_nosession=1

Gill, H.M. (2017b). City appoints councilor to one of two open seats. *The Madras Pioneer*. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://pamplinmedia.com/msp/129-news/377254-262380-city-appoints-councilor-to-one-of-two-open-seats?wallit_nosession=1

Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research*. Sociology Press.

Global Detention Project. (2021). *Overview: Detention centers*. Retrieved November 29, 2021, from https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-states#detention-centres

Graham, R. & L. Stack. (2021, May 26). U.S. faces outbreak of anti-Semitic threats and violence. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/26/us/anti-semitism-attacks-violence.html

Grieco, E. M. et al. (2012). *The foreign-born population in the United States: 2010. American Survey Reports*. U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2012/acs/acs-19.pdf

Griffin, J.D. & B. Newman. (2007). The Unequal Representation of Latinos and Whites. *The Journal of Politics 69*(4), 1032-1046.

GSS Data Explorer. (2018). [Data set]. Retrieved October 10, 2021, from gss.dataexplorer.norc.org

Gulasekaram, P. & Ramakrishnan, S.K. (2015). *The new immigration federalism.* Cambridge University Press.

Gulati, R., Lavie, D., & Madhavan, R. (2011). How do networks matter? The performance effects of interorganizational networks. *Research in Organizational Behavior 31*, 207-224.

Haynes, C., Merolla, J., & Ramakrishnan, S.K. (2016). *Framing immigrants: news coverage, public opinion, and policy.* Russell Sage Foundation.

Health and Human Services. (2021, October 12). *Profile: Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders.* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Minority Health. Retrieved February 1, 2022, from https://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lvl=3&lvlid=65#:~:text=According%20to%20the%202019%20U.S.,percent%20of%20the%20U.S.%20population

Health and Human Services. (2022, January 11). *Profile: American Indian/Alaska Native.* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Minority Health. Retrieved February 1, 2022, from https://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lvl=3&lvlid=62#:~:text=As%20of%202019%2C%20there%20were,one%20or%20more%20other%20ethnicities.

Hendrick, J. (2017). *Immigration Policy in the American States: Attitudes, Adoption, and Outcomes* (Publication No. 10673408). [Doctoral dissertation, Rice University]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Hesson, T. (2019, October 11). Trump ending U.S. role as worldwide leader on refugees. *Politico.* Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/11/trump-refugee-decrease-immigration-044186

High Desert Education Service District. (n.d.). *Migrant Education Program Oregon Region 11.* Retrieved November 26, 2021, from https://migrantregion11.org/

Hitlan, R.T., Carrillo, K., Zarate, M.A., & Aikman, S.N. Attitudes toward immigrant groups and the September 11 terrorist attacks. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 13*(2), 135-152. https://doi.org/10.1080/10781910701270970

Hochschild, A.R. (2016). *Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American right*. The New Press.

Hogan, J. (2019, June 22). Madras city councilor leaves to be near to family in Oregon City. *The Bend Bulletin*. Retrieved September 9, 2021, from https://www.bendbulletin.com/localstate/madras-city-councilor-leaves-to-be-near-to-family-in-oregon-city/article_f26147d0-1471-50d1-9960-b0abb6dcb51c.html

Huber, G. A., & T.J. Espenshade. (1997). Neo-Isolationism, balanced-budget conservatism, and the fiscal impact of immigrants. *The International Migration Review 31*(4), 1031-1055.

Huntington, C. (2008). The constitutional dimension of immigration federalism. *Vanderbilt Law Review 61*(3), 787-853.

Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening and Vetting of Applications for Visas and Other Immigration Benefits, Ensuring Enforcement of All Laws for Entry Into the United States, and Increasing Transparency Among Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government and for the American People. 82 Fed. Reg. 16279 (2017). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/03/2017-06702/implementing-immediate-heightened-screening-and-vetting-of-applications-for-visas-and-other

IRS. (2022, February 15). *ITG FAQ #9 Answer-What are some of the exceptions to members of federally recognized tribes being subject to taxes as individuals?* Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/indian-tribal-governments/itg-faq-9-answer-what-are-some-of-the-exceptions-to-members-of-federally-recognized-tribes-being-subject-to-taxes-as-individuals

Jayapal, P. (2021). The progressive path forward on immigration policy. In R. Milkman, D. Bhargava, & P. Lewis (Eds.), *Immigration matters: Movements, visions, and strategies for a progressive future* (pp. 235-252). The New Press.

Jefferson County Library District. (2021). *Home.* Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.jcld.org/

Jefferson County School District 509J. (n.d.). *Home.* Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.jcsd.k12.or.us/

Jefferson County. (n.d.-a). *Home.* Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.jeffco.net/

Jefferson County. (n.d.-b). *Welcome to Jefferson County*. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from *https://www.jeffco.net/administration/page/welcome-jefferson-county*

Jiang, J. (2018). *The Politics of Punishment and Protection: Deploying Penal Power in American Immigration Control, 1990-2017* (Publication No. 13838186) [Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Johnson, N. J., & Svara, J. H. (2011). *Justice for all: Promoting social equity in public administration.* Taylor & Francis Group.

Johnson, S. (1999). Applying social capital theory to needs assessment, social program development, and evaluation: A practitioner's perspective. *Administrative Theory & Praxis 21*(1), 12-22.

Jones, J.A. & Brown, H.E. (2019). American federalism and racial formation in contemporary immigration policy: A processual analysis of Alabama's HB56. *Ethnic and Racial Studies 42*(4), 531-551.

Jones, R.P. (2020). *White too long: The legacy of white supremacy in American Christianity.* Simon & Schuster.

Jones, R.P., Cox, D., Cooper, B., & Lienesch, R. (2016). *How Americans view immigrants and what they want from immigration reform: Findings from the 2015 American Values Atlas*. Public Religion Research Institute. Retrieved December 5, 2021, from https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PRRI-AVA-2015-Immigration-Report-1.pdf

Jones, R.P., Jackson, N., Orcés, D., & Bola, O. (2020). *A nation of immigrants? Diverging perceptions of immigrants increasingly marking partisan divides*. Public Religion Research Institute. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.prri.org/research/a-nation-of-immigrants-diverging-perceptions-of-immigrants-increasingly-marking-partisan-divides/

Jones, R.P., Jackson, N., Orcés, D., & Huff, I. (2021). *The 2020 census of American religion.* Public Religion Research Institute. Retrieved July 8, 2021 https://www.prri.org/research/2020-census-of-american-religion/

Jordan, B. (1993). *Birth in four cultures: A crosscultural investigation of childbirth in Yucatan, Holland, Sweden, and the United States* (4th ed.). Waveland Press, Inc.

Jurjevich, J.R. & Dann, R. (2012). In search of opportunity: Foreign-born residents in Oregon. *Publications, Reports and Presentations 6.* PDXScholar. http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/10502

Jurjevich, J.R. et al. (2018). Navigating statistical uncertainty: How urban and regional planners understand and work with American Community Survey (ACS) data for guiding policy. *Journal of the American Planning Association 84*(2), 112-126. https://doi-org.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/10.1080/01944363.2018.1440182

Jurjevich, J.R., N.Chun, K. Rancik, R. Proehl. (2017). *Coordinated population forecast for Clackamas County, its urban growth boundaries (UGB), and area outside UGBs 2017-2067* (Oregon Population Forecast Program, 26). Portland State University Population Research Center. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/opfp/26/

Kagan, E. (2001). Presidential administration. *Harvard Law Review 114*(8), 2245-2385.

Keller, J. (2005, January 20). Sugar factory closes: The reaction: School officials reflect on the news major employer will cease operating. *Argus Observer*. Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://www.argusobserver.com/news/sugar-factory-closes/article_bbd155fa-58aa-5ef4-a243-94b5004f6811.html

Kendi, I.X. (2016). *Stamped from the beginning: The definitive history of racist ideas in America*. Nation Books.

Kerr, B. & W. Miller. (1997). Latino representation: It's direct and indirect. *American Journal of Political Science 41*(3), 1066-1071.

King, D. (2001). Making Americans: Immigration meets race. In G. Gerstle & J. Mellenkopf (Eds.), *E pluribus unim? Contemporary and historical perspectives on immigrant political incorporation (pp. 143-172)*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Kissam, E. (2007). Migration networks and processes of community transformation: Arvin, California and Woodburn, Oregon. *The Journal of Latino Latin American Studies 2*(4), 87-116.

Kochhar, R., Espinoza, C.S., & Hinze-Pifer, R. (2010, October 29). *After the Great Recession: Foreign born gain jobs; native born lose jobs.* Pew Research Center. Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2010/10/29/after-the-great-recession-brforeign-born-gain-jobs-native-born-lose-jobs/

Koliba, C., Meek, J.W., & Zia, A. (2011). *Governance networks in public administration and public policy*. CRC Press.

Krane, D. (1993). American federalism, state governments, and public policy: Weaving together loose theoretical threads. *Political Science and Politics 26*(2), 186-190.

Kratz, J. (2018, December 11). *Middle Oregon Treaty of 1855*. National Archives: Pieces of History. https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2018/12/11/middle-oregon-treaty-of-1855/

Krause, R.M. (2011). An assessment of the greenhouse gas reducing activities being implemented in U.S. cities. *Local Environment 16*, 193-211.

Krogstad, J.M. (2020a, July 10). *Hispanics have accounted for more than half of total U.S. population growth since 2010.* Pew Research Center FACTTANK. Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/10/hispanics-have-accounted-for-more-than-half-of-total-u-s-population-growth-since-2010/

Krogstad, J.M. (2020b, June 17). *Americans broadly support legal status for immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally as children*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/17/americans-broadly-support-legal-status-for-immigrants-brought-to-the-u-s-illegally-as-children/

Latino Community Association. (n.d.). [Website]. https://latinocommunityassociation.org/

Law, A.O. (2013, August 28-September 1). *An assessment of immigration federalism in the nineteenth century* [Paper presentation]. 2013 annual American Political Science Association Committee Convention, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL.

Leerkes, A., Leech, M. & Backmeier, J. (2012). Borders behind the border: An exploration of state-level differences in migration control and their effects on US migration patterns. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38*(1), 111-129.

Legewie, (2013). An introduction to applied data analysis with qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). *Forum: Qualitative Social Research 14*(3).

Let's Talk Diversity Coalition. (n.d.). *Home* [Facebook Page]. Facebook. Retrieved November 26, 2021, from https://www.facebook.com/2017LTDC/

Lloyd, C. (2003) History and the social sciences. In S. Berger, H. Feldner, & K. Passmore (Eds.). *Writing history: Theory and practice.* Oxford University Press.

Loprinzi, C. M. (1991). *Hispanic migrant labor in Oregon, 1940-1990*. [Master's thesis, Portland State University]. PDXScholar.

Lynch, M. (2011). Mass incarceration, legal change, and locale: Understanding and remediating American penal overindulgence. *American Society of Criminology 10*(3), 673-698.

MACRD. (n.d.). Recreation Programs. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.macrecdistrict.com/sports-recreation/

Madras Downtown Association. (n.d.). *Home.* [Facebook Page]. Facebook. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.facebook.com/MadrasDowntownAssociation/

Madras Trust Site Redevelopment Intergovernmental Agreement. (2017, February 23). Obtained October 6, 2021, from the City of Madras.

Madras-JC Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Center. (n.d.). [Website]. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://madraschamber.com/

Malheur County Clerk. (2021, May 18). *Special District Election Results.* https://www.malheurco.org/wp-content/uploads/Departments/CountyClerk/Election%20Results/Group-4_Final.pdf

Manian, M. (2020, September 29). *Immigration detention and coerced sterilization: History tragically repeats itself.* American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/immigration-detention-and-coerced-sterilization-history-tragically-repeats-itself/

Manning, J. (2010, November 19). *Membership of the 111th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20101119_R40086_d2af7e3a8c129e691e2b2a3532e0ba4c41595d84.pdf

Manning, J. (2012, November 26). *Membership of the 112th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41647.pdf

Manning, J. (2014, November 24). *Membership of the 113th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42964.pdf

Manning, J. (2016, December 5). *Membership of the 114th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43869.pdf

Manning, J. (2018, December 20). *Membership of the 115th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44762.pdf

Manning, J. (2020, December 17). *Membership of the 116th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45583.pdf

Manning, J. (2021, May 12). *Membership of the 117th Congress: A profile* [CRS Report to Congress]. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46705

Marquez, T. & Schraufnagel. (2013). Hispanic population growth and state immigration policy: An analysis of restriction (2008-12). *Publius: The Journal of Federalism 43*(3), 347-367.

Marquez, T. (2017). *Race, Ethnicity, Economics, and Federalism: State Sentiment Regarding Non-citizens from 2009-2014* (Publication number No. 10639962) [Doctoral dissertation, Northern Illinois University]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Mayer, K.R. (1999). Executive orders and presidential power. *The Journal of Politics 61*(2), 445-466.

Medina, P.S. (2020). Immigrants and their inclusion. In M.E. Guy & S.A. McCandless (Eds.), *Achieving social equity: From problems to solutions* (pp. 125-141). Melvin & Leigh, Publishers.

Mendoza, M. (2012). Latinas and Citizenship in Oregon. *Oregon Historical Quarterly 113*(3), 444-451.

Merton, R.K. (1949). *Social theory and social structure*. Simon & Schuster; The Free Press.

Meyer, L. (2005, January 20). Sugar Factory Closes: The Cost: Nearly 190 full time employees are without work as TASCO orders halt in production. *Argus Observer*. https://www.argusobserver.com/news/sugar-factory-closes/article_bbd155fa-58aa-5ef4-a243-94b5004f6811.html

Migration Policy Institute. (2001-2021). *State immigration data profiles* [Data set]. Retrieved October 15, 2021, from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/state-immigration-data-profiles

Milkman, R., Bhargava, D., & Lewis, P. (2021). *Immigration matters: Movements, visions, and strategies for a progressive future*. The New Press.

Miller, Lisa. (2008). *The perils of federalism: Race, poverty and the politics of crime control*. Oxford University Press.

Miroff, N. (2020, October 1). Trump cuts refugee cap to lowest level ever, depicts them on campaign trail as a threat and burden. *The Washington Post.* Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-cuts-refugee-cap/2020/10/01/a5113b62-03ed-11eb-8879-7663b816bfa5_story.html

Moe, T.M. & Howell, W.G. (1999). The presidential power of unilateral action. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 15*(1), 132-179.

Mora, G.C. (2014). *Making Hispanics: How activists, bureaucrats & media constructed a new American.* The University of Chicago Press.

Morgan, D. & Vizzini, D. (1999). Transforming customers into citizens: Some preliminary lessons from the field. *Administrative Theory & Praxis 21*(1), 51-61.

Morgan, D., Green, R., Shinn, C., & Robinson, K. (2013). *Foundations of public service* (2nd ed.). M.E. Sharpe.

Morgan, D.F., Ingle, M.D., Shinn, C.W. (2019). *New public leadership: Making a difference from where we sit.* Routledge.

Mosaic Medical. (2021). *About us.* Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.mosaicmedical.org/about.shtml

Mukerjee, A. (2021). *Understanding financial and human resources capacity challenges among small nonprofits in Oregon: How to overcome challenges unique to size and urban-rural divide* (Publication No. 5691) [Doctoral dissertation, Portland State University]. PDXScholar.

Nagae, P. (2012). Asian women: Immigration and citizenship in Oregon. *Oregon Historical Quarterly, 113*(3), 334-359.

Naplitano, J. (2012, June 15). *Exercising prosecutorial discretion with respect to individuals who came to the United States as children* [Memorandum]. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf

National Archives. (2020). *Educator resources: Japanese-American internment during World War II.* https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation

National Archives. (n.d.). *Federal Register: Presidential documents.* National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved January 7, 2020, from https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents

National Center for Education Studies. (n.d.). *Search for Public Schools: Common Core of Data.* https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/schoolsearch/school_detail.asp?Search=1&DistrictID=4106740&ID=410674000456

National Immigration Forum. (2019, April 17). *Polling update: American attitudes on immigration steady, but showing more partisan divides.* Retrieved October 10, 2021 https://immigrationforum.org/article/american-attitudes-on-immigration-steady-but-showing-more-partisan-divides/

National Immigration Law Center. (n.d.). *What we do.* Retrieved May 21, 2021 https://www.nilc.org/about-us/what_we_do/.

National Research Council. (1997). *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.* Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/5779.

NCSL. (2020a, December 1). *State Legislator Demographics.* Retrieved November 29, 2021, from https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/state-legislator-demographics.aspx

NCSL. (2020b, December 27). *Immigration laws and current state immigration legislation* [Searchable database]. Retrieved December 15, 2020 and October 19, 2021, from https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/immigration-laws-database.aspx

Nelson, L. & Hiemstra, N. (2008). Latino immigrants and the renegotiation of place and belonging in small town America. *Social & Cultural Geography 9*(3), 319-342.

Nelson, L. & Nelson, P.B. (2010). The global rural: Gentrification and linked migration in the rural USA. *Progress in Human Geography 35*(4), 441-459.

Nelson, L. (2007). Farmworker housing and spaces of belonging in Woodburn, Oregon. *Geographical Review 97*(4), 520-541. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30034198

Nelson, L. (2008). Racialized landscapes: Whiteness and the struggle over farmworker housing in Woodburn, Oregon. *Cultural Geographies 15*, 41-62.

Neuman, G. L. (1993). The lost century of American immigration law (1776-1875). *Columbia Law Review 93*(8), 1833-1901.

Neustadt, R.E. & May, E.R. (1986). *Thinking in time: The uses of history for decision makers.* Free Press.

Newton, U. & Adams, B.E. (2009). State immigration policies: Innovation, cooperation or conflict? *Publius 39*(3), 408-431.

Ng, W.L. (1989). *Collective memory, social networks, and generation: The Japanese-American community in Hood River, Oregon* (Publication No. 9010142) [Doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Nicholson-Crotty, J. & Nicholson-Crotty, S. (2011). Industry strength and immigrant policy in the American states. *Political Research Quarterly 64*(3), 612-624.

Nishihara, J.S. (2007). Japanese Americans in eastern Oregon: The wartime roots of an unexpected community. In Xing et al. (Eds.), *Seeing color: Indigenous peoples and racialized ethnic minorities in Oregon* (pp. 44-58). University Press of America, Inc.

Nishishiba, M. (2021). Local government diversity initiatives in Oregon: An exploratory study. *State and Local Government Review 44*(1), 55-66.

Noe-Bustamante, L., M.H. Lopez, & J.M. Krogstad. (2020, July 7). *U.S. Hispanic population surpassed 60 million in 2019, but growth has slowed.* Pew Research Center FACTTANK. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/07/u-s-hispanic-population-surpassed-60-million-in-2019-but-growth-has-slowed/

Norris, M. (2018, March 15). *As America changes, come anxious whites feel left behind.* National Geographic Magazine: The Race Issue. Retrieved June 30, 2019, from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/article/race-rising-anxiety-white-america

O'Toole, L.J. (1997). Treating networks seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in public administration. *Public Administration Review, 57*, 45-52.

Okrent, D. (2019). *The guarded gate*. Scribner.

Oregon Driver & Motor Vehicle Services. (n.d.). *Diver licenses for all (HB2015).* Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.oregon.gov/odot/DMV/Pages/HB2015.aspx

Oregon History Project. (2021). *Reclaiming the Land*. The Oregon Historical Society. Retrieved September 5, 2021, from https://www.oregonhistoryproject.org/articles/reclaiming-the-land/#.YMeG4ahKg2w

Oregon Legislative Assembly. (2018). *Enrolled Senate Bill 1563*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2018R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1563

Oregon State University. (2020*). Land acknowledgements—Map of Oregon's indigenous communities.* Retrieved July 4, 2021, from https://guides.library.oregonstate.edu/land-acknowledgments/oregon

Oregon.gov. (n.d.). *Title I-C Migrant Education: Migrant Education Program*. Retrieved November 29, 2021, from https://www.oregon.gov/ode/schools-and-districts/grants/ESEA/Migrant/Pages/MEP.aspx

Oregonians for Immigration Reform. (2017, January 8). *Oregon's Sanctuary Law.* Retrieved November 28, 2021, from https://www.oregonir.org/book/export/html/2433

Ortlipp, M. (2008). Keeping and using reflexive journals in the qualitative research process. *The Qualitative Report, 13*(4), 695-705. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol13/iss4/8/

Pacific Oregon University. (2021, February 13). *Timeline of Indigenous History of Oregon*. Retrieved July 4, 2021, from https://pacificu.libguides.com/c.php?g=1050460&p=7794169

Papademetriou, D.G., Aleinikoff, T.A., & Meyers, D.W. (1998). *Reorganizing the U.S. immigration function: Toward a new framework for accountability*. International Migration Policy Program; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Parks, C. (2017, April 7). 'Everyone is affected.' Immigration raids turn Oregon City into ghost town. *The Oregonian/OregonLive*. https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/2017/04/woodburn_taught_latinos_to_dre.html

Parlow, M. (2007). A localist's case for decentralizing immigration policy (Faculty publications, paper 485). *84 Denver University Law Review 1061*, 1061-1073. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/485/

Patton, M. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods* (3rd ed.). Sage Publications.

Pear, R. (2007, June 12). '86 law looms over immigration fight. *The New York Times*. Retrieved July 28, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/washington/12immig.html

Perrin, A.J. (2014). *American democracy: From Tocqueville to town halls to Twitter*. Polity Press.

Pew Charitable Trusts. (2014, December). *Changing patterns in U.S. immigration and population: Immigrants slow population decline in many counties*. Retrieved December 5, 2021, from https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2014/12/changing-patterns-in-us-immigration-and-population

Pew Research Center. (2015, September 18). *Foreign-born share of Congress little changed since bottoming out in 1960s (Infographic).* Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/23/fewer-immigrants-in-congress-today-than-in-years-past/ft_15-09-09_foreingborncongress_640px/

Pew Research Center. (2018, June 28). *Shifting public views on legal immigration into the U.S.* Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-the-u-s/

Powell, W.W. (2007, October 29). The new institutionalism. In S.R. Clegg & J.R. Bailey (Eds.), *The International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies*. SAGE Publications, Inc. https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412956246

Preuhs, R.R. (2005). Descriptive representation, legislative leadership, and direct democracy: Latino influence of English only laws in the states, 1984-2002. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly 5*(3), 203-224.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. Simon & Schuster.

Radford, J. and Noe-Bustamante, L. (2019, June 3). *Facts on U.S. immigrants, 2017: Statistical portrait of the foreign-born population in the United States.* Pew Research Center. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://www.pewhispanic.org/2019/06/03/facts-on-u-s-immigrants/#foreign-born-by-state-and-region-of-birth-2012-a.

Radio Lineup. (2021a) *Sandy, Oregon Radio Stations*. Retrieved June 4, 2021, from https://www.radiolineup.com/locate/Sandy-OR

Radio Lineup. (2021b) *Nyssa, Oregon Radio Stations*. Retrieved July 4, 2021, from https://www.radiolineup.com/locate/Nyssa-OR

Radio Lineup. (2021c) *Madras, Oregon Radio Stations*. Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.radiolineup.com/locate/madras-or

Ragin, C.C. (1987/2014). *The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies*. University of California Press. (Original work published 1987)

Ragin, C.C. (2000). *Fuzzy-set social science*. University of Chicago Press.

Ramsey, J. (2003). *New era: Reflections on the human and natural history of central Oregon.* Oregon State University Press.

Reich, G. (2019). Hitting a wall? The Trump administration meets immigration federalism. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism 48*(3), 372-395.

Reinhardt, B.H. (2020). *Oregon history.* Oregon Blue Book. https://sos.oregon.gov/blue-book/Pages/facts-history.aspx

Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities. 82 Fed. Reg. 50055 (2017). Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/27/2017-23630/resuming-the-united-states-refugee-admissions-program-with-enhanced-vetting-capabilities

Reyna, C., Dobria, O., & Wetherell, G. (2013). The complexity and ambivalence of immigration attitudes: Ambivalent stereotypes predict conflicting attitudes toward immigration policies. *American Psychological Association 19*(3), 342-356. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032942

Rihoux, B. & Ragin, C.C. (2012). *Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques*. SAGE Publications, Inc.

Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. *Policy Sciences 4*, 155–169.

Rizzo, S. (2018, June 19). The facts about Trump's policy of separating families at the border. *The Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/06/19/the-facts-about-trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border/

Robbins, W. G. (2002). *This land, Oregon.* The Oregon History Project. Retrieved December 4, 2021, from https://www.oregonhistoryproject.org/narratives/this-land-oregon/

Roberts, H. (2017, May 5). New travel center under construction in Madras. *KBND Newstalk*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://kbnd.com/kbnd-news/local-news-feed/303659

Roberts, H. (2018, August 22). Madras city councilor runs for mayor. *KBND Newstalk*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://kbnd.com/kbnd-news/local-news-feed/377001

Rodriguez, C.M. (2008). The significance of the local in immigration regulation. *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 75*, 567-642.

Rojas-Burke, J. (2014, December 13). The Hispanic in-migration that's revitalizing farm towns. *joe rojas-burke, science writer*. https://joerojasburke.com/2014/12/13/hispanic-rural-immigration/ (Original work published by *Oregon Business,* November 2014).

Root, L. (March 18, 2019). Opinion: Racist terrorists are obsessed with demographics. Let's not give them talking points. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved June 30, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/18/racist-terrorists-are-obsessed-with-demographics-lets-not-give-them-talking-points/

Rosenblum, M.R. (2004). *The transnational politics of U.S. immigration policy*. Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, UCSD.

Ross, W. (2018, March 26). *Reinstatement of a citizenship question on the 2020 Decennial Census questionnaire* [Memorandum]. United States Department of Commerce. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2018-03-26_2.pdf

Sandy Area Chamber of Commerce. (2018). Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://sandyoregonchamber.org/

Sandy City Council. (2020, July 20). *A resolution condemning racism and affirming the City of Sandy's commitment to equity.* Retrieved November 11, 2021, from https://www.ci.sandy.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/administration/page/11301/resolution_2020-19_-_a_resolution_condemning_racism_and_affirming_the_city_of_sandys_commitment.pdf

Sandy High School. (2021). Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.oregontrailschools.com/Domain/15

Sassen, S. (1994). The informal economy: Between new developments and old regulations. *The Yale Law Journal 103*(8), 2289-2304.

Schneider, A.L. & Ingram, H. (1997). *Policy design for democracy*. University Press of Kansas.

Schuck, P.H. (2007a). Taking immigration federalism seriously. *University of Chicago Legal Forum 1*(4), 57-92. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2007/iss1/4

Schuck, P.H. (2007b). The disconnect between public attitudes and policy outcomes in immigration. In C. Swain (Ed.), *The Politics of Immigration Reform*, Cambridge University Press. https://ssrn.com/abstract=811829

Scott, W. R. (2014). *Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities* (4th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc.

Segovia, F. & Defever, R. (2010). Trends—American public opinion on immigrants and immigration policy. *The Public Opinion Quarterly 74*(2), 375-394.

Selznick, P. (1994). *The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.* University of California Press.

Semple, K. (2014, July 30). New York State sheriffs shying away from immigration detention. *The New York Times.* Retrieved January 18, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/nyregion/new-york-state-sheriffs-shying-away-from-immigration-detention-.html?searchResultPosition=16

Sgaier, S. & Downey, J. (2021, November 17). Opinion: What we see in the shameful trends on U.S. maternal health. *The New York Times*. Retrieved November 17, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/11/17/opinion/maternal-pregnancy-health.html

Shah, B. (2020). Executive (agency) administration. *Stanford Law Review 72*(641), 641-747. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/executive-agency-administration/

Shinn, C. (1999). Civic capacity: Theory, research and practice. A*dministrative Theory & Praxis 21*(1), 103-119.

Sifuentez, M.J. (2016). *Of forests and fields: Mexican labor in the Pacific Northwest*. Rutgers University Press.

Sifuentez, M.J. (2017). History, public memory, and creating the Bracero Archive. *Oregon Historical Quarterly 118*(4), 584-597.

Silva, A. (2016). *Rethinking state immigration laws: New actors, processes, and avenues for research* (Publication No. 10153632) [Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Riverside]. ProQuest Dissertation Publishing.

Silverman, C. (2017). Oregon Roma (Gypsies): A hidden history. *Oregon Historical Quarterly 118*(4), 518-553.

Simon, R.J. & Lynch, J.P. (1999). A comparative assessment of public opinion toward immigrants and immigration policies. *International Migration Review 33*(2), 0455-0467.

Singer, A. (2013). Contemporary immigrant gateways in historical perspective. *Daedalus 142*(3), 76-91. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00220

Sirianni, C. (2009). *Investing in democracy: Engaging citizens in collaborative governance*. Brookings Institution Press.

Skocpol, T. (2003). *Diminished democracy: From membership to management in American civic life*. University of Oklahoma Press.

Smith, J.P. & Edmonston, B. (Eds.). (1997). *The new Americans: Economic, demographic, and fiscal effects of immigration.* National Academy Press.

Social Explorer Tables. (2021a). *Census 2000* [Data table]. Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.socialexplorer.com/pub/reportdata/HtmlResults.aspx?reportid=R13020123

Social Explorer Tables. (2021b). *American Community Survey (ACS) 2006-2010 (5-Year Estimates)* [Data table]. Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.socialexplorer.com/pub/reportdata/HtmlResults.aspx?reportid=R13020127

Social Explorer Tables. (2021c). *American Community Survey (ACS) 2011-2015 (5-Year Estimates)* [Data table]. Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.socialexplorer.com/pub/reportdata/HtmlResults.aspx?reportid=R13020128

Social Explorer Tables. (2021d). *American Community Survey (ACS) 2015-2019 (5-Year Estimates)* [Data table]. Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.socialexplorer.com/pub/reportdata/HtmlResults.aspx?reportid=R13020130

Social Explorer Tables. (2021e). *Census 1990* [Data table]. Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.socialexplorer.com/pub/reportdata/HtmlResults.aspx?reportid=R13018701

Spiro, P.J. (2001). Federalism and immigration: models and trends. *International Social Science Journal 53*(167), 67-73. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00294

St. Charles Health System. (2021). Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.stcharleshealthcare.org/

Stephen, L. (2003). Cultural Citizenship and Labor Rights for Oregon Farmworkers: The Case of Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Nordoeste (PCUN). *Human Organization 62*(1), 27-38.

Stephen, L. (2017). Guatemalan Immigration to Oregon: Indigenous Transborder Communities. *Oregon Historical Society 118*(4), 554-583.

Stepick, A., Mahler, S.J., & Rey, T. (2009). *Churches and charity in the immigrant city: Religion, immigration, and civic engagement in Miami.* Rutgers University Press.

Stewart, W.H. (1982). Metaphors, models, and the development of federal theory. *Publius 12*(2), 5-24.

Stovall, D. (2010). *Bright Wood: The first half century* [Newsletter]. https://secureservercdn.net/72.167.242.48/3gx.380.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/anniversary-publication_web.pdf

Suro, R. & Singer, A. (2002, July). *Latino growth in metropolitan America: Changing patterns, new locations.* The Brookings Institution. Retrieved December 5, 2021, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/latino-growth-in-metropolitan-america-changing-patterns-new-locations/

Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will Financially Burden the United States Healthcare System, in Order To Protect the Availability of Healthcare Benefits for Americans, 84 FR 53991 (2019). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/09/2019-22225/suspension-of-entry-of-immigrants-who-will-financially-burden-the-united-states-healthcare-system-in

Suter-Warner, K.H. (n.d.). *Historic Sandy Downtown Tour* [Pamphlet]. City of Sandy. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://www.ci.sandy.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/community/page/9371/20511.pdf

Swers, M. (1998). Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills Than Their Male Colleagues? *Legislative Studies Quarterly 23*, 435-488.

Tamir, C. (2021, March 25). The growing diversity of black America. Pew Research Center. Retrieved February 1, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2021/03/25/the-growing-diversity-of-black-america/#:~:text=In%202019%2C%2046.8%20million%20people,than%20in%202000%20as%20well

Tamura, L. (1993). *The Hood River Issei: An oral history of Japanese settlers in Oregon's Hood River Valley*. University of Illinois Press.

Tate, K. (2001). The political representation of Blacks in congress: Does race matter? *Legislative Studies Quarterly 26*(4), 623-638.

The City of Madras. (2016a, October 11). *Official minutes: City council, City of Madras*. Retrieved September 5, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/meetings

The City of Madras. (2016b). *City of Madras, Oregon Urban Renewal Action Plan 2016*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/madras_redevelopment_commission/page/11451/madras_urban_renewal_action_plan.pdf

The City of Madras. (2017a, November 14). *Resolution No. 27-2017: A resolution declaring the City of Madras a welcoming city and affirming membership in the National Welcoming American initiative*. Madras City Council Meeting Packet. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/meetings

The City of Madras. (2017b, February 14). *Official minutes: City council, City of Madras*. Retrieved September 5, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/meetings

The City of Madras. (2018, April 24). *Official minutes: City council, City of Madras*. Retrieved September 5, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/meetings

The City of Madras. (2019, November 12). *Madras housing urban renewal district plan*. Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/community_development/page/1641/hurd.pdf

The City of Madras. (n.d.-a). *Home.* Retrieved August 28, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/

The City of Madras. (n.d.-b). *Meetings.* Retrieved September 3, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/meetings

The City of Madras. (n.d.-c). *Community: Organizations*. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.ci.madras.or.us/community/page/organizations

The White House. (2006, May 4). Determination pursuant to section 2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2006-05-11/xml/FR-2006-05-11.xml#seqnum27383

Trice, G., G. Martinez, & S. Ho. (2017). Migration Public History: A Roundtable at the Oregon Migrations Symposium. *Oregon Historical Quarterly 118*(4), 598-611.

Tucker, K. (2002). *Facts about Snake River Valley at Nyssa, Oregon.* The Oregon History Project: A Project of The Oregon Historical Society. Retrieved October 10, 2021, from https://www.oregonhistoryproject.org/articles/historical-records/facts-about-snake-river-valley-at-nyssa-oregon/#.YMjYhKhKg2x

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (n.d.). *Labor force characteristics of foreign-born workers.* United States Department of Labor. Retrieved June 29, 2020, from https://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.toc.htm

U.S. Census Bureau. (2019). *Quick Facts Table: Population Estimates, July 1, 2019.* United States Census Bureau. Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219#qf-headnote-b

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020a, September). *Understanding and using ACS single-year and multiyear estimates.* Retrieved January 18, 2021, from https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/acs/acs_general_handbook_2018_ch03.pdf

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020b, September 16). *Comparing ACS Data.* https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/guidance/comparing-acs-data.html

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020c, April). *Table 15. population by sex and age, for Asian alone or in combination and white alone, not Hispanic: 2019.* Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2019. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2019/demo/race/ppl-ac19.html

U.S. National Archives. (2021, October 10). *Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese (1942).* U.S. Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved October 10, 2021, from http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=74.

U.S. Senate. (n.d.). *Senators born outside the United States*. Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.senate.gov/senators/Foreign_born.htm#:~:text=The%20president%20is%20constitutionally%20required,in%20Article%20I%2C%20section%203

University of Oregon. (n.d.). *The history of Oregon's so-called "sanctuary" law* [Website]. Retrieved December 5, 2021, from https://sanctuarylaw.uoregon.edu/

USCIS. (2019). *Public Charge Final Rule.* https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/public-charge

Valentino, N.A., T. Brader, & A.E. Jardina. (2013). Immigration among U.S. whites: General ethnocentrism or media priming of attitudes about Latinos? *Political Psychology 34*(2), 149-166.

Varsanyi, M. W. (2008). Rescaling the "alien," rescaling personhood: Neoliberalism, immigration, and the state. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers 98*(4), 877-896.

Verhovek, S.H. (2000, September 20). Oregon immigration official resigns amid furor. *The New York Times*. Retrieved January 18, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/20/us/oregon-immigration-official-resigns-amid-furor.html?searchResultPosition=8

Vidal-Ortiz, S. & Martinez, J. (2018). Latinx thoughts: Latinidad with an X. *Lat Stud 16*, 384-395. doi.org/10.1057/s41276-018-0137-8

Wallace, S.J. (2014). Representing Latinos: Examining descriptive and substantive representation in Congress. *Political research Quarterly 67*(4), 917-929.

Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994). *Social network analysis: Methods and applications*. Cambridge University Press.

Waters, M.C. & Pineau, M.W. (2015). *The Integration of immigrants into American society*. National Academies Press.

Weick, K.E. (2007). The generative properties of richness. *The Academy of Management Journal 50*(1), 14-19.

Wilkinson, C. (2005). *Blood struggle: The rise of modern Indian nations.* W.W. Norton & Company.

Willis, E.M. (2020, April 10). *Human research protection program notice of exempt certification* [Form letter]. Human Resource Protection Program: Portland State University.

Wilson, C. & De La Torre, R. (2017, May 1). 30 años después, la ley del estado de santuario de Oregon, sirve como modelo para los demás. *Oregon Public Broadcasting.* Retrieved November 28, 2021, from https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-ley-estado-santuario-modelo-para-demas/

Wilson, J.H. (2014). *Investing in English skills: The limited English proficient workforce in U.S. metropolitan areas*. Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings. Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/investing-in-english-skills-the-limited-english-proficient-workforce-in-u-s-metropolitan-areas/

Witt, M. (1999). The origins and evolution of conflict in Portland's neighborhood association system: A case study of North Portland's District Coalition board. *Administrative Theory & Praxis 21*(1), 51-61.

Wright, D. (1988). *Understanding intergovernmental relations* (3rd ed.). Brooks/Cole.

Xing, J. et al. (2007). *Seeing color: Indigenous peoples and racialized ethnic minorities in Oregon*. University Press of America.

Ybarra, V. D., Sanchez, L. M., & Sanchez, G. R. (2016). Anti-immigrant Anxieties in State Policy: The Great Recession and Punitive Immigration Policy in the American States, 2005–2012. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, *16*(3), 313–339. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532440015605815

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064; 30 L. Ed. 220; 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1938

Yin, R.K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods* (6th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc.

Zuberi, T. & Bonilla-Silva, E. (Eds.). (2008). *White logic, white methods: Racism and methodology.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Appendix A: The Complete Framework for Immigration Federalism

	Institutions								
	Socio-political				**Socio-Economic**			**Socio-Cultural**	
	Law/Policy	**Courts**	**Legislative Representation**	**Interest Groups**	**Industry**	**Income**	**Education**	**Population Change**	**Ideology/political opinion**
Local (3)			Case Study		Case Study	Census; ACS	Census; ACS	Census; ACS	Case Study
	Local level: Explore ideological response to policy and examine actions to policy; observe similarities/differences. • Collect local policy history relating to immigration • Collect Media and Interest Group Grey Material • Assessment of civic capacity at local level (general population and immigrant specific)								
State comprehensive (50)	NCSL Data	■	Ballotpedia	■	AIC/MPI	Census & MPI	Census & MPI	Census & MPI (state)	PRRI
State deep (1)	Pertinent reports, grey material, etc. Media collection and review				AIC/MPI	Census (county)	Census (county)	Census & MPI (county)	PRRI Other Sources
Federal (1)	Literature Review National Archives (ACLU, AIC, NILC)	Review significant cases	Congressional Research Service	Media and Interest Group Grey Material	BLS	BLS; Census; ACS	BLS; Census; ACS	MPI Census; ACS	PRRI PEW GSS Other Sources

Note. This is a schematic representation of the database created for this project. Each box along the federal-level row is a data set that represents a significant aspect to immigration policy at the federal level, and state and local levels are similarly represented. Together, the collected materials are qualitatively analyzed to construct the federal, state, and local-level case studies.

Appendix B: Sample Interview Probes

1. **What is your history in the [LOCATION] community** and what various roles have you played within the community?
2. How would you characterize the **[LOCATION]** community as a whole?
3. **In your experience, what is the role of the immigrant population in the [LOCATION] community?** Has industry been supportive of immigrants?
4. Have you observed discussions or social sentiment around changing city demographics or immigrants in the [LOCATION] community? Does this have an effect on City Council topics of discussion or the direction of government concerns? Explain.
5. Does city council discuss topics related to the needs of specific populations within **[LOCATION]**? What actions come of these discussions? *Equity?*
6. **Do the police interact with federal agencies? Does ICE have a presence in [LOCATION]?**
7. What types of interactions did you have with people from the state/federal level in relation to immigration? **In terms of working with the dynamics of your population and the people who make up that population, do state or federal-level policy ever come into play?**
8. Did you see these things happening elsewhere in Oregon? Were you aware of communities dealing with immigration in similar or different ways? Did you draw on any of those experiences in your own community?
9. Where did you get your information as a city administrator? Was this more formal or informal in nature? How did you ensure that you heard from broad community populations?
10. I want to hear about **[LOCATION]**'s capacity to achieve goals more generally. Tell me about 3 of your favorite stories about **[LOCATION]** getting things done (not specifically related to immigration) or NOT getting things done.
11. **Who else should I talk to?**

Note. These items are sample interview probes for semi-structured interviews. Interview questions were adapted for each community and, due to the semi-structured nature of the process, were altered based on informant expertise and direction.

Appendix C: Charts Showing Changes in Education Attainment by State

Figure C1

Change in foreign-born adult population with less than a high school degree 1990 to 2000 versus 2019 state sentiment scores

Figure C2

Change in foreign-born adult population with less than a high school degree 2000 to 2019 versus 2019 state sentiment scores

Figure C3
Change in foreign-born adult population with a college degree or more 1990 to 2000 versus 2019 state sentiment scores

Figure C4
Change in foreign-born adult population with a college degree or more 2000 to 2019 versus 2019 state sentiment scores

Note. Appendix C Figures C1 through C4 show scatterplots illustrating the change in educational attainment of the foreign-born population from 1990 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2019 against 2019 state sentiment scores.

Figures C1 and C2 show that states that were restrictive in 2019 experienced more dramatic increases in the percentage of the adult foreign-born population who did not have a high school degree from 1990 to 2000. This is in line with steep increases in the overall foreign-born population in many states from 1990 to 2000. From 2000-2019 states experienced less dramatic increases in the percentage of the adult foreign-born population without a high school degree, and state sentiment scores suggest a less significant trend toward restrictive states experiencing greater increases in low-educated immigrants. In both time periods, there were several states, both integrative and restrictive, that saw a decrease in the percentage of the foreign-born population that did not have a high school degree.

However, because both time periods saw record foreign-born increases, and because the overall percentage of foreign-born individuals without a high school degree decreased in from 2000 to 2019, the figures also indicate that the foreign-born population in most states is becoming better educated.

Figures C3 and C4 show that the percentage of the foreign-born population with a college degree or more is increasing in all states, regardless of state sentiment score. No states, either integrative or restrictive, saw a decrease in the percentage of the foreign-born population that had a college degree or more either from 1990 to 2000 or from 2000 to 2019.

Appendix D: Languages Other Than English Spoken at Home by County in Oregon

Table D.1 *Languages other than English spoken at home by percentage of the population in select Oregon Counties in 2019*

FIPS	County Name	Languages other than English spoken at home in 2019			
		Spanish	Indo-European	Asian/Islander	Other
	Oregon State	**9.08%**	**2.51%**	**3.16%**	**0.61%**
41003	Benton County	5.39%	2.41%	5.32%	0.89%
41005	Clackamas County	5.61%	3.19%	2.91%	0.4%
41027	Hood River County	27.44%	0.98%	0.82%	0%
41031	Jefferson County	13.44%	0.52%	0.43%	1.85%
41045	Malheur County	24.13%	0.34%	0.54%	0.29%
41047	Marion County	20.6%	2.42%	2.13%	0.23%
41049	Morrow County	32.78%	0.45%	0.61%	0.07%
41051	Multnomah County	8.42%	4.25%	5.93%	1.36%
41053	Polk County	10.55%	1.11%	1.72%	0.61%
41059	Umatilla County	21.56%	0.44%	0.54%	0.31%
41067	Washington County	12.29%	4.52%	6.8%	1.17%
41071	Yamhill County	11.6%	1.22%	0.84%	0.14%

Note. In all counties listed, Spanish is the most common language other than English spoken at home. This table details the percentage of each county population that speaks a language other than English at home in 2019 and includes Oregon state data for comparison. These data do not reflect margin of error calculations.

Appendix E: Income Diversity in Oregon Counties

Table E. 1 *Income Diversity in Oregon Counties:* Overall median household income to Hispanic median household income and percent difference by county and the state of Oregon. Margin of error not taken into account.

	2000		
Place	Median Household Income (A)	Hispanic or Latino Householder (B)	B/A
Oregon	**$62,980**	**$49,124**	**78.0%**
Baker County, Oregon	$46,742	$37,519	80.3%
Benton County, Oregon	$64,490	$42,879	66.5%
Clackamas County, Oregon	$80,164	$58,428	72.9%
Clatsop County, Oregon	$55,876	$41,886	75.0%
Columbia County, Oregon	$70,493	$50,988	72.3%
Coos County, Oregon	$48,551	$38,096	78.5%
Crook County, Oregon	$54,160	$33,105	61.1%
Curry County, Oregon	$46,358	$45,006	97.1%
Deschutes County, Oregon	$64,413	$41,526	64.5%
Douglas County, Oregon	$51,138	$40,855	79.9%
Gilliam County, Oregon	$51,736	$25,782	49.8%
Grant County, Oregon	$50,118	$51,950	103.7%
Harney County, Oregon	$47,650	$42,466	89.1%
Hood River County, Oregon	$58,993	$43,516	73.8%
Jackson County, Oregon	$56,123	$43,473	77.5%
Jefferson County, Oregon	$55,187	$46,926	85.0%
Josephine County, Oregon	$48,069	$35,500	73.9%
Klamath County, Oregon	$48,543	$35,814	73.8%
Lake County, Oregon	$45,417	$26,494	58.3%
Lane County, Oregon	$56,863	$45,937	80.8%
Lincoln County, Oregon	$50,440	$51,565	102.2%
Linn County, Oregon	$57,749	$44,831	77.6%
Malheur County, Oregon	$46,548	$39,412	84.7%
Marion County, Oregon	$62,053	$49,108	79.1%
Morrow County, Oregon	$57,754	$42,369	73.4%
Multnomah County, Oregon	$63,537	$49,632	78.1%
Polk County, Oregon	$65,127	$47,951	73.6%
Sherman County, Oregon	$54,092	$30,143	55.7%
Tillamook County, Oregon	$52,748	$30,785	58.4%
Umatilla County, Oregon	$55,796	$49,211	88.2%
Union County, Oregon	$51,931	$46,852	90.2%
Wallowa County, Oregon	$49,454	$14,430	29.2%
Wasco County, Oregon	$55,350	$46,017	83.1%
Washington County, Oregon	$80,229	$57,108	71.2%
Wheeler County, Oregon	$44,253	$36,942	83.5%

Place	Median Household Income (A)	Hispanic or Latino Householder (B)	B/A
Yamhill County, Oregon	$67,898	$55,491	81.7%

2010

Place	Median Household Income (A)	Hispanic or Latino Householder (B)	B/A
Oregon	**$57,885**	**$43,945**	**75.9%**
Baker County, Oregon	$46,656	$36,447	78.1%
Benton County, Oregon	$56,419	$37,045	65.7%
Clackamas County, Oregon	$72,864	$53,031	72.8%
Clatsop County, Oregon	$49,616	$41,798	84.2%
Columbia County, Oregon	$64,864	$65,456	100.9%
Coos County, Oregon	$44,055	$46,223	104.9%
Crook County, Oregon	$54,124	$35,281	65.2%
Curry County, Oregon	$44,030	$49,068	111.4%
Deschutes County, Oregon	$62,363	$50,226	80.5%
Douglas County, Oregon	$46,664	$37,427	80.2%
Gilliam County, Oregon	$49,528	$45,263	91.4%
Grant County, Oregon	$42,273	$43,856	103.7%
Harney County, Oregon	$45,871	$25,772	56.2%
Hood River County, Oregon	$60,291	$48,967	81.2%
Jackson County, Oregon	$51,871	$38,088	73.4%
Jefferson County, Oregon	$48,678	$44,690	91.8%
Josephine County, Oregon	$44,695	$42,597	95.3%
Klamath County, Oregon	$49,140	$37,552	76.4%
Lake County, Oregon	$48,302	$26,195	54.2%
Lane County, Oregon	$50,439	$37,696	74.7%
Lincoln County, Oregon	$46,696	$35,367	75.7%
Linn County, Oregon	$53,857	$39,008	72.4%
Malheur County, Oregon	$45,998	$32,256	70.1%
Marion County, Oregon	$54,135	$44,719	82.6%
Morrow County, Oregon	$51,589	$47,105	91.3%
Multnomah County, Oregon	$58,306	$43,329	74.3%
Polk County, Oregon	$59,900	$42,819	71.5%
Sherman County, Oregon	$48,595	$25,522	52.5%
Tillamook County, Oregon	$46,313	$34,165	73.8%
Umatilla County, Oregon	$53,891	$44,173	82.0%
Union County, Oregon	$49,544	$60,341	121.8%
Wallowa County, Oregon	$48,315	$19,683	40.7%
Wasco County, Oregon	$49,510	$36,793	74.3%
Washington County, Oregon	$73,530	$48,215	65.6%
Wheeler County, Oregon	$39,252		0.0%
Yamhill County, Oregon	$61,675	$46,040	74.6%

Place	Median Household Income (A)	Hispanic or Latino Householder (B)	B/A
Oregon	**$55,297**	**$43,774**	**79.2%**
Baker County, Oregon	$44,349	$32,103	72.4%
Benton County, Oregon	$53,742	$39,078	72.7%
Clackamas County, Oregon	$71,183	$52,091	73.2%
Clatsop County, Oregon	$50,079	$39,358	78.6%
Columbia County, Oregon	$57,386	$29,241	51.0%
Coos County, Oregon	$41,659	$38,398	92.2%
Crook County, Oregon	$40,041	$58,783	146.8%
Curry County, Oregon	$44,118	$60,592	137.3%
Deschutes County, Oregon	$55,275	$40,635	73.5%
Douglas County, Oregon	$44,580	$33,006	74.0%
Gilliam County, Oregon	$47,797	$41,622	87.1%
Grant County, Oregon	$41,056		0.0%
Harney County, Oregon	$40,553		0.0%
Hood River County, Oregon	$60,243	$57,459	95.4%
Jackson County, Oregon	$47,511	$38,473	81.0%
Jefferson County, Oregon	$50,034	$39,806	79.6%
Josephine County, Oregon	$40,645	$36,802	90.5%
Klamath County, Oregon	$43,527	$40,691	93.5%
Lake County, Oregon	$34,930	$31,313	89.6%
Lane County, Oregon	$47,592	$40,965	86.1%
Lincoln County, Oregon	$45,431	$43,716	96.2%
Linn County, Oregon	$49,255	$32,733	66.5%
Malheur County, Oregon	$38,220	$33,935	88.8%
Marion County, Oregon	$52,263	$42,347	81.0%
Morrow County, Oregon	$54,946	$49,850	90.7%
Multnomah County, Oregon	$58,382	$42,432	72.7%
Polk County, Oregon	$56,999	$55,481	97.3%
Sherman County, Oregon	$41,397		0.0%
Tillamook County, Oregon	$45,949	$31,834	69.3%
Umatilla County, Oregon	$51,906	$46,146	88.9%
Union County, Oregon	$47,289	$36,113	76.4%
Wallowa County, Oregon	$43,791	$43,974	100.4%
Wasco County, Oregon	$46,857	$44,404	94.8%
Washington County, Oregon	$72,035	$48,078	66.7%
Wheeler County, Oregon	$36,136	$63,735	176.4%
Yamhill County, Oregon	$57,649	$46,203	80.1%

| | 2019 | | |
Place	Median Household Income (A)	Hispanic or Latino Householder (B)	B/A
Oregon	**$62,818**	**$52,537**	**83.6%**
Baker County, Oregon	$45,998	$49,917	108.5%
Benton County, Oregon	$62,077	$50,345	81.1%
Clackamas County, Oregon	$80,484	$67,083	83.3%
Clatsop County, Oregon	$54,886	$49,183	89.6%
Columbia County, Oregon	$62,257	$48,603	78.1%
Coos County, Oregon	$45,051	$41,645	92.4%
Crook County, Oregon	$49,006	$41,113	83.9%
Curry County, Oregon	$48,440	$60,691	125.3%
Deschutes County, Oregon	$67,043	$54,503	81.3%
Douglas County, Oregon	$47,267	$44,621	94.4%
Gilliam County, Oregon	$47,500	$53,553	112.7%
Grant County, Oregon	$44,712	$48,438	108.3%
Harney County, Oregon	$40,735	$30,417	74.7%
Hood River County, Oregon	$65,679	$58,924	89.7%
Jackson County, Oregon	$53,412	$43,416	81.3%
Jefferson County, Oregon	$53,277	$56,332	105.7%
Josephine County, Oregon	$45,616	$36,606	80.2%
Klamath County, Oregon	$46,491	$48,682	104.7%
Lake County, Oregon	$37,898	$24,573	64.8%
Lane County, Oregon	$52,426	$49,159	93.8%
Lincoln County, Oregon	$47,882	$49,265	102.9%
Linn County, Oregon	$55,893	$53,470	95.7%
Malheur County, Oregon	$43,313	$42,739	98.7%
Marion County, Oregon	$59,625	$49,236	82.6%
Morrow County, Oregon	$54,269	$51,500	94.9%
Multnomah County, Oregon	$69,176	$51,766	74.8%
Polk County, Oregon	$62,691	$54,286	86.6%
Sherman County, Oregon	$51,071		0.0%
Tillamook County, Oregon	$49,895	$46,141	92.5%
Umatilla County, Oregon	$54,699	$46,667	85.3%
Union County, Oregon	$52,171	$59,063	113.2%
Wallowa County, Oregon	$51,224	$50,703	99.0%
Wasco County, Oregon	$53,105	$66,117	124.5%
Washington County, Oregon	$82,215	$61,163	74.4%
Wheeler County, Oregon	$40,926		0.0%
Yamhill County, Oregon	$63,902	$48,866	76.5%

Appendix F: Top Employing Industries in Four Oregon Counties

Table F.1 *The top employing industries in four Oregon counties (Hood River, Malheur, Washington, and Jefferson Counties) in 2000 and 2019*

County	Region (Population)	2000		2019	
		Top Employing Industries	Participation by % of Population	Top Employing Industries	Participation by % of Population
Hood River	North Central Oregon	Educational, health and social services	18.5%	Educational, health and social services	21.9%
	2000 (20,411)	Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining	14.0%	Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining	15.6%
	2019 (23,209)	Retail trade	11.5%	Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation and food services	10.9%
		Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation and food services	10.3%	Retail trade	9.4%
		Manufacturing	9.2%	Manufacturing	8.8%
Jefferson	Central Oregon	Manufacturing	20.2%	Educational, health and social services	21.4%
	2000 (19,009)	Educational, health and social services	16.5%	Manufacturing	14.2%
	2019 (23,607)	Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation and food services	10.4%	Retail trade	11.8%
		Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining	10.3%	Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation and food services	11.6%
		Retail trade	9.3%	Public administration	9.5%
Malheur	Eastern Oregon	Educational, health and social services	19.2%	Educational, health and social services	19.7%
	2000 (31,615)	Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining	14.7%	Retail trade	13.4%
	2019 (30,412)	Retail trade	11.6%	Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining	12.8%
		Manufacturing	11.4%	Manufacturing	10.4%
		Public administration	7.5%	Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation and food services	8.6%
Washington	Portland Metro/ Mid-Valley	Manufacturing	20.1%	Educational, health and social services	19.9%
	2000 (445,342)	Educational, health and social services	15.8%	Manufacturing	17.5%
	2019 (589,481)	Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services	11.9%	Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services	13.4%
		Retail trade	11.5%	Retail trade	11.1%
		Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing	8.3%	Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation and food services	8.1%

Appendix G: Active Organizations Serving Immigrant Communities in Oregon

Table G.1 *List of Active Oregon Advocacy and Rights Organizations and Legal Support Resources Serving Immigrant Communities in the State of Oregon*

Organization Name	Function	Organization Details	Year Est.	Source Location
ACLU Oregon	Civil Rights	A nonpartisan organization dedicated to the defending and advancing civil liberties and civil rights	ACLU 1920	*https://aclu-or.org*
Bienestar	Housing	Builds housing, hope, and community for the wellbeing of Latinxs, immigrants, and all families in need	1981	*https://bienestar-or.org/*
Casa of Oregon	Housing	improves lives in underserved communities by building and renovating affordable housing and neighborhood facilities and providing programs and resources that increase families' financial well-being	1977	*https://casaoforegon.org/*
Causa	Advocacy	Founded to work towards legislation that improves the lives of Oregon's immigrant community	1995	*https://causaoregon.org/*
Euvalcree	Advocacy	Mobilizes and engages underserved and underrepresented populations to improve the lives of all children, families and communities in rural Oregon, Washington, and Idaho	2014	*https://euvalcree.org/*
Farmworker Housing Development Corporation	Housing	Developing farmworker leadership through affordable housing, social services, education, and economic development	1990	*http://fhdc.org/*
Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization	Advocacy/ Education	Promotes the integration of refugees, immigrants and the community at large into a self-sufficient, healthy and inclusive multi-ethnic society	1976	*https://irco.org/*
National Immigration Legal Services Directory	Legal	A full list of legal assistance organizations throughout the state		*https://www.immigrationadvocates.org/nonprofit/legaldirectory/search?state=OR*
Oregon Center for Public Policy	Policy	Uses research and analysis to advance policies and practices that improve the economic and social opportunities of all Oregonians	c. 2000	*https://www.ocpp.org/tag/immigration/*

Oregon Human Development Corporation	Human Services	provides workforce development and associated services for farmworkers and disadvantaged individuals throughout Oregon	1979	*https://www.ohdc.org/*
Oregon Immigration Resource	Legal	Resource for legal issues and advocacy (parent organization: Causa)		*https://oregonimmigrationresource.org/*
Oregon Law Center	Legal	Works to achieve justice for low-income Oregonians	2013	*https://oregonlawcenter.org/*
Unite Oregon	Advocacy	Works across Oregon to build a unified intercultural movement for justice (prior to 2015 was Oregon Action and Center for Intercultural Organizing)	2015	*https://www.uniteoregon.org/*

Appendix H: Place of Birth of Foreign-Born Population in Sandy, Oregon

Table H.1 *Place of Birth for Foreign-Born Population in Sandy Oregon: 2000, 2010, and 2019.* Margin of error not taken into account.

SE:T208. Place Of Birth For The Foreign-Born Population (ACS Compatible Version)	2000		SE:A07001. Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population	2010		SE:A07001. Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population	2019	
Foreign-Born Population:	309		Foreign-Born Population:	221		Foreign-Born Population:	750	
Europe:	161	52.1%	Europe:	77	34.8%	Europe:	249	33.2%
Northern Europe:	33	10.7%	Northern Europe:	25	11.3%	Northern Europe:	60	8.0%
United Kingdom	7	2.3%	United Kingdom:	14	6.3%	United Kingdom	60	8.0%
Other Northern Europe	26	8.4%	Other Northern Europe	11	5.0%			
Western Europe:	12	3.9%	Western Europe:	25	11.3%	Western Europe:	43	5.7%
Germany	6	1.9%	Germany	25	11.3%	Austria	17	2.3%
Netherlands	6	1.9%				Netherlands	26	3.5%
Eastern Europe:	116	37.5%	Eastern Europe:	27	12.2%	Eastern Europe:	146	19.5%
Czech Republic and Slovakia	8	2.6%	Poland	27	12.2%	Czech Republic and Slovakia	27	3.6%
Ukraine	101	32.7%				Russia	90	12.0%
Other Eastern Europe	7	2.3%				Ukraine	29	3.9%
Asia:	31	10.0%	Asia:	42	19.0%	Asia:	175	23.3%
Eastern Asia:	23	7.4%				Eastern Asia:	50	6.7%
Hong Kong	10	3.2%				Hong Kong	32	4.3%
Japan	8	2.6%				Japan	18	2.4%
Korea	5	1.6%				South Central Asia:	111	14.8%
South Eastern Asia:	8	2.6%	South Eastern Asia:	42	19.0%	South Eastern Asia:	14	1.9%
Philippines	8	2.6%	Philippines	42	19.0%	Vietnam	14	1.9%
Americas:	117	37.9%	Americas:	46	20.8%	Americas:	326	43.5%
Latin America:	117	37.9%	Latin America:	46	20.8%	Latin America:	301	40.2%
Cuba	20	6.5%	Cuba	17	7.7%	Cuba	11	1.5%
Central America:	97	31.4%	Central America:	29	13.1%	Central America:	290	38.7%
Mexico	87	28.2%	Mexico	9	4.1%	Mexico	290	38.7%
Guatemala	10	3.2%	Guatemala	20	9.1%			
			Oceania:	56	25.3%	Northern America:	25	3.3%
			Australia	56	25.3%	Canada	25	3.3%

Appendix I: Descriptive Data About Interview Informants

Table I.1 Descriptive Data About Interview Informants

Role in Community (2005-2019)	Longevity in Professional Context in Community	Longevity in Community	Notes re. Immigration	Sex and Ethnic Identity
City Manager	2012-present	Lifetime resident	NA	Male, Anglo
ED of Latino Community Organization	2015-present	Lifetime resident	U.S.-born/ migrant family	Female, Latina
ED of Latino Community Organization	2006-present	2006-present (has not lived in Madras)	NA	Male, ethnicity unknown
County Sheriff	1980s-present	Lifetime resident	NA	Male, Anglo
Chief of Police	1998-present	1990s-present	NA	Male, Anglo
City Manager	2014-present	2014-present	NA	Male, Anglo
City Manager (former)	2010-2018	2010-2018	NA	Male, Ethnic white
County Employee (Public Health)	1980s-present	1980s-present	NA	Female, Anglo
City Manager/ Reserve Officer	2014-present	2005-present	NA	Male, Anglo
Elected Official/ Various boards and commissions	2010s-present	Lifetime resident	NA	Female, Indigenous American
Elected Official (former)/Various boards and commissions	2010s-present	Lifetime resident until 2019	Immigrant	Female, Latina
City Manager	2005-present	2005-present	NA	Male, Anglo
County Administrator	2007-present	2007-present (has not lived in Madras)	NA	Male, Anglo
City Employee (Community Development)	2017-present	2017-present	NA	Female, Anglo
City Manager (former)	1990s-2013	1990s-2013	NA	Male, Anglo
Elected Official	1980s-2011	1980s-present	NA	Female, Anglo

City Employee (Community Services)	1980s-2017	1980s-present	NA	Female, Ethnic white
Elected Official (former)/ City Employee	2009-present	2004-present	Immigrant	Female, Latina
City Manager	2019-present	2019-present	NA	Male, Anglo
City Employee*	2019-present	Lifetime resident	Immigrant	Female, Latina

Note. *Indicates this interview was not included in the initial qualitative analysis of interview data.

Appendix J: Qualitative Analysis Coding for Interviews

The qualitative analysis of 19 interviews for this research study resulted in 165 discrete codes, including 24 code groups and 27 independent codes, or codes that do not fit under the umbrella of the 24 code groups. Code groups are listed in alphabetical order with the group label listed in all capital letters.

Code
ACCESS
Accessibility: Barriers (Functional)
Accessibility: Barriers (Perceived)
Accessibility: General
Accessibility: Languages (other than English)
Accessibility: Negotiating Systems
CAPACITY
Capacity to Achieve Goals, General (Failed)
Capacity to Achieve Goals, General (Lack of)
Capacity to Achieve Goals, General (Success)
Capacity to Achieve Goals: Potential
Capacity: Consultants
Capacity: Cultural Competence
Capacity: Cultural Competence (Incentives for)
Capacity: Cultural Competence (Lack of)
Capacity: Deserving and Able Attitude
Capacity: Equity
CHANGE
Change: Community Driven
Change: Intentionality
Change: Leadership Driven
Change: Resistance to
COMMUNITY
Community: Security
Community: Segregated
Community: Segregated (Not)
Community: Tightknit
Community: Trust
Community: Trust (Lack of)
Community: Trust: ICE as Obstacle
DEFINITION
Definition: "Community" (Differences)
Definition: "Immigrant"
Definition: City Manager Role
DEI
DEI: Informant Stated
DEI: Policy and Plan

DEMOGRAPHICS

Demographics: Countywide

Demographics: General

DIVERSITY

Diversity: Among Latino Population

Diversity: Diversification of new Hires

Diversity: Value

Diversity: Value (Superficial)

ENGAGEMENT

Engagement: Meet Population Where They Are

Engagement: Mentoring Success

Engagement: Non-White Participation Lacking

Engagement: Outreach

Engagement: Outreach (Reliance on Bridges)

Engagement: Outreach (unsuccessful)

Engagement: Relationship Building

Engagement: Respect and dignity

Engagement: Volunteering

HISTORICITY

Historicity: Context of Place

Historicity: Longevity of immigrant population

Historicity: Value

HOUSING

Housing: General Population

Housing: Workforce

ICE

ICE: Community Discussions

ICE: Concentration of Undocumented Population

ICE: Effects of Federal Administrative Change

ICE: Isolated Location

ICE: Presence

ICE: Presence (No)

ICE: Trump Administration

IGR

IGR: Complexities

IGR: Examples

IGR: Jurisdictional Responsiblity

IGR: Rural Oregon on Its Own

IGR: State (Border with Idaho)

IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT

Immigrant Employment: Agriculture and Nursery

Immigrant Employment: Creating Economic Value

Immigrant Employment: Other than Ag

INFORMANT

Informant: Lack of Awareness/Oversimplification
Informant: Self-Identification
Informant: Sentiment
INFORMATION
Information: Formal
Information: Informal
Information: Other Cities
Information: Trump Administration
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Law Enforcement: Enforcement v. Jail Mgmt
Law Enforcement: Gang Activity
Law Enforcement: Outreach
Law Enforcement: Targeting
Law Enforcement: Targeting (Not)
Law Enforcement: Warrant/ICE
LEADERSHIP
Leadership (Latino)
Leadership (Latino): Lack of
Leadership (White): Learning
Leadership: Burn Out
Leadership: Diversification
Leadership: Gatekeeping
Leadership: Open
Leadership: POC are Capable
Leadership: Value of Relationships
ORGANIZATIONS
Organizations: Association of Eastern Oregon Counties
Organizations: American Legion
Organizations: Building Bridges Annual Seminars (Washington County)
Organizations: Catholic Charities
Organizations: Catholic Church—not really a bridge
Organizations: Centro
Organizations: COIC
Organizations: Collage of Cultures
Organizations: DEQ
Organizations: DLCD (Dept. of Land conservation and Development)
Organizations: Downtown Association
Organizations: Economic Empowerment Center
Organizations: EMERGE Oregon
Organizations: HFDC
Organizations: Hispanic Advisory Committee
Organizations: Hood River County
Organizations: Housing Works
Organizations: Latino Advisory Committee

Organizations: Latino Chamber of Commerce
Organizations: Latino Community Association
Organizations: Latino Policy Advisory Council
Organizations: Library
Organizations: OHSU Nutritional Program
Organizations: Oregon Department of Transportation
Organizations: Portland State University
Organizations: Related to Local Social Capital
Organizations: USDA
POLICIES
Policies: 1986 IIRCA
Policies: 90s law
Policies: Bracero Program
Policies: Land Use Regulations
Policies: Oregon HB 3265
Policies: Oregon v. Trump 2020, 8 USC 1373
Policies: ORS Sanctuary State Law (ORS 181A.820)
Policies: Public Charge
Policy Example: Public Charge
Policy Example: Stimulus Payments
RACE
Race: Cultural Nervousness
Race: Racist Events/Beliefs
REPRESENTATION
Representation (Latino): Governance Roles
Representation (Tribal): Governance Roles
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
Socio-Economic Status: Survival Mode
Socio-Economic Status: Wealth Building
TENSION
Tension (Latino Population): Immigrant v. Non-Immigrant
Tension (Latino Population): Socio-Economic
Tension: Conservative White Leadership and Latino Community
Tension: Demographic Change
Tension: Growth
Tension: IGR
Tension: Political
*Accountability: Constituents
*Ag Technology Response to Increasing Wages
*Colorado: Tribes
*COVID-19
*Doing nothing is easy
*Equal Treatment
*Geography

*Growth
*I heard "Mexicans are lazy, they come to steel our jobs, and they're m…
*I just don't want to paint a picture that we're doing everything right
*Inclusivity
*Institutionalized Practice
*Invisible (Latino Population)
*It's like, not even speaking different languages. It's like someone's…
*Lateral Oppression
*Local Government Policy Drivers
*Organizational change
*People of color are perfectly capable of leading everybody.
*Politicization of Citizenship
*Rurality
*Schools
*Social Capital
*Systemic Issues: Equity
*The Struggle
*Tied to the land
*Transformative Event: Eclipse
*Women Empowered

Appendix K: Comparative Qualitative Analysis (QCA) Truth Tables

Truth table created for QCA analysis of three local case studies: Sandy, Nyssa, Madras.

Sensitizing concepts (conceptual categories and conceptual properties) for each city were listed in the table and, where the same concept is present in another city, the number '1' is placed in the column as an indicator of similarity. Likewise, where a concept is not shared, a '0' is input in the column to indicate difference. Once complete, it is possible to identify and discuss sensitizing concepts that are present in all three local case studies, present in only two of the three case studies, or present in only one of the studies.

City	Conceptual Categories	Conceptual Properties	Nyssa	Madras
Sandy	(Civic) Challenge	tight budget; tradeoffs limit services	1	
Sandy	Capacity	municipal broadband		
Sandy	Capacity	municipal bus		
Sandy	Challenge	serving needs of changing population (cultures and languages vary)		
Sandy	Contemporary Migration	climate; cost of living		
Sandy	Demographics	consistent population growth		1
Sandy	Demographics	Great Recession affected immigrant population numbers		
Sandy	Demographics	immigration: consistent population change		
Sandy	Demographics	immigration: Mexico dominant	1	1
Sandy	Demographics	Latino population growth	1	1
Sandy	Demographics	non-Spanish speaking Latinos		
Sandy	Demographics	Ukrainian: immigrant majority (2000)		
Sandy	Demographics	Tension: new arrivals versus homestead residents (not immigrant related)		
Sandy	Economy	existing industry can support substantial population growth		
Sandy	Economy	gateway city		1
Sandy	Economy	Immigration: city as gateway for immigrants to other locations possible		
Sandy	Economy	Latinos at parity with household income (not considering MOE)		
Sandy	Economy	little change in industry (2005-2019)		
Sandy	Economy	observed evolution of immigrant workforce from migrant work to stable work and entrepreneurship		
Sandy	Economy	no support for Hispanic/Latino business via Chamber	1	1

Sandy	Engagement	advance awareness of immigrant needs among broader community		
Sandy	Engagement	summer internship program (institutionalization unconfirmed)		
Sandy	Geography	gateway bt metro and mountains		
Sandy	Geography	falling just outside regional government a boon		
Sandy	Historicity	economy: lumber		
Sandy	Historicity	Ag	1	1
Sandy	Historicity	all Sandy residents as migrants		
Sandy	Historicity	Forced removal of tribes	1	1
Sandy	Historicity	Incorporation 1911	1	1
Sandy	Historicity	migrants and immigrants fill labor gaps		
Sandy	Historicity	European arrival (largely via Oregon Trail) 1840s-1880s	1	1
Sandy	Historicity	pioneer trading post		
Sandy	Historicity	Railroads become dominate mode of arrival		1
Sandy	Historicity	Tribal territory	1	1
Sandy	Historicity	pioneer heritage	1	
Sandy	Housing	farmworker (immigrant)	1	1
Sandy	Housing	Increasing values	1	1
Sandy	ICE	OR localities do not enforce federal law	1	1
Sandy	Identity	pioneer spirit	1	
Sandy	Identity	we deserve this		
Sandy	IGR	State: highway traffic control		
Sandy	IGR	State: land use laws	1	1
Sandy	Information	formal networks	1	1
Sandy	Information	informal networks	1	1
Sandy	Infrastructure	state highway		1
Sandy	Infrastructure	rail services	1	1
Sandy	Leadership	Creative Solutions	1	1
Sandy	Leadership	go-getters		
Sandy	Leadership	team continuity (Intentional)		1
Sandy	Leadership	Tension: acknowledgement of effort necessary to lift immigrants up		
Sandy	Participation	Lack of cultural understanding from Anglo community		1
Sandy	Religion	Hispanic, Catholic and Hispanic, Protestant	1	1
Sandy	Representation	Latino bridge of cultures		
Sandy	Representation	little to none in gov't	1	1
Sandy	Representation	immigrants and Latinos in business	1	1
Sandy	Representation	Latino bridge of cultures impactful		1

Sandy	Role of Gov't	design programs to increase Latino engagement (ex. facilitated bilingual materials and facilitate Latino participation)		
Sandy	Role of Gov't	draw immigrants into gov't (ex. encourage bilingual resident to run for council)		
Sandy	Role of Gov't	immigrants served equally	1	1
Sandy	Role of Gov't	limited to infrastructure and overall capacity; policy development dominated by emergencies		
Sandy	Role of Gov't	lack of trust between Latinos/immigrants and Anglos		1
Sandy	Social Capital	barriers remain for immigrants		
Sandy	Social Capital	robust opportunities		
Sandy	Spanish language	bus guides, parks department survey		
Sandy	Spanish language	church services (1)	1	
Sandy	Spanish language	radio stations (8)	1	
Sandy	Spanish language	County, city, and school websites YES	1	
Sandy	Undocumented	awareness of undocumented population left vulnerable		1

City	Conceptual Categories	Conceptual Properties	Sandy	Madras
Nyssa	(Civic) Challenge	remote (unseen)		
Nyssa	(Civic) Challenge	tight budget	1	
Nyssa	Civic Engagement	challenging leadership		
Nyssa	Demographics	immigrant population, stable		
Nyssa	Demographics	immigration: slowing		1
Nyssa	Demographics	Immigration: Mexico dominant	1	1
Nyssa	Demographics	Latino majority		
Nyssa	Demographics	Latino population growing	1	1
Nyssa	Demographics	Latinos and immigrants bolster population		
Nyssa	Demographics	maintaining population a challenge since 1980		
Nyssa	Economy	continued dependence on immigrants		
Nyssa	Economy	Ag (still)		
Nyssa	Economy	employment: immigrants in valuable industries		1
Nyssa	Economy	Employment: interstate travel		
Nyssa	Economy	employment: loss of anchor company		
Nyssa	Economy	Industry significant changes 2005-2019		1
Nyssa	Economy	loss of business to Idaho		
Nyssa	Economy	no support for Hispanic/Latino business via Chamber	1	1
Nyssa	Geography	Remote		
Nyssa	Historicity	Ag	1	1
Nyssa	Historicity	anchor employer		1

Nyssa	Historicity	demographic change paves way for more immigrants		
Nyssa	Historicity	Economy: private irrigation projects		
Nyssa	Historicity	Economy: rapid dev. Of Ag linked to irrigation		1
Nyssa	Historicity	European arrival mid-1800s	1	1
Nyssa	Historicity	Forced removal of tribes	1	1
Nyssa	Historicity	IGR: Farm Security Admin (federal)		
Nyssa	Historicity	IGR: Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 (Federal)		1
Nyssa	Historicity	immigrants reducing barriers for immigrants (also: internment and Bracero)		
Nyssa	Historicity	immigrants: Anglo animosity affects housing and opportunity		
Nyssa	Historicity	immigrants: pay, housing, treatment unsatisfactory		
Nyssa	Historicity	Incorporation 1903	1	1
Nyssa	Historicity	Japanese interment, state and federal support of		
Nyssa	Historicity	Mexican led Rights Organization		
Nyssa	Historicity	Migrant farmworkers fill WWII labor gap		
Nyssa	Historicity	migration (climate: Dust Boal migrants)	1	
Nyssa	Historicity	Othering of US citizens (Japanese); (Tejanos)		
Nyssa	Historicity	pioneer heritage	1	
Nyssa	Historicity	Social Capital: regional settling		
Nyssa	Historicity	social/economic capacity		
Nyssa	Historicity	Tejanos		
Nyssa	Historicity	Tribal territory	1	1
Nyssa	Historicity	violence against Mexicans		
Nyssa	Historicity	WWII: population drain		
Nyssa	Housing	Increasing Values	1	1
Nyssa	Housing	farmworker (immigrant)	1	1
Nyssa	ICE	OR localities do not enforce federal law	1	1
Nyssa	Identity	Ag, rural		
Nyssa	Identity	isolation and self-resilience		
Nyssa	IGR	Bordering State		
Nyssa	IGR	federal policy shifts from support to limitations in rural US: see EPA		
Nyssa	IGR	informal yet functional		
Nyssa	IGR	State: land use laws, etc.: barrier to full participation in economic competition	1	1
Nyssa	Information	formal networks	1	1
Nyssa	Information	informal networks	1	1

City	Conceptual Categories	Conceptual Properties	Sandy	Nyssa
Nyssa	Infrastructure	Rail services	1	1
Nyssa	Leadership	creative solutions	1	1
Nyssa	Religion	Hispanic, Catholic and Hispanic, Protestant	1	1
Nyssa	Representation	competitive at local level (recently)		
Nyssa	Representation	immigrants and Latinos in business	1	1
Nyssa	Representation	little to no immigrants and Latinos apparent in gov't	1	1
Nyssa	Role of Gov't	immigrants served equally	1	1
Nyssa	Role of Gov't	purely functional; not social		
Nyssa	Social Capital	Annual Festivals		
Nyssa	Social Capital	caring/outreach (COVID)		
Nyssa	Social Capital	immigrants not mentioned in outreach		
Nyssa	Social Capital	integration of immigrant population unknown		
Nyssa	Spanish language	church services (1)	1	1
Nyssa	Spanish language	County and school websites YES	1	
Nyssa	Spanish language	Discrimination against		
Nyssa	Spanish language	no city government support indicated via internet		
Nyssa	Spanish language	radio stations (4)	1	1

City	Conceptual Categories	Conceptual Properties	Sandy	Nyssa
Madras	Capacity	regional bus		
Madras	County Seat			
Madras	Demographics	Latino population growth	1	1
Madras	Demographics	Racially and culturally divided		
Madras	Demographics	consistent population growth	1	
Madras	Demographics	Anglo population decreasing*		
Madras	Demographics	immigration: decrease in recent arrivals		1
Madras	Demographics	Immigration: Mexico dominant	1	1
Madras	Disconnect	Other and Anglo perspectives/experiences		
Madras	Discrimination	Healthcare and elsewhere		
Madras	Diversity	non-English speakers (county)		
Madras	Economic Inequity	Latino dominant businesses at greater risk of setbacks		
Madras	Economic Inequity	Support for systems navigation needed		
Madras	Economy	Industry significant changes 2005-2019		1
Madras	Economy	clearly impacted by great recession		
Madras	Economy	Health care facilities		
Madras	Economy	employment: immigrants in valuable industries		1
Madras	Economy	possible informal economy (home-based businesses)		

Madras	Economy	anchor employers		1
Madras	Economy	racialization of Latinos and American Indians		
Madras	Economy	brain drain: educated non-whites leave Madras		
Madras	Economy	no support for Hispanic/Latino business via Chamber	1	1
Madras	Geography	Bordering Reservation		
Madras	Geography	Gateway City	1	
Madras	Historicity	Incorporation 1910	1	1
Madras	Historicity	European arrival early 1880s	1	1
Madras	Historicity	Railroads in early 1900s	1	
Madras	Historicity	Tribal territory	1	1
Madras	Historicity	Forced removal of Tribes	1	1
Madras	Historicity	IGR: Bureau of Indian Affairs (Federal)		
Madras	Historicity	Ag	1	1
Madras	Historicity	Economy: rapid dev. Of Ag linked to irrigation		1
Madras	Historicity	IGR: Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 (Federal)		1
Madras	Historicity	different values among different ethnic groups		
Madras	Historicity	WWII air force base prevented population drain		
Madras	Historicity	oldest farmworker population in central Oregon		
Madras	Historicity	Bracero led to Mexican immigration		1
Madras	Historicity	details of Latino arrival limited		
Madras	Historicity	Warm Springs sovereignty 1950-1970		
Madras	Historicity	Demographics: city of migrants (Madras) and Warm Springs mature in tandem		
Madras	Historicity	parallels in racialization of native and immigrant populations		
Madras	Housing	farmworker (immigrant)	1	1
Madras	Housing	Increasing values	1	1
Madras	ICE	OR localities do not enforce federal law	1	1
Madras	IGR	federal policies institutionalize racist ideas		
Madras	IGR	State: land use laws	1	1
Madras	IGR	building inspectors limited		
Madras	IGR	city and Reservation friction		
Madras	Infrastructure	Interstate highways	1	
Madras	Infrastructure	Municipal airport		
Madras	Infrastructure	rail services	1	1
Madras	Intersectionalities	Latino/Amer Indian intermarriage		
Madras	Leadership	Latinos: faith and business communities		
Madras	Leadership	lack of awareness/misconceptions re. needs		

Madras	Leadership	barriers to participation for Latinos/immigrants; retention weak		
Madras	Leadership	novelty, Spanish language meeting		
Madras	Leadership	Gatekeeping		
Madras	Leadership	Creative Solutions	1	1
Madras	Leadership	team continuity (although unaware)	1	
Madras	Participation	Anglos frustrated and perplexed		
Madras	Participation	Lack of cultural understanding from Anglo community	1	
Madras	Potential	civic capacity tools in place		
Madras	Religion	Hispanic, Catholic and Hispanic, Protestant	1	1
Madras	Representation	Latino bridge of cultures impactful	1	
Madras	Role of Gov't	lack of trust between Latinos/immigrants and Anglos	1	
Madras	Social Capital	Latino Community Association		
Madras	Social Capital	formal organizations (not inclusive)		
Madras	Social Capital	organizations targeting Latino populations		
Madras	Spanish language	County and city websites NO	1	
Madras	Spanish language	Library (some resources but few)		
Madras	Spanish language	school (some resources but few)		
Madras	Spanish language	radio stations (1)	1	1
Madras	Spanish language	church services (3)	1	1
Madras	Undocumented	awareness of undocumented population left vulnerable	1	
Madras	Information	formal networks	1	1
Madras	Information	informal networks	1	1
Madras	Representation	little to none in gov't	1	1
Madras	Representation	immigrants and Latinos in business	1	1
Madras	Role of Gov't	immigrants served equally	1	1