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George Lakoff"s Theory of Worldview : a Case Study of the Oregon Legislature

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GEORGE LAKOFF'S THEORY OF WORLDVIEW:

A CASE STUDY OF THE OREGON LEGISLATURE

by

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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the dissertation of Catherine Law for the Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration and Policy presented May 2, 2008

Title: George Lakoff's Theory of Worldview: A Case Study of the Oregon Legislature

George Lakoff's theory of worldview presented in *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think* (2002) has been a topic of interest and discussion in certain political and academic circles. To date, however, it appears that no empirical test of his theory exists. In this dissertation, Lakoff's theory of worldview is explored, using the Oregon Legislature as a case study. A survey instrument to test his theory was created and administered to members of the 2005-2006 Oregon House of Representatives. Cluster analysis and chi-square analysis were used in the data analysis to examine how well Lakoff's theory explains politics. It was found that in many instances, legislators did cluster into two distinct groups, but in two instances, crime and the environment, they did not. In all of the chi-square tests, there was a very strong association between interest group ratings and the worldview scores of legislators. Overall, the results of this study support Lakoff's theory of worldview. This research provides a foundation for further study on the topic of worldview in general and Lakoff's theory in particular. A better understanding of worldview may assist those who study and participate in politics in many ways.

DEDICATION

For my husband Steve, my greatest source of encouragement and loving partner in life, and for my son Sebastian, who will hopefully always remember that we can each work to make a difference if we try.

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PREFACE

As a first year doctoral student in Public Administration and Policy I had the opportunity to study and follow a bill through the legislative process in the Oregon Legislature. It was there that I began to notice first hand the divisions between legislators, primarily on party lines, that seemed to inhibit the development of collaborative and effective legislation. Several years later, I worked as a legislative intern in the Oregon House of Representatives. As I attended committee meetings, floor sessions, and listened to and watched the interactions and discussions between legislators and legislative staff, my initial impressions appeared to be confirmed: the legislative process was inhibited by the divisions and lack of civility between those making legislation.

As my time in the doctoral program progressed, questions about these divisions continued to peak my curiosity. I became especially interested in the degree to which civility between legislators, or lack thereof, affects the development of effective legislation that ultimately affects our state and the public at large. While pondering these questions, my dissertation chair handed me George Lakoff's (2002) book *Moral Politics* and suggested I read it. While I read through this book with great interest, a common theme continued to present itself in my mind: We all lack the ability to understand our own worldview and the worldviews of others; this has led to diminished civil discourse which has likely led to less effective public policy.

Because this reoccurring theme was the making of several dissertations, I decided to study Lakoff's notion of worldview as a beginning. First Lakoff's theory would need to be tested before it could be used for further study about its connection to civil discourse. Until the day when such a study is conducted, a literature review related to civil discourse in politics, along with some interview data on the topic, can be found in Appendix A. Even though the connection between worldview understanding and civil discourse is a project for another time, just the sheer act of studying worldview has affected my ability as an individual to engage in more civil discourse when discussing politics. In addition, some of the research participants seemed to begin to see issues in a different light when the discussion was framed in the context of worldview. While civil discourse hovers around this dissertation as a pervasive connection, the most important influence here is that it ultimately led me to this research project about Lakoff's theory of worldview.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

George Lakoff's theory of worldview has become a provocative and alternative method for understanding politics. According to Lakoff (2002), there are two central worldviews. One is the conservative worldview, based on a strict father model of the family, and the other is the liberal worldview, based on a nurturant parent model. Because of these differing worldviews, individuals understand and use dissimilar language, reasoning, and focus in public discourse. This being the case, it is difficult for all of us, including politicians, to understand each other, let alone find ways to communicate effectively and compromise when necessary.

In recent years, Lakoff's theory, particularly his concept of "framing," has become a topic of interest to many political elites. Since the release of the second edition of his book *Moral Politics* in 2002, he has authored numerous books and articles, appeared frequently as a media guest, participated in the growth of the Rockridge Institute (a progressive think-tank), and worked as a consultant for the Democratic Party (Bai, 2005; Pinker, 2006).

Lakoff's ideas have created some controversy in the political and academic world. In an Internet search in January of 2008, there were 135 references to Lakoff (70 using Lexi-Nexis and 65 using Academic Search Premier). Almost all of these citations were book reviews, critiques of his ideas, or responses to these critiques. Academic discussion related to Lakoff was primarily limited to the concept of framing alone, not to his entire theory of worldview. Despite the popularity and controversy

surrounding Lakoff's theory of worldview, to my knowledge, there has been no empirical testing of his theory.

Purpose of the Study

The study here is an empirical test of Lakoff's theory of worldview. There is one central research question associated with this study: *To what extent does the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory?* The prominence and popularity of Lakoff's theory makes it deserving of an empirical study. Politicians and others (e.g., radio show hosts) have used Lakoff's theory to explain current politics and as the basis for an argument about how they should conduct themselves in the political world. Without an empirical study, however, there is always the question of how well and with what qualifications his theory would hold up in the real world. For example, do legislators cluster in two groups in some situations but not in others? Does the expression of worldview help explain legislative voting behavior? In addition, Lakoff (2002) has proposed that understanding worldview—our own and those of others—is an important step to improving civil discourse in politics. "Public political discourse...has no adequate moral vocabulary, no adequate analysis of our moral conceptual systems, no way to sensibly discuss the link between the family, morality and politics—and no way to provide an understanding of why conservatives and liberals have the positions they have" (p. 384). If Lakoff is correct, then a study that focuses on worldview offers the potential of making an impact on the improvement of civil discourse in politics.

Contributions of this Study

This study makes five important contributions. First, this study adds to the body of knowledge related to values and beliefs and how they affect the political decisions of legislators. Second, this study found that, in many circumstances, the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators do conform to Lakoff's theory. Third, as part of an inquiry into Lakoff's theory of worldview, the first empirical instrument to test his theory was created. This instrument yielded data for this study, but it can be used by other scholars and with other populations as well. Fourth, the depth and quantity of information captured in this data set about worldview of state legislators is unusual—something that other scholars have been less attentive to or have been unable to achieve. Fifth, this study has already shown ways in which Lakoff's theory has contributed to a better understanding of worldview, which may, in turn, lead to better civil discourse in the political world.

Outline of the Chapters

This dissertation is composed of 7 chapters. Chapter 2 gives a background of the study of values and beliefs, explaining the ways in which political scientists and others have approached the topic in the past (values and beliefs systems, ethos, mores, ideology, and group classifications). Chapter 3 provides a discussion of worldview, identifying how it is different from the way values and beliefs have been studied previously and how it is a more encompassing concept than these other approaches.

Chapter 4 addresses Lakoff's theory of worldview specifically, including the ways in which it advances the discussion of worldview and how it has been critiqued and praised.

Despite the debate that Lakoff's theory has elicited, there has been no empirical test of his theory. This leads back to my research question: *To what extent does the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory?* This study sought to empirically address the stated research question. Chapter 5 discusses the methodology used in this study including the population studied, the survey created to operationalize Lakoff's theory, and the statistical procedures chosen to analyze the data. Chapter 6 describes the research findings as they relate to the research question and the associated propositions. Chapter 7 provides a discussion of these results, including their implications, limitations, contributions, and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2: THE STUDY OF VALUES AND BELIEFS

This chapter will provide a background of the study of values and beliefs, explaining the ways in which political scientists and others have approached the topic in the past. In addition, some specific attention will be paid to this area of study as it relates to state legislators. Previously, scholars have approached the study of values and beliefs in many ways and, as a result, they have classified, explained, and made distinctions about individuals with some variety. The terms *values* and *beliefs* may mean different things to different people, so defining them is a difficult proposition. For the purposes of this dissertation, values are defined as those deeply held principles, morals, desires, and distastes. Beliefs are defined as deeply held convictions or truths about life. Some approaches to this area of study are values and beliefs systems, ethos, mores, ideology, and an assortment of other attempts to classify groups. This chapter will provide the context for Chapter 3 where a discussion of worldview will be presented.

Value and Belief Systems

Some of the earlier research focused on how values and beliefs are at the core of an overall system by which people live. Rokeach (1968-69) defined a value system as "nothing more than a hierarchical arrangement of values, a rank-ordering of values along a continuum of importance" (p. 551) and later as "an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a

continuum of relative importance" (1973, p. 5). When looking at value systems, Rokeach (1968-69) found that the relationship between values and attitudes as well as the relationship between values and behavior were significant. He observed that "the function of a person's value-system is to help him chose between alternatives and to resolve conflicts between alternatives in everyday life" (p. 551). Hadari (1988) analyzed the concept of "value trade-off" and discovered that it is an important consideration in theories of decision-making. In this context, a value system is simply the entity that helps people make decisions when particular choices are available. The discussion on value systems does not address the foundations that create them, which is needed in order to have a complete understanding of the differences among us.

The discussion of belief systems is similar to that of values systems. It is not described in relationship to the deep core of a person, but as some sort of pervasive structural force. Scheibe (1970) described a belief system as "a set of functional dispositions...which are implicit expectations concerning what leads to what" (p. 39). Converse (1964) explained that belief systems are difficult to study in an empirical way and, although they share some similarities, *belief system* and *ideology* are not interchangeable terms (ideology will be discussed further in this review). From the perspective of Converse, a belief system is not simply a collection of ideas and attitudes but includes constraints as another important component. Converse, as well as Barton and Parsons (1977), noted that political elites and the public differ in the constraints of their belief systems or how well beliefs are connected to each other. Luttbeg (1968), however, argued that differences exist only in respect to the content of

the beliefs, not in whether the beliefs are packaged in predictable bundles. Cobb (1973) identified the three different types of studies that had been done in the area of belief systems: "using belief-system characteristics as a dependent variable" (p. 135), "the interrelationship among belief-system components" (p. 137), and "the use of belief-system characteristics to predict behavior" (pp. 140-141).

Value and belief systems have also been the focus of many who seek to promote a particular way of life or structure of government. While this vein of discussion does address the roots of value and beliefs, it does so only in relation to one preferred vision. Examples of this can take on many forms: (1) those who have suggested that families and government should be based upon a "balanced" approach of love and understanding with clear discipline and authority based upon the Judeo-Christian ethic (Dobson, 1992; Dobson & Bauer, 1990); (2) those who have explained how Libertarianism reflects a superior way of life and a way to govern (Murray, 1997); and (3) those who have explained that a land ethic—having an ecological conscience and a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land (Leopold, 1949, p. 221)—is both morally correct and the only position that makes sense.

Ethos

The study of ethos has spanned several decades (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001; Hawkins & Prather, 1971; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Wilson & Banfield, 1971). In the literature there was no definition of *ethos* found. Perhaps this is because

ethos is a term that is open to interpretation. A generally accepted definition of ethos is *the spirit of a group of people that is expressed in their beliefs and attitudes.* In their study of three attitudinal components of ethos—holists versus localists, community versus people, and good government versus benefits—Wilson and Banfield (1971) found that the attributes of income, schooling, religion, and ethnicity helped predict whether subjects would be more likely to have "unitarist" or "individualist" leanings. Hawkins and Prather (1971) explored particular components of ethos theory, including the terms "public regardingness" and "private regardingness" (p. 643) and how they relate to attitudes about government and public spending. McClosky and Zaller (1984) contextualized their research with a discussion of the American ethos: capitalism and democracy. Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) compared those favoring humanitarianism or egalitarianism—the two distinct elements of American ethos—and how they led to preferences for particular types of governmental programs. In the review of ethos literature, we again find a discussion that is not comprehensive enough to explain the distinctive roots and effects of those roots on our values and beliefs. According to Weber (cited in Kalberg, 2004), ethos is a "cluster of values" but it is not as comprehensive as worldview because "these values fail to offer adequate answers to the broader questions of meaning, purpose, suffering and injustice" (p. 141).

Mores

Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1996) framed the study of values and beliefs in the context of *mores.* They did not, however, define the term. An

accepted definition of mores is *the customs, attitudes, and manners of a particular group.* Bellah et al. contended that mores help us answer some of the same questions that we have asked ourselves since the founding of this nation, such as "How ought we to live?" and "Who are we, as Americans?" In this way the discussion of mores does address some of the deeper questions of life that Weber said that ethos does not. For Bellah et al., mores include "consciousness, culture, and daily practices of life" (p. 275). The authors found that there are many differences in how people look at moral issues surrounding public and private life. Despite these differences, people also share "a common moral vocabulary," which can be described as the "first language of American individualism" (p. 20). We are all familiar with terms such as *success*, *freedom,* and *justice*, but how we define and look at those words varies depending on the traditions from which we draw.

Much like De Tocqueville (1984), Bellah et al. (1996) argued that people have found a solution to isolation by creating communities in one form or another. The authors described a "real community" as one that is a "community of memory" (p. 153). These communities of memory can take on many forms, including religious, ethnic, political, and geographical. The distinguishing feature of these communities is that they have "stories of collective history and exemplary individuals" (p. 153), which are told and retold and which then tie people together through their common understanding. People in communities of memory also "participate in the practices—ritual, aesthetic, ethical—that define the community as a way of life" (p. 154). Bellah et al. called these practices the "practices of commitment" (p. 154). The authors

explained the interplay between individualism and community by saying, "...if the language of the self-reliant individual is the first language of American moral life, the languages of tradition and commitment in community of memory are 'second languages' that most Americans know well, and which they use when the language of the radically separate self does not seem adequate" (p. 154). While the discussion offered by Bellah et al. does provide an in-depth and provocative perspective on the on-going discussion regarding individualism versus communitarianism, there seems be more that is relevant to explaining the values and beliefs of human beings than a comparison of these ideas. A more carefully constructed theory that goes beyond mores and clearly maps out the acquisition of our values and beliefs and how it affects all areas of life, including the decisions we make, is needed.

Ideology

A preponderance of the literature on ideology was published between 1960 and the 1990s. Minar (1961) gave a thorough cataloguing of the scholarly discussion on ideology and how it related to political behavior. Many since have referenced his work (Barnes, 1966; Gerring, 1997; Patterson, 1963). Bawn (1999) defined ideology as "an enduring system of beliefs, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political circumstances" (p. 305). She described its importance in politics thus: "...it causes people to have preferences and opinions about issues in which they have no direct stake" (p. 303). According to Ball and Dagger (2004b), ideology provides people with a sense of identity as well as helping them explain why things are the way they are,

helping them evaluate social conditions, and helping them design a course of action. Ideology differs from worldview in that worldview is about a deep underlying morality that creates a way of looking at the world, which then influences how we act, whereas ideology skips that first step and becomes the underlying structure "...that tries to link thought with action" (Ball & Dagger, 2004b, p. 4).

The discussion of ideology has taken many forms, including identifying ideologies, measuring ideology, and discovering how ideology affects a variety of choices and behaviors. While each of these studies has individually made some contributions to the study of values and beliefs, none has provided a complete discussion or theoretical framework of the origins and effects in all areas of life. Barnes (1966), for example, drew attention to the difficulties in measuring ideology, the relationship between ideology and organization, the connection between ideology and conflict, and how these variables relate to political thought and behavior. Miller and Gronbeck (1994) explained that ideological differences are a reflection of how one perceives *virtue*. Their model was a four-quadrant matrix (p. 55) with the ideological groups defined as Interest-Group Liberalism (national-progressive corner of the matrix), Old Right Republicanism (national-traditional corner), Populist Democrats (local-progressive corner), and Populist Republicans (local-traditional corner). Galbraith (1998) made observations about ideological differences between liberals and conservatives in comparing how they felt about the issues of poverty, security, morality, equality/inequality, the pursuit of happiness, and a sense of place in relation to the American economic system. He noted that liberals have sought to

increase equality while conservatives defend inequality. Just recently, Love (2006b) presented a comprehensive discussion of the study of ideology, including its history and the various issues that present themselves in each type of ideology. She observed that there are "...three reasons for studying political ideologies: to understand modern politics, to discuss and choose among political values, and to democratize political theory" (p. 11). Love (2006a) also chronicled 49 separate writings of political writers and theorists that spanned from John Locke to Karl Marx to Al Gore. A very similar pair of books was presented by Ball and Dagger (2004a; 2004b).

Some studies have looked specifically at ideology and how it affects decision-making. Again these studies lack a comprehensive approach. Holm and Robinson (1978) looked at how self-determined ideology can be a good predictor of voting and is independent of party identification and issue position. In Shingles' (1989) study of the interplay between social stratification and ideology, he discovered that class and status explain only a small part of ideological differences in support for public aid policies. Jacoby (1990) found that ideological divisions of support of legislation depend upon the content of the issue at hand. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) used a set of measures to determine the ideologies of individual states.

Ethos and Ideology

In their seminal work connecting ethos and ideology, McClosky and Zaller (1984) identified American attitudes toward different dimensions of capitalism and democracy; they found that liberty and equality were the two most cherished values in

American democracy. They also found that while capitalism was originally derived from the protestant ethic, today it is more focused on individualism and economic efficiency. In addition to identifying attitudes about capitalism and democracy, McClosky and Zaller also addressed the tension that exists between these two pillars of American culture. Other literature has also suggested that there is a long history to this tension (Bellah et al., 1996), including literature that goes back several centuries (De Tocqueville, 1984; Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 1961; Locke, 1986; Storing, 1981). Since most Americans support the basic values of democracy and capitalism, McClosky and Zaller observed that most disagreements related to political ideology take place within a framework already set by these generally accepted values. As we might expect, conservatives tend to favor capitalist over democratic values, and for liberals the reverse is true.

McClosky and Zaller (1984) also identified some problems in attempting to analyze political ideology, the most important being how to operationalize it. In their analysis, they allowed respondents to self-designate their political ideology—strong liberal, liberal, middle of the road, conservative, and strong conservative. McClosky and Zaller believed that this led to some less clear results with the general public, perhaps because the general public does not actually have a clear picture of what the differing ideologies entail. However, McClosky and Zaller have found that using a method of self-designation has worked well in the study of those who are more politically sophisticated and those who would be considered political elites. Of all of the approaches to the study of values and beliefs, this study was the most

comprehensive, showing the complex relationship between values, beliefs, attitudes, and ideology. What was missing in this discussion, however, was a presentation of the roots of these values etc., leaving us with such questions as where these things come from and how they originate.

Group Classification

A body of literature has identified the differences between people by classifying them with distinct political labels. The terms *Republican*, *Democrat*, *Independent*, *liberal*, and *conservative* are some of the most common, but other ways of classifying, such as the identification of subgroups within the larger groups, are also present in the literature. This literature uses these political labels to explain other phenomena, such as political polarization and policy preferences. These studies provide an interesting analysis connecting values and beliefs to specific distinctions between people (e.g., conservative, liberal, Republican, Democrat), but again they do not explore the roots of these distinctions and, in some cases, the scope of their inquiry is quite limited. For example, in his discussion of the connection between increased political awareness and polarization, Zaller (1992) used the terms *Republican* and *conservative*, and *Democrat* and *liberal* interchangeably. He found that when opposite party elites agree, the public follows suit, and when elites disagree, the public becomes more polarized. In another study, Klein and Stern (2004) looked at the differences in views between Democrats and Republicans related to three broad policy areas—economic interventions, personal choice regulations, and government's role in

society—and found that Republicans and Democrats were quite similar in their views in these areas but in other areas they were not. In a study of neurobiology and how it relates to politics, Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007) found that liberals and conservatives differ in self-regulation and their response to conflict on a basic, brain-functioning level. Finally, Page and Shapiro (1992) explained differences in policy opinions of the public by connecting them to partisan labels: Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. In their research, they found that diverging opinions are influenced by demographic differences as well as party elites.

State Political Cultures

State political cultures are another way in which groups, in this case, states, are classified. Elazar (1966) argued that states have their individual political cultures. There are some concerns with this theory (Clynch, 1972), but there is considerable evidence suggesting that Elazar's model is indeed valid (Herzik, 1985; Johnson, 1976; Joslyn, 1980; Sharkansky, 1969). Elazar defined political culture as "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded" (p. 79). He argued that states exhibit different types and degrees of the three subcultures that make up the United States: individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic. These subcultures "are of nationwide proportions, having spread, in the course of time, from coast to coast...reflecting the currents of migration...Each of the three reflects its own particular synthesis of the marketplace and the commonwealth" (p. 86). While interesting, this discussion about the distinctions

between states does not provide an adequate theory to explain the roots of values and beliefs of individuals nor their effects.

Subcultures

Ray and Anderson (2000) classified the American people into three subcultures: Moderns, Traditionals, and Cultural Creatives, with Moderns and Traditionals as the only two recognized by the larger culture. Although they acknowledged that there is a widely accepted set of broad "American" values and virtues (e.g., honesty), each subculture possesses a particular structure and set of values. Much like the discussion of value systems, this approach to classifying people does not explain the imbedded roots of those values. Ray and Anderson (2002) determined that Moderns have four sub-groups and value things such as the market economy, progress, getting ahead, individual freedoms and choices, and keeping up with trends. Examples of Moderns are George H. W. Bush, Ted Kennedy, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and Madonna (Ray & Anderson). Traditionals value different things than Moderns do, such as traditional gender roles, religious tradition, local community, preserving "morality," military pride, and the right to bear arms (Ray & Anderson, 2000). Surprisingly, Ray and Anderson (2000) found that many Traditionals are pro-environment and anti-big business and some are pro-choice. Traditionals include a wide variety of subgroups that cannot be easily categorized, but the authors noted that, in general, "...this subculture is not primarily about politics. It's about beliefs, ways of life, and personal identity" (p. 31). Traditionals might

include Democrats from the Reagan or New Deal eras, social conservatives, and religious individuals from particular ethnic groups. Examples of Traditionals are Jimmy Carter, Billy Graham, Mother Teresa, and John Wayne (Ray & Anderson).

According to Ray and Anderson (2000), in the fight between Moderns and Traditionals to "define our social reality, and [to define] whose values will be the official values of our culture" (p. 67), Cultural Creatives came onto the scene. Cultural Creatives value authenticity, idealism, activism, whole process learning and engagement, ecology, and the importance of women (Ray & Anderson). According to the authors, there are two subgroups of Cultural Creatives: the Core group and the Green Cultural Creatives. While both groups have "green values" (p. 14), the latter group is primarily focused on green issues, whereas those in the Core group "combine a serious concern for their inner lives with a strong penchant for social activism, including a commitment to a sustainable future" (p. 14). Examples of Cultural Creatives are Tony Blair, Barbara Boxer, the Dalai Lama, and Robert Redford (Ray & Anderson).

Popular Literature

A variety of popular books have been written in recent years about the distinctions among people in the United States (Frank, 2004; Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004; Nunberg, 2006; Santorum, 2005). Frank (2004), for example, argued that there are essentially two Americas: red states and blue states. Frank's focus was on Kansas, a red state where, according to Frank, residents believe that the

problem with America is that the liberal, "latte-drinking," arrogant intellectuals have taken over society and that this, in turn, has caused great moral decay. According to Frank (2004), many red-staters seem to be fine with the fact that supporting most conservative candidates and/or the conservative platform will lead to economic conditions that will make them worse off financially. The power of the red-states has been in the coming together of two sub-groups: the "Mods" (traditional business Republicans) and the "Cons" (working class people concerned with family values). The preponderance and popularity of these types of books suggests that the questions about how we categorize ourselves and explain our behavior is of significant public concern, but again these books do not provide the reader with a comprehensive theory of the roots of values and beliefs and their effects.

Values and Beliefs of State Legislators

The literature review above focuses on values and beliefs as a general area of study. While this review provides us with an understanding of how they have traditionally been framed, a more specific accounting of the literature on the values and beliefs of state legislators is needed at this time. The review now looks at the study of values and beliefs of state legislators in three capacities: in relationship to specific issues, in reference to the term *ideology*, and in the interplay between ideology and roll-call voting. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the absence of values and beliefs in some studies on legislative decision-making.

In Relationship to Individual Issues or Sets of Issues

Much of the literature related to the values and beliefs of state legislators has looked at their views concerning a particular issue or sets of issues. Background characteristics of state legislators have been one area of focus (Dolan & Ford, 1995; Flanagan, Cohen, & Brennan, 1993; Hahn & Rayens, 2002; Thomas, 1994; Witt & Moncrief, 1993). Flanagan, Cohen, and Brennan (1993) measured and analyzed New York legislators' beliefs about crime issues and found that their views correlated with certain demographic factors. Democratic factors were also the predictor variables used in Witt and Moncrief's (1993) case study of an abortion bill in the Idaho Legislature. Hahn and Rayens (2002) compared views of legislators from particular regions in the state of Kentucky and found few regional differences in their views about tobacco policies. Dolan and Ford (1995) looked at how feminist identity affects desire for particular committee assignments and legislative priorities. As part of her book, Thomas (1994) compared attitudes across a range of issues between male and female legislators and determined that there has been a gender gap since the 1970s. Women are more likely to label themselves *liberal* and as informal rules about conformity and gender roles change, women are actually leading the way on certain social issues.

Some studies have looked at the effects of constituency and party on legislator values and beliefs and resulting behavior (Ferguson & Klein, 2001; Herring, 1990; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Schecter & Hedge, 2001). Herring (1990) studied the voting behavior of both black and white state legislators in three states regarding redistributive issues, civil rights, and liberties and found that their voting behavior

related heavily to the size of the black constituency. Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) looked at the factors that may influence the existence of the death penalty in 42 states, and they found that citizen ideology and Republican strength in the state legislature, or a link between the two, were factors. Ferguson and Klein (2001) found that in 50% of the cases studied, legislator attitude about party and party voting was positively linked. Schecter and Hedge (2001) found that in general, party money and party loyalty were not related. Other studies have addressed the interaction of values and beliefs of legislators in regards to issues of health policy (Beaulaurier, 2001; Kerschner & Cohen, 2002). Kerschner and Cohen (2002) identified values as one of the eight factors that influence decision-making of state legislators on health policy issues. Beaulaurier (2001) studied the attitudes and beliefs of Republican and Democratic state legislators regarding privatization of involuntary mental health treatment and found that beliefs about efficiency and effectiveness in the private sector as well as party affiliation were significant factors in support of such policies.

Ideology

The term *ideology* has been the specific focus of some literature on legislators (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; Bishin, 2006; Layman & Carsey, 2002; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Uslaner, 1999). In their study of the ideologies of individual states, Berry et al. (1998) compared ideological trends between citizens and state governments; they suggested that state legislators and congressional legislators are very similar ideologically. Although not specifically related to state legislators, the

work of Layman and Carsey (2002) demonstrated that if political elites embrace a position on a set of issues that reflect a particular ideology, the electorate will follow. Uslaner (1999) determined that legislator ideology is deeply affected by factors such as state party preferences and the views of party elites. Bishin (2006) distinguished the difference between private ideology and public ideology of legislators and created a measurement system that helps identify the background characteristics and socialization factors from which political beliefs originate.

In their research on American ethos and ideology, McClosky and Zaller (1984) found that their results regarding the values of political elites and the general public were quite different. They believed this was because elites tie their values together more distinctly, reflecting one particular ideology, whereas the general public tends to flip-flop in its ideological stance depending on the issue. McClosky and Zaller (1984) and others (e.g., Converse, 1964) reasoned that as people in the general public become more politically aware, they will begin to see how their values connect, and they, like political elites, will begin to reflect one distinct ideology.

McClosky and Zaller (1984) also found that political elites are highly influential in determining the political culture. As stated by Zaller (1992), when norms are "clear and uncontested," meaning that political elites agree on them, the general public tends to accept these norms. When, however, norms are "contested" by political elites, members of the general public tend to follow the opinions of the elites who most reflect their overall values system. Elites then capitalize on this phenomenon,

whether consciously or not, by espousing "ideologically integrated 'packages'" (McClosky & Zaller, p. 263).

Ideology and Roll-Call Voting

Some of the literature on the ideology of legislators focused on its impact on roll-call voting (Entman, 1983; Jackson & Kingdon, 1992; Peterson, Grossback, Stimson, & Gangl, 2003; Scully & Patterson, 2001). In some cases, however, the discussion focused on congressional legislators, not state legislators (Jackson & Kingdon; Kingdon,; Peterson et al., 2003). Entman (1983) looked at the impact of legislator ideology in two states and found that it was more of a factor in one state than the other but that its impact was significant in both cases. He also found that the factors of party and constituency were a consideration. Scully and Patterson (2001) looked at the differences between ideology and partisan attitudes of legislators from Ohio and suggested that these factors must be considered as independent from one another when looking at how they affect legislative voting. Peterson et al. (2003) tested if and to what degree legislators vote in response to a "mandate" from election results versus their personal ideology and found that mandates from voters do affect legislator voting, but only for a short time.

A finding of one of these studies on ideology and roll-call voting (Jackson & Kingdon, 1992) suggested that it is very difficult to determine the impact of ideology on roll-call voting as an independent variable because ideology does not exist in a vacuum. This finding is in alignment with image theory (Beach, Mitchell,

Paluchowski, & Van Zee, 1992), which states that the values of decision-makers are important but that individuals make decisions within the context of a larger group and therefore group dynamics are an important factor as well. Jackson & Kingdon (1992) suggested that "...actual legislative voting is driven by a complex mix of factors—ideology, the motivation to select 'good' public policies, a desire for reelection, party loyalty, career advancement, the pursuit of power within the legislature, and probably several other factors" (p. 816).

Legislative Decision-Making in General

Interestingly, some of the literature on legislative decision-making (Matthews & Stimson, 1975; Ray, 1982; Uslaner &Weber, 1977) did not look at ideology, or any other term related to values and beliefs, as the focus of their research. Other factors, such as cue-taking from legislative colleagues, were determined as the influential factors. In two different works, Francis (1967, 1989) focused on legislative decision-making in a manner that seemed to almost ignore the idea of ideology. One was a discussion of the rational decision-making "game" that takes place in the legislative committee system, and the other was a comparative analysis of all 50 state legislatures.

Additional research on legislative decision-making did discuss the impact of values and beliefs, but the discussion was limited within the larger discussion of factors such as constituency and interest groups (Jewell, 1982; Kingdon, 1981). All of the literature discussed in this section on decision-making in general was at least 20

years old, however, suggesting that the focus on issues other than ideology could be a reflection of a research topic trend during that time rather than its lack of importance.

This chapter provided a background of the study of values and beliefs, explaining the ways in which political scientists and others have approached the topic in the past, paying particular attention to how they have been studied in relation to state legislators. While these studies provided some understanding about values and beliefs and how they affect decision-making, there seems to be a lack of studies that get to the imbedded roots of those values and beliefs and their effects across a full range of issues. The next chapter provides a discussion of worldview, identifying how it is different from the way values and beliefs have been studied previously and how it is a more encompassing concept than these other approaches. This will provide the context for Chapter 4, which addresses Lakoff's theory of worldview specifically.

CHAPTER 3: THE STUDY OF WORLDVIEW

The preceding chapter provided a background of the study of values and beliefs, highlighting the ways in which the topic has been approached in the past. This chapter will discuss the topic of worldview, including what it is, how it is different from the other concepts related to values and beliefs, why we should study it, and how it has been studied in the past. This chapter will provide the context for Chapter 4, which will specifically address Lakoff's theory of worldview.

What is Worldview?

Worldview is an area of study that offers an alternative approach to the study of values and beliefs. Worldview is not simply a collection of beliefs about certain issues; it is, instead, made up of the deeply imbedded roots that make us who we are. It is those roots that eventually lead us to the decisions we make in all areas of life. It has great depth and impact in all areas of life. "Your worldview is the content of everything you believe is *real*—God, the economy, technology, the planet, how things work, how you should work and play, your relationship with your beloved—and everything you value" (Ray & Anderson, 2000, p. 17). Put simply, "a worldview is to humans as water is to fish. It's the water we swim in" (Ray & Anderson, p. 93).

Worldview is the result of many factors, such as socialization, experience, religious influence, and a variety of demographic variables. Early discussions on worldview (Berger, 1967) used the term *Weltanschauung* to describe this "all-

embracing" (p. 32) concept. The values associated with worldview "...assume a great comprehensiveness: they offer answers to ultimate questions. What is the meaning of life? What purpose does our existence serve? How do we best live our lives? Why do suffering, injustice and misery persist?" (Kalberg, 2004, p. 140).

Scholars and authors in varying fields (e.g., anthropology, counseling, linguistics, psychology, public policy, religion, social work, sociology) have addressed the topic of worldview (Belgrave, Townsend, Cherry, & Cunningham, 1997; Brinson & Kottler, 1995; Chong, 1998; Christians, Ferré, & Fackler, 1993; Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; Evans, 1997; Hodge, 2003; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Hunter, 1991, 1994, 2006; Ihle & Sodowsky, 1996; Kalberg, 2004; Klatch, 1994; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Lakoff, 2002; Ray & Anderson, 2000; Redfield, 1953; Schaeffer, 1976, 1981; Schaeffer & Koop, 1979; Sexton, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Wellman & Keyes, 2007). While definitions of worldview vary, they all point to the commonality of a pervasive, underlying association to the core of a person or groups of people that connects to all areas of life. Examples, in addition to the ideas of Ray and Anderson (2000) discussed in Chapter 2, include Redfield (1953), who noted, "It is the way we see ourselves in relation to all else" (p. 86) and Schaeffer (1981), who stated that worldview is "...the overall way people think and view the world and life as a whole" (p. 17).

Why We Should Study Worldview

There are four reasons why the study of worldview is warranted. First, as was discussed in Chapter 2, other approaches to the study of values and beliefs (values and

belief systems, ethos, mores, or ideology) are incomplete; they are not all-encompassing enough to capture the total essence of human beings in the way that worldview does—what they think, what they stand for, and how they live. Second, the study of worldview can tell us something about our larger culture. Ray and Anderson (2000) stated, "To spot a change in the shape of American culture, you have to go far beyond opinions and attitudes, because these shift as quickly as the summer wind. You have to dive down into the values and worldviews that shape people's lives—the deep structure that shifts gradually over decades or generations" (p. 7). Third, worldview is highly influential in politics and in the development of policies. Christians et al. (1993) said, "...Political action is actually a manifestation of our own world views, and that [sic] only in world views is there human consciousness. Through world views, humans are organized into social blocs, and conversely, world views are never individually generated but express communal life" (p. 189). Fourth, at least one scholar has suggested (Lakoff, 2002) that further study of worldview may help improve understanding and tolerance, which may lead to improved civil discourse, better government, and enhanced democracy.

Despite the fact that worldview is considered by many of the authors cited above to be the bedrock of our human experience, scholarly research on the subject is somewhat limited. This could be due to a variety of factors. First, it is difficult to operationalize and explain its effects. As Howlett and Ramesh (2003) noted, worldviews "...do not necessarily translate easily into specific views on specific policy problems" (p. 127). A second cause could be that worldview is more often

mentioned as an abstract term, not as a central topic of research. In Kalberg's (2004) discussion of Weber's work on the subject, he suggested that the notable lack of the study of worldview in the field of sociology might be due to its vague presentation in the literature. A third cause could be that worldview is so ingrained that most people are unaware of its existence and how it affects their way of thinking and living (Lakoff, 2002; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Early socialization entrenches our position on political issues from a very early age (Gimpel, Lay, & Schuknecht, 2003). This allows us to accept our point of view as simply a "given," without recognizing that it stems from a deeply held worldview. Additionally, it may be uncomfortable for people to be introspective about their own worldview or that of others. According to Ray and Anderson (2000), worldview rarely changes more than once within a lifetime or perhaps not at all. This is because "it changes virtually everything in our consciousness. When you make this shift, you change your sense of who you are and who you are related to, what you are willing to see and how you interpret it, your priorities for action and for the way you want to live...If your worldview changes, it changes everything" (pp. 17-18). Therefore, even if people do understand the existence of worldview and its importance, they may not want to discuss it.

Some of the literature on worldview is based upon promoting a Christian worldview (Dobson, 1978, 1982, 1992; Dobson & Bauer, 1990; Schaeffer, 1976, 1981; Schaeffer & Koop, 1979). Schaeffer (1981), for example, was vehemently opposed to what he perceived as the widely accepted worldview, which he called the "humanist world view." According to him, we must accept that there is one truth

(Schaeffer, 1981; Schaeffer & Koop, 1979), which can be found in Christianity and that it is a "truth about all of reality" (Schaeffer, 1981, p. 20). Schaeffer considered the acceptance of this truth to be the "right" worldview (1976, p. 254).

Worldview has also been used as a focal point to explain differences in people or groups. As noted in Chapter 2, Ray and Anderson (2000) acknowledged that there is a widely accepted set of broad "American" values and virtues, but that each subculture possesses a particular set of values, and our values and worldview go hand and hand. Christians et al. (1993) explained worldview as differences in leanings towards "rights versus the common good" (p. 45). Redfield (1953) used the term *worldview* to compare and contrast those from different cultures, using phrases such as "primitive world view" or the worldview of "modern man." Referencing Redfield's (1953) work, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) characterized worldview as one of the many terms used by anthropologists to "designate the central core of meanings in societies" (p. 1). Taylor (2002) discussed worldviews as evolving entities, using the events of September 11, 2001 as an example of clashing worldviews that are moving us toward a global worldview. Literature such as this provides more understanding of what worldview is and how it helps defines us, but it does not offer a thorough explanatory model of its roots and effects.

Some research on worldview is associated with a specific area of inquiry. Hodge (2003), for example, looked at differences in worldviews between social workers and people of faith but only focused on three areas: abortion and euthanasia, family structure and child-rearing, and sexual issues. Similarly, Evans (1997) looked

only at abortion, sexuality, gender roles, and tolerance in his work on worldview versus social groups as predictors of moral values. Other topical research on worldview has focused specifically on women (Ihle & Sodowsky, 1996), race and ethnicity (Belgrave et al., 1997; Brinson & Kottler, 1995; Chong, 1998), the environment (Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; Sexton, 2006), and particular religious groups (Wellman & Keyes, 2007). There is also some limited discussion of the term *worldview* in research related to social movements (Klatch, 1994). While this type of research does describe how worldview relates to certain issues or topics, it cannot help us understand worldview in a way that is generalizable to the entire population across a full range of issues.

The concept of worldview has also found its way into one particular vein of scholarly discussion: the existence or lack of a culture war in the United States. Hunter (1991) opened this discussion with the claim that there are two differing worldviews—orthodox and progressive—and that these two worldviews are at odds. Since then, many scholars (Carroll & Marler, 1995; Davis & Robinson, 1997; Fiorina, 2005; Hunter, 1994, 1996; Hunter & Wolfe, 2006; Smith, Emerson, Galagher, Kennedy, & Sikkink, 1997; Williams, 1997; Wolfe, 1998) have continued the discussion, asserting in one way or another their position on the existence of a culture war. Hunter (2006) stated in his most recent book that part of this sharp disagreement is due to how each of us defines and understands culture. Despite the fact that Lakoff's (2002) model, originally published in 1996, shares some similarities with this discussion on culture

wars, he is conspicuously absent from this discussion. Likewise, Lakoff (2002) did not reference any of these culture war scholars.

There is at least one study, other than Lakoff, in which a theoretical model explaining worldview is suggested. Duckitt and Fisher (2003) suggested a causal model wherein personality and social situations have a direct effect on ideology and worldview. They spoke of "social worldviews" that are "conceptualized as individuals' beliefs about the nature of the social world" (p. 202). This model, however, looked at worldview and its roots from a very narrow perspective. Social situations were limited to "threatening" and "competitive jungle," personality was limited to "social conformity" and tough-mindedness," and worldview was seen as "dangerous world beliefs" and "competitive-jungle world beliefs" (p. 203). With such a limited perspective of variables, it would be hard to suggest that this model explains the roots and effects of worldview in its entirety.

Chapter 2 gave a background of the study of values and beliefs, explaining the ways in which political scientists and others have previously approached the topic. This chapter provided a discussion of worldview, identifying what it is, how it is different from the way values and beliefs have been previously discussed, and the ways in which worldview has been studied. In the next chapter, Lakoff's theory of worldview will be addressed specifically, followed by a description of the study associated with this research project.

CHAPTER 4: LAKOFF'S THEORY OF WORLDVIEW

The two previous chapters provided a background of the study of values and beliefs and then a discussion of worldview, identifying how it is different from the way values and beliefs have been studied in the past. This chapter will provide an account of Lakoff's theory of worldview specifically, including the ways in which it advances the discussion of worldview and how it has been critiqued and praised. In the next chapter I will present the methodology used in this study to empirically test my research question: *to what extent does the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory?*

Lakoff's (2002) theory advances the discussion of worldview because it offers the most comprehensive model of worldview to date. His theory explains where worldviews originate, what form they take, and how they affect our actions. It tells us why people value what they do, think the way they do, and behave the way they do. He approached the concept of worldview from that of cognitive science, which is "a broad discipline, covering everything from vision, memory, and attention to everyday reasoning and language" (p. 3). Metaphorical reasoning is a central component of his theory. While Lakoff's theory explains the impact of worldview in all areas of life, his primary analysis was on its relationship to the political world.

Lakoff explained that people generally fit into one of two groups based upon idealized central models of the family. Those who have a conservative worldview possess a "strict father morality" based on a "strict father model of the family" while

those who have a liberal worldview possess a "nurturant parent morality" derived from a "nurturant parent model of the family" (p. 13). Differences in morality and worldview lead people to look and act upon political issues differently based upon categories for moral action.

The strict father model of the family is described by Lakoff (2002) thus:

> A traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall family policy. He teaches children right from wrong by setting strict rules for their behavior and enforcing them through punishment. The punishment is typically mild to moderate, but sufficiently painful. It is commonly corporal punishment—say, with a belt or a stick. He also gains their cooperation by showing love and appreciation when they do follow the rules. But children must never be coddled, lest they become spoiled; a spoiled child will be dependent for life and will not learn proper morals.
>
> The mother has day-to day responsibility for the care of the house, raising the children, and upholding the father's authority. Children must respect and obey their parents, partly for their own safety and partly because by doing so they build character, that is, self-discipline and self-reliance. Love and nurturance are a vital part of family life, but they should never outweigh parental authority, which is in itself an expression of love and nurturance—tough love. Self-discipline, self-reliance, and respect for legitimate authority are the crucial things that a child must learn. A mature adult becomes self-

reliant through applying self-discipline in pursuing his self-interest. Only if a child learns self-discipline can he become self-reliant later in life. Survival is a matter of competition, and only through self-discipline can a child learn to compete successfully.

The mature children of the Strict Father have to sink or swim by themselves. They are on their own and have to prove their responsibility and self-reliance. They have attained, through discipline, authority over themselves. They have to, and are competent to, make their own decisions. They have to protect themselves and their families. They know what is good for them better than their parents, who are distant from them. Good parents do not meddle or interfere in their lives. Any parental meddling on interference is strongly resented. (pp. 65-67)

While this is the "idealized" model, Lakoff explained that there are non-traditional family units, such as those headed by single mothers, who may operate using a Strict Father approach as well.

Lakoff's (2002) description of the Nurturant Parent model of the family is a sharp contrast to the Strict Father model described above:

A family of preferably two parents, but perhaps only one. If two, the parents share the household responsibilities.

The primary experience behind the model is one of being cared for and cared about, having one's desires for loving interactions met, living as happily as possible, and deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care.

Children develop best through their positive relationships with others, through their contribution to their community, and through ways in which they realize their potential and find joy in life. Children become responsible, self-disciplined, and self-reliant through being cared for and respected, and through caring for others. Support and protection are part of nurturance, and they require strength and courage on the part of the parents. The obedience of children comes out of their love and respect for their parents, not out of the fear of punishment.

Open, two-way, mutually respectful communication is crucial. If parents' authority is to be legitimate, they must tell children why their decisions serve the cause of protection and nurturance. The questioning of parents by children is positive, since children need to learn why their parents do what they do, since children often have good ideas that should be taken seriously, and since all family members should participate in important decisions. Responsible parents, of course, have to make the ultimate decisions and that must be clear.

Protection is a form of caring, and protection from external dangers takes up a significant part of the nurturant parent's attention. The world is filled with evils that can harm a child, and it is the nurturant parent's duty to ward them off. Crime and drugs are, of course, significant, but so are the less obvious dangers: cigarettes, cars without seatbelts, dangerous toys, inflammable clothing, pollution, asbestos, lead paint, pesticides in food,

diseases, unscrupulous businessmen, and so on. Protection of innocent and helpless children from such evils is a major part of a nurturant parent's job.

The principal goal of nurturance is for children to be fulfilled and happy in their lives and to become nurturant themselves. A fulfilling life is assumed to be, in significant part, a nurturant life, one committed to family and community responsibility. Self-fulfillment and the nurturance of others are seen as inseparable. What children need to learn most is empathy for others and the capacity for nurturance, cooperation, and the maintenance of social ties, which cannot be done without the strength, respect, self-discipline, and self-reliance that comes through being cared for and caring. Raising a child to be fulfilled also requires helping that child develop his or her own potential for achievement and enjoyment. That requires respecting the child's own values and allowing the child to explore the range of ideas and options that the world offers.

When children are respected, nurtured, and communicated with from birth, they gradually enter into a lifetime relationship of mutual respect, communication, and caring with their parents. (pp. 108-110)

Although the strict father and nurturant parent models seem to be almost complete opposites in many ways, they "both assume that the system of childrearing will be reproduced in the child" (p. 110).

In Figure 1 we see the basic layout of Lakoff's (2002) argument. He theorized that people in general believe in the same moral principles but prioritize them

Figure 1: George Lakoff's Theory of Worldview

Moral Principles →	Moral Priorities →	Moral System →		Categories for Moral Action
TYPE OF MORALITY: Strict Father	Priority #1 Moral Strength Moral Authority Moral Order Moral Boundaries Moral Essence Moral Wholeness Moral Purity Moral Health Priority #2 Moral Self-Interest Priority #3 Moral Nurturance	TYPE OF WORLDVIEW	Conservative	1. Promoting Strict Father morality in general. 2. Promoting self-discipline, responsibility, and self-reliance. 3. Upholding the Morality of Reward and Punishment. 4. Protecting moral people from external evils. 5. Upholding the Moral Order.
TYPE OF MORALITY: Nurturant Parent	Priority #1 Moral Nurturance Moral Empathy Moral Self-Nurturance Nurturance of Social Ties Moral Self-Development Moral Happiness Morality as Fair Distribution Moral growth? Priority #2 Moral Self-Interest Priority #3 Moral Strength Moral Authority Moral Boundaries Moral Growth?		Liberal	1. Empathetic behavior and promoting fairness. 2. Helping those who cannot help themselves. 3. Protecting those who cannot protect themselves 4. Promoting fulfillment in life. 5. Nurturing and strengthening oneself in order to do the above.

differently based on their underlying morality that arises out of the strict father and nurturant parent "models of ideal family life" (p. 65). The moral principles are expressed in the form of moral metaphors. He noted, "We use these metaphors to frame moral issues: to interpret them, understand them, and explore their consequences....They play an absolutely central role in our judgments about what is good behavior and what is bad, what is the right thing to do and what is wrong" (p. 44).

Those possessing a strict father morality put as priority one what Lakoff (2002) called the "Strength Group" of moral metaphors (Moral Strength, Moral Authority, Moral Order, Moral Boundaries, Moral Essence, Moral Wholeness, Moral Purity, and Moral Health), "Moral Self-Interest" as priority two, and "Moral Nurturance" as priority three. Although the type of metaphors described may vary somewhat, the overall priority list for those who possess a nurturant parent morality is essentially the reverse. Priority one is the "Nurturance Group" (Moral Nurturance, Moral Empathy, Moral Self-Nurturance, the Nurturance of Social Ties, Moral Self-Development, Moral Happiness, and Morality as Fair Distribution), priority two is "Moral Self-Interest" (as it pertains to business), and priority three is the "Strength Group" (Moral Strength, Moral Authority, and Moral Boundaries). Because Lakoff was unclear which category would include the moral metaphor described as Moral Growth, it is shown with a question mark in both the priority one and three groups.

Lakoff explained that the connection between worldview and these family-based moralities lies in what he called the "Nation As Family" metaphor. Regardless of political leanings, just about everyone conceptualizes the following (p. 154):

1. The Nation Is a Family.
2. The Government Is a Parent.
3. The Citizens Are the Children.

However, the type of family that we idealize (strict father or nurturant parent) leads us to believe or expect the nation to be run in the same capacity. Those who idealize a strict father family will believe that the nation should be run similarly, yielding the conservative political worldview. Those who idealize a nurturant parent family possess a liberal worldview and want the nation to be treated in the same fashion:

> This metaphor allows us to reason about the nation on the basis of what we know about a family. For example, just as a parent functions to protect his or her children, so the government functions to protect its citizens...The government, like parent, does have certain responsibilities toward its citizens and authority over them....For conservatives, the nation is conceptualized (implicitly and unconsciously) as a Strict Father family and for liberals as a Nurturant Parent family. (Lakoff, 2002, p. 155)

Lakoff rejected the common opinion that people possess a random conglomeration of viewpoints that do not fit together, instead suggesting that they possess a very coherent political worldview that is a reflection of their morality and their perception of the type of family our nation should be.

Differences in moral priorities for conservatives and liberals yield different moral systems from which categories for moral action are created (Lakoff, 2002). Categories for moral action are important because they "allow us to classify actions instantly into those that are moral and those that are not, with little or no reflection" (p. 162). Lakoff described the conservative categories for moral action as the following (p. 163):

1. Promoting Strict Father morality in general.
2. Promoting self-discipline, responsibility, and self-reliance.
3. Upholding the Morality of Reward and Punishment.
    a. Preventing interference with the pursuit of self-interest by self-disciplined, self-reliant people.
    b. Promoting punishment as a means of upholding authority.
    c. Insuring punishment for lack of self-discipline.
4. Protecting moral people from external evils.
5. Upholding the Moral Order.

The Moral Order includes a "natural" hierarchy, meaning that God has the moral authority over and the responsibility for the well-being of people, people have the moral authority over and the responsibility for the well-being of nature, adults have the moral authority over and responsibility for the well-being of children, and men have the moral authority over and the responsibility for the well-being of women (Lakoff, 2002, p. 105).

Just as it is with the family model that we idealized, our moral priorities, and our overall moral system, those of a liberal worldview have very different categories for moral action than conservatives (Lakoff, 2002, p. 165):

1. Empathetic behavior and promoting fairness.
2. Helping those who cannot help themselves.
3. Protecting those who cannot protect themselves.
4. Promoting fulfillment in life.
5. Nurturing and strengthening oneself in order to do the above.

Because categories for moral action allow us to classify actions (Lakoff), they can theoretically help us make decisions about public policy, such as how we interpret policies and how we vote. According to Lakoff, categories for moral action are important factors that can help us understand how people think, feel, and act upon political issues.

Also according to Lakoff, strict liberals and strict conservatives do not bounce back and forth between the two models but others will, embracing different worldviews as different types of issues arise (e.g., education, environment, moral issues, taxation). Such an occurrence may depend on the issue at hand or perhaps these individuals might follow one model when it comes to their family life and the other when dealing with political issues. However, even when this fluctuating occurs, one of the two models is still being embraced. According to Lakoff, fluctuation may be less common when it comes to political leaders. He noted, "What conservative and liberal political leaders and ideologues do is try to get voters to become coherent in their

views—to move to one pole or another, that is, to be entirely liberal or entirely conservative over a full range of issues" (pp. 15-16).

Criticism and Support of Lakoff

There is a notable lack of reference to or discussion about Lakoff and his ideas in the literature about worldview discussed above. This may be because the literature reaches across many fields—religion, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science—none of which are Lakoff's field of linguistics. Perhaps research around worldview remains more confined within individual disciplines.

Lakoff has been at odds with a number of other scholars in his field for some time. Four decades ago, Lakoff and some like-minded colleagues challenged Lakoff's mentor, Noam Chomsky, and the entire field of linguistics and headed off in an entirely different direction from what was then standard in the field (Bai, 2005; Pinker, 2006). These "new" thinkers believed that "...to understand language, you first had to study the way that each individual's worldview and ideas informed the thought process" (Bai, p. 4). The result of this split was the creation of the field of cognitive linguistics (Bai; Pinker).

Reviews of Lakoff's 2002 book have neither supported nor criticized Lakoff's theory of worldview; instead they have simply provided an overview of the theory and Lakoff's approach (e.g., Feldheim, 2006-07; Ryan, 2005). There did not appear to be strong feelings one way or another in the literature regarding Lakoff's ideas until he gained a spot in the political limelight and began publishing works written to boost

progressive political success and superiority. Since around 2004, the growth of outspoken criticism about Lakoff's ideas has arisen.

Lakoff's most staunch and vocal critic has been Pinker. Although Pinker's doctorate is in psychology, not linguistics, most of his career was spent in MIT's Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, a field in which it seems likely he would cross paths with the work of those new thinkers, such as Lakoff. Pinker has been critical of Lakoff's ideas about the way the brain works, metaphorical reasoning, and framing, as well his methods and procedures. When speaking of Lakoff's 2006 book, *Whose Freedom? The Battle over America's Most Important Idea*, Pinker (2006) observed:

> Though it contains messianic claims about everything from epistemology to political tactics, the book has no footnotes or references (just a generic reading list), and cites no studies from political science or economics, and barely mentions linguistics. Its use of cognitive neuroscience goes way beyond any consensus within that field, and its analysis of political ideologies is skewed by the author's own politics and limited by his disregard of centuries of prior thinking on the subject." (p. 25)

Pinker (2006) was also critical of how Lakoff explained the clustering of individuals in politics and suggested that Lakoff's approach is not that different from those of others who came before him. Some reviews (Berkowitz, 2006; Etzioni, 2006) have echoed Pinker's (2006) criticism, while others have not necessarily been critical of his ideas but rather have suggested that Lakoff's idea that we can quickly change the direction of political discourse is unrealistic (Grindstaff, 2006).

Despite various criticisms, Lakoff also has had his fair share of support. Schlesinger and Lau (2000) argued that Lakoff provides solid evidence about the use of methaphorical reasoning in politics. Similarly, Palacios (2006), while noting some deficiencies in Lakoff's work, noted that "his framing analysis is both academically and politically significant in understanding how people make decisions based on deep psychology feelings that often contradict their more rational decision making" (p. 352). Dombrink (2006), while acknowledging that others have tried to explain politics in a similar way, said that Lakoff "...certainly has the most fully developed approach" (p. 349). In addition to support from academic sources, Lakoff has received the backing and support of the Rockridge Institute, a progressive think tank, and a variety of progressive politicians who have seen Lakoff's ideas as an answer to building public support.

Need for an Empirical Test

While I found Lakoff's theory of worldview intriguing, offering a new approach to explaining and improving politics, there does appear to be some valid reasons for criticism. First, there is indeed a conspicuous lack of empiricism behind this theory. The theory is just that—a theory—and while he explains his theory in a way that suggests there is empirical research behind it, he does not offer any. Second, as noted by Pinker (2006) regarding Lakoff's *Moral Politics*, upon which this study is based, Lakoff also does not reference the work of others well and instead provides a suggested reading list. Third, when this reviewer began to examine his theory and

explanations, there were some obvious holes, such as the inconsistency of terms and where they fit (e.g., *moral growth* described above) and incomplete explanations (e.g., how a conservative or liberal would respond to an issue).

Because these issues are troubling, especially since Lakoff has laid out such a provocative theory, this research project sought to test his theory empirically in order to see *to what extent does the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory.* In the next chapter, I will discuss the details of my empirical test, including the population studied, the survey created to operationalize Lakoff's theory, and the statistical procedures chosen to analyze the data.

CHAPTER 5: METHODS

The research question associated with this study is *to what extent does the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory?* As was discussed in the previous chapters, worldview is a different and more encompassing concept than the more traditional approaches to the study of values and beliefs. Lakoff's theory advances the discussion of worldview because it is more comprehensive than other attempts to address the topic. However, to my knowledge there is no empirical study conducted to test his theory. This study provided an empirical test of Lakoff's theory.

This chapter discusses the methods and procedures used in this study. The primary statistical methods used were cluster analysis and chi-square analysis. Cluster analysis was used to test Lakoff's assertion that people will embrace one of the two types of worldview (conservative or liberal). Chi-square analysis was used to test for the association between worldview and voting behavior. Voting behavior is an example of *a category of moral action* that is directed by one's worldview. If Lakoff's theory is correct, this study should find the following propositions to be supported:

Proposition 1: Legislators will cluster in two groups across a range of issues.

Proposition 2: Legislators will cluster in two groups on an issue-by-issue basis.

Proposition 3: The legislators' worldview "score" will be significantly associated with interest group ratings.

An inquiry into these propositions was the primary focus of the data collection and analysis. In addition to a detailed discussion of these statistical methods, this chapter addresses population selection, creation and administration of the survey instrument, and data cleaning.

Population

A case study was chosen to address the research question associated with this study: *To what extent does Lakoff's theory of worldview explain the distribution of opinions of Oregon legislators and their voting behavior?* Case studies are a good research method "...when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon within some real life context" (Yin, 2003, p. 1). The first and third criteria were easily met. The study aimed to discover "how" well the theory explains the distribution of opinions and voting behaviors of Oregon legislators, and Lakoff's (2002) theory has been a significant topic of discussion in current politics. Although I had control over some events (e.g., timing of the study, the instrument used), there were some events over which there was no control (e.g., election cycles, previous events that led participants to be leery of such studies). An argument that the second criterion has been met can therefore be made.

There are two kinds of case studies: single-case and multiple-case. A single-case study can be an effective way to test a theory when that case is appropriate (Yin, 1989, 2003). Yin (2003) noted, "The single case can then be used to determine

whether a theory's propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant" (p. 40). The Oregon Legislature was selected as the single case for this study for three reasons. One, although it is not always the case (Clucas & Henkels, 2005), the Oregon Legislature has exhibited a significant amount of polarization in the past, making it a good population for testing Lakoff's theory. If Lakoff's dichotomous theory is correct, then it should hold true in Oregon. Two, because Oregon has a reputation as a leader in innovative and/or controversial legislation (Clucas & Henkels, 2005; Clucas & Rose, 2005), it provides an opportunity to test Lakoff's theory in an environment where there is theoretically more tension and the presence of cutting-edge issues. Three, I have previous work experience in the Oregon Legislature as a legislative intern for a democratic house member. This provided me with knowledge of the spoken and unspoken rules and procedures associated with this chamber, a contextual understanding of legislators and their interactions, and the personal contacts that allowed me greater access to both liberal and conservative legislators. While these justifications are important to the choice of case studies, it is more important to recognize that case studies are generalizable to a theory, not to a population.

After selecting Oregon as the case study, it was decided that the target population for this study were the Representatives from the 2005-2006 Oregon Legislature (N=60). The study was conducted in the interim session and before re-election campaigns were in full force. Due to time constraints during the regular session and re-election campaigns, and because of concerns about the sensitive nature

of the survey questions, this timing was chosen in an effort to increase participation and to encourage respondents to be more forthcoming. Surveys were completed by 18 of the 33 Republicans (54.55%) and 21 of the 27 Democrats (77.78%) for a total of 39 participants (65.0%).

The Instrument

The intent of this study was to discover if Lakoff's theory of worldview explains the distribution of opinions of Oregon legislators and their voting behavior. An instrument to gather the data for this study was needed. An extensive search was performed as well and many attempts were made to contact Lakoff directly to see if an instrument had already been created. Because none were found, I developed a phone survey instrument to measure a person's worldview and gather other information. The survey had three sections—items derived from the Lakoff text (2002) with 6-point Likert-type scale response categories, demographic questions, and probing questions. Probing questions were included in order to solicit statements from the participants that might help clarify their responses.[1]

[1] Before proceeding with the survey design, literature on survey design and administration was consulted (Braverman & Salter, 1996; Converse & Presser, 1986; Dillman, 1978, 2000; Sallant & Dillman, 1994). In addition, other survey instruments designed to measure beliefs and values were reviewed, such as the General Social Survey (National Opinion Research Center, 2001), the Opinions and Values Surveys of 1975 and 1977 (McClosky & Zaller, 1984), the Civil Liberties Study of 1978-1979 (McClosky & Zaller), The World Values Survey, 1981-1983 (Inglehart et al., 1990), and a variety of online surveys (e.g. World's Smallest Political Quiz, The Political Compass, Idealog). While reviewing these surveys, particular attention was paid to how the questions were framed in order to provide some perspective about the ways in which questions should and should not be framed.

Question Selection

Stage One

The first stage in creating the survey instrument was to choose the topic areas for the survey items from the Lakoff text. The selection process was focused on the bolded sub-topics in each chapter of "Part Four: The Hard Issues" or, when there were no subtitles in a chapter, the chapter title itself was treated as the sub-topic. There were two exceptions. One added topic area was college loans and the other was crime as it relates to moral character. These two topic areas were included because they were the introductory and concluding examples of Part Four. It was also decided not to include any items from the chapter on Christianity because I could not assume that everyone who would participate in this study was a Christian. Religious affiliation and participation would be captured in the demographic questions. At the end of Stage One there were 24 topic areas.

Stage Two

Stage Two involved creating possible survey items from each of the topic areas. This was accomplished by drawing upon statements or explanations presented by Lakoff about how a conservative or liberal person would look at each issue. This, however, yielded an unwieldy number of items. Because Lakoff's theory is that people will embrace either the strict father or nurturant parent morality and the corresponding conservative or liberal worldview when they evaluate their position on issues, the decision was made to select one conservative item and one liberal item from each

topic area (e.g. abortion). There were, however, three exceptions where more than one pair of items was chosen for a topic area. The first was gay marriage. This was an exception because Lakoff does not specifically address this issue in the text but instead addresses other topics related to gay rights. Including two items from this topic area would be in addition to the original two items about gay rights because it was a major political issue at the time of this study. The second exception to using only one pair of items for a topic area was the section where Lakoff discussed the national "just say no" campaign. Here two sets of items were used—one pair of questions for drugs and one for condoms—because both were important political topics during this time. The third exception was education where again two pairs of questions were created: one pair for educational funding and one pair for the type of subject matter taught in schools. These topics were both included because they are about vastly different topics that are continually argued and discussed. At the end of this stage, it appeared that the survey would have 54 items from the text.

Stage Three

The task of Stage Three was to chose which two items would be selected for each topic area when more than two choices of items existed. Then the actual language of each survey item was determined. It was decided that the survey items must reflect the "categories for moral action" because the heart of Lakoff's theory is that people make decisions and take action based upon these categories. According to Lakoff,

these categories "...allow us to classify actions instantly into those that are moral and those that are not, with little or no reflection" (p. 162).

The following criteria were used to determine which two items for each topic area would be selected:

(a) Each of the two items selected would reflect one of the two worldview perspectives (e.g. liberal, conservative) and they would be explicitly explained by Lakoff in the text.

(b) Selected items would incorporate the categories of moral action.

(c) When (a) and (b) could not be met (e.g., only one perspective was explained or neither explanation was connected to the categories of moral action), I selected the two items that best met (a) and (b) or created one when necessary.

(d) When both (a) and (b) were met for more than two items in a topic area, I chose the two items that were the most clearly explained or that reflected current political rhetoric.

Although in some cases the language of the survey items as explained by Lakoff needed little or no editing, in other cases the text needed to be edited significantly or invented completely in order to meet criteria (a) and (b) above. Below are three examples—one for the process of item selection, one for the process of item creation, and one for the process of item rewording.

Example #1: Drug Problems—item selection

Originally, three possible survey items derived from the book were considered:

1. Those who use drugs should be imprisoned.
2. Drug problems have to do with social problems, peer pressure, or addiction.
3. When a person uses drugs, it reflects his or her lack of moral strength and self-discipline.

Since number 2 was the only "liberal" item, it was chosen for the survey. Number 3 was chosen as the conservative item because it connected to the categories for moral action in the same way that the liberal item did: where drug problems originate. With both items, the text wording was eventually changed.

Example #2: Condoms—item creation

Only the conservative worldview perspective of this topic area was discussed by Lakoff. The conservative item chosen was "Giving teenagers condoms encourages promiscuity." The liberal item created needed to connect to the categories for moral action in the same way the conservative item did. The liberal item created was "Giving teenagers condoms will help prevent disease and pregnancy."

Example #3: Immigration—item rewording

> The text explained the conservative perspective on illegal immigrants by saying they need to be punished because they are lawbreakers and we are not responsible for providing government services to those who are not invited to be here. This explanation was reworded into an item that still addressed the idea of reward and punishment from the categories for moral action, but it also incorporated the issue of government services. The item then became "Giving government services rewards illegal immigrants for being here illegally."

At the end of this stage, the survey had 54 items that had been derived from the text and were connected to the categories of moral action as closely as possible.

Stage Four

Now that the text for the 54 survey items had been selected, Stage Four involved designing the survey format, creating demographic questions, and creating the probing questions. During this stage, I consulted with a survey expert to discuss basic ideas around survey design, question format, question text, participant incentive(s), cover letters, consent, human subjects review, maximizing return rate, and testing the instrument. Most of the original demographic questions came from the National Survey of Dual-Earner Couples in the Sandwiched Generation (Neal & Hammer, 1998). The probing questions were designed to glean some qualitative data

that might better help explain the results if needed. An example of a probing question was "In what ways do your personal views affect your votes on the floor?" At the end of this stage, the survey had 15 demographic items and 5 probing questions in addition to the 54 survey items derived from the text. The survey was in two draft forms (Form A and Form B) with a script at the beginning of each section of the survey.

Stage Five

Stage Five involved circulating the document for input to all dissertation committee members and the previously consulted survey expert. Each individual had the opportunity to give input on design, format, layout, question wording, and script. The appropriate adjustments were made, including eliminating the two items on orphanages because it was determined that this issue was dated. The survey now had 52 survey items, 15 demographic questions, 5 probing questions, and the accompanying script. At the end of this stage, the survey was ready for testing.

Pilot Study

It was decided that the sample was too small to use any potential participants from the target population to test the instrument. Instead, the instrument was tested on three graduate students and two past legislators. One graduate student took the survey in "Form A" where the two survey items on the same topic were right after the other, while two took the survey in "Form B" where all 52 survey items were intermixed. As suspected from previous input, the student who took Form A found that format to be

distracting. The students who took Form B liked the format and thought they would not like Form A. The students also gave input on question text, participant incentive, and maximizing return rate. The appropriate adjustments were made based upon this input.

After testing the instruments on graduate students, the Form B instrument was tested on two former legislators—one identified as a "liberal" and one as a "conservative" by the current legislator recommending them. Again, feedback on question text and possible ways to increase participation was given. Significant input was given on ways to make the legislators more comfortable with taking the survey and answering the questions openly and honestly. Based upon feedback, the survey was edited one more time and the instrument was finalized.

The complete survey used in this study can be found in Appendix B. Of the 52 survey items, 14 questions were from the chapter "Social Programs and Taxes" (Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 19, 26, 27, 31, 33, and 44), 18 from the chapter "The Culture Wars: From Affirmative Action to the Arts" (Questions 5, 7, 13, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 43, 47, 50, and 52), two questions from the chapter "Abortion" (Questions 36 and 51), four from the chapter "How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government?" (Questions 23, 37, 42, and 45), 12 from the chapter "Crime and the Death Penalty" (Questions 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 28, 32, 39, 46, 48, and 49), and two from the chapter "Regulation and the Environment" (Questions 18 and 20). Examples of survey questions from each chapter can be found in Table 1.

Table 1

Examples of Survey Questions, by Chapter and Type of Worldview

Chapter	Type of Worldview the Question Reflects	Actual Survey Question
Social Programs/Taxes	Conservative	Giving teenagers condoms encourages promiscuity.
Social Programs/Taxes	Liberal	Giving teenagers condoms will help prevent disease and pregnancy.
Culture Wars	Conservative	What is taught in schools today threatens our moral system.
Culture Wars	Liberal	Children should be taught about all aspects of our national history, good and bad.
Abortion	Conservative	Legal abortion encourages promiscuity and irresponsible behavior.
Abortion	Liberal	Legal abortion provides help to women who are not ready to have children or are unable to take care of them.
Love Country	Conservative	Responsible citizens should be left alone to manage their own affairs, family life, and local community without the interference of the federal government.
Love Country	Liberal	The federal government has the responsibility to make sure that state and local governments are adequately caring for and serving their citizens.
Crime	Conservative	Criminals should be punished harshly to discourage further criminal activity.

Crime	Liberal	It makes more sense to invest in crime prevention programs than in prisons.
Environment	Conservative	It is the natural order of things for human beings to dominate over nature.
Environment	Liberal	We have the responsibility to care for and respect the environment.

Survey Administration

In order to maximize participation by providing an easier time commitment for legislators and providing a more comfortable and convenient setting, and also to confirm that the survey was actually completed by the legislator, not legislative staff, the survey was administered by phone. The phone format also allowed me to ask follow-up questions when needed.

Due to concerns that legislators might have about taking such values surveys, the issue of confidentiality was strongly emphasized while soliciting participation. At the suggestion of previous legislators and one current legislator, a letter signed by the doctoral committee chair, the dean of the college, and the dean of graduate studies was created, stressing the issue of confidentiality and the non-partisan nature of the study. This letter (Appendix C) was sent via U.S. mail along with the cover letter inviting participation (Appendix D), the answer key that would be used during the survey (Appendix E), and a sample survey question (Appendix F). The ideas of giving a survey incentive or seeking an endorsement from a commission studying civility in the

legislature were considered. After consulting with a survey expert, current and past legislators, and the Government Standards and Practices Commission in Salem, both of these ideas were rejected. The reasoning was that incentives could be considered ethically questionable and that aligning the research with any commission might deter some potential participants.

Approximately a week after the legislators received the mailing, email contact was made to ask about setting up a time for the legislator to take the survey. From that point, multiple contacts via email, phone, and, in some cases, in-person at the Legislature were made until an appointment to take the survey was set or a definitive decline response was given. In the case where participants were willing to take the survey but not on the phone, alternative methods were used in order to increase the participation rate. Of the 39 participants, 31 took the survey on the phone (29 with the tape recording on and 2 without), 7 filled out the survey on their own and mailed it in, and one filled it out and then asked me to come to the Salem office to discuss it with me. After two months, I stopped collecting the data.

Data Cleaning

All data was entered into a SPSS data file. In order to ensure that the data was input into SPSS correctly, three measures were taken. First, the audio tape for each interview, when available, was played and all data was verified and corrected when needed. Second, the raw data was input into SPSS and then reviewed for inaccuracies. Corrections were made when necessary. Third, an outside individual not involved in

the study tracked the input data on the computer while I read out the raw data from the surveys. When an error was noted, the correction was made.

Once it was determined that the data had been accurately entered, all of the responses to the conservative survey items were reverse coded. This procedure was used so that each participant's answers went in one direction in relation to their political leanings. This meant that if a participant answered a 5 ("agree") on a conservative survey item, it was recoded into a 2 ("disagree"). With this procedure in effect, a participant with more "conservative" answers would end up with a lower worldview score and a participant with a higher worldview score would have answered more "liberally." The worldview score--the mean average of each participant's responses to all the survey items in the first section of the survey—will be discussed more thoroughly in the section on chi-square analysis.

As with most data sets, there were missing data in this study. A variety of recommendations and procedures have been suggested to deal with missing data (Acock, 2005; Everitt, Landau, & Leese, 2001; Gordon, 1981; Groves, Dillman, Eltinge, & Little, 2002; Kalton, 1983; Little & Rubin, 2002; Schafer, 1999; Schafer & Graham, 2002; Vach, 1994). Because cluster analysis will exclude cases with missing data, three approaches were considered for the missing data in the 52 text-derived survey items in this study: imputing a mean, omitting cases or variables, and predicting the value.

In this study two approaches to calculating an imputed mean were considered. Little and Rubin (2002) made three recommendations for the use of imputations, noting that they should be:

> (a) Conditional on observed variables, to reduce bias due to nonresponse, improve precision, and preserve association between missing and observed variables
>
> (b) Multivariate, to preserve associations between missing variables
>
> (c) Draw[n] from the predictive distribution rather than on means, to provide valid estimates of a wide range of estimands [sic] (p. 72)

Using the worldview score met recommendation (a) and (b). Whether the worldview score can be considered "predictive" could be argued but appeared to be the most reasonable prediction available. Despite some concerns about this method from a theoretical standpoint (e.g. is an imputed mean from a variety of other topic areas an accurate prediction for the missing value), there is some evidence that it provides a reasonable solution to missing values (Schafer & Graham, 2002). For these reasons, the best choice for handling missing values in this study was determined to be imputing the worldview score for each participant. This was the procedure used.

The other mean imputation approach—to impute the mean of each variable from all the cases in the data set or a group of cases that did not have missing data—was rejected. Everitt, Landau, and Leese (2001) did not recommend using a group mean in cluster analysis because this approach is only appropriately used when the researcher can predict the group membership and in this situation group membership

was unknown. Imputing the mean from all the cases in the data was also rejected because it seemed more appropriate to use an imputed value for each individual that reflected that individual (worldview score) than an imputed value that reflected the responses of other participants (the variable mean).

Other methods for handling missing data were also rejected. Excluding the cases or variables with missing data is the easiest approach (Everitt, Landau, & Leese, 2001) but a large amount of data would have been lost and this was a significant problem considering this was a small data set. Making a prediction of what each participant would have answered in each instance of missing data (e.g. imputing the opposite score of the item they did answer on the same topic) was also rejected because there was no consistent evidence that the participants always picked the opposite score on parried items and, in some cases, both items on the same topic had missing values.

Cluster Analysis

This study used cluster analysis to determine how legislators group together in their views about a variety of issues (Proposition 1 and Proposition 2). SPSS 11.0 for Mac OS X was used for the analyses. Cluster analysis is used to "find groups of similar entities in a sample of data" (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984, p. 33). Such groupings are based upon how the cases or variables are alike or unlike (Johnson & Wichern, 2007).

There are similarities between cluster analysis and other methods of analysis, such as discriminant analysis and factor analysis, but there are reasons why cluster analysis is appropriate in this study. First, predetermining the groupings of individuals is not the intention of this study, as it would be in a study that uses discriminant analysis (Johnson & Wichern, 2007; SPSS 1999). In fact, discovering the patterns in groupings is one of the main purposes of this study. Second, because this study's sample size is less than the number of variables, factor analysis should not be used (Aleamoni, 1976).

With the SPSS software used in this study, cluster analysis can be performed using *k*-means cluster analysis or hierarchical cluster analysis. *K*-means is recommended in large data sets (SPSS, 1999, 2004) and does not allow for dendrograms in the output. Dendrograms can be a helpful tool to see how cases are linked and group together (SPSS, 1999). Because it is a small data set and permits the use of dendrograms, hierarchical cluster analysis was therefore chosen for this study.

The Ward's method and the squared Euclidean distance measures were eventually chosen.[2] While Ward's has not been determined to be necessarily superior (Milligan, 1981), it is the method most widely used in hierarchical cluster analysis (Clatworthy, Buick, Hankins, Weinman, & Horne, 2005). When looking at this data set, the Ward's method provided the most consistent recovery in regards to readability

[2] In the preliminary steps of the data analysis, five methods of hierarchical cluster analysis were considered: Ward's, average-linkage between group, average-linkage within-group, complete linkage, and single linkage. Each of these methods uses different procedures for creating the clusters. There are no recommendations in the literature as to when to use which method, but these methods have proven to be the most popular (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Everitt, Landau, & Leese, 2001). Two similarity measures were considered: squared Euclidean distance and Pearson's r.

and clear delineations for all of the separate analyses. Ward's has some other inherent advantages. First, it has been identified as providing the best recovery when cluster overlap and outliers are present (Everitt, Landau, & Leese, 2001; Milligan). Second, Ward's is helpful in minimizing the "loss of information" through the statistical procedure it employs (Johnson & Wichern, 2007, p. 692). Ward's requires that the similarity measure used is the squared Euclidean distance measure.

The number of clusters for each solution was chosen by looking at both the dendrogram and the agglomeration schedule output. The coefficients on the agglomeration schedules were graphed to look for "jumps" in the coefficients. Although more formal techniques to help determine the number of clusters have been introduced (Everitt, Landau, & Leese, 2001), this procedure along with visual inspection of the dendrogram is the most common approach to determining the number of clusters (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Everitt, Landau, & Leese). Using the dendrograms, some further investigation was done on the degree of correlation between variables from each cluster analysis and the relationship between the clusters and demographic and qualitative data. For the correlation of variables, the percentage of significant correlations between both the paired variables (the conservative and liberal survey item for each topic area) and all of the variables associated with each chapter were calculated and analyzed in relationship to the cluster solutions. For the demographic and qualitative data, the variables of party affiliation, self-designated political views, self-designated roll-call voting practices, and a variety of qualitative

data from the probing questions and other comments made by participants during the survey were analyzed in relationship to each of the cluster analyses.

Chi-Square Analysis

Chi-square is a statistical procedure that tests the association between two or more categorical variables. This study used the chi-square test to look for associations between the worldview score of legislators and interest-group ratings (Proposition 3). SPSS 11.0 for Mac OS X was used for the analyses. To perform the chi-square tests the worldview scores were converted into a categorical variable: high worldview score and low worldview score, with the median of all worldview scores (4.48) as the dividing point.

Four groups were selected for the chi-square analysis: the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the Oregon League of Conservation Voters (OLCV), and Stand for Children (SFC). These groups were chosen for three reasons. First, they reflected a good cross-section of current political issues—civil rights, business, environment, and children. Second, each of these organizations reported their ratings for multiple bills that were voted on during this legislative session. Third, data on the ratings were retrievable and complete. The interest group rating was calculated by looking at the percentage of time that the legislator voted in accordance with these organizations and then converting the percentage into a categorical variable (low $\leq 50\%$, high $> 50\%$).

The data for the ACLU, NFIB, and OLCV came from Project Vote Smart. Project Vote Smart is a non-partisan, primarily volunteer-based organization that provides a variety of political information to the public (e.g., voting records, campaign finances, voter registration and ballot measure information, interest-group ratings). Project Vote Smart does warn of a potential bias because organizations may not report all of the bills that relate to their organization. The data from SFC came directly from SFC.

This chapter explained the methods and procedures used in this study. The cluster analyses and chi-square analyses produced intriguing results that were useful in evaluating Lakoff's theory of worldview. The next chapter will discuss these findings in detail.

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS

In order to explore the research question associated with this study--*to what extent does the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory*--cluster analysis and chi-square analysis were used to test the three identified propositions:

Proposition 1: Legislators will cluster in two groups across a range of issues.

Proposition 2: Legislators will cluster in two groups on an issue-by-issue basis.

Proposition 3: The legislators' worldview "score" will be significantly associated with interest group ratings.

In this chapter, the results of these analyses will be reported as well as information about the correlation of variables and demographic and qualitative data. The next chapter will provide a discussion of these results.

Descriptive Statistics

There were 39 participants in this study (65.0% of the population)—28 males and 11 females. The mean and median birth year was 1951. The political party distribution was 18 of the 33 Republicans (54.55%) and 21 of the 27 Democrats (77.78%). The mean level of education was some graduate study and the median level of education was a graduate degree. Thirty-five of the 39 participants were married and 33 had children (mean number of children=2.5, median number of children=2). All of the 38 percent participants who answered the question about income had a

combined household income level before taxes that was at least $40,001 per year and the mean and median was between $80,001 and $100,000. Thirty-six of the 38 participants who responded to the question regarding ethnicity identified themselves as white or Caucasian. When asked to identify their religion, 23 different types of responses were given other than "none" or no response and only 20 of the participants said they regularly attend religious services. Thirty-eight different responses were given in regards to occupation and 31 said they considered state legislator as at least part of their occupation. The mean and median number of years in the legislature was 4.36 and 4.00, respectively. In regards to self-designated political views, the mean response was between "slightly liberal" and "moderate" and the median response was "moderate". For roll-call voting practices, the mean and median were both "moderate".

A summary of the descriptive statistics (N, mean, median, and standard deviation) for all 52 variables derived from the text can be found in Table 2. For

Table 2

Summary of Descriptive Statistics for All Variables

Descriptive Statistic	Range
N (valid)	39
N (missing)	0
Mean	2.41-5.55
Median	2.00-6.00
Standard deviation	0.58-2.05

each variable, scores from all 39 cases were used when available. The mean, median, and standard deviation for each variable differed, resulting in a large range. Complete details for individual variables, including chapter of origin, can be found in Table 3.

Table 3

Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Each Variable, Including Chapter of Origin

Question	Chapter of Origin	N (valid)	N (missing)	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation
1	Social Programs/Taxes	39	0	3.46	3.00	1.31
2	Social Programs/Taxes	39	0	4.56	5.00	1.23
3	Social Programs/Taxes	39	0	2.56	2.00	1.77
4	Social Programs/Taxes	34	5	2.24	2.00	1.23
6	Social Programs/Taxes	39	0	2.71	2.00	1.71
8	Social Programs/Taxes	39	0	3.41	4.00	1.39
9	Social Programs/Taxes	35	4	4.60	5.00	1.70
14	Social Programs/Taxes	33	6	2.15	2.00	1.33
19	Social Programs/Taxes	39	0	4.59	5.00	1.46
26	Social Programs/Taxes	39	0	2.41	2.00	1.29
27	Social Programs/Taxes	36	3	3.86	4.00	1.48
31	Social Programs/Taxes	38	1	4.68	5.00	1.60
33	Social Programs/Taxes	38	1	4.55	5.00	1.22
44	Social Programs/Taxes	37	2	3.59	4.00	1.36
5	Culture Wars	36	3	2.25	2.00	1.46
7	Culture Wars	38	1	5.60	6.00	.50
13	Culture Wars	37	2	4.57	5.00	1.24
21	Culture Wars	37	2	2.84	3.00	1.19
22	Culture Wars	38	1	5.24	6.00	1.26
24	Culture Wars	35	4	3.83	5.00	2.16
25	Culture Wars	38	1	2.00	2.00	1.34
29	Culture Wars	37	2	2.59	2.00	1.42
30	Culture Wars	39	0	5.41	6.00	.72
34	Culture Wars	38	1	2.47	2.00	1.64
35	Culture Wars	36	3	5.08	5.00	.84
38	Culture Wars	37	2	5.19	5.00	.94
40	Culture Wars	39	0	3.95	4.00	1.85
41	Culture Wars	39	0	1.69	2.00	.77
43	Culture Wars	37	2	2.30	2.00	1.65
47	Culture Wars	39	0	5.23	5.00	1.04
50	Culture Wars	38	1	1.61	1.00	.97
52	Culture Wars	38	1	3.82	4.00	1.29
36	Abortion	37	2	2.65	2.00	1.83
51	Abortion	38	1	4.24	5.00	1.67
23	Love Country	36	3	3.64	4.00	1.02
37	Love Country	39	0	4.59	5.00	.94
42	Love Country	39	0	3.64	4.00	1.35

45	Love Country	38	1	4.16	4.00	1.08
10	Crime	39	0	3.97	4.00	1.56
11	Crime	38	1	4.92	5.00	1.08
12	Crime	37	2	3.46	3.00	1.88
15	Crime	34	5	4.47	5.00	1.08
16	Crime	38	1	4.37	4.00	1.02
17	Crime	37	2	2.41	2.00	1.07
28	Crime	38	1	3.58	4.00	1.62
32	Crime	36	3	3.72	4.00	1.21
39	Crime	38	1	4.39	5.00	1.44
46	Crime	36	3	2.67	2.50	1.37
48	Crime	38	1	2.11	2.00	.76
49	Crime	37	2	4.19	4.00	1.17
18	Environment	37	2	3.11	3.00	1.45
20	Environment	39	0	5.51	6.00	.56

Cluster Analysis

Seven cluster analyses were conducted, each using different sets of variables. In all of the analyses, the Ward's method of hierarchical cluster analysis and the squared Euclidean distance measure were used. Using the agglomeration schedules (Appendix G), graphing the agglomeration coefficients, and looking at the dendrograms to look for the first significant jump in the coefficients, the number of clusters in each analysis was determined. In the case where all 52 variables were used to determine how legislators clustered together across a range of issues, a two-cluster solution was chosen (Figure 2). A two-cluster solution was also chosen when using the variables associated with the following chapters in Lakoff's *Moral Politics* (2002): "Social Programs and Taxes" (Figure 3), "The Culture Wars: From Affirmative Action to the Arts" (Figure 4), "Abortion" (Figure 5), and "How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government?" (Figure 6). In the two chapters entitled "Crime and the Death Penalty" (Figure 7) and "Regulation and the Environment" (Figure 8), a

three-cluster solution was chosen. The vertical line in each figure signifies the point at which the cut was made. In Figure 5, for example, the cut is made at the point that there are two clear and distinct groups. In Figure 8, the cut was made at the point where there were three clear and distinct groups.



Figure 2. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for all 52 variables.



Figure 3. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the Lakoff (2002) chapter "Social Programs and Taxes."



Figure 4. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the Lakoff (2002) chapter "The Culture Wars: From Affirmative Action to the Arts."



Figure 5. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the Lakoff (2002) chapter "Abortion."



Figure 6. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the Lakoff (2002) chapter "How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government?"



Figure 7. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the Lakoff (2002) chapter "Crime and the Death Penalty."



Figure 8. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the Lakoff (2002) chapter "Regulation and the Environment."

Validation Procedure Results

Two validation procedures were used to determine cluster stability. These procedures have been used in a variety of other cluster analysis studies (Clatworthy et al., 2005). One procedure was to look at the output from the between-group method to see if similar results were found. This method was used because in other studies (Hale & Dougherty, 1988; Milligan, 1981), the group average method performed as well as or better than the Ward's method in some data sets. The other validation procedure was to randomly select 50% of the cases and re-run the cluster analysis. Due to the possible limitation of splitting such a small data set and yielding an unbalanced population, this procedure was done multiple times. For the analyses where no ambiguous or inconsistent results were found, the procedure was repeated two additional times. The procedure was repeated three or more times in the analyses with ambiguous or inconsistent results.

In four out of the five analyses where there had been two clusters chosen in the Ward's analysis (all 52 variables, social programs and taxes, culture wars, and abortion), two clusters were also visible in the between-group analysis when the group membership of outliers was not considered. The same was true for those analyses where a three-cluster solution was chosen using Ward's (crime and the death penalty, and regulation and the environment). Results using the between-group method for these two analyses were quite similar when removing outliers. The one exception in the midst of all these similarities was the analysis for the chapter "How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government?" The between-group result for this

analysis was somewhat ambiguous. No definitive cluster solution could be seen, but the best guess was a two-cluster solution—the same as the original Ward's analysis.

Some similar results were also found when approximately 50% of the cases were randomly selected and the Ward's analysis was performed again. In the analyses involving the 52 variables, social programs and taxes, culture wars, and abortion, two definitive clusters were chosen. As was the case in the between-group method, the results for the chapter "How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government?" was unclear. A two-cluster solution was chosen more than 50% of the time. For both the crime and the death penalty cluster analysis and the regulation and the environment cluster analysis, two or three clusters could be seen, depending on the random selection of the cases. This ambiguity suggests that the clustering solutions are less stable for these two chapters.

Correlation of Variables

Table 4 reports the percentage of significant correlations between the paired variables (e.g., the liberal survey item on immigration and the conservative survey item on immigration) and among all the variables derived from each chapter. In the chapters where a two-cluster solution was chosen, there was a high degree of significant correlation in both instances. The correlation among paired variables and total variables for those two chapters where a three-cluster solution was chosen had a much lower rate of significant correlations.

Table 4

Results for Percentage of Significant Correlation among Variables in Each Chapter

Chapter Title	Paired Variables (%)	All Variables (%)
"Social Programs and Taxes" (N=14)	86**	15* 63**
"Crime and the Death Penalty" (N=12)	33* 17**	10* 33**
"Regulation and the Environment" (N=2)	0	0
"The Culture Wars" (N=18)	11* 56**	15* 52**
"Abortion" (N=2)	100**	100**
"How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government?" (N=4)	50* 50**	50* 17**

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level, 2-tailed. ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level, 2-tailed.

Demographic and Qualitative Data As It Relates to the Cluster Analyses

Because of a large assortment of demographic and qualitative data collected during the survey, some further observations can be made about the cluster groupings in all of the seven cluster analyses. Such observations include the degree to which clusters or the smaller sub-clusters follow party affiliation, self-designated political views, and self-designated roll-call voting practices. Table 5 gives a summary of these data. In many instances, when cases fell outside the norm for a particular cluster or sub-cluster, the qualitative data gave some possible explanations. There was also a

Table 5

Summary of Party Affiliation and Self-Identifiers for Political Views and Roll-Call Voting Practices by Case Number

Case	Party Affiliation*	Political Views**	Roll-Call Voting Practices**
1	D	M	M
2	R	SC	SC
3	R	C	M
4	D	SL	SL
5	D	M	M
6	D	L	L
7	D	M	M
8	R	-	SC
9	R	C	C
10	D	L	L
11	D	-	-
12	D	L	SL
13	D	L	-
14	D	L	L
15	D	L	L
16	D	SL	M
17	R	SC	SC
18	R	SC	SC
19	D	L	-
20	R	SL	SC
21	D	SL	SL
22	R	SC	SC
23	R	C	C
24	R	SC	SL
25	R	C	C
26	D	L	L
27	R	SC	SC
28	R	SL	SC
29	D	M	M
30	R	SC	SC
31	D	L	L
32	D	L	L
33	D	M	M
34	D	L	L
35	R	C	SC
36	R	M	C
37	R	-	-
38	R	M	M
39	D	L	M

*D=Democrat, R=Republican

**L=Liberal, SL=Slightly Liberal, M=Moderate, SC=Slightly Conservative, C=Conservative

number of situations where few or no generalizations about the clusters or sub-clusters could be made. Each of the seven cluster analyses is discussed separately.

Fifty-Two Variables

In the cluster analysis where all 52 variables were used, one cluster was composed of all Republicans and the other cluster was composed of one Republican and all of the Democrats. In the demographic data, this one Republican (Case 20) identified his or her political views as two levels more "liberal" than his or her roll-call voting practices—and more liberal than some of the Democratic colleagues. Because this survey was about each participant's views, not about voting, it is not surprising that a case such as this ended up in a cluster with all Democrats. It should also be noted that, in the probing questions, this case stated that he or she typically did not vote with his or her party on social issues. In the discussion that follows, it can be observed that this case follows the same pattern in all the other analyses.

In this same 52-variable cluster analysis, each cluster had two distinguishable sub-clusters of fairly even size. In the primarily Democratic cluster, there was one sub-cluster composed predominantly of cases who identified their political views and roll-call voting practices as "liberal." In the other sub-cluster, more conservative self-designated political views and voting practices were identified—mostly "moderate" or "slightly liberal." The one Republican (Case 20) discussed above was included in this sub-cluster. In the cluster with all Republicans, a similar situation was observed. One sub-cluster was more conservative—most of the cases used the self-identifier

"conservative"—while the other sub-cluster included more cases who identified themselves as "slightly conservative."

Social Programs and Taxes

A similar scenario can be seen when looking at the Social Programs and Taxes cluster analysis. One cluster includes all of the Democrats plus, this time, two Republicans. One is Case 20 discussed previously and the other is Case 36, who identified his or her political views as "moderate" and his or her roll-call voting practices as "conservative." As with Case 20, Case 36 identified his or her political views as two levels more liberal than his or her voting and said that he or she did typically not vote with his or her party on one particular significant issue. When asked about the factors that typically influenced his or her roll-call voting, this case stated that how the bill would affect his or her constituents and Oregonians in general was a more important factor than his or her political views. The reverse was true for Case 20, however.

When looking at the sub-clusters for the Social Programs and Taxes analysis, the pattern is similar to the 52-variable cluster analysis. In the primarily Democratic cluster, both Republican cases (Case 20 and Case 36) fell into the sub-cluster with the more conservative Democrats. The other sub-cluster continued to be those who identified themselves as "liberal." The all-Republican cluster is also divided into two sub-clusters. While this time there is more variation in political views and roll-call voting practices within each sub-cluster than in the 52-variable analysis, there is still

one sub-cluster composed of more cases who identified themselves as more conservative and one as less conservative.

Culture Wars

In the cluster analysis for Culture Wars, there is again one cluster of primarily Democrats, except for Case 20. The other cluster this time has one Democrat included in an otherwise all-Republican cluster. This case did not like identifiers such as "liberal" and "conservative," and for this reason he or she answered "moderate" to the questions asking about political views and roll-call voting. This case said he or she did not vote consistently either way and he or she looked at each issue on a case-by-case basis.

In this cluster analysis, the sub-clusters exhibited a less consistent pattern than in the two previous cluster analyses. For the primarily Democratic cluster, there is one large sub-cluster that includes Case 20 and that has a greater range of self-identifiers than in the two previous analyses. The other sub-cluster is quite small and also has a range of self-identifiers. There is also one case that is a bit of an outlier. For the primarily Republican sub-cluster, there are two relatively equal sized sub-clusters and one outlier. The only generalizations that can be made here is that one of the sub-clusters did have the majority of the cases who used the "conservative" self-identifier.

Abortion

In the Abortion cluster analysis, there are two clusters of disproportionate size. One cluster is composed of all Republicans plus one Democrat outlier. This Democrat (Case 10) gave a response to the two survey items about abortion that were not consistent—one very conservative response and one very liberal response. There are at least three probable explanations for this anomaly: (1) there was some sort of error in survey response, (2) he or she has conflicting views about the topic, and (3) he or she did not understand or interpret the question accurately. Because this participant did the survey by mail, there were no available measures (e.g., asking follow-up questions) to explain the conflicting results. He or she did state, however, that there were sometimes conflicting reasons why he or she might vote for something. The other cluster is made up of all the remaining Democrats and five Republicans, all of whom stated that they were either "pro-choice," would not vote to overturn Roe vs. Wade, or did not typically vote with their party on social issues.

For the primarily Republican sub-cluster, there are no generalizations that can be made about the two existing sub-clusters because there is a mix of self-identifiers in both sub-clusters. In the other larger cluster, there are two sub-clusters. One is approximately half of the total number of cases in the study. In this sub-cluster, there is one Republican; the rest are Democrats with a range of self-identifiers. The other, smaller sub-cluster includes the remaining four Republicans and two Democrats, one of whom has been discussed previously (Case 29). The other Democrat (Case 21) used the self-identifier of "slightly liberal" for both political views and voting practices but

stated that how he or she voted depended upon the type of issue at hand (e.g., social vs. fiscal).

How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government?

In the cluster analysis on How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government? there are again two clusters, but this time each cluster has a mix of party affiliation. One cluster has 16 Democrats and 6 Republicans while the other cluster has 5 Democrats and 12 Republicans. In the cluster with a majority of Democrats, three of the six Republicans are anomalies in one or more of the previous analyses discussed above (Case 20, Case 24, and Case 28), perhaps explaining their membership here. Of the other three Republicans, some observations can be made. Case 17 indicated that he or she might not vote with his or her party on certain issues, including some Corrections issues. Since two of the four variables in the analysis were related to views on the origins of crime, this may explain his or her inclusion in this cluster. Factors such as district attributes and viewpoints on certain aspects of governmental intervention are possible reasons for the inclusion of the other two cases (Case 18 and Case 35) in this cluster. In the cluster with a majority of Republicans, three of the five Democrats identified themselves as having both "moderate" political views and roll-call voting practices (Case 1, Case 29, and Case 33). For Case 11, he or she did not relay any self-identifiers to the questions regarding political views or roll-call voting but did state, as Case 21 did, that how he or she voted would depend on the issue.

In the cluster with a majority of Democrats, there are two sub-clusters, each with three Republicans. It is not readily clear why the six Republicans split evenly into the two sub-clusters. There are also no particular divisions between these two sub-clusters as far as the self-identifiers for political views or roll-call voting practices. In the cluster with a majority of Republicans, there are three sub-clusters. All five Democrats in this cluster are in the same sub-cluster with one slightly conservative Republican. The self-identifiers in the other two sub-clusters show no consistent pattern.

Crime and the Death Penalty

In the cluster analysis on Crime and the Death Penalty, there are three distinct clusters. One is composed of all Republicans plus one Democrat (Case 1). This case was identified in the previous analysis as having a "moderate" self-identifier for both political views and roll-call voting. A second cluster is composed of all Democrats. The third is made up of six Democrats and seven Republicans. The Democrats in this cluster (Cases 7, 11, 16, 29, 33, and 39) are those who identified themselves as more moderate and/or as voting on an issue-by-issue basis. The Republicans in this cluster tended to be less conservative, having at least one self-identifier that ranged from "slightly liberal" to "slightly conservative."

The sub-clusters in this analysis are less easily defined than in some of the previous analyses. In both the primarily Republican cluster and the mixed Republican/Democratic cluster, there appear to be two sub-clusters, one larger one and

one with only three cases. No generalizations regarding political views or roll-call voting practices can be made about either of these sub-clusters. In the all-Democratic cluster, there are again two sub-clusters, one larger and one with only three cases, but this time there is also one outlier. The only generalization that can be made in this instance is that the larger of the two sub-clusters contains primarily more liberal Democrats.

Regulation and the Environment

As in the previous analysis, there are three clusters in the Regulation and the Environment cluster analysis. One cluster is composed of fourteen Democrats and one Republican, one has two Democrats and five Republicans, and one has five Democrats and twelve Republicans. In the primarily Democratic cluster, the one Republican case made no statement that might help explain his or her more "liberal" answers around this topic, even though his or her overall worldview score was in the fairly conservative range. In both of the other two clusters, the full range of self-identifiers was given, from "liberal" to "conservative." Given this, and the fact there were no definitive demographic or qualitative data explaining why these cases clustered together, no generalization can be made about either of these two clusters.

In this analysis, there are three sub-clusters of fairly equal size in the primarily Democratic cluster. Because the self-identifiers range from "liberal" to "moderate" in all three sub-clusters, no generalizations can be made as to why the cases grouped in this way. In the cluster with two Democrats and three Republicans, there are two

relatively small sub-clusters, with one Democrat in each. Again, no generalization can be made about the make-up of these sub-clusters. In the cluster with five Democrats and twelve Republicans, there are two sub-clusters of fairly equal size. One of the sub-clusters contains all but one of the Democrats, and three of the four Republicans in this sub-cluster have less conservative self-identifiers. The other sub-cluster has such a range of self-identifiers that no generalizations can be made.

Chi-Square Analysis

A cross-tabulation chi-square analysis was performed to determine if there was an association between the worldview score of the cases and voting in accordance with four particular interest groups. The two variables were the worldview score (high and low) and the percentage of time that the legislator voted in a way that each interest group considered favorable ($\leq 50\%$ and $> 50\%$). High worldview scores reflect liberal views, while low worldview scores reflect conservative views. The point of separation between high and low worldview scores is the median (4.48) of the range of worldview scores (2.61-5.51) of all participants. The four interest groups selected were the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the Oregon League of Conservation Voters (OLCV), and Stand for Children (SFC). Table 6 gives a summary of the chi-square test results for all four tests. Details regarding each individual analysis follow. The frequency table for all worldview scores and all case processing summaries for chi-square tests can be found in Appendix H and Appendix I.

Table 6

Results for Chi-Square Analysis Using Worldview Score and Interest-Group Ratings

Interest Group	Pearson Chi-square	p-value	Cramér's V
ACLU	19.76	< .001	.72
NFIB	23.95	< .001	.79
OLCV	27.02	< .001	.84
SFC	34.20	< .001	.95

ACLU

The relationship between the worldview score and voting in agreement with the ACLU was statistically significant: Pearson's χ^2 (1, N = 38) = 19.76, p < .001, Cramér's V = .72 (Table 6). Table 7 reports the cross-tabulation for this test. Of those who voted favorably as per the ACLU, 100% had high worldview scores. For those who voted unfavorably as per the ACLU, a higher percentage (76%) had low worldview scores than high worldview scores (24%). Thus, those with high worldview scores were more likely to vote in agreement with the ACLU while those with low scores were not (Figure 9).

Table 7

Cross-Tabulation for the ACLU and Worldview Score Variables

		Worldview Score 4.47 and Below	Worldview Score 4.48 and Above	Total
ACLU 0%-50%	Count	19	6	25
	Expected count	12.5	12.5	25
	% within ACLU	76%	24%	100%
	% within worldview score	100%	31.6%	65.8%
	% of total	50%	15.8%	65.8%
ACLU 50.1%-100%	Count	0	13	13
	Expected count	6.5	6.5	13
	% within ACLU	0%	100%	100%
	% within worldview score	0%	68.4%	34.2%
	% of total	0%	34.2%	34.2%
Total	Count	19	19	38
	Expected count	19	19	38
	% within ACLU	50%	50%	100%
	% within worldview score	100%	50%	100%
	% of total	50%	50%	100%



Figure 9. Count and Worldview Score of Voting in Accordance with ACLU

NFIB

The relationship between worldview score and voting in agreement with the NFIB was statistically significant: Pearson's χ^2 $(1, N = 38) = 23.950, p < .001$, Cramér's $V = .79$ (Table 6). Table 8 reports the cross-tabulation for this test. Of those who voted favorably as per the NFIB, a higher percentage (85.7%) had low worldview scores than high worldview scores (14.3%). For those who voted unfavorably as per the NFBI, a higher percentage (94.1%) had high worldview scores than low worldview scores (5.9%). Thus, those with low worldview scores were more likely to vote in agreement with the NFIB while those with high scores were not (Figure 10).

Table 8

Cross-Tabulation for the NFIB and Worldview Score Variables

		Worldview Score 4.47 and Below	Worldview Score 4.48 and Above	Total
NFIB 0%-50%	Count	1	16	17
	Expected count	8.5	8.5	17.0
	% within NFIB	5.9%	94.1%	100%
	% within worldview score	5.3%	84.2%	44.7%
	% of total	2.6%	42.1%	444.7%
NFIB 50.1%-100%	Count	18	3	21
	Expected count	10.5	10.5	21
	% within NFIB	85.7%	14.3%	100%
	% within worldview score	94.7%	15.8%	55.3%
	% of total	47.4%	7.9%	555.3%
Total	Count	19	19	38
	Expected count	19	19	38
	% within NFIB	50%	50%	100%
	% within worldview score	100%	50%	100%
	% of total	50%	50%	100%



Figure 10. Count and Worldview Score of Voting in Accordance with NFIB.

OLCV

The relationship between worldview score and voting in agreement with the OLCV was statistically significant: Pearson's χ^2 (1, N = 38) = 27.02, p < .001, Cramér's V = .84 (Table 6). Table 9 reports the cross-tabulation for this test. Of those who voted favorably as per the OLCV, a higher percentage had high worldview scores (94.4%) than low worldview scores (5.6%). For those who voted unfavorably as per the OLCV, a higher percentage (90%) had low worldview scores than high worldview scores (10%). Thus, those with high worldview scores were more likely to vote in agreement with the OLCV while those with low scores were not (Figure 11).

Table 9

Cross-Tabulation for the OLCV and Worldview Score Variables

		Worldview Score 4.47 and Below	Worldview Score 4.48 and Above	Total
OLCV 0%-50%	Count	18	2	20
	Expected count	10	10	20
	% within OLCV	90%	10%	100%
	% within worldview score	94.7%	10.5%	52.6%
	% of total	47.4%	5.3%	52.6%
OLCV 50.1%-100%	Count	1	17	18
	Expected count	9	9	18
	% within OLCV	5.6%	94.4%	100%
	% within worldview score	5.3%	89.5%	47.4%
	% of total	2.6%	44.7%	47.4%
Total	Count	19	19	38
	Expected count	19	19	38
	% within OLCV	50%	50%	100%
	% within worldview score	100%	50%	100%
	% of total	50%	50%	100%



Figure 11. Count and Worldview Score of Voting in Accordance with OLCV.

SFC

The relationship between worldview score and voting in agreement with SFC was statistically significant: Pearson's χ^2 (1, $N = 38$) = 34.20, $p < .001$, Cramér's $V =$ .95 (Table 6). Table 10 reports the cross-tabulation for this test. Of those who voted favorably as per the SFC, a higher percentage had high worldview scores (95%) than low worldview scores (5%). For those who voted unfavorably as per the SFC, 100% had low worldview scores. Thus, those with high worldview scores were more likely to vote in agreement with SFC while those with low scores were not (Figure 12).

Table 10

Cross-Tabulation for SFC and Worldview Score Variables

		Worldview Score 4.47 and Below	Worldview Score 4.48 and Above	Total
SFC 0%-50%	Count	18	0	18
	Expected count	9	9	18
	% within SFC	100%	0%	100%
	% within worldview score	94.7%	0%	47.4%
	% of total	47.4%	0%	47.4%
SFC 50.1%-100%	Count	1	19	20
	Expected count	10	10	20
	% within SFC	5%	95%	100%
	% within worldview score	5.3%	100%	52.6%
	% of total	2.6%	50%	52.6%
Total	Count	19	19	38
	Expected count	19	19	38
	% within SFC	50%	50%	100%
	% within worldview score	100%	50%	100%
	% of total	50%	50%	100%



Figure 12. Count and Worldview Score of Voting in Accordance with SFC.

This chapter discussed the results of this study related to the research question: *To what extent does the worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory?* The results suggest that legislators do cluster in two groups across a range of issues (Proposition 1) and, in many cases, in particular classes of issues (Proposition 2). In addition, worldview score appears to be highly associated with interest group ratings (Proposition 3). A discussion of these results is addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

Propositions 1 and 2

The cluster analysis results for this study were generally supportive of Lakoff's theory of worldview. As previously discussed, Lakoff suggested that while individuals may change which ideal model of the family they embrace depending on the issue at hand, individuals should cluster in two distinct groups. Participants in this study did cluster in two groups in five out of the seven cluster analyses: 52-variable, Social Programs and Taxes, Culture Wars, Abortion, and Love Your Country and Hate Your Government. In the cluster analyses for Crime and the Death Penalty and Regulation and the Environment the participants clustered in three groups. However, when validating the data, participants clustered in two or three groups suggesting that Lakoff's theory is somewhat supported even in these two cases. These varied results lead to the following question: Why does the worldview of Oregon legislators conform to Lakoff's theory in most cases, but not entirely in all cases?

First, there is the possibility that there is some sort of measurement error taking place. The survey items were derived using the interpretations outlined in Lakoff's book. Despite considerable effort, perhaps the way in which the survey items were worded did not correctly capture Lakoff's interpretation. With some survey items, some participants stated they did not like the wording of the question, which could indicate a problem with the question's design. In addition, in the case of the

Regulation and the Environment cluster analysis, there were only two questions and this may have been inadequate to capture the entire issue.

A second possibility is that Lakoff is mistaken in his assumptions about how liberals and conservatives think about issues related to the topics of crime and the death penalty and regulation and the environment. If the correlation of variables is any indication of Lakoff's misunderstanding, then this possibility is likely. In these two cluster analyses, the variables only correlated between 0-50% of the time. In the chapters where a two-cluster solution was observed, the variables correlated between 67-100% of the time. There were times throughout the phone surveys when some participants indicated that they did not like the way in which Lakoff represented the different positions, possibly accounting for the varied results. For the most part, these unfavorable remarks were from more conservative legislators, perhaps indicating a misinterpretation of the conservative worldview in some circumstances. In the later part of his book, Lakoff argued that the liberal worldview is superior to the conservative worldview. While Lakoff intended to be objective throughout his discussion of his theory, perhaps the way in which he explained the conservative worldview position on certain issues still included enough of his personal bias that he was off-base in how conservatives look at these issues.

A third possibility is that there are indeed three clusters when it comes to the issues of crime and the death penalty and regulation and the environment. Perhaps some issues are too complex to fit Lakoff's simple dichotomous explanation. There may be three or more clusters on a number of issues if they were examined

individually instead of as a group of issues. It may be that in situations where three clusters are present it is a reflection of some other distinction not made by Lakoff, such as the difference between economic conservatives and social conservatives.

Proposition 3

The chi-square analysis results for this study were very supportive of Lakoff's theory of worldview. In all four cases comparing worldview score and interest group ratings, the relationship was statistically significant. In each case the results suggest that the variables were not independent and the difference between expected and observed counts were not due to chance. Although it is important to note that a small sample size could have confounded the results, the evidence here certainly suggests that Lakoff's theory explains political decision-making quite well. High worldview scores, reflecting a more liberal worldview, were associated with favorable ratings from the three organizations that would generally be considered as *liberal* organizations (ACLU, OLCV, and SFC). Low worldview scores, reflecting a more conservative worldview, were associated with a more favorable rating from a *conservative* organization (NFIB). This evidence suggests then that when a comprehensive "snapshot" of a legislator's views are used (a worldview score derived from all 52 variables associated with Lakoff's model), those views can be expected to be associated with interest group ratings.

Implications

This study supports Lakoff's theory that worldview stems from an underlying morality in many ways. Because this study did not demonstrate the existence of two groups in the areas of crime and the death penalty and regulation and the environment, it would suggest that Lakoff might want to consider revisiting these topics to see if further analysis or modifications are needed. The ideas behind Lakoff's theory give us the ability to educate ourselves about our own worldview and the worldview of others. For many, this may mean even coming to the realization that we each have a worldview and that it affects how we think and act in all areas on our lives. For those who already understand the existence of worldview, this theory may help explain the components of these two specified worldviews in enough detail to see how they connect to thought and actions more clearly.

The findings of this study might prove valuable to those in a variety of fields. The deep moral underpinnings of worldview delineated by this theory might prove interesting to those in the fields of psychology, anthropology, sociology, mental health, social work, or religion as they work to understand what makes people think and act as they do. Those who work in the areas of media and politics, and possibly linguistics or religion, who are interested in working toward improving civil discourse might find this research helpful for reframing public debate because it gives us some tools to understand our own worldview and the worldview of others with less judgment. This leads to other lingering questions: (1) could worldview then be an out-in-the-open topic adding clarity to public and political discourse? (2) could candidates,

parties, lobbyists, or other political actors become accustomed to expressing their worldview publicly (e.g., in the voters pamphlet)? (3) could the public learn to do the same?

Limitations

While this case study provided some insight into Lakoff's theory, it has some limitations. First, the population (N=60) and sample size (N=39) was small, and the participants did not reflect a random sample. This makes it difficult to argue that the results are generalizable to a larger population.

Second, this study involved only one chamber, in one state. Different results may have been found in other states or even in the Oregon Senate. Again, this makes it difficult to make any generalizations about the results.

Third, there were times when I had to make an educated guess about what Lakoff was trying to say or would say in order to create the survey questions. This sort of interpretation leaves open a greater possibility of measurement error.

Fourth, because many of the questions dealt with issues of a sensitive nature, this may have increased the number of "decline to answer" or "don't know" responses and, in the case of surveys returned by mail, blank responses. This may have confounded the results.

Fifth, there are some limitations to cluster analysis: it uses heuristics so interpreting the results can be subjective (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Manly, 2005); results can vary depending on the method used (Aldenderfer & Blashfield;

Manly); it will always find groups in the cases or variables whether or not they should truly be in those groupings (Aldenderfer & Blashfield); and, a variety of biases may exist because cluster analysis has developed from work in many disciplines (Aldenderfer & Blashfield).

Sixth, there were no measures taken to confirm external validity of the cluster solutions. Typically this is done in one of two ways. The first is to confirm that the results are in line with other similar studies or expert opinion (Clatworthy et al., 2005). To my knowledge, however, no other studies have been done to test Lakoff's theory and no expert opinion—other than Lakoff himself—was found to confirm such findings. This external validity procedure was therefore unavailable. The second way to test for external validity of cluster solutions is by using other statistical methods, such as ANOVA or discriminant functional analysis, using the same variables as those in the cluster analysis (Clatworthy et al., 2005). Researchers (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Clatworthy et al.; Mulry, Kalichman, Kelly, Ostrow, & Heckman, 1997), however, have been unable to demonstrate how these tests actually support external validity. Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) even went so far as to say that "...the performance of these tests is useless at best and misleading at worst" (p. 65). Due to lack of evidence that these tests would support the external validity of the cluster solutions, the decision was made not to perform these tests.

Seventh, the data for the chi-square analysis was limited (only four interest groups were used) and for three out of the four groups, data was collected from only one source (Project Vote Smart). This again brings about the question of

generalizability as well as the question of whether this data sort is completely objective.

Eighth, while the chi-square analysis did show an association between worldview score and interest group ratings, there may be other factors (e.g. party affiliation, party leadership, demographic variables) that could be equally influential on their own or could account for part of the association.

Ninth, this study cannot make a definitive causal connection between Lakoff's metaphorical reasoning of one's ideal model of the family leading to one's worldview. While the evidence did certainly suggest that there is a connection between the two, there could likely be other factors that influence our morality other than our perception of the ideal model of the family.

Contributions

This dissertation adds to the greater body of knowledge surrounding the study of values and beliefs and the political views of legislators. Addressing Lakoff's notion of worldview offers a unique approach to understanding how an underlying morality leads to worldview, which in turn leads to action. The empiricism behind this study helps add some clarity to the discussion of whether Lakoff's theory has merit. Because this study found that worldview and voting behavior of Oregon legislators does conform to Lakoff's theory to some extent but not in all cases, critics and supporters alike now have some documented empirical evidence upon which to debate. The survey instrument in itself is a key contribution of this study since it could be used for

further study or inquiry into Lakoff's theory of worldview. In addition, from looking at the literature on state legislative studies, the data collected in this study about worldview is extensive and its depth is unusually good compared to other studies of state legislatures. The data set therefore is another key contribution.

A strong impetus for this dissertation was to see if a worldview approach could prove beneficial to increasing civil discourse in politics. Lakoff (2002) has suggested that it will and anecdotal evidence that arose out this study suggests that it may. Many participants paused at times when a survey item was read and then responded with phrases such as "Well, I never thought about it that way before." Responses such as these seem to suggest that participants, by the sheer act of taking the survey, were gaining increased understanding about the moral underpinnings of their own worldviews or perhaps those of others. Whether this will translate into improved civil discourse remains to be seen, but such a possibility seems much more likely when individuals have a better understanding.

When I first read Lakoff's book, my reactionary response to those who possess the opposite worldview from my own began to shift. Over time, and by the act of completing this research and listening to those who are different from me, I have come to a place where I no longer think of those with an opposite worldview as irrational or unfocused. I now understand that their morality connects issues very differently from my own, but they do indeed connect and make sense to them. When I talk to someone of the opposite worldview, I can, for the most part and when the other party is willing, really talk with them and we can even sometimes find common ground upon which to

agree. My own ability to engage in civil discourse has been improved by the information presented in this theory, so perhaps this same phenomenon can be true for others.

Further Study

This study, while answering some questions about worldview and Lakoff's theory, leads to many more research questions. First, as discussed earlier, this study was limited in its scope and population. What results would we find if a different population was used? The main body of the survey instrument used in this study (the 52 survey items related to Lakoff's theory) was intentionally designed so that it could be used in a variety of situations with varying populations. With or without modifications to the instrument, future research should involve other states and other legislative bodies (e.g., the Oregon Senate). A study using the general public as participants would also be a possibility. We might discover that worldview and voting behavior does conform well to Lakoff's theory when looking at political elites but it does not hold when the participants are average citizens. If the instrument were used in research involving particular groups, such as political parties or churches, would we find that they also have coherent, unified worldviews? In addition, a longitudinal study that repeats the procedures and analysis in the Oregon Legislature every 5 years may also help us understand whether Lakoff's theory will hold over time and during a different segment of the legislative session and election cycle. This study took place a year after the completion of the regular legislative session and right before re-election

campaigns were beginning to ramp up. It may be that clustering results are different right after a regular legislative session, for example, or at a time in history when polarization is less visible.

Second, as speculated earlier, why does Lakoff's theory not work in all topic areas? If Lakoff does not address this inquiry himself, another researcher could certainly do so. Perhaps a study that focuses just on the two areas of crime and the death penalty and regulation and the environment with a greater number of related survey items would be helpful. In fact, such an approach could be carried out with all of the seven chapter areas discussed in order to test the reliability of the results from this study. Without input from Lakoff, this would again involve trying to extrapolate the essence of Lakoff's argument into survey items and would involve having to create survey items from scratch when Lakoff's discussion on a subtopic is somewhat limited.

Third, how consistent is the association between worldview score and interest group ratings? Because only four groups were used in this study, we cannot make any generalizations that the association would be significant for all interests groups. Further research in this area might involve collecting data from a large number and variety of interest groups and repeat the analyses for each group. It may be that the association will remain consistent, but we may find that the association is only significant with particular types of groups or when the data is collected from specific sources.

Fourth, there is the question as to how much other variables explain or contribute to voting behavior. Therefore, further inquiry into legislative voting patterns is warranted, perhaps utilizing regression analysis to discover how much the variable *worldview* explains voting behavior of legislators versus other known explanatory variables (district characteristics, party affiliation, initiative voting, campaign contributions).

Fifth, how could the demographic and qualitative data collected lead us to further understanding about worldview in general or Lakoff's theory in particular? Further study could therefore be done on the ways in which demographic factors such as gender, ethnicity, geography, profession, or number of years in office connect to worldview. Similar studies on worldview and data collected from qualitative questions, such as how political views affect floor votes, could also be of interest.

Finally, the connection between worldview and civil discourse should be explored. As Lakoff has speculated, does a better understanding of one's own worldview and the worldview of others increase the likelihood of improved civil discourse? While this idea may make intuitive sense, a study aimed at measuring the level of civil discourse both before and after some sort of worldview education program on a particular population would provide some empirical evidence of this connection.

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APPENDIX A

Civil Discourse in Politics

Discourse has been a topic of concern since the beginning of modern political analysis (De Tocqueville, 1984; Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 1961; Locke, 1986). Because there are examples of the lack of civility from the very start of our nation (Miller & Gronbeck, 1994), this is clearly not a new problem. However, some of the literature has asserted that civil discourse in politics has been declining in recent years (Crowley, 2006; Farrell, 1993; Patterson, 2002; Rosenthal, 1996). Some of the suggested causes, effects, and cures for this decline are discussed here, and comments from past and current Oregon legislators are presented. These comments were acquired from short, informal phone interviews during January and February of 2008 with three past Oregon legislators (two Democrats and one Republican) and three current legislators (one Democrat and two Republicans). All comments were recorded in a computer file and checked for accuracy. By request, and for the sake of confidentiality, the legislators are here designated as A, B, C, D, E, and F. Legislator A, a female Democrat; legislator B, a male Democrat; and legislator C, a male Republican, are all past legislators. Legislator D, a male Republican; legislator E, a female Democrat; and legislator F, a male Republican, are all current legislators.

Declining Civil Discourse?

Interviewees were first asked the following question: "Do you think there has been a decline in civil discourse in politics?" Legislator A, who has worked in politics since 1974, said she has never found civility in local politics to be a problem, but in the last 15 years, civility in state politics has declined. She noted that the Oregon legislature has a high standard of civility on the floor and that legislators tend to be quite polite when in rooms together (e.g., committees, receptions, social events), but behind the scenes and in campaigns, there are many attempts to "embarrass, criticize, and be sarcastic" towards those in the opposition. From his experience in Oregon and California, Legislator B agreed with A's assertion that there has been a trend of declining civility, but he saw this declining civility as a problem on the floor as well.

Negative Rhetoric and Its Effects

Some research has suggested that current political rhetoric puts people into divisive categories that negatively impacts how our society functions (Crowley, 2006; Miller & Gronbeck, 1994). Legislator C said that there have always been winners and losers in politics but that things have become more "shrill and accusatory" in recent years. Legislator A said, "The public is disgusted with internal bickering and negative campaigning and this depresses turnout and participation." Some studies have supported this claim finding that uncivil discourse in politics leads to the public's disengagement from and disillusionment with politics, which ultimately decreases voter turnout (Gimpel, Lay, & Schuknecht, 2003; Patterson, 2002; Schaeffer, 1981); it

can also create a waning trust in government (Skocpol, 2003). Other effects of declining civil discourse in politics have been identified as fiscal deficits (Krause, 2000) and budgetary problems (Jones, True, & Baumgartner, 1997).

Polarization between and within Parties

Increasing partisanship was identified by several of the legislators interviewed (A, B, and D) as a significant problem in maintaining civility Legislator D said that partisan politics has increased during his tenure in the legislature, but when he talks to long-timers, they say that this rise is even more extreme than in the past. Strong feelings about particular issues identified by Legislator A and "posturing for the next election" identified by Legislator B were seen as contributing factors that have increased partisanship. From past experience in the Oregon Legislature and a variety of other interactions with elected officials and activists, I have found that complaints such as these are not uncommon. This is one of the ideas that first led me to this research project. However, a question remained whether the evidence of a relationship between a decline in civility and partisanship or polarization is purely anecdotal or based in solid research.

A review of the literature showed some evidence that supported these legislators' claims (Rosenthal, 1998), particularly when it comes to certain social issues (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Rose, 2001a, 2001b). Factors such as interest groups (Rosenthal, 2004) can exacerbate competing positions between parties on issues. Outwardly observable conflict can also be a result

of electoral realignments (Sundquist, 1983). Some have argued that changes in constituency bases, or a *culture war*, have led to this increased party polarization (Conley, 2002; Hunter, 1991, 2005). While that term is not clearly defined, proponents of the culture war theory see a culture war as a much deeper level of conflict than the customary conflicts associated with public policy issues because "...the source of conflict is found in different moral visions" (Hunter, 1991, p. 48). Other research, however, showed that the idea of a culture war is a myth (Fiorina, 2005; Williams, 1997; Hunter & Wolfe, 2006) or that evidence of its existence is limited to that of political elites (Fiorina). Research by Kaufman (2002) also suggested that culture wars, complicated by factors such as gender and race, are only in part a result of moral conflict.

Other research has suggested that partisanship is not always a negative thing. Rosenthal (1998), for example, suggested that partisanship requires politicians to be more "responsive to their constituencies" (p. 195). Romance (1998) argued that our two-party system actually helps manage conflict in a system that would otherwise be fraught with higher levels of conflict. Research on divided government—when political parties share power—has shown that it can increase the number of important votes on social regulation policy (Rose, 2001a), although this result may depend upon the setting (Rose, 2004). Jones (2001) found that divided government does not necessarily increase gridlock while Mayhew (1991) argued that the effects of divided government, such as increasing deficit growth, are not significantly different from those of unified government. Ginsberg and Shefter (1990) argued that elections have

become less of a factor in American public policy, while behind-the-scenes factors, such as seeking support from legislative leaders or shifting the burden of solving problems to other governmental entities, have gained influence.

Although not specifically addressed by those legislators interviewed, conflict often exists between members of the same party, which may present itself in the form of uncivil discourse. This may in part be due to the competing interests of those from different districts (Rosenthal, 2004). Rose (2001b) found that tension within parties tends to increase during times of divided government. It has also been suggested that factionalization or extremism within parties can encourage a vicious cycle where the overall party can become more extreme (Layman & Carsey, 2002; Pastor, Stone, & Rapport, 1999) or factionalized (Davidson & Oleszek, 1976). This is not to suggest that this type of conflict is causing party decline, but it perhaps adds to the evidence (McKay, 2000) that the role of parties is changing. In fact, McCann (1995) noted that even though factionalization within parties can become very intense during primary races, each party tends to reunify after the primaries are over.

Political Community

Legislators B and C identified the connection between declining political community and declining civil discourse. This could be a case of the "vanishing table" discussed by Kemmis (1990): People who once worked together fairly well have now lost a common sense of place and purpose (Kemmis) or conditions are not right for the "communitarian model" of leadership to work (Morgan & Shinn, 2001, p. 7). Because

of this interrelationship between political community and civil discourse, this research project may not only help to improve civil discourse through better understanding, but it may also indirectly enhance political community. Legislators B, C and E suggested that leadership plays a role in the level of civility in politics. This means, as Legislator B said, that the degree of civility "depends on who gets elected." Legislator C suggested that minority and majority leaders should work together to set standards of civility and better communication. In contrast, Legislator D thought that interest groups were largely to blame for declining civility, noting that "the legislative process survives because of goodwill."

Research has suggested that decreasing face-to-face contact, waning collegiality, competitive politics, and term limits are some factors that contribute to declining civility (Rosenthal, 1996, 1998). Thompson, Kurtz, and Moncrief (1996) found that more experienced legislators see newer legislators as less concerned with the legislature as an institution or in the relationships between legislators. Instead, new legislators are seen as concerned with reelection, raising funds, district issues, and being "anti-legislative." Research by Rose (2001b, 2004), however, suggested that how elected leaders interact depends upon the type of political body involved. Community building has been attempted in a variety of ways, such as relying on majority leaders to bridge differences (Pitney, 1982), eliminating term limits to improve institutional memory (Rosenthal, 1996), and enlisting the art of compromise (Morehouse, 1996). According to Legislator A, however, attempts to improve civil

discourse in the Oregon Legislature, such as workshops, only result in improved civil discourse for a short time.

Media

Legislators E and F pointed to the media as a significant contributing factor to the decline of civil discourse in politics. Legislator F said that declining civility "...is at times amplified due to the impact of the media. We do not hear much about the statesmanship that leads to negotiation and produces good policy, but rather the mostly negative or sensationalized hype that sells newspapers and provides fuel to further divide the public on matters of importance." Legislator E said that media affects civility in two ways. First, the media has accustomed people to receiving information in quick sound bites and this requires politicians to use the same in order to keep public attention. Second, the level of civility is directly related to how much the media and others are paying attention to the issues being deliberated. It is her experience that "thoughtful discourse" is more likely when the media is not watching. This is consistent with the findings of Lawrence (2000b) regarding "event-driven news," which "is often sensationalized, hyperbolic, and overheated; at the least, it may be based on erroneous first impressions and irresistible but misleading metaphors" (p. 187).

Some research has suggested that the media has played a significant role in creating an atmosphere of declining civil discourse through the way it frames issues (Christians, Ferré, & Fackler, 1993; Farrell, 1993; Lakoff, 2002) and the type of

content it espouses (Lakoff; Lasch, 1995; Patterson, 2002). Lawrence (2000a) has identified media's tendency to frame public policy issues as a game of winners and losers, rather than a substantive matter. Lasch (1995) made the case that political discourse was more meaningful and plentiful when media sources were clear in expressing their point of view, instead of claiming to be *objective*. Fiorina (2005) said that media fuels the culture war by exaggerating the existence of and giving heavy coverage to extremists.

Because of the role media has played in political civil discourse, questions then arise surrounding the degree of power that the media has in the political world. Cook (2005) identified the news media as a "social institution" (p. 84) that participates in the policy-making process "through their ultimate control of the central means of communicating among officials and between government and the public..." (p. 208). Wolfsfeld (1997) has identified a significant interrelationship between the news media and politics. The news media does have a certain level of power in the political world, but the political world has even a greater influence over the news media through avenues such as its controlled access and ensuing content. Similarly, Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston (2007) observed that there is a "recurring pattern of the government leading the press" (p. 196) and that the press fails to provide solid debate about difficult issues, something essential in a democracy. Despite the picture painted here that media is primarily a negative force in the search for increased civility, some authors have suggested that the media has a role to play in improving civil discourse in politics (Christians et al., 1993; Farrell, 1993; Miller & Gronbeck, 1994). Legislator E

believed that civil discourse could be improved if the media trusted the intelligence of citizens more and gave them more information, allowing people to be more thoughtful and politicians to be more direct.

The Role of Our Culture and Its Citizens

Although there has been some evidence to the contrary (Jacoby, 1990), it is often difficult for people, including political leaders, to understand each other, find ways to communicate effectively, and compromise when necessary (Lakoff, 2002). Some have suggested that the role of our larger culture is at least in part to blame. Legislator C stated that our society has "become the paparazzi" and that we expect life to be played out as it is in the tabloids. Legislator F observed that "...we have degenerated in our ability to respect individuals and participate in honest discussions with those who hold conflicting opinions." He believed that civil discourse will improve only when citizens learn to be respectful of those who have different opinions and elect those who will do so as well. Legislator E pointed to the competitive nature of our overall culture as a cause of declining civil discourse. She believed that civil discourse could be improved by reframing discourse away from "winners and losers" toward a more thoughtful discourse focused on listening and collaborating. This comment is consistent with the literature, which suggested that re-framing political debate is necessary in order to improve civil discourse (Lakoff; Miller & Gronbeck, 1994; Thomas & Dobson, 1999; Watson, 1997), and this may be facilitated by

remembering that debate does not have a negative tone (Crowley, 2006; Farrell, 1993; Lakoff; Sullivan, 1994).

Conclusions about Civil Discourse in Politics

When I set out to look at the literature on civil discourse, I expected to find significant evidence that conflict in politics is always negative. I was surprised to learn that there are good and essential reasons for its presence in a democracy, as suggested in the above section on polarization. That said, there is a difference between political conflict and a lack of civility in political discourse. Much like the lessons we were taught in grade school, it is possible to address and work on conflict, including political conflict, in a civil manner. However, in order to do that, we must first understand what is at the source of our conflicts.

All of the legislators interviewed about civil discourse believed that it has been declining in recent years and that this is a problem. This may be in part due to perceptions by the public that politics is a nasty business and, as findings by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) suggested, public opinion matters a great deal to how the business of politics is carried out. Perhaps this perception of a decline in civility is a result of the natural trend of politics resulting from factors such as electoral realignments. Alternatively, it could be a misguided nostalgia for the "good old days." In any case, all of these Oregon legislators desired a change in the level of civility. All but one of the other legislators interviewed thought that there were ways to do this, including continuing the trend in sharing power in committees, supporting the recent

removal of term limits, implementing campaign finance reform, seeking a different role for the media, and reframing discourse to be more civil.

APPENDIX B

Worldview Survey, 2006

"Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. As was discussed in the letter you received the purpose of this study is to explore George Lakoff's theory of worldview using the Oregon legislature as a case study. The entire survey should take about 20 minutes. Your answers will be kept completely confidential. Is it all right if I record your answers on an audiotape? If at any time you would like me to repeat a question, please do not hesitate to ask. While it is VERY important that you answer every question, you may say 'don't know' if you truly do not understand the question and feel you cannot give an accurate answer. You may also say 'decline to answer' if you understand the question but are unwilling to answer it. Any questions so far?"

"The first set of questions focuses on your views regarding specific issues. Some of the questions may sound similar. When giving your answer, please try to think of each question as it stands on its own. Do you have the answer key that was mailed to you?" (If not, help respondent make a key that they can refer to)

After I read each question, please refer to the answer key and tell me the answer, using the number or words that best reflects your view for that question. Remember, 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Somewhat Disagree, 4=Somewhat Agree, 5=Agree, 6=Strongly Agree. Are you ready?"

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know	Decline
1.	People who use drugs lack moral strength and self-discipline.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
2.	Government subsidized college loans should be provided to all who need them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
3.	Giving teenagers condoms encourages promiscuity.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
4.	Because illegal immigrants are paid so little, they should receive government services to ensure that their basic needs are met.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
5.	Art should positively reflect traditional American values and moral standards.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
6.	It punishes those in upper income brackets when they are taxed at a higher rate than other people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
7.	Children should be taught about all aspects of our national history, good and bad.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
8.	Because protecting the nation is the most important function of government, military funding should be our national government's top priority.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
9.	It is unfair to increase the deficit to lower taxes for those in upper income brackets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
10.	Unrestricted gun ownership allows people the right to protect themselves.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know	Decline
11. It makes more sense to invest in crime prevention programs than in prisons.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
12. Use of the death penalty shows a disrespect for life by the government.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
13. Children should be taught "traditional" moral values.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
14. Increasing the deficit to lower taxes for those in upper income brackets is okay because we should reward enterprising individuals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
15. The government should help change the social and economic system that keeps people trapped in their social class.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
16. The type of environment that children grow up in is the most important contributing factor to their success in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
17. We coddle criminals when we worry about how they are treated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
18. It is the natural order of things for human beings to dominate over nature.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
19. Giving teenagers condoms will help prevent disease and pregnancy	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
20. We have the responsibility to care for and respect the environment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
21. Affirmative action "gives people things" they have not earned.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
22. People who are homosexual and people who are heterosexual should have equal rights that are protected by the law.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
23. When a person commits a crime it is a reflection of poor moral character.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
24. We should allow people who are homosexual to marry.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
25. Multiculturalism weakens our national morality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
26. Offering government subsidized college loans encourages dependence on government rather than on self-reliance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
27. Giving government services rewards illegal immigrants for being here illegally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
28. Gun control helps protect people against violence.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
29. What is taught in schools today threatens our moral system.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know	Decline
30. It is everyone's obligation to adequately fund public schools, whether they use them or not.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
31. It is fair for those who have more money to be taxed at a higher rate than those who have less.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
32. Criminals should be punished harshly to discourage further criminal activity.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
33. Drug addiction is a disease.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
34. The quality of education in this country is declining due in large part to liberal social policies.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
35. Art that compels people to question things, such as the unfair treatment of certain people or groups, is valuable.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
36. Legal abortion encourages promiscuity and irresponsible behavior.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
37. Responsible citizens should be left alone to manage their own affairs, family life, and local community without the interference of the federal government.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
38. Moral and cultural differences should be respected and tolerated	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
39. "Anyone with enough self-discipline and imagination can become an entrepreneur" (pp. 204).	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
40. The quality of education in this country is declining due in large part to inadequate funding of schools.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
41. People who do not use public schools should not have to pay for them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
42. The federal government has the responsibility to make sure that state and local governments are adequately caring for and serving their citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
43. People who are homosexual should not be allowed to marry because this would go against the natural order of things.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
44. As a general rule, education, health care, and social services should take priority over military spending.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
45. In general, crime is a result of larger social problems, such as poverty.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
46. The death penalty is justified because it means a life for a life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know	Decline
47. Children should be taught that different people have different views.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
48. People who are unsuccessful in life, lack good character or talent.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
49. The legal system is unfair to poor people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
50. We should not be concerned about protecting the rights of people who are homosexual.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
51. Legal abortion provides help to women who are not ready to have children or are unable to take care of them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
52. Affirmative action makes up for other past injustices, such as lack of opportunity.	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9

Demographic Questions:

"Now I will ask some questions about you and your background. Please remember that your answers will be kept completely confidential."

1. "In what year were you born?" _____

2. "I know this is a strange question, but I am trained to ask: What is your gender?"

   0 Male 1 Female 2 Both (Transgender)

3. "What is your party affiliation?" (list choices) 0 Democrat 1 Republican 2 Independent 3 Other

4. "What is the highest grade/degree in school that you completed?[1]" (list choices)

   1 grade school or less
   2 some high school
   3 graduated high school
   4 some college
   5 graduated college
   6 some graduate study
   7 graduate degree

5. "What is your marital status?" (list choices)

   1 single
   2 married
   3 live with domestic partner
   4 divorced
   5 separated
   6 widowed

6. "How many children do you have?" # _____. "What are their ages?" _____ years

7. "About what would you say is your (and, IF APPROPRIATE, your spouse's or partner's) approximate combined household income before taxes?"[2]
   1 $20,000 or less
   2 $20,001 to $40,000
   3 $40,001 to $60,000
   4 $60,001 to $80,000
   5 $80,001 to $100,000
   6 over $100,001

8. "Do you consider yourself Hispanic or Latino?[3]" 0 No 1 Yes

9. "Do you consider yourself primarily:[4]" (list choices)

   1 White/Caucasian
   2 Black/African American
   3 American Indian or Alaska Native
   4 Asian
   5 Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
   6 Other _____

10. "What is your religion?" _____

11. "Do you regularly attend religious services?" 0 No 1 Yes

12. "What is your profession or professions? Please be as specific as possible"

13. "How would you describe your political views?[5] Are they:" (list choices)

1 Extremely liberal
2 Liberal
3 Slightly liberal
4 Moderate or middle of the road
5 Slightly conservative
6 Conservative
7 Extremely conservative

14. "How would you say you typically vote on the floor?" (list choices)

1 Extremely liberal
2 Liberal
3 Slightly liberal
4 Moderate or middle of the road
5 Slightly conservative
6 Conservative
7 Extremely conservative

15. "How many years have you served in the legislature?[6]" _____ years.

Probing questions:

" We are almost done. The questions in this last section give you a chance to describe what influences your voting decisions. There are no multiple-choice answers. Please answer just in your own words. Again, your answers will be kept completely confidential."

1. "What factors typically influence your votes on the floor?" (Answer) "Any other factors?"

2. "In what ways do your personal views affect your votes on the floor?"

3. "Do you think you vote consistently liberal or conservative?"

4. "What are the reasons that you do or do not vote consistently?"

5. "Are there certain issues on which you typically do NOT vote with others in your party?"

   0 No
   1 YesIf yes, then, "Which issues are these and why?"

"The survey is now complete. Do you have anything that you would like to add or any questions for me? Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this survey. Your participation is very appreciated."

Definitions:

Natural order of things: "The order of dominance that occurs in the world" (pp. 81), such as God is naturally more powerful than people, people are naturally more powerful than animals and plants and natural objects, adults are naturally more powerful than children, and men are naturally more powerful than women.

Traditional moral values: the importance of the traditional nuclear family, respect for authority, self-discipline, self-reliance, responsibility, a system of reward and punishment, and protection from external evils.

Moral standards: there should be a clear moral authority and clear moral boundaries; people should practice moral strength and moral self-interest, and accept the idea of reward and punishment.

[1] From National Survey of Dual-Earner Couples in the Sandwiched Generation, 1998
[2] Adapted from National Survey of Dual-Earner Couples in the Sandwiched Generation, 1998
[3] From National Survey of Dual-Earner Couples in the Sandwiched Generation, 1998
[4] From National Survey of Dual-Earner Couples in the Sandwiched Generation, 1998
[5] Adapted from "The 1995 State Legislator Surveys", in Carey, J.M., Niemi, R. G., & Powell, L. W. (2000). Term limits in the state legislatures. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
[6] From "State Legislature Survey", in Francis, W. L. (1989). The legislative committee game: A comparative analysis of fifty states. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

APPENDIX C

Confidence Letter

PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY

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506 SW Mill
Phone: 503-725-5156
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May 1, 2006

Dear Representative _____,

Enclosed is a letter asking you to participate in a study designed by Cathy Law's as part of her doctoral dissertation research. Cathy Law is a student in our Public Administration and Policy Ph.D. Program.

Portland State University adheres to strict guidelines for research protocols. All doctoral students conducting survey research are required to submit their materials for approval to a university level human subjects review committee.

Because of this, we can assure you that the purpose of this project is purely educational and nonpartisan, and that the information collected will be kept completely confidential. In no case will any individual responses be revealed, unless consent is directly asked for and given.

We urge you to participate in this study. If you do participate, we thank you for your time. It is with the help of people like you that our students are able to fulfill their educational goals and contribute to the knowledge base in their area of study.

Sincerely,

Charles Heying

Charles Heying, Ph.D.
Dissertation Chair
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning

Lawrence Wallack, DrPH
Dean, College of Urban and Public Affairs

William H. Feyerherm, Ph.D.
Vice Provost for Sponsored Research and Dean of Graduate Studies

BuildingOurFuture
The Campaign for Portland State University

APPENDIX D

Cover Letter

PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY

Mark O. Hatfield School of Government
College of Urban and Public Affairs
Post Office Box 751
Portland, Oregon 97207
URBN 650
506 SW Mill
PHONE: 503-725-3156
FAX: 503-725-8250
http://www.hatfieldschool.pdx.edu/

May 1, 2006

Dear Representative _____,

My name is Cathy Law and I am a student at Portland State University. I am beginning a study on George Lakoff's theory of worldview and would like to invite you to participate. This study is for my Ph. D. dissertation project and it is in no way linked to any partisan group or organization. The title of the study is "George Lakoff's Theory of Worldview: A Case Study of the Oregon Legislature".

You are being asked to take part because you are a current legislator in the Oregon House of Representatives. As part of the study, I am interested in your views about a wide range of issues. I hope that the information I collect will help us to better understand how worldview can be classified and how much it correlates to voting decisions. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to take a telephone survey that involves answering questions about your views on a variety of issues on a scale from one to six, as well as some demographic questions and some open-ended questions about your voting. The entire survey should take about twenty minutes to complete.

Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be linked to you or identify you will be kept confidential. I will ask you ahead of time if I can record the results of the survey on an audio tape. The purpose of the audio tape is to confirm that I have your answers documented accurately. Completed surveys and tapes will be stored in a locked safe. If for some unlikely reason I would like to quote you, I will ask for your permission in writing and it will be perfectly acceptable if you do not wish to give your permission. After the study is complete, I would be happy to share the results with you. Again, these results will be presented in a way that confidentiality will be upheld. It is my hope that this study will help us all better understand the impact of worldview on the decisions that people make.

Although your participation is very important and would be extremely appreciated, participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Your decision to participate or not will not affect your relationship with the researcher or with Portland State University in any way. If you decide to take part in the study, you may choose to withdraw at any time. Please keep a copy of this letter for your records. If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland State University, (503) 725-4288. If you have questions about the study itself, contact Cathy Law at 544 NW 16th, Corvallis, OR, 97330, (541) 829-1068 or law@peak.org.

In the next week or so, I will be contacting you or your staff to see if we can set up an appointment time for you to take the survey. Again, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to ask. Thank you for you help.

Sincerely,

Cathy Law

Cathy Law
Ph. D. Student, Portland State University

BuildingOurFuture
The Campaign for Portland State University

APPENDIX E

ANSWER KEY

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

****Please save this card. You will be asked to use it during**

APPENDIX F

Sample Survey Question

The following is an example of the type of question that will be in the survey:

"In general, regulation of the environment is unfair because it restricts the free-market."

Note: This exact question will not be in the survey.

APPENDIX G

Agglomeration Schedules for Cluster Analyses

Ward Linkage: 52-Variable Cluster Analysis

Agglomeration Schedule

Stage	Cluster Combined		Coefficients	Stage Cluster First Appears		Next Stage
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	
1	14	26	13.000	0	0	4
2	12	34	27.159	0	0	4
3	6	19	43.083	0	0	7
4	12	14	62.153	2	1	16
5	7	20	82.351	0	0	18
6	33	39	104.851	0	0	10
7	6	13	128.949	3	0	9
8	23	30	154.481	0	0	24
9	6	31	180.932	7	0	16
10	5	33	207.682	0	6	18
11	4	32	236.682	0	0	27
12	18	35	267.733	0	0	19
13	2	27	298.808	0	0	19
14	1	29	331.808	0	0	22
15	9	25	368.758	0	0	30
16	6	12	406.635	9	4	23
17	28	36	445.140	0	0	26
18	5	7	483.884	10	5	20
19	2	18	524.653	13	12	28
20	5	16	569.559	18	0	22
21	17	24	614.836	0	0	26
22	1	5	663.852	14	20	25
23	6	15	713.463	16	0	27
24	23	38	768.637	8	0	30
25	1	21	824.074	22	0	32
26	17	28	882.927	21	17	29
27	4	6	945.752	11	23	34
28	2	8	1009.422	19	0	31
29	17	37	1076.062	26	0	37
30	9	23	1150.282	15	24	31
31	2	9	1230.908	28	30	35
32	1	11	1314.071	25	0	36
33	3	22	1399.323	0	0	35
34	4	10	1537.050	27	0	36
35	2	3	1701.483	31	33	37
36	1	4	1896.248	32	34	38
37	2	17	2098.075	35	29	38
38	1	2	3560.026	36	37	0

Ward Linkage: Social Programs and Taxes Cluster Analysis

Agglomeration Schedule

Stage	Cluster Combined		Coefficients	Stage Cluster First Appears		Next Stage
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	
1	14	26	1.500	0	0	6
2	13	31	3.500	0	0	23
3	6	39	6.000	0	0	6
4	19	34	8.558	0	0	5
5	15	19	11.468	0	4	23
6	6	14	14.468	3	1	10
7	5	16	17.968	0	0	14
8	7	29	22.468	0	0	13
9	2	35	27.852	0	0	12
10	6	12	33.252	6	0	27
11	9	25	38.739	0	0	35
12	2	18	44.707	9	0	30
13	7	20	51.451	8	0	18
14	5	33	58.618	7	0	19
15	4	32	67.118	0	0	33
16	24	28	76.292	0	0	24
17	23	30	85.474	0	0	21
18	1	7	94.706	0	13	22
19	5	36	105.039	14	0	26
20	10	11	116.039	0	0	34
21	23	27	127.921	17	0	25
22	1	21	141.868	18	0	26
23	13	15	156.591	2	5	27
24	24	38	172.587	16	0	29
25	23	37	189.134	21	0	32
26	1	5	205.900	22	19	33
27	6	13	223.828	10	23	34
28	8	22	243.828	0	0	30
29	17	24	266.491	0	24	32
30	2	8	291.951	12	28	31
31	2	3	321.811	30	0	35
32	17	23	351.756	29	25	37
33	1	4	393.565	26	15	36
34	6	10	438.760	27	20	36
35	2	9	488.002	31	11	37
36	1	6	546.914	33	34	38
37	2	17	629.680	35	32	38
38	1	2	1128.457	36	37	0

Ward Linkage: Culture Wars Cluster Analysis

Agglomeration Schedule

Stage	Cluster Combined		Coefficients	Stage Cluster First Appears		Next Stage
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	
1	26	34	1.500	0	0	8
2	14	32	3.500	0	0	5
3	12	19	6.029	0	0	7
4	4	5	9.058	0	0	18
5	1	14	12.391	0	2	8
6	11	21	15.891	0	0	31
7	12	13	19.954	3	0	11
8	1	26	24.321	5	1	18
9	20	33	28.821	0	0	10
10	7	20	33.576	0	9	24
11	12	31	38.528	7	0	22
12	6	39	43.528	0	0	22
13	2	27	48.555	0	0	16
14	23	30	56.405	0	0	17
15	28	29	64.405	0	0	19
16	2	36	73.101	13	0	20
17	23	25	82.275	14	0	28
18	1	4	91.730	8	4	24
19	24	28	101.422	0	15	32
20	2	17	111.387	16	0	27
21	9	18	122.387	0	0	25
22	6	12	133.899	12	11	26
23	8	35	146.205	0	0	28
24	1	7	160.081	18	10	26
25	9	38	176.414	21	0	29
26	1	6	195.429	24	22	30
27	2	22	214.633	20	0	34
28	8	23	234.445	23	17	29
29	8	9	258.448	28	25	36
30	1	15	282.781	26	0	33
31	11	16	307.947	6	0	33
32	24	37	334.064	19	0	34
33	1	11	365.644	30	31	35
34	2	24	414.251	27	32	37
35	1	10	466.890	33	0	38
36	3	8	533.911	0	29	37
37	2	3	615.411	34	36	38
38	1	2	1161.407	35	37	0

Ward Linkage: Abortion Cluster Analysis

Agglomeration Schedule

Stage	Cluster Combined		Coefficients	Stage Cluster First Appears		Next Stage
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	
1	34	39	.000	0	0	3
2	29	36	.000	0	0	24
3	1	34	.000	0	1	5
4	32	33	.000	0	0	5
5	1	32	.000	3	4	13
6	28	31	.000	0	0	8
7	27	30	.000	0	0	21
8	5	28	.000	0	6	18
9	14	26	.000	0	0	14
10	2	25	.000	0	0	25
11	9	22	.000	0	0	26
12	15	19	.000	0	0	13
13	1	15	.000	5	12	17
14	4	14	.000	0	9	19
15	6	13	.000	0	0	19
16	11	12	.000	0	0	17
17	1	11	.000	13	16	33
18	5	7	.000	8	0	28
19	4	6	.000	14	15	31
20	24	38	.018	0	0	27
21	27	37	.242	7	0	30
22	8	17	.504	0	0	30
23	18	35	1.004	0	0	29
24	21	29	1.671	0	2	32
25	2	23	2.338	10	0	34
26	3	9	3.004	0	11	29
27	20	24	3.804	0	20	32
28	5	16	4.604	18	0	31
29	3	18	5.837	26	23	35
30	8	27	7.275	22	21	34
31	4	5	9.875	19	28	33
32	20	21	12.650	27	24	36
33	1	4	17.671	17	31	36
34	2	8	22.828	25	30	35
35	2	3	34.965	34	29	37
36	1	20	49.016	33	32	38
37	2	10	63.769	35	0	38
38	1	2	225.146	36	37	0

Ward Linkage: How Can You Love Your Country and Hate Your Government Cluster Analysis

Agglomeration Schedule

Stage	Cluster Combined		Coefficients	Stage Cluster First Appears		Next Stage
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	
1	35	39	.000	0	0	2
2	5	35	.000	0	1	28
3	18	28	.000	0	0	5
4	1	21	.000	0	0	13
5	6	18	.000	0	3	25
6	8	9	.038	0	0	18
7	23	36	.538	0	0	16
8	31	34	1.038	0	0	26
9	26	32	1.538	0	0	22
10	13	24	2.038	0	0	23
11	14	20	2.538	0	0	14
12	7	19	3.038	0	0	15
13	1	33	3.704	4	0	27
14	12	14	4.538	0	11	22
15	7	10	5.371	12	0	23
16	23	37	6.323	7	0	19
17	15	16	7.407	0	0	31
18	2	8	8.570	0	6	30
19	22	23	10.001	0	16	30
20	27	38	11.501	0	0	24
21	11	30	13.001	0	0	29
22	12	26	14.768	14	9	25
23	7	13	16.935	15	10	33
24	3	27	19.435	0	20	32
25	6	12	22.210	5	22	31
26	4	31	25.043	0	8	34
27	1	29	27.876	13	0	29
28	5	17	30.876	2	0	33
29	1	11	34.710	27	21	35
30	2	22	39.361	18	19	35
31	6	15	44.977	25	17	34
32	3	25	52.477	24	0	37
33	5	7	61.033	28	23	36
34	4	6	72.825	26	31	36
35	1	2	86.927	29	30	37
36	4	5	103.792	34	33	38
37	1	3	124.764	35	32	38
38	1	4	186.096	37	36	0

Ward Linkage: Crime and the Death Penalty Cluster Analysis

Agglomeration Schedule

Stage	Cluster Combined		Coefficients	Stage Cluster First Appears		Next Stage
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	
1	1	35	2.000	0	0	9
2	12	34	4.000	0	0	17
3	17	23	6.000	0	0	10
4	6	31	9.000	0	0	22
5	25	38	13.288	0	0	30
6	33	39	17.788	0	0	27
7	13	32	22.288	0	0	20
8	4	19	26.817	0	0	20
9	1	30	31.483	1	0	21
10	9	17	36.150	0	3	16
11	7	20	41.203	0	0	14
12	8	18	46.267	0	0	29
13	16	36	51.767	0	0	28
14	7	28	57.669	11	0	28
15	2	37	63.695	0	0	24
16	9	27	70.028	10	0	21
17	12	26	76.695	2	0	22
18	14	21	83.695	0	0	23
19	11	22	92.144	0	0	25
20	4	13	100.828	8	7	31
21	1	9	110.304	9	16	30
22	6	12	120.238	4	17	26
23	5	14	131.943	0	18	33
24	2	24	144.120	15	0	32
25	3	11	156.533	0	19	36
26	6	15	170.600	22	0	31
27	29	33	184.767	0	6	29
28	7	16	199.996	14	13	34
29	8	29	215.348	12	27	34
30	1	25	233.210	21	5	32
31	4	6	252.418	20	26	33
32	1	2	276.139	30	24	37
33	4	5	300.638	31	23	35
34	7	8	325.564	28	29	36
35	4	10	355.435	33	0	38
36	3	7	398.850	25	34	37
37	1	3	499.910	32	36	38
38	1	4	771.558	37	35	0

Ward Linkage: Regulation and the Environment Cluster Analysis

Agglomeration Schedule

Stage	Cluster Combined		Coefficients	Stage Cluster First Appears		Next Stage
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	
1	33	39	.000	0	0	7
2	30	38	.000	0	0	10
3	31	37	.000	0	0	9
4	16	36	.000	0	0	27
5	29	35	.000	0	0	11
6	32	34	.000	0	0	8
7	4	33	.000	0	1	17
8	12	32	.000	0	6	21
9	5	31	.000	0	3	26
10	2	30	.000	0	2	15
11	7	29	.000	0	5	22
12	23	27	.000	0	0	15
13	21	26	.000	0	0	17
14	11	25	.000	0	0	24
15	2	23	.000	10	12	20
16	9	22	.000	0	0	31
17	4	21	.000	7	13	18
18	4	19	.000	17	0	33
19	17	18	.000	0	0	20
20	2	17	.000	15	19	23
21	12	15	.000	8	0	29
22	7	14	.000	11	0	32
23	2	13	.000	20	0	30
24	3	11	.000	0	14	35
25	8	10	.000	0	0	31
26	5	6	.000	9	0	33
27	16	28	.006	4	0	28
28	16	24	.044	27	0	32
29	1	12	.844	0	21	34
30	2	20	1.733	23	0	36
31	8	9	2.733	25	16	35
32	7	16	4.734	22	28	36
33	4	5	7.134	18	26	34
34	1	4	10.600	29	33	38
35	3	8	14.458	24	31	37
36	2	7	20.177	30	32	37
37	2	3	36.361	36	35	38
38	1	2	87.360	34	37	0

APPENDIX H

Range of Worldview Scores

Statistics

NADJWVSC

N	Valid	39
	Missing	0
Mean		4.2276
Median		4.4808

NADJWVSC

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2.61	1	2.6	2.6	2.6
	2.92	1	2.6	2.6	5.1
	3.06	1	2.6	2.6	7.7
	3.16	1	2.6	2.6	10.3
	3.18	1	2.6	2.6	12.8
	3.24	1	2.6	2.6	15.4
	3.26	1	2.6	2.6	17.9
	3.28	1	2.6	2.6	20.5
	3.31	1	2.6	2.6	23.1
	3.33	1	2.6	2.6	25.6
	3.40	1	2.6	2.6	28.2
	3.48	1	2.6	2.6	30.8
	3.54	1	2.6	2.6	33.3
	3.58	1	2.6	2.6	35.9
	3.81	1	2.6	2.6	38.5
	4.10	1	2.6	2.6	41.0
	4.12	1	2.6	2.6	43.6
	4.25	1	2.6	2.6	46.2
	4.33	1	2.6	2.6	48.7
	4.48	1	2.6	2.6	51.3
	4.54	1	2.6	2.6	53.8
	4.59	1	2.6	2.6	56.4
	4.62	1	2.6	2.6	59.0
	4.67	1	2.6	2.6	61.5
	4.75	1	2.6	2.6	64.1
	4.76	1	2.6	2.6	66.7
	4.77	1	2.6	2.6	69.2
	4.87	1	2.6	2.6	71.8
	4.92	1	2.6	2.6	74.4
	5.00	1	2.6	2.6	76.9
	5.02	1	2.6	2.6	79.5
	5.04	2	5.1	5.1	84.6
	5.12	1	2.6	2.6	87.2
	5.17	1	2.6	2.6	89.7
	5.35	1	2.6	2.6	92.3
	5.37	2	5.1	5.1	97.4
	5.51	1	2.6	2.6	100.0
	Total	39	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX I

Case Processing Summaries for Interest Group Rating and Worldview Score

Case Processing Summary for ACLU Rating and Worldview Score

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
ACLU H/L * WV High/Low using NOT adj wvs	38	97.4%	1	2.6%	39	100.0%

Case Processing Summary for NFIB Rating and Worldview Score

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
NFIB H/L * WV High/Low using NOT adj wvs	38	97.4%	1	2.6%	39	100.0%

Case Processing Summary for OLCV Rating and Worldview Score

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
OLCV H/L * WV High/Low using NOT adj wvs	38	97.4%	1	2.6%	39	100.0%

Case Processing Summary for SFC Rating and Worldview Score

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SFC H/L * WV High/Low using NOT adj wvs	38	97.4%	1	2.6%	39	100.0%