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Agenda Setting and Europe's Common Immigration Policy

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Agenda Setting and Europe's Common Immigration Policy

by

Jamie P. Surface

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Public Affairs and Policy

Dissertation Committee:
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2022

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Abstract

For over a decade the European Union has been immersed in an immigration crisis. As the desired destination for millions of people fleeing unrest in the Middle East and war in Ukraine, the EU has developed its own social, political, and humanitarian crisis. Lacking policy commonality across its member states on how to accept and manage the mass waves of migrants, the EU continues to struggle with implementing a common immigration policy. This research examines EU immigration issues, policies, and the failures of successful collaboration stymying the implementation of a standard immigration policy. Using the agenda setting model of John Kingdon, the EU's immigration policy problem is evaluated. In conjunction with personal interviews of EU officials, public opinion, and Senturion agent-based modeling, the future and possibility of the EU developing an immigration policy are determined.

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Introduction

Migrants and asylum seekers present a growing population in Europe; however, immigration and asylum policy consensus waver across the European Union (EU). The institutional governance framework of the EU fails to incorporate a common policy to manage the economic, political, and social implications surrounding immigration. This dissertation uses an agenda setting model to analyze and discern why the EU does not have a standard immigration policy. In pursuit of answering this research question, the relational nature between supranational and intergovernmental institutions in the decision-making process and the nature of the EU will be addressed. This dissertation addresses the following questions: (1) to what extent do opinions of political elites and citizens determine the EU's common immigration policy? (2) How do EU institutions affect policy formulation between elites and the public?

To this end, John W. Kingdon's¹ prevailing work in describing policy complexities with his comparative theory of agenda setting and multiple-streams framework is used. Using a mixed methods approach, this dissertation will illustrate the failure of EU consensus for a common immigration policy. In addition, it will contribute to policy literature by demonstrating the successful application of the agenda setting framework for resolving immigration policy. The EU naturally incorporates multilevel governance into its comprehensive governing structure. With the various levels of

¹ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (1984). Kingdon subsequently published a second edition in 1995. The format remains consistent with the original work but includes Kingdon's reflection on public policy events since the first publication inclusive of chapter 10. An updated second edition, 2013, includes an epilogue on healthcare. For reader accessibility and convenience, I will be referencing Kingdon 1995.

authority functioning within countries, between neighbors, and across the region, confluence is necessary for integration. Agenda setting provides substantial explanatory power for addressing the complexities of immigration policy in multilevel governance. Addressing levels of government simultaneously rather than independently identifies incongruence on the supranational level. Agenda setting's approach and integration of multilevel governance naturally complement EU governing intricacies. Using Kingdon's approach, stakeholders are identified and evaluated to reveal the overarching integration of multiple actors needed to understand and evaluate policy.

Agenda setting fits into the evolving policy challenges the EU faces. Approaching the policy problem from an incorporative perspective provides depth to investigating the pitfalls of EU immigration policy. This relatively unincorporated methodology in EU politics provides an integrative examination of institutions and the relationship between policy, public opinion, and elite opinion. Within the scope of this research, elites are defined as the policymakers within the EU. As immigration policy is discussed, the gap between institutions, elites, and public opinion will be spanned using Kingdon's methodological analysis. This research will pave the way for a collective response to EU challenges and provide a reasonable methodological path for discerning implications for the future of the EU.

As an organization that successfully eliminated passport travel, created a common market across member states, and presented a valid and robust common European currency to the global market, the lack of a common immigration policy is uncharacteristic based on the historical nature of EU cohesiveness. Immigration flows, beginning with the 2015 exodus, exploited the vulnerabilities and existing capacities of

the EU's borders and immigration policy. Countries exposed their lack of preparation and resources to process and receive tens of thousands of new individuals arriving on EU shores. Implementation of emergency policies or directives elevated migrant concerns to catastrophic levels. Rather than working with existing systems and procedures, countries sought to halt entrance to the EU. Security measures at borders increased, commencing the conflict between supranational and intergovernmental actors. The influx intensified the country positions on immigration, accelerating the deterioration of security commonality. A growing inability to effectively welcome over a million vulnerable individuals in a short period saturated the EU's struggling immigration system and continued unabated in subsequent years. No agreeable solution appeared on the agenda threatening the movement of people, acceptance of immigrants, and policy formation.

Currently, EU immigration policy remains a volatile and contentious topic. Before the migration influx and swells of MENA refugees fleeing aggrieved war areas, EU border and immigration policies were functional but minimalist. Tracking and managing illegal and undocumented entries was manageable. Border agencies were relatively established, countries handled individual intakes of immigrants under their guidelines, and the EU continued to function without an overarching immigration policy. Once borders quickly exceeded functional capacity, the EU recognized its shortfall in resources and efficiency. The lack of an immigration policy directing border standards instigated reactive rather than proactive country responses.

Immigration has deepened policy prescriptions and complex decision-making aspects permeating into economic, social justice, healthcare, housing, asylum, security, and labor policy. The importance of this research model is threefold. First, addressing

immigration policy and the lack of agenda movement magnifies the complexity of supranational versus intergovernmental decision-making. Collaboration across 27 member states presents an increasingly difficult feat and shifting internal policies affect the overall success of EU governance and cohesion.

Second, the EU faces policy challenges extending beyond immigration.

Discussion on immigration affects borders, security, asylum, social policy, enlargement, and Schengen. Without general guidance or consensus on immigration, future strategies and policies become ambiguous affecting integration. In turn, country policies and interactions actuate the escalation of intergovernmental powers. Countries fail to receive EU policy direction, subsequently taking independent action to address EU policy gaps, creating conflict between supranational management and governance.

Third, should immigration policy concerns and country cooperation be achieved, such a unifying motivation paves the way for a collective EU response to growing EU challenges—a unification currently lost. Implications for future EU solidarity are warped as immigration policy remains a political enigma.

Lack of consensus over immigration policy threatens the Schengen Agreement, EU neighborhood policy, and European security and defense policy. Actuated during the contention and deterioration that transpired through the immigration crisis, cohesiveness and political union remain in disrepair. The importance of identifying how immigration policy can become a workable agenda item would be instrumental for mending tarnished supranational relations and reinforcing the framework of the EU.

Immigration policy in the EU presents a unique opportunity for evaluating governance and public opinion about the policymaking process. Engaging in research

involving policy prescriptions establishes a reliable framework for policymaking. This topic, through the lens of the agenda setting model, presents an essential dynamic in policy that transcends nascent evaluations. Incorporating input from stakeholders and the public in conjunction with elite interviews promotes replicable and valuable data associated with the policy process. Although results and opinions change over time, the policy process remains consistent.

Analysis of policy officials' views on immigration remains relatively understudied. The analysis of this research centralizes on combining elite opinions with public opinion further examining policy implications stressing EU relations and cohesiveness. The research engages in the policy debacle to explore the purpose of these policy implications and the theoretical understanding of decision-making in complex intergovernmental and supranational negotiations. Chapter One reviews EU immigration problems and the policies created to manage immigration. Chapter Two examines the literature on policy decision-making. Chapter Three discusses agenda setting and the application of Kingdon's model. Chapter Four presents the data and methodology employed and examines the results, while Chapter Five concludes the research with policy recommendations.

Chapter One: Historical Background to Immigration Problems of the EU

Originally established as a community to maintain peace and security in a war-depleted region, Europe has seen unprecedented growth and rebuilding. After World War II, European countries were in an economic debacle with the production of coal and steel resources. To prevent market failure, regulate resources, and prevent further war, six countries sought to establish an organization to safeguard these purposes: Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, France, and West Germany. With the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, the six countries created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Yeşilada & Wood, 2010). Further recognizing the benefits instigated by the ECSC, Europe was advancing to successfully establish a common market and economic benefit achievable through common political and economic purposes. This original pact launched Europe's legacy of enlargement and integration. In 1957, following the Treaty of Rome, the countries formed the European Economic Community (EEC) transitioning into a more formal economic unit setting forth goals of free trade and common policy (Caporaso, 2000). From the original six countries into a hefty 27², the EU's desire for continued integration and expansion deepens economic, social, political, and policy issues on a regional level.

Over the span of decades, enlargement became a policy staple and sign of cohesion. Enlargement occurred in waves bringing diversity to the Union and a deepening of integration necessary to function on a global scale. During those same enlargement periods the EU also demonstrated enlargement's ability to deepen regional

² The EU heretofore maximized at the time of interviews at 28. Between interviews, write-ups, and defense, the United Kingdom is no longer a member of the EU, making its official membership 27 countries.

integration. Movement toward a customs union and common market elevated EU status among global competitors (Dent, 1997). With this integration, however, internal policy emerged as a more ominous issue. Initially policy on immigration and migration helped advance internal EU dynamics. The challenges of immigration and governance with continued enlargement grew as countries sought to “reassert control over forms of migration” (Geddes, 2001, p. 29). Developments in country authority, sovereignty, and policy instilled voids in EU supranationalism leading to suboptimal immigration policy development and “obstructed progress toward migration policies” (Stetter, 2000, p. 92). Consequently, governance creates challenges in addressing policy prioritization. Dumont (2009) questions whether the EU’s choices of immigration policy are part of a larger strategy of constraint. EU efforts to govern and address individual country concerns directly impact immigration policy and decision-making.

From the creation of the EEC to the solidification of the EU, the core issue is that immigration policy has never been comprehensively addressed. Bits and pieces of policy attempt to define immigration, but they occur in the moment of need. The EU has been approaching immigration policy in crisis mode creating political band-aids on an as-needed basis. Policymaking, decision-making, treaties, and politics continue to fail due to a lack of diligence and commitment defining and implementing a common immigration policy.

Challenges of Policymaking


What began as a pursuit of peace and close cooperation became a success story in economic integration. Deepening of regional integration instigated the creation of border-

free travel, the tariff-free customs union, advancement toward a common market, and finally achieving a monetary system. Enlargement and cooperation impacted stages of these developments creating a stronger Union body. Member states were inclined to deepen and broaden integration economically to establish and implement common policies. In many respects, the failure to establish a political community shifted focus to the politics of economic integration (Bözel, 2005). Establishing the Common Market, customs union, Eurozone, and economic and monetary union (EMU), the EU propelled itself into the new territory of bringing commonality, citizenship, and fundamental rights to its member states as borders became “invisible”.

Immigration and migration policy fall into two conflicting areas: open border policy controlled at the EU level and restricted border policy controlled at the state level. Challenges with enlargement, integration, country compliance, and Schengen outline challenges the EU faces in reaching policy consensus. Caldwell (2009) consolidates arguments for open border policy and the effectiveness of managing immigrants as a political means to an end stating that Europe has neither the political means nor the will to combat swells of migrants. Continued immigration flows and the lack of EU level institutional policy increase the social, financial, and economic burden of member states.

Upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region triggered massive waves of migration north and west due to individuals seeking asylum and a more stable way of life. These influxes left peripheral and more desirable European countries with high numbers of migrants, little resources, and failed support systems (Trauner, 2016). Figure 1 and Table 1 show the magnitude of the number of migrants and asylum seekers reflecting the specific challenges of individual countries in the EU.

Figure 1: Number of Migrants Entering EU Countries



Source: Eurostat (<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00176/default/table?lang=en>)

Table 1: Asylum Applications by Country

Country	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Belgium	44,660	18,280	18,340	22,530	27,460	131,270
Bulgaria	20,390	19,420	3,695	2,535	2,150	48,190
Czechia	1,515	1,475	1,445	1,690	1,915	8,040
Denmark	20,935	6,180	3,220	3,570	2,695	36,600
Germany	476,510	745,155	222,560	184,180	165,615	1,794,020
Estonia	230	175	190	95	105	795
Ireland	3,275	2,245	2,930	3,670	4,780	16,900
Greece	13,205	51,110	58,650	66,965	77,275	267,205
Spain	14,780	15,755	36,605	54,050	117,795	238,985
France	76,165	84,270	99,330	137,665	151,070	548,500
Croatia	210	2,225	975	800	1,400	5,610
Italy	83,540	122,960	128,850	59,950	43,770	439,070
Cyprus	2,265	2,940	4,600	7,765	13,650	31,220
Latvia	330	350	355	185	195	1,415
Lithuania	315	430	545	405	645	2,340
Luxembourg	2,505	2,160	2,430	2,335	2,270	11,700
Hungary	177,135	29,430	3,390	670	500	211,125
Malta	1,845	1,930	1,840	2,130	4,090	11,835
Netherlands	44,970	20,945	18,210	24,025	25,195	133,345
Austria	88,160	42,255	24,715	13,710	12,860	181,700
Poland	12,190	12,305	5,045	4,110	4,070	37,720
Portugal	895	1,460	1,750	1,285	1,820	7,210
Romania	1,260	1,880	4,815	2,135	2,590	12,680
Slovenia	275	1,310	1,475	2,875	3,820	9,755
Slovakia	330	145	160	175	230	1,040
Finland	32,345	5,605	4,990	4,500	4,520	51,960
Sweden	162,450	28,790	26,325	21,560	26,255	265,380
Total	1,282,685	1,221,185	677,435	625,565	698,740	4,505,610

Source: Eurostat (https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en)

With immigration policy currently state specific, each country has particular demands or needs resulting in decentralization and a desire to increase state policy rights to limit migrants and asylum seeker access (Immigration, 2015).

Countries experiencing uncontrolled influxes of migration face daunting political and economic challenges. Resources and institutional capacities of member states become overwhelmed leaving migrants overflowing into cities unable to place the sheer number of people. Consequently, a country incapable of accommodating migrants becomes a less desirable location sending migrants fleeing to locations with better conditions and acceptance. Member states that do not have the resources or experience to process and handle high levels of migrants facilitate travel and relocation elsewhere by closing borders and implementing deterrence policies. Such struggles guide the quarrel over a common immigration policy and the future of border protections.

The Schengen Agreement

The Schengen Agreement was monumental when signed in 1985 to abolish internal border controls. Since Schengen's implementation of EU law in 1999, and the 2004 directive allowing extra-communitarians (non-EU citizens) to move freely across EU borders, Schengen has become one of the four basic freedoms of the EU. Schengen removed barriers to many aspects of movement demonstrating one of the most successful acts of internal integration. The area of passportless travel afforded by Schengen created one of the largest country to country border control free zones in the world. Over time, more countries became qualified to participate in the Schengen travel zone. The

Schengen Agreement represents a unified Europe-wide common policy of member states in a time when cohesion and unity are off keel. Upon entering the Schengen area, in theory, an individual can move between participating Schengen countries without passing through a passport check. There are, however, instances when patrols board trains or countries choose to implement temporary border restrictions.

EU policies have been evolving since expansion in the 1970s to reflect the fundamental rights of foreigners and citizens. Policy measures across time continue to portray deliberate distinctions between EU-citizens and foreigners fracturing unity and implementing perceptions of “outsiders” and “others” (d’Appollonia, 2008, p. 205). Such actions of policy occur on the nation state level incurring various levels of inclusion, discrimination, and perceptions of immigrants. It can be ascertained that open and free borders are not free; rather, borders reflect sovereign strategies of political inclusion and exclusion between citizens and the rest of humanity (Johnson et al, 2011). The EU claims it has an established policy to help member states build sound and consistent external borders with an Internal Security Fund to provide for member states (European Commission, 2015). This policy falls short of maintaining its key objective of achieving a uniform and high level of control of the external borders.

External border security has been taken over by member states led by Hungary’s actions of constructing a fence the length of their Serbian border and various forms of movement efforts to halt passage west for migrants (Kallius, Monterescu, & Rajaram, 2015). Inundated by immigrants, Hungary resorted to building the fence to halt overwhelming numbers of immigrants from entering its country. Borders have intermittently closed or threatened closure to deter immigrants from key regional access

points for European entry. Schengen's original intent and political success now bring controversy to member state border control demands. Such closures and threatening measures for closure rise and fall with political climate fluctuation. Opinions from member states and citizens clash while trying to reach a consensus on the acceptance of immigrants.

The formation of the EMU transpired after Schengen and presented renewed potential for economic convergence and growth, however, economies diverged and treaty-based leadership lacked lucidness and accountability (Dinan, Nugent, & Paterson, 2017). Focusing integration on establishing economic and social cohesion, European enlargement subsequently led to regional inequality. The processes meant to promote prosperity and opportunities are no longer sufficient for growth (Iammarino, Rodriguez-Pose, & Storper, 2018). Integration slowed while enlargement expanded adopting further economic and social issues. Continued enlargement without sufficient integration has shifted overall responsibility to more stable and economically viable countries instigating country level policies. The integration struggles across various member states spilled over into key areas of social, political, and economic capacities. Several countries still struggle to qualify for the euro over a decade after membership while others face long-standing exclusion from Schengen due to corruption or failing internal policies. As the EU expanded both in membership and its policies, contentions and uncertainties escalated among member states creating larger cleavages in an ever-closer Union (Tawat, 2016). Deepening integration pushed enlargement but common policy and cooperation evolved into a foreboding and avoided agenda issue.

With enlargement, immigration and borders became fuzzier. The EU continued to advance with temperate integration leaving necessary policy changes undeveloped. Beyond the successes of economic prowess and internal communal development, undefined policies silently loomed at the threshold of political disaster. Europe has the opportunity to become a frontrunner in effective management of migrants and asylum seekers; however, EU policymaking fails to be cohesive.

Schengen and Free Movement Policy

Migration is termed that the “movement of people is the movement of potential” (Tammen, et al, 2000, p. 128), but such movement challenges EU policies. Regardless of country size or Schengen’s ability to afford smooth passage for travelers, policies and changes continue to emerge from the country level, not the EU. Since Schengen addressed borderless travel throughout many areas of the EU, this has been the greatest and most widely accepted policy across the EU with only the United Kingdom holding out participation. Enlargement was tempered for nearly 40 years but EU membership growth brought access to country goods, services, people, resources, and education. Often referred to as the EU-15, these countries were all post-WWII countries from Germany west. Even though a country is part of the EU, membership does not denote immediate Schengen rights. New countries are granted the opportunity to participate in Schengen only upon reaching and maintaining specific government, social, and safety requirements.

The year 2015 provoked the greatest threat to Schengen and movement through Europe. After the terrorist attacks at Charlie Hedbo in Paris in January 2015, EU-level initiatives for tightening and enhancing overall security were a major push for the EU

agenda, but these practices and initiatives challenged the freedom of movement around Europe (Bigo, et al, 2015). Actions against Schengen continue to transpire on a country-by-country basis. Whether by increased border security in Hungary or curfews and sporadic border checks in France, the original seamless movement between EU countries demonstrated backward momentum to the EU's future. The deepening of Schengen originally instilled by country cohesion now splits at the seams tearing the fabric of EU integration and aspiration for a common immigration policy.

Outside European borders, the view of immigrants grows dim. Already facing challenges internally with Schengen, the stress of accepting non-European migrants negatively affects perceptions of immigrants. Tensions regarding internal and external security have been a pressing issue with enlargement and integration since initial expansion to Central and Eastern Europe (Grabbe, 2000). With regional disparity still existing today, there are currently not enough benefits from EU policies to adequately cover the unraveling costs of incorporating immigrants.

The success of Schengen addressed immigration and migration through the region but did not define the scope of external migration on how member states are supposed to respond to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Subsequent policies, such as the Single European Act (1986) assured internal movement of people, services, goods, and capital. Lack of direction on external immigration remained. Low-level numbers of refugees and asylum seekers did not illicit heightened response until Europe experienced an inundation of migrants. Schengen created a smooth country transition for rail systems, passenger travel, trade, and country to country transfer, but simply did not have the policy capacity to prevent a Union-wide political crisis.

Enlargement and Immigration Policy

In 2004, the EU experienced its most historic and publicly contested enlargement. This involved incorporation of former Eastern Bloc and post-Soviet countries and a reunification—albeit contentious one—of Europe as a whole. Overnight the EU expanded from 15 to 25 countries. For the first time in decades, public concerns stirred with the prospect of welcoming new countries into the EU and Eastern states saturating the labor market. Increasing EU membership by one-third, the new countries only brought a 5 percent increase to the EU's overall GDP broadening immigration concerns (Yeşilada & Wood, 2010, p. 76). Public opinion was wary of the inclusion of Europe's eastern neighbors. For member state elites, they did not focus their attention on the migration issue, rather they focused on arguments and dialogues involving policy coordination processes (Dimitrova & Kortenska, 2017). Moving forward, enlargements occurred with less scrutiny from the public, but attitudes of the public created a growing political concern for member state governments. "Citizen attitudes and discourses [have become] increasingly problematic for governments negotiating in the shadow of future accession treaty ratification" (Dimitrova & Kortenska, 2017, p. 262). With growing concern of immigration and lacking integration, horizontal spreading ignited concerned public voice. Immigration concerns emerged as a potential challenge and political concern.

Comprehensive cooperation and collaboration of countries propelled economic gains and successful enlargements. Individual economies strengthened the EU as a political and global entity. In present day, integration appears to be waning in comparison

to earlier decades of achievement. Since 2004, only three countries advanced into EU membership with the last country joining in 2013, and one country left. With a lack of collaboration among countries and EU governance, superficial integration will be prominent as enlargement becomes increasingly politicized among member states (Dimitrova & Kortenska, 2017). Considering immigration and immigration policy, the addition of countries without rectifying immigration policy concerns creates uncertainty among nations.

Countries may remain more intergovernmental but the process of enlargement is a demonstration of supranational policymaking. Overall, citizens favor deepened integration and oppose enlargement (Hobolt, 2015). It is important to note that, immigration and migration play a key role in the process of expanding EU membership and the future of EU integration. Enlargement and associated governance magnified country concerns and consequences associated with immigration policy.

Under the development of Schengen, economic prowess and movement between countries became a reality. Key aspects for movement of goods, people, and services once necessary for expansion were now common practice across all markets and countries. Policy has morphed where all countries, regardless of level of integration, are now recognizing commonalities in education, transportation, and movement. Countries across Europe modify their economic policies to remain consistent with their neighbors. Eurozone countries create policies leading non-Eurozone countries to align their fiscal policies with the Eurozone to be closer. Communally, the expanse of Europe as a whole uses these economic policies as a guideline. Economically, the EU establishes a strong foundation of economic integration to promote cohesion across member states and non-

EU countries. Countries in the Eurozone favor integration as overarching economic policies across the EU attempt to bring cohesiveness and integration (Hobolt, 2015). Regardless of the successes, cleavages have developed in other areas of policy undermining the success of current integration and affecting temperament for enlargement. For years, immigration rarely made an appearance on the agenda. Policies, agreements, and treaties addressing immigration became more frequently discussed at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Brexit

The largest contention in the battle between supranationalism and state authority occurred on June 23, 2016. In a monumental move that shook the core of the European Union, the United Kingdom successfully voted to leave the EU. Termed “Brexit”, leaving the EU has been a process and motion speculated for years finally coming to fruition. After 47 years of EU membership, on January 31, 2020, the UK officially left the EU. Already possessing unique circumstances in policy during its time in the EU, the greatest permission of exclusions were non-participation in the common market, maintaining their national currency, and immigration policy. Even after the implementation of the euro, the UK was allowed to continue the British Pound. Further, the UK has intermittently been afforded opt-outs for policies specific to immigration. While borders dropped with Schengen across member states, the UK was permitted an exclusion.

Without proper authority and direction, the EU failed to prevent the formulation of state policies contradictory to EU practices. Specifically, when the EU initially embraced open borders with the creation of Schengen, the United Kingdom set a

precedent of dismissing EU policy by opting out of the agreement and not allowing open border access. Limiting UK immigration by not permitting fluid borders allowed the country control of external security and immigration beyond EU policies and regulations. Continuing to maintain control of its borders after the inclusion of Schengen, the UK appeared to keep EU governing policies at arm's length. Less than a decade later when discussing asylum, Britain maintained the option to opt-out of the Dublin II regulation. Now, the UK is given renewed governmental power to enforce border controls, handle immigration, and reject any asylum seeker acceptance quotas mandated by the EU. UK's exit raises questions about integration and stability of the EU. A direct act against supranationalism and overarching governance, the people of Britain voted to leave the EU community and manage all aspects of policy without a higher governing body.

For the UK, their removal from facets of the EU has dominated state policy options via opt-outs from EU policies, not joining the Eurozone, and maintaining circulation of their country's currency. The UK removed their country from key EU policies, including those on immigration, for decades. On the supranational level, the EU allowed disunity in policy to exist. In a push to deride EU mandates or control of future country policies, Brexit demonstrates a show of "taking back its country" and shaking up the future of supranationalism in the EU (Michaels, 2016). Through three prime ministers seeking to lead Britain's cause for exit, struggles to abscond were finally achieved. For EU-UK relations, immigration policy became the final straw to determine a successful Brexit vote. Ramifications of Britain's exit are still uncertain as countries face growing

discontent with EU supranationalism and the future of Britain's involvement with EU relations.

Ukraine Crisis

February 2022 brought new conflict to Europe. With Russia's hostile invasion of Ukraine, millions of civilians began fleeing. A large portion of these individuals fled to EU neighboring countries as refugees. In a turn of migration exodus events, EU countries openly accepted Ukrainian refugees. The actions by countries like Poland, Romania, and Hungary of accepting these European refugees diverge from their willingness to tightly hold fast fences and exclusions for non-European refugees. With the war in Ukraine, humanitarian efforts have increased EU-wide but policies overall remain unchanged. Identity requirements, length of stay, benefits, and hospitality toward war-fleeing European refugees are quite the contrast to the welcome war-fleeing Arabian refugees have encountered in the same EU countries.

Acceptance and treatment of neighboring refugees raise a concerning double standard for non-European refugees. Aggressions by Russia and aggressions in the Middle East share little difference other than geographic location. This raises trepidation over the possibility of achieving a common policy when differential treatment currently exists. For instance, while Poland is rejecting quotas of MENA refugees and has less than 50,000 MENA refugees in the country since 2015, over 3 million Ukrainian refugees and asylum seekers have sought refuge in Poland in three months (UNHCR, 2022). Proceeding policies addressing immigration issues are applied to the exodus from MENA and overall are inconsistent or invalid for current treatment and acceptance of Ukrainian

refugees. As the EU manages through another migrant exodus, a two-track policy may emerge to address the difference in country acceptance and tolerance of geographic migrants.

Immigration Treaties and Policies

Treaties are fundamental to EU enlargement, function, and advancement. In the quest to manage immigration policies, EU instruction has gradually been established through iterative processes. Treaties create binding resolutions to reform policies, enhance member state cooperation, and centralize EU governance. Countries unanimously resolve the specifics of a treaty in anticipation of monumental Union changes. As the EU is based on rule of law, treaties are a necessary step for modifying Union function for efficiency amidst change to establish new policies for member states. Treaties are critical for building the European Union as the entity it is today and for establishing integral institutions and organizational structures. Since 2009, however, the EU has not had a defining treaty or major modification.

Stemming from rising individual country sentiment, policy decisions fail to streamline with EU policy. Countries choose to embrace homeland issues to protect their citizens. Headlines of terrorism, controversial immigration laws, financial and economic fallout, country discontentment, and political dynamics move the EU to the forefront of public policy scrutiny. Bodies of migrants washing ashore on Mediterranean coastlines, shipwrecks *en route* to Europe, and the influx of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants escalate the severity of the immigration situation. Facing oscillating backlash since 2015, the EU still fails to implement a standard immigration policy acceptable across all

member states. Since adopting the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has attempted to bring commonality and unity through proposals, suggestions, and recommendations, but these quasi-legal structures fail to implement a law, policy, regulation, or mandate. Voluntary implementation of proposals and white papers leave cooperation for communal immigration policy to the discretion of the member states. Such actions go against EU characteristics of cohesion and governance.

Treaties to Manage Immigration

The EU established key agreements and treaties to create the EU body and how it functions today. Founding treaties were enacted in the 1950s, but it was not until the 1990s that the Treaty on European Union was signed. The Maastricht Treaty (1992)³ represents a fundamental document integral to establishing the European Union and outlining the foundation of the EU.

Since Maastricht, the EU experienced three enlargements with the largest occurring in 2004. During this period of cohesion and EU growth, functions were enhanced under the Amsterdam Treaty (1997)⁴. Centralization of governance occurred as powers given to the EU were strengthened. Amsterdam also reformed institutions in preparation for enlargement. Treaties through the 1990s and early 2000s focused on promoting cohesion and deepening integration between and among member states and did little to enhance immigration policies. With the largest enlargement on the horizon, in

³ The Maastricht Treaty was enacted in 1993. Recommended reviewing of the Maastricht Treaty in its entirety can be viewed at https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf

⁴ The Treaty of Amsterdam was enacted in 1999. Recommended review of the treaty in its entirety can be viewed at https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_of_amsterdam_en.pdf

2001 the Treaty of Nice (2001)⁵ was signed to update institutional roles and structures to withstand welcoming 10 new countries into the governing structure. Parliament experienced increases in its legislative and supervisory powers in the EU. Reaching 25 member states, Nice ensured the EU continued to function appropriately with such an increase.

After the mega enlargement and shifting into a new decade, the EU signed its last major treaty in 2007. Under the Treaty of Lisbon⁶, major modifications occurred for the EU both immediately and in the future. Lisbon transpired to make the EU more democratic yet cohesive as a single voice. Policymaking post-Lisbon desired to have a more comprehensive approach that interacted between supranational and intergovernmental institutions while maintaining national security priorities of member states.

Relating to immigration, the Treaty of Lisbon made inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding. Further integral to Lisbon's involvement in immigration, The Treaty of Lisbon, "normalized immigration policy as a core EU issue, introducing qualified majority voting in this domain and strengthening the role of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice" (Scholten & Penninx, 2016, p. 95). Lisbon emerged from the need for institutional change on the heels of a failed Constitutional Treaty and more successful enlargements (Sela & Shabani, 2008).

⁵ The Treaty of Nice was enacted in 2003. Recommended review of the treaty in its entirety can be viewed at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12001C/TXT&from=EN>

⁶ The Treaty of Lisbon was enacted in 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon represents and includes the entirety of the two-part amendment to the Treaty on Europe and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Recommended review of the article at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT>

Although Lisbon was meant to give the EU a more supranational role, Lisbon strengthened the role of member states by including national parliaments directly in the decision-making process at the EU level and it clearly outlined a process for leaving the EU. In addition, there are many options by which member states are allowed to maintain their national rules and practices. Lisbon set forth immigration legislation that did not supplant member state sovereignty. Over time, Lisbon exposed multi-level migration governance that included aspects of supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, and sub-national authority structures (Hampshire, 2016). Growth in divergence of national interests further undermined Lisbon's purpose in addition to resurgent tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Lisbon accepted fundamental rights, but member states adopted diverging practices of implementation.

EU treaties advanced centralization but increased certain movement liberties for member states as each state still maintained policies reflecting state security and immigration concerns. Through the 1980s and 1990s, immigration was considered to be a national matter and the EU only had an indirect impact on immigration policies (van Munster, 2009). Immigration continued to remain a peripheral issue of free movement until immigration was framed as a high-ranking security issue (van Munster, 2009). The efforts of the EU to create and effectively implement consolidated immigration policies continue to fail or are rejected by states.

Immigration falls under the umbrella of the EU's foreign and security policy but an indistinct policy area is maintained at both the EU and national levels. Immigration remains in a state of division as a result of competences belonging to member states (Katcherian, 2012). The treaties committed statements on human rights and made social

stances, however, they fell short of specifically creating an actual immigration policy. Treaties define EU structure refining and outlining powers, policy, and process. Not a single EU treaty has been signed since Lisbon in 2007.

Politics Addressing Immigration Issues

The EU has positioned itself over the years as an entity in constant reformation of its immigration policies. Pre-Lisbon, immigration had spillover into all three pillars extending its problems into numerous aspects of governance. Post-Lisbon and with the elimination of the pillars, immigration still refrained from having an effective and actionable position on the policy agenda. Treaties initiated EU collaborative change, but since Lisbon, official governance virtually halted. Carrera and Guild (2008) explore the efforts of the EU Commission to address immigration policy employing an issued policy brief. The Commission created a European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in 2008⁷ with a revision in 2014 providing guidelines and principles for the future of EU immigration and border security. The non-binding nature of the pact, however, demonstrated lacking centralized power of the Commission. Rather than redefine migration policy as a whole entity, providing the immigration principles as guidelines rather than a policy permits member states leniency. By not enforcing, the EU strengthened state rights by not requiring broad implementation of asylum quotas, border security procedures, and migration entry cooperation. Should the brief have expressed enforceable policy, the EU would have defined an important message of governance to states concerned about sovereignty and centralization of immigration. Governing

⁷ The document can be read in entirety via EU Commission publication at <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2013440%202008%20INIT/EN/pdf>

incompatible or stubborn countries toward a common policy continues to plague policy advancement and collaboration. While many countries try to comply with asylum and migration requests—such as family reunification—several countries blatantly ignore the pact’s parameters. On a global scale, the UN produced a Global Compact for Migration in 2018 where several EU countries declined to sign or abstained from voting, referring the decision to their respective country parliaments to determine participation. This pact, too, however, is non-binding or enforceable as several countries have since pulled out of the UN pact.

Over time, the EU has tried, succeeded, and failed in immigration and border security administration. From the supranational level, early policies on immigration and migration were foundational for early movement, transport, and transit. Without these policies from the supranational level, passportless travel within many EU member states would not be present. Although free movement exists in many facets of the EU, border openness is not without its problems. Because countries are still allowed to monitor their borders, particularly in times of crisis, the EU cannot demand countries open their closed borders. The past several years, countries have invoked their right to close or monitor their borders. Some closures have been immigration related (Pap & Remenyi, 2017) while others were security related (Brouwer, van der Woude, & van der Leun, 2018). The evolving issue with member state discretion of border control occurs when countries implement border policies beyond the scope of temporary security measures. EU governance provides open movement of goods, services, and people so individual country policies on internal borders create disputations with EU structures. These

struggles are particularly prominent since the 2015 migration crisis with several countries placing restrictions on their borders and access to their country.

Over decades, the EU has created, shaped, changed, and implemented policies, treaties, institutions, and recommendations (see Table 2). These movements have varied in terms of their impact on immigration.

Table 2: EU Related Immigration Political Developments

Migration Related Political Developments	Year Created	EU Immigration Impact
Schengen	1985	Policy- Borders
Dublin Convention	1990	Policy- Asylum
Treaty of Maastricht	1992	Treaty- Borders
Dublin II Regulation	2003	Policy- Asylum
Frontex	2005	Institution- Borders
European Migration Network	2008	Organization- Migration and Asylum
Lisbon Treaty	2007	Treaty- Immigration
European Asylum Support Office	2011	Institution- Asylum
Dublin III Regulation	2013	Policy- Asylum
European Migration Agenda	2015	Agenda Item- Migration
Asylum Quotas	2015	Proposal- Asylum
EU-Turkey Statement	2016	Agreement- Immigration and Asylum

Since Schengen, the EU has implemented actions, pushed for asylum quotas, and entered accords with non-EU countries to manage the immigration inundation. Maastricht Treaty (1992) was the first formal documentation citing migration and asylum as a common policy concern. Policy wise the Dublin Regulations, EU-Turkey Statement (EU-Turkey

Joint Action Plan), European Agenda on Migration, and asylum quota implementation succeeded and failed in various capacities. Each suggestion or policy suffered some pitfall instigated by past policy issues. Key aspects of integration now common, like the Common Security and Defence Policy, assert little facilitation for common immigration policies. From an institutional and intergovernmental standpoint, immigration and migration have been addressed via the creation of Frontex, European Migration Network, and EU Common European Asylum System. These institutional directives were implemented to address the myriad of border needs as governments appear more attentive to creating a new agency rather than abdicating internal immigration policy.

Dublin Convention

Originally derived in 1990 and enacted under the treaty of Maastricht and implementation of the Schengen Agreement, Dublin created a methodology for countries to manage asylum. Harmonization between the free movement area of Schengen and asylum policy lacked. Dublin's creation placed the onus of receiving asylum seekers on the peripheral member states (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2016). Dublin intended to limit asylum documentation to the first country a seeker stepped foot in creating an intake responsibility for the outer EU countries. Dublin "assumes that each Member State will examine asylum seeker's claims and act in accordance with the relevant rules of national, European Union, and international law" (Mitchell, 2017, p. 318). By limiting asylum to the first entered country, the EU prevented asylum seekers from submitting multiple applications in various member states. Asylum seekers were further prevented from shopping for asylum in other member states and the applicant country decided to

accept or deny the application. The burden of accepting asylum seekers was heavy-laden for peripheral countries like Greece, Italy, and Hungary. Undergoing modifications the subsequent year, Dublin's new regulations led to decreased member state involvement and unequal sharing of asylum acceptance and paperwork burdens. Intentions of Dublin were meant to establish constancy with the asylum process, but the subsequent amendments of Dublin exposed its deficiencies and lack of fair distribution.

Dublin II Regulation. Following the implementation of the Dublin Convention, in 2003, Dublin II Regulation replaced the Dublin Convention. Exposing flaws in the original agreement, Dublin II was created to “establish a mechanism to swiftly determine the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application and to ensure that all asylum claims received a substantive examination” (Mitchell, 2017, p. 301). For further inclusion, Dublin II created the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC). This new system required fingerprinting of all asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Dublin II also placed Dublin under EU governance (Buonanno, 2017). Now, the EU from a supranational position could track where migrants entered the EU. The actions created under Dublin II led to a loss of inclusivity among member states. Referencing their country's constitution, Denmark opted-out of Dublin due to conflict with areas of freedom, security, and justice.

Dublin III Regulation. Dublin II succeeded in helping streamline the immigration process and asylum application. In 2013, Dublin entered into another revision. In addition to clarifying member state responsibility, it worked to identify flaws in member state asylum systems and implemented a degree of rights to asylum seekers. Dublin III prohibited the transfer of an asylum seeker to member states with “systemic flaws” in the asylum managing systems. “Dublin III declares that a systemic flaw is

found when a State's asylum procedure and its reception conditions for applicants result in a "risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4" of the CFR" (Mitchell, 2017, p. 313). Such action was monumental in addressing the maltreatment of asylum seekers and deficiencies in member state systems that could present both a crisis and human rights violation. Dublin was never meant to establish border equality among member states. Seemingly, Dublin III did not have the effect the EU envisioned for immigration and the regulation has led to further modifications and suggestions by the EU. Dublin's intentions to bring fluidity between Schengen and asylum did little to bring certainty and trust among member states and it did not bring commonality to policy.

Frontex (2005)

Official operations to manage external borders began in 2005 with the creation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, or Frontex. Based in Warsaw, Frontex is understood as a security actor functioning to reinforce existing political discourse and engage in securitization practices (Horii, 2016; Leonard, 2010). Although not a body designated to create policy, the assessments of migration, borders, and immigration produced by Frontex steer EU policy (Horii). Frontex emerged after the EU-10 enlargement and expansion of the Schengen zone. With the elimination of internal borders, external borders needed to be controlled more effectively (Perkowski, 2018). The European Migration Agenda expanded Frontex's operations and mandates including coast guard operations and committing to add 10,000 border agents by 2020. Externally, borders have more defined protection than

internal borders with the more formally established agency. Since the addition of the coast guard to Frontex, the agency has been very active in sea patrols and migration intercepts from the MENA region, however, Frontex is also contributing to saving lives at sea.

Similar to other immigration actions and motives instigated in 2015, Frontex emerged with enhanced competences. Revamped in its border protection, the organization experienced a significant boost in budget and personnel transforming into a broader border and coast guard protection agency. External border and security threats to the EU prompted changes to the organization's structure and enhanced its sea patrols. Frontex is prominent in following and disrupting migration paths to the EU's exposed borders from Finland down to Greece and functions in a contentious capacity among human rights organizations (Leonard, 2010). With their increased responsibilities and role in border security, Frontex has led to the securitization of asylum and migration in the EU.

European Migration Network (2008)

An information collection agency, the European Migration Network (EMN) provides factual and reliable data to the EU regarding migration and asylum. Providing official reports and timely information to national level governments, EMN does not act as a policymaking organization but provides essential information to assist elites. Contributions from EMN to officials presents evidence-based information for policymaking. In addition to its published works, EMN holds conferences to discuss the progress made on EU migration policies and agendas. The information network of the

agency is integrated in EU policy fields of borders, visas, immigration, and asylum.

Migration and asylum metrics are collected and presented annually to the Commission to support policymaking.

European Asylum Support Office (2011)

Exactly as its name suggests, European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is a support mechanism for member states. Established by the European Parliament and the Council, EASO presents as a prominent center for all manners of asylum. The office provides cooperation among member states regarding asylum-related matters—particularly to high-traffic countries—including onsite support, operational assistance, technical support, and even support officers in stressed intake/arrival areas. EASO has support sites in key migration reception areas throughout the EU whose policies and overall border structure are under pressure from the EU and from overloaded migration officials and intake specialists. EASO works to promote enhanced protection of asylum seekers and better coordination between member states and relocation efforts. Information collected by this office is furnished to elites to assist with informed decision-making and policy development surrounding asylum seekers, emergency support, and even non-member state support. EASO operates around the EU to better bolster member state and asylum seeker relations.

European Migration Agenda (2015)

As part of the Commission's response at the height of the migration crisis in 2015, the EC produced the European Migration Agenda (EMA) item. The agenda outlines the EC's plans for addressing migration by tripling Frontex's budget, resettling

20,000 migrants across the EU, adding 60 million euros for emergency funding, cooperating with Turkey and other third countries, migrant return, and border protection. Action by the EU could have pushed beyond the agenda, but it was a directive of guidance demonstrated by country acceptance (Juhasz, 2016). The EMA served as a “policy document and guide for action seeking a formula for voluntary burden-sharing or distribution of refugees and migrants entering the European Union” (Tinker, 2016, p. 397). The EU has fulfilled some of the agenda items, but relocation efforts and financial support still wane. Since its introduction, the agenda is still not a policy or fully implemented, but the Commission furnishes updates and reports on the implementation progress (European Commission, 2018b). As a guideline, rather than policy, this agenda defined EU efforts for strengthening border management and focusing on irregular migration.

The EMA started the first conversation about migration since the EU faced historical waves of migrants. Aside from working through the process of restructuring struggling Dublin Regulations, the Commission producing EMA is a first initiation of action on immigration and migration. The migration crisis and stress on the EU forced some form of action, however, this was not a policy and did not assert influence or direction to member state behavior. Results from this agenda since its promotion are uncertain as the correlation between the overall decline in irregular migration and this action is unknown. The EU continues to work at fulfilling the items proposed on this agenda, but structural problems within the EU remain.

Asylum Quotas (2015)

The inundation of migrants in select countries—and the failed proposal for Dublin IV—came the EC’s proposal for asylum quotas in all countries. This statement came with mixed support from member states after the proposal of the European Migration Agenda. Several asylum and migrant accepting countries considered a solidarity instrument necessary for alleviating flow. It is argued that most member states oppose cooperation in any form to avoid pressure on their own countries and government (Zaun, 2018; Juhasz, 2016). Had the EU successfully implemented quotas and created a policy, asylum quotas may have been an effective long-term solution for alleviating the migration situation, especially in peripheral countries. Asylum quotas presented countries with an opportunity to stand against the EU and supranational direction. Overall, member state governments implemented restrictive policies directed at immigration and migration. Accepting fines over providing resettlement, countries maintained their position against the EU. Five years after the push for asylum quotas, countries still are pushing back.

EU-Turkey Statement (2016)

When European migration turned into an inundation of migration, the EU worked to create a plan for addressing migration. Following the EU’s mission of the agenda, in 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed on how to manage the heightened wave of migrants into the EU. The agreement essentially established a one-in-one-out system to control the flow of immigrants (European Council, 2016). Turkey would accept one migrant from the EU upon the successful acceptance of one migrant in the EU. The agreement set to provide rapid return to Turkey with Turkey taking necessary measures to quash new and

existing illegal smuggling and migration routes via land or sea to the EU. Results are mixed on the benefits of the EU-Turkey deal. Since the period between the agreement of the statement and implementation of the statement, a 97% drop in average daily arrivals occurred (European Commission, 2018a). Smuggling and Mediterranean deaths also drastically decreased during this period. To further assist Turkey in the relocation and return of migrants the EU provided 3 billion euros. Although not without its flaws (Poon, 2016), the EU-Turkey Statement became an integral element of the EU's approach to immigration.

Overall, the EU-Turkey Statement magnifies reluctance of member states' willingness to open country borders to migrants. Success of the deal between Turkey and the EU remains mixed. International humanitarian organizations decried the agreement as a violation of international law (Poon, 2016). Greece became a holding point for migrants and asylum seekers due to the term agreements and migrants applying for asylum in Greece could not leave. Much like the migration agenda having an impact on migration, inferring a correlation between reduced migration and the EU-Turkey deal would be spurious. Other restrictions emerged during this time involving Turkey's borders. For instance, in 2016 Turkey began visa restrictions for entry from certain heavily migrating countries (like Syria), and Turkey also began construction of a 700-kilometer wall along their Syrian border (Batalla Adam, 2017). Rather than focusing on internal policies to address EU-member state migration woes, the EU worked on policies with countries involved in migration flows externally to slow migration to the EU.

Temporary Protection Directive (2022)

The above institutions, policies, papers, quotas, and agreements have not applied to the Ukrainian neighbors. Individuals fleeing Ukraine and arriving without passports or valid travel documents are not detained or turned away. Conversely, EU countries are lifting visa requirements for Ukrainian refugees, relocating, and placing them in areas for assistance, not holding cells. The Commission announced it would activate the Temporary Protection Directive to help arriving Ukrainians stay in one country for at least one year. The EU also jointly agreed to simplify border controls and allow Ukrainians visa-free travel throughout the EU for 90 days (European Commission, 2022). The limitation for temporary protection further allows for access to the EU labor market and education system. No agreements for returning Ukrainian refugees are in place and protections and assistance are proclaimed to be provided through the duration of the Russian aggression. This directive is specifically for Ukrainians, not other refugees.

Continuation of Policy Struggles

Schengen promoted transparency and fluidity for all factions of movement and trade. Developing into a comprehensive cohesion across the heart of the EU, opportunities for EU citizens blossomed. After Lisbon, treaties and agreements since Schengen developed in a more reactionary manner to stymie migration flows. Dublin's failures and subsequent regulations highlight the struggles of establishing a common policy, and Dublin was superfluous to the overall picture of immigration. The EU-Turkey Statement and protection of external borders appear to significantly impact immigration broadly but do not address the internal struggles of the member states. Dissent still exists


on the management of internal borders. Some member states remain adamant to implement internal regulations to maintain protection of their borders, including their external borders, in contradiction to EU direction (Juhasz, 2016). A large accomplishment for supranational border management was the creation of Frontex. It can be argued that Frontex's establishment was the most openly accepted development related to immigration by all member states. Member states are generally comfortable with the creation of Frontex and its increased responsibilities involving the coast guard to protect external borders.

Development, creation, and establishment of policies, treaties, organizations, and systems come with mixed results. Attempting to regulate procedures, the intersection of supranational and intergovernmental organizations remains mixed. Elites in member states agree to some aspects of the EU's effort to manage immigration, but the increased numbers of migrants and refugees strain capacities and member state tolerance. Attempts at coordinating immigration policy among member states are a more compartmentalized approach rather than a uniform policy as they target specific aspects of immigration. Such selectiveness averts discussion from an overarching comprehensive policy.

The EU experienced migration flows that peaked in 2015. Although the influx has ebbed, there has not been a return to pre-exodus levels (see Figure 2). The lack of provisions and country acceptance another mass wave of migration will bring has the potential to harden country dissension and position, particularly in countries still recovering from lack of resources. Specifically, in 2021 and early 2022, the EU is again seeing a new rise in migration accompanied by mounting country frustration. Reaching a solution and cohesive agreement among all countries is critical for avoiding another

humanitarian and policy disaster. The livelihood of countries, citizens, and migrants alike all struggle until a policy solution for the problem is achieved.

Figure 2: Graph of EU Asylum Applications



Source: EUROSTAT ([https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Annual asylum statistics#Number of asylum applicants: increase in 2021](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Annual_asylum_statistics#Number_of_asylum_applicants:_increase_in_2021))

Immigration policy's enduring lack of cohesion transpired from a series of ill-fated attempts to monitor and create entry provisions. While freedom of movement, education, goods, and services have strengthened the internal border dynamics of the EU, comprehensive immigration policy addressing external borders, internal border closures, and acceptance of immigrants and migrants entering the EU remains undeveloped. Even though immigration policy makes an appearance at least quarterly on the Parliament's agenda, the prioritization of a workable immigration policy on the agenda remains insufficient. Migration related policies demonstrate various levels of success and half-hearted attempts to place a patch on a hull breach. Escalations in discontentment led to Brexit and a rise in anti-EU and anti-immigration governing parties. Dissenting countries

became more vocal in their positions and policies creating profound arguments among member states. Achievements in border fluidity over time have become compromised while the EU seeks to expound and amend border and immigration policies.

Shortcomings in Decision-Making

In what can be described as an unconventional debacle, the EU's policy and institutional development history have demonstrated the rise and fall of country cooperation. Treaties and immigration policies have not appropriately solved the problem at hand. Decision-making remains a priority of all member states, but achieving policymaking consensus has stalled. Maintaining country contentment and satisfaction among 27 different nations proves to be a difficult task, particularly involving immigration. The development of secondary immigration, migration, and asylum resources streamlined EU efforts to maintain humanitarian endeavors amidst mounting immigration dissension and exclusion without disturbing sovereignty. The European Migration Network and Asylum Support Office were instrumental in providing needed assistance to both first-entry countries and immigrants. From enlargements and Schengen to modern day institutional development, the EU now projects a different grimmer image.

Adding 21 countries over 60 years to what began as a neophyte commune and pact between six countries, the EU seemed to outgrow its purpose in exchange for integration and establishment. EU governance over independent state governments formed a unique situation of oversight and policy formation. Many state-centered liberties were relinquished but several important entitlements remained. Sanctioning opt-outs and loopholes prohibited consensus. Little by little holes formed in the fabric of

cohesiveness. In the moment of climax, Brexit became the beacon of digression for the EU. Fundamental objectives for establishing a community of peace and security amid a war depleted region falter throughout a community politically at war over peace and security. The historical and bright evolution of the EU and its successes remain shadowed due to communal discontentment and the inability to engage in unified decision-making. Incorporating a different approach to policymaking, the EU can enter into a new era of cohesive decision-making reflective of its original unified nature.

Chapter Two: Literature Review on Immigration and EU Decision-Making

The EU presents a clear longitudinal instance of the rise, fall, and difficulties of immigration policy. Determining why the EU does not have a common immigration policy is understood by implementing the appropriate theory and model of analysis. The fundamental theory for this analysis comes through the utilization of the most complete model to answer the question posed by this research. Several theories exist and are used to explain the lacking immigration policy but these theories remain incomplete. Supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, and multi-level governance—among competing theories—have previously explained the EU’s immigration policy conundrum in addition to an array of regional integration theories. Upon evaluation, models reveal their inadequacy for successfully answering the research question. These misgivings are further analyzed and rejected using the agenda setting model. Employing a comprehensive theory of integration is fundamental for determining the profundity of EU policymaking. With further evaluation, agenda setting theory presents itself as an integrated and overarching theory to answer the research question where others are inadequate.

Analyzing immigration policy exposes the shortcomings of other decision-making models and theoretical approaches. Agenda setting, supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, sovereignty, and subsidiarity represent a few of many topics magnifying why the EU does not have a common immigration policy. Multi-level governance and state-centric priorities result in suboptimal policies. In particular, countries utilizing subsidiarity undertake individual initiatives where the EU fails to

assume responsibility or a country determines it is better informed to address the issues of their citizens.

Key to enacting workable policy collaboration, supranational and intergovernmental institutions must keep a close working relationship that often tends to conflict with one another (Dagi, 2017). States utilize national jurisdiction and subsidiarity to assume control of immigration reform creating country personalized rules and policies for managing immigration within their borders. Theories attempting to address EU immigration policy complications are unable to provide a comprehensive resolution. Immigration developed from policy spillover. No longer a standalone issue or isolated event, the effects of immigration spread beyond border security into areas of economic policy, state rights, human rights, cohesion, integration, and enlargement. Andersson (2016) uses Sweden as a case study in the convergence of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism for the EU to successfully reach a common immigration policy. Identifying the spillover of immigration into many facets of policy, Andersson introduces the concept of including multiple areas of governance for successful immigration policy formation. Unrestricted and unresolved immigration policy escalates the scope of the problem. Immigration policy permeated border and security policy and developed into an overarching impediment to EU policy, sovereignty, subsidiarity, and both supranational and intergovernmental institutions.

Within this chapter, challenges in decision-making processes are discussed. The governance design of the EU and its interaction between member states set the precedence for specific policymaking procedures. To this end, intergovernmental-supranational relations are elaborated with further application to immigration and the

overall policy process. Proceeding discussion expounds on decision-making processes with evaluation of immigration in literature. Immigration struggles to fit into one realm of governance or clear “one-size-fits-all” policy solution. The section concludes with expansion of literature⁸ on multi-level governance and the presentation of agenda setting as a clearer approach toward decision-making.


Challenges in Immigration Policymaking

EU governance consists of collaboration across member states mirroring federal and state governing structures. What differentiates the EU function of state level governance is the individual makeup of countries with unique policies, needs, languages, governing bodies, and structures. Intergovernmentalism represents this level of governance and the individual involvement of member states in the EU. Member states further participate in a higher level of governance similar to federal systems. This supranational governing structure acts as an overarching political body. Dependent on unity and cohesion, the EU creates policies enacted across all member states. These policies require certain contributions from member states and enforcement of policy also requiring countries to surrender certain rights and sovereignties. Economically and politically the EU has enacted such forms of legislation creating universal structures for all member states. Over time, the acceptance of EU mandates on the country level has varied on a case-by-case basis affecting cohesion and EU unity.

⁸ Although EU immigration is a multi-national issue spanning 27 countries and nearly as many languages, the reliance on literature was nearly exclusively English language material. With English being one of the functioning languages of publication within the EU, utilizing non-English materials does not pose a serious implication for EU studies. With the noted limitation of some French publications, scholarly publications on the EU are overwhelmingly submitted in English and were utilized for this research.

As elaborated previously, treaties and policies have altered governing structures inadvertently promoting more state rights. Supranational and intergovernmental governance both hone key characteristics for policy and governance and afford countries certain liberties while restricting others. Maintaining a degree of governing power, member states embrace subsidiarity, which grants the ability to maintain state rights. This action prevents member states from accepting policies that conflict with country governance, the longstanding conflict for immigration policy.

Figure 3: EU Governance Decision-Making Chart



Governance and decision-making across political institutions vary (see Figure 3). The EU Commission represents a politically independent arm of EU governance and the supranational body. They are the overarching governing institution of the EU where legislation is developed and proposed to both the Council of Ministers and European Parliament. The Council of Ministers is a diverse body consisting of ministers from each

member state representing specific areas of governance. Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs, for instance, are responsible for migration and border management. The Council of Ministers is a complex body due to the multiple facets of sectoral councils. Their legislative power is vast but they also engage in co-decision-making with the European Parliament across several areas of policy. European Parliament officials are directly elected by member state citizens and represent multiple parties and interests across all countries. The Council of Ministers and European Parliament share some governing responsibilities, but Parliament has policy control powers in relation to the Commission.

The flow of EU governance and immigration policy was consolidated by Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska (2018) presenting a comprehensive overview of legislative and political measures. This analysis evaluated the policies and steps taken by the EU to form an immigration policy. Expounding on the policies discussed in the previous chapter, she concludes that while immigration policy parts were developed and strengthened, EU immigration policy in its current form remains a fragmented and insufficient mess. Rising issues with immigration have challenged EU governance promoting a shift toward decentralization and growing involvement of intergovernmental power. Combating centralization and supranational governance, member states are choosing subsidiarity over corroboration and cohesion. These trends work against EU governance and lead to discussion about assertion of power and whether centralization is best for policymaking.

Supranationalism, Intergovernmentalism, and Sovereignty

Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism theory outline the dynamic political foundations of EU policy and governance. The problem is the lack of meshing the two theories together for a comprehensive and cooperative approach as the two theories decision-make independently. Immigration policy issues exist because state level governance can still act in contradiction to supranationalism. Resignations of decision-making powers at the state level leave a glaring gap in policy formation and integration.

By nature, supranational rule and national rule function on different levels with ideas that may not be reconcilable. On the normative level public sentiments remain strongly linked to the idea of state autonomy, whereas on the cognitive level, the paradigm of a functional necessity to cooperate is decisive for actual policymaking. While centralization is key to EU governance, scholars remain mixed in the argument of whether state rights or EU rights should be the focus of the EU. To maintain sovereignty, states may react rather than enact supranational governance. A study conducted by Trondal (2002) asserted that member state officials working on the EU level have greater tendencies to enact supranational policies and opinions. In such situations, allegiances of these civil servants lean away from individual state ideals transcending intergovernmentalism and shifting to the supranational level (Trondal 2002; Egeberg 1999). Centralization arguments affirm the necessity for EU integration and policy success. Dunleavy (2016) explains how the simple foundations and internal structure of the EU have led to centralization. He further asserts that the integration of many social, economic, and even environmental policies brings more supranational involvement to the

EU. Conversely, Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2015) contend that intergovernmental trends and theories are similar stating the integration of core state powers comes through increasing involvement of EU institutions.

Givens and Leudke (2004) examine the conflict between supranational and intergovernmental governance related to the attempts of the EU to create a common immigration policy. Supranationalism in general has no theoretical approach that can explain variation across EU countries and immigration policy areas. The theory may imply long-term validity, but there is too much loss of political control and involvement with multi-levels of governance. They conclude immigration policy is needed at the EU level, but due to the high salience of such a policy, intergovernmental bargaining and national resistance block such efforts. The value of supranationalism is the ability to create binding policy in any policy domain (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998). According to Sweet and Sandholtz, supranationalism provokes processes and behaviors compulsory to producing supranational policy. Supranationalism can drive the process between governmental polities (Pollack, 2003). Demonstrated by the EU's current dynamics, such efforts have left the EU at a stalemate with both supranationalism and immigration policy.

In combination with intergovernmentalism approaches, the member state is emphasized in the role of policymaking and integration. Moravcsik (1998) was essential to the development of the theory emphasizing the role of national governments in policymaking and integration. When drawing on theories of intergovernmentalism to obtain immigration policy, the policy becomes more state-centric and tailored to individual country dynamics and preferences (Geddes, 2000; Joppke, 1999; Luedtke,

2005). In the case of the EU, such actions are completely contrary to EU purpose and direction of integration. Problems with intergovernmentalism arise due to previous discussions of immigration and spillover. Theories of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism tend to consider each other as limited in having explanatory power, but they are necessary to the theory's capacity to explain EU immigration policy.

Diverse characteristics of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism provide depth to understanding the controversy between the European Union and member states in developing immigration policy. Such controversy came with failed modification of Dublin III. In 2016, the Commission produced a proposal of Dublin IV involving relocation and protection of asylum seekers (European Parliament, 2016; Maiani, 2017). The agreement of Dublin IV overall failed to endorse its objectives. Dublin isolated member states presenting less than desirable policy initiatives. More importantly, Dublin neglected to implement common rules and standards to address asylum procedures. Although important for member states to establish certain mechanisms for managing asylum processes, the overall lack of cooperation between the two governmental structures magnified the failure of centralizing a larger policy issue.

One of the more comprehensive literary works on the dynamics of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) discuss the academic interpretations and definitions of these forms of governance and the institutional foundations of EU governance. Comparing and contrasting leading scholarly work on intergovernmentalism, the work of Tsebelis and Garrett leads the reader into an explanation of intergovernmentalism shaping the EU's supranational institutional composition and vice versa. Literature on intergovernmentalism magnifies

the paradox of governance and how member states have “pursued integration...at an unprecedented rate and yet have stubbornly resisted further significant transfers of ultimate decision-making power to the supranational level along traditional lines” (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 4). This struggle is magnified by today’s struggles with immigration policy. As states move away from relinquishing key decision-making powers to the EU Council and Commission, integration continues to struggle under the current weight of social and economic issues.

Movement away from intergovernmentalism is what Burgess (1996) describes as a necessary action for growth and integration. Rather than promoting state sovereignty, Burgess acknowledges the “federal aspect” of the European Union. EU governance is necessary for certain policies to follow the supranational political direction to be successful. In 2009, the EU took action to institute qualified majority voting. Such voting in certain situations in the EU eliminates unanimity and undermines the sovereignty of objecting member states (Sieberson, 2010). Institutionalization cannot occur if reform is initiated towards a more supranational system of governance, which is what Sieberson states occurred. Outlining how the European Union originally left some intergovernmental dimensions intact to allow member states a presence politically, Burgess (1996) explains how the efforts of the EU have historically shifted. Supranationalism is necessary for the EU, but the actions of current issues with governance, like immigration, demonstrate the need for more state power or better EU collaboration. Some states seek more EU governance and control while others want less government involvement and more state sovereignty.

Subsidiarity and State Sovereignty

The principle of subsidiarity imparts status of control to the state. Immigration is state specific and each EU member elicits particular demands or needs creating enhanced challenges with decision-making. Sovereignty is a foundational problem associated with integration of the European Union. Its relevance and acceptability in the political sphere are becoming convoluted with integration (Bellamy & Castiglione, 1997). Addressing the contemporary transformation of states, Axtmann (2004) magnifies the issue of sovereignty regarding the concept of homogeneity of the EU. Recognizing that issues of homogeneity become problematic, he contends this is a foundational aspect of sovereign states in an institutional situation. Axtmann explains the pressures nation states face when involved in territorially consolidated environments, like the EU, and he contends growing theories support the unnatural state of maintaining sovereignty. Maintaining certain structures and governing abilities promotes cooperation with the larger institutional body. Declining a state their rights to sovereignty promotes contention with the supranational institution.

Alternatively, Goldman (2001) differentiates between capacity of the state and sovereignty defining sovereignty as a legal right. The idea of maintaining independent status within the EU conglomerate provides a sense of importance. The importance comes from being a viable economic and political state within the larger body. States are benefactors of the larger organization's successes, yet satisfying demands for increased supranational governance are in contradiction to public sentiments (Heidbreder, 2013). Institutionally, the contentions between intergovernmental and supranational power

initiate at the foundation of the institutions created within the EU (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001). Focusing on the institutional interactions in the EU, Tsebelis and Garrett provide insights into how member states decide to pool their sovereignty in the integration process, not convolute it like Bellamy and Castiglione (1997) suggest. Decisions to pool sovereignty bind the states in their decision to change and be influenced by EU policy as they willingly relinquish state rights. Agreement on common immigration policy across member states and the Union continues to hinder EU policy formation. States choosing not to implement policies take a stand against EU law usurping state policy rights (Goldmann, 2001). Alternatively, other scholars determine EU policy continuity and effectiveness need more cooperation stemming from the state level (Reh, 2012). Much like the work of Heidbreder, Reh addresses the need for EU compromise for legitimizing supranational governance and limiting compromise in European polity. Cooperation and compromise work through concessions of intergovernmental powers but suffer complete integration due to state policy retaining control on certain issues.

Sovereignty still carries importance for countries and perceived threats to state identity decrease willingness to adhere to EU policy (Goldmann, 2001; Hobolth & Martinsen, 2013; Reh, 2012). Using approaches to integration demonstrated by Semetko, Van Der Brug, and Valkenburg (2003), researching attitudes towards EU supranationalism explains variable influences of supranational attitudes. Using a similar approach in this research assesses qualitative variables necessary for identifying state immigration policies and social disintegration. In the quest of defining an immigration policy, immigration has been framed as a security issue (Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska 2018; van Munster 2009; Baldaccini, Guild, & Toner 2007; Fakhoury 2016). Baldaccini

et al explore the institutions, policies, and issues within EU governance turning immigration into an issue of security. Fakhoury examines EU immigration policymaking and its developments being security threat centered. In turn, countries have used the platform of security to enact state specific immigration policies.

Utilizing subsidiarity to enact policy, states can circumvent EU policies. Decentralization to more local levels of government instigates more local level involvement (Barnett, 2001; Cameron & Ndhlovu, 2001). Hrbek (2008) engages the principle of subsidiarity as an important factor in deciding the level of governance for a policy. Maintaining that separation of state level and EU level policy is necessary, Hrbek's argument favors intergovernmental policy interpretation. Accordingly, Hrbek determines the importance of state governance and its necessity for regional integration. Edwards (1996), however, identifies that states recognize common problems and attempt to solve them on the community level thus introducing the principle of subsidiarity. The enactment of subsidiarity is a right of member states but stands as a barrier to creating a common immigration policy.

Tensions increase with subsidiarity due to the centripetal nature of supranationalism. Referencing Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty, Edwards (1996, p. 543) specifically states:

The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.

The principle of subsidiarity rose to political prominence particularly for its role to quell fears of European centralization (Føllesdal, 1998; Neunreither, 1993; Sypris, 2004), allowing countries the power to establish their own immigration policies. The principle of subsidiarity may help to generate movement toward further integration in the European Union, but member states currently implore individual immigration standards not rendering the need for EU interference. Subsidiarity is the impetus for the progression of supranationalism and further immigration reforms (Edwards, 1996; Føllesdal, 1998; Hrbek, 2008). States create unrealistic policies allowing entrance for EU intercession.

Limiting state power increases uncertainty of EU intentions and with states seeking decentralization through subsidiarity, the EU faces additional challenges (Cameron & Ndhlovu, 2001). Ultimately, subsidiarity is capable of supporting or undermining the legitimacy of EU policy (Golub, 1996). Juxtaposed with EU policy, subsidiarity provides powerful justification for maintaining EU control or expanding the central government's control beyond its current capacity (Golub, 1996). Although rights and positions clash when states defend their sovereignty, sovereignty seeks to return ideas and governance supplanted by supranationalism (Bellamy, 2003). Why state policies choose to take alternative directions to EU policy is necessary to understand state immigration policies. States choosing to enact immigration policies contrary to the EU have been described as a political power struggle (Maccanico, 2021). The policy developments across the national, supranational, and intergovernmental levels work against one another. Maccanico further finds that immigration policy inherently suffers from "reluctance to accept limits to state powers" (p. 2). This expounds on the constant

conflicts within the EU's structure and identifies what is already known about sovereignty: states want to maintain political power.

Sovereignty is integral for the European Union and encourages countries to consider subsidiarity as a direction for various policies. It is a foundational integration tool of the European Union but its importance in policy is increasingly questioned (Bellamy & Castiglione, 1997). The contemporary transformation of states described by Axtmann (2004) magnifies the issue of sovereignty regarding the concept of homogeneity. Governments are provided with incentives to pool their sovereignty (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). The empirical nature of Koenig-Archibugi's analysis identifies the strength and power of supranational preferences. Further, Koenig-Archibugi provides a contrasting analysis identifying the strength and power of supranational preferences in conjunction with Burgess' (1996) argument of stepping away from intergovernmentalism. Whether member states deliberately choose subsidiarity in an act of defiance, member states are choosing to maintain greater sovereignty against centralization and EU supranationalism.

The decision-making contradictions involving sovereignty, supranationalism, and intergovernmentalism magnify the challenges the EU faces in policymaking. The European Commission seeks to implement asylum and migration policies; however, member states are not keen on opening or expanding their social policies. Although the EU has in place an appropriate mechanism for coordinating immigration, member states have not embraced the format and avoid further introduction of a common EU immigration policy (Caviedes, 2004). Issues of sovereignty and conflicts accentuate

divergence between supranational and intergovernmental powers necessary in the policymaking process.

Immigration Policy and Decision-Making

Evolving from varied governance structures the EU remains distinct.

Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism function on conflicting planes but still function as an entity. The contradictory governing structures and layers of governance propel the EU into difficult discussions and creation of policies. Over many decades, the EU efficaciously implemented Union-wide changes growing and challenging country reservations. Transformations came with contentions, but the EU persevered. Subsidiarity silently remains a country's trump should country consternations or civilian discontent transpire. In addition, subsidiarity eases uncertainty transpiring with laws. The deeply rooted histories and identities of each country in the EU influence policy and distribution of sovereignty. Countries that have struggled with sovereignty before joining the EU find value in being part of a more familiar governing environment, yet simultaneously retain several governing identities (Schmidtke, 2006). Identifying as a countryman first and EU citizen second magnifies the association to the country rather than the identifying body of the EU. State rights continue to challenge EU authority and progress in the advancement of policy. Such a faction of governance is necessary for policy consideration in the larger discussion of policy.

Overarching conflicts between subsidiarity, supranationalism, and intergovernmentalism demonstrate the comprehensive collaborative nature for decision-making of EU actors. These actors engage in decision-making by responding to causal

factors advancing limitations on the incorporation or consideration of secondary factors. It has been explained that immigration decision-making has been reactive with policies (Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska, 2018; Geddes, 2001; Fakhoury, 2016). In a multi-level governance structure like the EU, inclusivity of multiple-level actors beyond government such as interest groups, professional associations, non-governmental actors, and the public are not equally weighed in the policy process. EU government presents an even more intricate level of analysis due to the supranational, intergovernmental, and intra-state regional actors.

The premise of this research frames the question through an agenda setting lens. Specifically, this research uses the natural multi-level governing structure of the EU and incorporates both public opinion and elite perspectives. Much of the current literature provides known information on governance conflicts between supranational and intergovernmental policymaking. Where literature falls overly short is using public opinion as a contributing factor to policy and decision-making. Multi-level governance theory provides the closest research model to EU governing structure. Evaluation of this model is examined leading into the agenda setting model for decision-making.

Multi-Level Governance

Multi-level governance (MLG) argues for dispersion of authority across various levels of political governance. MLG incorporates a dynamic of governance often ignored by competing theories by establishing an overarching theory of governance that includes low-level governmental organizations. Authors of MLG assert that authority and sovereignty have moved away from national governments in the EU (Hooghe & Marks,

2001). The changing nature of policymaking in the EU provides specific restraints to one level of governance requiring multiple actors at various levels to be involved rather than limited. The relationship between different levels extends to other social causes working together to find policy solutions and promote interests both vertically and horizontally (Zapata-Barrero, Caponio, & Scholten, 2017; Piattoni, 2010).

MLG stands to promote an ideal model to determine why immigration policy is lacking, however, upon deeper analysis, the theory fails to present as a theory but more of an umbrella notion failing to be comprehensive for multiple levels of policy (Stubbs, 2005). Since its introduction, MLG has suffered from various interpretations obscuring the original aims of the theory. Nonetheless, the theory progressed to an all-encompassing theory for solving numerous political queries. More recently, scholars produced work devoting MLG analysis to immigration policy. Specifically, the horizontal and vertical involvement of MLG exposes decentralization shifts of member states. Instead of engaging in a recentralization of policy, national involvement in immigration policy has emerged (Campomori & Caponio, 2017). Responsibility for handling immigration and specific services funnels down to the local level. As countries struggle with various decision-making processes, devolution of governance emerges. Immigration governance and determining a common policy still rests at the higher level of European government. In contrast, governance of migrant integration more commonly defers to local or regional governance of the country (Zapata-Barrero, Caponio, & Scholten, 2017). Such inferences highlight the discord countries and the EU are experiencing in establishing a common immigration policy.

The aims of MLG suggest being descriptive rather than explanatory and suffers from concept stretching. The inclusion of other theories like stakeholder analysis, network governance, or policy learning would expand and further test the explanatory power of MLG and diffuse the theory's ambiguity (Ongaro, 2015; Tortola, 2017). Perhaps the more uncertain usage of this theory comes from the theory's inability to define the role of non-state actors or the policy process. Immigration is an issue of delineated policy framed between social and governmental policy. This framing falls outside the realm of MLG which focuses on policymaking structures rather than the policy processes. Explaining policymaking from a MLG perspective appears to fit seamlessly across discussions, but using MLG to explain immigration policy process is inadequate.

Because of the governing structure of the EU, MLG initially appears as an integral starting point for engaging in theoretical discussion of agenda setting. Using MLG in the implementation process may not be best for immigration policy due to the theory's reputation for creating contentions among the EU governing structure. Further, MLG lays a great deal of its emphasis on the outcomes of governance rather than the governance process (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018; Dimitriadis et al, 2021). Decision-making using this theory is noted for lacking transparency, restricting citizen scrutiny, and eventually blurring overall outcomes of policy (Papadopoulos, 2010). Questions about actual involvement of political actors remain a barrier to fully accepting MLG as a successful theory for immigration policy. Genuine participation and consideration of all elite and local stakeholders are necessary for successful governance (Dabrowski, Bachtler, & Bafoil, 2014). Seeking to use a theory that is integrative and cohesive in

governance and decision-making, MLG falls short. MLG's inability to explicate the policy process removes a primary practice of policymaking necessary for explaining and resolving immigration policy in the EU.

MLG is one of many incomplete theories that contributes to the evaluation of EU immigration policymaking. Where nearly all fall short is including public opinion. Recently, research has emerged acknowledging the importance of incorporating public opinion and relations toward immigration (Barbulescu & Beaudonnet, 2014; Toshkov & Kortenska, 2015). In a working paper, Blinder and Markaki (2018) look specifically at public attitudes toward immigration through a multi-level modeling approach. They use public opinion to determine the relation between anti-immigration sentiments and acceptance. Building off MLG and Hooghe's work, Di Mauro and Memoli (2021) discuss the relationship between elites and the public during the refugee crisis. This emerging work is the closest evaluation of public and elite view collaboration. Their approach of using MLG, however, centers on integration and policy outcomes. Building off the concept of public and elite views, a stronger theory has the potential to fill the gaps in the governance process.

Agenda Setting Theory

Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism distinguish the governing structure of the EU from other governmental organizations. Within these foundations, various theories compete for explanation as to the cooperation and transformation of the EU. Theories of integration, governance, and cooperation drive European integration and policymaking. The emerging work of multi-level governance and Hooghe's

acknowledgment of the involvement of various actors brings the theory closer to a more complete analysis and examination of complex European political evaluations. Agenda setting evaluates the process of getting a policy on the agenda. It involves both the process and the outcome (Dearing & Rogers, 1996); the combination MLG lacks.

Agenda setting relates missing aspects of the policymaking process creating inclusivity of the entire region's key actors. Multilevel governance segues into agenda setting's completeness. The multifaceted governing structure of the EU at present date necessitates multilayered theories conversant with policymaking across a region. Advancing analysis on immigration policy, the above theories and models strive to expound on their sufficiency to explain EU immigration policy. MLG is an incorporative starting point for agenda setting but fell short of that needed inclusiveness. Several models and theories discuss immigration policy, but they exhibit various degrees of failure and success. All demonstrated shortcomings. The limitations of the models exploit their ability to inadequately resolve immigration policymaking issues. Particularly, each model lacked deeper expansion on hierarchical discrepancies and collaboration in governance or multi-level governance evaluations on less superficial levels.

Agenda setting theory largely developed in the United States gaining ground after the seminal work by McCombs and Shaw (1972). With a foundation set in directing specific attention to issues in the policymaking process, agenda setting fluidly applies to policies beyond American governance (Princen, 2018). Unlike other theories, agenda setting includes variables of all levels of governance with the umbrella of agenda setting incorporating communication with research theory. The inclusivity of policy actors is significantly deeper than other theories. An agenda is about communicating to elites

important items of consideration, thus requiring a degree of collaboration among all influencing and affected parties. Originally, agenda setting relayed issues specifically on media exposure and subsequent public perception (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).

Expansion and further definition of agenda setting theory advanced application to assess complex policy problems through a comprehensive theoretical approach. Integrating all levels of stakeholders and citizens, the theoretical approach becomes more conclusive than comparable or competing theories. The incorporative nature of agenda setting promotes broader coverage and influence across all aspects of governance. Growth in not only the literature but application of the theory has advanced the theory's legitimacy and usability, particularly in the EU.

Since 1972, research advanced the influence of public voice on agenda setting (McCombs, 1993). Developing beyond communication channel influence and how specific stakeholder input garners success in a democratic society, agenda setting evolved into a model for addressing all manners of influence emerging on the international policy platform. Exposure and influence to particular issues still profoundly affect opinion and agenda success (Dunaway, Branton, & Abrajano, 2010). The theory has become more thorough and explanatory for addressing governmental policy issues. Competing theories diminish in their ability to explain perplexing issues like EU immigration while agenda setting provides an enhanced and complete approach.

Recognizing agenda setting in the decision-making process, Tallberg (2003) examines the EU Presidency's agenda prowess. Further, he theoretically develops a conceptual framework expanding agenda shaping and implications for the EU. Arguing for several alternatives and by investigating the powers of agenda setting and

organizations, Pollack (1997) identifies the constraints of relationships between institutions implying supranational institutions are bound by state desires. In addition, as Pollack evaluates relationships and policy influences of specific actors, he questions actor involvement. Pollack further develops the decision-making and agenda setting process arguing that supranational institutions establish their distinct preferences in the agenda setting process as part of integration (Pollack, 2003).

Agenda setting provides both a theoretical framework and correlation of parties spanning beyond supranational and intergovernmental actors. This model provides a more dynamic look than multi-level governance for identifying policy challenges. Other models lack the capacity to analyze why the EU and members struggled through the various treaties and previously expounded reactive policies. Agenda setting determines that the impact of specific events prompts people to pay greater attention to transpiring problems. As such, a myriad of political events unfolds due to the growing exposure of immigration woes throughout the EU. The incorporation of an added layer of the agenda setting model provides the overarching framework and mechanism necessary for successfully evaluating immigration policy adversity in the EU.

The continued lack of policy prescriptions, the problem at hand (immigration), and the stakeholders direct the discussion toward a more inclusive theoretical model. For these reasons, agenda setting emerges as that inclusive model. Regional integration theories deconstructed above have foundations in the theory of agenda setting. Using a refined model of agenda setting theory, the interplay of the problem, the policy options, and stakeholders involved with immigration policy explain in detail the pressing question of immigration and the possibility of obtaining a common policy. This research demands

an analytic model with as few insufficiencies as possible. With theory refinement, gaps originally existing in other theories are bridged with the introduction and expansion of agenda setting. Given the models previously discussed, agenda setting presents as the most appropriate model for understanding how policies are decided in multi-level governance. Expounding and refining the governance structure of MLG, incorporating a litany of policy actors, and expanding the problems associated with a policy issue, agenda setting is a more complete and explanatory model than previous models used to explain the issue of immigration policy.

These theories have their strengths, but their shortcomings in the decision-making process make them unsuitable for exploring immigration policy. With EU politics in particular, incorporating public opinion into the policy process and working with intergovernmental and supranational politics, agenda setting is the most complete model for evaluating immigration. Other models simply lack the ability to encompass the breadth of stakeholders affecting EU policy. The array of competing models falls short in understanding the policy process and inclusion of multiple stakeholders beyond governmental organizations. The common exclusion from competing theories is inclusion of public opinion in addition to elites in the policy process. These inclusions from agenda setting provide the missing link necessary for understanding the current immigration policy challenge.

Scholars provide multiple frameworks for understanding agenda setting emphasizing aspects of the process, contributing to the strength of the framework, and dismissing theoretical weaknesses or contradictions (Béland, 2016). Individually the theory provides a self-sufficient framework including units of analysis, inputs and

outputs, the policy process, and the purpose of their lens of evaluation. Agenda setting is purposeful showing “the process by which issues gain greater mass and elite attention” through the policy process (Birkland, 1997, p. 5).

Fundamental theories like MLG demonstrate their inability to fully engage in evaluation of the policy process. Researchers are not investigating lacking EU immigration policy, but rather discussing failed asylum and refugee dynamics amidst growing Euroskepticism and lacking integration (Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier, 2016; Scipioni, 2018; Stockemer et al, 2018; Tillman, 2013). Governance extending to areas with complex governing structures makes the agenda setting model an appropriate model for evaluating EU immigration policy.

John Kingdon’s Agenda Setting Model

Regarding agenda setting for in-depth analysis of how and why decision-makers choose a specific policy option, the framework proposed by John Kingdon is worth considering. Kingdon’s agenda setting model is a frontrunner in its field expanding the usability and application of the theory. Building off the foundations of early theory development, he enhances policy evaluation by introducing his method of multiple streams (1995). The theory of multiple streams purports that the distinct nature of each stream and their eventual intersection determines when a policy is created. The premise of his argument ascertains that issues gain agenda status when his proposed three streams converge.

Table 3: Three Streams of Kingdon

Problem Stream	Policy Stream	Political Stream
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Societal policy issues needing attention. • Government action to resolve the problem. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The myriad of policy solutions suggested, created, or otherwise offered for the problem. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All forms of political and non-political actors • Changes in public mood or opinion.

The three streams of Kingdon's model are simple and clearly defined in a high-level systematic manner (see Table 3). The three defined process streams are problems, policies, and political. The first stream is *problem* recognition. Simply stated, this stream addresses the problem and arrival at the current situation. This first stream defines where actors and individuals recognize the problem encompassing the attributes of a specific problem and the prognosis of solvable alternatives. The problem derives from individuals believing that a situation or condition should have some action to reach a resolution. "Problems are not simply the condition or external events themselves; there is also a perceptual, interpretive element" (Kingdon, p. 109). Political stakes are greatly defined during the problem stream.

The second stream, *policy*, takes into consideration ideas and generating proposals for potential solutions. Inclusive of this process are operations and examination of existing programs, external pressures that drive the agenda, or even effectiveness of participants. Policies are the alternatives and recommendations to address the problem by member states, specialists, and other involved actors. Ideas are proverbially tossed around and introduced to address the problem stream. Some policies are short lived and others

are considered after much deliberation. Ideas for policy are generated in the form of proposals and alternatives to address the problem.


The third stream in Kingdon's model, *political*, is broadly defined and incorporates elites, citizens, political involvements, and other actors. This stream encompasses all matters of politics and public opinion. Politics in Kingdon's stream describes more than just the key government institutional actors. The politics include national level actors of the member states and their governing bodies. Not solely concerned with elite voice, the political stream further incorporates citizens and other non-governmental and political organizations. The political stream presents the most complex nature of all streams due to the variety of involved actors, the policy processes, and the stream's ability to flow according to its own dynamics and rules (Kingdon, p. 162).

Where Kingdon sets his theory apart from others is the interaction of political and policy streams. All streams are initially independent running parallel to each other, the streams tend to be reciprocal in nature and converge—or couple—providing an effective foundation for describing the EU's relationship between member states and other political actors. All streams have the opportunity to integrate and crossover addressing the importance of seeking political resolution. Crossover between streams leads to stages of solution building and problem solving throughout the policy process. Converging at one critical moment of opportunity, an “open policy window” occurs (Kingdon, p. 168) (see Figure 4). At this moment, political actors are provided the opportunity to advocate for proposals and address the prominent problem. Ideally, a solution is devised among policy actors, political change occurs on all levels of EU governance, and policy

constraints no longer resist change. Together, the policy stream, political stream, and problem stream create policy windows advancing the opportunity for an issue to be placed on the agenda and resolved at a pinnacle moment.

Policy windows are the only moment when policy resolution can occur as the item—after much stream deliberation—has reached the agenda. After various phases of the streams' progress, the policy window results from stream collaboration and construction. At times, windows may open due to crisis or the need for immediate action. Interaction between streams may have been minimal, but the issue itself escalated the policy window. Changes in regime or governance may also be instrumental in a policy window opening after many months, or years, of combative policy, problem, and political interaction.

Figure 4: Kingdon's Three Streams Venn



Once the streams converge, the opportunity to discuss a solution emerges. If the primary solution is disagreeable, there is the option of a secondary inclusion to the agenda in the presence of policy alternatives. Kingdon describes this as “pet alternatives” (p. 194) to a policy. The secondary proposal is kept in the ready waiting for a problem or new development in the political stream where a policy official can subsequently attach their solution. This alternative may be very powerful depending on the desperation or willingness of the group to reach a consensus. Regardless, at the critical moment when the three streams converge, solutions are joined to the problem when the policy window opens. The window of convergence may not be predictable, as demonstrated with past attempts by the EU, but the moment the window opens talks for a solution are highly viable.

The intersection of policy, politics, and problem explains the complex facets of society and governance. Kingdon’s model successfully applies to foreign policy and the organizational structure of the EU. Considering immigration policy, Kingdon’s agenda setting model and multiple streams approach add needed depth to current literature and research. Detailing the contents of each stream presents a comprehensive depiction of the EU immigration policy debacle. Specifics for each stream further define the complexities associated with immigration and the depth of the parties involved in the process. By identifying the problem, policy, and political stream associations, a clear picture of contribution and analysis emerges.

Applications of Kingdon's Model

Kingdon's multiple stream analysis provides the most comprehensive application to agenda setting amidst various competing models. Literature successfully contributes Kingdon's model to other realms of academia and policy with scholars expounding application to educational, political, and social issues. Kingdon's model has successfully been applied to situations beyond its initial implication in the United States. Relevance and utilization of Kingdon's policy agenda has been applied to institutions abroad and also in the European Union (Princen, 2009; Tallberg, 2003).

Much of Kingdon's application started within the US and originally with domestic policy. When the success of using Kingdon's model was identified, research expanded to facets of government and social services. Multiple streams approach successfully determined US foreign policy and foreign aid allocation (Travis & Zahariadis, 2002). This evaluation was very telling to not only the domestic relationships originally specified by Kingdon, but that the use of multiple streams was highly effective at evaluating foreign policy. Gradually, the basis of Kingdon's model extended application to the EU and has been present in various aspects of EU research and agenda queries. In line with the systematic nature of Kingdon's method and multiple streams frameworks, Zahariadis (2008) approaches the framework similarly to Kingdon's but argues the approach is not as linear as Kingdon portrays and may be framed in ways of privatization. Through Zahariadis' analyses of multiple streams, he applies the method to EU policymaking and demonstrates the important relationship between problems, solutions, and politics (2008). Zahariadis and Kingdon defend such multiple stream

analyses against critics who question there is not enough falsifiable evidence or workability between economic and civic realms (Sabatier, 2007; Stone, 2002).

Using Kingdon's multiple streams approach in education, the three streams were applied in a study of state reading policy and the state-level policy agenda (Young, Shepley, & Song, 2010). Again, the theory was performed to understand policymaking and the differences that exist when applied at a local level compared to the national policy level (Liu et al, 2010). The importance of this application brings insight to the dynamic nature of agenda setting working between various levels of governance. In foreign policy analysis, Mazarr (2006) used Kingdon's model to assess decision-making by the United States to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom. Applying the model to accounting in Australia, the framework outlines various organizational involvement and social functioning for policy success (Ryan, 1998). The versatility of Kingdon's model permits enhanced implementation of his framework relating to the EU's common immigration policy.

Understanding environmental policy, Kingdon's framework was employed to examine emissions trading in Germany (Brunner, 2008). Brunner concluded Kingdon's model as being highly effective in capturing the important aspects of the policy window, or joining of streams. Regarding secondary factors like multilevel governance and networks, Kingdon's model did not sufficiently evaluate the full potential of the issue. In contrast, inclusion of more explanatory approaches would step beyond the processes outlined by Kingdon.

Application of Kingdon is broad and beneficial for evaluating policymaking. Each policy field using Kingdon demonstrates the reach of agenda setting. Not bound to one

subject area, agenda setting represents a model available to explain a diverse range of social and political issues. The model's growth from use within the US to a more international stage brings clout to its application across the various aspects of decision-making and its use in European politics. The shortcomings of other models with their lack of inclusivity are glaring when compared to the well-rounded approach of agenda setting.

Critique of Kingdon's Model

A successful theory is not without its dissenters or competing theories. Not being inclusive enough or failing to integrate certain institutions or actors remains a solid contention. While authors counter Kingdon's model and question aspects of validity, the underlying commonality of these theories is their questioning of actor involvement in the policy process and lack of inclusivity. When examined further, most of these arguments are due to researchers not pursuing these avenues. For instance, it is argued that the multiple streams application fails to take institutions seriously (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg, & Huß, 2015). Zohlnhöfer et al expound on the multiple streams by suggesting the incorporation of institutions, specifically what this research investigates. Cairney and Jones (2016) also elaborate on the effectiveness of the multiple streams approach but argue expansion and application of the model has progressed too quickly to accurately conceptualize specific processes and outcomes. It can be argued that criticism about the nature of Kingdon's model does not take into consideration the breadth and application of the framework beyond agenda setting, however, Kingdon's framework in application to policy allows for deepened assessment of a multiple streams framework.

Critiquing Kingdon's policy windows and the necessary degree of institutionalism to achieve a policy window, Howlett quantitatively breaks down the policy window process (1998). By compartmentalizing Kingdon's policy windows and their behavior, Howlett created his own evaluative network. Kingdon's evaluation and description of policy windows are competitive, which is why he does not identify necessary mechanisms for reaching each policy window opportunity. Further, any distinction or evaluation between competing policy windows, created by Howlett, would require qualitative analysis, not quantitative. Kingdon's theory offers an open, less confined approach. As Kingdon's theory applies and reflects on reality, Howlett's analysis attempts to facilitate an empirical investigation (Soroka, 1999). To criticize the theory, Howlett creates his own theoretical analysis and evaluation to test Kingdon's model.

A common critique of agenda setting is the lack of application to more specific processes. This is vaguely defined as an issue when applied in the consideration of policy entrepreneurship. In their explanation of structural reform policy process in Denmark, Bundgaard and Vrangbæk (2007) criticize Kingdon's model for not providing tools for a micro-analysis of the three streams. Even with this lack of defining ability, Kingdon's model is still noted as "useful inspiration" (p. 494) for their study. Goldfinch and 't Hart (2003) also highlight Kingdon's model as inadequate by failing to specify "why certain individuals are able to play the role of policy entrepreneur" and the inability to "operationalize the concept in a way that allows for systematic empirical research" (p. 237). Application of Kingdon's model, however, has been noted in similar works like Ahearne (2006) exploring the role of French intellectuals, and Liu and Jayakar (2012) regarding China and policy entrepreneurs.

Beyond Kingdon's model, Baumgartner and Jones' (2009) punctuated equilibrium explains a complex system of policy analysis by embracing both the shifts of policy and policy stagnation used in explaining agenda setting. Baumgartner and Jones argue that punctuated equilibrium can further explain policy analysis as the agenda setting process "implies that no single equilibrium could be possible in politics" (2009, p. 4). Regardless of having a solid equilibrium, punctuated equilibrium does not provide an ideal framework for application. The framework of punctuated equilibrium has a foundation that is based on political institutions and bounded rationality. The span of bounded rationality to determine policy change purveys its limits and it acknowledges that people are subject to cognitive limitations (Rubinstein, 1998; Simon, 1955; True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007). In addition, punctuated equilibrium's utility is in explaining the nature of political vicissitude over a period of time. While the model has unique properties and explanations for agenda, punctuated equilibrium fails to address key aspects of the political stream beyond political institutions.

Baumgartner and Jones work within the theory of agenda setting through varied dynamics. Work started with agenda setting, but expanded to other theoretical frameworks by incorporating branched theories such as punctuated equilibrium. More recently, Baumgartner et al examined agenda setting across 20 countries (Baumgartner, Breunig, & Grossman, 2019). This comparative analysis examines the history and dynamics of public attention to all activities of government. Their work examines agenda setting policy examples while defining the challenges and benefits of using the theory. Quite extensive and descriptive in its analysis, the ample work represents a thorough compilation on agenda setting policies and actions. Although the work touches on public

agenda and public involvement, the incorporation of public is based on individual-level demographic information and the influences the agenda has on the public. Such a work is beneficial but it fails to evaluate the involvement of public voice and its effect on the policy process.

Baumgartner also evaluated effects of groups and interest groups in the politics process (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). This analysis does not come from an agenda setting perspective, rather this analysis resurrects Olson's (1965) theory of collective action and politics. Groups were once considered focal to the political process but over time moved to a more peripheral factor. Baumgartner and Leech bring to action past research on group involvement while suggesting future research on interest group involvement, but the analysis focuses on individual voices being advanced through organizations—collective action—not as a public unit. Baumgartner recognizes the necessity of public involvement in policy, but the public is never considered as a unit. Public involvement in his policy processes comes in the form of organizations speaking on behalf of community interest, the public being influenced by an agenda, or by discussing political constituents reacting to the agenda.

Common EU policies have historically been achieved which is why the current immigration issue is uncharacteristic of the EU. Difficulty reaching a common immigration policy highlights recent EU struggles. Kingdon's model and the three streams explain why the EU continues to struggle to adopt such a policy. Kingdon's model outlines how agreements on previous policies were adopted. Analyzing the politics, policy, and problem of policies demonstrates the application of agenda setting and its utilization for this research model.

Chapter Three: Application of Kingdon's Model to EU's Immigration Policy Challenge

Agenda setting has presented diverse applications to policy areas, including immigration. Using Kingdon to explain the policy framework of Schengen demonstrates the breadth of the model's possibilities and its applicability to EU politics. Objections to agenda setting and its lack in immigration research do not make this model irrelevant. Conversely, Kingdon's model and its inclusivity make it the appropriate approach applied to this dissertation. Seeking a model to fully explain the parameters of this research, Kingdon's agenda setting model fills the gaps of models previously explained. Other theories and models present adequate foundations, however, Kingdon builds on these foundations by incorporating all manner of stakeholders—including public opinion—in the political realm, considers numerous problems associated with the issue, and incorporates the myriad of problems surrounding the issue. Using Kingdon as the framework for this dissertation, new insight will be presented on the pitfalls of the EU's common immigration policy.

Understanding the historical background of EU policy and the query of immigration policy directs the conversation into the decision-making approach of Kingdon's theory. To the end of advancing with Kingdon's model, a mixed methods approach is used for this analysis. This method permits a more encompassing analysis of the three streams, particularly the political stream. Kingdon's model will be used to define the framework of the three streams and the EU's current decision-making on this topic. Since 2009 with the Lisbon treaty, a common immigration policy had little movement on the agenda. When the EU experienced its first wave of the migration crisis

in 2015, the gravity of disregarding such a policy decision was realized. Efforts since 2009 to define a common immigration policy have failed. Using Kingdon, we will understand the future of EU immigration policymaking.

For application of Kingdon's model, problem stream information critical and comprehensive information in the political stream is imperative. Including political elites and the public in the same policymaking sphere ensures all levels of opinion in the policymaking process are recognized. Ignoring non-policymakers in the decision-making process would place Kingdon on the same level as other competing theories. Such theories have demonstrated they are less than ideal for this research, thus the necessity for a comprehensive political stream. Populating the problem stream, the depth of the immigration policy query and problem recognition is further understood.

The agenda setting model evaluates the posed problem by incorporating opinions of *both* governing elites and citizens showing how institutions bridge the gap between public opinion and institutional policy to define a new policy. Using the agenda setting model, the following hypothesis and related policy question will be evaluated:

H_1 : Perceptions of political elites and citizens on immigration policy are misaligned.

Q : Under current circumstances, is it possible for member states to reach consensus on a common immigration policy?

Populating the Three Streams Data

To analyze immigration policy, data was needed to populate the three streams. Using a mixed methods design afforded the amplest approach to data collection and interpretation. Obtaining both qualitative and quantitative data enhances the results of the

presented data and strengthens use of Kingdon's model. Kingdon's methodological approach hinges on the comprehensiveness of political actors. Formulating an analysis of whether views of immigrants affect EU immigration policy, it is determined whether specific European states are at odds with the creation of a common immigration policy and if a future policy window will emerge.

This research used a convergent design. A convergent design allows for two theoretical lines of research—the interview collection and survey data collection—to converge on a similar result (immigration). This methodological approach provided the most effective analysis in assessing policy concerns. Collecting quantitative and qualitative data and analyzing the findings independently implemented the greatest depth for the analysis before comparing the findings and interpreting the data (Patten & Newhart, 2018). Because the research question could produce causal findings, separate analyses were given equal emphasis before final interpretation. The parallel structure of the convergent design imparted the most effective form of data collection and analysis to avoid emphasis on one particular question or group of results. Interpreting data in this manner leads to social implications that may be present within the research⁹.

Data collected, analyzed, and evaluated for this research incorporates the diversity of voices among citizens and elites. Considering the question of immigration and the intricate nature of the parties involved in the political process, it is prudent to identify the main concerns and desires of those involved to assess current policy direction. The views of elites and citizens alike are juxtaposed in understanding problem and policy

⁹ Data collection and the instruments for this study are further elaborated in Appendix C.

alternatives. To understand European elites' support of immigration policy, this research used qualitative data. Qualitative data was obtained through personal interviews with currently elected or appointed decision-making elites inclusive of: ministers, parliamentarians, directorate generals, and other individuals involved in policymaking within the European Union during spring 2018¹⁰. The collected information provided insight to answer the research question through interpretation of the interview data and appropriate indexing of the interviews. Interviews with elites helped determine policy positions on the current immigration situation and the motivations behind immigration policy in the EU as part of the political stream.

Survey data on public opinion and attitudes on the political problem add further depth to the analysis process. The subsequent surveying of elites presents a more innovative approach to previous research where only citizen perceptions were considered or evaluated. Little research has been done in the presented format incorporating one-on-one interviews and collected opinions from elites. The surveys consider the overarching needs and concerns among all parties involved with the voice of the people in mind and the voice of the elites recognized. Citizen feedback may mirror elite desires and vice versa, or a complete disconnect may exist between the political parties. The causal factors are currently undefined due to lacking data on elite positions for developing a common immigration policy.

Sources of data were two-fold. First, from an index created via the WVS/EVS and Eurobarometer. Elite interview questions for this research were devised based on the

¹⁰ For information on how data was obtained, see Appendix C.

index framing the WVS/EVS. Second, information for immigration policy was collected through access and content analysis of documents, memos, policy papers, and EU/governance directives that were longitudinal in nature. Information collected and evaluated through content analysis was specifically used for evaluation of the problem and policy streams defined by Kingdon. Such information has been extensively discussed previously in preparation of the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the streams.

With the lack of research applied to EU policies and the very sparse application of Kingdon on immigration policy, Kingdon's model will be applied to a past case. An assessment on this case shows the application of Kingdon's model and its ability to successfully apply to EU politics and policymaking to immigration. This assessment then leads into the current dilemma and population of the problem stream. Demonstrating the relevancy of Kingdon to EU policymaking outlines the necessity of using such a model to approach this dissertation.

Enhancing Kingdon's model, preferences of stakeholders will be analyzed using the agent-based decision model (ABM). In this research model, ABM complements the use of Kingdon's approach. Understanding member state, Commission, public, and elite preferences toward immigration policy establishes the dynamics of the political stream and the process of reaching convergence. As stakeholders ascertain positions and options, ABM simulates anticipated position shifts in response to pressure from others (Yeşilada et al, 2017, p. 108). Identifying stakeholder preferences and how shifts may interact with other streams expounds on the ability and possibility for stream convergence.

The Senturion agent-based model will be used to analyze political stream preferences. Working in tandem with Kingdon's model, Senturion ABM analysis uses the

current state of the streams to analyze and predict the next phase of policymaking and if the EU can reach a common immigration policy. Senturion uses the information of the stakeholders to anticipate the future behavior and likely policy outcomes of actors.

Information obtained in this research will guide the analysis and provide information and assessment on the future of a common immigration policy.

Together, this data, analysis, and explanation using agenda setting present a more synthesized approach other decision-making models lack. Inadequate integration of qualitative and quantitative comparisons in other methodological approaches highlights the weakness of such models in their approach to decision-making. This research brings an integrated structure to the decision-making system focusing on the three streams for assessing implications and challenges of integration and policymaking. The following analysis and results expound on the theoretical focus of agenda setting.

Chapter Four: Analysis and Interpretation of Results

Agenda setting following Kingdon's theory combines what is known about the struggles of immigration policy with how immigration policy has historically and theoretically come to pass. To more fully and accurately assess the overall query of a common immigration policy, applying Kingdon's model in greater detail explains why other theoretical approaches are falling short and how Kingdon fills the methodological void. Kingdon's model and the three streams applied to immigration policy define the issue and emergence of future trends.

Beginning with the application of Kingdon to an EU immigration policy, this example will set precedence for successful application of the agenda setting model to the current immigration dilemma. Considering the several policies, papers, agreements, and treaties surrounding past immigration policy formation, Kingdon will be applied to Schengen. As the first major common policy addressing immigration and one that was further bound by treaty, Kingdon's application to Schengen outlines the difficulty encountered in reaching the policy window and achieving this common policy.

Schengen and Agenda Setting

Schengen stemmed from the debacle of transportation between EC (European Community at that time) member states. Movement of goods, services, and people with passports at border checks hindered flow and movement, yet borderless travel remained a topic of contention among its 10 members. Since WWII, free movement among EC states was hotly debated. Immigration after WWII was needed to rebuild the western countries. Immigration at that time was an economic issued and served the political interests of the

countries (Messina, 2007, p. 239). Discussion and argument about the pros and cons of open border policy divided member states as the political urgency of immigration related policy were more pressing in only select countries. The problem, policy, and political streams continued to develop and change over decades of debate and polarized positions. Each stream experienced moments of development through country-to-country conversation and failed placement on the agenda. Political and problem streams intersected; policy and problem streams crossed and were discussed; political and policy streams merged and discussions commenced. Arriving at the moment of agreeing on a policy of free movement did not emerge until the 80s.

In 1984, two countries—France and Germany—pushed the open border problem upon member states by forcing discussion as a key policy initiative. Suddenly, the policy window opened. The problem moved onto the agenda. The politics surrounding the agenda item had been identified allowing the creation of alliances among actors. The policy window fleetingly opened and was ready for solutions and policies to emerge. In this moment, near Schengen, Luxembourg in 1985, an agreement was signed advancing the development of internal border control abolishment. At the time, only five of the 10 countries signed the Schengen Agreement easing the road for the ability to live, work, travel, and educate fluidly. Countries that remained skeptical of the process or were against free movement stayed on the sidelines for several more years. Eventually, acceptance of Schengen grew to nearly all member states and became an integrated legal framework and part of EU policy in 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam.

It took nearly 30 years for all streams to converge and a policy window to open. That policy window created Schengen allowing opportunity and movement between

countries. Fluctuating streams brought the concept of borderless travel to member states. The years preceding Schengen created the lacking conjunction of all three streams and the environment for policy failure. Through the actions of motivated countries and successful placement on the agenda, nearly 15 years after the initial policy window the EU incorporated Schengen as a common policy bound by treaty.

Agenda Setting Application

Reactive approaches, policies, and decisions muddled the policy waters. At any given time, two of the three streams may have converged initiating discussions and optional solutions, but the policy window to define a policy resolution has not occurred due to a lack of simultaneous three streams convergence. Although immigration policy has been in question for several decades, the streams and analysis of this dissertation specifically draw from the immigration crises that began in 2015. The unsuccessful policy attempts described prior to 2015 instigated actions in each stream where we arrive at the current situation.

Problem Stream

The blatant problem is that the EU cannot establish a union-wide immigration policy. Member states are moving toward state-centric policies shifting away from centralization of supranational governance. Immigration policy is greater than the problem of simply not having a common immigration policy, rather, it involves nuances and issues affecting the ability to reach a resolution. With Ukraine's exodus, EU countries are demonstrating humanitarian efforts without policy change. Table 4 outlines several problems surrounding the policymaking issue.

Table 4: Policymaking Problems

Problem	Effect of problem
Failure to pass immigration reform.	Member states enact personalized immigration policies.
Enlargement without immigration policy.	Expansion without deepened integration.
Escalation of migration crisis.	Enactment of subsidiarity and exclusion.
Migration inundation at key southern borders.	Exposure of Dublin failures; States working in conflict to Schengen.
Acceptance of Ukrainian refugees, but not MENA refugees	Double standard or two-track policy option.

The EU's continued lack of immigration policymaking escalates member state divisiveness. Continued subsidiarity and member state emergence against EU policy muddle overall EU cohesiveness. Problem recognition is critical to agenda setting (Kingdon, p. 198). The EU is not suffering from a lack of recognition but a failure to address the problem. Creation of papers, statements, quotas, and agreements were attempts to address the problem without actually creating a resolution. Subsequently, the outcomes and reactions are significantly affected.

Political Stream

The political stream, or politics, involves many governmental and non-governmental actors. Here is where Kingdon's model stands apart and is superior to other models. The inclusion of the myriad of actors includes interest groups, public voice, national mood, elites, and other policy stakeholders. Political stream events flow along according to their own dynamics (Kingdon, p. 198). This is the stream where power is honed and influence made by agenda setters. It is in this stream where direction is defined for placement on the agenda. Much like the earlier explanation of advancing Schengen's

policy on the agenda after years of debate, it was the alliance between France and Germany (two very powerful and influential countries at the time) that pushed borderless travel onto the agenda.

Within the political stream and immigration policy, the politics are described through country position and public opinion. Immigration preferences of each country and whether they are open or closed to immigration affect the ability of the streams to converge. Each member state hones political preferences vis-à-vis immigration by either working with or against the EU. A common distinction among non-compliant countries is their position on the immigrant in general, not just immigration. Xenophobia and cultural acceptance politically drive the views and perceptions of several countries. Rather than be welcoming to immigrants, countries continue to exhibit fear and resentment to providing a safe harbor for those who are culturally and physically different. Within these views and individual country assessments, the wedge of xenophobia further drives policy cooperation apart. Below, each country has reacted differently to the refugee situation at times making a bold statement to the EU on their political position. Such positions, positive or negative, affect the ability for policy opportunities. Like the 80s with Schengen, countries today create alliances or demonstrate joint positions toward EU policies.

Austria. Discontentment with the passage of immigrants through Hungary into Austria affected governance and border control. Mass movements of migrants resulted in Austria temporarily sealing its borders to immigrants and surrounding countries in 2015 (EurActiv, 2015). Identity checks and turning migrants and asylum seekers away have also become a standard in Austria. Advancing their anti-immigrant and anti-EU

government position, the Austrian government sought advice on how to turn away migrants and institute a cap on the number of asylum requests they accept (EurActiv, 2016). Austria's position of formulating more stringent border policies continues to grow and develop as the immigration crisis continues. Regarding Ukraine, however, Austria is welcome to accepting refugees and providing support.

Belgium. The center for EU governance, Belgium has long been considered a country of perpetual immigration. With Brussels as the hub of EU politics, Belgium has an incredibly diverse population and governance structure. Generally welcoming to immigrants, Belgium, too, has found itself in difficult situations of acceptance after terror attacks; however, anti-immigrant sentiments are not at the frontline of Belgium's policies. Belgium welcomes immigrants and generally stays removed from media prominence regarding immigration. At times, the policies and practices of Belgium are conflated with those of EU politics and policies. Regardless of housing the breadth of EU dynamics, Belgium has worked in coordination with France to protect and monitor their common border due to terrorist attacks and associated travel between the two countries. Regarding Ukraine, however, Belgium is welcome to accepting refugees and providing support.

Bulgaria. Sharing a border with Turkey, Bulgaria focused on tightening their border and securing entry to their country. With the development of the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016, Bulgaria was hopeful for a drastic decrease in immigration flows (European Council, 2016). Not a member of Schengen due to its proximity to Turkey, Bulgaria takes a militarized approach to securing its borders. With increased security forces, Bulgaria worked to stymie irregular migration through stauncher patrolling and

military forces at the border. In addition, Bulgaria utilized detention facilities as its main response to migration flows. Bulgaria's position stands opposite of EU governance and hinders movement toward relinquishing border control to the EU. Conversely, Bulgaria is not using militarized approaches to Ukrainian refugees and is openly welcoming those fleeing.

Croatia. At the end of the migration influx in 2016, the Bosnia-Croatia border became the last gateway to northern Europe. During the crisis, Croatia waffled with its open-door policy. Sudden migrant influxes would force border closures due to the inability to handle migrants. Further, Croatia encountered border conflict in the north with Hungary. Migrants traveling into Croatia continued north to be halted by closed borders and heavily guarded crossings. Since 2016, Croatia now has a firmer immigration stance aimed at turning away migrants, but its securitization is a demonstration of border control efforts showing the EU its ability to remain good stewards of legal migration (Louarn, 2020). Croatia is seeking membership in Schengen and Croatia remains supportive of EU policies to join Schengen in 2024. As such, immigration policies and support for EU policy are positive.

Cyprus. Markedly different than other EU countries, the island of Cyprus' internal shared border with Turkey makes immigration and acceptance of migrants convoluted. Entry to the EU side of Cyprus is open access to the EU. The EU-Turkey statement which successfully assisted in limiting the influx of migrants to Greece and Balkan states was not applied by Turkey to Cyprus. Politics within Cyprus are strained with the country's immigration crisis. Cypriots overwhelmingly support the idea of refugee limitations and closed borders (Tamma, 2019). Overall, public and political

perceptions toward migrants are relatively negative. Lack of EU support also affects the politics of Cyprus.

The Czech Republic. Relatively unfazed by immigration waves, the Czech Republic focused immigration restrictions by closing borders, detaining immigrants, and rejecting the EU's quota plan. In 2019, illegal immigration and asylum practically resolved to zero. Relatively poor compared to western counterparts, the Czech Republic is undesirable for migrants to seek refuge and is known for its xenophobic politics and country sentiment. The Czech Republic is critical of the EU and its border control efforts stressing for the EU to adapt existing legal frameworks. With the Ukrainian influx to the EU, the Czech Republic is open and welcoming of those fleeing the Russian war.

Denmark. Making monumental statements regarding immigrants, Denmark has felt overburdened by migration flows and social burdens and is working to lock every door accessible for immigrants. In 2015, Denmark experienced a large wave of migrants and since has worked to modify and create policy. In January 2016, Danish parliament implemented the "jewelry bill" to legally seize valuables and possessions from migrants passing Danish borders in order to help pay for the upkeep of asylum seekers (Asher-Shapiro, 2016). Strengthening local governance, in August 2016, the Danish government proposed a law giving local law enforcement the ability to reject asylum seekers (Deacon, 2016). August 2016 brought the lowest immigration levels to Denmark since the waves began in 2014. A more recent announcement in 2018 by Danish immigration minister Inger Sojberg cited a proposal to house up to 100 foreigners on Lindholm Island "who have been convicted of crimes but who cannot be returned to their home countries. Many would be rejected asylum seekers" (Sorensen,

2018). The proposed site was denied after new leadership came into office in 2019. The new prime minister has shifted Denmark's immigration restrictions from exclusive to more understanding. However, the position of the government has not turned pro-immigration and long-term stay. With policy leanings to assist Ukrainian refugees, Denmark is open and accepting of refugees.

Estonia. Sharing a border with Russia, this Baltic country fluctuates in its position. Joining the EU, Estonia had a relatively neutral position and overall supported EU policy and leadership. Recent migratory influxes in 2021 began a shift in country position. Estonia stands against EU quotas and mandatory relocation of immigrants but supports targeted measures by the EU to “alleviate pressure on the European Union's external borders and migration management” (“Estonia government approves”, 2022). Estonia remains open to supporting EU policy efforts that secure borders and limit illegal immigration. Due to their border proximity to Russia, Estonia is taking a cautious approach to its borders but still allowing Ukrainian refugees entrance.

Finland. Sharing a border with Russia, Finland is in a unique position. In 2015, Finland accepted tens of thousands of migrants. Finland was accepting of EU migrant relocation and quotas and continues to support EU policy. Working to help adjust policies after a new wave of illegal migration began in 2021, Finland actively supports EU efforts to better manage migration (“Finnish migration policy”, n.d.). As the EU works to lean member states toward a common policy, Finland is participatory in developing common EU migration and asylum policies.

France. The position of France has been one of controversy in recent years and their political stances have inadvertently focused on immigration by targeting religion,

specifically, followers of Islam. Immigrants from MENA more traditionally are followers of Islam driving the population of Muslims in France drastically upward. The largest population of Muslims in Europe at 5.7 million, France has reacted to the increase in immigration and the Muslim population by enacting policies targeting Muslims, citizens or not. In 2004, France's anti-veil policy in public spaces directly targeted Muslims and many Arab immigrants hailing from MENA, the largest group of immigrants in the state (Gökariksel & Mitchell, 2005). In August 2016, France again attacked Muslim culture as certain areas tried to push through a ban on a particular Islamic swimwear called a "burkini." While as many as 30 French areas enforced burkini bans on their beaches, the French high court—The Council of State—in a battle of cultures and discrimination against inclusiveness across France, suspended all burkini bans (Bitterman, McKenzie, & Soichet, 2016). Magnifying the country's position on immigration, in 2018, France passed an immigration reform reducing asylum applications to 90 days and afforded increased powers to the police department.

Sweeping controversy across France, the tightening of country immigration laws contends with EU policy and regulations. Since the increase in terrorist attacks on French soil, French borders have also been the strong subject of closure and restriction. More inclined to handle border policies on their own, closing individual borders was another strike against Schengen and free movement among countries. The French outlook on immigration policy and shifts away from EU governance continues to grow. France is complying with EU policies for Ukrainian refugees and stay durations within their country.

Germany. As the second most popular migration destination in the world behind the United States, Germany is a land of immigration. Like other countries in Europe, acceptance of both policies and immigrants are mixed due to the conflict between German citizens and German government. The voice of acceptance for EU policies and incorporation of immigrants entering Europe, German leadership has generally been welcoming to immigrants, but rising voices of the people have muted the motivations of the German government.

Country acceptance of immigrants is highlighted by welcoming the throngs of immigrants with open borders and a plea for the rest of the European countries to be more accepting in accepting quotas and managing the crisis. After a week of alleged openness to all migrants, Germany faltered and reimposed controls on its open borders (Smale & Eddy, 2015). German government remains the champion of EU solidarity. Trying to welcome immigrants and align with EU policies and values, German governance struggled with the success of their platform in the 2017 election. When citizens took to the polls in 2017, anti-immigration parties were on the rise. The results stunned parties across the nation as the anti-immigration focused group “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) became the first far-right party to win seats in more than half a century (Schuetz, 2017). Passing a new immigration bill in 2018, Germany would limit immigration from unqualified third-country nationals and retain the right to close off immigration for specific job categories. As the country prepares for policymaking under the new election cycle, the shift away from supranational governance is more pressing than ever. Germany continues to remain open to accepting Ukrainian refugees and following EU guidelines.

Greece. The face of immigration burden, Greece's large water access and land border to the Middle East through Turkey make Greek entry to Europe—and eventually the EU—a desirable entry point. Unfortunately, the high number of immigrants waiting and settling in Greece has left the government struggling to accommodate immigrants and asylum seekers. In 2015, out of 700,000 migrants and asylum seekers 560,000 arrived by sea. The crisis led Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to make public statements about the shame felt over the inability of Europe to deal with the omnipresent human drama and loss of life (Graham-Harrison, 2015). European leaders called for reception camps to be boosted in Greece, but it was Greece and Italy who voiced needed assistance from the EU to help with asylum relocation (Guarascio & Macdonald, 2015). Another breakdown of unity in policy and supranational governance, rather than assist the EU in relocating 120,000 migrants, countries rejected the imposed quotas offering buyout options. Since the peak of arrivals and the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, immigration overall in 2018 decreased with Greece experiencing the sharpest decline in immigrant arrivals placing their country of destination second behind Spain. Greece's tough stance of strengthening borders, regulating migrants, and rejecting migrants has been softened with the arrival of Ukrainians.

Hungary. A vocally dissenting country, Hungary adamantly stands against EU policy on immigration and quotas. Blatant shifts by member states to secure external border security were magnified by Hungary's actions of constructing a fence the length of their Serbian border (Moffett & Feher, 2015; Juhasz, 2017). Inundated by immigrants, Hungary resorted to building the fence to halt overwhelming numbers of immigrants. Copious opinions from citizens, officials, and authority figures to remedy

the situation continue their presence, but the oscillation of the immigration climate stalls future directives from European officials. In addition, Hungary proves noncompliant in accepting any form of direction from the supranational authority. In accordance with other countries, Hungary held an anti-immigration referendum aimed at the supranational authorities in Brussels after the release of the Commission's asylum quotas. Hungarians voted overwhelmingly to reject the quota and create their own policy.

In a staunch move of subsidiarity and state rights in response to the lack of the EU failing to agree on a common policy or resolve the immigration crisis, Hungary passed a law to deport and jail refugees illegally entering Hungary. EU Schengen policy allows member states to impose temporary controls of their borders for security reasons and this action continues to be utilized by several countries struggling with immigration. Hungary's membership in the EU and unique placement on the European continent make them the transit country to the EU for mass migrant flows from the Middle East. Feeling overwhelmed by immigrants and the lack of EU policy, Hungary firmly stands against any EU immigration policy. That said, Hungary has shifted its immigration and humanitarian efforts toward welcoming Ukrainians.

Ireland. Ireland welcomes migrants through the migration exoduses. Working with the EU, Ireland has urged member states to engage in greater solidarity and burden sharing of migrants supporting EU quotas, relocation, and migration cooperation. Government and public opinion are generally sympathetic toward immigrants.

Italy. Completely overwhelmed by the immigration influx, Italy is a country swamped by heightened numbers they can no longer support, house, or relocate. They

plead continually for the EU to provide assistance. Not entirely anti-immigration, Italy is at the disposal of EU governance to help relieve the country of the vast numbers of immigrants entering their borders by sea. Even with decreased immigration, numbers continued to soar in Italy through 2017. Italy gained a new populist government in 2018 proceeded by the deputy prime minister's announcement to deport 500,000 illegal migrants (Ellyatt, 2018). Welcoming of immigrants, Italy reached a breaking point by using private charter jets to deport immigrants back to their home country. Originally keen on rescuing migrants from the sea to bring them safely to land, Italy has backed off its efforts and even rejected boats of migrants. With Ukrainians presenting in Italy, these refugees are offered a warm welcome.

Latvia. Latvia accepted migration relocation efforts with a frosty reception. Politicians and citizens alike have an overwhelmingly negative attitude toward immigrants. Latvia's cooperation with the EU does particularly advance EU immigration politics. The majority of immigrants relocated to Latvia left after receiving refugee status with a destination further west (Antonenko, 2017). Public acceptance is very low in terms of welcoming and accepting migrants. Latvia stands more frequently against EU decision-making, immigration quotas, immigration reform, and open borders.

Lithuania. Openly critical of immigration quotas, Lithuania figuratively turned its back on the migration crises and the EU. In addition to criticizing the EU, Lithuania refused to stand in solidarity with member states. Rather than being open to immigration, Lithuania tightened its border controls, dispatched military forces to the borders, and erected fences on the eastern border (Sytas & Mardiste, 2016). Both the government and

public are particularly critical of immigration and the EU's handling of the crisis.

Regarding Ukraine, Lithuania is offering temporary protections.

Luxembourg. The richest country in the Union, Luxembourg is a unique country of both politics and citizens. Accepting working migrants for decades, being open to immigrants was no exception. Political decision-makers in Luxembourg welcome migrants and overall work in tandem with EU policies. During the migration crises, Luxembourg officials placed migrants in houses, rather than tents or camps, and the prime minister proposed giving foreigners the right to vote (Turner, 2015). The proposal was staunchly rejected by the public. Public opinion in Luxembourg is more cautious than political leaders. Locals have an underlying xenophobic fear due to perceived attacks on the social, cultural, economic, and financial systems. Ukrainians are receiving reception in Luxembourg in addition to permitting fleeing students application at the University of Luxembourg (European Migration Network, 2022).

Malta. Located in the Mediterranean migration path between Africa and Europe, Malta's acceptance has been mixed. The Maltese government initially demonstrated compassion to migrants hoping for EU intervention and a path to a solution. While no solution or intervention has come to fruition, Maltese public opinion has completely shifted away from compassion (Grech, 2015). Anti-immigrant voice has stressed the rejection of migrants and displeasure with Malta's government. Malta has a history of refusing to accept migrant rescue ships turning them away and instructing them on to Italy. Malta is offering relief services for Ukrainians and assisting in relocation efforts.

The Netherlands. Finding ways to maintain sovereignty, the Netherlands tends to stand apart from EU politicking. Such behavior was put on display in 2005 when they

rejected the EU constitution. Working against solidarity, the migration exodus encountered a less than accepting public and political leaders who were focused on anti-immigration sentiment. Anti-immigration parties continue to lead the government and anti-immigration sentiments find renewed strength among the general population. The Netherlands does not favor quotas or resettlement but recognizes the magnitude of the issue reluctantly participating in EU related efforts. This reluctance, however, is set aside in welcoming Ukrainian refugees and providing temporary protection.

Poland. Wanting little to do with immigration, Poland has been a staunch supporter of closing borders, rejecting migrants, and not supporting EU governance on immigration policy. Providing little Union solidarity, Poland responded to immigration with closed borders and anti-immigration sentiments. Political alignments shifted to an anti-immigration right with support from the public. Salience of immigration in Poland drives xenophobia and negative sentiments (Krzyżanowska & Krzyżanowski, 2018). In response to recent waves of MENA migrants, Poland tightened asylum rules erecting a fence to secure their border with Belarus. Poland's hard stance is the complete opposite with the current Ukraine crisis. Poland is the number one recipient of Ukrainian refugees toppling over 3 million accepted in three months. This is staunchly contrasted to their position on MENA refugees and fence building.

Portugal. Unlike several member states, Portugal has an incredibly open approach. Offering refuge and services for all migrants, Portugal encourages migrants to come to their country. Politically, elites, stakeholders, public opinion, and non-governmental organizations are accepting and eager to fill EU quotas. Portugal supports EU policy and is an advocate for solidarity between all countries.

Romania. Romania has been one of the least affected countries in the EU in terms of immigration and immigration policy. An undesirable stop for migrants, Romania has little to offer with many of their own countryfolk emigrating west. Romania accepted quotas for relocation efforts and did not construct fences during the 2015 exodus. Recently, however, shifts have occurred with militarization of their borders. Public support is moderate but many are leaving the country due to a lack of stability and economic growth. During Romania's presidency in 2019, the president sought to enhance member state solidarity to strengthen the EU-UN partnership regarding immigration (Neagu & Preoteasa, 2019). Romania's proximity to Ukraine has brought an influx of refugees second to Poland. These refugees continue to receive a warm reception.

Slovakia. Coming forward in direct response to accepting migrants, Slovakia stated "[We] will only take Christian migrants" (Smith-Spark, Cotovio, & Damon, 2015). The problem with such a claim is Slovakia's denouncement verbalizing what migrants will bring to their community: a phobia of alleged religious tendencies against the foundation of their country, and a phobia of the integration of immigrants into Slovakian culture. Slovakia determined the political reason for not accepting migrants, especially from the Middle East, was based on their low level of mosques and resources to benefit and integrate specific groups of migrants (Smith-Spark, Cotovio, & Damon, 2015). Such actions were also at the plight of the people not wanting their culture overrun by immigrants. Slovakia touts one of the lowest immigrant populations as migrants avoid the region. Slovakia joined neighboring countries by rejecting participation in the global migration pact (Gotev, 2018). The extremely low number of

refugees previously reported by Slovakia is now trumped by the welcoming of over 200,000 Ukrainian refugees.

Slovenia. Very anti-immigration, Slovenia responded to the migration crisis by constructing a razor wire fence along its Croatian border. This fence was unique in that it was constructed along an internal border and against another EU country. Being part of Schengen, Slovenia sought to bar access to the passportless travel area and shutdown entry through the Balkans route from Greece (Migrant crisis, 2016). Quick to protect borders against illegal movement, Slovenia agreed to EU relocation quotas once their border was secure. Slovenian government comprises of anti-migration voices supporting militarization of borders accompanied by a supporting public. Slovenia is accepting of Ukrainian refugees but slow to process and provide assistance. They remain relatively sluggish in their attempts to readily welcome refugees.

Spain. Public opinion and temperament toward immigration have fluctuated since 2015. Acceptance toward immigrants was increasing and overall positive. After the exodus, public view began to decline. Spain boasts the highest level of immigration per capita, yet public opinion and acceptance are not near the levels of more dissenting and even lesser affected member states (Enríquez & Rincken, 2021). Overall, Spain remains a collaborative and supportive partner of EU policies and governance.

Sweden. Joining in 1995, Sweden is a poster-child success story of joining the European Union and magnifying compliance. Initially, a country to proverbially drag its feet, the country has gone from skeptic to exceptionally Europeanized during its time in the EU. The reluctance of the country has changed over the years becoming one of the more welcoming and compliant nations in the EU (Hegeland, 2015). The policies of

Sweden tend to fall in congruence with EU policy but citizen discontent began rising with overly accepting migration policies (Hurd, 2015). Sweden accepted more immigrants per capita than any other European nation exhausting its social systems. Like other countries' discontent, Sweden had a shift in government toward a more anti-immigration party raising concerns for immigrants currently residing in the country.

Countries continue to form alliances and present barriers to reaching a common policy. These positions are prevalent based on how countries have independently reacted to immigration. Twelve countries recently produced a statement to the European VP, Home Affairs Commissioner, and the EU Presidency requesting for Schengen to be updated to permit physical barriers as a means of border protection (Brzozowski, 2021). Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia joined voice against the EU's current lack of immigration resolve.

Policy Stream

For the EU to move forward with a common immigration policy, the streams must develop individually. The problem is evident, but a viable and agreeable solution is still to be determined. Once a solution presents and the political climate among all actors (civilian, supranational, member state) is ideal, the opportunity–policy window–is ripe to appear on the agenda as a plausible policy. The topic of immigration is still very fragile for certain member states hence the streams not yet in a state of convergence. Clearly present by the political climate across several states in the EU, the streams are still lacking appropriate components preventing appearance on the agenda.

EU countries face a myriad of policy options—and preferences—regarding how to handle immigration and refugee arrivals. Policy options range in extremes with the far end of exclusion including closed doors and shoot to kill policy. Entrance is considered violence enabled trespass. Moving away from zero tolerance is the option to provide assistance from afar. This is somewhat similar to the EU-Turkey statement. Moving closer to a middle ground that still does not involve EU entrance are options for designated safe zones outside the EU. Moving toward policy options of more acceptance is the option to resettle migrants and refugees, but not in the EU. Bringing countries away from the extremes beyond EU borders is a policy to resettle in the EU but with security controls and limitations. With various levels of inclusion in between each policy option, the ultimate open-door policy is also an option—albeit unpopular by several countries—and to admit all with no restrictions. Outlining the specifics of each stream related to the current immigration policy challenges, the below table provides the policymaking conundrum plaguing the EU (see Table 5).

Table 5: EU Immigration Issues Applied to Kingdon’s Three Streams

Problem Stream	Policy Stream	Political Stream
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Crisis created by immigration and threats to Schengen. 2. Failure to agree on immigration reforms among member states. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Lacking agenda items and opt outs for countries. b. Enacted and underperforming regulations of Dublin. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Approaching EU negotiations on common immigration policy reform. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Turn back refugees. b. Help from afar. c. Safe zones. 2. What does the common immigration policy look like? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Capitulation of certain state rights. b. Resettle but not in the EU. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Member state’s creation of internal immigration policies. 2. EU implements asylum quotas. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Member states openly reject EU asylum quotas. 3. Hungary constructs external border fence to prohibit migrant entry. 4. Mediterranean entry points and migrant holding areas of Italy

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Decentralization of EU authority on failed reforms and agenda. 3. Increased state sovereignty accompanied with lacking integration. Enlargement and expansion without deepened integration. 4. Decline in open movement and increase in border security. 5. Continued development of independent immigration policies under rule of subsidiarity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. Resettle in the EU but with security controls. d. Open door policy. 3. What institutions are needed to manage and control internal immigration of irregular migrants? 4. How to enforce agreed regulations and policies across 27 member states? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Not allowing opt-outs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> and Greece reject migrant boats entry at their shores. 5. United Kingdom passes referendum to leave the EU. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Three years after the referendum, the UK left the EU.
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Given where countries currently stand on the immigration debacle, policy options do exist, however, the gravity of the problem and the politics surrounding immigration establish an alternative mix of policy options. The policy stream within this model contains the various policy options or policy prospects surrounding immigration. A common immigration policy has a myriad of options to be considered for the agenda and this dissertation looks at several of those options. A common immigration policy can start with agreement on one immigration item. Even coming to terms with a single item, the policy has the opportunity to grow and include other policies in the future like the Dublin iterations. Possible immigration policy options include adjustments to Schengen including border modification and security options, asylum/refugee policy, and protections for citizens.

To understand further a country's position and the future of a common immigration policy for the EU, surveys conducted with elites provide the premise of

country position and country preference for desired policy outcomes. Elites interviewed provided insightful information on the future of policymaking and how immigration policy can be reformed. Information obtained from elites is used to assess policy options. Once analysis on key interview data is provided, I am going to employ Senturion as the key analytic tool to predict the outcome of an immigration policy.


EU Opinion Analysis

The lack of a common immigration policy does not undermine that immigration is an important issue for member states. Immigration is a very important issue with different perspectives surrounding who and how borders should be protected or monitored. This research was based on obtaining opinions of European elites. Elites in this regard are both bureaucratic and political. Bureaucratic elites rank high in bureaucratic position who are appointed or acting in non-publicly voted positions. These include Directorate Generals, country representatives, and high-ranking individuals within EU agencies and offices within. Political elites are the policymakers at the top of political parties. They are elected within their parties and also by the public. These political elites are parliamentarians, ministers, commissioners, and other highly ranked elected officials. Combining the views of these elites with public opinion surveys, the data takes into consideration mapping of their preferences.

Based on the survey data with elites, immigration in general is an important issue for most member states, but data was split on who should control borders (see Figure 5). Overall, 33 of the 35 interviewees stated immigration was very important or rather important. Who should control borders, however, was overall split. This magnifies the


contention of where current policy responsibility rests and why immigration remains an issue of importance among member states.

Figure 5: Comparison of Border Control and Immigration




Discussing immigration and who should control borders, elites were asked about their own country's immigration policy. Overwhelmingly, individuals were dissatisfied with their own country's policy on immigration with 62% of respondents stating they were rather dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. A striking finding was that regardless of an elite's perception of their country's immigration policy, they were completely divided on who should control borders (see Figure 6). Although there was no statistical significance in border control, the divisiveness among elites and who should control borders highlights the struggles of policy cooperation.

Figure 6: Comparison of Border Control and Country Immigration Policy




Among public opinion of immigration policy, Figure 7 shows respondents of the WVS were similarly split on immigration policy and who should be welcomed into their country. Only 12% believed anyone should come in regardless of circumstance and 40% agreed that immigrants should be allowed to enter so long as jobs are available. Placing strict limits on immigrants accounted for 37% of opinion with 11% believing all people should be prohibited from coming into their country.

Figure 7: Comparison of WVS Public Opinion and Immigration Policy



The migration crisis created individual country policies that temporarily modified and threatened the fluidity of Schengen. Shifting to policies focused on Schengen modification and security options, interview questions specific to Schengen were asked including “how important is Schengen to your country” and “Schengen is outdated and needs to be eliminated”. These questions targeted changes being made on a country-by-country basis and examined perspectives on continuation of Schengen. When asked about the elimination of Schengen, elites were split. An interesting finding from this question was that every EU Commissioner interviewed believed that Schengen should be eliminated (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Comparison of Schengen View and EU Position




Schengen is outdated and needs to be eliminated.

During the same period of time as these interviews, Eurobarometer asked about Schengen. Results indicated the opposite view of Schengen. Regarding EU security, 55% of respondents agreed that Schengen contributes to EU security (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: EuroBarometer Question on Schengen


QA12 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the Schengen Area? (% - EU)



Source: European Commission (<https://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/documents/EuroBarometer-Schengen-Summary.pdf>)

A stark contrast emerged when asked about the importance of Schengen to their country. In correlation to immigration policy, nearly every elite stated that Schengen was important to their country (see Figure 10). Comparatively, EU citizens overwhelmingly agree that Schengen is good for their country.

Figure 10: Comparison of Importance of Schengen and Immigration



Although 61% of elites stated Schengen is outdated and needs to be eliminated, Schengen maintains a position of importance to elites. Inferences can be made that this leads into how Schengen affects a country regardless of whether it is a positive or negative perception. We know that immigration and border security remain interconnected on the country level. The challenge between supranationalism and sovereignty is demonstrated above. To assess views of immigration related to border security, a Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to examine the relationship between immigration and border control (see Tables 6 and 7). There was a significant

positive correlation, $r = .693$, $p < .01$, indicating border security concerns increased with immigration concerns. There was a strong relationship between these two variables as 48% of their variance was shared ($r^2 = .481$). Finding resolve between EU policy and state policy remains the challenge for addressing country specific concerns of immigration.

Table 6: Correlation of Importance of Schengen and Immigration

		How important is the issue of immigration for your country?	How important is border security to your country?
How important is the issue of immigration for your country?	Pearson Correlation	1	.693**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	35	35
How important is border security to your country?	Pearson Correlation	.693**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	35	35

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7: Variance of Importance of Schengen and Immigration

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.693 ^a	.481	.465	.472

a. Predictors: (Constant), How important is the issue of immigration for your country?

Assessing further the relationship between border security concerns and immigration concerns a simple regression was conducted (see Tables 8 and 9). Results indicated that these were significantly related, $b = .782$, $\beta = .693$.

Table 8: Regression of Border Security and Immigration Concern

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.815	1	6.815	30.571	.000 ^b
	Residual	7.356	33	.223		
	Total	14.171	34			

a. Dependent Variable: How important is border security to your country?

b. Predictors: (Constant), How important is the issue of immigration for your country?

Table 9: Regression of Border Security and Immigration Concern

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.223	.199		1.123	.269
	How important is the issue of immigration for your country?	.782	.141	.693	5.529	.000


a. Dependent Variable: How important is border security to your country?

During the same period of time, EU citizens identified immigration as the most important issue facing the EU up 2% from the beginning of the year with 40% of respondents citing immigration (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: EuroBarometer Most Important Issues Facing the EU

QAS What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?

(% - EU)



Source: European Commission - Eurobarometer 90 – Autumn 2018


Quotas and acceptance were widely criticized by many member states when the EU asked countries to burden share from inundated first entry peripheral countries. When asked about quotas and acceptance, results from the elites surveyed did not strongly mirror the animosity for acceptance publicly portrayed at the height of the migration crisis. Overall, 83% of elites were somewhat open or very open to accepting asylum quotas (see Table 10). When also considering granting refugee status to migrants, elites were overwhelmingly accepting (see Figure 12).

Table 10: Frequency of Elite's Position on Accepting Asylum Quotas

How open are you to accepting asylum quotas?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very open	23	65.7	65.7	65.7
	Somewhat open	6	17.1	17.1	82.9
	Not very open	4	11.4	11.4	94.3
	Not open at all	1	2.9	2.9	97.1
	No Answer	1	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Figure 12: Comparison of Accepting Asylum Quotas and Granting Refugee Status



A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to examine the relationship between granting refugee status and accepting asylum quotas (see Tables 11 and 12). The results yielded a significant positive correlation between accepting asylum quotas and granting refugee status, $r = .650$, $p < .01$, indicating that acceptance of asylum quotas increased with refugee status. There was a strong relationship between these two variables as approximately 42% of the variance was shared ($r^2 = .423$).

Table 11: Correlation of Accepting Asylum Quotas and Granting Refugee Status

		How open are you to accepting asylum quotas?	Countries should be generous in granting refugee status.
How open are you to accepting asylum quotas?	Pearson Correlation	1	.650**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	35	35
Countries should be generous in granting refugee status.	Pearson Correlation	.650**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	35	35

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 12: Variance of Accepting Asylum Quotas

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.650 ^a	.423	.405	1.013

a. Predictors: (Constant), How open are you to accepting asylum quotas?

Aside from a possible immigration policy focusing on borders, external migrants, or border security, some countries have expressed concern over citizen protections and that immigration policies would not violate or diminish current citizen rights. Such a policy would focus on maintaining rights, safety, and internal security of citizens. Questions pertaining to activities within country borders were asked. Specifically, “what degree are you concerned about a terrorist attack” and “what degree are you concerned about mass scale public unrest”. Public unrest was specifically focused on specific public acts such as riots, violent protesting, or uncontrollable large scale public violence. The relationship between these two variables provided an interesting relationship.

A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to examine the relationship between concern about mass scale public unrest and concern about a terrorist attack (see Table 13). The results yielded a significant positive correlation between concerns about mass scale public unrest and concern about a terrorist attack, $r = .484$, $p < .01$. This relationship indicated that when there was decreased concern about public unrest, there was more concern about a terrorist attack. When the public was content, there was more concern about a terrorist attack. In comparison to citizen opinion, the public, too, stated that a terrorist attack was of great concern for the EU. As one of two major concerns the EU is facing, terrorism was identified second to immigration (see Figure 11).


Table 13: Correlation of Concerns about Terrorist Attacks and Public Unrest

		Correlations	
		What degree are you concerned about mass scale public unrest	What degree are you concerned about a terrorist attack?
What degree are you concerned about mass scale public unrest	Pearson Correlation	1	.484**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.003
	N	35	35
What degree are you concerned about a terrorist attack?	Pearson Correlation	.484**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	
	N	35	35

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Despite the continued failure of a common immigration policy and some stark negative views, not all is demise for the EU. Elites continue to have a deal of confidence in the EU directly related to public contentment. Confidence was overall high with 74% of elites stating they had quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in the EU (see Figure 13).

Figure 13: Comparison of Confidence in EU and Concern Public Unrest



A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to examine the relationship between concern about mass-scale public unrest and confidence in the EU (see Table 14). The results yielded a significant positive correlation between concerns about mass scale public unrest and confidence in the EU, $r = .492$, $p < .01$. This relationship indicated that when the public was content, there was greater confidence in the EU. There was a significant relationship between these two variables as 24% of their variance was shared ($r^2 = .242$) (see Table 15).

Table 14: Correlation of Confidence in EU and Public Unrest

		How much confidence do you have in the EU?	What degree are you concerned about mass scale public unrest
How much confidence do you have in the EU?	Pearson Correlation	1	-.492**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.003
	N	35	35
What degree are you concerned about mass scale public unrest	Pearson Correlation	-.492**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	
	N	35	35

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 15: Variance of Public Unrest

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.492 ^a	.242	.219	.766

a. Predictors: (Constant), What degree are you concerned about mass scale public unrest

Concerning views of confidence in the EU, public opinion expressed a more negative view of the EU compared to elites. Figure 14 shows public opinion and EU confidence slightly split with 46% of respondents stating they have quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in the EU. Whereas Figure 15 shows that among interviewed elites, 74% had quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in the EU

Figure 14: Comparison of WVS Public Opinion and Confidence of EU





Figure 15: Comparison of Elite Opinion and Confidence of EU



Data gathered through interviews provided insights on the wide dissensions of elite views and perspectives with possible collaborative underpinnings. This magnifies the problem the EU is facing with their immigration policy and the future of obtaining such a policy. In conjunction with public opinion, certain divisions exist between public perception and elite opinion. Taking into consideration previous studies to map longitudinal references, the opinions of elites are further evaluated. With the obtained information, Senturion will be used to further expound on the current challenges to predict if elites can reach an agreement.

Senturion Analysis of Policy Preferences

Agent-based modeling utilizes stakeholder analyses to anticipate decision-making. Using the Senturion program, preferences of stakeholders are predicted to assess current and probable future developments of achieving a common immigration policy (see Appendix C). The model uses Black's median voter theory that shows the winning position in a pairwise comparison of all alternatives is the median. Distance from the median defines an agent's risk profile¹¹—those close to the median are risk-averse, and those farther from the median are risk acceptant.¹² An agent attempts to achieve its goal subject to risk tradeoffs estimated in a game-theoretical context.¹³ Using such information, the model maps potential decisions by calculating pairwise interactions for each dyad colored by risk perceptions. Given the median outcome, the model analyzes

¹¹ Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. *Journal of Political Economy*, 56, 23–34.

¹² Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. *Econometrica*, 32(1/2), 122-136; and Arrow, K. (1965). The theory of risk aversion, in Yrjö Jahnssonin Saatio, Helsinki, *Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing*.

¹³ Lalman, D. (1987). Conflict resolution and peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(3); 590-615.

how agents will attempt to change other actor's positions, and to what degree will they succeed. The model reports individual actor moves and their influence on the overall median. Iterations stop when agents see no potential to influence others. Predictions are reliable for the duration of policy control by current governments or if the replacement does not shift current positions.

Senturion assumes that agents hold rational preferences that are complete—all choices are disclosed. Applications are only valid to single picked monotonic and symmetrically declining utility preferences away from the preferred position of an actor. The decision-making landscape is built from data on policy positions by competing actors whose commitment to their position are affected by influence weighted by the importance they attach to the outcome on the contested issue.

A country's immigration policy position and those of elites tend to be fluid and changing with government dynamics. Hence has been the recurring evaluation by scholars when discussing EU immigration. As cited earlier, most literature on EU immigration policy considers the EU's situation as an iterative current event rather than a policy problem. Scholars ultimately forego evaluation of policy implications by trying to address the immigration situation as it unfolds, speculating on future developments based on event occurring in real time. The position of countries are open-source policy positions and taken into consideration by Senturion. Senturion anticipates future behavior repeatedly analyzing changing structures resulting from accepted proposals across numerous actors, all of which seek to maximize their net gains. Perceptions are created by considering the gains and losses of not acting at all compared to the anticipated outcomes of intervening conditions on expectations that third parties will join, oppose, or

remain neutral. Each agent perceives potential payoffs differently based on their risk propensity and the importance attached to the issue. Change is driven in part by real opportunities, and also by unseen opportunities generated by differences in risk and importance across agents. The Senturion agent-based model is performed with the highest level of accuracy and granularity achieving an accuracy of over 90% for baseline projections in policy analysis.¹⁴

Senturion Data Results

The policies on immigration include a variety of options from closed doors to accepting all refugees and immigrants with open arms. In assessing the time dependent variation in stakeholders' preferences, the base is taken from the work of Yeşilada, et al (2017) as presented under "Position" in black on the left in Table 16. The green numbers in the middle represent pre-Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the third option in red to the right represents post-Russian invasion of Ukraine. All "Client/Proxy" and "Veto" were no. In terms of operationalizing these preferences the following scale is employed:

EU IMMIGRATION POLICY 2022

- 0 — Fortress Europe**
- 20 — Turn Back Refugees**
- 40 — Help From Afar Only**
- 50 — Safe Zones Outside Europe**
- 70 — Resettle Not in Europe**
- 80 — Current SQ: Resettle in Europe with Controls**
- 100 — Accept all Refugees with Open Arms**

¹⁴ I am most grateful to Professor Jacek Kugler for assisting me in the agent-based analysis of EU immigration data using Senturion program. I appreciate his time, effort, and support for this project. For a technical assessment see various contributions in Jacek Kugler and Yi Feng ed 1997, The expected utility approach to policy decision making. *International Interactions*, 23. Abdollahian, M. and Alsharabati, C. (2003), Modeling the strategic effects of risk and perceptions in linkage politics. *Rationality and Society*, 16; Abdollahian, M., Baranick, M., Efirid, B., and Kugler, J. (2006). *Senturion: Predictive political simulation model*. Defense and technology paper, 32, Center for Technology and National Security Policy.

Table 16: Stakeholder Preferences on Immigration and Refugee Policy in the EU

AGENT	GROUP	POSITION	INFLUENCE	GROUP INFLUENCE	IMPORTANCE
Austria	Eurozone	70 60 80	10	100	50 50 70
Belgium	Eurozone	60 65 75	10	100	70 75 80
Cyprus	Eurozone	20 20 45	4	100	80 70 80
Estonia	Eurozone	55 80 20	4	100	40 40 60
Finland	Eurozone	55 85 85	7	100	40 50 85
France	Eurozone	80 80 70	75	100	85 65 65
Germany	Eurozone	80 70 85	100	100	70 70 75
Greece	Eurozone	80 35 85	10	100	60 50 70
Ireland	Eurozone	80 80 90	5	100	40 50 70
Italy	Eurozone	60 30 85	50	100	80 55 80
Latvia	Eurozone	55 50 80	4	100	40 40 60
Lithuania	Eurozone	55 20 75	4	100	40 40 60
Luxembourg	Eurozone	60 75 75	4	100	70 70 70
Malta	Eurozone	20 15 65	3	100	80 70 80
Netherlands	Eurozone	65 50 75	10	100	60 75 80
Portugal	Eurozone	80 90 90	10	100	50 80 90
Slovenia	Eurozone	20 15 75	4	100	80 50 70
Slovakia	Eurozone	20 20 85	4	100	90 80 80
Spain	Eurozone	70 80 85	20	100	60 60 90
Bulgaria	Eurozone	25 5 90	4	100	75 35 50
Czech	Eurozone	20 15 80	4	100	80 80 90
Denmark	EU	40 25 80	7	30	80 80 80
Hungary	EU	5 5 85	10	30	90 40 80
Poland	EU	10 10 85	20	30	65 60 90
Romania	EU	75 55 85	5	30	40 65 80
Sweden	EU	35 35 90	10	30	40 30 90
Croatia	EU	20 15 80	4	30	80 80 80


Position Color Key:

EU Position- Base Analysis (Findings from the Yeşilada et. al. Study Immigration I)

EU Position- Pre-Ukraine War


EU Position- Post-Ukraine War

Figure 16: EU Country Immigration Policy Base Position



round 1 2 3

Figure 17: EU Country Immigration Policy Base Senturion Prediction



round 1 2 3

Figures 16 and 17 present the base positions on immigration and Senturion's prediction. In this case, there is no consensus on a Common European policy on immigration and refugees. However, since their study, member states have shown some shift in their policy preferences based on data obtained for this dissertation shown in Figures 18 and 19.

Figure 18: EU Country Immigration Position Pre-Ukrainian War





Figure 19: EU Country Immigration Policy Position Pre-Ukrainian War Senturion Prediction



Dissenters at 75-80: Belgium, Spain, Luxemburg, Ireland, Finland, Portugal

The initial spread of policy preferences in the above figures covers almost all of the options available for EU countries. However, through bargaining, the Senturion program predicts large coalition around Turn Back Refugees. This is most likely due to rise of tribalism in member states citizens and growing tension between refugees and local residents being reflected in national government policies.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, one observes a fundamental shift to resettle the refugees in Europe starkly different than previous positions. Yet, this is an anomaly. It is highly unlikely this drastic shift from results in Figure 16 to results Figure 20 is for all refugees and immigrants. The dramatic events simply made the EU members more willing to accept people escaping the Russian army than an open-door policy for others from Third world countries. Figure 21 shows the results of Senturion's prediction and policy position post-Ukrainian war.

Figure 20: EU Country Immigration Position Post-Ukrainian War





Figure 21: EU Country Immigration Policy Position Post-Ukrainian War Senturion Prediction



Dissenters: Estonia, Cyprus, Malta

Assessment

Interviewing elites provided insight to positional stances in comparison to public opinion. Although WVS has a much larger pool of respondents than interviewed elites, the overall consensus among elites is that they possess a more positive view and hope in the EU regardless of position. This confidence, however, does not transpire into immigration policy consensus. The combination of public opinion and elite views collected circles back to the importance of Kingdon's model. Incorporating public opinion into the analysis and the variety of stakeholders beyond elites illustrates the disconnect toward the plausibility of a common immigration policy. While elites maintain hope for the EU, public opinion remains heavily divided on EU success.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine creates unique one-off policy positions open to accepting refugees and immigrants in a policy shift that does not appear to extend to countries beyond Europe, nor did it set precedence for the EU to drastically shift overall EU immigration position. These positions, however, represent a temporary shift specifically developed for Ukrainians, not everyone. Ukraine and their "Europeanness" exposes the double standard of EU immigration and refugee discrimination. The cultural significance of looking, acting and being European culturally assisted Ukrainians in their successful welcome to EU countries. Current open-door policies offered to Ukraine act as a catalyst for the shift to closed doors. The millions of Ukrainian refugees settling within EU borders further weigh on the ability to accept and relocate others knocking on the EU's door. Although appearing generous in the situation, these temporary policy position

shifts are making EU countries more rigid in how to continue beyond this secondary crisis.

EU policy positions—excluding the current Ukrainian exception—more clearly outline consistency of country positions for long term policy success and consensus. Comparing the position of elites on immigration policy and the predictions of Senturion pre-Ukraine, projections are slim for country consensus. Using these positions as the standard application to everyone beyond European neighbors, Senturion predicts that EU country domestic policies will shift to Fortress Europe. This is demonstrated with both Malta and Cyprus still supporting closed doors despite the Ukrainian influx. Further, treatment of immigrants with the MENA upheaval and exodus to the EU is starkly different in comparison to current EU acceptance of Ukrainians. Such differences are clearly defined by the continuous failures and contentions of past immigration policy attempts.

Following Kingdon's methodology, the converging of immigration problems, politics, and policies are naught to provide a policy window. The juncture of Kingdon's agenda setting and the prediction of Senturion's model indicate it does not appear plausible for the EU to establish a common immigration policy that is truly inclusive for all non-European countries in all situations. Positions of countries on the spectrum of "fortress Europe to open arms" limits intergovernmental negotiations and the ability to reach complete consensus. Political dynamics remain strained as member states positionally align to maintain state rights.

Together, views of public opinion, Senturion, and Kingdon's agenda setting approach indicate the future inability to create a common immigration policy. Regardless

of elite hopes and views of EU confidence, data presents the contrary. The positive communal concerns over immigration policy, acceptance of asylum quotas, and granting of refugee status are glaringly unique to actual policy formations and policy opinions indicated by the blatant split in dynamics over control of policy, borders, and Schengen. Even with acceptance and softening of controls with the Ukrainian crisis, EU countries will continue to remain opposed to one governing and inclusive immigration policy.

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Pulling back the blanket of exemptions the Ukrainian crisis brought to EU immigration policy, the fragile and scattered political detritus of a common policy persists. The EU stands in a unique situation due to the increasing nature of member states enacting their own immigration policies and the standing conflict with subsidiarity. Such actions continue to remain commonplace. With the EU's current approach and based on the application of Kingdon and Senturion, pursuing a common immigration policy is not recommended. Conflicting internal dynamics between supranational and intergovernmental institutions magnify the theoretical discussion presented and the complexity of the problem. However, achieving a common immigration policy would be ideal and monumental for the EU, but in all likelihood not a reality. The divergence between subsidiarity and supranational governance involving internal and external security policy weighs heavily toward national interest. This national preference deepens the intergovernmental nature of policies like immigration and security.

Paths exist to achieve an immigration policy should all countries agree to some relinquishment of state rights. Demonstrated through the data and literature, this is not a conventional option for several countries. If the EU pursues and implements changes systematically and in an iterative manner, small approaches may lead to more consensus and compliance. All this is contingent on the EU—and its member states—desiring an overarching immigration policy. One alternative to help in achieving a common policy would be to eliminate and prohibit any existing opt-outs. Countries continue to have the option to opt-out of certain EU policies. This places countries who want to opt-out in a

predicament of being forced to accept a policy. Another alternative would be to assess whether a common policy is legitimately wanted across all member states and the best fit for the EU as the whole. A mutual concern among member states is that they want to control their own immigration situation. Countries sit in two camps: (1) those anticipating the policy green-light from the EU directing that state policy should take precedence over a common immigration policy; (2) countries prepared to follow supranational guidance waiting for the EU to tell them what to do.

Leaving immigration to the member states may have recourse for the EU, but a common policy could be adopted on a lesser level supplemented by member state policy. Deciding who should control borders remains the key question for the EU to determine. Continuing on their current path with no commonality for controlling internal and external borders, the EU will remain divided and on a path of decentralization. The EU's framework of promoting regional integration will continue to stall by instigating leanings toward less unification. Penalizing member states has little effect as countries ultimately get what they want: maintaining their sovereignty and carrying out their desired policy. An EU immigration policy allowing for broader interpretation of some immigration aspects, yet defined with a few mandates to control for larger issues, can lead to overall compliance in a way that draws policy consensus without defiance. Maintaining status quo will not lead to policy agreements and will drive the EU toward fortress Europe.

This research has explored the governing structures and policies that have produced the EU's current immigration plight. These challenges are what scholars and literature have attempted to define, yet fallen short. The myriad of actors involved in policymaking—beyond elites—present a practical explanation and policy forecast not

offered by other methodologies. Involvement of institutions, public, non-policy actors, and other outlying entities has been identified as necessary in pursuit of the research question. Researching the topic from a lens focused on Kingdon's agenda setting, the three streams, and policy windows rather than from current events, will more accurately determine policy outcomes. Research demonstrated that opinions of both political elites and citizens are needed to determine the fate of the EU's common immigration policy. In addition, EU institutions showed a significant effect on policy formulation between elites and the public. With Kingdon's model, researching the failure of EU consensus for a common immigration policy outlines future methodological approaches to identify policy success and failure. Agenda setting provided a substantial explanatory power to address the complexities of immigration policy in multilevel governance. Utilizing public opinion against elite opinion, the policy debacle was magnified and ultimately indicated that attainment of a common immigration policy is unlikely.

The field of immigration policy stands to benefit from this contribution to the academic and political field. Kingdon has not been widely adapted in governance beyond the limited uses within the US and certain fields of study. This research demonstrates there is no limitation in application of Kingdon's agenda setting model and that the three streams can be applied to non-American settings and to complex policy issues that involve "n" number of stakeholders. Expanding Kingdon's methodology has proven to be both feasible and applicable. Further, even within issues that appear current event focused, it has been demonstrated how the model can extend and complement the time sensitive decision analysis with a dynamic model (Senturion). Whereas Kingdon's model lays out the complex landscape of what are the problem, politics, and policy options it

does not readily make itself available for projecting what might happen. In conjunction with Senturion, the foundation of agenda setting expands to become a larger predictive model.

Kingdon is at best a post-decision explanatory model, as demonstrated by the several literary works utilizing Kingdon for policymaking explanation. It is not predictive and has only been used to explain the decision-making process of specific areas. This research proves what a likely outcome will be within a complex decision model. Using Kingdon and Senturion together, it can be predicted what is possible. Despite the gravity of the immigration situation in the EU, my prediction is that the EU will not receive a consensus on an immigration policy. Based on the research, the EU will continue to act in a way of settling with the lowest common denominator by continually placing band-aids on the problem. What direction the EU goes what countries decide to do can be determined using this research model.

The predictive capabilities of this research are vast and validate the feasibility of applying Kingdon beyond American politics. Future research can use this paradigm by expanding Kingdon's model with a predictive model (such as Senturion) to provide the most likely scenario and outcome for a research question. Utilizing this research and application of Kingdon in European politics, future research studies can more accurately assess and predict not only immigration policy in the EU, but various policies and governing structures globally where application has been questioned or ignored.

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Appendix A: Interview Guide

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview and research. The purpose of this research and interview guide is to assess attitudes toward immigrants and why the EU does not have a common immigration policy. In addition, it is the intent of this research to further assess the interrelational nature between supranational and intergovernmental institutions in the decision-making process. This interview and subsequent analyses of collected data will provide significant interpretations of state and supranational governance. Your information and identity will remain confidential in this process, so please know your opinions and views will not be linked directly to you. This will take less than 10 minutes of your time.

Interview Guide

Q1. How important is the issue of immigration for your country?

1. Very important
2. Rather important
3. Not very important
4. Not important at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q2. Consider border security and the movement of people, can you tell me how important Schengen is to your country?

1. Very important
2. Rather important
3. Not very important
4. Not important at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q3. Speaking of borders, over the past year Schengen has been in the media for many reasons. Can you tell me how much you would agree or disagree with this statement: Schengen is outdated and needs to be changed.

1. Completely agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Completely disagree
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q4. To what degree are you concerned about the following situations?

a. Mass scale public unrest

1. Very much
2. A good deal
3. Not much
4. Not at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

b. A terrorist attack

1. Very much
2. A good deal
3. Not much
4. Not at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q5. In your opinion, how likely is a common immigration policy for the EU?

1. Very likely
2. Rather likely
3. Not very likely
4. Not likely at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q6. Do you consider immigration as an economic issue?

1. Very much
2. A good deal
3. Not much
4. Not at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q7. Can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: I consider my country to be a more desirable European destination to immigrants compared to other European countries.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q8. How satisfied are you with your own country's policy on immigration?

1. Very satisfied
2. Rather satisfied
3. Rather dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q9. People sometimes talk about who should control country borders. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider as the most important entity to control borders? The EU or Member State?

First Choice Second Choice

The EU

Member States

Q10. Consider the EU proposed asylum quotas to distribute immigrants proportionately across the EU. How open are you to accepting asylum quotas?

1. Very open
2. Somewhat open
3. Not very open
4. Not open at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q11. Can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: Countries should be generous in its granting of refugee status.

1. Strongly agree
2. Rather agree
3. Rather disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q12. With Britain's vote to leave the EU, can you tell me how important future expansion and integration is to the EU?

1. Very important
2. Rather important
3. Not very important
4. Not important at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q13. Can you tell me how much confidence you have in the EU?

1. A great deal
2. Quite a lot
3. Not very much
4. Not at all
5. Don't know
6. No answer

Q14. How many years have you been in your position?

Q15. How, if at all, have your position responsibilities changed over the last five years?

Q16. How, if at all, do you see your position changing or evolving over the next few years?

Q17. How, if at all, do you see immigration evolving over the next few years?

Q18. How, if at all, do you see expansion and enlargement affected by immigration?

Q19. Do you have any recommendations or suggestions of other individuals I should speak to or contact?

Q20. What is your occupation?

1. Commission
2. Parliament
3. Directorate General
4. Permanent Representative
5. Other

Q21. Country of representation?

Signature and Date Completed

Appendix B: Consent Form

You are being asked to take part in a research study of EU policymaking and immigration policy. I am asking you to take part because you are key policymaker of your country and viable asset to the course of this research project. Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study.

What the research is about: The research is about institution and state attitudes of immigrants and immigration policy. It evaluates policymaking level perceptions to those of public perceptions.

What I will ask you to do: If you agree to the research project, I will conduct an interview with you. The interview will include questions about your job, your country's immigration policies, subsidiarity, and policy. The interview will take about 30 minutes to complete.

Risks and benefits: There is the risk that you may find some of the questions about your country's policies from your point of view as a policymaker to be sensitive. There are no benefits to you. I hope to learn more about your country's immigration policies and where you understand your state to be in relation to EU policy.

Compensation: You will receive no compensation

Your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report I make public I will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. Your name, position, and other identifying information will remain confidential. Research records will be kept in an encrypted file, anything transcribed to a computer will be encrypted; only the researchers will have access to the records. If you

allow for a tape-record interview, recordings will not be kept indefinitely. I will destroy the recording after it has been transcribed and encrypted, which I anticipate will be within two months of its taping.

Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this interview is completely voluntary. You may skip any questions you do not want to answer. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time.

If you have questions: I will be conducting the interview. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact me at (503)310-2303 or at jamie.surface@pdx.edu. If you have any concerns or questions regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Portland State University at (503) 725-5484 or access their website at <https://sites.google.com/a/pdx.edu/research/integrity/human-subjectshttp://www.irb.cornell.edu/>. You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.

Your Signature _____ Date _____

Your Name (printed)

In addition to agreeing to participate, I also consent to having the interview tape-recorded.

Your Signature _____ Date _____

Signature of person obtaining consent _____ Date _____

Printed name of person obtaining consent _____ Date _____

This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the study and was approved by the IRB on [date].

Appendix C: Research Specifics

Protection of Human Subjects

The use of human subjects was part of this research study. To protect the human subjects, each interviewee was given a consent form with the option to refuse or participate in the research process (Appendix B). The protocol outlined in the consent form was adhered to at all times. Although individuals were public figures, protecting the identity of the individuals was a priority to ensure the success of this study. Names or other identifying characteristics were not identified during this write-up or publication of this document to protect the identity of the interviewee. Consent was first obtained by IRB to ensure appropriate and satisfactory measures are taken to protect the human subjects in this study.

Data Sources

Controlling for influence of the public on policy or country motivations, public sentiments of immigration and institutional policy were assessed through the creation of an index using a combination of the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS). Survey data from these resources is long standing as a global standard in soliciting unbiased public opinion. For over 30 years, the WVS in particular, reevaluates on a consistent basis to obtain up-to-date information on public perceptions. The new survey wave in 2017-2019 resulted in the EVS combining their efforts with the WVS to save on time and resources. The surveys evaluate Europeans and how they deal with conflicting perspectives and their position on perceptions and concerns. Understanding

public sentiments and the role of elites was best attained and analyzed through a combination of these research tools.

Primary data was furnished through interviews with elites. This information was collected using a structured questionnaire with the option for open ended feedback. Developing the survey in this manner provided valuable insight into current intergovernmental struggles and immigration policy concerns from an individual perspective. With the structure of the questionnaire, policy officials were able to openly express their opinions and thoughts on the current immigration situation yielding invaluable information from some of the EU's most prominent individuals. Furthermore, scaled questions were designed to elicit a firm response rather than a non-compliant or deferred answer.

Secondary alternatives for this data were not an option as such data did not exist. Elite interviews were the most complex data source to obtain. Conducted on-site in Europe, the home base of research was Brussels, Belgium. Travel and stay in Belgium was necessary for the duration of the data collection. Time was limited to eight weeks due to the impending summer adjournment of EU offices and researcher availability to travel to Belgium. To obtain interviews, solicitations to elites were sent prior to arrival in Brussels to procure interviews with mild success.

Severe limitations in access to elites existed due to presenting as a self-funded American researcher without an internship, study visit, or other country/scholastic/official sponsorship. Access to buildings and individuals was therefore solely based on the ability to receive an invitation to an individual's office. In all, 313 electronic inquiries of interview solicitation were sent to commissioners,

parliamentarians, designated representatives, head of states, ministers, directorate generals, and other high-level servicing officials. While the majority of interviews were conducted within Brussels, on several occasions due to the location and nature of an individual's work and schedule, travel to other countries was required. Overall, 32 interviews were completed in five different countries, 31 in English, and one was completed with an interpreter. In addition, 10 surveys were completed and returned via email. Electronic survey return rate was 66.6%. A total of 37 interviews¹⁵ were acceptable for use. This was due to some individuals not being at the level necessary to be quantified as elite.

WVS/EVS data is open source and readily available since the first wave was completed in 1981. Currently in its seventh wave, data for this analysis will include the most current wave of collected information. A compilation of the WVS/EVS prior to the seventh wave was created to produce a more extensive data tool.

Use of correlation analysis was used to assess statistical significance for both public and elite views. After independent analysis of both research questions, public and elite data was merged to provide the analysis for the research question of the link between immigration policy and institutions. The results of this data are interpreted in relation to the research questions proposed.

Data Instruments

Data collection began with gathering quantitative data to assess populous sentiments of immigrants. These data are collected through the operationalization of the

¹⁵ At the time of interviews, the United Kingdom was still part of the EU. Elites interviewed representing the UK were removed from analysis.

WVS/EVS by means of an immigration index and compared against Eurobarometer. The immigration index used for analysis of interviews comprises of specific questions from the combined WVS/EVS related to public view of immigrants. Rather than engage in the time and resources of surveying mass quantities of individuals, the consistency of the WVS makes it an appropriate tool to quantify public opinion of immigrants and a superior secondary source of information. Available data for all 27 member states is based on availability of survey results within the WVS/EVS. Given the information the survey provides, it is an efficient and reliable resource regardless of missing data during certain waves. The index was used to extrapolate data making conjectures based on the sentiments of immigration (and their perception of “the other”). Once this information was analyzed, it was assessed with the data derived from personal interviews.

To remain consistent and have comparable items for analysis against public sentiments, WVS/EVS data provided the premise for creation of the survey for elites. As specified, qualitative data came through interviewing elites. These interviews were conducted using a semi-structured format with predetermined scaled questions in addition to open ended questions (Appendix A). At the time of interview, interviewees were assured their identity would remain anonymous, however, all noted that as a public official they were completely comfortable expressing their opinions or if their opinions were made known. Regardless, names and identities are to remain confidential. Scaled interview questions at the beginning of the questionnaire were structured to elicit a firm/committed response. Inconclusive or indecisive answers such as “not sure”, “neither”, “neutral”, or “both” were not included. The options of “no answer” or “don’t know” were offered alternatives but rarely chosen as a response. The findings of scaled

interview questions were further analyzed in conjunction with WVS/EVS results to determine if any correlation existed between immigration policy and immigrant perceptions. Evaluating in this manner provided a more complete analysis of current policy roadblocks juxtaposed with public opinion in answering why the EU does not have a common immigration policy. Once the two individual data sets were analyzed, the findings were compared for further analysis. Achieving final results, the data was interpreted, and the appropriate final analysis was evaluated.

Overview of Senturion

Senturion has been used for a variety of cases ranging from complex diplomatic and business negotiations to anticipation and evolution of conflicts. Given all the components in the data, Senturion simulates political dynamics and future interactions to predict the outcome of negotiations. The model uses Black's median voter theory that shows the winning position in a pairwise comparison of all alternatives is the median. Distance from the median defines an agent's risk profile—those close to the median are risk averse and those farther from the median are risk acceptant.¹⁶ An agent attempts to achieve its goal subject to risk tradeoffs estimated in a game theoretical context.¹⁷ Using such information, the model maps potential decisions by calculating pairwise interactions for each dyad colored by risk perceptions. Given the median outcome, the model analyzes how agents will attempt to change other actor's positions and to what degree they will succeed. The model reports individual actor moves and their influence on the overall

¹⁶ Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. *Journal of Political Economy*. 56, 23–34.
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large, *Econometrica*, 32(1/2), 122-136; and Arrow, K. and Saatio, Y. J. (1965). The theory of risk aversion, In *Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing*, Helsinki.

¹⁷ Lalman, D. (1987). Conflict resolution and peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(3), 590-615.

median. Iterations stop when agents see no potential to influence others. Stability emerges when a winning coalition coalesces around a median outcome—the smaller the dispersion the more stable the outcome. Dissent will take place when coalitions form but do not coalesce. Confrontations take place when the distance between such coalitions is large. Predictions are reliable for the duration of policy control by current governments or if the replacement does not shift current positions. This analysis applies to all political disputes where agents have a say in the outcome but does not apply to market-driven events determined by the pricing of goods.

Senturion assumes that agents hold complete rational preferences—all choices are disclosed. Ordered—all choices can be ranked. Transitive—consistent ranking of choices from best to worst holds. Applications are only valid to single-picked monotonic and symmetrically declining utility preferences away from the preferred position of an actor. The decision-making landscape is built from data on policy positions by competing relevant actors whose commitment to their position are affected by influence weighted by the importance they attach to the outcome on the contested issue. Senturion anticipates future behavior repeatedly analyzing changing structures resulting from accepted proposals across numerous actors all of which seek to maximize their net gains. Perceptions are created by considering the gains and losses of not acting at all compared to the anticipated outcomes of intervening conditions on expectations that third parties will join, oppose, or remain neutral. Each agent perceives potential payoffs differently based on their risk propensity and the importance attached to the issue. Change is driven in part by real opportunities, and also by unseen opportunities generated by differences in risk and importance across agents. The Senturion agent based model performs with the

highest level of accuracy and granularity, achieving an accuracy of over 90% for baseline projections in policy analysis.

Limitations

Much like threats to validity, limitations to the study were based on access to individuals to conduct interviews. As elites made time in their political schedules to meet, time restrictions were the greatest challenge. Interviews needed to be conducted efficiently and sometimes in under 15 minutes due to the rigorous schedules of some elites. Due to time restrictions, there were some interviewees who did not or could not answer the open-ended questions. As this was a survey involving elites conducted abroad, there were size limitations due to time constraints. The measurement tools for public opinion survey data could pose a limitation. Deciding to use secondary data with the WVS/EVS, care needs to be taken to create the indexes to evaluate Europeans and how they manage with conflicting perspectives. As the secondary data is not first-hand creation, it may not completely contain data available for concerns of immigration or may not include all applicable states. This particular data, however, could change and be reflective of current public opinion based on when the data is used for analysis.

Validity

Necessary to consider for any research project are threats to the validity of the design, data collection, and methodological approach. After successfully conducting the interviews, a noted threat to validity may be the number of interviews obtained. For replication purposes, the results or conclusions from the data may vary based on the number of individuals interviewed. However, the collected data from elites were not

meant to be a representative sample. In addition, the results could produce different results based on the parties evaluated or not incorporating political party diversity among interviewees. Access to elites, members of parliament, or other policymaking individuals did not pose a direct challenge. As one of the functioning and publishing languages of the EU is English, there was a little barrier in communicating with the interviewees. Interviews were completed to the extent that additional information was not needed beyond the scope of the original interview. All respondents were willing and highly cooperative in answering all questions and completing the interviews. Controlling for personal bias was necessary and easily avoided to ensure proper measurement and interpretation of the data. Other threats to validity include the depth of the available literature and resources needed to further evaluate applicable literature and results.