On Communicative Competence: Its Nature and Origin

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THESIS APPROVAL

The abstract and thesis of Mary Lou Emerson for the Master of Arts in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages were presented May 30, 2000, and accepted by the thesis committee and the department.

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ABSTRACT


The purpose of this thesis is to trace the lineage of the term communicative competence (CC) and to provide a framework for understanding the term CC, a controversial term introduced by Hymes (1972). This paper argues that the term CC is only meaningful if it includes competence in the same sense as Chomsky (1980) defines it—underlying knowledge of the rules of language severed from ability. Although Chomsky discusses competence in terms of grammar, he suggests that there may be underlying knowledge of language use—pragmatic competence. In the end, I will attempt to demonstrate the possibility that there is a competence of communication—pragmatic competence, like Chomsky's grammatical competence, and that both these competencies should be integrated into a theory of CC.

This paper focuses on the theories of four linguists—Hymes (1972), Halliday (1977), Savignon (1983), and Bachman (1990). Hymes and Halliday represent the empirical approach to CC—language is learned through experience with a speaker/hearer’s native language. Savignon and Bachman represent the rational approach to CC—language is acquired through the interaction of grammatical competence with the speaker/hearer’s native or second language. Savignon (1983) and Bachman (1990) maintain a distinction between competence and performance; and in this respect, I believe, they
provide a more adequate theory of CC by including Chomsky's *grammatical competence*.

Bachman (1990) theorizes that *competence* includes grammatical and pragmatic competence. Neurolinguistic studies by Ross (1981) and others support the theory that we possess underlying knowledge of pragmatics—*communicative competence*.

Based on the above theories of CC and neuropsychological findings, I present a deductive model of CC which illustrates the intersection of UG, grammatical and pragmatic knowledge of language with Hymes and Halliday's theories of CC. Chomsky's UG has been expanded to include universal rules of pragmatics—Grice's Maxims (1975). UG combined with grammatical and pragmatic knowledge of language underlies the orderly processing of primary linguistic data and the rhythmic production of comprehensible speech. The organizing properties of *pragmatic and grammatical competence* rule out chaos.
ON COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE:
ITS NATURE AND ORIGIN

by

MARY LOU EMERSON

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
TEACHING ENGLISH TO SPEAKERS
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**LIST OF FIGURES** ............................................................................ iii

**CHAPTER 1**
Reaching an Understanding of Chomsky's Grammatical Competence............. 1

I. Chomsky's Grammatical Competence...................................................... 2

II. Chomsky's Universal Grammar................................................................. 7

III. Chomsky and Others on Pragmatic Competence.................................... 12

IV. Communicative Competence................................................................. 16

**CHAPTER 2**
The Empiricists and the Notion of Communicative Competence......................... 17

I. Hymes Argues Against the Chomskyan Perspective.................................. 22

II. Hymes' Ethnographic Perspective........................................................ 24

III. Possible Compromise Between Chomsky and Hymes............................ 24

IV. Halliday's Functional Theory Language Acquisition................................ 29

V. Instrumental, Regulatory, and Interactional Models of Language............. 30

VI. Personal, Heuristic, and Representational Models of Language............. 31

VII. Linguistic Structures Depend on Social Functions................................. 32

VIII. Alternatives to the Term Communicative Competence......................... 43

**CHAPTER 3**
Psycholinguistic View Versus Sociolinguistic View: Chomsky's Defense........... 47

I. Empiricism Versus Nativism, Piaget Chomsky Debates............................. 50

II. Chomsky's Reply to Piaget.................................................................. 54

III. Syntactic Structures are Bound by Principles and Parameters............... 55
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

IV. Phonology is Governed by Abstract Universal Rules ......................... 58
V. Chomsky Refutes Behaviorism and Constructivism ......................... 59
VI. Fodor Argues Against Constructivism .............................................. 61

**CHAPTER 4**

Integrative Theories of Communicative Competence ........................................ 64

I. Savignon’s Theory and Model of Communicative Competence .......... 64
II. Bachman’s Theory and Model .............................................................. 76

**CHAPTER 5**

Deductive Model of Communicative Competence ......................................... 95

I. Recent Studies Show Evidence that Grammatical Competence .......... 99
   Affects Pragmatic Competence
II. Pragmatics Are Dominated by the Right Hemisphere ..................... 102
III. Pragmatic Competence Mirrors Grammatical Competence .......... 105
IV. Language is an Interactive Process Between Knowledge ............... 109
   Structures and the Environment
V. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 112

**REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 113**
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.</td>
<td>Nigel at 19 months: part of the instrumental component</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.</td>
<td>Nigel at 19 months: part of the regulatory component</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.</td>
<td>Nigel at 19 months: part of the interactional component</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.</td>
<td>Savignon’s Components of Communicative Competence</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.</td>
<td>Bachman’s Components of Communicative Language</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.</td>
<td>Bachman’s Components of Language Competence</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.</td>
<td>A Model of Language Use</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8.</td>
<td>Deductive Model of Communicative Proficiency</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Reaching an Understanding of Chomsky's Grammatical Competence

The purpose of this paper is to trace the lineage of the term communicative competence (CC), and to provide a framework for understanding the term CC, a controversial term introduced by Hymes (1972). This paper argues that the term CC is only meaningful if it includes competence in the same sense as Chomsky defines it—underlying knowledge of the rules of language severed from ability. Although Chomsky (1980) discusses competence in terms of grammar, he suggests that there may be underlying knowledge of language use—pragmatic competence. In the end, I will attempt to demonstrate the possibility that there is a competence of communication—pragmatic competence, like Chomsky's grammatical competence, and that both these competencies should be integrated into the theory of CC.

In the process of tracing the idea for the term communicative competence back to Roman Jakobson, a Russian linguist whose work was not translated until the 1960s, I discovered an argument among linguists regarding the derivation of the term and a question as to whether the term was appropriately chosen. Hymes, who is credited with the term communicative competence (CC), discusses his model of CC at great length in a report presented at the Research Planning Conference on Language Development Among Disadvantaged Children in 1966 at Yeshiva University (1972, p. 269). In his discussion of CC, Hymes takes issue with Chomsky's theories of grammatical competence and performance. Although Hymes'
On Communicative Competence

theories of the use of language are not new (he draws from Roman Jacobson), he develops his own models in reaction to Chomsky’s theories of *competence* and *performance*. It is the contention of this paper and of many linguists that Hymes and other linguists not only misinterpreted Chomsky, but misappropriated the linguistic term *competence* as defined by Chomsky. In order to understand the controversy surrounding the term *communicative competence*, it is necessary to present Chomsky’s theory of *grammatical competence* in detail.

**Chomsky’s Grammatical Competence**

Chomsky defined linguistic competence in terms of innate knowledge of language and tacit knowledge of a particular language that everyone possesses who acquires a native language (1965). Chomsky severed the term *competence* from “ability” (1980, p. 59). Thus, the term *competence* as defined by Chomsky is a linguistic term which includes innate knowledge of language as well as emergent knowledge of language. *Competence* is concerned with UG—"the principles that specify the range of possible human grammars" and tacit knowledge of “the system of rules and principles that we assume have, in some manner, been internally represented by the person who knows a language and that enable the speaker, in principle, to understand an arbitrary sentence and to produce a sentence expressing his thought” (Chomsky, 1980, p. 201). Universal Grammar is knowledge apriori; it constitutes “the ‘initial state’ of the language faculty prior to any linguistic experience” (Chomsky, 1986, p. 4). This language acquisition device (LAD) generates a grammar and affords everyone the opportunity to make sense of
linguistic input or primary linguistic data (Chomsky, 1965, p. 27). "In particular, it allows pre-linguistic children to make sense of the linguistic input" (Dieterich, 1999).

Although Chomsky does not expound on the creative aspects of language use--the ability of a speaker to devise novel sentences appropriate to new situations, like Jakobson and Hymes, among others, he does not see life as irrelevant. Rather, Chomsky focuses on knowledge of the mind, and through the study of language or more specifically generative grammar, he purports to establish the existence of universal rules and innate representations of the human mind. Chomsky's perspective is as follows:

Thus, linguistics is taken to be the field that relies on informant judgments, elicited material, whatever limited use can be made of an actual corpus, and so on, to try to determine the nature of grammar and universal grammar. Its concern is competence, the system of rules and principles that we assume have, in some manner, been internally represented by the person who knows a language and that enable the speaker, in principle, to understand an arbitrary sentence and to produce a sentence expressing his thought; and its further concern is universal grammar, the principles that specify the range of possible human grammars. (Chomsky, 1980, p. 201)

Chomsky's theory of *competence* is founded in rationalist theories of the existence of innate ideas and generative grammar. His theory of innate ideas is in part rooted in seventeenth century rationalist philosophy. Descartes (1970) asserts that ideas arise from the faculty of the mind, and that some ideas are innate. Lord Herbert (1624) and Cudworth (1731) expressed the same view that innate ideas and principles exist and remain latent when corresponding objects are not present (Chomsky, 1965, p. 49).

Later Leibniz (1949) states a similar view--that the senses are necessary for our actual behavior, but the principles upon which our actions
are based are innate. Therefore, ideas and and innate truth are discovered through experience. “Thus it is that one possesses many things without knowing it . . .” (Leibniz, 1949, p. 74).

Applying this rationalist view to the special case of language learning, Humboldt (1836) concludes that one cannot really teach language but can only present the conditions under which it will develop spontaneously in the mind in its own way. Thus the form of the language, the schema for its grammar, is to a large extent given, though it will not be available for use without appropriate experience to set the language-forming process into operation. Like Leibniz, Humboldt reiterates the Platonistic view that, for the individual, learning is largely a matter of “Wiederezeugung,” that is, drawing out what is innate in the mind. (Chomsky, 1965, p. 51)

These rationalist views contrast sharply with the empiricist notion that the structure of language does not rely on innate principles. The empiricist assumes “that the procedures and mechanisms for the acquisition of knowledge constitute innate property of mind” (Chomsky, 1965, p. 51). On the other hand, Chomsky assumes that our linguistic abilities are based on mental structures of rules and representations, not procedures and mechanisms. In the empiricist tradition, the form of knowledge is not fixed in the same sense as it is for the rationalist philosophers. While it is important to understand the two views of language acquisition, it’s also important to consider where these two seemingly divergent theories converge. Chomsky himself says, “It is not, of course, necessary to assume that the empiricist and rationalist views can always be sharply distinguished and that these currents cannot cross paths” (Chomsky, 1965, p. 52).

However, Chomsky distinguishes the two arguments specifically to reach “explicit hypotheses about the acquisition of knowledge, in particular, about the innate structure of a language acquisition device” (Chomsky, 1965,
Thus, Chomsky admits there are points of intersection of the two theories.

Despite the differences in theories, there are points of agreement and one theory does overlap the other. It is impossible for them not to overlap given the fact that both deal with human language. Somewhere along the continuum, language input intersects with the human mind. What is clear is that the human mind is endowed with innate knowledge either in terms of grammatical competence (absolute knowledge of grammar), or in terms of procedural competence (relative knowledge of language). Chomsky defines knowledge of language as a certain state of the mind/brain, a relatively stable element in transitory mental states once it is attained; furthermore, as a state of some distinguishable faculty of the mind--the language faculty--with its specific properties, structure, and organization, one "module" of the mind (1986, pp. 12-13). One of the goals of this paper is to demonstrate that this innate fixed nucleus or 'module' of mind/brain--the language faculty--should be considered the foundation of language acquisition, and therefore, one of the integral components of communicative competence.

Chomsky admits that there are different ways in which primary linguistic data may be necessary for language learning. In addition, he admits that normal language learning in some way requires the use of language in real-life situations (Chomsky, 1965, p. 33). However, the fact that sociological factors play a role in language acquisition, still doesn't show how language is acquired once the innate mechanism "is put to work and the task of language learning is undertaken by the child" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 33). This seems to be where the argument lies among the different
On Communicative Competence

linguists. Chomsky distinguishes between the innate language acquisition device which is defined in terms of a fixed grammar, and ability for use; whereas others don't make this distinction, in part because they aren't defining knowledge of the mind as a state or product, but rather as a process (Taylor, 1988, p. 153). Thus, what Chomsky maintains is that the language acquisition device selects grammars which are compatible with primary linguistic data. The selected grammar then provides the device with a method for interpreting linguistic input:

The theory that the device has now selected and internally represented specifies its tacit competence, its knowledge of the language. The child who acquires a language in this way of course knows a great deal more than he has 'learned.' His knowledge of the language, as this is determined by his internalized grammar, goes far beyond the presented primary linguistic data and is in no sense an 'inductive generalization' from these data." (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 32-33)

This theory parallels the view of Leibniz (1949)--that we possess more than we know. Innate knowledge becomes available to us given corresponding external stimuli or environmental reality that stimulates a particular mental reality. It is where these signals, or external stimuli meet the mind that there is agreement and common ground among linguists of differing opinions with respect to innate knowledge and how it interacts with primary linguistic data. That is to say that there is universal agreement that the mind intersects with primary linguistic data; although how it intersects is a matter of debate.

Chomsky necessarily separates competence from performance because knowledge of the rules of a language do not provide a model for the language user. However, UG does form the basis for understanding
language acquisition, and is therefore, a critical component of some of the major theories of language acquisition which will be discussed below. If one does not admit the existence of a language acquisition device, it would seem one has to acknowledge the existence of innate processes and procedures of the mind. Piaget (see pp. 50-54) and Halliday discuss innate mechanisms for language learning in terms of functional processes and procedures, not in terms of structure, or a fixed nucleus of the mind.

In order to adequately explain Chomsky's position regarding language acquisition, it is essential to look at examples of Chomsky's UG. The following section describes a few of the principles and parameters of UG.

**Chomsky's UG**

The theory of UG holds that the speaker knows a set of principles that apply to all languages, and in the process of language acquisition s/he learns how to apply these principles to his/her native language. In addition, the speaker knows certain parameters that vary within clearly defined limits from one language to another, and s/he applies these to his/her native language. The theory of UG does not make vague or unverifiable statements about properties of the mind; instead, specific statements are made about innate properties of the human mind based on specific evidence.

For example, the principle of structure-dependency which appears to apply to all languages, asserts that knowledge of language relies on the structural relationships of the sentence rather than the linear sequence of words. That is, in order to know which element of the sentence to move to form a well-formed sentence, one must know its underlying structure
For example, in order to construct a passive sentence out of the active sentence:

They elected John president.

one must choose the other NP and not the direct object to form the passive sentence:

John was elected president.

Interestingly, a native speaker of English never produces the following ill-formed sentence:

President was elected John.

Equivalent sentences in Greek and German also demonstrate the principle of structure-dependency. In the German passive sentence:

Hans wurde von Marie gesehen.

(Hans was by Mary seen)

Hans was seen by Mary (Cook & Newson, 1996, p. 10).

it is the object NP, Hans, that moves to subject position, not any other NP or any other word.

In the Greek passive sentence:

ο γιατρός διδαχθήκε Αγλικα απο τον Πέτερ.

(the doctor was taught English by Peter)

The doctor was taught by Peter (Cook & Newson, 1996, p. 11).

the NP, o giatros, was moved to the subject position.

Chomsky gives the following example of question formation in Spanish:

Esta' el hombre, que esta' contento, en la casa?
On Communicative Competence

"Is the man who is happy at home?" (Chomsky, 1988, p. 43)

where *esta* (is) has moved from the main VP, 'the man is at home,' not the relative clause VP, 'who is happy.'

Thus, rules for the formation of passives and questions in all languages are structure-dependent, and not based on the linear order of elements. This principle of structure-dependency is just one example of a language universal that Chomsky discovered about the nature of human languages; it is a property of human language in general, and reflects the internal structure of the mind.

Contrary to Hymes' (1996) claim that Chomsky's focus was English only, Chomsky's goal has always been to discover the universal aspects of language which reflect the properties of the human mind. "Real progress in linguistics consists in the discovery that certain features of given languages can be reduced to universal properties of language, and explained in terms of these deeper aspects of linguistic form" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 35).

Furthermore, Chomsky's theory of UG claims that such principles and parameters are inherently impossible to learn; and if they are not learned, they must be part of the human mind--part of our biological endowment.

While the principle of structure-dependency seems common to all languages, languages differ in many ways, and knowledge of language also differs. For example, the **head parameter** captures the variations between languages. As always, it is Chomsky's aim to express generalizations about the phrase structure of all languages rather than features that are idiosyncratic to a single language. One way in which language differs is where the essential element in each phrase, the **head**, occurs in
On Communicative Competence

On Communicative Competence

relationship to other elements of the phrase, called complements. English
is a head-first language where the head of a phrase is first, or to the left of its
complement. In the NP: food for the soul, the noun food appears first as is
ture for the VP: ran to the store, where the verb ran is first or to the left of its
complement. Similarly, the preposition to appears first in the PP: to the store.

On the other hand, Japanese is different. In the sentence:

E wa kabe ni kakatte imasu
(picture wall on is hanging)
The picture is hanging on the wall. (Cook and Newson, 1996, p. 14)

"the head Verb kakatte imasu occurs on the right of the Verb complement
kabe ni, and the postposition ni (on) comes on the right of the PP
complement, kabe. Thus, Japanese is a head-last language where the head
occurs to the right of its complement. A single generalization regarding the
head of a phrase is that according to the head parameter, a language is
either head-first or head-last. Again, Chomsky expresses his interest in all
languages and the universal aspects of language: "Ideally, we hope to find
that complexes of properties differentiating otherwise similar languages are
reducible to a single parameter, fixed in one or another way" (1981, p. 6.)

In addition to the syntactic principles discussed above, principles and
parameters theory integrates the syntactic description of the sentence with
the words of the language via the Projection Principle, which requires the
syntax to accommodate the properties of each lexical item (Cook & Newson,
1996, p. 17). In other words, the lexical entry for each verb in the dictionary
must specify whether on not it is followed by a NP--whether it is transitive or
intransitive. Certain verbs (transitive) subcategorize NPs, while others
On Communicative Competence

(intransitive) do not. A subcategorization frame such as the following indicates that the verb prefer must be followed by a NP:

\[ \text{prefer Verb, [__ NP]} \]

Other verbs such as want subcategorize a NP, and can be followed by a phrase starting with to:

I want money.

I want to go.

Speakers know how verbs may be used in sentences and need not be concerned with a rule such as VP --> V (NP), meaning that the VP consists of a verb and an optional NP. Instead a native speaker knows that certain lexical items subcategorize particular syntactic forms. This is known as the Projection Principle which Cook and Newson define as "the properties of lexical entries [that] project onto the syntax of the sentence" (1996, p. 20).

Chomsky states that "structure must be represented subcategorically at every syntactic level" (1986, p. 84).

The Projection Principle is another example of UG; all languages integrate the syntax with the properties of lexical items. Since there is no logical explanation for this particular characteristic of language, nor is it obvious how a child might acquire the Projection Principle, it is considered to be an innate property of the human mind.

These are but a few of the principles and parameters of UG which demonstrate language universals--those principles and parameters that are common to all languages and explain language knowledge in terms of properties of the human mind. Again, Chomsky's primary goal is to discover what constitutes language knowledge common to everyone despite
On Communicative Competence

language differences. Chomsky’s focus is on language universals and encompasses all languages, not just the English language.

Chomsky and Others on Pragmatic Competence

Chomsky makes a clear distinction between competence and performance. His performance model is limited by memory, time and access (1965, p.10). In his later writing Chomsky admits the limitations of his performance model and adds a pragmatic component to his model of performance (1980, p. 59). Although Chomsky does not investigate pragmatic competence, he suggests that it may be domain-specific, like syntactic knowledge. In Rules and Representations, Chomsky defines pragmatic competence as the underlying ability to use grammatical knowledge combined with the conceptual system to achieve certain ends or purposes. He states the following: “It might be that pragmatic competence is characterized by a certain system of constitutive rules represented in the mind, as has been suggested in a number of studies” (1980, p. 59).

Chomsky distinguishes grammatical competence from pragmatic competence. The first is restricted to “the knowledge of form and meaning”, and the second is restricted to “knowledge of conditions and manner of appropriate use, in conformity with various purposes” (Chomsky, 1980, p. 224). Chomsky suggests that

[p]ragmatic competence may include what Paul Grice has called a “logic of conversation.” We might say that pragmatic competence places language in the institutional setting of its use, relating intentions and purposes to the linguistic means at hand. (1980, p. 225)

Similarly, Canale and Swain argue that it is reasonable to assume
that there are rule-governed, universal, and creative aspects of sociolinguistic competence just as there are of grammatical competence" (1980, p. 6). Brown and Levinson develop a theory of *pragmatic competence* within the framework of Grice's Maxims, "namely, that there is a working assumption by conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk" (1987, p. 4). They argue that politeness is rooted in rational and efficient modes of communication. However, Brown and Levinson develop their own universal theory of politeness based on the notion of 'face.' Regarding their theory, they state the following:

while the content of face will differ in different cultures (what the exact limits are to personal territories, and what the publicly relevant content of personality consists in), we are assuming that the mutual knowledge of members' public self-image or face, and social necessity to orient oneself to it in interaction, are universal. (Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. 61)

Brown and Levinson believe that a speaker approaches any conversation with two "face wants:" "negative face:" the want to act unimpeded by others, and "positive face:" the want that his desires be liked and respected (1987, p. 61). For example, in conversation we maintain a 'negative face' when we make a request to the listener, do not want to impose, and yet we expect the request to be granted. We maintain a 'positive face' when we compliment someone or defer to someone in an effort to be understood, or approved of, or admired.

Brown and Levinson study three language--English (from both sides of the Atlantic); Tzeltal, a Mayan language spoken in Chiapas; and South Indian Tamil. They argue that by studying three languages from unrelated cultures, and showing evidence for convergence, that their theory of
On Communicative Competence

 universals lies far beyond chance. However, Wierzbicka (1991) argues that their theory is flawed, because it is based on an Anglo-Saxon value of individualism—that the notion of ‘face’ relates to ‘self;’ and there are many cultures that are not individually oriented, or self-oriented, but rather are community oriented, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Polish.

Brown and Levinson discuss universal politeness with respect to indirect speech acts. For all three languages studied they determined that in making requests all speakers employ the more ‘polite’ forms such as, ‘Can you,’ ‘Would you like to,’ and ‘Do you want to.’ From these results, they concluded that this is a universal rule of politeness.

However, Wierzbicka claims that use of this indirect form in Polish would seem “particularly odd,” and would be interpreted by the hearer as “naive hypocrisy” (1991, p. 34). In Polish a request would not be made unless the hearer can cooperate. In general, for Polish it is polite to use the direct form for making a request—‘Please do X.’

Furthermore, Yu (1999) who studied the use of requests in Chinese, also concluded that Chinese speakers use more direct forms in making requests. Because of their community orientation, this is considered a polite form or socially appropriate. Although Yu (1999) does not rule out pragmatic universals, he concluded that the use of direct/indirect speech was culture-specific. Both Yu and Wierzbicka argue that Brown and Levinson’s pragmatic theory of universality, based on Anglo-Saxon tradition which places specific emphasis on the rights and autonomy of every individual does not work when applied to many other cultures.

It is clear that further investigation of pragmatic universals needs to be
pursued. It seems likely, as Chomsky suggests, that there are pragmatic
universals, such as Grice's Conversational Maxims (1975) which underlie
language use. It is a matter of studying performance models in more depth.
"[E]vidence about the actual organization of behavior may prove crucial to
advancing the theory of underlying competence. Study of performance and
study of competence are mutually supportive" (Chomsky, 1980, p. 226).
Chomsky considers the distinction between psychology, which is concerned
with performance, and linguistics, which is concerned with competence, to be
senseless:

Delineation of disciplines [linguistics and psychology] may be useful
for administering universities or organizing professional societies, but
apart from that, it is an undertaking of limited merit. A person who
happens to be interested in underlying competence will naturally be
delighted to exploit whatever understanding may be forthcoming
about process models that incorporate one or another set of
assumptions about linguistic knowledge. Furthermore, it seems
evident that investigation of performance will rely, to whatever extent it
can, on what is learned about the systems of knowledge that are put to

However, Chomsky does not focus on performance models because he seeks to explain how innate knowledge of grammar or universal grammar
(UG) accommodates the creative aspect of language. Although Chomsky
does not focus on performance, he does discuss it in terms of 'acceptability'
(1965, p. 11). Communicative aspects of language include performance and
acceptability. Chomsky differentiates between acceptability and
grammaticality. Acceptability belongs to performance and grammaticality
belongs to competence (1965, p.11). "Grammaticalness is only one of the
many factors that interacts to determine acceptability" (1965, p. 11). Thus,
Chomsky does not deny the sociological aspects of language production;
however, his interest lies in determining the nature of grammar and universal
grammar of an ideal speaker/hearer. He nonetheless agrees with
Lenneberg (1967) that the rules of grammar enter into the processing
mechanisms of language in context. Chomsky states that if we accept
Lenneberg's contention that "the rules of grammar enter into the processing
mechanisms, then evidence concerning production, recognition, recall, and
language use in general can be expected (in principle) to have bearing on
the investigations of rules of grammar, on what is sometimes called
'grammatical competence' or 'knowledge of language'" (Chomsky 1980, p.
200-202).

Communicative Competence

Hymes (1972), proposes a broader notion of competence--
communicative competence, which includes not only grammatical
competence (tacit knowledge of the rules of grammar), but also pragmatic
competence, (knowledge of the rules of language use). Although Hymes
(1996) reveres Chomsky's "brilliant work," he does not make a distinction
between competence and performance. The following discussion in
Chapter 2 attempts to demonstrate why Hymes' theory is not a competence
theory. Instead, it is a performance theory, because Hymes is not
investigating language universals or knowledge of language that underlies
pragmatics. Since Hymes' theory of communicative competence is
formulated in reaction to Chomsky's theory of grammatical competence, it
seems appropriate to begin by discussing Hymes' socio-cultural theory of
language acquisition. The following is a detailed discussion of the evolution
of Hymes' theory of CC.
Chapter 2

The Empiricists and the Notion of Communicative Competence

Theories of language acquisition are based on different philosophies or psychological theories. The two main views related to language acquisition are either based on rationalist theories or empiricist theories of learning. As stated above, the rationalist theories of Leibniz (1949) and Lenneberg (1967) form the basis of Chomsky's theory of language acquisition--that humans possess innate knowledge of language in the form of principles and parameters. The philosophical theories of John Locke (1975), an empiricist, and the psychological theories of Piaget (1980), a constructivist, form the foundation of the empiricist's theories--that there are no innate principles.

Hymes (1972) and Halliday (1970) represent the empiricist view of language acquisition. Although Hymes acknowledges innate knowledge of language as defined by Chomsky, his emphasis is on the sociolinguistic and anthropological aspects of language. Since Hymes redefines competence to suit his perspective on language acquisition, I juxtapose Hymes with Chomsky in order to elaborate further on the theory of competence.

For Hymes, grammatical knowledge is a resource, not an abstract cognitive configuration. How knowledge gets realized as use is a central issue and a component of communicative competence (CC). Chomsky's theoretical notion of the ideal speaker/hearer is "unilluminating from the standpoint of the children we seek to understand and help" (Hymes, 1971, p. 4). Hymes admits that Chomsky's theoretical standpoint is necessary, but not sufficient on its own, "because this idealized conception becomes
inadequate as soon as it is confronted with real children in a particular environment" (Hymes, 1971, p. 4). Hymes explains the value in Chomsky's theory:

A theoretical perspective is essential, and the perspective afforded by transformational generative grammar is particularly valuable because it gives us the concept of an idealized learner, with built-in propensities for language. This does away with the notion of genetic racial inferiority of any particular group, or sub-group. (1971, p. 4)

However, Hymes objects to the lack of socio-cultural factors in linguistic theory, and believes that in order for language to be adequately studied the notion of competence needs to be extended. He states the following:

I should therefore take competence as the most general term for the speaking and hearing capabilities of a person. This choice is in the spirit of present linguistic theory, if at present against the letter. Competence is understood to be dependent upon two things: (tacit) knowledge and (ability for) use. (Hymes, 1971, p. 16)

Thus, by extending the idea of competence, Hymes has changed the narrow meaning of the linguistic term put forth by Chomsky (1965). As stated above Chomsky severed the term competence from ability, and chose to do so in order to disentangle it from the many meanings of 'knowledge' (Chomsky, 1980, p. 59). Taking Hymes' new definition of competence, the term communicative competence makes sense. However, this is where the terminological confusion begins, because there are many linguists who define competence according to Chomsky's definition—knowledge of language severed from ability, and draw the distinction between competence (a state) and performance (a process).

Hymes agrees with Chomsky that competence must be the central concern. "But arbitrary restriction of the domain of underlying knowledge can
On Communicative Competence

be ended; the methodological spirit of generative grammar can be extended
to the whole sphere of the abilities manifest in speech" (Hymes, 1971, p.11).
Hymes claims that what is important now is “the relation between rules of
grammar and rules of use” (1971, p.11).

In 1968 the Centre for Advanced Study in the Developmental
Sciences with the Ciba Foundation held a Study Group on Language
Development in England. Hymes was one of the participants who presented
a formal paper which was later edited for publication. In the discussion
following Hymes’ presentation on competence and performance, Bever
points out that Hymes does not resolve the problem of the relationship
between a linguistic grammar and speech performance (1971, p. 25).
Furthermore, inherent in Chomsky’s theory of competence is that there is
more to language than grammar, since grammaticality is seen as a
psychological notion. Later in the ensuing discussion, Cazden asks Hymes if
his notion of competence includes knowledge of rules of style and rules of
social interaction, etc. Hymes answers, “Yes, and this may lead to different
kinds of competence in people who grow up in different cultural contexts”
(1971, p. 26). In this respect, Hymes’ theory of competence relates more to a
theory of pragmatic competence, since pragmatic competence directly
relates to use. In this regard, his term communicative competence becomes
more meaningful. The underlying rules, then, which relate to pragmatic
behavior, would be different depending on cultural differences.

However, the problem with Hymes’ extended definition of competence,
still remains, because Chomsky discusses grammatical competence and
pragmatic competence in terms of language universals as well as emergent
knowledge of language. While each culture may have particular grammatical and pragmatic differences, Chomsky's purpose in investigating language is to discover universals which are general to all languages. Although Chomsky does not investigate pragmatic universals, he does investigate grammatical universals which are discussed under the heading of UG. Hence, the distinction between Chomsky's narrow definition of the term competencen and performance remains of critical importance.

In an effort to attain a more global understanding of language, Hymes helped to clarify the domain of performance, but he muddied the domain of competence in his attempt to refocus the study of language from the intrinsic to the extrinsic.

Hymes' model of CC contains four parameters: possibility, feasibility, appropriateness, and attestedness in actual performance. Below is an explanation of these four parameters:

1) Whether (and to what degree) something is formally possible.
2) Whether (and to what degree) something is feasible in virtue of the means of implementation.
3) Whether (and to what degree) something is appropriate (adequate, happy, successful) in relation to a context in which it is used and evaluated.
4) Whether (and to what degree) something is in fact done, actually performed, and what its doing entails. (Hymes, 1972, 285-286)

There are two aspects to each parameter—(tacit) knowledge and (ability for) use, which make eight elements. Contrary to Chomsky, Hymes does not separate competence from performance. As stated above he redefines competence to include knowledge and use. However, Hymes does make a distinction between knowledge and competence. "This distinction allows one to deal with differential competence due to differential
knowledge" (Hymes, 1971, p. 16). If knowledge is differential then it is not a state, but rather a process related to performance. Hymes associates both terms, competence and knowledge, with ability, and while he says he is interested in the underlying rules of use or pragmatic competence, he continues to discuss competence in terms of ability for use. As stated above, in Rules and Representations Chomsky recognized pragmatic competence which he conceived of as underlying the ability to make use of the knowledge characterized as grammatical competence (1980, p. 59). Even with respect to the term pragmatic competence, Chomsky draws the distinction between competence and performance.

Chomsky only has two elements—competence and performance. As stated earlier Chomsky’s concern is competence:

the system of rules and principles that we assume have, in some manner, been internally represented by the person who knows a language and that enable the speaker, in principle, to understand an arbitrary sentence and to produce a sentence expressing his thought; and its further concern is universal grammar, the principles that specify the range of possible human grammars. (Chomsky, 1980, p. 201)

So it seems that Chomsky’s original theory of competence should remain intact, and while Hymes’ theory of performance is important in its own right, it needs to be discussed in terms of a theory of language use. It is not a competence theory. Although Hymes talks about underlying rules of language use, he does not investigate pragmatic universals, just as Chomsky does not investigate or develop performance models. If Hymes changed his terminology and referred to his theory as one of performance, then Hymes and Chomsky’s theories could complement each other.

The following section on Hymes further demonstrates why Hymes’
theory is not a *competence* theory, but rather a theory of performance. Although in 1971, Hymes argued that Chomsky's theory of *competence* needed to be extended to include the concept of underlying *competence* for use, he does not explore the rules of use or pragmatic competence. Rather, Hymes discusses language from a socio-cultural standpoint. His later work reveals his sociolinguistic perspective on language acquisition.

**Hymes Argues Against the Chomskyan Perspective**

In *Ethnography, Linguistics, Narrative, and Inequality* Hymes (1996) discusses his ethnographic perspective on the study of language. He argues against the "Chomskyan perspective" of formal linguistics or abstract representations of the mind and UG, and elaborates on his theory of ethnography of speaking which seeks to reach an understanding of languages and all their dialects and varieties in terms of a socially constituted linguistic theory:

*that verbal means and the social matrices in which they exist are interdependent;*
*that the organization of verbal means must be viewed from the vantage point of social matrices;*
*that one must discover ways in which verbal means are organized by virtue of social matrices (using 'social matrices' here as a general term for activities, institutions, groups, etc.)* (Hymes, 1996, p. 102)

For Hymes, "[t]he true scope of a socially constituted study of language is thus the study of speech styles within culturally constituted ways of speaking" (Hymes, 1996, p.102). Although Hymes admits that grammar can account for phonological, morphological and syntactic elements and their relationships, and can be abstracted from social context, he maintains that it
is not possible to account for speech styles in abstraction from social context.
He suggests that both the formal properties and meaning of speech styles may lie in the relations among social contexts, not in the relations of the linguistic features themselves (Hymes, 1996, p. 102). It seems as though Hymes contradicts himself here, because if grammar can be abstracted from social context then theoretically a language faculty could exist that possesses specific properties, structure and organization. This is why I consider Hymes a straddler, because he never categorically states that there is no such module of the mind/brain called the language faculty. As stated above, Hymes reveres Chomsky’s “brilliant work,” yet he does not embrace it.

Hymes does not investigate the formal properties of language; he merely criticizes Chomsky for creating a perspective on the study of language that diverted other linguists from properly pursuing the ethnography of speaking. Hymes asserts the following regarding Chomsky:

Chomsky’s conception of linguistics is the bringing to perfection of the trend to focus on formal models, while investing formal models with the ultimate significance of being avenues to human mind and nature, the only general goal worthy of a linguist. The unintended consequence of the success of this brilliant work was to disable linguists from study of the social and to reinforce assumptions in American life prejudicial to understanding the place of language in it. (Hymes, 1996, p. 95)

Hymes holds Chomsky responsible for the following injustices with respect to language learning:

1. Only English. Most linguistic theory and analysis under his aegis focused on English.
2. Bilingualism is suspect. Chomsky's focus on his own language set bilingualism aside as secondary. A necessary simplifying assumption of the theory is the ideally fluent speaker/hearer in a homogeneous speech community.
3. Learn literary standard. Chomskyan linguistics was essentially
formal written English. Dialects and vernaculars are assumed to be superficial variations.

4 English is enough. See 1 and 3.

5 Right or Wrong. Most Americans assume that there is a single standard. Chomskyan linguists were quick to apply a sign of exclusion, the asterisk, to sentences they judged impossible in English.

6 Fluency and style are suspect. Many of the utterances set aside as ungrammatical prove acceptable in sufficient context, such as a poetic one; intonation, which is inseparable from the effect and acceptability of utterances, is ignored. (Adapted from Hymes, 1996, pp. 95-96)

**Hymes’ Ethnographic Perspective**

Hymes asserts that there were two stages in the development of the ethnography of speaking. He credits Sapir, Burke, and Jakobson (1960) for the first stage because they discussed language from a cross-cultural perspective, and their ideas laid the foundation for a discipline based on the social constitution of language in both structure and function. Jakobson argued that language must be investigated in terms of its many varieties and functions. “The verbal structure of a message depends primarily on the predominant function” (Jakobson, 1966, p. 353).

“The second stage has been the undertaking of field studies explicitly devoted to questions of the structure and function of means of speech” (Hymes, 1996, p. 103). The third stage, which is in the developmental stages, has the task of comparing and contrasting case studies leading to a sharpening of terminology and a better understanding of the social constitution of language and how it relates to structure and function.

**Possible Compromise Between Chomsky and Hymes**

However, Hymes admits that:

Grammar in the usual sense contributes analysis of many of the
resources of speech styles, but not all. The grammar of discourse has additional properties. Two crucial properties are these: 1) a speech style involves selection and grouping of features across the usual levels of linguistic analysis, coordinating them in a novel way independent of such levels; 2) a socially significant speech style often involves only a portion of the occurring features.

Now a grammarian is used to seeking total accountability at each level of analysis--all of the message form is referable to phonological elements and relationships, to morphological elements and relationships, to syntactic and semantic elements and relationships. This kind of accountability can be pursued to a fair degree in abstraction from social context. (Hymes, 1996, p. 102)

To a certain degree, Hymes can embrace Chomsky's viewpoint--that the formal aspects of language can be pursued in abstraction from social context. And to a certain degree, Chomsky can embrace Hymes' perspective stated below:

It is not possible to pursue accountability of speech styles in abstraction from social context, and much of the interest, both in formal properties and in meaning, of speech styles may lie in the relations among social contexts, not in the relations of the linguistic features themselves. (Hymes, 1996, p.102)

Chomsky would at least agree that speech styles or "special uses of language" cannot be abstracted from social context; however, I believe he would argue that the formal properties of speech styles are governed by tacit knowledge of underlying rules, and therefore, can and should be investigated independent of social context. Nonetheless, Chomsky (1986) is keenly interested in how knowledge of language is put to use--how the language faculty yields a particular language through interaction with presented experience such as specific speech styles.

Hymes believes we should break away from the domination of the formal models of the investigation of grammar and look critically at language
On Communicative Competence

from an ethnographic perspective. The question arises: Why not look at both aspects of language—the abstract and the concrete, as suggested by Spolsky (1989), Chomsky, and Widdowson (1989), who describes language in terms of 'usage' and 'use?'

Hymes claims that:

It is increasingly accepted that linguistic elements should be analyzed and explained in terms of their functional relevance, meaning not only their function within a grammar as such, but their relevance to needs and interests of users of language in conveying and processing information, making discourse coherent, managing social relationships. (1996, p. 88)

Chomsky would be the first to admit that the investigation of the abstract principles of the mind/brain with respect to language does not say anything specific about cultural patterns or institutional constraints. However, in order to study the innate properties of the mind, one must look at language of the ideal speaker/hearer taken out of social context. In Language and Mind Chomsky states: “The most challenging theoretical problem in linguistics is that of discovering the principles of universal grammar that interweave with the rules of particular grammars to provide explanations for phenomena that appear arbitrary and chaotic” (1972, p. 48). Chomsky's theory is based on the Platonistic conception that knowledge of a particular language grows and matures along a course that is in part intrinsically determined, similar to the visual system or other bodily organs that develop along a course determined by genetic instructions under the triggering and shaping effects of environmental factors (1986, p. 2).

Hymes reacts to Chomsky's theory of grammatical competence because he wants to emphasize the socio-cultural aspects of language, and
change the focus of linguistics from grammar to use. Hence, he redefines competence to include (tacit) knowledge and (ability for) use. Hymes does not make a distinction between competence and performance because, unlike Chomsky, competence is not severed from ability for use. On the other hand, Chomsky makes the distinction, because knowledge of the rules of grammar does not tell us how a person might proceed in conversation. Furthermore, a speaker/hearer may possess full grammatical competence, but because of disabilities may not be able to employ his knowledge.

While Chomsky is not interested in behavior and its products, he recognizes a relationship between knowledge of language and language acquisition. Several applied linguists suggest a compromise between Chomsky and Hymes. The following is a summary of their perspectives. Widdowson (1989) also acknowledges a relationship between knowledge and acquisition, and he reformulates Hymes’ parameters into two competencies—grammatical competence (the parameter of possibility) and pragmatic competence (all the other parameters). Canale and Swain adopt “the term ‘communicative competence’ to refer to the relationship and interaction between grammatical competence, or knowledge of the rules of grammar, and sociolinguistic competence, or knowledge of the rules of language use” (1980, p. 6). They also make a counterpoint to Hymes’ earlier statement: “Just as Hymes (1972) was able to say that there are rules of grammar that would be useless without rules of language use, so we feel that there are rules of language use that would be useless without rules of grammar” (Canale and Swain, 1980, p. 5). In this same vein of thought, Spolsky (1989) asserts that grammatical competence is critical to any
Spolsky and Canale and Swain agree that there is a relationship between *competence* and *performance* (Spolsky, 1989, p.139). Spolsky proposes that these two independent measures of *competence* and *performance* overlap (1989, p.139).

Bialystok maintains that *competence* theories and processing theories are derived from Chomsky's definition of *competence* and *performance* (Bialystok, 1990, p. 637). Most linguists discuss theories of communication either in response to Chomsky's theory of *grammatical competence* or in reaction to Chomsky's theories of generative grammar.

Whether there is agreement or disagreement with regard to Chomsky's theory of *grammatical competence*, his theory remains a pivotal point for linguists that study language acquisition. Bialystok states that while Chomsky elevates *competence* and relegated *performance* to use, it is not what he intended, but is a result of his focus on knowledge of the mind rather than the whole of language which includes sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and language strategies. Still, Bialystok is committed to Chomsky's views. She quotes from Macnamara, a psychologist who extends Chomsky's distinction between *competence* and *performance* beyond linguistics (1990): “Is there understanding of the mind in its logical aspects without access to the mind’s logical ideas?” (Macnamara 1990, p. 19).

Bialystok agrees that *competence* theories by their very nature must be idealized because they are based on mental structures and representations. Furthermore, performance is an indirect and imperfect reflection of knowledge structures (1990, p. 643). Bialystok predicts that metatheoretical distinctions should be able to reconcile differences between *competence* theories and *performance*
theories. Chomsky and Bialystok agree that learners have structured representations of their knowledge and these representations are used systematically to produce utterances.

Hymes' theory of *communicative competence* evolved over time. Originally, Hymes (1971) stated his goal to develop the concept of underlying knowledge for use from a socio-cultural standpoint. Later, Hymes (1996) argues against the "Chomskyan perspective" of formal linguistics or abstract representations of the mind and UG. Instead of a *competence* theory, he developed a theory of speech performance which is rooted in a functional theory of language use and acquisition. To support his theory, Hymes (1996) refers to Halliday's (1977) theory of the functional basis of language acquisition. Halliday's theory is discussed below.

**Halliday's Functional Theory of Language Acquisition**

There are other linguists who reject the Chomskyan perspective outright, and who consider it 'incomprehensible' that there is a language acquisition device, an innate component of the human mind that yields a particular language through interaction with presented experience. Hymes looks to the work of Halliday who has always defined language in terms of its functional relevance. In this respect, Halliday's theory of the functional basis of language is aligned with Piaget's (1980) constructivist philosophy of language--that there are no innate principles with respect to language, and that language learning is a process of building on experiences with a particular language. Halliday rejects the whole notion of *competence* and *performance* and the distinction between them.
For Halliday, a child's language is what s/he internalizes as a result of his/her own experiences. In his book, *Explorations in the Functions of Language*, Halliday states the following:

The child knows what language is because he knows what language does. . . . He has used language in many ways--for the satisfaction of material and intellectual needs, for the mediation of personal relationships, the expression of feelings and so on. Language in all these uses has come within his own direct experience, and because of this he is subconsciously aware that language has many functions that affect him personally. Language is, for the child, a rich and adaptable instrument for the realization of his intentions; there is hardly any limit to what he can do with it. (Halliday, 1977, p. 2)

Halliday emphasizes the many-sidedness of a child's linguistic experience and identifies models of language with which the normal child is endowed by the time s/he is five. In other words, the child internalizes complex models of language through experience with the language as a functional system.

**Instrumental, Regulatory, and Interactional Models of Language**

The simplest of the child's models of language is called the 'instrumental' model--an internalized awareness that language provides a means to a desired end. Closely related to the instrumental mode of language is the 'regulatory' model of language--an internalized awareness of language used to control the behavior of others. Bernstein (1971) discusses different types of regulatory language used specifically to control the behavior of others. Based on Bernstein's work, Halliday gives the following examples of regulatory language that a child experiences and then internalizes, adding this model of language to his/her repertoire. In various
situations a mother may say:

you mustn’t take things that don’t belong to you (control through conditional prohibition based on a categorization of objects in terms of a particular social institution, that of ownership); that was very naughty (control through categorization of behaviour in terms of opposition approved/disapproved); if you do that again I’ll smack you (control through threat of reprisal linked to repetition of behaviour); you’ll make Mummy very unhappy if you do that (control through emotional blackmail); that’s not allowed (control through categorization of behaviour as governed by rule) and so on. (1977, p. 5)

Thus, the child applies these awarenesses or internalized models of language use to achieve a desired end (instrumental), and based on his/her experience with the language of rules and instructions (regulatory), he/she learns to control others. Closely related to the regulatory model is the third model called the ‘interactional’ model, which refers to the use of language in maintaining relationships. In this case, language is used to “define and consolidate the group, to include and to exclude, showing who is ‘one of us’ and who is not; to impose status, and to contest status that is imposed; and humour, ridicule, deception, persuasion, all forensic and theatrical arts of language are brought into play” (Halliday, 1977, p. 6). Thus, while the child is listening and involved in complex interactions, s/he is internalizing models of language that perform a function.

**Personal, Heuristic, and Representational Models of Language**

The fourth model of language use internalized by the child is called the ‘personal’ model which refers to the child’s awareness of language as a form of his own individuality; language plays an essential role in the development of a child’s personality—“his awareness of himself is closely
bound up with speech: both with hearing himself speak, and with having at
his disposal the range of behavioural options that constitute language"
(Halliday, 1977, p. 6).

Fifthly, the child has a 'heuristic' model of language derived from his
knowledge of how language has facilitated his investigation of reality. The
child demonstrates this awareness of the 'heuristic' model of language by
asking questions in order to gain information and explain facts. By the age of
five many children already possess a metalanguage for the heuristic
function--"they know what a 'question' is, what an 'answer' is, what knowing
and 'understanding' mean, and they can talk about these things without
difficulty" (Halliday, 1977, p. 7). Another aspect of 'metalanguage' or
'language about language' is how the child uses language to create his own
environment. This is called the 'imaginative' model of language; "and this
provides some further elements of the metalanguage, with words like story,
make up, and pretend" (Halliday, 1977, p. 7).

The sixth and final model of language is called the 'representational'
model. This refers to the child's awareness that language is a means of
communicating about something, or expressing propositions. "The child is
aware that he can convey a message in language, a message which has
specific reference to the processes, persons, objects, abstractions, qualities,
states and relations of the real world around him" (Halliday, 1977, p. 8).

**Linguistic Structure Depends on Social Function**

Thus, the functional approach to the study of language investigates
how the character of language has been shaped and determined by use.
The social function of language or 'diatypic' varieties, or 'registers' in language is governed by the range of uses that language is put to in a particular culture. This leads us to the fundamental question of the relation between the functions of language and the nature of the linguistic system. Halliday poses the question: "Is the social functioning of language reflected in linguistic structure--that is, in the internal organization of language as a system" (Halliday, 1977, p. 15)?

To answer this question, Halliday refers to the work of Malinowski (1923) who conducted ethnographic research among some Melanesian tribes of Eastern New Guinea. In general, what Malinowski attempts to make clear through his analysis of 'primitive' text is that language is essentially rooted in the reality of the culture, and that it cannot be explained without reference to the context of situation, an expression that he coined.

From his analysis of the Trobriand language, a Melanesian language used by the natives of the Trobriand Islands, N. E. New Guinea, Malinowski concludes the following:

The study of any form of speech used in connection with vital work [other than fishing] would reveal the same grammatical and lexical peculiarities: the dependence of the meaning of each word upon practical experience, and of the structure of each utterance upon the momentary situation in which it is spoken. Thus the consideration of linguistic uses associated with any practical pursuit, leads us to the conclusion that language in its primitive forms ought to be regarded and studied against the background of human activities and as a mode of human behaviour in practical matters. (Malinowski, 1949, p. 312)

Malinowski goes on to say that meaning is directly related to use--that there is a direct connection with the meaning of the word and the object or prototype it represents. He states the following:
The meaning of a word arises out of familiarity, out of ability to use, out of the faculty of direct clamouring as with the infant, or practically directing as with primitive man. A word is used always in direct active conjunction with the reality it means. The word acts on the thing and the thing releases the word in the human mind. (1949, p. 322-323).

However, we know this to be false because many words have more than one meaning or associations; and many words refer to abstract ideas or intangible objects. Nonetheless, Malinowski maintains that "there can be no definition of a word without the reality which it means being present" (1949, p. 325).

In the final section of Malinowski's article, he addresses the problem of the structure of language. He asserts that linguistic structure is not the result of the rules of human thought, nor is it the case described by H. Sweet—that every grammatical category is the expression of some logical category. While Malinowski believes real categories exist on which the grammatical divisions are based, these real categories are not derived from a primitive philosophic system. Instead, Malinowski claims the following:

Language in its structure mirrors the real categories derived from practical attitudes of the child and of primitive or natural man to the surrounding world. The grammatical categories with all their peculiarities, exceptions, and refractory insubordination to rule, are the reflection of the makeshift, unsystematic, practical outlook imposed by man's struggle for existence in the widest sense of this word. (1949, p. 327-328)

Malinowski claims that each category closely corresponds with the part of speech. This part of speech (noun, verb, pronoun, etc.) is "rooted in active modes of behaviour and in active uses of speech" (1949, p. 332). So that the category of substance corresponds to the category of 'noun-substantives,' and this connection between category and part of speech is
made by the child who observes active modes of behaviour and active uses of speech. In other words, Malinowski concludes that all linguistic processes including the grammatical structure of language, “derive their power only from real processes taking place in man’s relation to his surroundings” (1949, p. 336).

However, in his final section which addresses the problem of the structure of language, Malinowski admits that all human languages show, in spite of great divergences, a certain fundamental agreement in structure and means of grammatical expression. It would be both preposterous and intellectually pusillanimous to give up at the outset any search for deeper forces which must have produced these common, universally human features of Language. (1949, p. 327)

It is interesting to note that despite Malinowski’s observation that language universals appear to exist in “structure and grammatical expression,” he still maintains the close relationship between the structure of language and language use. “This adaptation, this correlation between language and the uses to which it is put, has left its traces in linguistic structure” (Malinowski, 1949, p. 327).

For Halliday also, language learning is learning the uses of language and meanings associated with their uses. He states the following:

If language development is regarded as the development of a meaning potential it becomes possible to consider the Malinowskian thesis seriously, since we can begin by looking at the relation between the child’s linguistic structures and the uses he is putting language to. (1949, p. 16)

However, Halliday does not endorse Malinowski’s original view that ancestral types of language were ‘primitive.’ When linguistic research had demonstrated that there was no such thing as a ‘primitive language,’
Malinowski modified this view. Halliday agrees with Malinowski’s later view--“all adult speech represented the same highly sophisticated level of linguistic evolution” (Halliday, 1977, p.16).

Although Halliday acknowledges the linguistic movement of the 1960’s—the “psycholinguistic view (the so-called ‘nativist’ view of the language learning faculty),” he asserts that this view is not relevant to his present perspective (Halliday, 1977, p. 16). Halliday defines language as a linguistic system where there is a set of options—that is choosing the correct vocabulary and saying it when it is appropriate. In other words, choice of words and meaning depend on ‘context of situation,’ to use Malinowski’s term. The ability to say the right thing in the right place is what Hymes defines as communicative competence. Halliday does not make a distinction between meaning and function. He believes separating meaning from context is an artificial distinction. There are merely different contexts and the meaning of an expression within a particular context is different from its meaning elsewhere. Rather than characterize language subjectively as the ability, or competence, of a speaker in the way Hymes does, Halliday characterizes language objectively as a ‘meaning potential,’ a set of alternatives. He proposes “the concept of ‘meaning potential,’ which is what the speaker/hearer can (what he can mean, if you like), not what he knows” (Halliday, 1977, p. 17). In contrast, Chomsky does make a distinction between knowledge of language and the social function of language because his focus is on what the ideal speaker/hearer inherently knows about language. While Chomsky acknowledges the social functions of language, he does not focus on it because his goal is to discover and
On Communicative Competence

establish universal rules and representations of language which allow us to communicate in a social setting.

On the other hand, Halliday's focus is on the social functions of language, meaning "those contexts which are significant in that we are able to specify some of the meaning potential that is characteristically, and explainably, associated with them" (1977, p. 18-19). And Halliday is interested in how the meaning potential associated with certain contexts sheds light on certain features of the internal organization of language. In this respect Halliday differs from Chomsky in that he believes that "[w]hat the child does with language tends to determine structure" (1977, p. 19). In other words, Halliday believes that the internal form directly reflects the function of the language. This idea contradicts Chomsky's theory that language use reflects knowledge of language--that rules and representations of the mind can be derived from investigating primary linguistic data.

Halliday maintains that a close match between structure and function can be brought out by a functional analysis of the system in terms of its meaning potential. In other words, the structures that the child has mastered are a direct reflection of the functions that the language serves for him/her. In this respect, Halliday's theory of language acquisition fits with Piaget's philosophy of constructivism--a child constructs the structure of a language to serve his/her needs, and through the process of building upon abstractions based upon experience, he becomes proficient in his native language. While this process may be going on to an extent, it still does not explain how a child creates novel sentences, and constructs sentences before the need arises.

More specifically, as stated above, Halliday describes the process of
On Communicative Competence

building structure in terms of three main functions—'instrumental,' 'regulatory,' and 'interactional.' Each of these has subordinate components. Figure 1 (below) illustrates the system Nigel has developed for the 'instrumental'

Figure 1. Nigel at 19 months: part of the instrumental component.

Examples:

yes no bread breakfast more bread powder water on Bartok on
R: pos R: neg O: f O: f Q + O: f O: t A S: am A S: am
?e no bie bieka ma bie biega wata ?on tab ?on
yes I no I want I want my I want some I want the I want a
want it don't some breakfast more bread some water tap record
want it bread
off get down

S: ass S: ass

?efva dy kao
I want I want to
my bib get down
taken
off

Elements:

O object of desire [food, toiletry]
S service [amenity, assistance]
R response [positive, negative]
Q quantifier
A amenity

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function of language which refers to the use of language for the purpose of satisfying needs. In the instrumental component there are five structure-forming elements: the response element, the object of desire, the service desired, the quantifier, and the amenity.

Figure 2. Nigel at 19 months: part of the regulatory component.


What Halliday proposes is that there is a connection between, for
example, 'the object of desire' and the structure derived from it—the structures of language are expressed in terms of functional elements (and not of classes, such as noun and verb); and they are contextually determined according to the particular function of language. Although Halliday presents early stages of language learning, he claims the same process occurs in later stages, and the emphasis is on the form of the language. He states:

I shall suggest, however, that in principle the same is true of the elements of structure of the adult language: that these also have their origin in the social functions of language, though in a way that is less direct and therefore less immediately apparent. Even such a 'purely grammatical' function as 'subject' is derivable from language in use: in fact the notion that there are 'purely grammatical' elements of structure is really self-contradictory. (Halliday, 1977, p. 23)

Figure 2 (above) illustrates the 'regulatory' use of language which is used to control the behavior of others, to manipulate the persons in the environment. It consists of four elements: a demand for company, request for performance, demand for repetition of prior actions, and an urgency command. Halliday points out that there is no negative in the regulatory function at this stage, which means that this is not yet an option in the child's meaning potential.

Figure 3 (below) illustrates the 'interactional' component which is the child's use of language to interact with those around him/her—the 'me' and 'you' function of language. It consists of three elements: interaction, need, and search.

Halliday does not draw a sharp line among the three main language systems. He says there is a connection between the instrumental and the regulatory function, in that both represent types of demands placed on the addressee. The regulatory and the interactional are also related, in that both
involve interpersonal relationships. Nevertheless, the functions are
distinguishable from one another; “and this is important, because it is through
the gradual extension of his meaning potential into new functions that the
child's linguistic horizons become enlarged” (Halliday, 1977, p. 25).

Figure 3. Nigel at 19 months: part of the interactional component.

Examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Ndebele</th>
<th>Ndebele</th>
<th>Ndebele</th>
<th>Ndebele</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hullo</td>
<td>elisiwa</td>
<td>elisiwa</td>
<td>Mummy</td>
<td>Mummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I:gen</td>
<td>I:gen</td>
<td>I:pers</td>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Anna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hullo</td>
<td>hullo</td>
<td>memi</td>
<td>memi</td>
<td>memi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(greeting)</td>
<td>who's</td>
<td>Mummy!</td>
<td>Anna?</td>
<td>Mummy. I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[narrow</td>
<td>there?</td>
<td>where</td>
<td>where</td>
<td>want you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tone; +</td>
<td>(call)</td>
<td>you are!</td>
<td>you?</td>
<td>you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smile]</td>
<td>[wide</td>
<td>you?</td>
<td>you?</td>
<td>you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tone]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where Mummy

S + I:pers

wana memi

I want to
know where
Mummy is

Elements:

I interaction [general, personal]
N need
S search

Note. From M. A. K. Halliday (1977). *Explorations in the Functions of Language*
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Halliday defines meaning potential as the "linguistic realization of the
behaviour potential; 'can mean' is 'can do' when translated into language.
The meaning potential is in turn realized in the language system as lexico-grammatical potential, which is what the speaker 'can say' (Halliday, 1977, p. 43). Halliday further explains meaning potential as

the range of significant variation that is at the disposal of the speaker. The notion is not unlike Dell Hymes' notion of 'communicative competence', except that Hymes defines this in terms of 'competence' in the Chomskyan sense of what the speaker knows, whereas we are talking of a potential--what he can do, in the special linguistic sense of what he can mean--and avoiding the additional complication of a distinction between doing and knowing. (1973, p. 46)

We know that Hymes does not define competence in the Chomskyan sense because he does not sever it from ability as Chomsky does. However, Halliday's meaning potential is similar to Hymes' communicative competence because Hymes investigates language from a socio-cultural perspective in the same way that Halliday explores language. Furthermore, Halliday differentiates meaning potential from the Chomskyan notion of competence. Meaning potential is not defined in terms of the mind; rather, it is defined in terms of culture; "not as what the speaker knows, but as what he can do--in the special sense of what he can do linguistically (what he 'can mean', as we have expressed it)" (Halliday, 1977, p. 44).

In conclusion, Halliday asserts the following:

Although this connection between the functions of language and the linguistic system is clearest in the case of the language of very young children, it is essentially, I think, a feature of language as a whole. The internal organization of natural language can best be explained in the light of the social functions which language has evolved to serve. Language is as it is because of what it has to do. (1977, p. 26).

Essentially, Halliday investigates language from a sociolinguistic perspective. While his theory has its merits, it constitutes only a part of language learning. Although Halliday's complex models of language use
may play a significant role in how the child manipulates language to serve his/her needs, it still does not explain how the well-formed sentences are generated for the child to internalize, nor does it explain how the child creates novel sentences and makes sense of primary linguistic data.

Ultimately, Halliday admits that the investigation of structure leads to "a fairly abstract grammar (fairly 'deep', in the Chomskyan sense) . . ." (1977, p. 87). Nonetheless, Halliday continues to explain language learning exclusively in terms of its functions, despite the fact that he cannot explain the complexity of the structure of language, and how a child masters complex rules of his/her native language. This is where Chomsky's theory of UG seems to fit in, but Halliday refuses to admit this. The following chapter demonstrates the limitations of Halliday's socio-semantic or Hymes' socio-cultural theory of CC.

Alternatives to the Term Communicative Competence

What is important to remember, as many linguists agree, is that UG or the mind's mechanism to organize and interpret language is a necessary component for communicative language ability. Chomsky asserts that this innate linguistic knowledge makes it possible for a child to acquire language in a relatively short period of time given the complexity of human language. What linguists suggest and this paper contends is that the "language faculty" converges with language input and produces successful communicative interaction. Without grammatical competence or underlying knowledge of grammar, communication would not take place. This is a theory that, although is not directly stated, can be inferred from many linguistic theories.
Where non-verbal and verbal communicative input and UG converge there is communication, or to use another term proposed by Brown, communicative cognizance takes place (1984, p. 600). By using another term other than communicative competence, Brown solves the confusing problem of using Chomsky's linguistic term of competence which does not mean ability.

Others such as Taylor have replaced the term competence with the term proficiency (1980, p. 163). Other linguists define communicative competence in terms of ability, and make it clear from the start that they are not talking about the language instinct or innate knowledge of language as Chomsky defines it.

For example, Geis (1995) acknowledges Chomsky's distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic performance. However, Geis maintains that linguistic performance is part of a much more complex competence, "namely speakers' communicative competence" (1995, p. 215). Geis defines CC as

(a) a quite general ability to construct communicative plans, including, in particular, conversational plans, in an attempt to achieve one's (normally) nonlinguistic goals and recognize and identify the plans and therefore the goals of others and (b) an ability to produce and to understand plan-relevant messages (including utterances, silences, and other verbal and nonverbal behaviors). (1995, p. 215)

Thus, Geis draws the distinction between the knowledge speakers have of their languages and how speakers use their languages. The term CC is then used to refer to "use" and is strictly associated with "ability." Chomsky's grammatical competence is a separate component; although like Chomsky, Geis is interested in how linguistic competence and CC relate. Geis' theory of CC is that communication or utterance generation is
pragmatically driven, because the goal in producing utterances is to construct utterances that are not only semantically appropriate, but also contextually appropriate--

utterances that advance the purposes of the talk exchange in which they occur (Grice 1975) and are consistent in style, politeness, register, and discourse with the context in which they occur. Such utterances may or may not be grammatical in the sense that they are generatable by a conventional grammar of a language.

Since the term *communicative competence* seems to have been born out of a reaction to Chomsky's theory of *grammatical competence*, and the term "'competence' entered the technical literature in an effort to avoid entanglement with the slew of problems relating to 'knowledge'" (Chomsky, 1980, p. 59) in general, this paper asserts that the term CC should be changed to *communicative proficiency* (CP) as suggested by Taylor (1988). Thus, Chomsky's linguistic term can be understood as originally intended--severed from ability, and the confusion regarding the term *communicative competence* can be eliminated. Although I will continue to use the term CC because that is how it is discussed in linguistic circles, I believe I have sufficiently illustrated the need to use a different term when discussing theories of communicative language proficiency.

By taking this position, I am not making the claim that communicative behavior or *pragmatic competence* is not underlain by abstract mental knowledge structures as Chomsky proposes for *grammatical competence*. On the contrary, based on Chomsky's definition of *competence*, the term CC suggests that we possess underlying knowledge of the rules of language use. However, Hymes does not pursue this investigation. Instead, he discusses CC in terms of social matrices as though language use is merely a
product of its functions. Thus, the term CP better defines what Hymes investigates--how we learn the social and cultural aspects of language.

However, if one wants to gain insight into what is involved in successful communication, then it seems one should look closely at the possibility of underlying rules for *pragmatic competence* in that same way that Chomsky investigates underlying rules for *grammatical competence*. If Hymes uses the term CC to mean all that is involved in communicative language ability, then one needs to consider what abstract rules and representations enter into CC--Chomsky's *grammatical competence* as well as the possibility of *pragmatic competence* in the Chomskyan sense.

In other words, Hymes' theory of CC should take into consideration the underlying abstract rules that make communication possible in context. The following chapter which provides evidence for Chomsky's *grammatical competence* opens the door for an investigation of *pragmatic competence*--underlying abstract rules of language use.
Psycholinguistic View versus Sociolinguistic View:

Chomsky's Defense

While Chomsky was looking at the individual and attempting to determine through generative grammar what constitutes universal rules of grammar, Hymes was looking at communication between or among people, and defining language in sociolinguistic terms. In contrast to Chomsky, Hymes proposed that we stop looking at knowledge in the mind of the individual, but think of knowledge as between minds of individuals (Cazden, 1996, p. 7). Chomsky continues to investigate formal models to illuminate abstract properties of the mind/brain, but he never intended the investigation of the universal aspects of language to limit the study of language and all that it encompasses as Hymes claims. As stated earlier, he denies that his theories of abstract rules and representation of the mind/brain have direct application to the teaching of language (Chomsky, 1966, p. 43). While Chomsky successfully demonstrates that there are formal properties of language, he always maintains in all his writings that performance, or 'speech styles' cannot be abstracted from social context.

Even Hymes, a sociolinguist, credits Chomsky with a profound linguistic theory of the intrinsic structure of language (Hymes, 1972, p. 273). Still, Hymes attacks Chomsky for revering knowledge and depreciating use. Linguists such as Taylor (1988, p.156) claim Hymes misunderstood Chomsky who was defining competence in terms of the individual's tacit knowledge, knowledge as a state, not knowledge as a process. Hymes looks to antiquity for support for his sociolinguistic views of language acquisition where
structure was a means to use, and the grammarian subordinate to the rhetor" (1972, p. 272). Although Hymes, a sociolinguist, sought to transcend the notion of *competence* in a homogeneous speech community independent of sociological features, he does not preclude the existence of innate linguistic knowledge. However, he does claim that social life affects inner knowledge as well as outward performance. In this regard, Hymes theories are based in empiricist philosophy.

Whereas Chomsky differentiates between *grammatical competence* and *performance*, Hymes combines knowledge and ability to create his model of *communicative competence*. In this regard, Hymes has misappropriated the linguistic term *competence* as defined by Chomsky, since Chomsky severs the term competence from ability (1980, p. 59). Hymes claims Chomsky attacks traditions by using "his own language [as] a basis for theory: intuiting, rather than observing, and rejecting the social world with disdain" (Hymes, 1989, p. 245). Hymes does not equate language acquisition with a universalist view. "Chomsky pursues whatever may provide evidence of the innate. That sets aside much of what users, learners and teachers of language know and do" (Hymes, 1989, p. 248).

While Hymes blames Chomsky for disabling linguists from pursuing the righteous path of investigating the ethnography of speaking, I believe Hymes is responsible for confusing the issue by coining the term *communicative competence* which by Chomsky’s definition is a contradiction of terms. For Chomsky, communication encompasses performance and ability, while ‘competence’ is knowledge of language severed from ability (Chomsky, 1980, p. 59).
Hymes' allegations (see p. 25) regarding Chomsky's work illustrates why Hymes, not Chomsky, is at least in part responsible for the injustices mentioned earlier related to language learning. To attribute these injustices to Chomsky is to completely misinterpret his work and goals—to determine underlying rules and representations which make language acquisition possible. It does not logically follow that because Chomsky focuses his attention on *competence* or the formal models of language, that he discounts *performance*. What Chomsky did do was to shift the focus from behavior or the products of behavior to states of the mind/brain that enter into behavior. Chomsky's concern is knowledge of language: its nature, origin, and use. The three basic questions that he attempts to answer are the following:

(i) What constitutes knowledge of language?

(ii) How is knowledge of language acquired?

(iii) How is knowledge of language put to use? (Chomsky, 1986, p. 3)

So while Chomsky's main focus is on *competence* severed from ability, he is acutely aware of its relationship to use, and is interested in how knowledge of language is put to use. As Spolsky proposed earlier, there is a point at which *competence* and *performance* overlap (1989, p. 139).

Chomsky proposes how to pursue the answers to the above three basic questions:

The answer to the first question is given by a particular generative grammar, a theory concerned with the state of the mind/brain of the person who knows a particular language. The answer to the second is given by a specification of UG along with an account of the ways in which its principles interact with experience to yield a particular language; UG is a theory of the "initial state" of the language faculty, prior to any linguistic experience. The answer to the third question would be a theory of how the knowledge of language attained enters into the expression of thought and the understanding of presented
Chomsky goes on to say that he is doing nothing more than taking up classical questions that had been set aside for many years. By investigating the 'steady state,' Chomsky demonstrates that there are generalizations about all languages, not just English, which characterize UG, a theory of knowledge, not of behavior. In fact, the UG theory gains its power by being applied to many languages; and since the 1980's many languages have been studied, in particular the Romance languages and Japanese (Cook & Newson, 1996, p. 3). Chomsky defines UG as "the system of principles, conditions, and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages . . . the essence of human language" (Chomsky, 1975, p. 29). Again, Chomsky's theory of competence does not say how a speaker might proceed, nor does it support a method of language teaching. So Hymes' claim that Chomsky is responsible for the list of injustices (see p. 25) with respect to language learning is unfounded.

The Chomsky/Piaget debates (below) illuminate the complexities of language learning. These debates demonstrate that language learning extends beyond Halliday's socio-semantic theory of language and Hymes' socio-cultural theory of language.
of general "constructed" intellectual development (as Piaget contended), or whether they are a highly specialized part of human genetic inheritance—a kind of innate knowledge that has only to unfold (as Chomsky asserts) (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980, p. xxvii). In the opening chapter by Piaget, “The Psychogenesis of Knowledge and Its Epistemological Significance,” Piaget asserts the following:

Fifty years of experience have taught us that knowledge does not result from a mere recording of observations without a structuring activity on the part of the subject. Nor do any apriori or innate cognitive structures exist in man; the functioning of intelligence alone is hereditary and creates structures only through an organization of successive actions performed on objects. (Piaget, 1980, p. 23)

Piaget does not consider himself a behaviorist or a nativist, but rather he claims to be a constructivist, which he defines as a strong empiricist position regarding the acquisition of knowledge or human understanding. In this respect, Piaget’s view is representative of Halliday’s theory of language learning—that the character of language has been shaped and determined by what we use it for, and that language is a process of building meaning potential associated with the social functions of language.

Piaget explains his anti-behaviorist and non-nativist position as follows: Knowledge proceeds from action or experience similar to the empiricist and behaviorist argument, but the relationship between objects and subjects is not merely “adaptive” or simply a process of association. Rather it is a process which Piaget defines as “the integration of new objects or new situations and events into previous schemes of action which are developed as a result of generalizations made based on experience” (1980, p.164).
Adaptation does occur but not in an isolated state, because there are logical generalizations constructed based on experience; and new experiences are then integrated into these constructed schemes of action. Piaget maintains that learning is a continual process of construction of schemes and that as we mature we begin to reflect on knowledge gained through the constructed schemes of action. He states: "As a rule, all reflecting on a new plane leads to and necessitates a reorganization, and it is this reconstruction, productive of new concepts, that we call "reflection"" (1980, pp. 27-28). According to Piaget, we progress from constructive generalizations based on sensorimotor assimilation to reflective abstraction. Piaget explains this process further:

[R]eflecting on a higher plane of an element taken from a lower level (for example, the interiorization of an action into a conceptualized representation) constitutes an establishment of correspondences, which is itself already a new concept, and this then opens the way to other possible correspondences, which represents a new "opening." The element transferred into the new level is then constituted from those that were already there or those that are going to be added, which is now the work of the "reflection" and no longer of the "reflecting" (although initially elicited by the latter). (1980, p. 27)

In other words, we pass from sensorimotor assimilation (assimilating objects to schemes) to representational assimilation (assimilating objects to each other) through the formation of the semiotic function (evocation of objects not presently perceived). The semiotic function commences when sensorimotor signifiers (cues or signals) are differentiated from what is thereby signified and when signifiers can correspond to a multiplicity of things signified (Piaget, 1980, p. 29). In addition to vocal and learned language, semiotic functions include deferred imitations, symbolic play,
mental image which is an interiorized imitation, and sign language. In so far as the semiotic function is concerned, Piaget's theory of language learning diverges from Halliday's theory, because Halliday refers to Malinowski's theory that language learning is a direct result of experience with objects that are present. Of course, as stated before, we know that language acquisition is not the result of interaction with the environment alone. There is a biological aspect to language acquisition, and although Piaget and Chomsky disagree on just what that is, they do agree that the biological endowment possesses an innate component.

Piaget argues against Chomsky's hypothesis of an "innate fixed nucleus" or the transformational aspects of Chomsky's doctrine. Piaget maintains that at every level of learning a mechanism called autoregulation plays a role. Autoregulation is the process by which we construct schemes of action via sensorimotor assimilation, and pass from action to representation due to the semiotic function--differentiation of sensorimotor signifiers from those signifiers that remain as a result of constructive generalizations. While these reflective abstractions are not at the time dependent on sensory input, they were initially produced by sensorimotor intelligence. So that the initial state for Piaget consists of the hereditary mechanism of autoregulation, common to biological and mental processes (1980, pp. 30-31).

Piaget maintains that a non-innate fixed nucleus is the "result of the constructions of sensorimotor intelligence, which is prior to language and results from those joint organic and behavioral autoregulations that determine this epigenesis" (1980, p. 31). He admits that autoregulation is in part innate, but more in terms of functioning than in terms of structure (1980,
p. 381). This is similar to Halliday's theory of language learning—that the structure of language is clearly related to the type of function which the language is being made to serve (1977, p. 21).

**Chomsky's Reply to Piaget**

In the chapter by Chomsky, "On Cognitive Structures and Their Development: A Reply to Piaget," Chomsky argues against Piaget's two basic tenets: that innate structures are "biologically inexplicable," and that a fixed non-innate structure can be explained as the 'necessary' result of constructions of sensorimotor intelligence (1980, p. 35). Although Chomsky agrees that the evolutionary development is no doubt, "biologically unexplained," he does not believe that it is "biologically inexplicable." Chomsky argues that there are no substantive proposals involving 'construction of sensorimotor intelligence' that offer any hope of accounting for the phenomenon of language. He draws an analogy between cognitive structures and physical structures of the human body:

> The expectation that constructions of sensorimotor intelligence determines the character of a mental organ such as language seems to me hardly more plausible than a proposal that the fundamental properties of the eye or the visual cortex or the heart develop on this basis. (Chomsky, 1980, p. 37)

By investigating the 'steady state' attained by puberty, Chomsky claims we can construct a hypothesis as to the grammar internally represented; and we could gain further insight into the growth of language by investigating the intermediate states—the sequences of states that progress from the genetically determined 'initial state' (So) to the 'steady state' (Ss). By looking at the steady state of a language Chomsky postulates abstract mental
On Communicative Competence 55

processing of a 'nontrivial' sort which explains how a child can comprehend and construct well-formed sentences from degenerative information. In other words, primary linguistic data does not provide enough information to explain how we comprehend and construct well-formed sentences. Given this poverty of stimulus, Chomsky proposes innate knowledge of language--rules and representations that provide the basis from which we derive well-formed, comprehensible sentences.

**Syntactic Structures Are Bound by Principles and Parameters**

Chomsky presents examples of later states of language acquisition that are not determined by experience, that is, elements of language that are known but for which there appear to be no relevant evidence that allows for the formation of well-formed sentences. In other words, experience with language in a linguistic environment does not provide the stimulus to produce well-formed sentences. Chomsky considers the process of the formation of simple yes-or-no questions. He gives the following examples:

1. The man is here.--Is the man here?
2. The man will leave.--Will the man leave?

Chomsky puts forth two hypothesis to account for this infinite class of pairs:

- **H1**: process the declarative from the beginning to end (left to right), word by word, until reaching the first occurrence of the words is, will, etc.; transpose this occurrence to the beginning (left), forming the associated interrogative
- **H2**: same as H1, but select the first occurrence of is, will, etc., following the first noun phrase of the declarative. (1980, p.39)

Hypothesis 1 is a "structure independent rule" and H2 is a "structure
dependent rule" (Chomsky, 1980, p.39). Chomsky explains further:

Thus, H1 requires analysis of the declarative into just a sequence of words, whereas H2 requires an analysis into successive words and also abstract phrases such as "noun phrase." The phrases are abstract in that their boundaries and labeling are not in general physically marked in any way; rather they are mental constructions. (1980, p. 39).

To illustrate the fact that the structure independent rule, H1, is invalid, Chomsky gives the following data:

(2) The man who is here is tall.--Is the man who is here tall?
The man who is tall will leave.--Will the man who is tall leave?
These data are predicted by H2 and refute H1, which would predict rather the interrogatives (3):
(3) Is the man who here is tall?

Chomsky explains the preference for H2 over H1, even when no child is taught the relevant facts, by postulating the existence of innate mental representations of rules--rules that are structure dependent. "The child need not consider H1, it is ruled out by properties of his initial mental state, So" (Chomsky, 1980, p. 40). Chomsky likens language learning to other genetically determined physical properties of the human body. In other words, the different organs of the body are predetermined to function in a certain way, and the mind/brain is no different in that it is genetically predetermined to acquire language. The initial state which possesses rules of grammar provide the resource or foundation for the acquisition of language. This theory explains why children are never heard to make errors like those in example (3). Chomsky explains further:

[Though as in the case of many other genetically determined properties, (for example, the onset of puberty, the termination of growth) the appearance of this mental characteristic may be delayed many years after birth, and may be conditional on the triggering effect]
Phonology Is Governed by Abstract Universal Rules

Even at the level of sound structure, there is evidence that abstract representations are formed and manipulated by a restrictive schematism that specifies the choice of relevant phonetic properties. In other words, in the same way that universal rules govern syntax as illustrated above, universal rules also govern phonology. A careful investigation of sound reveals general principles of organization governing phonological rules. For example, it has been observed that certain phonological rules operate in a cycle. This principle is called the principle of cyclic application (Chomsky, 1972, p. 45). Some simple effects of this principle are illustrated below:

a. relaxation, emendation, elasticity, connectivity
b. illustration, demonstration, devastation, anecdotal (Chomsky, 1972, p. 44).

The unitalicized vowels are reduced to [ə] in b, but they retain their original quality in a. Example a differs from b in that the former are derived from underlying forms--relax, emend, elastic, connective, that contain primary stress on the unitalicized vowel. Those in b do not have the same property; and what Chomsky contends is that vowel reduction is contingent upon lack of stress. He accounts for the distinction between forms a and b by employing the principle of cyclic application. In the case of a on the first, innermost cycle, stress will be assigned by general abstract rules to the unitalicized vowels. On the next cycle, stress is shifted, but the abstract stress (the stress on the underlying form) assigned in the first cycle is sufficient to protect the vowel from reduction.

In the case of b the underlying forms do not contain a primary stress
Therefore, the lack of stress in the first cycle does not protect the vowel from reduction. "Thus, it is the abstract underlying representation that determines the phonetic form, a primary role being played by the abstract stress that is virtually eliminated in the phonetic form" (Chomsky, 1972, p. 44-45). Since it is difficult to explain how a language learner might derive this principle by "induction" from the data presented to him, Chomsky concludes that "the principle of cyclic application of phonological rules is an innate organizing principle of universal grammar that is used in determining the character of linguistic experience and in constructing a grammar that constitutes the acquired knowledge of language" (1972, p. 45).

**Chomsky Refutes Behaviorism and Constructivism**

Through a close investigation of language in its 'steady state' (Ss), not only does Chomsky demonstrate that language is not learned through an inductive process, as the behaviorists attempt to show, but he also undermines Piaget's theory of constructivism. According to Piaget, who considers himself an anti-nativist and anti-behaviorist, cognitive development is a constructive exchange with the environment. In other words, cognitive development is the construction of the new in the mind/brain, and through assimilation, some structure without is turned into some structure within. Once assimilated, the new structure becomes part of the subject's repertoire, and then can enter as a component into more complex constructions which then build upon themselves, so that the subject can create constructions of constructions within the mind/brain. For Piaget the initial state consists of the
hereditary mechanism of autoregulation, the process by which we construct
schemes of action via sensorimotor intelligence. Piaget explains further:

[C]ognitive autoregulation makes use of the general systems of
organic regulation such as are found at every genetic, morphogenetic,
physiological, and nervous level, and forthwith adapts them to their
new situation (new, that is, by relation to the preceding levels, but still
present in every animal series). This situation constitutes the
exchanges with environment that form the basis of behavior. . . .

[T]he operational structures of the intelligence are transformation
systems of a kind which maintains the system as an invariant totality.
This same definition could be applied to the living organism itself,
since its two basic properties are that it serves as the field for multiple
interactions (=transformations), though at the same time leaving
unchanged both the overall form (=conservation) and even a certain
number of invariant relationships. (1971, p. 34)

However, based on his investigation of the steady state (Ss), Chomsky
argues that the process of language development cannot be fully explained
by Piaget’s theory of constructivism. Chomsky’s principles and parameters
theory, first known as Government/Binding (GB) theory (1981), makes the
claim that language knowledge consists of principles universal to all
languages and parameters that vary from one language to another. These
principles reveal the existence of a fixed nucleus or innate knowledge of
language which when exposed to primary linguistic data organizes the input
so that it is phonologically, syntactically, and semantically comprehensible.
Piaget admits that there is something innate as far as functioning (but not
structure) is concerned: “no one has ever been able to make an intelligent
man out of an idiot” (Piaget, 1980, p. 168). However, Chomsky argues that if
there are elements of innateness involved in the structure of language, then
one must postulate innate structures; you cannot have it both ways.
Fodor Argues Against Constructivism

In a continuation of the rebuttal to Piaget's theory of constructivism, Fodor argues "On the Impossibility of Acquiring 'More Powerful' Structures" (Fodor, 1980, p. 142). While Piaget is in favor of some kind of compromise between innatism and constructivism, Chomsky and Fodor are not. In fact, Fodor considers himself a radical innatist. As stated earlier Piaget admits that some structures are innate, but these innate structures are not highly specific linguistic rules as Chomsky proposes in his theory of UG. Instead, according to Piaget, these rules are the sophisticated outcome of the interactions among simpler primitives. The resulting rules are constructed using the subject's innate repertoire of computational abilities of the mind interacting among themselves and with the environment. Furthermore, Piaget claims that richer or stronger concepts can be constructed from impoverished or weaker concepts.

Fodor explains why this inductive learning theory does not fully explain the origin of concepts. Most learning theories are based on experiments which demonstrate how a subject maps certain attributes or characteristics onto an object. For example, the subject, through trial and error, associates the word *miv* with a red square. This exemplifies the theory of inductive learning, but Fodor argues that this says nothing about the origin of concepts. "What it doesn't tell you is where the hypothesis (and the concepts that they deploy) come from" (Fodor, 1980, p. 145). Furthermore, Fodor argues that Piaget's theory of constructing richer structures from weaker structures is also flawed, because if you define learning as hypothesis formation and confirmation, it is never possible to learn a richer
logic based on a weaker logic. Fodor explains that in order to get from stage 1 to stage 2 by a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation (the only learning theory we have) we would have to learn the truth conditions upon which the hypothesis in stage 1 is based. And to learn these truth conditions we need to formulate a hypothesis using the conceptual apparatus available at stage 1. However, such a hypothesis cannot be formulated because the conceptual apparatus available at stage 1 does not provide the means to formulate a hypothesis which could then theoretically bridge the gap between stage 1 and stage 2.

In summary, what the above discussion illustrates is that language learning is different from general learning in that it is not learned inductively. In order to explain language acquisition, one must include Chomsky's theory of principles and parameters, or UG, because grammatical competence, a component of communication, develops despite the poverty of stimulus. Thus, in the process of acquiring communicative skills we induce from universal rules of grammar how to structure and organize language.

Several questions remain: Is pragmatic competence like grammatical competence, in that some part of communicative language ability is underlain by abstract knowledge? Are there universal rules of language use as suggested by Chomsky (1980) and Grice (1975)? Do we possess knowledge of pragmatics like we possess grammatical knowledge? In other words, do certain parts of the brain govern pragmatics like specific modules of the mind govern grammar (i.e. Broca's and Wernicke's aphasia)? These are some of the questions I will attempt to answer in the ensuing chapters.

In Chapter 4 I review Savignon's (1983) theory of CC and Bachman's
(1990) theory of Communicative Language Ability. Both linguists describe an integrative theory of CC. Like Chomsky, they make a distinction between *competence* and *performance*, but they combine these two entities into one theory. Savignon refers to her theory as a theory of CC; whereas, Bachman avoids the terminological confusion by developing a theory of Communicative Language Ability (CLA).

Included in Bachman's theory, and suggested by Savignon, is a theory of *pragmatic competence*. They theorize that *pragmatic competence* may be like *grammatical competence* in that there are basic underlying rules for pragmatics. Through exploring the theories of Savignon (1983) and Bachman (1990) this paper reaches a more complete picture of what it means to achieve *communicative competence*, or communicative proficiency (Taylor, 1988). It is the contention of this thesis that these theories move beyond Hymes' theory of CC, a socially constituted linguistic theory. Savignon (1983) and Bachman (1990) provide a more comprehensive theory of CC, by integrating Chomsky's theory of *grammatical competence* into their theory of CC or CLA (Bachman, 1990). In addition, they suggest that we do possess *pragmatic competence* in the Chomskyan sense.
Integrative Theories of Communicative Competence

Both Savignon (1983) and Bachman (1990) develop models of CC that include grammatical competence as one of the integral components of CC. They also theorize that we possess pragmatic competence—underlying knowledge of language use. By theorizing that we possess pragmatic competence, Bachman and Savignon suggest that language skills are subserved by competence—tacit knowledge structures severed from ability. This knowledge of language use enters into performance in the same way that knowledge of grammar enters into performance. Just as there are organizing principles and parameters for grammar, there are organizing principles and parameters for pragmatics. Furthermore, Bachman and Savignon suggest that there is a competence of communication--CC.

Savignon’s Theory and Model of CC

As early as 1972 Savignon followed her intuition and developed a method of teaching that addressed the needs of communication—a continuous process of expression, interpretation, and negotiation between or among people (1972, p. 8). In her book, Communicative Competence: An Experiment in Foreign Language Teaching (1972), Savignon compares three groups of students’ ability to use French in four different situations—discussion of a school related topic, information getting, reporting about personal life, and description of the characteristics of an actor. After 18 weeks of institutional teaching, those students who received training in communicative skills performed at a superior level compared with the other
two groups who did not --a culture group that discussed French culture and attended cultural events, and a control group that attended the language laboratory for two 30-minute sessions a week. These two 30-minute sessions in the language laboratory were in addition to four 50-minute lessons using an instructional program based on the audiolingual method of teaching language which all three groups attended. The experimental group received a 50-minute supplementary session of communicative acts in place of the two 30-minute sessions in the language laboratory for the control group. The results revealed that all groups performed the same (there were no significant differences) on the CEEB tests of listening and reading. However, the experimental communicative group scored higher on communication skills. These findings suggest that there is a difference between linguistic competence and the one hand, and communicative competence on the other hand.

Savignon differentiates linguistic competence from communicative competence in practice--through her study in foreign language teaching. In addition, her theory carefully integrates grammatical competence with the other competencies. At the same time, she acknowledges underlying grammatical competence in the strict Chomskyan sense as the basis for language performance or language acquisition. Chomsky defines grammatical competence as

the cognitive state that encompasses all those aspects of form and meaning and their relation, including underlying structures that enter into that relation, which are properly assigned to the specific subsystem of the human mind that relates representations of form and meaning. A bit misleadingly perhaps, I will continue to call this subsystem "the language faculty." (1980, p. 59)
The language faculty is understood to be a particular component of the human mind; and UG, a theory of linguistic structure that aims to discover the principles and parameters of attainable human languages, may be regarded as a characterization of the genetically determined language faculty (Chomsky, 1986, p. 3).

Thus, knowledge of language plays a critical role in language performance; although as Chomsky explains, and Savignon agrees, a speaker/hearer's implicit knowledge of language is not evident from his performance because errors occur in real situations due to "memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest . . ." (Chomsky, 1965, p. 3).

Since Savignon's focus is L2 acquisition, her model (1983) is based on Canale and Swain's (1980) theoretical framework for curriculum design and evaluation in L2 programs. Canale and Swain's theoretical framework for communicative competence minimally includes three main components: grammatical competence, sociolinguistic competence, and strategic competence (1980, p.28). Grammatical competence includes knowledge of lexical items and of rules of morphology, syntax, sentence-grammar semantics, and phonology (1980, p. 29). They refer to Chomsky for a definition of grammatical competence.

Sociolinguistic competence consists of two sets of rules: sociocultural rules of use and rules of discourse. Sociocultural rules specify the ways in which utterances are produced appropriately within a given context. Rules of discourse are defined in terms of cohesion (i.e. grammatical links) and coherence (i.e. appropriate combination of communicative functions).
Canale and Swain define strategic competence as the following:

verbal and non-verbal communication strategies that may be called into action to compensate for breakdowns in communication due to performance variables or to insufficient competence. Such strategies will be of two main types: those that relate primarily to grammatical competence (e.g. how to paraphrase grammatical forms that one has not mastered or cannot recall momentarily) and those that relate more to sociolinguistic competence (e.g. various role-playing strategies, how to address strangers when unsure of their social status). (1980, p. 30-31)

The only difference between Canale and Swain's model and Savignon's model is that Savignon proposes a separate component for discourse competence. Later, in 1983, Canale distinguishes sociolinguistic competence from discourse competence (Canale, 1983, p. 9-10). Thus, by discussing Savignon's theory of CC which reconfigures Canale and Swain's theory of CC, I will have outlined the contents and boundaries of each of their components, and will not discuss Canale and Swain's theory separately.

**Savignon's Grammatical Competence**

Savignon (1983) defines grammatical competence as "linguistic competence in the restricted sense of the term as it has been used by Chomsky ... and most other linguists. It is that part of language performance with which we are most familiar, that is, the grammatical well-formedness that has provided the focus of L2 studies for centuries" (Savignon, 1983, p. 36). Savignon explains in more detail:

Grammatical competence is mastery of the linguistic code, the ability to recognize the lexical, morphological, syntactic, and phonological features to form words and sentences. Grammatical competence is not linked to any single theory of grammar, nor does it assume the ability to make explicit the rules of usage. A person demonstrates grammatical competence by using a rule, not by stating a rule" (1983, p. 37).
Savignon's definition of grammatical competence fits with Chomsky's theory that grammar is a system of rules underlying the creative aspects of language. For Chomsky grammatical competence constitutes knowledge of language—the mental structures and representations of the mind/brain with respect to language. The term competence is used because of the problems relating to knowledge; Chomsky wants to sever competence from the meaning of 'ability' (1980, p. 59). Grammatical competence is concerned with those aspects of form and meaning that are determined by the "language faculty." Universal Grammar provides the basis for developing the rules of grammar of a particular language and all of this knowledge is tacit or implicit. As Savignon states above, grammatical competence is demonstrated by using the rules, not by stating the rules of a language of which there are hundreds.

While Savignon's theory of grammatical competence is used as the basis for L2 teaching, Chomsky is skeptical that the theoretical underpinnings of grammatical competence would support a method of language teaching (Chomsky, 1966, p. 43). Nonetheless, Chomsky believes it is important to study the processes by which transition takes place from the 'initial state' of the language faculty prior to any linguistic experience to the 'final state,' that is, language acquisition (Chomsky, 1980, p. 202).

Savignon's Sociolinguistic Competence

The second component of CC, according to Savignon, is sociolinguistic competence which is an interdisciplinary field of study that relates to the socio-cultural rules of language use. Savignon defines it as the
Sociolinguistic competence requires an understanding of the social context in which language is used: the roles of the participants, the information they share, and the function of the interaction. Only in full context of this kind can judgments be made on the appropriateness of a particular utterance in the terms elaborated by Hymes. (1977, p. 37)

Savignon admits that we are far from formulating a satisfactory description of socio-cultural rules of appropriateness. However, one of the goals of intercultural analysis is to make explicit the rules of a culture in order to help nonnatives adapt to unfamiliar cultures.

Savignon explains sociolinguistic competence further:

Judgments of appropriateness involve more than knowing what to say in a situation and how to say it. They also involve knowing when to remain silent. Or, in fact, when to appear incompetent. Women of my generation may remember being cautioned by their mothers not to talk up too much in class, not to "show up" the boys, and counseled to "act dumb" on occasion so as to give the men in their lives a feeling of superiority. The appearance of incompetence in this instance was considered appropriate, that is, a sign of sociolinguistic competence. (1983, p. 37).

Another example of appropriate behavior is when L2 speakers deliberately maintain a formal register, where in the same situation an informal register might be appropriate for a native speaker. These L2 speakers are playing the role of "foreigner," which they believe has been assigned to them by a native speaker. Thus, there are specific roles to play in a given social situation, and knowing the social rules provides the speaker/listener with the tools to use language correctly--according to convention, and effectively so that s/he may accomplish his/her goals. Both native and non-native speakers need to know and understand cultural rules of behavior in order to adapt or assimilate into society. In general, the purpose of
achieving sociolinguistic competence is to promote successful communication.

**Savignon's Discourse Competence**

Discourse competence, the third component of CC as defined by Savignon, is also an interdisciplinary inquiry like sociolinguistic competence. "The theory and analysis of discourse bring together many disciplines--for example, linguistics, literary criticism, psychology, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, print, and broadcast media" (Savignon, 1983, p. 38).

Discourse competence is concerned with the connections of sentences or utterances used to form a meaningful whole. Organizational patterns of discourse differ depending on the nature of the text and the content in which it appears. Morgan (1981) refers to the various structures underlying discourse as discourse grammar. As stated above, Canale and Swain discuss rules of discourse under the heading of sociolinguistic competence; although they distinguish rules of discourse from socio-cultural rules or rules of appropriateness (1980, p. 30). However, as mentioned above, in 1983 Canale made a further distinction between sociolinguistic competence (socio-cultural rules) and discourse competence (cohesion and coherence).

Canale and Swain (1980) refer to Halliday and Hasan (1976) and Widdowson (1978) for a discussion of rules of discourse. These rules are defined in terms of the cohesion (grammatical links) and coherence (appropriate combinations of communicative functions) of groups of utterances (1980, p. 30). Halliday and Hasan (1976) identify and explain cohesive devices used to create a meaningful sentence. Formal cohesive
devices used to connect language include: pronouns, conjunctions, synonyms, ellipsis, comparisons, and parallel structures. These devices will be discussed in detail in Bachman's (1990) model of CC, since he also relies on Halliday and Hasan (1976) for a definition of what Bachman refers to as 'textual competence.'

Connections or structural links between sentences are often not explicit--there may be no overt expression of a link between one proposition and another. However, a listener infers meaning based on knowledge of the world as well as familiarity with a particular context. The following examples by Savignon illustrate the role of inference in the interpretation of discourse:

1) Chico suddenly turned and ran because he saw a policeman coming down the street.
2) Chico saw a policeman coming down the street. Suddenly he turned and ran. (1983, p. 39)

In sentence 1) the relationship between the first independent clause and the second dependent clause is explicit. The use of the conjunction 'because', a cohesive device, makes it clear why Chico ran. However, in sentence 2) we need to infer why Chico ran because there is no cohesive device used to make the obvious unambiguous connection, and grammatical knowledge will not provide this information. Our original interpretation might be the same as sentence 1), but with more contextual information, this could be invalidated. To illustrate, Savignon gives the following example of how the text might continue:

3) Chico saw the policeman coming down the street. Suddenly he turned and ran. The 5th street bus had just passed him by and he was going to be late for school again. There was no time to ask about Pedro. (1983, p. 39)
Hence, discourse competence is the ability to grasp the meaning of the text beyond the sentence-level structure. As Savignon's above example illustrates, a single sentence becomes meaningful only in context, therefore creating a 'global' meaning. Text coherence or a global meaning can either be created through cohesive devices such as in sentence 1), or by giving more related information in discourse, as in example 3) above. Furthermore, discourse competence is the ability to interpret text connected by implicit or explicit means in order to form a meaningful whole, and to be able to construct a meaningful whole through cohesion or coherence so that others may comprehend the global meaning. Successful communication "is dependent on the knowledge shared by the writer/speaker and the reader/hearer--knowledge of the real world, knowledge of discourse structure and knowledge of the social setting" (Savignon, 1983, p. 40).

**Savignon's Strategic Competence**

Strategic competence, the fourth component of CC, is analogous to survival strategies with respect to communication. In other words, survival strategies are the coping and strategic skills used to successfully communicate, and to sustain communication. Savignon defines strategic competence further:

There is no such person as an ideal speaker/hearer, who knows the language perfectly and uses it appropriately in all social interactions. . . . The Strategies that one uses to compensate for imperfect knowledge of rules--or limiting factors in their application such as fatigue, distraction, and inattention- -may be characterized as strategic competence. . . . The strategies we use to sustain communication include paraphrasing, circumlocution, repetition, hesitation, avoidance, and guessing, as well as shifts in register and style. (1983, p. 40-41)
Thus, strategic competence is the ability of a native or nonnative speaker/hearer to rephrase, repeat, emphasize, clarify, avoid unknown words, topics or situations, and modify the message when a breakdown in communication occurs. This adaptation in L1 and L2 requires the speaker/hearer to 'empathize' with others. Horwitz and Horwitz describe empathy as the power of imaginatively experiencing others' experiences, and they believe it is a necessary component for communicative competence:

Given a 'complete' repertoire of all the appropriate linguistic and sociolinguistic skills, a person without empathy would still be unable to define from a mutual perspective that of the other person (as well as his own) what the particular interpersonal context was and what kind of language it required. (1977, p. 110)

In addition to these four linguistic components of CC, there are paralinguistic features of communication to take into consideration. Paralinguistic features include gestures, distance, posture, and facial expressions which accompany words and facilitate communication. According to Savignon, just as there is a linguistic code, there is also a gesture code--there are sociolinguistic rules which govern gesture as well as speech (1983, p. 43). For example, an appropriate gesture may replace a word as a coping strategy during a moment of silence, and may prevent a communication breakdown. These paralinguistic features such as gestures used during speech communication can serve the same purpose as linguistic features in the framework of CC. Thus, different paralinguistic features may fall within one of the four main components depending on the function they serve.
Savignon’s Model of Communicative Competence

The question now remains: How do these four linguistic components interact to produce CC in a particular setting or context? Figure 4 (below) shows Savignon’s theoretical model of CC. What this diagram proposes is that even without any grammatical competence, sociolinguistic competence and strategic competence interact to afford a measure of CC. In other words, successful communication can occur without the use of words through gestures, facial expressions, etc., provided there is a willing partner.

Savignon includes strategic competence as a component of CC at all levels because coping strategies are always in play, and “regardless of experience or level of proficiency one never knows all of a language” (1983, p. 46). She states that the proportions drawn have no empirical basis, but minimally illustrate that CC is greater than linguistic or grammatical competence, and that one does not move from one competence to the other. “Rather, an increase in one component interacts with the other components to produce a corresponding increase in overall communicative competence” (Savignon, 1983, p. 45).

It is true that grammatical competence would increase with respect to grammatical knowledge of a particular language as the tacit knowledge of rules governing a particular language became part of one’s repertoire in the process of language acquisition. However, since Savignon defines grammatical competence in the strict Chomskyan sense it also must begin at the point of the pyramid, like strategic competence, at least in so far as she conceives CC. Universal grammar constitutes “the initial state of the language faculty prior to any linguistic experience” (Chomsky, 1986, p. 4).
My interpretation of the above model is that we as social animals are biologically endowed with a predisposition to communicate, and therefore, we possess innate mechanisms which are designed to use strategies and conform to sociolinguistic rules. This knowledge—strategic and sociolinguistic competence, is not the same as Chomsky's language faculty characterized by UG; however, we possess a general knowledge for communication. Chomsky (1988) and Piaget (1980) both discuss general innate learning mechanisms which are engaged during communication. On the other hand, because of the way the model is drawn with strategic competence and sociolinguistic competence beginning at the point of the pyramid, it seems possible that Savignon is suggesting that we have knowledge of underlying rules of pragmatics—pragmatic competence in the
Chomskyan sense. Bachman (1990) theorizes that we possess *pragmatic competence* in the Chomskyan sense of *grammatical competence*. Under the heading of Language Competence, which Bachman defines as knowledge of language, he includes organizational competence (Chomsky's grammatical competence and textual competence) and pragmatic competence (illocutionary competence and sociolinguistic competence).

Below is a review of Bachman's theory.

**Bachman's Theory and Model of Communicative Language Ability**

Bachman (1990) includes all of the same components in his theory of CC, but his theoretical models are drawn differently with many more delineations of the four basic components discussed above from Savignon (1983) and Canale and Swain (1980). Instead of using the term *communicative competence*, Bachman coins his own term--*communicative language ability* (CLA). In this respect, he avoids the confusion caused by using the term CC, since Chomsky entered the term *competence* as a technical linguistic term severed from ability. Bachman's framework of CLA (Figure 5) includes three main components: language competence, strategic competence, and psychophysiological mechanisms. Bachman describes CLA in a way that provides a broad basis for the development and use of language tests and language testing research. He extends the framework of earlier models of CC by Hymes (1972), who focuses on L1, Savignon (1983), Canale and Swain (1980), and Canale (1983), all of whom focus on L2. Therefore, Bachman's models are applicable to L1 and L2.
Language competence consists of specific knowledge of language used in communication. Strategic competence refers to the language user's appropriate implementation of his knowledge of language in a particular setting. "Psychophysiological mechanisms refer to the neurological and psychological processes involved in the actual execution of language as a physical phenomenon (sound, light)" (Bachman, 1990, p. 84).

Below is Bachman's diagram of the interaction of these three basic components of CLA with the language user's knowledge of the world within a particular context. The diagram illustrates how knowledge of the world and knowledge of language provide the tools for strategic competence--the ability to use linguistic knowledge and knowledge of the world to negotiate meaning so that successful communication takes place between speaker/hearer, and writer/reader. What the rest of the diagram illustrates is that neurological and psychological mechanisms interact with strategic competence and context of situation. In other words, how we employ our brains with respect to language is impacted by our level of strategic competence as well as the context in which the communication takes place.

Certain psychophysiological mechanisms are engaged when we are placed in a specific linguistic context; and certain psychophysiological mechanisms are employed with respect to our level of strategic competence. On the other hand, our level of strategic competence is impacted by the condition of our psychophysiological mechanisms, and by the context of situation. All three components work together and are affected by one another. Ultimately, they are governed by knowledge structures and

It is the interaction of the three main components--language
Similarly, Savignon states “communicative competence is context specific. Communication takes place in an infinite variety of situations, and success in a particular role depends on one's understanding of the context and on prior experience of a similar kind. It requires making appropriate choices of register and style in terms of the situation and the other participants” (1983, p. 8). Thus, both Savignon and Bachman agree that communication is like a weaving of all the different competencies and our
choice of 'design' (style) and 'color' (register) depends on our knowledge of the world and the context of our situation.

Defining Bachman's Language Competence

For Bachman, language competence includes some of the components found in Canale and Swain's (1980) and Savignon's (1983) models of CC. Language competence is divided into two types: organizational competence and pragmatic competence, and each of these is broken down into its constituent parts. Below is a tree diagram which extends earlier models of CC. Bachman explains that the tree diagram is intended as a visual metaphor, not a theoretical model. The relationships among the components of language competence as shown in the diagram are not in reality independent of each other. Rather, they interact with each other, and it is the interaction among the various competencies and the language use context that characterizes CLA. Canale and Swain (1980) and Savignon (1983) make the same point, that it is how these components interact that characterizes CC. With respect to Bachman's model of language competence, Bachman and Palmer (1983) developed a battery of tests that included grammatical competence (morphology and syntax), pragmatic competence (vocabulary, cohesion, and organization) and sociolinguistic competence (sensitivity to register, naturalness, and cultural references). The results of their study revealed empirical evidence that grammatical and pragmatic competence were closely related; whereas, the components of sociolinguistic competence were distinct. Bachman's model of language competence is based on the empirical findings of this study. Pragmatic
competence is redefined to include not only Bachman and Palmer’s (1983) sociolinguistic competence, but also illocutionary competence—those abilities related to the functions that are performed through language use. Although Bachman and Palmer’s (1983) study revealed that grammatical and discourse competence are related, they felt that there is strong theoretical justification for hypothesizing a distinction between organization—grammar, vocabulary, and cohesion—and organizational strategies of coherence (p. 462).

Bachman’s model of language competence is based on the empirical findings that vocabulary, morphology, syntax, cohesion, and organization are related; and these components fall under the heading of organizational competence. Pragmatic competence is then redefined to include
sociolinguistic competence and illocutionary competence (see Figure 6).

"Language competencies can thus be classified into two types: organizational competence and pragmatic competence" (Bachman, 1990, p. 86.) In this regard, Bachman extends the definition of competence to include pragmatic competence as suggested by Chomsky (1980).

Bachman (1990) describes how these competencies interact under the heading of strategic competence. Thus, while strategic competence is theoretically conceived as part of CLA, Bachman developed a separate model which he adapts from Faerch and Kasper (1983) (see p. 91). As one can see, Bachman’s theory of CC is not only based on empirical study, but also expands on the framework of Canale and Swain (1980) and Savignon’s (1983) model of CC. Remember that Savignon also drew an empirical distinction between grammatical competence and communicative skills based on her study in foreign language teaching.

**Bachman’s Grammatical Competence**

Bachman’s grammatical competence is based on the competencies described by Widdowson (1978). These consist of the same competencies described by Canale and Swain (1980) with an additional competency—graphology or written symbols.

In Widdowson’s chapter on “Usage and Use” he states that “we are generally required to use our knowledge of the language system in order to achieve some kind of communicative purpose” (1978, p. 3). In other words, the abstract system of the language or tacit knowledge of language is generally not manifested out of context. While we possess the tacit
knowledge of grammatical rules, and we as students study grammatical rules, there are hundreds of rules that are too complex to teach, and yet are employed in instances of language use. Widdowson makes a distinction between 'usage' and 'use' similar to De Saussure's *langue* (a system of psychological signs) and *parole* (social side of speech) (1959, pp. 14-15). Chomsky makes a similar distinction between *competence* and *performance*. Like Chomsky, De Saussure believes that the *langue* can be studied separately; "indeed, the science of language is possible only if the other elements are excluded. Whereas speech is heterogeneous, language [langue], as defined is homogeneous. It is a system of signs in which the only essential thing is the union of meanings and sound-images, and in which both parts of the sign are psychological" (1959, p. 15).

For Widdowson, production of a grammatical sentence out of context is referred to as 'usage'--making use of grammatical knowledge or what Chomsky calls *grammatical competence* in a non-communicative manner. "The notion of competence has to do with a language user's knowledge of abstract linguistic rules. This knowledge has to be put into effect as behavior; it has to be revealed through performance" (Widdowson, 1978, p. 3). If we employ our knowledge of language or grammatical competence in context, then we are demonstrating 'use,' our ability to use linguistic knowledge for successful communication. Widdowson maintains that there is a natural coincidence of 'usage' and 'use.' Thus, Bachman describes *grammatical competence* in Widdowson's terms, and Widdowson relies on Chomsky for his definition. Widdowson states:

The term 'communicative competence' is now very much in fashion and for this reason alone it is as well to be wary of it: particularly since it does not seem to be used in the same sense by different writers. It
should be noted that if (as here) it is meant to refer to the knowledge of how the language system is realized as use in social contexts, then it includes competence in the more restricted Chomskyan sense of the term. (1978, p.163)

Bachman agrees with Widdowson that knowledge of language or grammatical competence governs “the choice of words to express specific significations, their forms, their arrangement in utterances to express propositions and their physical realization, either as sounds or written symbols” (1990, p. 87). Similarly, Canale and Swain define grammatical competence as those competencies which provide the “knowledge of how to determine and express accurately the literal meaning of utterances” (1980, p. 30).

Bachman’s Textual Competence

The second component of organizational competence is textual competence, which is equivalent to Savignon’s discourse competence. “Textual competence includes the knowledge of the conventions for joining utterances together to form a text, which is essentially a unit of language—spoken or written—consisting of two or more utterances in sentences that are structured according to rules of cohesion and rhetorical organization” (Bachman, 1990, p. 88). Text is defined by Halliday and Hasan “as any passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole” (1976, p. 1). Bachman defines cohesion in terms of cohesive devices as delineated by Halliday and Hasan (1976). Cohesive devices provide a way to semantically connect parts of a sentence or a number of complete sentences in a text. “Cohesive devices may refer either to upcoming text or
more commonly, back to prior text, which is known as anaphor” (McCabe, 1998, p. 277). Examples of cohesive devices are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Sadie is a good dog. She stays in the yard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronominal</td>
<td>That was the best dinner ever.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>She’s not as smart as I thought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>He told her to run home. She did so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
<td>She likes to run. I don’t [like to run].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellipsis</td>
<td>I thought he could read well, but he couldn’t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjunction</td>
<td>The child ran across the street. The toddler scared me. (Adapted from McCabe, 1998, p. 277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohesion also includes the proper ordering of old information and new information in discourse. For example, a pronoun (new information) cannot be used unless its reference is known (old information).

Rhetorical organization refers to the organizational conventions used in different forms of writing or speaking, such as narrative, expository, descriptive, and comparative.

Textual competence also includes conventions of conversation often discussed in terms of Grice’s conversational maxims. These maxims include four unwritten rules for efficient speech:

1. The Maxim of Quality: Make your contribution one that is true.
2. The Maxim of Manner: Be brief and orderly. Avoid obscurity and ambiguity.
3. The Maxim of Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as required for the current purposes of the exchange.
4. The Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. (Adapted from Grice, 1975, p. 45)
(It is important to note that Chomsky (1980) considers Grice’s Maxims a part of pragmatic competence, a system of rules and principles that determine how knowledge of language is put to use).

Thus far, under the main heading of language competence, Bachman has discussed the necessary organizational competencies of a speaker/hearer. In addition to grammatical competence or innate knowledge of language, all of the above abilities associated with textual competence are essential to achieving the communicative goals of the interlocutors. However, the ability to organize and create a cohesive text is only part of communicative language because communication takes place in context. Knowledge of pragmatics or the conventional rules of language use in context provide the speaker/hearer or writer/reader with the tools to make utterances acceptable.

**Bachman’s Pragmatic Competence**

Bachman refers to the knowledge of pragmatic conventions for performing acceptable language functions within a specific context as illocutionary competence; and knowledge of sociolinguistic conventions for performing language functions appropriately in a given context is called sociolinguistic competence. Bachman breaks down each of these two components of pragmatic competence into specific abilities.

**Bachman’s Illocutionary Competence**

Bachman’s definition of illocutionary competence is taken from Searle (1969) who developed a theory of speech acts. Searle distinguishes three
types of speech acts:

a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts.
b) Referring and predicating = performing propositional acts.
c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing illocutionary acts. (1969, p. 24)

What Searle maintains is that when uttering a sentence which might be a statement, a question, an exclamation, or an order, the speaker is simultaneously performing three distinct speech acts as listed above.

Bachman further defines illocutionary acts in terms of language functions based on Halliday's (1973, 1977) work. Bachman describes four functions of language use as it relates to both the expression of language (speech and writing) and its interpretation (listening and reading). The first and most widely used function in language use is the ideational function--expressing meaning in terms of our experience of the real world (Halliday, 1973, p. 27). For example, language is used ideationally to present knowledge in lectures or scholarly articles, and language is used to express feelings either by confiding in a friend or writing in a diary.

Manipulative functions are used to effect change and are classified as instrumental, regulatory, or interactional. An example of an instrumental function is to get someone to do something by suggestion, a command or a warning. A regulatory function is used to control the behavior of others by stating rules, laws or norms of behavior (Halliday, 1973, p. 23). The interactional function of a language is the use of interpersonal language to form, maintain or change relationships between people. "Phatic language use, such as greetings, ritual inquiries about health, or comments on the weather, is primarily interactional in function. Its propositional content is
subordinate to the relationship maintaining function” (Bachman, 1990, p. 93).

Imaginative functions of language such as telling jokes, story telling, creating metaphors, as well as attending plays and films enable us to create or enhance our environment for humorous or aesthetic purposes.

Finally, Bachman emphasizes that these functions are not distinct. Like Searle’s (1969) theory of speech acts where several speech acts are performed within one utterance, several functions are performed simultaneously within one utterance or written expression. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, utterances seldom stand alone, but are connected and they perform multiple functions. “[T]he connections among these functions that provide coherence to discourse” (Bachman, 1990, p. 94).

**Bachman’s Sociolinguistic Competence**

Thus, illocutionary competence enables us to use language to express a wide range of functions. The appropriateness of these functions and how they are performed in context are determined according to socio-cultural and discourse features. Sociolinguistic competence is the sensitivity to the socio-cultural conventions of language use and the ability to respond appropriately to the demands of a particular context. According to Bachman, sociolinguistic competence includes the following abilities: “sensitivity to differences in dialect or variety, to differences in register and to naturalness, and the ability to interpret cultural references and figures of speech” (1990, p. 95).

An example of sensitivity to variety or different dialect is that of a Black student who appropriately uses ‘Standard American English’ in a classroom;
whereas, outside of the classroom with Black friends, (s)he would use 'Black English Vernacular.' With respect to discourse, there are important choices to make in different contexts because the appropriate use of a dialect or register in a given situation could make the difference between 'acceptability' and 'unacceptability.' For an understanding of the term 'register,' Bachman refers to Halliday, McIntosh, and Strevens (1964) who define register as the variation in language use within a single variety or dialect. Halliday et. al. distinguish differences in register in terms of three aspects of language use in context: 'field of discourse' (subject matter of the language use), 'mode of discourse' (spoken and written), and 'style of discourse' (how participants relate to one another in the language use context) (1964, pp. 90-92).

Joos (1967) distinguishes five different levels of style, or register in language use: frozen, formal, consultative, casual, and intimate. When in communication with others in spoken or written discourse the speaker or writer must choose the most appropriate style of language use for the context. An inappropriate choice of style could be interpreted as presumptuous or rude.

The third aspect of sociolinguistic competence is sensitivity to naturalness which allows the user to interpret and speak like a native speaker. In other words, a sensitive speaker/hearer will respond in a manner or style that is culturally appropriate. Stilted or unnatural language not only sounds strange but could be misinterpreted.

Bachman uses the following examples to illustrate his point: “Compare . . . ‘I wish you wouldn’t do that’ with ‘I would feel better by your not doing that,’ or ‘I have my doubts’ with ‘I have several doubts’” (1990, p. 97).
The final aspect of sociolinguistic competence is the ability to interpret cultural references and figures of speech. Knowledge of referential meaning specific to a culture allows the language user to accurately interpret discourse. For example, a referential expression such as, 'He met his Waterloo' can only be adequately understood if the language user knows what 'Waterloo' symbolizes in American culture.

Interpreting figures of speech involves more than knowledge of referential meaning. For example, interpretation of hyperbola such as, "It's a jungle out there," requires more than a knowledge of the signification of the words and grammatical structures involved..." (Bachman, 1990, p. 98). Correct interpretation also involves knowledge of specific meanings and images that are evoked when using figurative speech that is deeply rooted in the culture of a given society or speech community (Bachman, 1990, p. 98).

**Bachman's Strategic Competence**

Finally, like Canale and Swain (1980) and Savignon (1983), Bachman recognizes that language is a dynamic process—that the components of language competence interact with one another. The ability to assess relevant information in context, and negotiate meaning on the part of the language user is called 'strategic competence.' According to Bachman, there are two approaches to defining communication strategies: "the 'interactional' definition (Tarone, 1980) and the 'psycholinguistic' definition (Faerch and Kasper, 1984). Tarone defines interactional communication strategies as the "mutual attempt by two interlocutors to agree on a meaning in situations where the requisite meaning structures do not seem to be shared" (1980, p.
On Communicative Competence 90

419). On the other hand, Faerch and Kasper believe that this definition is too narrow in scope since it only applies to two interlocutors, and often language use involves only one individual in the case of reading and writing. Tarone does describe another type of strategy called ‘production strategy’ which she defines as “an attempt to use one’s linguistic system efficiently and clearly, with a minimum of effort” (1980, p. 419). Production strategies are like communication strategies in that they are distinct from the language user’s language competence, but unlike communicative competence, they lack the interactional focus on the negotiation of meaning.

Faerch and Kasper consider Tarone’s interactional definition of communicative strategies a subset of the strategies encompassed in the psycholinguistic definition of strategic competence (1984, p. 61). Their psycholinguistic definition of strategic competence provides a more comprehensive definition of strategic competence.

Both Savignon and Bachman incorporate strategic competence within their framework and view it as a distinct ability separate from language competence. In addition, Bachman as well as Savignon accept the interactional definition of strategic competence in the broader sense as defined by Faerch and Kasper.

Similarly, Canale and Swain include strategic competence as a separate component of CC. They describe strategic competence as being made up of verbal and nonverbal communicative strategies that may be called into action to compensate for breakdowns in communication due to performance variables or to insufficient competence. Such strategies will be of two types: those that relate primarily to grammatical competence (e.g. how to paraphrase grammatical forms that one has not mastered or cannot recall momentarily) and those that relate more to sociolinguistic competence (e.g. various role-playing strategies, how to address strangers when unsure of their
Later Canale extended his definition of strategic competence to include enhancement characteristics of production strategies—mastery of verbal and nonverbal strategies to enhance the rhetorical effect of utterances (1983, p. 339).

Figure 7. A Model of Language Use

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Faerch and Kasper’s psycholinguistic model of speech production includes a planning phase and an execution phase. The planning phase is described as an interaction of three components--communicative goals, communicative resources available to the individual, and the assessment of the communicative situation. “The execution phase of Faerch and Kasper’s model consists of ‘neurological and physiological processes’ that implement the plan, resulting in language use” (Bachman, 1990, p. 100). However, Faerch and Kasper’s model is limited to the use of communication strategies in interlanguage communication where language abilities are deficient, and Bachman views strategic competence to be an important part of all communicative language use, not just compensatory language use.

Furthermore, Bachman claims that the above definitions of strategic competence are not adequate because they do not describe the mechanisms by which strategic competence operates. He extends Faerch and Kasper’s formulation by adding a separate assessment component; whereas Faerch and Kasper include assessment within the planning phase. Bachman includes three components in his model of strategic competence: assessment, planning, and execution. Figure 7 (above) is a model of how these three components interact with other components of CLA to produce language utterances. Bachman defines the assessment component similar to Faerch and Kasper’s planning phase:

The assessment component enables us to (1) identify the information—including the language variety, or dialect—that is needed for realizing a particular communicative goal in a given context; (2) determine what language competencies (native language, second or foreign language) are at our disposal for most effectively bringing that information to bear in achieving the communicative goal; (3) ascertain the abilities and knowledge that are shared by our interlocutor; and (4) following the communication attempt, evaluate the extent to which the
communicative goal has been achieved. (1990, p. 100)

As the model above illustrates, during the planning process of Bachman's model, the interlocutor retrieves relevant items from language competence and formulates a plan to achieve the communicative goals either by using L1, Li (interlanguage), or L2 (second or foreign language). Like Faerch and Kasper, Bachman defines the planning process as a dynamic interchange between context and discourse:

The interpretation of discourse, in other words, requires the ability to utilize available language competencies to assess the context for relevant information and to then match this information to information in the discourse. (1990, p. 102).

Finally, Bachman's execution component, similar to Faerch and Kasper's execution phase, draws on the psychophysiological mechanisms (neurological and physiological processes) to implement the plan in the style and register appropriate to the common goal, and context of situation.

**Summary**

Figure 7 (above) illustrates Bachman's perception of the interactional process of language use, similar to Canale and Swain and Savignon's models of CC. All of the above linguists include *grammatical competence* in the strict Chomskyan sense as part of their theoretical model of CC. In other words, Chomsky's term *grammatical competence* (innate knowledge of language and emergent knowledge of language) is included as one of the components of *communicative competence*. Although Chomsky defines *competence* as knowledge of the rules of grammar independent of use, these
rules enter into communication. According to Chomsky, the language faculty possesses specific properties, structures, and organization in its initial state; and UG, which characterizes the language faculty, is accessible upon exposure to primary linguistic data. In addition, knowledge of the tacit rules of a particular language are also involved in the communicative process. As Chomsky states in *Rules and Representations*, it is the goal of the investigator to determine the nature of the competence system, and to show how this abstract system of rules of grammar is put to use (1980, p. 203).

In Bachman's theory of language competence, he includes *pragmatic competence*, knowledge of language use that subserves performance or communication. There are neurolinguistic studies that support Bachman's theory, which I will discuss below.

In the following chapter I present my own integrated model and explanation of communicative proficiency. It is similar to Savignon and Bachman's models of CC, in that it includes Chomsky's *grammatical competence*. However, I place more importance on the organizational properties of UG, a part of *grammatical competence*. In addition, as suggested by Chomsky (1980) UG includes knowledge of universal rules of language use--Grice's Conversational Maxims (1975), as well as universal rules of grammar. Thus, UG provides organizing principles and parameters for the development of language in context. The rules and constraints of UG and knowledge of grammar and pragmatics provide the basis for successful language acquisition.
Deductive Model of Communicative Proficiency

Based on the inferential evidence of innate knowledge of language provided by Chomsky, I propose a deductive model of communicative proficiency. Chomsky's theory of UG basically states that in order to create and understand novel sentences we rely on our internal system of rules and representations; language learning is a deductive process whereby we deduce from innate and tacit knowledge of grammar and phonology how to create and comprehend language. Furthermore, Chomsky states that "[c]reativity is predicated on a system of rules and forms, in part determined by intrinsic human capacities. Without such constraints, we have arbitrary and random behavior, not creative acts" (Chomsky, 1975, p. 133).

Figure 8 (below) illustrates that our innate system of language knowledge prevents chaos, or blocks out chaos that would occur without the harmonizing system of the mind/brain. On the basis of suggestions by Grice (1975), Chomsky (1980), and Brown and Levinson (1987), I am extending the theory of UG to include universal rules of pragmatics--Grice's Conversational Maxims. These include truthfulness, relevance, brevity, and informativeness. Brown and Levinson (1987) suggest universal rules of politeness that deviate from Grice's Maxims depending on the context. However, Yu (1999) and Wierzbicka (1990) claim that Brown and Levinson's theory is flawed, because it is based on the theory that all cultures are individually oriented. Yu and Wierzbicka point out that Chinese, Japanese, and Polish cultures are not individually-oriented. Rather, they are community-oriented, and that changes how they view politeness (see pp. 13-
These differences could possibly be seen in the same light as Chomsky's Principles and Parameters Theory. Grice's Maxims would constitute the basic principles of pragmatic competence, but there would be parameters like the **head parameter** for grammar. These pragmatic parameters could only vary in one of a few ways depending on the culture. For example, in making a request in individually oriented cultures, one would use indirect speech. However, in a community oriented culture, one would use direct speech. Yu (1999) determined that when making requests in China, a community oriented culture, it is polite to use the direct form. Wierzbicka (1991) determined the same with respect to Polish culture (see p. 14).

The deductive model (below) illustrates that language learning is governed by both the environment and the innate properties of the mind/brain. Knowledge of language and UG intersect with primary linguistic data and produces or creates CP. Without UG, in its extended definition, providing the overall organization of language, we would have "arbitrary and random behavior, not creative acts" (Chomsky, 1975, p.133). In other words, the theory of UG provides a schema to which any particular language must conform, and leads to language acquisition through its interaction with the cultural and functional aspects of language as outlined by Hymes (1996) and Halliday (1977), respectively. UG or innate knowledge of language provides the foundation for language acquisition, and allows language learning to proceed in an orderly and unchaotic manner. UG affects all the components of communicative proficiency by providing the underlying rules for organized development of language in context.
Like Savignon and Bachman, I maintain a distinction between 

*competence* and *performance*. Recent studies in neurolinguistics show

Figure 8. Deductive Model of Communicative Proficiency.

evidence that "[n]ot only is (context-independent) sentence grammar theoretically separable from other aspects of sentence interpretation in normal language use, but it has in fact been shown to be clearly separated neurofunctionally" (Paradis, 1998, p. 4). Neurofunctionally focal left hemisphere (LH) damage causes context-independent sentence grammar deficits, and right hemisphere (RH) damage causes deficits in context-dependent interpretations, non-literal interpretations and affect-related aspects of language processing (Paradis, 1998, p. 4). For example, pragmatics of reference is preserved in patients with Broca's and Wernicke's aphasia, despite syndrome specific problems in retrieving content words such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives, or closed-class grammatical elements such as the, and, and from (Paradis, 1998, p. 7).

Bloom and Obler (1998) reported that patients with right-brain-damage produced ambiguous and poorly structured discourse that contained less information, fewer concepts, and more irrelevant remarks than normal control subjects. Chantraine, Joanette and Ska (1998) found that in general RHD patients in conversation displayed deficits such as irrelevant comments, digressions, and inferential problems. On the other hand, the subjects' grammar remained intact.

Dronkers, Ludy, and Redfern (1998) observed that aphasic patients who were not able to utter a word demonstrated nearly normal pragmatic competence in communication, exhibiting skills such as maintaining normal proxemics, turn-taking, paralinguistics such as gesturing, facial expressions, and eye gaze. From the results of their study with aphasics with left hemisphere damage, they concluded that pragmatics functions independent
of grammatical competence; although Paradis (1998), Chomsky (1980) and this paper argues that pragmatic competence is not completely independent of grammatical competence.

**Recent Studies Show Evidence for Grammatical Competence Affecting Pragmatic Competence**

Paradis (1998) asserts that neither the right side nor the left side of the brain is sufficient for the processing of language—both are necessary. Recent studies reveal that deficits in the left hemisphere (LH) affect pragmatics. For example, Avent, Wertz and Aurther (1998) observed that individuals with aphasia generally display more intact pragmatic skills than they do in the more formal skills such as syntax. Nonetheless, pragmatic deficits are still present in individuals with aphasia caused by left hemisphere damage.

Prutting and Kirchner (1987) observed that aphasic subjects showed a mean of 82% appropriate pragmatic performance. Avent et. al. concluded the same as Prutting and Kirchner—that aphasic people communicated better than they talked (1998, p. 217). In general, their sample of aphasic people displayed better pragmatic performance in conversation than language ability on a standardized test for aphasics. As with Prutting and Kirchner, Avent et. al. noted deficits in pragmatic competence. Pragmatic behaviors that were most impaired were specificity/accuracy, cohesion, and intelligibility. Avent et. al. associated these deficient aspects of pragmatic behavior with semantic, syntactic, and phonological measures of linguistic competence measured by the standardized test, the PICA. Their results indicate pragmatic performance during conversation and performance on a standardized aphasia test are significantly related in a sample of aphasic people [left hemisphere damaged patients].
Thus, performance on one measure predicts performance on another. However, the strength of the relationship correlation range from +.57 to+.68 is not overwhelming. (Avent et al., 1998, p. 219) The above studies demonstrate what Chomsky (1986) and Bachman (1990) theorize, that knowledge of grammar affects pragmatic performance. This exemplifies how knowledge of language or in this case how lack of knowledge of cohesion is put to use--deficits occur in pragmatic behavior.

Discourse studies address the pragmatic aspects of communication, as well as linguistic aspects, because they are conducted in a social setting where linguistics, paralinguistics, and nonverbal skills are observable. Utalowska, North, and Macaluso-Haynes studied a group of 10 aphasics with left hemisphere (LH) damage and 10 normals in their production of narrative and procedural discourse--telling stories, producing summaries, giving morals to the stories and producing procedures such as brushing teeth. In general the results of the study showed that mildly aphasic individuals produced well-structured narratives and procedural discourse; however, language of the aphasics was reduced in complexity and amount. Aphasics have difficulty in producing summaries and giving morals for the stories. Content and clarity of discourse were rated lower than those produced by the normals. More specifically,

Sentence level analysis of the summaries showed that aphasics produced much simpler language than the normals in terms of the amount of embedding and percentage of dependent clauses, and nonfinite clauses. The aphasics used more pronouns as compared to nouns than normals. They also used more deictic expressions such as *up there*, and generalized verbs such as *get*. (Utalowska, et. al., 1981, p. 358)

In narratives, it was the amount of evaluation or elaboration which was primarily reduced in aphasics. Evaluation (explaining the point of the
narrative) involves use of some complex syntactic devices such as comparatives, negatives, and modals. The authors concluded that this reduction of evaluation in narratives was related either to its function (less important information) or its form (more complex language), or a combination of both (Utalowska, et al., 1981, p. 366).

With respect to summaries, the aphasics' inability to produce morals was not related to a lack of linguistic resources, but rather was associated with a well documented abstract attitude in aphasics. As stated above, content and clarity were rated lower for aphasics than for normals. The authors posited that the quality of content might correspond to the notion of coherence; whereas, the clarity of language might depend on utilization of devices producing linguistic cohesion (Utalowska, et. al., 1981, p. 367). Although Savignon (1983), Canale and Swain (1980), and Halliday and Hasan (1976) consider cohesion and coherence a part of discourse competence which falls under the heading of pragmatics, Utalowska et al. are classifying them as part of linguistic competence. In a study in 1983 Bachman and Palmer defined pragmatic competence as vocabulary, cohesion, and organization; however, the results of the study revealed that these elements were closely related to grammatical competence (morphology and syntax) (see pp. 79-80). Hence, Bachman (1990) created the term organizational competence to include grammatical competence and textual competence. Pragmatic competence was then redefined to include illocutionary competence and sociolinguistic competence. Note that Paradis (1998) also found that patients with Broca's and Wernicke's aphasia had problems retrieving closed-class words such as the, and, and from,
which include cohesive devices (see p. 98). Thus, in so far as cohesion is defined as grammatical links, they fall under the heading of *grammatical competence*, or according to Bachman, *organizational competence*. Although Bachman and Palmer (1983) did not find a separation of the components of grammar and those of discourse in their study, they believe there is strong theoretical justification for making a distinction between organization in terms of grammar, vocabulary, and cohesion, and the organizational strategies of coherence (p. 462).

Thus, the above studies show evidence that *grammatical competence* does provide a framework for the production of comprehensible language, and that *grammatical competence* plays a significant role in *pragmatic competence*—how successfully language is used. The above studies also suggest that *pragmatic competence* is like *grammatical competence*. In the same way that the left hemisphere is dominant for grammar, the right hemisphere forms the foundation for pragmatics. The following is a summary of some of the studies that advance the theory that the right hemisphere specializes in extralinguistic aspects of communication, like the left hemisphere specializes in linguistic aspects of language.

**Pragmatics Is Dominated by the Right Hemisphere**

Extralinguistic aspects of communication which come under the label of pragmatics include features of speech, such as intonation, pitch, and voice quality. These features are referred to as prosody, and disordered prosody as dysprosody or aprosody (Code, 1987, p. 88). Variations in prosody—pitch intonation, rhythm and word stress communicate affective information such
Prosodic cues also differentiate grammatical and semantic contrasts such as whether a sentence is a question or a statement, or what a sentence means depending on the placement of stress. For example, the sentence, 'She is hot,' has two different meanings depending on whether or not 'hot' is stressed or 'She' is stressed.

Boss (1996) claims the right hemisphere mediates prosody, attitude, emotion, and gestures. "These right hemisphere aspects of communication are collectively known as pragmatics" (Boss, 1996, p. 81).

Recent research examines the special role of the right hemisphere in processing visuospatial, musical, and emotional aspects of communication. Based on their studies on right hemisphere damaged patients, Wapner, Hamby, and Gardner (1981) propose a theory that the right hemisphere is responsible for processing context-dependent linguistic entities; whereas, the left hemisphere subserves context-independent componential aspects of linguistics. The following discussion supports their theory.

Kertesz (1983) reports evidence that visuospatial deficits such as poor map reading, neglect of the left side of a design or a word, and spatial disorientation are caused by right hemisphere post-Rolandic lesions, and in some cases more anterior portions of the right hemisphere are substantially involved.

Code (1987) reports evidence that skilled musicians depend on left hemisphere processing, and untrained musicians rely on right hemisphere processing. In a dichotic study, Bever and Chiarello (1974) found a right ear advantage in trained musicians and a left ear advantage in non-musicians in a melody recognition task. They concluded that the trained musicians were
On Communicative Competence

concerned with the separate componential elements of the melodies--the
grammar of music; whereas the non-musicians used a more holistic
approach, not being trained in reading, writing, and transcribing music.

Related to music are studies on prosody (pitch, intonation, and rhythm)
and the right hemisphere. Like music, speech sounds possess acoustical
properties. "All speech sounds are composed of complex sound waves; that
is, they contain many different frequencies simultaneously, like a musical

"It is now generally accepted that the right hemisphere is involved in
the processing of prosody" (Code, 1987, p. 94). Results of several studies on
prosody are similar to the studies in music. Van Lancker and Fromkin (1973)
observed a right ear advantage where tone is used phonologically to
distinguish and contrast individual words in tone languages such as Chinese
and Thai. Zurif (1974) reported similar findings--that the right ear is superior
at linguistics; however, the left ear is better at comprehending non-linguistic
intonational speech. Zurif (1974) states the following:

[W]hen the subjects' task was a linguistic one, that is, when they had to
make use of fundamental frequencies to distinguish voiced from
voiceless syllables, they generated a significant right ear advantage.
In contrast, when the subjects had to identify the emotional tones of
utterances, and presumably, had to process long-term variations in
fundamental frequency to do so, they produced a significant left ear
superiority. . . Thus, when the acoustic parameters of intonational
contour or emotional tone must be processed or matched
independently of their linguistic medium, they become tied to the right
hemisphere. In contrast, when these same parameters are used in the
service of linguistic decisions, they are focused upon and utilized by
the language mechanisms of the left hemisphere. (p. 395)

Zurif theorizes that intonation by itself is probably processed by
acoustic analyzers in the right hemisphere, and thereby enhances the left
hemisphere's ability to carry out linguistic decisions; thus, language is a
collaborative process between the mind and the environment as well as
within the mind. Certainly the environment interacts with the mind to produce
language; however, *pragmatic competence* may be like *grammatical
competence* in that there are specific modules that determine how we
interact with the environment—a language faculty for pragmatics.

Based on the studies on right hemisphere damage and prosody, Ross
(1981) developed a theory of right hemisphere specialization for prosody
which mirrors the classical left hemisphere model for language. He suggests
that prosody is functionally and structurally represented in the right
hemisphere, in the same way as formal linguistic aspects of language are
represented in the left hemisphere.

**Pragmatic Competence Mirrors Grammatical Competence**

Ross (1981) defined different kinds of aprosodias (a general lack of
prosody), and associated them with specific right hemisphere damage. He
further theorized the these aprosodias are analogous to the aphasias
resulting from damage to homogeneous areas of the left hemisphere.

Because the eight known categories of aphasia—motor, sensory,
conduction, global, transcortical motor, transcortical sensory, anomic,
and mixed transcortical—can be classified by observations concerning
(1) spontaneous speech (fluency versus nonfluency); (2) repetition
ability; (3) comprehension of spoken language; and (4) visual
language skills (naming and reading), patients with focal right
hemisphere damage might be examined in a similar manner by
evaluating (1) spontaneous prosody and emotional gesturing; (2) the
ability to repeat sentences with prosodic-affective variation; (3) the
ability to comprehend the prosodic-affective components of language;
and (4) the ability to comprehend emotional gesturing. (Ross, 1983, p.
498)
For example, Ross (1981) discovered that injury to the right frontal and anterior-inferior parietal lobe produced motor aprosodia—a flat monotone speech and loss of spontaneous gesturing. This is analogous to lesions in the left hemisphere known to cause Broca (motor) aphasia. Sensory aprosodia, characterized by an impaired ability to understand the emotion and/or mood being conveyed auditorily or visually by gestures and facial expressions, was associated with damage to the right posterior-superior temporal and inferior-posterior parietal lobes. "This distribution is consistent with left hemisphere lesions known to cause Wernicke (sensory) aphasia" (Ross, 1983, p. 502).

Ross (1983) admits that the number of cases are limited; however, he did observe six different aprosodias—motor, sensory, global, transcortical motor, transcortical sensory, and mixed transcortical. The lesions in the right hemisphere associated with these syndromes correspond functionally and anatomically to lesions in the left hemisphere associated with aphasias of propositional language.

Visuospatial, musical, prosodic and emotional functions are closely tied together, and the right hemisphere has been shown to underlie the processes of these affective components of language. Ross theorizes a language faculty for pragmatics similar to Chomsky's language faculty for grammar. Ross' (1981) finding that sensory aprosodia is caused by damage to the right hemisphere lends support to other studies that propose the right hemisphere is superior in processing emotion.

Schwartz, Davidson, and Maer (1975) recorded the lateral eye movements (LEM) of normal subjects while they were answering emotionally
charged and neutral questions. Significantly more leftward LEMs (right hemisphere) were observed while answering emotional than neutral questions.

Borod, Koff, and Caron (1983) examined normals in facial asymmetry during eight posed emotional expressions. They selected four that were communicative—greeting (mild smiling), clowning (silly—to amuse a child), flirtation ("come hither"), and disapproval (scolding), and four others that were more reactive—confusion (perplexed), disgust (apprehending a "bad smell"), horror (terrified), grief (crying). The results of their study revealed that the left side of the face was more involved during posed emotional expressions. Borod et al. (1983) concluded that facial expression is primarily related to emotion, and is mediated by the right hemisphere. The significance of these results is that facial expression, an affective part of language, facilitates linguistic communication.

Results of Wapner, Hamby and Gardner's (1981) study with 16 right hemisphere brain-damaged patients revealed that right hemisphere patients had no problem using appropriate phonology and syntax when retelling a story; however, they were unable to use their own words; they could not infer a moral for a story; and their mode of delivery was flat. Furthermore, the right hemisphere patients embellished stories three times as often as left hemisphere patients and normals (Wapner et al., 1981, p. 23) Wapner found that those patients with large anterior lesions of the right hemisphere most frequently embellished the stories. In general, right hemisphere patients had difficulty separating out the actual plot from their own invention. All groups were successful in ordering temporal elements of a story. Wapner et al.
determined that right hemisphere patients suffered from deficits in the processing of ideational and conceptual factors rather than in terms of linguistic ones. They concluded: "While the left hemisphere might appreciate some of Groucho's puns, the right hemisphere might be entertained by the antics of Harpo, only the two hemispheres can appreciate a whole Marx Brother's routine" (Wapner et al., 1981, p. 32).

Gardner, Brownell, Wapner, and Michelow (1983) conducted a similar study and corroborated the results of Wapner et al.'s study. Overall, the right hemisphere patients exhibited great difficulty in handling complex ideational materials--paraphrasing and interpreting stories, appreciating humor, inferring the moral of a story, assessing the appropriateness of various facts and situations, and comprehending emotional forms of information. Gardner et al. conclude the following:

To be sure, when memory is sufficiently acute, or cues sufficiently abundant, subjects may well mention all the major points. But their inability to negotiate noncanonical elements, their frequent confabulations and injections of personal details, all suggest that the basic scaffolding of the story has not been apprehended. Without an organizing principle, the patients are consigned to undirected rambling, unable to judge which details matter, and what overarching points they yield. (1983, p.187)

Although Gardner et al. (1983) depict the left hemisphere as a context-free machine, and the right hemisphere as context-dependent machine, they agree with other neuropsychologists that "no functions are housed solely in a particular region of the brain, that all important human capacities have wide cortical representation" (1983, p. 188-189). This is a position that is suggested by Savignon (1983), and theorized by Bachman (1990)--that language is a dynamic process not only between the mind/brain and the
Bara, Tirassa, and Zettin (1997), who investigate the possibility of underlying knowledge for pragmatics, assert that Chomsky's distinction between *competence* and *performance* is a fundamental of cognitive science. "Ideally, a cognitive theory should describe both the competence and the performance of the system under analysis" (Bara et al., 1997, p. 9). Bara et al. (1997) maintain that the study of performance impairments after brain damage helps to constrain the underlying competence theory.

Given the above neuropsychological evidence for certain pragmatic skills, this paper argues that pragmatics is subserved by domain-specific knowledge structures. Therefore, *pragmatic competence* is like *grammatical competence* in that it is also underlain by competence--knowledge of language use.

**Language Is an Interactive Process Between Knowledge Structures and the Environment**

Of course, language learning cannot be purely innate because we don't all speak the same language; we speak the language that we hear. Linguistic data or input is required for language acquisition, and input determines output to a certain extent. However, as Chomsky and neurolinguists have shown, innate properties of the mind/brain provide the principles and parameters of all languages, and make it possible for a five year old, who has not yet developed formal operations, to master his/her native language.

The top diamond of the above model (see Figure 8) includes UG in its
On Communicative Competence

extended definition, and knowledge of language--grammatical knowledge of
syntax and phonology, and pragmatic knowledge of prosody, emotion and
gestures. Ross (1981, 1983) theorizes that the right hemisphere is
functionally and anatomically like the left hemisphere in that there are
localized areas of the brain that govern pragmatics. Thus, the top diamond
represents our biological endowment--UG (universal rules of grammar and
pragmatics--Grice's Maxims), as well as knowledge of grammar (syntax and
phonology), and knowledge of pragmatics (prosody, emotion and
visuospatial elements of language--gestures).

The brain possesses innate properties that subserve linguistics and
extralinguistics or pragmatics. Without a healthy brain, deficits in
communication result, depending on the location of the injury.
Comprehension and production of emotional messages through facial
expressions and prosody is dependent upon an intact right hemisphere. On
the other hand, comprehension and production of grammatical speech is
dependent on an intact left hemisphere.

However, in order to achieve communicative proficiency, both
hemispheres must be intact. Language is an interactive process between the
organizational properties of the left and right hemispheres. Achieving
communicative competence is not simply a matter of the mind/brain
interacting with the environment as explained by Hymes (1972) and Halliday
(1977). Language acquisition is a product of two healthy hemispheres
working together, as well the mind/brain interacting with the environment.

In addition to innate knowledge of language and UG, mind/brain is
included in the top diamond, because there are other innate learning
On Communicative Competence

mechanisms besides the language faculty that interact with the environment to produce CP. These are distinct from Chomsky's UG, and would include what Bachman (1990) refers to as the psychophysiological mechanisms of the mind/brain. In the case of the study of language Chomsky states the following:

> the question is complicated in practice by the obvious fact that the system of language is only one of a number of cognitive systems that interact in the most intimate way in the actual use of language. When we speak or interpret what we hear, we bring to bear a vast set of background assumptions about the participants in the discourse, the subject matter under discussion, laws of nature, human institutions, and the like. (1980, p.188)

Primary linguistic data (the environment) include Hymes' (1996) ethnographic components of language, and Halliday's (1977) functional aspects of language. While Hymes and Halliday's theories have their merits, the cultural and functional aspects of language explain only part of the process of language acquisition. The innate properties of mind, which include UG in its extended definition, and knowledge of language must interact with the environment to produce CP which is comprised of five main components--grammatical competence, pragmatic competence, sociolinguistic competence, discourse competence, and strategic competence. *Grammatical competence* and *pragmatic competence* form the base of the pyramid because they are the foundation of *communicative competence*. They provide the organizing principles that allow language acquisition to take place in context. UG, which includes Chomsky's universal rules of grammar and Grice's Conversational Maxims, provides the underlying principles and parameters for the orderly processing of primary linguistic data and production of language in context. Unlike Bachman, who
On Communicative Competence

includes Grice’s Maxims under textual competence, I consider these maxims universal rules of pragmatics. In addition, cohesion (grammatical links) would be subsumed under grammatical competence; and rhetorical organization and strategies of coherence would come under the heading of discourse competence.

Conclusion

In the way that Hymes (1971) defines CC--tacit knowledge of language and ability for use, he does not address competence in the same sense as Chomsky (1980) defines it--underlying knowledge of language severed from ability. While Chomsky maintains the distinction between competence and performance, knowledge of language enters into performance. In fact, it allows language acquisition and language use to take place successfully.

How does this reflect on the term CC? Do we possess underlying knowledge of communication that allows communication to successfully take place? Based on the neurolinguistic studies presented above, I believe there is evidence that we possess CC in the Chomskyan sense.

My conclusion that there are universal rules of pragmatics is not based on any evidence. Rather it is based on theories of Chomsky (1980), Grice (1975), and Brown and Levinson (1987). On the other hand, neuropsychological studies reveal evidence that we possess knowledge of prosody--intonation, pitch, and rhythm (Code, 1987).

Included in pragmatic competence would be knowledge of the suprasegmentals--pitch, tone, stress and rhythm. Based on Ross’ (1981)
studies we possess specific modules of the mind that allow us to produce and comprehend prosody of language. How these elements of pragmatics overlap with grammar to facilitate communication constitutes \textit{pragmatic competence}. Communicative behaviors such as hugging, kissing, and crying would not be included in the theory of \textit{pragmatic competence}. Only those aspects of language use that directly overlap with grammar would be included in \textit{pragmatic competence}. Therefore, CC is knowledge of prosody, the musical components of language that express emotion in conjunction with the linguistic aspects of language. Thus, \textit{pragmatic competence} and \textit{grammatical competence} work together to produce CP--all that is involved in communication.

Since my conclusion as to what is included in pragmatic competence is based on neuropsychological studies, a limited body of knowledge, it is clear that more research needs to be done in order to accurately determine what constitutes \textit{pragmatic competence}. Further investigation of pragmatic universals also needs to be pursued.


On Communicative Competence

References


References


On Communicative Competence

References


References


On Communicative Competence

References


References


On Communicative Competence

References


