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Corporatizing Violence: Targeted Repression of Indigenous Dissent in Democratic States

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Corporatizing Violence:

Targeted Repression of Indigenous Dissent in Democratic States

by

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Abstract

This thesis explores state repression of disruptive protests against private development projects in democracies. Using a mixed methods approach, including logistic regression and case studies, the research identifies key factors influencing repression. Indigenous leadership, fragmented public opposition, and private elite influence increase the likelihood of violent repression. The findings suggest that when public resistance is insufficient against powerful private interests, coercive institutions resort to violent strategies to quell disruptions and signal increased costs for future dissent. State repression is more likely when the protest movement is comprised of Indigenous groups than compared to those of the general public. The study offers insights into the complex interplay of societal, economic, and political factors shaping state repression in democratic states.

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"Our elders have told us that if the zuzeca sape, the black snake, comes across our land, our world will end. Zuzeca has come [...] and so I must fight."

- *Iyuskin American Horse*

(1) Introduction

Rubber bullets rain down on pipeline protesters while tear gas fills their eyes. Armed units assault the unarmed demonstrators with little in the way of defending themselves as they are sprayed with a high-powered water cannon in below freezing weather. This highly militarized, and extremely violent, state-sanctioned response to this demonstration resulted in over 300 injured and many in life threatening conditions. While many a political observer may assume this was somewhere in Asian or Latin America, where there tends to be higher rates of violent state repression against environmental dissent (Poulos & Haddad 2016), this occurred in a Western democracy. More precisely, this happened in November of 2016 in North Dakota, United States, within a system of governance that touts its respect for the freedom of its citizens to engage in the political sphere. Indeed, leaders of democratic states - such as the United States - speak of protest as a welcome "outlet," in the words of former president George W. Bush. "If people feel like their government is not listening to them or doesn't agree with them, there ought to be an outlet for their discontent" (National Archives and Records Administration 2023). However, in the case of Indigenous peoples, this statement often proves to be little more than lip service.

This instance is not an isolated case. Violently repressive events against Indigenous protest can be seen in consolidated democracies across the Western world,

even countries considered to be the safest for expressions of civil disobedience - e.g., Canada. *When* and *why* these instances of violent repression in otherwise politically liberal countries occur present a complex puzzle. These instances of violent repression do not occur haphazardly and are, as I argue, a form of targeted repression. At first glance, a clear pattern emerges: Indigenous protesters are violently repressed by the coercive institutions of the state when they disrupt private development projects; and these instances of violent repression against Indigenous dissidents occur at higher rates than instances where the general public carries out similar forms of disruption, reflecting the notion that Indigenous protesters are treated differently from the public at large.

Indigenous protest is situated in a unique position in the realm of political dissent and regime opposition. Both Indigenous communities and the public citizenry tend to protest over their rights; however, unlike the general public which tends to protest over social and economic rights, Indigenous protests seek to contest sovereign rights to govern and manage a particular geographical area and their own communities. In the other camp of dissent, Indigenous communities are different from insurgents. Insurgent groups seek to overthrow the government, installing a new government in its place. Indigenous communities, on the other hand, are not seeking to overthrow the government; rather, they typically seek for the government to remove its authority from particular issues that pertain to them and their contested spaces (e.g., Coastal GasLink protests, Canada; North Dakota Access Pipeline protests, United States; the Jabiluka Mine protests, Australia). While (some) Indigenous communities and individuals are more akin to separatist movements - aiming to create their own state - the results of my analysis do not suggest that this is a true concern of consolidated democracies when making the choice to

violently repress, intimidate, or harass (hereafter referred to as a *show of force*) dissent; although, some policies may imply that through labeling of Indigenous groups and individuals as akin to terrorists (Proulx 2014).

Instead, I argue that the coercive institutions of democratic states conduct a show of force when *Indigenous communities disrupt private development projects* of private elites with *significant private capital* that can be used to leverage their interests in the absence of *robust public pressure.* Policing institutions make a cost-benefit analysis of potential public and private pressures (a sanction-reward system of private/public accountability) when deciding whether to conduct a show of force operation. In the security capital context (Dupont 2004), the police are either rewarded or sanctioned by private elites and the public with either private or public capital gains and losses. To assess this theory, I use a mixed methods approach, utilizing qualitative and quantitative data to evaluate the applicability of different independent variables. My approach involves using (1) a theoretical proposition model to explain the interacting variables present, then (2) empirical testing via (a) regression analysis and (b) process tracing of select case studies.

(1a) Definitions

Before continuing, it is important to address three terms that I will be using: "repression," a "show of force," and "Indigenous." "Repression" often has distinctions drawn on its exact use across disciplines (sociology, history, and political science). Even within political science, which is often state-oriented in its definition, multi-state comparativists tend to examine forms of repression that are more readily comparative (i.e., broad usage of the term "repression") but single-state researchers tend to be stricter

with their usage of the term. For simplicity, I use Jennifer Earl's (2011) broad definition, which is a "state [...] action that is meant to prevent, control, or constrain noninstitutional, collective action (e.g., protest), including its initiation." However, I slightly adjusted the definition by removing "state *or private* action," as this research is concerned with actions by the state's coercive arm[1]. I use the term "show of force" to describe a particular phenomenon that reflects the very nature of the act. The United States Department of Defense defines a show of force as an "operation planned to demonstrate [state] resolve that involves increased visibility of [...] deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to [the state's] interests or national objectives" (Department of Defense 2017). While this is a start, I argue that it is not satisfactory for the intention behind the operation. Using Scobell's (2000) discussion on a show of force in the context of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, they describe it as a form of coercive diplomacy that "demonstrate[s] a credible threat but at the same time [...] offer[ing] some incentive for the other party to comply," while taking care that the "signals [are] as clear as possible, to ensure that the threat of force is recognized as such." Using these two samples, this thesis defines a "show of force" in the context of protest as an "operation in which the coercive institutions present a credible threat to force compliance in alignment with the agency's goals through either actual or perceived harm in order to disperse ongoing political demonstrations and raise the perceived cost of future political demonstrations."

[1] There is some level of disagreement of the role of the government with regards to coercion in democratic contexts – with some arguing that coercive agencies act with relative independence, while others see the coercive agencies and government as a single actor. For the purposes of this thesis, I treat "coercive institutions" and "the government" as separate actors.

By this definition, a show of force can involve intimidation tactics, harassment, or physical violence. Of course, civilians may always fear the threat of arrest; however, this definition goes beyond that and makes the recipient or demonstration observer of the show of force believe that their continued activities may result in compromising their own well-being. While the coercive institutions could simply imprison or disperse demonstrations, they have opted to make a "show" of the repression; in other words, while repression is generally seen as an act which is intended to deter protest and raise its perceived costs, I argue that these instances of violent repression are to prevent future challenges with a higher-than-average cost attached. These attempts to instill fear into demonstrators send a message that their assemblies are likely to result in bodily harm. These operations are intended to raise the perceived cost to disruptions against the coercive agency's interests, particularly with regards to demonstrations against critical infrastructure, and discourage future dissent with the perceived calculus of physical or psychological harm. Lastly, there is some conflict of terminology in the political science literature on the term "native" - often ascribed to those that were born within a country who retain nationality. I use the term "Indigenous" to refer to Native communities and individuals. Borrowing from the United Nations, Indigenous is defined as "inheritors and practitioners of unique cultures and ways of relating to people and the environment" who have "retained social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the dominant societies in which they live" (United Nations 2023); and the addition of "a people or state-less nation with a past and/or on-going experience of colonization, with the occupation of a primarily ethnic out-group-developed government."

(2) Thesis Organization

There are ten main sections to this thesis project. The third section - following the (*1*) introduction and (*2*) layout - is a literature review of the current literature on two subjects: repression and dark money. In this section, I go over some of the most prolific literature on both topics, then I discuss gaps in the literature, how my research attempts to fill those gaps, and meaningfully contribute to an underdeveloped topic of interest - targeted repression in democratic contexts. Both pieces of literature directly inform this thesis on three of the variables (repression, public pressures, and private pressures), and one indirectly (indigeneity).

The fourth section details the testing methods. It begins by describing the research questions and aims, then initial hypotheses drawn from the current literature and preliminary data observations. Next, it moves onto discussing the research methods, which includes: (1) data collection; (2) sample selection - for the regression analysis data; (3) case study selection - for the process tracing portion; and (4) theory testing, which contains discussion of (a) the theoretical model, (b) the logistic regression model, (c) the process tracing of the case studies.

The fifth section discusses a theoretical model of my argument. It details the various independent variables that are present in this theory and how they impact differing outputs (a show of force or a lack thereof). While section five is hypothetical, sections six and seven are used for empirical testing. The sixth section goes over the results after I have run the regression model and discussion. The seventh section examines the case studies to get a better understanding of the various points of interests

and the interacting variables in these events, explaining why these interactions resulted in their outputs.

The eighth section expands this theory outside of states that were not included in the case study selection or the sample selection, and details instances where structural and contextual changes to the independent variables heavily alter the outcomes. The ninth section describes the scope conditions of this research, detailing both external and internal validity of my findings. The last section (section ten) contains the implications of these findings and potential areas of future research, and this thesis' conclusion, where I summarize my findings and arguments.

(3) Literature Review

This literature review focuses on two important subjects involved in this thesis: (1) repression and (2) dark money. These are important components to informing this research, as the first focuses on primarily the questions of *why* and *when* the coercive apparatus represses dissident activities. This area of literature is an important source of information with regards to the dependent variable – violent repression. The (broader) repression literature largely discusses instances of widespread repression as well as factors behind repression's more general occurrence and effectiveness. Within the literature review of repression research, there is also discussion on literature pertaining to *targeted repression*. The literature on targeted repression discusses issues of *why* select groups become the primary recipients of repression and *how* this repression can alter the political landscape and calculus of the dissent. Another area of research examined within the repression literature involves police-public relations that is used to inform another independent variable - public disposition. This portion of the literature review gives a short examination of the effects of public opinion on police legitimacy. Although it may be useful to some degree and potentially applicable to this project, Indigenous dissent literature is excluded from this review. This is due to the fact that much of the Indigenous resistance literature tends to be case-by-case, rather than generalizable and comparative between states. Additionally, much of the literature focuses on detailing case-by-case methodological approaches to dissent, while this thesis is only concerned with disruptive actions that stymie the progression and development of privately-owned projects. The "dark money" literature, albeit a field of study somewhat in its infancy, is an important

point in informing this project on the capital linkages between policing institutions and private economic elites - an independent variable.

(3.1) Repression Literature

In addressing the current literature on repression, I will focus on some findings across both studies of repression and nonviolent resistance, two major points of divergence in methodological approaches and assumptions, scales and scope of repression effects, and the effects of public perspective on police and repressive activities.

(3.1.1) Repression and Nonviolent Resistance Consensus

As noted by Chenoweth et al. (2017), research regarding nonviolent dissent and state repression have developed through divergent paths, and it is rare for researchers of political repression to mention or focus on nonviolent resistance as a variable of interest. Repression is a wide-ranging subject, and researchers of its dynamics often examine various aspects or forms of repression, such as covert versus overt repression, restrictions of civil rights, law enforcement methods, or targeted killings and disappearances. This section of the literature review is informed by another literature review conducted by Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang (2017). In their comparisons on the nonviolent resistance and repression literatures, Chenoweth et al. (2017) noted that there are six consensus findings across both areas of research: (1) dissent will always results in state repression in one form or another; (2) the scope and intensity of repression is conditioned by regime type; (3) short- and long-term effects of repression vary considerably; (4) state repression is less effective against nonviolent movements that are highly organized; (5) nonviolent dissent tends to lead to less intense state repression than other - more violent - forms of

dissident activities; and (6) the cooperation of security forces is critical to both the onset or perpetuation of repression and the success of a campaign.

First, a finding across both groups is that dissent will always encourage some form of state repression as a response. Davenport's (2007) "law of coercive responsiveness" postulates that any form of dissent which challenges the state[2] will result in some form of repression. Repression is considered a guarantee when the dissent or opposition challenge the status quo and seeks to disrupt the state's practices, institutional arrangements, or interests (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). However, this does operate with the assumption that repression interacts as an output *y* variable and dissent is the input *x* variable; a perspective that is being challenged by ongoing research, (Ritter & Conrad 2016). More on this is discussed in section *3.1.3*.

Second, both fields have concluded that the scope and intensity of repression is conditioned by regime type. Much of the basis for this argument is related to Davenport's (2010) concept of "domestic democratic peace." Davenport and Armstrong (2004) argue that states who pass a "certain threshold" of democratic institutional consolidation are less likely to commit ongoing repressive behaviors. Exceptions to this finding have been noted by Carey (2006), who have found that democracies are just as likely as other regime types to repress when faced with popular dissent. More of these divergent findings are discussed in the next section (*3.1.2*).

Third, they have found that both literatures agree that there is significant variation in the short- and long-term effects of repression, especially when considering the scale at and scope with which repression is applied. For example, repression that is large in scale

[2] For the purposes of this literature review, "the state" refers to both the government and the coercive apparatus, as this is the leading view in authoritarian repression literature.

but narrow in scope (i.e., targeted repression) helps citizens to develop unique skills that can provide aid to the continuation and longevity of dissent in the face of ongoing repression (Finkel 2015). A major conclusion has been drawn around the notion of "backlash." Backlash effects vary on several factors, including the scope of the application of repression. For example, excessive or widespread repression tends to decrease dissent in the short-term but increases dissent in the long-term as the dissent "backlashes" at the abuses (Hess & Martin 2006). The point is discussed further in section *3.1.4*.

Fourth, they have found that there is a consensus between both areas of research on the notion that state repression is less effective when it targets highly organized nonviolent movements. The organizational capacity of a campaign impacts their ability to survive leadership assassination so long as they maintain administrative structures (Bob & Nepstad 2007); their ability to endure repressive policies and maintain nonviolent doctrines (Pearlman 2011); and exploit opportunities to garner support and - to a degree - manufacture the backlash effect by documenting and disseminating evidence of repression (Martin 2007) - as a few examples. The effect of asymmetric violence varies due to the organizational capacity and preparation on the part of the campaign (Sutton et al. 2014).

Fifth, nonviolent dissent activities tend to result in less intense instances of state repression than do other forms (more violent) of oppositional behaviors. Conrad and Moore (2010) found that states rarely end the use of torture until they no longer face violent dissidents. Carey (2010) finds a similar relationship, arguing that amongst five

distinct types of dissident activities (four nonviolent, one violent), only the violent opposition behavior increased the likelihood of repression.

Finally, they contend that both forms of research have found that the relationship between the security apparatus and political leadership is an important variable to the application of repression and the success of a campaign. They state that the primary means by which nonviolent resistance works is by stymying the political leadership's options in employing repressive policies by removing its source of power. The loyalty from the coercive apparatus to the political leadership is vulnerable to exogenous pressures (Chenoweth et al. 2017). By removing their ability to employ the coercive apparatus, the likelihood of the campaign succeeding raises significantly.

(3.1.2) Regime Types

The current repression literature is often concerned primarily with two forms of repression: restrictions of civil liberties (e.g., restrictions to assembly) and personal integrity violations (e.g., threats to individual wellbeing and safety) (Davenport 2007). These two varying types of repression often lead research assumptions and measurements, which can lead to divergent perspectives of variable importance and baselines. Unofficially, there are two divergent theories on the importance of regime typology within repression literature. The first sees institutions (or a lack thereof) as a primary driver of repression. This reasoning of political repression literature is indeed the more contemporary and commonly accepted perspective of repression. The primary assumption in this theory contends that "after a threshold [level of democracy] has been passed [...], democracy decreases state repression" (Davenport & Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007); however, this threshold is abstract, and the specific measurement

employed often changes by case. Nonetheless, there is a consensus in both theories that states with democratic institutions are less likely to engage in repressive activities (Davenport & Armstrong 2004; Carey 2006; Davenport 2007; Chenoweth et al. 2017), although there are subsets that disagree with the underlying causes of these variations.

The primary independent variable that is often seen as the divergent factor between authoritarian and democratic states in their variation in applications of repression are the institutions available to them that serve as alternatives to repression. There has been literature that has explored divergence within autocracies, finding that variation in authoritarian regime typology also varies in applications of repression due to the institutions available to them. These findings have concluded that single-party regimes tend to be the least repressive across the autocratic board, while military regimes are the least repressive of civil liberties (although more repressive in terms of personal integrity), and personalist regimes are the least repressive of personal integrity post-Cold War (Davenport 2007); however, other scholars have found that regime typology serve as a poor proxy for levels of institutionalization (Meng 2020), so it is difficult to discern if these findings were due to factors outside the tested parameters and variables. Although those in this line of theory do not claim that repression never occurs in democratic states, the general acceptance of the notion that repression is contingent on regime type has led many scholars to focus their attention on authoritarian states for repression data and theory development, leaving fertile ground for research data left relatively unexplored.

Diverging academic perspectives and interests have led a few to begin to research repression in the democratic context. These theories see the regime itself and the context of the state as a primary diver of repressive behaviors. This line of reasoning does not

contend that there is a lack of institutional options available to authoritarian states and hybrid regimes that lead them to repressive responses; rather there are more generalizable variables impacting the coercive calculus of the state that go outside of regime typology or institutional availability, and instead find variables that have greater importance on repression as an output than democratic institutions. Although some following along this line of thought do still observe differences between democracies and other regimes types, Chenoweth et al. (2017) argues that "attempts to study the link between regime type and repression [...] can be problematic" when the variables explored are already those used to define a type of regime rather than specific applications or forms of repression. A few researchers have found that two of the main factors of state repression are executive job security (Ritter 2014) and threat level to the regime stability (Regan & Henderson 2002; Earl 2011). For example, it is agreed upon by both lines of theory that a regime is highly likely to repress against popular dissent (Brockett 1993); and much of this research has focused on its applicability to authoritarian regimes. Other scholars have found that democracies are more likely to cooperate with dissent and less likely than authoritarian regimes to engage in continuous repression but are just as likely to engage in repression as autocracies when faced with popular dissent (Carey 2006). Finally, Gotham (1994) has found that democracies tend to engage in covert repression, which gives them the appearance of behaving democratic while meeting the challenges of dissident activities.

Research that has engaged with "threat perception" in Western countries have found that decentralized policing systems, e.g. much of Western Europe, threats to political elites are more important as a determinant of repression (Wisler & Kriesi 1998); while others have found that decentralized policing systems, e.g. the United States,

threats to coercive agents are a stronger indicator of repression than threats to political elites (Earl & Soule 2006). Gonzáles (2020) found that coercive institutions within democracies can leverage their structural power (the threat of withdrawal of support for political parties and government), and are more likely to repress in the absence of (a) public convergence in opinion with dissatisfaction towards policing practices and (b) robust political party opposition, which bring about credible threats to policymakers and the coercive apparatus to enact structural and institutional reforms. Carey's (2006) findings suggest that repression is least effective in democracies, across regime types, in coercing the dissent into cooperation. Interestingly, a consensus perspective in the nonviolent resistance literature is that "the effects of repression [on y = dissent] are not preordained by regime type, capacity, or other static, structural factors," rather the "effects of repression are alterable by nonviolent dissidents themselves, depending on their own preparation, planning, training, and capacities" (Chenoweth et al. 2017).

In any case, although some researchers have begun to look at repression within democracies as the primary subject, rather than comparing levels of repression between democracies and non-democracies, the democratic repression literature is quite unexplored. To date, many contemporary repression researchers continue to postulate that democratic institutions are the primary determinant of repression. Many of these considerations, although potentially not invalid, may be due to methodological flaws in research design, rather than significant measures of variable importance and proper evaluations (Hill & Jones 2014).

(3.1.3) The Chicken, the Egg, or the Cycle?

A second debate within the repression literature asks, "*Does repression cause dissent or does dissent cause repression?"* As Davenport (2007) argues, the state responds to challenges against the status quo with repressive action to eliminate perceived threats - or the "law of coercive responsiveness.". However, this falls on the assumption that repressor and dissident behaviors are endogenous (Ritter & Conrad 2016), with a claim that dissent causes repression to occur (Davenport 2007). While many researchers instead see this as a methodological question and employ each as a dependent or independent variable based on the research question, some scholars place these two variables squarely on one side of the equation. Much of the repression literature tends to focus on ways that dissent causes repressive activities, postulating that repression is the dependent variable in the equation. Davis and Ward (1990) found that government repression does not have a substantive impact on rebellion opposition, but conversely, rebellion opposition does increase the state's application of negative sanctions. Davenport (1995) additionally has found that aspects of dissent - such as action frequency, deviation from normative practices, and variety is dissenting methodology - also has a positive relationship with repression. Much of the current literature contests that dissident activities are largely shaped around and decided by state repressive behaviors (Chenoweth et al. 2017).

On the other end, some treat dissent as the dependent variable which is affected by repression. Lichbach (1987) has noted that low levels of repression tends to reduce dissident violence and increases it after a certain threshold, while the inverse also occurs with high intensity of state violence increasing oppositional violence and decreasing it

after a threshold has been passed. Many researchers argue that there is a "backlash" effect, where the government is not expected to respond to dissent accommodation with repression because it is likely to lead to "backlash" and intensify mobilization and oppositional aggression (Opp & Roehl 1990; Carey 2006; Hess & Martin 2006; Sutton et al. 2014). Opp and Roehl (1990) have found that repressive policies and operations perceived as unjust on movement-integrated individuals who have experienced said repression can have a radicalizing effect on the dissident. Similarly, Gupta, Singh, and Sprague (1993) have found that repression in democratic contexts is more likely to incite violence in dissent response. Some research has indicated that repression of dissent causes the aggregate amount of dissent (e.g. the overall instances of political protest & broader political activities across the state) to decrease, but the greater the pressure that repression applies, the greater the number of alliances that are formed between government opposition groups (Chang 2008). Although these instances of (sometimes violent) repression does produce a lesser amount of dissent across the state, this incentivizes dissent actors to create alliance networks between each other.

Studies have found that the structure of social networks (or alliances) are critical to the efficiency of repression - primarily the way in which the "network structure interacts with the distribution of individual's motivations within networks and the nature of repression in producing outcomes" (Siegel 2011). If repression is contingent on stability and public support of the dissent - i.e. popular dissent repressed more often, especially in fragile regimes - and repression lowers overall instances of dissent while increasing alliance networks, this may beget more popular dissent to survive and grow while other challenges to the status quo die out, and then feeding back into further

repression. Going along the line of the findings of other research, this may indicate that repression and dissent can enter into a feedback loop. Attempts to grapple with this "repression/popular-protest paradox" have been documented in some research. Brockett finds that the most important determinant in whether repression will spur increased dissent mobilization is the "temporal location in the protest cycle" (Brockett 1993), or the timing in which the repression is applied in the protest cycle. This leads to the third string of thought.

While neither notion is wrong, a third body of theory remains unconcerned with answering the question of origin and instead argues that whoever the initiator is, the two are reciprocal (Brockett 1993; Carey 2006). A smaller subset of research around this question has found that dissent does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of repression occurring in states that engage in preventative repression (Ritter & Conrad 2016) - e.g., institutional changes that stymie the capacity of dissent and mobilization. In this strand of literature, the repression-protest nexus is seen as something on a continuum or a cycle. Both repression and protest are treated as dependent and independent variables, causing increases and decreases in each other after the other party makes an action. Carey (2006) found that repression and dissent are reciprocal, and the relationship between them is consistent longitudinally.

(3.1.4) Repression Scales and Effects

Repression varies widely in form and scale. Along those lines, differing forms of repression also have varying implications at distinct levels of dissent (Earl 2011). Two forms of repression scales are targeted repression, which targets individuals or specific groups as the receiver of repression, and widespread repression, which indiscriminately

represses whole populations based on dissident activities they participate in. Targeted forms of repression have been observed to affect individual group identity as well as broader trends in political and social dynamics. In a study by Elizbeth R. Nugent (2020), they found that the way that the state applies repression affects the levels of polarization among society during times of democratic transition. Although, these findings may be more generalizable, as targeted repression has been found to have a radicalizing effect (Opp & Roehl 1990), Nugent (2020) argues that targeted repression leads to higher levels of in-group salience and lower levels of cooperation with out-groups (which can result in long-term polarization). On the other hand, widespread repression lowers in-group isolation and increases broader societal identification through equalized shared trauma. The scale and scope of repression changes in-group/out-group perceptions by changing levels of affective polarization (ideas and feelings towards out-group members) and distance in policy preference (preferences on political issues). It does so in three mechanisms: psychological, social, and organizational.

In the psychological mechanism, group identification occurs through shared experiences. When those experiences are focused on individual groups, this increases salience of being within that group; when it is observed to be widespread, the shared experience becomes one that all members of society have dealt with and formerly "others" become ones of equalized experiences. In the social mechanism, repression alters group exposure to each other. When select groups are detained, exiled, or otherwise repressed, this forces isolated socialization among the in-group; when these same repressive measures are widespread, this forces socialization with out-group members. Finally, the organizational mechanism forces changes to internal membership,

socialization processes of organization, and group structure adaptation to survive repression.

When repression seeks to target specific groups, Rozenas (2020) has termed it as "demographic targeting" and has defined this form of repression as "when the risk of repression depends on the individual's demographic type, in part or entirely," which includes "ascriptive characteristics such as gender, age, religion, race, ethnicity, or geographic residence." Rozenas (2020) theorizes that in these instances, even if two individuals behave effectively in the same manner (e.g., disruptive protests), their treatment is distributed differently by the state through repression (or a lack thereof).

Some of the more effective forms of repression are targeted and this can result in divisions of non-elites against each other (Nugent 2020). However, to coerce effectively along these lines, a regime must be willing to commit to a "punishment schedule" that depends on behavior and is prescribed by or "determined by the individual's ascriptive characteristics" (Rozenas 2020), rather than behavior alone. Building upon previous work of effective deterrent coercive practices, which postulate that deterrence must bind the punishment to a particular behavior or action (Schelling 2008), Rozenas (2020) pushes the notion that ascriptive characteristics must also be tied to a particular "punishment schedule" in order to deter dissent.

Targeting of particular groups facilitates a "divide and conquer" strategy of domination in a state, regardless of regime type. As I argue, democratic states are unlikely to engage in widespread repression - as much of the repression literature argues - but they are likely to engage in demographic targeting as a means to meet their interests. Repression is not assigned at random, but rather strategically applied for the goals of the

ruling government under a strict calculus of what can be employed to achieve those goals, such as executive job security (Ritter 2014), level of threats to the regime (Regan & Henderson 2002), popular challenges (Chang 2006), and disruptions to the status quo (Davenport 2007). Instances of widespread or indiscriminate repression are more likely to suffer from the backlash effect, which can reduce immediate dissent, but increase dissent in the long term (Rasler 1996; Sullivan et al. 2012), facilitate alliance formation among dissident organizations (Chang 2008), and create stronger in-group perceptions of other repressed individuals that might otherwise be considered an out-group (Nugent 2020). Lachapelle (2022) has found that targeted repression can be used as a method of generating legitimacy and garnering popular support, rather than simply for quelling opposition, by repressing those that are a real or imagined threat to the wider society and utilizing popular fears of out-group members.

(3.1.5) Public Opinion, Police, and Repression

Many of the effects of public effects on the state's policing institutions are reliant on a relationship between public opinion and perceived police legitimacy. Police legitimacy is conditioned by public trust and confidence, which enables them to perform their work effectively and efficiently (e.g., community information provision), compliance with the law, community-police partnerships, and acceptance of police authority (Gourley 1954; Myhill & Quinton 2011; Worden & McLean 2017). The police rely on the public's cooperation and accommodation to coercive agents in their daily operations. In order to be an effective institution - ensuring adherence to the law and social order - it requires maintaining strong, positive community perceptions, networks, and relations (Myhill & Quinton 2011). A key component in shaping public perceptions

of police legitimacy is procedural fairness of policing practices in fulfilling their role as law enforcement (Sunshine & Tyler 2003). In other words, the public needs to perceive the police as applying justice in a fair manner in order for the police to retain their reserves of legitimacy. Continued and observable abuses by the police, such as violent repression of dissent, can hinder perceived police legitimacy, and - by extension - public trust and confidence in domestic policing institutions (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Cruz 2015).

Reactionary public outrage towards perceived injustices rely heavily on the concept of backlash (Hess & Martin 2006; Sutton et al. 2014). Coercive agents are always aware and sensitive to public disposition and attempt to disengage potential for backlash. Hess and Martin (2006) identify five mechanisms with which coercive institutions will mitigate the potential for backlash: (1) cover-ups, including censoring media coverage; (2) stigmatization of the subjects of repression, intending for the application of repression to seem legitimate while the dissidents are not; (3) reinterpretations of events; (4) obtaining statements from authorities and experts on events assessments; and (5) intimidating and/or bribing event participations and witnesses. Research conducted by Sutton [et al.] (2014) and Hess & Martin (2006) conclude that dissemination of documentation of repressive events is a key condition in which backlash effects take place, with Sutton placing special emphasis on media presence.

In the absence of trust and confidence in policing behaviors, and public outrage towards perceived injustices in application of repression, convergent public opinion can lead to calls for institutional and structural reform (Gonzáles 2021), loss of informants

and intelligence (Jansson 2005), and fueling popular discontents (Frankel 1980) (i.e., the potential for mass unrest). Therefore, the public's perception of police legitimacy is an integral part of the constraints placed on what forms of force are acceptable (Gerber & Jackson 2017); and given their ties to public perception linking their own legitimacy to that of the regime, public discontent towards policing behaviors and conduct can weaken the perceived legitimacy of the regime as well (Cruz 2015), publicly unfavorable conduct can threaten the legitimacy of the regime itself; an issue which can endanger the regime's own survival (Lipset 1981).

(3.2) Dark Money Literature

Dark money is an understudied topic - and the issue is intensified in the subset of research investigating dark money in relation to coercive apparatuses. For the purposes of this thesis, this literature review has opted to discuss only studies of dark money that relate to policing institutions. Dark money is a term applied to "a broad array of fraudulent or legal arrangements to avoid disclosing a source of funding in any sector" (Irvin 2023). By design, it is quite difficult to access information and data to achieve comprehensive studies. Current attempts to research the subject are often inhibited by their ability to access data, as many requests for information - Freedom of Information (FOI) Act requests - are often either heavily redacted or denied outright (Walby et al. 2018; Lippert & Walby 2022). Quite often, one of the methods by which dark money is channeled is through non-profit organizations. For policing institutions, this is most commonly supplied through police foundations. Police foundations are shell corporations that are able to collect funds from private elites and entities, who can then funnel that money into relevant policing departments (Walby et al. 2018), serving as a broker

between the two (Walby et al. 2018; Lipper & Walby 2022). However, these are not the only methods by which they channel capital, and the exchange is not unidirectional.

Lippert & Walby (2022) note that there are eight other forms of capital exchange methods, which the refer to as partnerships and sponsorships, that provide corporate influence into policing: *prima facie* strategic investments - e.g., Enbridge's donations of vehicle and safety equipment to Hamilton police in 2013 for policing their pipeline project (103); police paid advertisement of corporations (104); paid contracted detail policing (105); as an alternative for a lack in police budget (108); police creating network ties between corporations and other state institutions (110); donations as an attempt to ensure long-term contracts - e.g., equipment manufacturers (112); police-corporate partnerships that are mediated by policing executives, which allow them expertise in methods of funneling social and economic capital in these networks (114); and opaque small donations by smaller businesses that reinforce police worldview (116).

These methods allow donors to maintain some level of anonymity in their contributions to a given government institution (Dimmery & Peterson 2016; Lippert & Walby 2022). In the absence of police foundations, policing departments are able to accept direct donations in some cases from private entities, but they run the risk of scrutiny (Walby et al. 2018). Skirting disclosure laws on contributions and avoiding transparency, which stymies two mechanisms of accountability - information and sanctions - from taking effect. Lippert & Walby (2022), building off of Dupont's (2004) discussion of security capital, argue that the police, as a "greedy institution," seek capital as a reward in their corporate-police networks. They argue that there are five forms of capital sought after in these networks: economic capital (financial rewards), symbolic

capital (legitimacy, authority, and power), cultural capital (police knowledge, professionalism, expertise, information, and intelligence), social capital (social relations and networks), and political capital (the relative proximity of an actor to the machinery of government) (26).

(3.3) Gaps in the Literature

There are three observable gaps in the current literature examined above: (1) inclusion of democratic states' violently repressive behaviors; (2) the current breadth of dark money literature; and (3) the marriage of these two areas of inquiry. Additionally, this research attempts to increase the methodological approaches of Indigenous resistance literature. Much of the current literature on repression has primarily fallen into the "comparatively peaceful democracies" theorizing, opting to follow along with the reasoning of the domestic democratic peace theory (Davenport 2010). This theory, as previously mentioned, argues that democratic states behave as generally less repressive - compared to authoritarian states or hybrid regimes. This theory is largely viewed as accepted fact, and I propose that it has had a generally deterrent effect on further research into repression - particularly violent repression - in the context of democratic states.

While this research is not intended to disclaim the validity of this theory, it ignores a critical issue: not all regimes repress dissent *equally across groups.* The current literature has failed to address *why democracies apply repressive policies* and *what forms of repression they apply.* Indeed, as my theory argues, states make calculated decisions based around distinct groups and their behaviors, and it is not conditioned by their democratic institutionalization. The states, being rational actors, will approach varying situations with varying methods. Consolidated democracies tend to enjoy a great deal of

institutional strength and state capacity. While there may be alternatives to repression - e.g., cooptation or accommodation - this is not always the approach taken by political leaders and coercive agents. Particularly strong states are better equipped, I argue, to engage in targeted repression that ties behaviors and characteristics together to form a punishment schedule.

Second, there is extraordinarily little research into dark money at present. Given that there is truly little data out there, due to the very nature of the subject, it is no surprise that researchers have strayed away from this area. Even attempts to gain insight into the subject through Freedom of Information Act requests are often either denied outright or are heavily redacted (Lippert & Walby, 2022), making studies into the subject quite difficult. Dark money literature often focuses on economic capital relations between public political officials and economic elites and entities; however, this research expands the definition of "capital," utilizing the descriptions of Lippert & Walby (2022) and Dupont (2004), seeing capital exchange networks and capital interests as involving more than monetary exchanges in the dark money literature.

Third, there is little research that has attempted to merge the two subjects. While Lippert & Walby (2022) do discuss how private elites influence policing agencies, and vice versa, they do not engage with the question of its application of repression. Finally, as mentioned in passing above, the Indigenous resistance literature is, more often than not, case-by-case studies that lack cross-comparison between countries. My research attempts to fill in these gaps by examining the way in which consolidated democracies engage in repressive behaviors based on demographic-activity links (indigeneity-critical infrastructure disruptions), expand the current dark money literature, and attempt to

merge the two subjects while creating comparative research on state-Indigenous repression-dissent relations. This theory is developed from the findings of González (2020), Lippert & Walby (2022, and Dupont (2004), and theoretical arguments of Rozenas (2020), while using the methodological recommendations of Hill and Jones (2014).

(4) Testing Methods

The testing methods section discusses (1) the research questions and aims of this project; (2) some initial hypotheses that occur through preliminary data observations and a review of the relevant literature; and (3) research methods. The research methods section (*4.3*) is broken into 4 sections and 3 subsections: (*4.3.1*) data collection methods, (*4.3.2*) sample selection methods, (*4.3.3*) case selection, and (*4.3.4*) testing, which contains (*a*) discussion of the theoretical model, (*b*) the logistic regression model, and (*c*) process tracing of the selected case studies.

(4.1) Research Questions and Aims

There are two primary research questions of this study:

1. *When do states decide to violently repress Indigenous protests?*
2. *Why are Indigenous protests repressed violently in these instances while public protests, disrupting development in a comparable manner, are not?*

These questions drive the focus of the research and attempt to figure out primary aims of the study: an analysis of the *differences* of repressive agent treatment of Indigenous protests and the *similarities* across democratic states.

(4.2) Hypotheses

Based on the current literature and observations from preliminary data, there are four initial hypotheses:

H1: Indigeneity has a significant effect on the likelihood of the coercive apparatus using a show of force to prevent disruptive events.

H2: Indigenous demonstrations that disrupt private projects owned by economic elites are more likely to experience a show of force than the (non-Indigenous) public engaging in similar activities.

H3: Disruptive demonstrations against private development projects are less likely to be repressed if the project has robust public opposition.

H4: Coercive agents and/or departments that have significant capital links with private elites and/or entities are more likely to engage in a show of force.

(4.3) Research Methods

(4.3.1) Data Collection

The data for this research is collected through three sources: publicly available datasets and databases, news outlets and archives, public opinion surveys and polls, and previous research on disruptive demonstrations. These datasets include: (1) the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) datasets[3], (2) Civicus Monitoring data[4], (3) the Australia PEA Catalogue[5], (4) the Cassy Dorff (et al.) protests dataset[6], (5) the Nonviolent Action database[7], and (6) Nexus Uni[8]. Data is gathered by first analyzing the data available on various data sets and databases, then following their own sources (often media outlets) for more information. The news outlet articles and archives are

[3] https://acleddata.com/.
[4] https://www.civicus.org/.
[5] *This data source has either been removed from public availability during the time of this research or has become inaccessible for linking.*
[6] Cassy Dorff, Grace Adcox, Amanda Konet, "Data Innovations on Protests in the United States," *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 60, no. 1(2023): 172-189. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221143808.
[7] https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/.
[8] https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/professional/academic/nexis-uni.page.

found through search engine requests, direct access to local, regional, and state media outlet websites, and through NGO citation of conflict events on their own databases.

The news media sources utilizes both specialized websites (i.e., watchdog outlets, such as Censored News[9]) as well as general local, regional, and state-wide media sites. Given that many of these events are severely understudied or underreported with regards to the repressive behaviors of the state's coercive institutions and their capital linkages with private interests involved, media accounts of events and uncovered documentation (e.g. police-corporate communication documents obtained through Freedom of Information requests) are necessary to gain a full picture of these instances. Public opinion surveys and polls serve as a proxy to gauging the public's relative stance on a particular project (opposition or support). Finally, previous research on protests events informs the data of underreported information on the demonstration or corporate-police relations, and creates more robust case studies and data for the logistic regression model.

With regards to the datasets and databases, all data points that fulfilled a strict level of scrutiny were added to the dataset. Details on the restriction guidelines are detailed in the sample selection section (*4.3.2*). To ensure that samples were not selected with a degree of bias in the other three data sources, procedural steps were taken when examining news outlets and archives, and search engines[10], a two-step system was established (Figure I).

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[9] https://www.censored.news/.

[10] It is also worth noting that some samples were gathered with a variation of snowball sampling. Some data points were discovered through analyses of other events that followed this procedure. If those events were found to pass the requirements of an acceptable data point, it was accepted even without following the first step in the procedural guidelines.

Step 1	[NULL] Indigenous Native First Nations Traditional Owners Native American	AND	Demonstration Protest Protest Camp Occupied Obstruct Tree-Sit Halt Prevent	AND	Project Development Construction Pipeline Logging Mine
Step 2	Police OR [Agency] AND Arrest Harass Intimidate Militarized Violence Brutality Beat Pepper Spray Baton Taser LRAD Water Cannon				

Figure I Two-Step Procedure

In the search prompt of the given site, a list of key words was entered in to find relevant cases. In step one, a state or region was specified, then the terms were entered as "(*term*) AND (*term*) AND (*term*)" to optimize the search functionality. When an observation was considered relevant (based on the scrutiny restrictions), the data collection moved into the second step. In step 2, the event was specified based on unique terms - e.g., "Enbridge," "Line 3 pipeline replacement," etc. - and either "(Police)" or a specified agency, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), was entered, with an additional term provided using "AND (*term*)" from the descending list.

(4.3.2) Sample Selection

The samples are isolated to three consolidated democratic states - the United States, Canada, and Australia - between 2000-2023. The decision to isolate for this time period was to control for potential compounding factors pre-2000. The security contexts of all three states shifted dramatically in the wake of September 11, 2001, and a significant focus of coercive behavior began to shift to specialized securitizing of critical infrastructure and global commitments to the War on Terror. In focusing on data on the onset and after the shift in security context, it is assumed that the security interests and behavior of the state's policing agencies will be equalized. Furthermore, these three states were selected for their similarities with regards to government structure and history of Indigenous-state relations.

All three states are consolidated democracies with relatively similar democratic institutions available as alternatives to conflict (e.g., independent democratic courts). Additionally, all three states have federal government systems and structures, with regional governments and policing agencies. Regional policing independence (relative to other regions and federal directives) allows for more variation in the data and policing responses to demonstrations as interests and chains-of-command change by region. Furthermore, all three cases are relatively equal in terms of Indigenous-state histories. In other cases, such as the Philippines or Scandinavia, the Indigenous and "non-Indigenous" populations are separated by a factor of westernization and/or culture. In all three states, the Indigenous population is both racially and ethnically divergent from the dominant ethnic group, which provides a relative similarity in social dynamics, systems of

institutional oppression, and histories of settler colonization. This also reinforces the out-group/in-group dynamics through physical characteristic differences[11].

To control for potential compounding factors, protest data is only added as a datapoint under an elevated level of scrutiny. Observations are only added in cases where: (1) the absence of violent demonstrations or activities by the dissent, (2) the project is wholly private-owned, (3) the project is not Indigenous-owned, (4) the security agents are not tribal or that of a reservation, (5) the demonstrations directly disrupt the project's progress (on-site), and (6) the demonstration disrupts material extraction or construction. First, instances of violent political dissent (unless it occurred in reaction to state violence) are removed from the observations. Because a primary interest of this study is instances of unprovoked, asymmetric state show of force employed against the dissent, instances where a movement opted to engage in violence from the onset or during the campaign potentially allude to the coercive apparatus' response as reactionary (and possibly necessary) in order to protect threats to public wellbeing. As previous research has found, violent dissent activities tend to illicit violent repression (Carey 2010). These observations were removed or kept from the dataset to maintain an examination of instances where the coercive agents were the initiators of aggression (a show of force).

Second, Indigenous- or state-owned (e.g. crown-corporations) projects were excluded. To control the merging of spheres of interest (e.g., the state as both the repressor and project owner) only projects owned entirely by private elites and entities

[11] Although physical characteristics of an individual are not always strong indicators of group membership, the social perception and stigmatization of "what group X is 'supposed' to appear as" is assumed to create stronger in-group/out-group social cleavages.

were accounted for. While it may be a fruitful area for future research, the interests and sources of pressure are likely to shift dramatically from one case to the next. Third, remote (relative to the project) demonstrations and obstructions to anything other than material extraction or construction are not considered. These demonstrations that obstructed other worksites, such as processing facilities or downtown offices, are unlikely to be treated as critical as time-sensitive projects, which are often on strict deadlines and timeframes. This raises the bar for private elites to attempt to extend their influence outward or invest more resources into quelling the disruptions.

A single unit of observation ($n=1$) is considered by location, actors, campaign, time, and the specific issue of contention. First, the location of a contentious event was scaled down to a lower level of coercive response possible - i.e., the regional level. While the scale of the threat to the regime and the status quo has a significant impact on the coercive apparatus' response (Regan & Henderson, 2002), maintaining an observable unit down to the lower level of governance allows for more observations. Second, the units of observation are isolated for the actors involved in the event itself: (a) the Indigenous community/communities, groups, individuals, and cross-Indigenous alliances or (b) the public. The coercive apparatus itself is assumed to always be an actor, whether they decide to act or refrain from involvement. Different unaligned campaigns were separated into different units of observation. For example, two campaigns that are contesting the same project but are not aligned with each other may invoke various police responses - based on Indigenous categorization. The longitudinal effects of enduring protests are accounted for, so the units of observation could range from a single day to X days,

months, or years[12]. The ACLED, Australia PEA Catalogue, and Cassy (et al.) datasets separate each instance of protest into a single day, so each observation is consolidated into a single unit based on time, actors, location, and issue. However, instances separated by more than one year are considered as different campaigns, and therefore different units of observation.

(4.3.3) Case Selection

The cases selected for the process tracing portion of this research are two instances where there were multiple cases of a show of force were carried out against an Indigenous demonstration. The Enbridge Line 3 Replacement project in Minnesota, United States, and the Coastal GasLink demonstrations in British Columbia, Canada. These cases were selected because of similarities shared between the countries, but variation in terms of private and public pressures being exerted onto the policing agencies as well as the intensity of repression. As previously mentioned, these two countries have relatively similar political systems in place, as well as similar histories with Indigenous-state relations.

Additionally, both states have a great deal of natural resource wealths; and natural resource extraction industries (e.g., the energy industry) tend to be one of the primary oppositional enterprises that go against Indigenous community interests. Because of this, both states have relatively powerful extractive industry economic elites who enjoy significant financial resources with which they can use to create fortuitous patron-client relationships with the coercive apparatus, leverage their wealth of resources to exert influence, and facilitate stronger security capital linkages. Equally important, these two

[12] Due to data limitations, it was not possible to include a variable for "actual obstructed days."

states have high voter turnout rates and active registered voting populations. According to Elections Canada, Canada retains a relatively politically active population, with a 62.6% voter turnout rate in the 2021 federal election (Elections Canada 2023); and by the results of a 2022 study done by Pew Research, about ⅔ of eligible U.S. adults voting in the 2020 election with increasing rates of voter participation (Pew Research Center 2023). This is important to this theory because this theory requires credible threats and incentives generated by a system of sanctions and rewards in both the public sphere and private sphere. The presence of strong political participation among the public is a prerequisite to create a credible threat against the coercive apparatus, and counterbalance capital incentives offered by economic elites and entities.

(4.3.4) Testing

There are three main sections that present this thesis's testing and arguments: (1) a theoretical model, (2) a logistic regression model, and (3) case study process tracing. The first section details a theoretical model that highlights the assumptions and predictions of this thesis. This model provides some clarity for the thesis being presented. This theoretical model postulates that both parties are making cost-benefit decisions around contentious political issues and using those calculations to assess what action should be taken: either to acquiesce or contest, on the part of the Indigenous community/communities; and to employ a show of force, provide concessions, or cooperate and compromise on the part of the state's policing agencies.

For the second portion, this thesis utilizes the most common method for repression literature test of large datasets, logistic regression (Hill & Jones 2014). If the model performs well, it will be used in informing the findings of the case studies. The

third section - case study process tracing - provides useful empirical information. Both methods work together by accounting for the issues that can arise by its counterpart. In other words, both quantitative and qualitative methods have their own flaws. Using both methods together while testing the same theory provides some level of potential error correction. For example, criteria for an observation unit (n=1) creates some barriers to effectively looking at events longitudinally. These units capture 3-year events with the same consideration as 1-month disruptions.

Process tracing of selected case studies allows this research project to look across time at specific events and provides useful insight into how contentious political events - especially prolonged contests - can change across time due to the changes in the political environment (institutions, actors, et cetera). However, the logistic regression model allows for statistical relevance to be captured where process tracing of specific cases cannot and is limited to discussing only a few cases at a time. By using a logistic regression model in tandem with the case studies, the two methods of testing suggest a higher degree of validity. Additionally, the private capital variable cannot be captured in the logistic regression model's data. This is due to the fact that these capital linkages between policing agencies and private corporations or elites are kept intentionally hidden, preventing transparency or access to information (Walby et al., 2018; Brownlee, 2018; Lippert & Walby 2022).

(4.3.4a) Theoretical Model

The theoretical model employed does not provide any form of empirical evidence of this theory's arguments; however, it does provide insight into the dynamics of the variables at play in this thesis. To present a clear picture of the ways in which the

independent and dependent variables are interacting, the theory is presented as a sequential process, in which there is an onset of the contest between Indigenous communities and the state and private interests, then the pressure variables (public and private) change the state's coercive institution's calculus on whether to engage in a show of force.

In this theory there are three independent variables that coalesce into the occurrence (or absence) of the dependent variable (a show of force): (1) Indigenous categorization and disruptive demonstrations; (2) public pressures that create a set a costs and benefits with relation to state response; and (3) private pressures that develop their own set of costs and benefits. It should be noted that this argument requires both demographic and behavioral characteristics (indigeneity and disruptive protests, variable *i*) to be present as a prerequisite for the coercive apparatus to engage in a show of force when the other two variables are taken into consideration. In the absence of either portion of variable *i*, this theory does not predict that the coercive institution will be likely to engage in violently repressive behavior with the goal of raising the perceived future costs of protest. The process of this theoretical model is discussed more in depth in section 3.

It should be noted, however, that these are not the only possible courses of action that either party could dedicate their resources to. Especially on the part of the coercive agents, they represent potential "extremes" in a wide set of actions they could take. For example, the policing agencies could delegitimize through media campaigns and discredit the Indigenous communities' goals in the eye of the public. While these extremes are not representative of the wide range of potential avenues either party could take, they provide

a useful categorization for theoretical propositions and examination for opposite ends to these extremes, leaving potential for the "in-between" methods to be accounted for.

(4.3.4b) Logistic Regression Analysis: Disruptive Protest Model

The disruptive protest model for this study is a multivariate binary logistic regression that employs two dummy variables for the dependent variable, which is the occurrence of a show of force, and one independent variable, representing the demographic characteristics of the dissenting party. A continuous variable is used as a proxy for generalized public opposition to a project. The data and model were constructed using R programming software with the ROCR and caret packages, as well as Stata. The model is written as:

$$P(y\ =1)\ =\ \frac{e^{\ \beta_0\ +\beta_1\ i+\beta_2 p}}{1+e^{\beta_0\ +\beta_1\ i+\beta_2 p}}$$

$$P(y=1) = P(show\ of\ force\ occurs)$$

$$\ln\left(\frac{P}{1-P}\right) =\ \beta_0+\beta_1 i+\beta_2 p$$

$$\left(\frac{P}{1-P}\right)\ =\ (\frac{Probability\ of\ Success}{Probability\ of\ Failure})$$

y = a show of force =
1 = show of force occurred
0 = show of force did not occur
i = disruption of private development project =
1 = Indigenous demonstration
0 = public demonstration
p = public opposition to a project =
0.00 - 1.00 = 0.00% - 100.00%

Each observation unit was coded based on the details of the campaigns based on these three variables. The dependent variable, *y* (show of force), is the main variable of interest. If the unit of observation had an instance of a show of force anytime during the contest campaign, the observation was coded with as 1 for the occurrence of a show of

force and 0 for all else. Variable *i* represents the demographic characteristics of the protesting group. These instances, just as the dependent variable, were coded with a dummy variable (1) to represent the instance of the event being composed of, led, organized, and/or originated by an Indigenous group or collective of Indigenous groups and 0 otherwise.

The control group (the public) is represented by an instance where $i = 0$ and displays the treatment effect of the "Indigenous variable" on rates of a show of force. If the theory is correct, then it is expected that the p-value of this variable in the model will be less than 0.05, indicating that indigeneity as a variable has a statistically significant effect on whether the coercive agencies will decide to have a show of force to quell the demonstration when it disrupts private development projects. Variable *p* is a continuous variable indicating general public opposition to the project itself. Public *opposition* to the project was the decided metric, due to the assumption that policing agencies will be more sensitive to public opposition than support to maintain legitimacy within publicly acceptable limitations. Likewise, public opposition is a more suitable measurement of the potential for eruption into mass unrest, due to backlash. The variable is coded as being between 0.00-1.00 to reflect survey results and fit them to the requirements of a categorical machine learning model. The "usual suspects" identified by Hill and Jones (2014) were excluded because the addition of too many variables, they argue, would run the risk of overfitting, may not meaningfully reflect variable importance in the model, and could ignore the ability to the model to predict state repression based on the above-mentioned variables alone.

To ensure the model's goodness of fit and evaluate its robustness, several measures are employed. First, the model will be split into testing and training data subsets (30:70, testing-training ratio). Then tested using *k*-fold cross validation, with $k = 10$, utilizing the trainControl() function, during training. The p-value will only be accepted if it is statistically significant – i.e., under 0.05. If the p-value of the trained model is less than 0.05, then the null hypothesis will be rejected. However, a noted flaw of logistic regression models in the repression literature is the reliance on null hypothesis significance (Hill & Jones 2014). To account for this, next the model will be cross validated by exposing it to unseen data – i.e., 30% of the data reserved for testing. If the model is performing well, it should be able to accurately predict the output of the unseen data in a confusion matrix. Next, the ROC curve is examined. If the model is performing well, it should curve up into the top left corner of the graph and a significant portion should remain under the curve. As a final measurement of performance, the testing and training accuracy are compared. If the model performs well on unseen data, the testing accuracy should be higher than the training accuracy.

(4.3.4c) Case Study Process-Tracing

To assess this argument further, I offer an in-depth analysis of the demonstrations and key moments during the campaigns (e.g. a show of force occurrence) and describe the capital linkages between the coercive apparatus and private entities, public opinion survey data, and background information on the protests. Each point of interest gives a clearer picture of the public and private pressures (independent variables) that incentivize coercive response or withdrawal and why the coercive institutions did or did not engage in a show of force. There are three independent variables under examination in the

process tracing portion of my thesis, which are: (1) two types of pressures being applied to the coercive institutions, including (a) public pressures (with opinion surveys serving as proxies) and (b) private interest pressures; and (2) Indigenous categorization of the dissent in disruptive demonstrations that serves as a causal mechanism.

These selected cases show disruptive Indigenous contests that prevent private development projects from continuing uninhibited can garner a reaction from the policing forces *if* private interest groups have credible private capital to incentivize repression; but it is the balancing pressures of private and public spheres that determine whether the policing institutions will decide to have a show of force to threaten on-going demonstrations and raise the perceived costs of future protests, as well as the intensity with which repression is applied. However, as the process tracing will show, the longitudinal effect of the shifts in the varying levels of these public and private sphere pressures, changing the coercive apparatus' calculus over time.

(5) Theoretical Model

This theory builds upon previous works. Namely González's (2020) work on coercive practices in democracies, Lippert & Walby (2022) and Dupont's (2004) research and arguments of the capital links between the coercive apparatus and private economic elites, and the theoretical arguments of Rozenas (2020). González (2020) finds that repressive practices in democracies are likely to perpetuate in the absence of convergent public opinion against the practices, robust elected political opposition that can capitalize on the shift in public perspective, with the public making calls for structural and institutional reforms. Lippert and Walby (2022), working off the findings of Dupont (2004), argue that the policing structures in many Western countries have created a security capital network, in which the coercive apparatus and corporations enter into agreements to secure five forms of capital (symbolic, political, economic, social, and cultural). These varying forms of capital are discussed further in case studies.

In garnering these relations, policing institutions can reproduce themselves, as a "greedy institution," internally as well as expanding beyond themselves (Lippert & Walby 2022). Rozenas (2020) articulates a game theoretical model in which select groups within the citizenry are strategically targeted to fulfill state goals. Each of these play a greater part in this thesis and are explained in more detail within this discussion of the theoretical framework. Within this theoretical framework, there are four primary actors (Figure II): the coercive apparatus, the Indigenous communities/nations, the private sphere, and the public sphere. Each of these actors maintain bilateral interactions with the coercive apparatus for varying purposes.

Figure II Primary Actors and Interactions



Sequentially, the Indigenous demonstrators are the first to move, disrupting private development projects of the private sphere through various means such as blockades or site occupations or acquiescing. It is assumed that the private sphere has developed, or is in the process of developing, private capital exchange networks with the relevant coercive agents. These capital exchange networks are one end of the equation that informs the coercive apparatus cost-benefit analysis on whether to engage in a show of force. On the other end of the equation is the (potentially) counterbalancing public sphere. The public sphere supplies public capital to the coercive apparatus, which includes forms of symbolic, cultural, political, and social capital. The exact forms of capital received are discussed in-depth in the case studies section and can vary by case. The coercive institutions of the state and the Indigenous dissent are the primary direct interactors.



Figure III Contest-Repression Process

As described in Figure III, as a useful starting point, this theory asserts that the onset of the contest between parties begins with the contract or leasing agreement being made between a private developer and the state (step alpha). While it is fair to say that these land disputes have been continuous since the inception of colonization, this theory is concerned with the particular form of protest that is met with violent reactions by the coercive apparatus. Indigenous communities, seeing this contract or lease being offered and certain pieces of contested land being used for the development projects of a private enterprise, will either choose to contest (protest) or abstain from engagement - stage 1. Stage 2 is where the policing institutions decide whether to react, assuming the Indigenous community decides to engage in a contest. Between their reaction and the decision of the Indigenous community to contest, the coercive agencies receive public and private pressures in their decision on whether to have a show of force. When the

private capital benefits from private elites and entities outweigh the costs presented by the public sphere, the decision to violently repress Indigenous dissent is the predicted result. In reaction - stage 3 - the Indigenous community will either choose to continue to contest the space or acquiesce. If they choose to continue their demonstrations against the project, the state's policing agencies will react in stage 4. In Figure III, the contest's numerical ordering ends with stage 3, while the "final" stage is labeled as "Stage …" This is due to the assumption that this contest could go on indefinitely, and both parties could continue the protest-repression cycle in perpetuity.

The costs and benefits of repression (or not repressing) in both spheres vary. Private capital exchanges and networks supplied by economic elites offer lucrative partnerships and can facilitate the policing institutions desire to reproduce as an institution (Lippert & Walby 2022). However, violent repression can be quite costly to the status of officials if these instances turn into what González (2020) refers to as a "scandal." In these instances, there is the risk of backlash, in which the public reacts to perceived injustices against the dissent through mobilization (Hess & Martin 2006; Sutton et al. 2014; Cruz 2015). On the other hand, the decision not to repress can be costly as well. While the coercive apparatus is able to maintain their flow of public capital, they run the risk of being sanctioned by private elites and entities, through the withdrawal of private capital and networks.

In order to violently repress Indigenous dissent, the coercive agents calculate their risks and potential rewards based on the value of the private capital offered and the current trends in public opinion. Because there are always risks and costs associated with the application of repression, the coercive apparatus is unlikely to engage in violent

Table I Public Pressure Cost-Benefit Analysis

	Public Opinion	Cost	Benefit
(a) No Show of Force	Converged	Null	Low/Abstract
(b) No Show of Force	Fragmented	Low	Low/Abstract
(c) Show of Force	Converged	Medium to High	Low
(d) Show of Force	Fragmented	Low	Low

displays of repression simply because private capital is offered. No matter how large the potential private capital rewards, this theory predicts that the policing agencies will be unlikely to engage in a show of force if public opinion has converged in opposition to the project, in support of the movement, or both. As a useful tool for this discussion, public opinion has been set simply as "converged" or "fractured"." While there are myriad combinations and variances of public opinion, keeping the discussion limited to these two forms is useful to discuss the theoretical framework. The assumptions of the effects of the level of public opposition are summarized in Table I.

"Converged" public opinion broadly covers a situation in which the majority of citizenry is in support of the movement, in opposition to the project, or a mixture of both. "Fragmented" public opinion, on the other hand, describes all other situations. In this instance, public opinion is split in one form or another - e.g., some support the movement, others oppose, and an equal number may be considered neutral. There are four potential combinations of outcomes with regards to public pressures, listed *a-d*. In all four outcomes, the benefits are low (or abstract). Because this pertains to democratic state contexts, law enforcement without violence or brutality is an assumed norm. Indeed, there is no assumed hypothetical "pat on the back" for the policing institutions displaying

restraint from violence in their operations. However, there is an abstract benefit of maintaining legitimacy. Instances in which law enforcement display behaviors perceived to be unjust reduce the perceived legitimacy of the institution (Cruz 2015). On the other end of the analysis, the costs are also relatively low in instances *b* and *d.* In these instances, the fragmented public opinion means there may be relatively even numbers of individuals encouraging repression or restraint. In either repressing (*d*) or abstaining (*b*), there is the potential that *x* amount of citizens will be upset by the decision, potentially resulting in a marginal reduction of trust and confidence in the policing agencies. If public opinion has converged in favor of the movement, or against the project, there are assumed to be no associated or significant costs against refraining from repression. However, if public opinion has converged in favor of the movement or against the project, the cost to repression is predicted to be medium to high (*c*). In this instance, there is the potential loss of perceived legitimacy (Cruz 2015), the potential for calls for institutional and structural reform (González 2020), fueling of popular discontent (Frankel 1980), or the movement gains material support from the public (DeNardo 1985).

The counterbalancing force to these pressures are presented by the private sphere, summarized in Table II. Private pressure is assumed to be equal to the relative private capital value presented to coercive agents. Private capital value is simplified dichotomously as either “high” or “low” for theoretical purposes. First, in all four outcomes, it is assumed that there will be some cost associated with any decision. In the case of *a* and *b,* the assumed cost to not repress the movement is the loss of potential private capital. The degree of the cost is proportional to the perceived value of the private capital offered. However, the benefits in these two instances are predicted to be null. As

Table II Private Pressure Cost-Benefit Analysis

	Private Capital Value	Cost	Benefit
(a) No Show of Force	Low	Low	Null
(b) No Show of Force	High	High	Null
(c) Show of Force	Low	Low	Low
(d) Show of Force	High	Low	High

the coercive apparatus has decided to abstain from engagement, there is no assumption that there would be a direct benefit from the private sphere for their abstention - although there are predicted to be abstract public capital benefits. In outcomes *c* and *d,* although there are no anticipated costs for engaging in a show of force incurred from the private sphere directly, the repression literature always assumes that repression always has a cost in some form as a general principle. Following this reasoning, the cost in these two outcomes was set to "low" by default. Costs are considered low in all instances aside from a situation where the coercive apparatus does not engage in a show of force while private capital value is high. In three of the scenarios (*a, c,* and *d*), the costs to their strategy are low because either the private capital value loss is low (*a*) or the private pressure costs are associated to a show of force aren't believed to be costly (*c* and *d*) – this does not include operational, procedural, or public sphere costs. Instance *b* is estimated as the costliest, as it is largest potential loss of private capital. The benefits obtained for a show of force in these events are assumed to be equal to the perceived

Table III Strategy, Opinion, and Capital Value Combinations

	Public Opinion	Public Cost	Public Benefit	Private Capital Value	Private Cost	Private Benefit
No Show of Force						
1	Converged	Null	Low/Abstract	Low	Low	Null
2	Fragmented	Low	Low/Abstract	High	High	Null
3	Fragmented	Low	Low/Abstract	Low	Low	Null
4	Converged	Null	Low/Abstract	High	High	Null
Show of Force						
5	Converged	Med-High	Low	Low	Low	Low
6	***Fragmented***	***Low***	***Low***	***High***	***Low***	***High***
7	Fragmented	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
8	Converged	Med-High	Low	High	Low	High

value of the private capital incentives garnered, with the benefits highest for a show of force with high private capital value offered (*d*). Although, the benefits garnered to not engaging in a show of force are considered "null" as the coercive institutions are not assumed to be afforded benefits from private elites and entities for no repression provided.

There are two strategies available to the coercive apparatus, two types of public opinion, and two value types of private capital. Of these six variations in the 3 variables, there are eight predicted outcomes (Table III). Although each may provide useful insight, there is one strategy highlighted by these theoretical predictions of interest to this thesis. In scenario 6 - where a show of force is taken, public opinion is fragmented, and the private capital value is perceived to be high - the outcome is anticipated as near absolute gains in favor of the coercive agencies. While there is a negligible risk of incurring costs from negative public sanctions, the benefits garnered from private capital outweigh those risks. This outcome, I argue, is where many obstructive Indigenous protests private

development projects are likely to occur. As Rozenas (2020) theorizes, the coercive apparatus creates "punishment schedules" that target specific demographics, and tie characteristics (e.g., ethnicity or race) to certain behaviors (e.g., disruptive demonstrations) in their application of repression to meet political goals. Indeed, incidents such as the Dakota Access pipeline (DAPL) are not isolated. Rather, the violent repression of the DAPL dissident was since there were significant capital linkages between the coercive apparatus and Energy Transfer Partners - the primary stakeholder in the DAPL project.

Documents obtained through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests over the years have revealed that Energy Transfer Partners established a lucrative partnership with regional policing agencies. In this partnership, there were instances of collusion to repress media information, the company providing financial support to police and purchasing equipment, and intelligence sharing (Brown & Sadasivam 2023). Meanwhile, public opinion was fragmented, with 43% favoring the project and 48% opposed nationally (Suls 2017). In 2017, an estimated 56% of the voting age population in North Dakota was Republican/Lean-Republican, while only 28% were Democrats/Lean-Democrat (Gallup n.d.). The survey noted that there was a strong political affiliation division in perspective of the pipeline, with three-quarters of Republicans affirming support for the project and 69% of Democrats expressing opposition (Suls 2017).

To be sure, in most instances it is likely that the issue will fall somewhere in one of the other seven outcomes. Additionally, there is always variation in public opinion and private capital value. These variables here are represented dichotomously for simplicity. In real world instances, many variables are considered to measure these variables in the

coercive apparatus' strategic repression calculus. The case of the DAPL project and Standing Rock presents the instances in which the correct variables align that led to a show of force, subjecting Indigenous dissent to violence by the coercive arm of the state. In short, the public opinion, in the case of the DAPL, could be considered as "converged," although this convergence would be in favor of the project, rather than in opposition. In the absence of robust public opinion against the project and high perceived private capital incentives, a show of force was determined to be the most lucrative strategy.

(6) Logistic Regression Model

(6.1) Data Overview

Before discussing the empirical findings of the model, section 6.1 discusses an overview of the data that was applied to the model.

(6.1.1) Observations

As previously mentioned, the data gathered for the supervised classification model utilized existing databases on protests, news articles from archives and media outlets, and relevant public opinion surveys and polls. This amounted to a total of 356 relevant articles, and six different comprehensive databases, as well as 103 relevant surveys and polls (Table IV).

Table IV Count of Data Sources

	Count =
News Articles	356
Databases	6
Surveys and Polls	103

Heavy restrictions and specifications were placed on what constituted an acceptable observation. As a baseline, only instances of obstruction post-2000 was considered. Next, data was omitted from consideration if (1) the obstructive demonstration initiated violence; (2) obstructions were against a state-owned company (e.g. a "Crown-Corporation") or, conversely, (3) the company was Indigenous-, tribe/band-, or Nation-owned; (4) the demonstration did not directly disrupt the projects development (e.g. obstruction to offices); (5) the coercive agents, such as rangers or officers, were party to a tribal or band institution; or (6) the demonstration targeted

Table V Observations (N =)

	N = Indigenous =	N = Public =	*N (state) =*
Australia	7	20	*27*
Canada	33	10	*43*
United States	16	17	*33*
N (status)=	*56*	*47*	***103***

processing activities (e.g. mills) rather than extraction (e.g. logging), collection, or construction. Each consideration was established to limit noise (ε) and potential compounding factors that were unaccounted for.

The first restriction was established to prevent the potential for reactionary violence by the policing agencies over threats to the personal safety of officers and third parties. If, for example, the demonstration was to assault employees of a development project, the reactionary violence of the coercive apparatus would not constitute an instance where the policing agents unilaterally decided to repress this movement with a show of force. The second, third, and fifth restrictions were placed to prevent the merging of any two of the competing interests at play in these interactions. This theory is primarily interested in the interaction of these spheres of interest as autonomous beings, and the introduction of conglomerations of these spheres may lead to inaccurate results. The fourth and sixth restrictions were placed on the observations being accepted to equalize results.

The interests of private corporations may change depending on the location of the demonstrations and the activities disrupted. If, for example, the demonstration prevents access to downtown offices, the building may simply close for the day and work can be conducted remotely; if, however, the demonstrations inhibit time-sensitive progress in the

Table VI Observations where Show of Force = 1

	N = Indigenous =	N = Public =	*N (state) =*
Australia	4	3	*7*
Canada	13	1	*14*
United States	10	2	*12*
N (status) =	*27*	*6*	***33***

project's development (e.g. construction or extraction), the perceived need to quell dissent may be higher. Over the course of nine months of data collection, these data sources and restrictions resulted in a total of *(N=)* 103 observations across the three states (Table V).

An act committed by the coercive apparatus was considered a "show of force" if it included: (1) violent apprehension or repression; (2) heavily armed or militarized response; (3) use of chemical agents and/or "pain compliance" measures; or (4) threats of or actual physical or bodily harm; (5) psychological warfare manipulation; or (6) prolonged campaigns of harassment and intimidation. Of the 103 observations collected under these conditions, thirty-three observations had evidence of a show of force against a campaign demonstration (Table VI).

Although the observations on public protests resulted in an even number across states (10-20/state), the Indigenous protest observations were more varied (7-33/state). The Indigenous communities across all three states are diverse and unique, as are their interests, methods of political participation, and goals. Many Traditional Custodian protests in Australia focused on social issues - e.g., Aboriginal protests over police violence or deaths in custody. Although not included in this discussion, preliminary observations of Aboriginal Black Lives Matter protests in Australia displayed several

instances of a show of force conducted to quell these protests. Second, many of Australia's public protests against private projects tended to target processing facilities or transportation of resources (such as ports or trains), rather than the site of the project. Third, in Australia, many companies that are contested are "crown-corporations" (state-owned corporations) or crown-corporation projects with private developers.

Many of Canada's First Nations communities tend to target transportation lines (e.g., trains), which are excluded from this discussion. While there was a great deal of observed instances of a show of force employed against these demonstrations, their inclusion may lead to data errors. The Canadian public, on the other hand, were observed to engage in the least number of disruptive protests of privately-owned development across all three cases. Oftentimes, these disruptions, under the conditional restrictions placed on an acceptable observation, tended to be short lived. Finally, a primary issue for data collection for the United States was preferred contestation methods. A great deal of observed conflict was primarily through either the court system or off-site demonstrations, rather than instances of direct action.

Nevertheless, the observed rates of repression (Table VII) are in line with the observations made by the NGO watchdog Civicus. As of October 7, 2023, Civicus has given these three states the following ratings:

Australia: 72/100 (narrowed)

Canada: 84/100 (open)

The United States of America: 70/100 (narrowed)

The reported rates of show of force operations are relatively on par with Civicus' evaluations on the political "openness" or "closedness" of the state's coercive apparatus

Table VII Show of Force Rates and Means

	Indigenous	Public	*Rate (State)*	*Mean (State)*
Australia	57.14%	15.00%	*25.93%*	*36.07%*
Canada	39.39%	10.00%	*32.56%*	*24.70%*
United States	62.50%	11.76%	*36.36%*	*37.13%*
Rate (Status)	*48.21%*	*12.77%*	***32.04%***	
Mean (Status)	*53.01%*	*12.25%*		***32.63%***

towards political dissent.[13] Civicus labels the "openness" of a state's political tolerance of dissident activities, with the most "closed" systems at a value of 1-20, and the most "open" with a value between 81-100. Likewise, this trend follows along the rating given by Freedom House's own metrics, which has given these states the following ratings in terms of "global freedom":

Australia: 95/100 (38/40 Political Rights; 57/60 Civil Liberties)

Canada: 98/100 (40/40 Political Rights; 58/60 Civil Liberties)

The United States: 83/100 (33/40 Political Rights; 50/60 Civil Liberties).

These numbers are consistent with the identified show of force rates by state reflected in the collected observations. Cross-group observed rates of a show of force employed against disruptions of private development projects were similar to the NGOs' analysis with the United States in the lead (12/33, 36.36% of obstructions against private projects resulting in a show of force), Australia (7/27, 25.93%), and Canada trailing in last (14/43, 32.56%). However, the rates listed under the column *rate (state)* are not weighted to consider population size of racial and ethnic groups and overall sample size.

[13] Closed = 1-20; Repressed = 21-40; Obstructed = 41-60; Narrowed = 61-80; and Open = 81-100.

Rather, it is simply the portion of observed show of force instances (*s*) divided by the whole sample of the state (*n*) (= *s/n = rate (status)*).

(6.1.2) Public Opposition Data

To measure potential public opposition towards a particular development project, public opinion surveys were collected and used as a proxy for potential public opposition. As this theory argues, robust public opposition is the primary way in which the public sphere applies pressure to the coercive apparatus, resulting in the perception of potential sanctions for undesirable actions (e.g., violent repression of obstructive protests). Projects with robust public opposition that are backed by the policing institutions in the form of violent behavior may be more likely to erupt into a scandal, mass mobilization, or calls for police reform. More will be discussed on this in the discussion under the process-tracing section.

The "closeness" (or relative approximation) of the surveys was considered. A numeric count is reported in Table VIII. The public perspective surveys were ranked in terms of their approximation to the project and given a categorical label. These labels were classified in order of most approximate to public opinion to least:

Figure IV Assumed Accuracy of Opposition Proxy



An assumption here is that the most approximate indicator of public opposition would be a poll that was conducted specifically on a particular project at the state level. Because the coercive apparatus may be more sensitive to localized public attitudes (e.g., the state-,

Table VIII Opposition Proxy (Numeric Count)

	State	National	
Project	19	0	
Subject	50	9	
Scope	19	5	
Ideology	1	0	
N =	*89*	*14*	***103***

provincial-, or territorial-level), regional public opinion surveys were given a higher ranking and priority. If regional public opinion polls were not found, then national level polls were used as a proxy for potential public opposition. Additionally, the surveys utilized were kept within ±1-2 years of the direct action being taken by activists. *Subject* refers to a particular subject being polled – e.g., a specific activity occurring within a given area (mining in the Boreal Forest). Many of the observations fell in this category, since surveys that focused on public perspectives of a specific project were rare, often only occurring with particularly contentious projects. *Scope* refers to something within the scope of the issue, such as the environment when the obstructive demonstration was intended to prevent shale gas extraction. Lastly, *ideology* refers to societal ideology that may indicate opposition towards a particular project. This final category was given the lowest priority as it may not be a strong indication of public position towards more dynamic issues.

The data collection stage was able to maintain relative accuracy with regards to how "close" an approximation the surveys reflect public opinion towards a given project. The distribution of surveys on the perception proxy estimation to the line chart (Figure V)

Figure V Distribution of Opposition Proxy



is heavily skewed to the left (*positive assumed approximation of public perception*), indicating a higher rate of preferred survey categories (i.e., those more accurate toward public attitudes with regards to a particular project).

(6.1.3) Data Restrictions

There are various restrictions to the availability of data worth noting. Some important considerations are access to information - e.g. financial constraints, country access restrictions, and organization inaccessibility (information and data only available to an individual based on their relation to a specific institution); location-related information filtration, in that the data observed was filtered through a United States vpn; resources; and time, as the data collection and analysis adhered to a strict timeline. This research project did not receive financial support from a third party. Relevant data was only accessible if (a) it was provided through Portland State University or (b) was available to the public.

Table IX Logit Model Summary Results

Coefficients	Coefficient (β)	Standard Error	z Value	Pr (> |z|)	
(Intercept)	0.07981	0.79598	0.100	0.92013	
Indigeneity	1.98407	0.67376	2.945	0.00323	**
Public Opposition	-4.51894	1.40118	-3.225	0.00126	**

Significance Codes p-value = 0, '***' 0.001, '**' 0.01, '*' 0.05, '.' 0.1, ' ' 1

**Dependent Variable = Show of Force*

***Independent Variables =*

Indigeneity: 1 = Indigenous Demonstration; 0 = Non-Indigenous Demonstration

Public Opposition: 0.00 [0%] – 1.00 [100%]

(6.2) Model Results

This model was applied through R programming and Stata. The data employed used 2 dummy variables to represent a show of force (0 = did not occur; 1 = did occur) and indigeneity of the opposition (0 = not Indigenous; 1 = Indigenous). The public opposition data was a continuous variable, coded as a value between 0.00-1.00 (= 0.00-100.00%), which was based off public survey and polling data within the region, and reflected the regional disposition towards a project on a spectrum as either weak (0.00) or robust (1.00) opposition. The most common measurements of repression - GDP per capita, population size, civil and international war, and democratic political institutions - were not applied to the model or data. This is due to arguments by Hill and Jones (2014) that propose the addition of these variables to models create a "significant danger of overfitting." The results of the logistic regression model (Table IX) suggest that both the "Indigenous" variable and the "opposition" variable are key factors in the state's policing agencies' decision whether to employ a show of force.

Table X Confusion Matrix Results

	Predicted	
Actual	**0**	**1**
0	*21*	1
1	2	*7*

Both the "Indigenous variable" (*indigeneity*) and the "potential opposition variable" (*public opposition*) are statistically significant based on the results of this model, with p-values below 0.05 of 0.0323 (indigeneity) and 0.00126 (opposition). In this model, goodness-of-fit, as evaluated initially by the value of R^2, is within acceptable range in social science research models (between 0.5-0.99) (Ozili 2022). Here, the R^2 = 0.5020229, A widespread practice of models in the repression literature is to rely on null hypothesis testing alone to assume variable value and model validity (Hill & Jones 2014). To address this deficiency in the current trend, several steps were taken to ensure the robustness of the model and goodness-of-fit.

Using the recommendations of Hill and Jones (2014), the model was split into testing and training datasets for cross-validating. Only 70% of the original data was used for training while the remaining 30% of the data was withheld for testing. The training data was trained using *k*-fold cross-validation as the train control (k = 10). The summary of the model above is the result of the cross-validated model based on the separated training data.

Then, the withheld data was applied to the trained model and, if the model was working correctly, the model was predicted to be able to make accurate predictions based on the unseen data. When the new data was applied, the model holds against cross-



Figure VI Logit Model ROC Curve

validation through exposure to unseen data. The confusion matrix[14] shows that the model was able to accurately identify 21/22 data points where *Show[-of-force] = 0*, and 7/9 data points where *Show = 1* when the model made predictions based on the testing data (Table XI). This reflects that the model can meaningfully predict outcomes based on the model, which is a noted flaw in the current repression models (Hill & Jones 2014).

Next, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was assessed based on the model's predictive performance. The ROC curve gains insight into the classification model's performance at all classification thresholds and reflects the accuracy of the model's predictive performance. If the model was performing well at generating predictions, the ROC curve should remain in the top left corner, away from the 45-degree angle, which indicates a low false positive rate (x-axis) and a high true positive rate (y-axis). The results of the ROC curve indicate that the model was highly effective at

[14] True positives (actual = 1, predicted = 1) and true negatives (actual = 0, predicted = 0) are in *italics*.

generating predictions based on the training data since it reported 0.8559 (85.99%) of the observations being correctly classified (Figure VI).

Table XI Training versus Testing Accuracy

Training Accuracy	0.7916667	(79.16667%)
Test Accuracy	0.9032258	(90.32258%)
Difference	*0.1115591*	*(11.15591%)*

Finally, as an additional measure, to ensure that the model was not overfitting, the test accuracy was measured against the training accuracy - reported in Table XI. Interestingly, the test accuracy was greater than the training accuracy by a margin of 0.1115591 (11.15591%), indicating that the model was not overfitting and was able to make accurate predictions on unseen data with relative ease.

(6.3) Discussion and Analysis

The results of the logistic regression model are in line with this thesis' hypotheses. First, the results indicate that public opposition towards a particular project affects whether the coercive agencies choose to engage in a show of force to quell dissent. According to the logistic regression model's estimates, there is a negative relationship between the opposition variable and the output; for each increase in opposition level by 1 unit (100%), there is a decreased probability of a show of force

Table XII Odds Ratio Report

	Odds Ratio	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	intervals]
Indigeneity	7.272285	4.899758	2.94	0.003	1.941633	27.23796
Public Opposition	0.0109006	0.0152737	-3.23	0.001	0.0006995	0.1698776
Constant	1.083085	0.8621164	0.1	0.92	0.2275732	5.154706

Figure VII Boxplot: Show of Force ~ Public Opposition



occurring by a rate of 4.51894. As reported by the odds ratio, Table XII, this model estimates that a single unit increase in the reduces the odds of a show of force occurring by 0.0109. Given that the original data was coded as a value between 0.00 (0%) to 1.00 (100%) to reflect the data provided by the polls and surveys, a 1 unit increase would suggest a +100% increase in public opposition to the project, which is an unrealistic extreme and does not provide a great deal of empirical insight; however, it does highlight the negative relationship between a show of force and public opposition. Examining the raw data, when opposition is below a threshold of around 30% opposition towards the project, a show of force is more likely to occur, and the instances in which it may occur drop significantly above this threshold. As shown by the boxplot (Figure VII), a show of force is rare - save for a few outliers - below this threshold, but a common occurrence below the 30% public opposition threshold. As displayed by the boxplot below, instances

Table XIII Average Marginal Effects of Public Opposition

	Delta-method dy/dx	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. intervals]	
Public Opposition						
0.1	-0.8461247	0.2230891	-3.79	0.000	-1.283371	-0.4088782
0.2	-0.8856204	0.2833592	-3.13	0.002	-1.440994	-0.3302465
0.3	-0.8914111	0.3040225	-2.93	0.003	-1.487284	-0.2955379
0.4	-0.859944	0.2866812	-3.00	0.003	-1.421829	-0.2980592
0.5	-0.7853505	0.2350252	-3.34	0.001	-1.245991	-0.3247096
0.6	-0.671523	0.1641631	-4.09	0.000	-0.9932769	-0.3497692
0.7	-0.5363806	0.1072745	-5.00	0.000	-0.7466347	-0.3261264
0.8	-0.4029126	0.0920796	-4.38	0.000	-0.5833854	-0.2224398
0.9	-0.2879651	0.0962968	-2.99	0.003	-0.4767034	-0.0992268

in which a show of force occurred (*Show = 1*) was consistent across both groups, occurring primarily when public opposition fell below roughly 30%.

Conversely, indigeneity had a positive relationship with a show of force. According to the odds ratio, reported in Table XIII, the model estimates that the odds of a show of force occurring with the presence of indigeneity dummy variable (0 = non-Indigenous disruptive demonstration, 1 = Indigenous or Indigenous-led) as 7.272285, suggesting that indigeneity has a significant effect on the likelihood of a disruptive demonstration experiencing a show of force as a repression strategy. The impact of the covariant "public opposition" in these findings are confirmed by the results of the predictive effects and the average marginal effects (AMEs). The AMEs highlight how the presence of the variable is correlated to a lower probability of the event taking place. The results reported in the AME table of public opposition suggest that a one-unit increase in the covariant would result in the probability of the event taking place (a show of force) from occurring at all levels. By these estimates, if public opposition is at 0.1 (10%), then a 1-unit increase in that level (+100%) is expected to decrease the probability of a show

Table XIV Predictive Margins of Public Opposition

		Delta-Method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	intervals]
Public Opposition							
	0.1	0.6326866	0.1080113	5.86	0.000	0.4209883	0.8443848
	0.2	0.5458141	0.0895124	6.10	0.000	0.370373	0.7212552
	0.3	0.4566778	0.0711706	6.42	0.000	0.3171859	0.5961697
	0.4	0.3687697	0.059664	6.18	0.000	0.2518304	0.485709
	0.5	0.2861388	0.0576392	4.96	0.000	0.173168	0.3991096
	0.6	0.2130251	0.0598039	3.56	0.000	0.0958116	0.3302386
	0.7	0.1525505	0.0596443	2.56	0.011	0.0356499	0.2694511
	0.8	0.1056852	0.0550512	1.92	0.055	-0.0022132	0.2135835
	0.9	0.0713385	0.0471855	1.51	0.131	-0.0211434	0.1638204



Figure VIII Predictive Margins of Public Opposition

of force by 0.8461. This effect is particularly greatest at the lower levels and decreases as those levels rise. The expected decrease in the AMEs remains below -0.8 until public opposition = 0.5 (50%).

Table XV Average Marginal Effects of Indigeneity

		Delta-Method dy/dx	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. intervals]	
Indigeneity							
	0	0.2258917	0.0428813	5.27	0.000	0.1418459	0.3099376
	1	0.3901805	0.1415578	2.76	0.006	0.1127323	0.6676288



Figure IX AMEs of Indigeneity

The predictive effects show that extremely low levels of public opposition are associated with a higher probability of a show of force occurring. The predictive margins remains below 45% until the public opposition variable retains a coefficient of 0.4 (or 40% public opposition to the project) (Table XIV). At the lowest level of estimated public opposition (= 0.1 or 10%), the predictive margins of the probability of a show of force occurring is estimated to be quite high at 0.6326. However, once public opposition

has reached 0.3 (30%), the model predicted the probability of a show of force taking place at less than 50% (45.66%), with those margins decreasing to 0.0713 (7.13% probability) at 0.9 (90%) public opposition.

The average marginal effects of indigeneity reflect a similar finding. The average marginal effect of indigeneity at a value of 1 (the demonstration is identified as an Indigenous or is Indigenous-led) was 0.1643 (16.43%) higher than a value of 0 (the demonstration was identified as non-Indigenous) (Table XV). The average marginal effect of indigeneity = 1 reported at 0.3902 (39.02%) on the probability of a show of force. The significant effect of indigeneity is portrayed more clearly by the predicted margins. Examining the predictive margins of indigeneity at levels 0 and 1 (Table XVI), the predicted probability of a show of force was 0.4804 (48.04%) for a value of indigeneity = 1 (demonstration identified as Indigenous or Indigenous-led), which is 0.3257 (32.557%) higher than the predicted probability of a show of force at a value of indigeneity = 0 (non-Indigenous demonstration) of 0.1547 (15.47%). To explore the relationship of the variables and their relative impact in conjunction, it is important to evaluate model estimations with both variables present.

Table XVI Predictive Margins of Indigeneity

		Delta-Method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	intervals]
Indigeneity							
	0	0.1547007	0.0649019	2.38	0.017	0.0274952	0.2819062
	1	0.4803955	0.0748566	6.42	0.000	0.3336793	0.6271116



Figure X Predictive Margins of Indigeneity

These variables do not act in isolation by the arguments of this theory; rather, this theory proports that indigeneity increases the probability of a show of force while the relative level of public opposition against a project may counterbalance that probability. To examine the impact that these variables have when both are present, the adjusted predicted probabilities are reported. The results suggest that, on average, Indigenous disruptive demonstrations are consistently more likely to experience a show of force than

Table XVII Adjusted Predictive Margins of Opposition and Indigeneity

		Delta-Method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. intervals]	
Indigeneity	*Public Opposition*						
0	0.1	0.4080384	0.1697864	2.40	0.016	0.0752633	0.7408136
_	0.2	0.3049207	0.1330161	2.29	0.022	0.044214	0.5656275
_	0.3	0.2182545	0.0984472	2.22	0.027	0.0253015	0.4112075
_	0.4	0.1508742	0.0714717	2.11	0.035	0.0107921	0.2909562
_	0.5	0.1015924	0.0523374	1.94	0.052	-0.000987	0.2041719
_	0.6	0.0671354	0.0388932	1.73	0.084	-0.0090938	0.1433646
_	0.7	0.0437954	0.029067	1.51	0.132	-0.0131748	0.1007657
_	0.8	0.0283234	0.0216203	1.31	0.190	-0.0140516	0.0706983
_	0.9	0.0182132	0.0159114	1.14	0.252	-0.0129725	0.0493989
1	0.1	0.8336875	0.0829409	10.05	0.000	0.6711263	0.9962487
_	0.2	0.7613503	0.0903158	8.43	0.000	0.5843345	0.938366
_	0.3	0.6700039	0.0926483	7.23	0.000	0.4884166	0.8515912
_	0.4	0.5637288	0.0931224	6.05	0.000	0.3812122	0.7462454
_	0.5	0.4512592	0.0960363	4.70	0.000	0.2630315	0.6394869
_	0.6	0.3435581	0.1000284	3.43	0.001	0.147506	0.5396101
_	0.7	0.2498577	0.0995842	2.51	0.012	0.0546762	0.4450391
_	0.8	0.1749036	0.0920821	1.90	0.058	-0.0055741	0.3553812
_	0.9	0.1188717	0.0791644	1.50	0.133	-0.0362877	0.274031

non-Indigenous disruptive demonstrations. Although, the likelihood of the event taking place is heavily dependent on the level of public opposition. To explore this relationship, it is important to examine the adjusted marginal predictions with the inclusion of both explanatory variables.

The results of the adjusted predictive margins reflect this argument (Table XVII). The adjusted predicted margins are the estimated probability of a show of force occurring based on values of the covariates. The predicted margins suggest that there is a 0.408 (40.8%) chance of a show of force occurring at the lowest estimated value of public opposition (0.1 or 10%). In contrast, the same value for opposition in relation to a demonstration categorized as Indigenous has a marginal probability of 0.8337 (83.37%)



Figure XI Adjusted Predictive Margins of Indigeneity and Public Opposition

of a show of force occurring – a difference of 0.4257 (42.57%) or a 2.04 times higher probability. At the highest estimated level of public opposition (0.9 or 90%), there is a slim estimated probability of a show of force occurring at 0.018 (1.8%) against a non-Indigenous disruptive demonstration. On the other hand, the probability of a show of force occurring against an Indigenous demonstration at highest estimated level of public opposition was 0.1009 (10.09%) higher than a public opposition at 0.1189 (11.89%). All else being held equal, these results suggest that Indigenous classification is a strong determinant of violent state repression, and the level of perceived public opposition acts as a buffer that can counterbalance the probability of a show of force strategy.

The result of the logistic regression alludes to two important but related concepts: (1) targeted repression in democracies and, in a similar vein, (2) differentiation of

Indigenous protest treatment. The results of the regression suggest that coercive institutions situated within democracies engage in targeting distinct groups with diverse levels of repressive treatment for different purposes. As previously mentioned, the repression literature has been largely silent on the question of targeted repression in democratic contexts. However, the implication of these results for the regression models indicate that group X's methods of dissent are routinely subjected to selective treatment by coercive agents in comparison to group Y and are being targeted for their membership and association within that group. An important takeaway from this finding is that it indicates democratic countries are making strategic choices of *who* to repress and *how* to conduct that repression depending on the associated behavior exhibited - i.e., demographic targeting (Rozenas 2020).

This goes along with some of the findings of previous research that has found that Indigenous dissent going against the will of private industry, democratic states "sid[e] with the private companies against the expressed interests of Indigenous communities," while the "promise of democratic co-participation deteriorate[s] into a cruel fraud" (Rodriguez & Carruthers 2008). Indigenous protests that attempt to prevent the continuation of private development projects are statistically more likely than non-Indigenous contenders to experience a show of force by the coercive institutions against their protests, assumably so that the threshold for the costs of future protests is raised and a deterrent effect is disseminated among both Indigenous activists directly involved in the protests *as well as* observers - i.e. other Indigenous communities and community members to those associated with the contestation or who might consider an alliance or future participation.

(7) Case Studies

The case studies presented highlight the process in which instances of obstructive demonstrations result in a show of force. Social movements and dissent activities that contest private projects typically involve many forms of activism, such as legal challenges in court, rallying in public spaces, marching, et cetera. However, the objectives of this thesis - and the case studies therein - are only interested in instances of direct action with instances of obstructive demonstrations that halt or impede private development projects, such as blockades. With that in mind, the majority of alternative methods of direct action or political contestation are omitted from the discussion; instead, focusing primarily on instances in which Indigenous communities attempted to directly halt development and the policing agencies' response to these obstructions.

(7.1) Canada: The Coastal GasLink Pipeline

Lippert and Walby (2022) argue that the coercive apparatus of a state is a "greedy institution," in that it seeks capital for the "broader process of aligning interests as a means of institutional reproduction" (4). To be sure, while financial/economic capital provides policing agencies with several means by which they may be able to access avenues towards that goal, this is only one form of capital to be gained from corporate-police relationships by which they can achieve that goal. As previously mentioned, the police, as an institution, also seeks social, political, cultural, and symbolic capital. As displayed in the following case study, financial gains were not the primary target in the relationship between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Coastal GasLink shareholders and private economic elites.

To begin, it is useful to understand the current security context of the Canadian state. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011, the increased Western commitments to the War on Terror, and increased Indigenous movements within the state (e.g., Idle No More), the Canadian government created new mechanisms by which they share information and manage internal threats. A result of these changes has been the institutionalization of Indigenous repression and surveillance. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Canada has created several new agencies that have been tasked with the surveillance of Indigenous protest activities against "critical infrastructure" and private development projects, placing such activists in the category of "terrorist" or "extremist" groups and individuals, while sharing that information with private elites and entities (Proulx, 2014). Canada has placed First Nations communities as activists separate from the general public and has committed to differentiated policing of Indigenous peoples that is supported by its institutionalization. In the following discussion, it becomes clear that the threat assessment of, and state response to, Indigenous communities exercising their freedom of assembly is perceived by the policing institutions as extremist or terrorist activities against private interests and "critical infrastructure."

In 2007, an Interest and Use Study was conducted on the proposed Pacific Trail Pipeline. At the onset, the Wet'suwet'en expressed opposition to the idea of a pipeline project that would run through their lands. To ensure that no such project would take place, a preemptive checkpoint was established along the proposal's route on the Wedzin Kwa entrance to the Unist'ot'en camp territory. Even with strong opposition from First Nations communities, construction for a cabin intended for the use of contractors along a potential pipeline's route began in 2010. In June of 2012, the Coastal GasLink pipeline

project was announced. This massive 670-kilometer pipeline was due to run straight through the heart of the Wet'suwet'en First Nation's territory between Dawson Creek and Kitimat.

Figure XII Map of Coastal GasLink Pipeline Route[15]

The project was being led by LNG Canada, who, in 2012, recruited TC Energy to design, build, and obtain ownership of the pipeline upon completion. By October 2021, several financially powerful entities had become stakeholders in the project, including the Royal Bank of Canada and twenty-six other banks, major investors such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and AIMCo, oil companies including Royal Dutch Shell, PetroChina Company Ltd., and the Korean Gas Corporation, and even Mitsubishi. In May of 2018, the Coastal GasLink project received approval from the Environmental Assessment Office. Seeing that a project would take place, the Wet'suwet'en began establishing checkpoints along a remote forest service road and bridge in late 2018. In

[15] Ligeti, Arik, *There's a Map for That Conflict,* 2022, The Narwhal, https://thenarwhal.ca/newsletter-wetsuweten-coastal-gaslink-map/.

response to the growing number of obstructive checkpoints, Coastal GasLink Ltd. applied for an injunction against the Unist'ot'en camp.

Construction officially began in the first month of 2019. To mark the occasion, the RCMP forcefully breached a Wet'suwet'en territory checkpoint and then established a roadblock that isolated the Unist'ot'en camp – the first noted show of force. Uncovered documents - obtained through the Access to Information Act (ATIA) - detail that the RCMP strategy notes had instructions to "use as much violence toward the gate as you want," while going on to state that arrests would be necessary to "sterilize the site" (Kestler-D'Amours 2020). The breaching unit came fully equipped in a militarized style, with tactical gear and armed with military-grade rifles (Armao 2021) and snipers in place (McIntosh 2020; Bellrichard 2020). The RCMP's response, however, was not simply reactionary. Documents obtained by APTN News from the Department of Public Safety's Government Operations Center revealed 2015 threat assessments of the movement, labeling an Indigenous leader (Hereditary Chief Smogelgem) as an "Aboriginal extremist" and the Unist'ot'en House of the Cilseyhu Clan a risk to national interests (Brake 2018).

In December of that year, Coastal GasLink was afforded an injunction by the British Columbia Supreme Court. Only a day later on January 1, 2020, Wet'suwet'en leaders served Coastal GasLink officials with an eviction notice, stating that they were trespassing on unceded lands. Only 12 days later (January 13, 2020), the RCMP began to ramp up their presence in the vicinity and within surrounding towns. One such measurement included reports of daily helicopter flights in the areas surrounding the First Nations' protest camps. Tensions were slowly reaching a boiling point that was sure to

erupt. On January 27, the British Columbia government appointed former Democrat Member of Parliament Nathan Cullen as the provincial liaison within the dispute.

They managed to broker a meeting with First Nations leaders who, on the 30th, agreed to seven days of talks with the provincial government; nevertheless, these discussions failed after sometime between 2 to 5 days - as reports on the exact timing of its downturn vary by outlet. When the talks failed, the RCMP moved in again into the territory to enforce the injunction on February 6, 2020. In an attempt to ambush the demonstrators and allies, they conducted a pre-dawn raid on the site. The policing units entered equipped with night vision goggles, heavily armed, and employing K9 units. It was reported that journalists present were being threatened with detainment for non-compliance should they take photographs and maintain evidence of the event (McIntosh 2020).

This sparked outrage among First Nations around the state. In response to this show of force, First Nations communities began obstructive solidarity protests throughout the month across the country. This “backlash” effect is consistent with the findings of Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson (2014), who argue that movements that maintain high organizational capacity are more resilient in the face of repression and can facilitate greater mobilization as an output of repressive events; as well as the arguments of Rasler (1996) who states that repression is only effective in the immediate term but can increase mobilization in the longer term. By March 2020, the Wet’suwet’en had gathered statements of solidarity from 255 First Nations, NGOs, labor unions, and academic institutions (Unist’ot’en 2020). Although, much of the solidarity in the form of direct action was from First Nations solidarity blockades. However much support this garnered

from other First Nations communities, it had the inverse effect on public opinion. A survey conducted by Leger found that 57% of British Columbia residents either "strongly" or "somewhat supported" the construction project, with 73% of respondents reporting that they are losing patience towards the roadblocks interrupting rail lines, 72% against the obstructions to roads, and 60% disagreeing with blocking construction sites (Penner 2020).

Additional surveys conducted around that same time by Research Co. found that 61% of British Columbia citizens "agreed" with the decision to build the Coastal GasLink pipeline (Gall 2020). The reasons for this increase in public opposition towards the movement are aligned with previous research that suggests that highly disruptive demonstrations tend to lose public support for the movement's goals (Feinberg et al. 2020). Additional polls conducted by Innovative - released only 9 days after the February show of force - highlighted public perception of the incident all too well, with 39% of respondents stating that they believe the RCMP managed the conflict either "very" or "somewhat appropriately," and 26% remained neutral on the matter (Innovative Research Group 2022). These sentiments gave the RCMP the metaphorical green light to proceed as they deemed necessary.

With an ear to the public, RCMP officials attempted to teeter a fine line between appearing both altruistic and authoritative. In response to public questions, a news conference was held at the E Division Headquarters in Surrey. Senior RCMP officials stated that they will "clear obstructions" preventing the project's development (Smith 2020). They assured the public they were taking steps to develop a team to enforce the injunction and clear the area. On the other hand, Deputy Commissioner Jennifer Strachan

claimed the RCMP officers have been "exercising limited discretion" and are trying to engage in dialogue with the First Nations communities (Smith 2020). Here it is apparent that the RCMP's top officials are ensuring that they are sensitive to the notion that the public wants this project to move forward, reducing public pressure to engage, while rationalizing all planned show of force operations (past and future) as both necessary, minimalist, and diplomatic.

These ongoing disruptions to the economic networks within the state prompted the country's top Executive, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, to convene the Community-Incident Response Group (C-IRG) on February 17, 2020. A specialized task force created in response to growing Indigenous dissent that was designed to gather for instances of national crisis. Promptly after this meeting, a press conference was held, and Trudeau took a *Bourassan* stance; going on public record as stating that the barricades must be removed immediately, and the injunction enforced while blaming Indigenous leaders for the ongoing conflict and stating that the situation was "unacceptable and untenable" (The Canadian Press 2020). Trudeau went on to claim that the "federal government [has] exhausted [their] capacity to engage in a positive, substantive active way" (Aiello 2020). Glen Coulthard, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, predicted that the comments made by the Prime Minister in their speech would "escalate the conflict" (Lindeman 2020). This demonstration for Indigenous sovereignty of unceded land has certainly "increas[ed] [the] political pressure [on Trudeau] to" find a resolution (2020).

A substantial move was made by the dissent on September 25, 2021, when Gidimt'en checkpoint organizers moved in to occupy a Coastal GasLink drill site on the

banks of the Wedzin Kwa Rivera. This occupation, according to reports, lasted for 59 days. On October 18, 2021, Liht'samisyu chiefs Dsta'hyl and Tse'besa moved to deactivate an excavator after drilling had begun without their consent. These recent developments prompted TC Energy's Kent Wilfur, Vice President of Coastal GasLink, to email RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki and Superintendent John Brewer, Commander of the C-IRG, on November 2, 2021. In their email, reported in an exposé by The Narwhal, they stated that the RCMP is "not enforcing the injunction" running "contrary to upholding the rule of law," then threatened to apply to the courts to "have direction provided to the RCMP to enforce" the injunction (Simmons 2022).

Although the courts do not retain the power to ensure the relevant authorities enforce the injunctions, these emails do highlight the power dynamic and relationship between the company and the RCMP, and the notion that private elites retain the capacity place pressure on the coercive agents to act. Jeffery Monaghan, an Associate Professor at the Carleton Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, stated that the "[p]olice do not have to enforce these injunctions [...]. The police are *choosing* to enforce these injunctions. They go in, SWAT team, Oka-style [referring to the Oka Crisis - a particularly violent contentious event between the Kanehsatà:ke and the police in 1990]. Police are making those decisions [sic] and those decisions are very closely aligned with the interests of the companies" (Simmons 2022).

The ongoing linkages between the RCMP and the energy giants involved in the project are numerous. Although the private elites and the RCMP have managed to keep many of their dealings concealed - more optimally than the following case of Enbridge and Minnesota police - some of these connections have become known. First, the Public

Sector Pension Investment Board, a Montreal-based crown corporation that manages the pension fund investments for the RCMP and other Canadian forces, reportedly has invested a sizable portion of shares into TC Energy, with an ownership of (CAD) $106,899,441. James Rowe, Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at the University of Victoria, stated that "[t]here is a definite conflict of interest… This pipeline is literally in the material interest of the retirement security of the RCMP" (Seucharan 2020). While some individual officers may not be aware of this relationship, it would be negligible to insist that top RCMP officials, such as Commissioner Brenda Lucki or C-IRG Commander John Brewer, are in the dark about this source of capital.

Secondly, both TC Energy and LNG Canada, two major shareholders of the project, are mentionable police foundation donors. LNG Canada is noted as having donated between $15,000 - $24,999 to the Vancouver Police Department - the most relevant to local RCMP offices in this conflict - while TC Energy is listed as an "annual donor" for the Calgary Police Foundation (Penner 2020). While this does not indicate that donations have gone directly into the RCMP's pockets, with the foundations serving as brokers, it does highlight the companies' willingness to invest in "security" capital. The RCMP maintains a personal stake as a "greedy institution" in their replication and outward growth (Lippert & Walby 2022). Third, Coastal GasLink's security company, Forsythe Security, is Warren Forsythe, a former RCMP officer. In a written interview with The Narwhal, Sleydo' Molly Wickham, a First Nations activist and perceived movement leader by the RCMP and private elites, went on the record stating that they observed Forsythe security personnel directing the RCMP on how to reach Wickham's

home, additionally claiming that they have “regular meetings right outside of Gidimt’en checkpoint, where they’re sharing information” (Simmons 2022).

A growing area of research has identified linkages between the policing institutions of the Canadian state and corporate interests, identifying Indigenous groups and individuals as extremists, terrorists, or threats to critical infrastructure and institutionalized means of monitoring First Nations communities (Proulx 2014; Crosby & Monaghan 2016), developing risk assessment profiles of Indigenous activists, and methods of “managing” and delegitimizing their movements (Howe & Monaghan 2018), and creating information and capital sharing networks with private interests that Indigenous communities contest (Proulx, 2014). Particularly corporations within extractive industries have been identified as aggressively intertwined within the security apparatus (Crosby & Monaghan 2018).

Less than two weeks later, on November 14, 2021, land defenders had erected a blockade on the road entering their territory. The pressure applied by TC Energy officials from the November 2nd email seemed to have an effect, because Senior RCMP officials met with the Wet’suwet’en Chiefs, requesting to convene a summit and discuss a resolution. Two days later, Commissioner Eric Stubbs emailed the Office of the Wet’suwet’en, attempting to coerce them into removing the blockade so that the summit could take place. Unknown to the Wet’suwet’en, obtained emails indicated that John Brewer had received communications the day prior from Ward Laymburner, a Senior Official with the British Columbia Public Safety Ministry, which authorized a raid operation in the works before the summit request was made (Simmons 2022).

Only a few days following the attempt to coerce the demonstration into removing the blockade, a violent raid took place in Gidimt'en territory, resulting in thirty arrests. Video footage of the raid displays the C-IRG breaking down doors of the makeshift homes of the land defenders on Wet'suwet'en territory, rifles drawn and trained on unarmed protesters (Democracy Now 2021). As an article by The Narwhal described it: "[t]he scene played out like a movie - snipers aiming at a cabin and those inside, police dogs barking and RCMP using an axe [sic] and a chainsaw to cut down the door of a tiny house" (Simmons 2022). In an interview with The Narwhal, Kolin Sutherland-Wilson, Gitxsan member of Wilp Git'luuhl'em'hetxwit, stated "[t]hey had statical units, sniper teams and riot suppression gear and we had children with marshmallows. [...] That overwhelming use of force is nothing less than terrorism. They were trying to instill fear in us" (Simmons 2021).

A statement released by John Brewer, C-IRG Chief Superintendent, referred to the raid as a "rescue and enforcement" operation, citing cases of undocumented vandalization, makeshift traps, and forest destruction by demonstrators, and "rescuing" workers that were supposed trapped behind the checkpoint and unable to leave or access food and water (Morgan 2021). These framing narratives are in line with prior research indicating that the RCMP often attempts to delegitimize First Nations' protests (Howe & Monaghan 2018). Past research has indicated that a movement's ability to successfully garner public support is affected by the public perception of its legitimacy (Opp & Roehl 1990). This framing tactic appeared successful, or the public simply remained relatively ambivalent towards the movement, because there were no noted instances of public

outcry, meso- or macro-level public mobilization in support of the movement, calls for inquiry into the operation, or demands for institutional or structural reform of the RCMP.

There were no observed instances of a raid conducted by the C-IRG in 2022; however, there were instances of intimidation as the Wet'suwet'en camps reported sighting heavily armed and militarized RCMP units were spotted patrolling the camps, equipped with rifles in military-grade uniforms (Rowell 2022) with land defenders fearful of another violent raid. For these operations, the C-IRG was awarded a CAD $36 million portion of government rural policing fund by the B.C.'s Ministry of Public Safety early March of 2023 (Hosgood 2023). On March 29, 2023, the conflict continued as the RCMP conducted a final raid at a Wet'suwet'en protest camp. On the pretense of a warrant to search for (supposedly) missing tools, the RCMP's C-IRG swarmed the camp and arrested seven land defenders. An Amnesty International Canada agent was noted as referring to this as the most recent in a long-lasting "campaign of violence and intimidation and dispossession" against First Nations land defenders (Amnesty International 2023). Following the current trends from the available data, it is possible these events would have continued in perpetuity; however, as of October 2023, Coastal GasLink had announced that their construction project was completed.

In creating and embedding a system of capital benefit network sharing between the C-IRG and Coastal GasLink's stakeholders, the two organizations were able to facilitate a lucrative partnership - in both terms of monetary gains as well as intangible benefits. While exact financial flows *to* the C-IRG from the project's financiers is not entirely known - aside from pension fund observations and potential gains from relevant police foundations - the capitalization of security benefited Coastal GasLink in

completing their project and making significant future returns on their investments. Additionally, an observable capital gain for the Coastal GasLink's venture members was greater access to the state via social network ties through their RCMP partnership. For the C-IRG, and the larger RCMP organization, the primary observable gains were three forms of capital: symbolic, political, and social.

In terms of symbolic capital, which refers to their legitimacy relative to other actors and their ability to speak with authority, the RCMP's gains were mixed depending on the measurements used, but in their favor, nonetheless. For both their state and private clientele, the sustained repressive operations committed against "threats to critical infrastructure" and "national security interests" (Proulx 2014), they have signaled their loyalty and commitments to both parties, as well as their ability to effectively conduct repressive measures on behalf of their partners. However, it is unclear how this impacted their standing with the wider public; the evidence available leaves doubt that it shifted significantly in favor of the movement. The movement itself was able to adequately utilize its organizational capacity to maintain the campaign's momentum, although media documentation of the repressive policies of the coercive agencies were unable to co-opt the asymmetric violence to increase public mobilization (Sutton et al 2014).

According to a public perspective survey conducted by EKOS Research Associates, while the RCMP has fallen behind in public favor by a small margin in terms of beliefs towards their "efforts of fostering safer Indigenous communities" (36% satisfaction) and "advancing reconciliation" (35% satisfaction), they've retained a majority support of the public with regards to their "importance on the [...] contribution to public safety" (86%) and abilities in "respond[ing] to national security threats" (59%

satisfaction) (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2023) - a major framing tactic of policing agencies of repressing Indigenous movements against development projects (Proulx 2014). In a 2023 survey, researchers found that only 80% of respondents "strongly disagreed" with personal responsibilities in land acknowledgements (Humphreys 2023), suggesting that there is a low level of public loyalty towards First Nations communities. As of the most recent survey, Canadians maintain a preference for domestic oil sources (81%), the importance of the domestic oil industry (72%), importance of eliminating foreign oil dependence (80%), and operating as a key player in international oil trade (77%) (Canada Action Coalition 2023). By the results of these surveys, it seems that the RCMP and energy infrastructure has retained higher favor in public opinion over Indigenous interests. This translates into a stable, or potentially increasing, perspective of RCMP legitimacy.

In terms of political capital, the RCMP's top officials have shown greater capabilities in acting autonomously as a state institution relative to other governmental agencies. During their operations, their decisions to employ violently repressive tactics was never questioned by the Trudeau Government or the regional Government; nor did they attempt to withdraw government support for the RCMP or the RCMP services entirely. In policing these protests, the C-IRG - as well as the larger RCMP - widened their political powers and their abilities to function as an undeterred actor. As for social capital, the RCMP was able to facilitate private and public social networks, widening their access to various entities, institutions, and individuals. Sources of future support and networks were expanded both in the private sphere (gaining connections with more than 3 dozen known private entities) and government institutions. By creating these capital

linkages with the Coastal GasLink, the RCMP was able to broaden itself as an institution outwards and was able to externally and internally align interests "as a means of institutional reproduction" (Lippert & Walby 2022). In the absence of strong public pressures to disincentivize violent operations, security being their primary product for their corporate partners, and leverage against private pressures, the result was the persistence of show of force operations.

(7.2) The United States: The Line 3 Replacement Project

Similar to the Canadian case, the post-9/11 security context places unique values on critical infrastructure security, relating forms of economic supply chains – e.g., oil and natural gas pipelines - as an essential component of national security (Department of Homeland Security 2003). This perspective enabled and justified the increasing criminalization and securitization of critical infrastructure against public demonstrations that would threaten their production. In line with the Canadian Government's perspective, this issue framing that ties national security with critical infrastructure allows the scope of its interpretation to consider disruptions as acts of terrorism (Bosworth & Chua 2023). In the wake of September 11, 2001, there has been a growing justification for and repression of Indigenous movements for the state's interests.

Back in 2015, Enbridge - a multibillion dollar, multinational Canadian pipeline and energy corporation based in Calgary, Alberta - announced interests in increasing the capacity of its pipeline network. Line 3 of the Mainline System pipeline network was of particular interest. According to reports by Enbridge, the replacement project had an estimated cost of $9.3 billion and would be 337-miles long, replacing the current stretch of pipeline spanning 282-miles. A massive portion of the pipeline stretches from

Edmonton, Alberta to Superior, Wisconsin. However, the proposed pipeline infrastructural reroute and replacement would run between and through three different reservations (the Leech Lake Indian Reservation, the White Earth Indian Reservation, and the Red Lake Indian Reservation) as well as traditional and treaty-protected lands allotted to the Ojibwe through the Treaty of 1855 for hunting, fishing, and gathering wild rice.

Figure XIII Map of Line 3 Replacement Project[16]

Major concerns were raised by the various tribes over the potential for an oil spill, as well as other environmental and health related impacts on the local and surrounding populations. Other major Indigenous resistance groups and water protectors argued that,

[16] McKenna, Phil, *Enbridge's Line 3 Replacement Plans,* Inside Climate News, April 25, 2018, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/25042018/minnesota-oil-pipeline-enbridge-line-3-route-map-tar-sands-native-american-tribal-sovereignty-leech-lake-fond-du-lac/.

along with the detriments it posed to health and wildlife, the project was a "perpetuation of cultural genocide," as stated by activist Tara Houska (Regan 2021). The brunt of the opposition front were led by Ojibwe groups - including the Giniw Collective, Camp Migizi, RISE Coalition, Honor the Earth, and Red Treaty Camp - as well as various Anishinaabe-led groups. In June of 2018, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) - a body of five Commissioners that are appointed directly by the Minnesota Governor - gave permission for the project to proceed, voting unanimously to approve Enbridge's Line 3 project's Certificate of Need and the Route Permit.

In response to this development, numerous groups, including White Earth Band of Ojibwe, Friends of the Headwaters, Red Lake, Mille Lacs, and the Sierra Club, attempted to appeal the decision in court. The following month, on September 10, a meeting took place at the St. Louis County Emergency Operations Center between the regional law enforcement departments. An outcome of this meeting was the creation of the Northern Lights Task Force, which included representatives (both legal and from fourteen law enforcement departments), as well as officials from jails, 9-1-1 communication centers, intelligence centers, and emergency managers. This task force was specifically developed to "coordinate planning, resources and response to the Enbridge's Pipeline 3 replacement project," and has been a key mechanism by which agencies and Enbridge officials had been able to coordinate resources and communication, facilitate training, and prepare for events (Neef 2019)

The following year in June of 2019, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled against Enbridge's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), stating that it did not adequately account for the potential risks of oil spillage in the Lake Superior watershed. The

opposition was aware that the development project would not die here, so mobilization and organization efforts increased to get ahead of the issue. On September 28, 2019, MN 350's Pipeline Resistance Team organized the Gichi-gami Gather in Duluth to raise awareness on the Stop Line 3 efforts, garnering support from 1,200 attendees. A month later, on Indigenous People's Day (October 14), a Giniw Collective demonstration took place with two hundred *water protectors* - a title given to Indigenous peoples defending water systems such as lakes and rivers - and citizen allies gathered in Clearbrook.

The opposition's growing numbers and strength were not lost on the state's policing institutions or the energy giant. Emails obtained through the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, reported by The Intercept's Alleen Brown (2021b), revealed that correspondence was already taking place in June of 2020 between County Sheriffs. The emails include discussions on capital provisions that law enforcement and Enbridge deemed critical to repressing the oncoming dissent. As a condition for the route permit, the PUC provided a last-minute provision that resulted in the Public Safety Escrow Account (PSEA). This provision offered a (direct) capital link between Enbridge and policing agencies, by allowing the company to fund the account with the facade of reimbursements for associated costs. To keep the PSEA independent and impartial, it called for the placement of a third-party manager who would review invoices sent by law enforcement departments for reimbursements for either denial or approval.

In the aforementioned email from June between various Sheriffs, Daniel Guida of the Aitkin County Sheriff's Office mentioned speaking with Troy Kirby, Enbridge's Chief of Security, who had "expressed concern over that position [the third-party manager] and the escrow account," then going on to say that "[Kirby] indicated they have

some influence on the hiring of that position and he would be involved to ensure we are taken care of, one way or another" (Brown 2021a). The email chain continues, with Brian Smith, Kanabec County Sheriff's Office, insisting that they "need to let the PUC know that the person selected needs to be someone that we also agree upon. Not a member of the PUC, not a state, county or federal employee, but someone that has an understanding of rioting and MFF [Mobile Field Force or anti-rioting] operations" (Brown 2021a). Alarmingly, this suggested that the coercive apparatus of Minnesota, and by extension Enbridge, have some level of influence in and appointment of officials intended to operate independently.

During this time, the policing agencies also kept an eye on public perceptions before acting. In September of 2020, Star Tribune reported on a Minnesota polling survey, which indicated that 52% of Minnesota citizens perceive civilian violence against peoples and property as a larger issue than compared to the 35% who stated that police violence against citizens was a bigger concern (Wigdahl & Jacobsen 2020). Currently, the public's approval did not place significant pressures on the police to show restraint in their future operations. This perception is highlighted in another series of emails obtained by the FOI during that same month. On September 8, 2020, emails were exchanged between Minnesota policing agencies and Enbridge officials attempting to coordinate training exercises on Enbridge's dime (Brown 2021b). The training in question was heavily focused on Line 3 protests. Prior to the training exercises taking place, "Incident Briefing Maps" were distributed to indicate key points at which Enbridge security personnel and law enforcement may need to coordinate efforts. In fact, this was not their first time coordinating anti-pipeline training. Emails obtained by Unicorn Riot, a protest

media station, disclosed communications between Minnesota's Department of Public Safety, Enbridge's own security, and a police foundation (Neef 2018) known as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). These emails date all the way back to June 18, 2018, to July 20, 2018. In the emails, they discuss plans to coordinate MFF training exercises. MFF units are often deployed for highly volatile events; equipped with "less-than-lethal munitions," chemical arms, armored vehicles, and Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs).

The capital linkages and networks between Enbridge and the Minnesota police departments became even more apparent on October 2, 2020, when an email exchange took place between Northern Lights Task Force members detailing a call with then-Governor Time Waltz. A major concern of the police during this time was shoring up funds for so-called less-than-lethal munitions. A provision of the PSEA stipulates that the management may not approve reimbursements for these types of munitions. In the email, Kelly Lake of Carlton County Sheriff's Office mentioned Dave Olmstead, a retired Bloomington police commander who is the Line 3 project's Special Events Preparedness Coordinator, stating that "Dave's assessment is that it went very well and he believes that the Governor will figure out the funding piece and the munitions. It sounds like his staff was already trying to line up a meeting internally for them to discuss it" (Brown 2021a).

These emails highlight a critical point in corporate-police relations and "dark money." One way that corporate-police relations facilitate the exchange of capital is through network, information, and connection sharing (Lippert & Walby 2022). These dubious communications between Northern Lights Task Force members displays the amount of capital that they can garner from this relationship, as well as the networks and

connections they maintain that Enbridge can access through their agreements and relationships. Not only does this imply that Enbridge can influence policing behaviors and practices, but also the flow of resources and even government appointment of officials through their connections with the regional policing agencies.

In late November 2020, the PUC and the United States Army Corps of Engineers gave final approvals to move the project forward. Then the project was granted a Minnesota Pollution Control Agency construction stormwater permit on the 30th. By then, intelligence sharing and the broader relationship between Enbridge and the Minnesota policing agencies that form the Northern Lights Task Force were fully solidified. During the following months, the intimate and fiscally lucrative partnership garnered a great deal of financial benefits for the Minnesota police. In one of many instances, between December of 2020 to August of 2021, the Cass County Sheriff's Office began "proactive safety patrols" of communities along the pipeline's route, which it was subsequently reimbursed for by the PSEA and Enbridge for a total of $849,163.40 during that period (Beaumont 2021). The Minnesota police maintained prominent levels of public support prior to volatile direct engagements. On August 11, 2021, a survey conducted by APM Research Lab was published, which found that ~⅔ of Minnesota adults reported feeling trust in the police, while 71% of non-Hispanic White residents reported trusting the police "just about always" or "most of the time" (APM Research Lab 2021). The current United States Census Bureau estimates that non-Hispanic White Minnesotans encompass 82.6% of the total regional population as of 2022 (U.S. Census Bureau 2023). Indeed, the private interests at play incentivized the coercive apparatus

with a great deal of private capital with little to no public capital or pressure to leverage against it and disincentivize aggressive tactics.

During their campaign, the opposition deployed a mixture of online - e.g., creating online petitions and a social media presence - and offline methods of dissent, including legal challenges to the project and protesting outside of the Governor's home. Of primary concern to this research is their methods of direct action - i.e., blockades and obstructions to the project's development. On January 9, 2021, Indigenous-led demonstrators gathered at one of the first construction sites in Aitkin County. Kevin Ott of the Grand Rapid Police Department wrote in their report that they were contacted directly by Enbridge personnel to come to the site. The department was later reimbursed $1,306.35 for their support. Winona LaDuke, Executive Director of Honor the Earth, noted in an interview that they observed Enbridge employees directing police efforts and giving orders to the officers (Beaumont 2021). The following month, the Giniw Collective launched the #DefundLine3 campaign as an additional measure to foster public awareness and support for the movement's cause. However, by April of 2021, it had already been reported that Enbridge had reimbursed Minnesota police agencies $750,000 in the first few months of the policing and protest efforts (Hughlett & Johnson 2021).

June of 2021 experienced a two-week blockade of the Two Inlets Pump Stations by the Giniw Collective. Hubbard County Sheriffs responded to break up the ongoing disruptions to their client's project, resulting in the first noted show of force. A Department of Homeland Security helicopter was flown in and purposefully maintained a low altitude of around twenty feet as a means to intimate the crowd, with authorities

stating that it was used as an announcement for demonstrators to disperse (Brown & Richards 2021). When the helicopter began to depart and the protesters were no longer being showered with debris, the Northern Light Task Force agents deployed an LRAD to announce dispersal orders. LRADs, also known as acoustic hailing devices or sound cannons, are extremely high-powered methods of communicating over long distances. When used for crowd dispersal in close proximity, as the demonstrators were, it has been known to cause permanent hearing damage, producing sound of up to 150 decibels and 2.5kHz. LRAD devices can cause extreme pain at 20 meters and permanent hearing loss can occur at around five meters (PHR & INCLO 2020). For their efforts, invoices indicated that Enbridge reimbursed police department forces present that day by a sum of $80,000 (Nexus Media News 2023).

These repressive tactics, contrary to their intention, did not deter the movement. Tensions mounted once again the following month. Beginning in July 2021, the Minnesota police constructed an open-air blockade of a private property (owned by dissidents) that was being used by Namewag Camp, which prevented activists from being able to leave the property and detaining them without formal arrest. Although the act of repression was ruled as unlawful by a Minnesota court, the illegitimacy of the operation did not facilitate public support in favor of the movement - as previous research would indicate as a likely output (Opp & Roehl 1990). Towards the end of July 2021, Indigenous-led dissidents gathered around a drilling site under the Red Lake River, located near Thief River Falls. Over the next few days, around one hundred demonstrators joined the obstructive direct action. As a show of continued loyalty, the Minnesota law enforcement responded with force. Employing the use of pepper spray

and rubber bullets, coercive agents began a series of arrests (Sainato 2021). Tara Houska, an Indigenous Lawyer, and activist, who was present that day, stated in an interview:

> "The level of brutality that was unleashed on us was extreme. People were shot in their faces, in their bodies, in their upper torsos. I saw a young woman's head get split open right in front of me. It was a really brutal scene and the arrests in-person were quite brutal. Throwing people face down in the dirt, and being extremely violent in a situation in which we were outnumbered by police at least 2:1" (Houska 2021).

Later in the same interview, Houska noted that they observed police discussing how they would receive overtime bonus pay for "the brutality they unleashed upon us" (2021). The statements heard by Houska proved to be true. For maintaining their service to Enbridge, the Wright County Sheriff's Office was reimbursed $26,886.44 for miles traveled, salaries, meals, and benefits, while additional funds were sent to Marshall, Ciacho, Anoka, and Claw County departments for sending officers as well (Beaumont 2021). In fact, by late August 2021, the escrow account utilized as a financial link between the oil giant and Minnesota's coercive institutions had provided funding equally a total of $2.3 million (Brown 2021b).

A series of interviews conducted by More Perfect Union (2021) with pipeline dissidents from the Giniw Collective recounted their experiences dealing with the policing of the project. Numerous water defenders reported that they were purposefully harmed, with one officer in an audio recording stating "that's the point. It's called pain compliance" (More Perfect Union 2021). Numerous protesters were repeatedly put into pressure holds, which pushed down on their throats, face, nose, and teeth. Upon finishing

with a protester, the interviewees stated that they would return to apply pain compliance additional times to already subdued demonstrators. Multiple protesters reported that they developed Bell's palsy due to the methods employed - resulting in potentially permanent facial damage.

In an attempt to shore up public support for the movement, in September of 2021, Indigenous leaders invited representatives Ihan Omar, Rashia Tlaib, Cori Bush, and Ayanna Pressley to meet with them. The attempt fell short, as later public opinion polls reflect. Later that month, a poll conducted by MinnPost of 1,945 Minnesota voters found that 56% of the citizens continued to support the project, while only 34% opposed (Orenstein 2021). Although the Indigenous organizations involved in the movement were highly organized - launching media campaigns, expanding social and organization networks, maintaining bureaucratic internal structures, and effective coordination of activities - they were unable to utilize media documentation and dissemination of this one-sided violence in order to incite backlash from the general public (Sutton et al. 2014). The pipeline's replacement was completed that same month and was operational by the 1st of October. As of October of 2021, it was reported that nearly nine hundred demonstrators had been arrested by Minnesota law enforcement (Marohn 2021), while the PSEA had accumulated a total of $8.6 million in reimbursements (Climate Nexus 2023).

There are a number of observable capital gains established between the Minnesota police departments and Enbridge. The following will discuss the economic, social, political, cultural, and symbolic capital garnered in the relationship. First, the economic capital that both parties gained is easier to observe than that of the Canadian case. Indeed,

Enbridge's investments into security capital and replacing the Line 3 pipeline estimated to "restore[] the full pipeline capacity of 760,000 barrels per day to meet the energy needs of refiners in the Midwest" (Enbridge Inc. 2021), increasing levels of projected production and distribution. The Minnesota police departments, for their part in the operations, received $8.6 million in direct contributions through the PSEA.

Financial concerns also highlighted the expansion of the Minnesota police departments' political and symbolic capital. Reflected in the October of 2020 emails between the members of the Northern Lights Task Force as well as the emails from June of 2020 between Enbridge officials and senior policing officials, the Minnesota police displayed a greater ability to directly influence government decisions (political capital): both obtaining financial provisions from the top regional Executive and expanding authority over government appointment. Exerting this influence and authority, then that authority being affirmed by the relevant government agencies, narrowed the policing institutions' proximity to other government agencies and expanded control over the regional political machinery. Equally important to consider is that the coercive apparatus' standing in the public remained unchanged, as discussed in the surveys above. In retaining public support for their goals, the policing agencies can continue their operations without the fear of public disapproval and the outcomes thereof - such as effective operational capacity, preventing mass public mobilization, or structural and institutional reform. More will be discussed on this in the next section.

The Minnesota police were also able to expand their social capital in terms of networks and connections by way of security investments. The networks and connections the various Minnesota police departments were able to garner both in relations to private

and public institutions. Not only were they able to exert authority over other government agencies, but they also formed connections in doing so. Additionally, this display of loyalty towards their private clientele signaled to other private entities they are willing to do the same with the right incentives. Developing a connection with Enbridge officials can facilitate future connections with other private economic elites. Cultural capital is opaquer and more difficult to measure; however, police officials were able to gather significant ways to increase policing culture. A prime example of these gains were the opportunities in which they obtained specialized MFF training as well as individual officers' displayed willingness to continually support and engage in these show of force operations. Both instill stronger internal loyalties and continuation of the reproduction of police as an institution.

In the end, a major problem for the dissent has been its inability to foster broader public support for the movement's goals. Throughout the movement, the general public has remained uninvolved and apathetic towards the movement or maintained a stance of opposition toward the campaign's goals and supporting policing operations. The police departments and corporate elites developed a capital exchange relationship that offered highly lucrative incentives for violently repressive operations, which were brokered through two observable agencies. In this example, these relations and exchanges are the PSEA and the IACP police foundation's involvement highlighted through the emails discussed from June-July of 2018. In the absence of robust public support for the movement (or public opposition for the project or policing activities), the coercive institutions of the region have had little in the way of public pressures to leverage their private capital incentives or the pressures presented on them by private elites.

(7.3) Discussion and Synthesis

In both scenarios discussed, a similar process unfolds, with marginal variation between them. Initially, private interest groups propose a project in a contested location. Once the relevant institutions accept the project, Indigenous communities challenge the authority of the state and private elites regarding land use. Private entities presented powerful incentives to policing departments that encouraged the use-of-force. While the use-of-force (e.g., arrests) were unlikely to prevent future protests and raise the cost of participating in dissent activities, a show of force and the threat of potential harm was deemed a useful strategy to raise the metaphorical bar and deter future demonstrations. The similarity among cases becomes evident through the variation of the pressures exerted on the coercive institutions of the state by the public and private institutions.

When public opposition to the project was low and private pressures were high - exemplified by substantial capital linkages and inducements, and variation in the level of direct communication - instances of a show of force occurred. In both cases the public displayed ambivalence towards the repression of Indigenous protests. There are notable instances in which the coercive apparatus is more sensitive to public concern; although, these instances had primarily either highlighted the economic concerns of the public or discussed the ways in which the states' policing agencies and government were attempting to engage in dialogue with Indigenous communities. Even if this was not the case, the sentiments were enough to satiate public discomfort. In the following sections, I will discuss the three independent variables: (1) private capital & pressures, (2) public capital & pressures, and (3) indigeneity classification and group categorization.

(7.3.1) Private Capital and Pressures

As highlighted by the case studies, third-party influence can significantly increase the risk and likelihood of repression (Chyzh & Labzina 2018). The interest of the police, I argue, is private capital. Capital, in this context, refers to Dupont's (2004) idea of capital in security networks, encompassing social, cultural, political, economic, and symbolic capital. While there are financial incentives to police-corporate partnerships, they are not sufficient for the police's interests as an institution. Lippert and Walby (2022) argue that the police are a "greedy institution," in terms of their desire to expand outward beyond itself and reproduce. The police as an institution maintains a desire to replicate itself both internally among its own ranks as well as outwardly within the public and private spheres.

In each case where there was an instance of a show of force, there was also the issue of funds being channeled into policing agencies or individual accounts. In instances like this, these funds are often channeled through private non-profit organizations - most notably police foundations. Police foundations have been growing in number, with nearly every major US city maintaining a police foundation (as many as fourteen in California alone), a growing number in Canada, and the increasing practice of utilizing both police foundations as well as direct private sponsorship in Australia. Some research has indicated that this development stems because of departments requiring additional funds for training and equipment to meet the needs of the communities they serve (Fernandez & Trembley-Boire 2021), with policing leadership "leveraging private resources to fill budget gaps" (Delaney 2010).

However, these claims of resource scarcity prove less than coherent when considering that each state continues to increase budgets for policing on both the regional and federal levels. In the United States alone, major cities average 20% to 45% of their budget allotted for policing, while nationwide spending at the end of 2020 reached $100 billion (Lakhani 2020). Lippert and Walby (2022) argue that police "[f]oundations are shell corporations designed to shield further identities as well as the details of the exchange between the foundation and the funder, and the foundation and the police department" (181). Additionally, a growing body of literature discusses the implications of corruption and private influence in policing practices as a form of clientelism between governmental agencies and private elites/entities. Admittedly, this body of research is quite difficult to test and analyze due to the very nature of the subject - i.e., "dark money" politics is purposefully difficult information to access and assess, as the prevention of transparency is an intentional mechanism of its implementation methods.

Lippert and Walby (2022) note eight different methods by which capital is transmitted in the corporate-police partnerships: (1) direct donations, although this method is subject to greater scrutiny and transparency; (2) police advertisement of a corporation in exchange for other forms of capital; (3) paid detail policing, where individual officers are contracted to work in a private capacity for the company; (4) donations as labeled alternatives for funding deficits for the police; (5) donations to ensure bigger bids into long-term contracts with departments (e.g. taser manufacturers or equipment distributors); (6) working as mediators for lucrative deals; (7) network connections sharing; and (8) opaque donations made by smaller corporations.

In most cases, there are policies in place that don't prohibit direct donations; there are policies in place, however, in each state that prevent conflicts of interest that deter donations directly from private entities, and these policies are meant to stymie the risk of bribery, collusion, corruption, or conflict of interest (Walby et al. 2018). Recently, it has become more apparent that private entities are providing large sums of funds to police foundations, which then provide these funds to target departments, to encourage particular policing behaviors - i.e., repression of disruptive protests. Police foundations provide a means by which private entities and landed economic elites, particularly through linkages with foundation directors and staff, can retain "a novel position in policing, wielding financial, and sometimes operational, influence" (Walby et al. 2020).

Indeed, although data (e.g., records of communications or financial statements on donations and contributions) there are numerous documented instances in which high-profile economic elites, who were either new or ongoing contributors to local police foundations, sent direct communications to the relevant enforcement institutions and requested direct intervention into a disruptive demonstration. There are also numerous examples, particularly in the case of natural resource extraction industries, with high-level company executives sitting on foundation boards, serving as "featured partners" to foundations, and serving as lifelong foundation donors and sponsors (Armstrong 2020), deepening the links between public policing institutions and private elites. Often, the private capital that the police receive is in the form of funds for equipment, training, budgetary concerns, or direct donations of equipment (Lippert & Walby 2022; Lukacs & Groves 2020).

Nevertheless, financial gains are not the primary interest in private capital. The private capital police gain may also include networks and connections with other private elites, symbolic authority, and legitimacy (Lippert & Walby 2022). In return, the company receives benefits such as networks and connections to the state and other private elites, increased policing and protection of their interests, and security financing of their interests (Lippert & Walby 2022). A major boon of the police-private partnership, as displayed by the United States case, is that the police may be able to leverage context with the goals of others and utilize new connections to increase their own authority and power, while narrowing their proximity to the state. Although the police are a state institution, they do not typically retain powers of appointment, nor are they often able to utilize a top regional Executive's power as a tool to their own ends. The police were able to achieve both in this case study by leveraging the desires of the government with the current context, drawing power from the necessities of others. In effect, this gave those departments significantly more influence over other government institutions by the precedent it established. With the leverage provided by private capital incentives, the (often heavily militarized) well-funded and well-connected policing units have been found to repress and maintain surveillance on ethnic and racial minority protests, particularly Black and Indigenous protests, at a much higher rate than others (Color of Change 2021; Poulos & Haddad 2016). The external influence that "bankrolls" - or pays into - conflict on the onset of protest (and repression) significantly increases the risk of repression with an additional goal of deterring future protests within a specified sphere of interest (Chyzh & Labzina 2018).

As highlighted by the exposed email communications between private elites and policing agencies, the clientelist relationship between the policing agencies and landed economic elites is quite clear. When there is a disruption to private development projects, the corporations in charge of the projects call on their support network - in this case, the coercive apparatus - to conduct ensuring their project's continuation through repressive tactics in exchange for continued private capital. In turn, the coercive agencies reaffirm loyalty to their client and maintains future funds. In instances in which the coercive institutions do not conduct, private elites "express[] [their] frustration that police agencies [are] not carrying out their duties as the repressive apparatus of settler colonialism" (Crosby & Managhan 2016). There was variation in the direct pressures applied – e.g., the observable email communications. In the case of Minnesota, Enbridge maintained more direct communications and application of pressures through constant streams of capital in exchange for continued policing. Coastal GasLink, however, communicated much less frequently and did not provide a comparatively robust and incentivizing stream of capital.

In the case studies presented above, there was variation in the security capital incentives, both supplied directly by the private elites and capital acquired indirectly. In the case of Coastal GasLink, the RCMP's C-IRG collected economic capital (foundation donors and pension funders) and social & symbolic capital (network relations with private security firm Forsythe, which is owned by a former RCMP officer); additionally, they gained access to social networks (other private elites) and increased some level of legitimacy (symbolic capital) within the private sphere by proving commitments to resolving focuses of either sphere's dissatisfaction. Likewise, in the case of the Line 3

Replacement project, the Minnesota police departments gained direct funds through the PSEA (economic capital), training and professionalization (cultural capital), and intelligence networks (cultural capital); as well as narrowing their proximity to the political machinery and relative influence (political capital), private social networks (social capital), and private sphere legitimacy (symbolic capital). In the second case study, the perceived value of potential capital was greater than the former, and the instances and intensity with which show of force operations were conducted were higher as well. More on the outcomes of this variation is discussed in the next section (*7.3.2*).

(7.3.2) Public Capital and Pressure

In these instances, described in the case studies as well as the results of the classification model, there is a clear pattern highlighted by the variation of public support for the movements and the levels of repression each movement experienced. More

Figure XIV Boxplot: Show of Force ~ Public Opposition



precisely, there is a negative relationship between the levels of popular support and repression. In the instances in which mass support for the movement was relatively low (or public disfavor for the project was low), the instances in which the movements experienced repression were much higher - and vice versa. The majority of the repression literature that discusses that popular movements tend to result in the output of increased levels of repression across regime types (Carey 2006) - indicating that these two factors typically have a *positive relationship*; however, I argue that my findings differ in a few significant ways that do not nullify the findings of other researchers on the subject.

The evidence presented in the process-tracing case studies is in line with the findings of the logistic regression model. The results of the logistic regression model indicated that the "public opposition variable" was statistically significant (less than 0.05) at a p-value of 0.0126 and a coefficient of -4.5189. The raw data showed a similar story, with rates the average instances of a show of force occurring were very low levels of public opposition, while high rates of opposition did not normally happen in tandem with a show of force (Figure XIV).These instances where a show of force did occur (=1, right) fell into a range below ~0.3 (30%), and a median around 0.2 (20%). Instances where a show of force did not occur (=0, left) also had exceedingly prominent levels of predicted or actual public opposition to the project. The average marginal effects (AMEs) and predicted probabilities shared a similar story. The reported AMEs showed that a 1 value increase in public opposition impacted the probability of a show of force at the lowest levels (0.1-0.5 [+ 1 unit increase] = AMEs < -0.8). Similarly, the predicted probabilities (at levels 0.1 [10%] to 0.9 [90%] in intervals of 0.1) estimated that the probability of a

show of force would not be greater than 50% until the level of public opposition was below 0.3 (30%).

Divergence from my findings compared to other findings on popular protests, I argue, is because these instances of repression are localized, fixed, specialized, and particularized. Many of the findings of previous research on contentious politics involve broader public rights that extend to a much larger group and those that reach or are growing to a national scale. These movements tend to be on a much smaller scale - often being isolated within a few local areas (i.e., the project sites) and do not mobilize much farther outward, resulting in them remaining fixed to a localized area. Some instances in which they do often result in related blockades that are quickly shut down - e.g., railway blockades by allied First Nations that relevant enforcement institutions dismantle. Additionally, these issues are particularized and specialized in that they do not insight the same sense of urgency and necessity in the general public; rather, the urgency and necessity to secure these rights are most deeply felt by a minority population, while the general public tends to concern itself with issues of the economy. For example, during open comment forums on the issue of Line 3, public opposition to the project largely focused on the effects it would have on climate change (Frost 2020) while issue polling within the region places the climate low on their list of priorities, with only 5% citing it as a top concern (Callaghan 2022), highlighting the divergence of importance for the public and Indigenous communities' perceptions on the Line 3 project. Similarly, a poll conducted by Leger, British Columbia, found that 57% of BC citizens supported the project while 72% opposed the Wet'suwet'en opposition movements' activities (Penner 2020).

Ritter (2014) has found that many cases of repression often occur to remove a threat to the executive office. Here I argue the reverse is occurring, where the coercive institutions of the state are choosing not to repress when the strategy itself may threaten their tenure, since particularly unfavorable (in the public eye) sustained instances of repressive tactics reduce the perceived legitimacy of the state and enforcement institutions (Beggan 2006). My argument, growing off existing literature, contends that the policing agencies of the state see three potential outcomes in the face of public disfavor for a show of force with varying degrees of severity: (1) a loss of public support in carrying out their functions and operations; (2) calls for structural and institutional reformation; or (3) mass public mobilization and disorder.

Although more lucrative, and potentially more desirable, not only do the enforcement institutions of the state seek out private capital, but they also attempt to maximize - or minimize damage to - their public capital. Going back to Dupont's (2004) discussion of the different forms of capital, here I argue that public capital in this dynamic involves (1) political capital, (2) social capital, and (3) symbolic capital, based on previous literature and research around police-community relations. Political capital is rooted in the law enforcement's relation to governance and their "capacity to influence or direct this machinery toward their own objectives" (Dupont, 2004); social capital, in this context, is the set of community and public networks the police are able to draw upon; while symbolic capital is the perceived legitimacy of the institution, as well as their ability to maintain a level of authority over others. The importance of each are heavily interrelated to policing institutions.

The coercive apparatus must retain some level of legitimacy, over the prospects of a loss of office when falling too far into public backlash and running the risk of a scandal (González 2021). As highlighted by the findings of logistic regression model, a show of force was significantly less likely to occur in the presence of robust public opposition to the project. When policing behaviors are seen as unjust, the police lose institutional legitimacy (Cruz 2015). Because the media tends to follow public interests, a particularly contentious issue is likely to garner a great deal of salience and media focus. A key mechanism of backlash is the dissemination of event information through media (Sutton et al. 2014). Some research has indicated that the state's law enforcement's capacity is tied to community and public perceptions. Policing institutions require some level of public support to conduct their functions and operations (Gourley 1954). With the loss of community support, the police lose valuable networks within the communities that they oversee, including resources such as information proliferation by informants (Jansson 2005). Earlier studies have found that public cooperation is an essential mechanism of effective community policing, maintaining a causal relationship with both policing effectiveness and crime rate reduction (Myhill & Quinton 2011). This heavily relies on the notion of "policing by consent," in which the police are only able to effectively police by the consent of the policed.

González (2021) has found that the policing institutions of the state are sensitive to the risk of a consensus in public disapproval of policing practices in democratic states. A strong and unified position against policing behaviors and actions within the public sphere - alongside a robust political opposition (non-majority or non-government forming parties) - result in public calls for structural and institutional changes within the coercive

apparatus; the ruling party or parties then, realizing the political implications of public sanctions for not addressing these concerns, implement those reformations. Often this results in institutional restraints and constraints on policing powers, overhauls of policing bodies, and increased power within - or the creation of - policing accountability mechanisms (e.g., civilian review boards).

Trends in public support for police reform are mixed in many Western democracies. According to a poll conducted by Gallup in 2022, ~50% of United States citizens agree that "major changes are needed to make policing better" (McCarthy 2022). Similar stances are seen in Canada, where an Ipsos poll from 2020 found that 51% of Canadians supported defunding the police (Russell 2020); while survey data collected by Statistics Canada found that 67% of Canadians retained "a high level of confidence in the police" (Statistics Canada 2023). No survey data on Australian perspectives of police reform could be found, even in the face of increased protest crackdowns; however, findings by Productivity Commission's Report on Government Services found that there was a drop of public perceptions that police treat people fairly and equally, going from 77.7% down to 66.3% (Macdonald 2023).

Not only could these reforms reduce the structural and institutional power of the police, but they could lead to the loss of private capital networks. Police foundations, the broker between policing agencies and private elites, tend to remain shrouded from the public eye and maintain a severe lack of oversight and transparency (Lippert & Walby 2022), resulting in issues of accountability and corruption (Walby et al. 2017). In the face of robust public requests for police reform and accountability, these mechanisms that are used as a means for channeling capital connections between the police and private

elites/entities may come to the front of public attention and scrutiny, facing potential legislative overhauls as (non-profit) institutions that donate to political bodies.

To maintain social order and prevent the loss of public support, it is "a critical minimum that police-community relations avoid situations in which police actions inevitably fuel popular discontents" and take actions that will "dissuade the majority of [citizens] from engaging in radical political action" (Frankel 1980). As the research has shown, the policing agencies of the state are much more likely to repress popular protest (Carey 2006; Siegel 2011) and threats to the stability of the status quo & regime survival (Regan & Henderson 2002). Mass public unrest is quite difficult for coercive institutions to quell, maintain, coopt, or accommodate. Because of this, the police must maintain their legitimacy in the eye of the public and the public's cooperation and conviction to social order. The legitimacy of the coercive apparatus is an imperative part of the public's support for the police and places constraints on the level of acceptable force that is used for coercive means (Gerber & Jackson 2017).

Because there is always the risk of public disapproval, the coercive institutions of the state are ever aware of the public's position towards a given project or related behaviors and actions. A convergence of public dissatisfaction becomes a means by which the coercive apparatus is constrained in the repressive responses they can deploy. The punishment schedule is then decided upon based on the cost-benefit analysis of the prospective capital rewards and sanctions within the public and private spheres - private capital networks and supplies by the economic elites vs potential public capital support or disapproval.

Table XVIII Case Study Public Sphere, Private Sphere, Outcome Comparisons

Issue, State	*Public Pressure*	*Private Sphere*	*Strategy Outcome*
Coastal GasLink, Canada	Converged against the Movement	Capital Value: Medium Direct Pressures: Medium	Show of Force (6), Medium Intensity
Line 3 Replacement, United States	Fragmented	Capital Value: High Direct Pressures: High	Show of Force (4), High Intensity

Comparisons of these case studies are summarized in Table XVIII. In the case studies above, the relative public position had some divergence. While the public opinion surveys in Minnesota, United States, displayed a public that was fragmented, the public perspective in British Columbia, Canada, reflected in polling data suggested convergence *against* the movement. This convergence emboldened the C-IRG branch of the RCMP, making the associated risks to repression lessened. While the public presented little opposition to the potential for repression, the perceived capital value was more moderate in value. In comparison, the capital value presented to Minnesota police was much higher and the fragmented public, likewise, presented little potential for public sanctions. Additionally, there was variation present in the directly observed pressures applied by private elites. The emails sent to Minnesota police by Enbridge displayed a higher degree of private influence and strategic control than those of Coastal GasLink shareholders to the RCMP. Indeed, Enbridge's communications detailed a greater entanglement of interests and were able to apply greater influence on the coercive apparatus' training, strategies, and organization of their budgetary interests. As a result, there were higher frequencies of an observed show of force in Canada (6) than that of the United States (4), but a higher intensity of application - e.g., brutality, physical violence, pain compliance - occurred in the case of the Line 3 Replacement project repression strategy compared to

the lower, medium-intensity in the Coastal GasLink case - harassment, psychological warfare, repeat aggressive raiding, and threats of bodily harm.

(7.3.3) Indigeneity

Observed resistance events display that Indigenous movements have been targeted by repressive measures; this has included, but is not limited to, differentiated state surveillance (Proulx 2014; Howe & Monaghan 2018), operational tactics (Howe & Monaghan 2018), and the institutionalization of Indigenous surveillance and repression. The resulting was an interweaving of the perceptions of Indigenous movements against critical infrastructure as threats to national security (Proulx 2014; Crosby & Monaghan 2016; Bosworth & Chua 2023) as the coercive institutions focused on corporate interests. While there is ongoing evidence indicating that there is a global trend in the crackdown on environmental protests (Lakhani et al. 2023), Indigenous environmentalist movements and land claims are differentiated in the coercive institution's perception.

Mainstream environmentalism is viewed in a white settler context, while Indigenous environmentalist movements "center sovereignty and relationships to land and water [...] that are not typically considered within the environmentalist canon" (Curnow & Helferty 2022). Indigenous movements against pipelines and critical infrastructure present a form of "countersovereignty," as argued by Bosworth and Chua (2023), which conflicts with white settler society, and frames critical infrastructure as vital to national security and enables the criminalization of Indigenous dissent. As reflected in the results of the logistic regression model, Indigenous obstructive demonstrations against private development projects were statistically significant (less than 0.05) with a p-value of 0.0323 and a coefficient of 1.98407, meaning that the

Table XIX Show of Force Rates and Means

	Indigenous	Public	*Rate (State)*	*Mean (State)*
Australia	57.14%	15.00%	*25.93%*	*36.07%*
Canada	39.39%	10.00%	*32.56%*	*24.70%*
United States	62.50%	11.76%	*36.36%*	*37.13%*
Rate (Status)	*48.21%*	*12.77%*	***32.04%***	
Mean (Status)	*53.01%*	*12.25%*		***32.63%***

categorization of a movement as Indigenous increases the log(Odds) of the protest experiencing a show of force by 1.98407. Looking at rates of a show of force occurring the raw data alludes to similar outcomes, as reported in Table XIX. Based on the observations in the data set, Indigenous demonstrations were 4 times more likely to experience a show of force[17]. The predictive margins of indigeneity estimated only a 15.47% probability of a show of force for non-Indigenous disruptive demonstrations, all else being equal, while the estimated probability of a show of force against an Indigenous demonstration was 3.1 times higher at a probability of 48.03%.

The results from the regression and the differentiated treatment of Indigenous communities by policing agencies is in line with previous research that has indicated that violent repression of environmental protests is more likely to occur with marginalized groups (Poulos & Haddad 2016) and particularly Indigenous land and water defenders (Le Billon and Lujala 2020). As the logistic regression displayed, the classification of indigeneity was positively associated with a show of force occurring against a disruptive demonstration. In accounting for levels of public opposition to a project, there continues to be a clear differentiation in repression applied with Indigenous communities versus the

[17] Measured by *Rate (Status = Indigenous) / Rate (Status = non-Indigenous)*

general population. At all levels of the adjusted predicted margins, Indigenous classed demonstrations were predicted to experience a show of force at a higher probability than non-Indigenous movements. The difference of adjusted predictive probabilities[18] ranged from 2.04[19] (times higher) predicted show of force against Indigenous demonstrations to 6.52[20], with an average higher predicted probability of a show of force against Indigenous dissent of 4.37 times. I argue that here the policing agencies are repressing when public opposition to the project is low, taking advantage of the potential acceptability of repression, but doing so to prevent the movement's potential for increased support. This is a potential area for future research.

As reflected by the results of the classification model, the odds ratio of a value of Indigenous = 1 (i.e., the group is identified as being Indigenous or led by Indigenous movement leaders), increased the odds of a show of force by 7.27. The level of perceived public opposition to the project, conversely, had a negative relationship with the probabilities of a show of force occurring. Likewise, Indigenous protests were on average predicted to be more likely to be subject to a show of force than a public demonstration at all levels of public opposition. Indeed, as the results of the regression suggest, Indigenous characterization and public opposition are opposing indicators of the probability of a show of force. In the absence of robust public opposition to the project (or policing practices), the chance of a show of force to become the decided strategy increased dramatically. This is especially true in cases where the project is tied to the notion of "critical infrastructure," as was the case in both the Line 3 Replacement and the Coastal

[18] *Probabilities Difference* = *Public Opposition* (x)+*Indigenous* (1)/*Public Opposition* (x)+*Indigenous* (0).
[19] *Public Opposition* = 0.1.
[20] *Public Opposition* = 0.9.

GasLink projects. As Proulx (2014) argues, the state has institutionalized Indigenous peoples as a threat to national interests, particularly in cases of critical infrastructure and economic interests.

(8) Testing Outside the Case Studies

To evaluate these causal mechanisms in additional cases, I have selected two democratic states for analysis: Aotearoa (New Zealand), which displays a high degree of public pressure against the coercive apparatus' calculus to commit to a show of force; and Taiwan, which lacks significant private sphere pressures. In both cases, these display contexts where a show of force is highly unlikely due to an *absence* of or a *considerable influence* over the causal mechanisms that incentivize or disincentivize the coercive agents to engage in a show of force. Democratic states where these pressures are nonexistent, or the Indigenous population have significant leverage over them are much less likely to violently repress disruptive Indigenous protest.

(8.1) Aotearoa (New Zealand) - Public Sphere Variance

By the model of this argument, I predict that it would be highly unlikely for a case such as Māori of New Zealand - herein referred to as *Aotearoa* - to experience instances of a show of force in reaction to disruptive political dissent against private development projects; this is predicted as such for one simple reason: the Māori population constitutes 17.4% of the population (Stats Tatauranga Aotearoa 2022), which translates into significant political influence. According to te Kaitiaki Take Kōwhiri (the Electoral Commission of New Zealand), 2020 saw 81.54% (or a total of 2,894,486 people) of Māori voter turnout (Te Kaitiaki Take Kōwhiri 2023). Because of this perceived large and active political body, the costs of violent repression against disruptive Māori contests of land should always be assumed to be higher on average even in instances where the non-Indigenous public retains low levels of opposition to a private development project.

Because there is such a large Indigenous population, the likelihood that such acts of violence would turn into a political scandal are also quite high. Indeed, it is not the information I have found but the data I have not that more strongly indicates this assessment. Since the treaty of Waitangi, I have been unable to find a single instance in which the Aotearoa coercive apparatus has come in force to threaten Māori disruptive demonstrators in such a way that there would be true belief of bodily harm or raise the perceived costs of future dissent. Indeed, when the ACLED data is filtered for Indigenous protests, peaceful protests, scale, campaign, private interest group, Indigenous-non-Indigenous conflict, and location, the sample reduces to a small-n sample size of $n = 19$. Among those observations, six were found to be disruptive demonstrations against private interests and projects (31.58% of all Māori peaceful protests between 2021-2023 in the ACLED data set). In these data points, there was not one observed instance of a show of force by the measurements of this project.

One instance of such a disruptive event is that of Ihumātao housing development. The key private entity here is Fletcher Building, who retains a significant financial backing with an estimated revenue of $5.29 billion as of 2022 (Companies Market Cap 2023). The dispute with the development project began in 2016 when the "Wallace Block" on Ihumātao was sold to the developer. In response, the Māori protest group SOUL (Save Our Unique Landscape) set up a campsite beside Ihumātao Quarry Road on November 4th, 2016, which came to be known as Kaitiaki Village. Opponents of the project argued that it was in violation of the Treaty of Waitangi. Disruptions to the project continued and, in 2018, SOUL managed to appeal to the Environmental Court

who overturned Fletcher Buildings permission for the project. In March of 2019, SOUL began to petition Parliament and its representatives demanding intervention.

Although this could be arguably a small-scale issue to the occupying government - a 480 housing development - when considering national scope, the Māori pressures were great enough to gain an audience with Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, who announced they will halt the project while there are dialogues between parties on a solution (Quinlivan 2019). There were small instances of the use-of-force, episodic arrests for obstruction, but no instances where a show of force occurred. In December of 2020, the government and the developers reached an agreement to purchase at a price of $30 million (Moir 2022), for the purposes of housing development with the inclusion of Māori representation in the discussions and plans on its use - as well as two Crown representatives. Because of disputes by the Auditor General, as the purchase was seen as unlawful due to the government purchasing the land without proper approval, plans for future co-managed development projects have been halted.

There is a major takeaway from this event: the Māori political society base presented a *domination* effect of public pressures; although they did not constitute a majority of voters, the state realized that the Māori had noteworthy influence on the electoral system and constituted a large voting base. Enough so that seemingly small-scale issues against medium to high profile economic elites were deemed important enough to be granted an audience with the state's highest ranking official (the Prime Minister), who worked to broker a deal with the Indigenous protesters, rather than allow or order the coercive institutions of the state to violently quell dissent and raise the perceived costs to these demonstrations.

(8.2) Taiwan - Private Sphere Variance

This theory proposes that there need to be two types of pressure present to either incentivize or disincentivize the coercive institutions to engage in a show of force: public and private pressures. In these instances, there must be economic elites that maintain a great deal of lobbying power (or financial leverage) to influence their interests to penetrate the coercive apparatus. Furthermore, those landed private elites and entities must also be within sectors that are often disrupted - or have a chance to be disrupted - by Indigenous dissent that opposes their activities. One instance where this is absent is that of Taiwan; Taiwan has extraordinarily few natural resources, and the extractive oil and natural gas industry, as a useful proxy for the determination of a presence of powerful industrial sector elites, is very weak within the state, primarily relying on the importation of oil.

The state has only "small deposits [...] of approximately 2.4 million barrels as of January 2016 [...] [and] produced an average of 28,000 barrels per day (b/d) of petroleum and other liquids in 2015, virtually all of which was refinery processing gains" (EIA 2016). In the absence of a powerful industry whose activities are opposed by Indigenous communities, there are few instances where the Indigenous communities may disrupt the entity's destructive operations; and, even within the instances where this does occur, these elites are often very weak and unable to leverage a great deal of lobbying power to influence the state or the coercive apparatus with.

Likewise, in the example of Aotearoa, it is the *lack* of data that is the most striking. Across all examined instances of (ACLED) disruptive Indigenous protests in Taiwan, there were no moments of contentious politics where the coercive agencies

repressed dissent by this thesis' definition of a show of force. However, unlike the Aotearoa case, this displays an absence of one of the sources of political pressure that prime a democratic state to engage in violent repression of disruptive Indigenous dissent: private interest group pressures. Indeed, in an original sample of $N = 95$ (ACLED data, accessed May 2023, Taiwan), there was only one instance of particularly disruptive demonstrations against development projects - the development of a cattle ranch by a low-level private entity. One instance of protest was against a mid-level profile entity - the Asia Cement Corp - but these demonstrations did not prevent or obstruct operations. Even in these episodic instances of disruption, there was no longevity of demonstrations, ending after a single day and primarily attempting to express outrage rather than prevent the project through ongoing disruptive protest. With the lack of high-level private entities in extractive industries who would go against the interests of many Indigenous communities in the state, the coercive apparatus has little incentive to have a show of force to prove loyalty to their economic elite clientele.

(9) Scope conditions

The scope conditions for this theory are limited to states with three main characteristics: (1) an Indigenous population that are ethnically heterogeneous to the dominant ethnic majority, and do not constitute a large sector of political society; (2) states in which the public presents a credible threat in a system of accountability to the coercive apparatus; and (3) states in which there are economic elites powerful enough to have a strong lobbying capability *and* those elites are situated in industries that oppose the interests of Indigenous communities (e.g. extractive development such as logging or natural gas & oil). First, there is a chance that sociopolitical characteristics and institutions (e.g., racial or ethnic heterogeneity between the dominant ethnic group and the Indigenous population) may influence the demographic targeting mechanism.

This research has only tested groups delineated along racial and ethnic differences, who have a history of colonized-colonizer relations. Other Indigenous populations with less pronounced racial differences, or states whose dominant ethnic group obtained power through the withdrawal of or on the decision of a colonial power - e.g. the Amazigh/Berbers and the Arab population of Tunisia - may not create an Indigenous-disruptive protest connection in their "punishment schedule." Relative shared history between groups (e.g., both experiencing the imposition of an external colonial power) or unpronounced ethnic & racial divergence may lead to variation in outcomes from what was found here. This theory is limited to states with heterogeneous Indigenous-dominant ethnic group relations and colonized-colonizer histories. However, this would be a fruitful area of future research.

Second, this is confined to states where the public's opinion can generate a credible sanction-reward system to balance against private pressures and the behaviors of officials. Short of these threats, state authorities' incentives to *not* to have a show of force when an Indigenous population disrupts their or their clients' economic interests in instances where the landed economic elites enjoy a relatively great deal of financial power are assumed to be significantly lessened. Even in hybrid regimes where the state must still maintain some level of legitimacy. To be sure, this may in fact increase the willingness of the coercive apparatus to engage in violently repressive behaviors against disruptive Indigenous dissent, even in instances where the disruptive behaviors are in opposition to relatively weak interest groups' development projects. Additionally, as this theory has only been applied to *consolidated democratic* regimes, the state's status as such would be questionable if their political institutions do not pose a credible threat of accountability by removal for egregious behaviors and policies. Comparative variation across regime types is an encouraged subject of future research, as a primary aim of this thesis is to counter the notion of regime type variable importance in repression research.

Finally, this has only been applied to states where powerful financial private interests are the primary target of Indigenous dissent. This theory has not been applied to other types of elites outside the scope conditions: communal elites, military elites, or elected elites, to name a few. If Indigenous communities come into conflict with any form of group that has sufficient lobbying power and attempt to disrupt their operations, those elites that leverage their power over the policing agencies could potentially sway those agencies to engage in a show of force to prevent further and future disruptions. However, this is an untested hypothesis, and may be a fruitful area of future research.

(10) Conclusions

Protesting is seen as a given right in Western democracies. In the United States, citizens are afforded the right to assembly under the First Amendment of the Constitution. However, my findings suggest that this right is not distributed and protected equally. Rather, the political impetus of the coercive apparatus, private elites and entities, and the public have an impact on the likelihood of violence in the repression of Indigenous dissent. Disruptive Indigenous protests that attempt to prevent the continuation of private development projects are subjected to different treatment than disruptive non-Indigenous public demonstrations contesting the same issue in a comparable way. My findings suggest that when Indigenous communities/Nations or Indigenous-led movements disrupt private development projects, the coercive apparatus calculates the risks and rewards of a show of force based on a cost-benefit/reward-sanction analysis of private pressures & capital versus public pressure & capital. When the pressures placed on the policing agencies by private elites for potential or actual private capital outweigh potential public sanctions & loss of public capital (or may even gain in public capital as a result), they engage in a show of force; in the inverse, if public pressures are sufficiently leveraged against private pressures, a show of force is unlikely to occur.

While the repression literature has largely been silent on forms of targeted repression in democracies, the evidence presented here suggests that democratic states scribe punishment schedules (Rozenas 2020) that link ascriptive demographic characteristics and behaviors to prescriptive repression along those lines. However, it is not only the link of behavior and demographic variables that affect the occurrence of a

show of force. Rather, it is in interaction of often counterbalancing public and private sphere pressures that determine the output. The public sphere can place pressure on the coercive apparatus by creating a system of sanctions (diminished perceived legitimacy, social unrest, popular backlash, calls for reform) and rewards (continued police-community partnerships, information networks, societal peace and behavior in accordance to the law); while the private sphere pressures the apparatus by creating its own system of sanctions (loss of partnerships, direct or indirect police budgetary funding) and rewards (financial inducements, social network and connection development, narrowed proximity to the political machinery and increased government influence). The public sphere's convergence against a project or in support of Indigenous dissent is a key mechanism in which it can place sufficient pressure on the coercive institutions to make the threats credible and raise the threshold for the cost of repression. In its absence, the private sphere, assuming it has credible and significant private capital, can influence policing agencies into a security capital exchange.

These findings call into question the validity of many of the conclusions drawn by current repression literature. As a great deal of repression literature tends to reuse the same data sets, it is questionable if there is level of confirmation bias. Furthermore, the disaggregation of both subject-focus and repression type should take the forefront of future research. First, current literature on repression across regime types does not differentiate the subjects of repression. As many of the multi-state, multi-regime type data sets do not include such information, it is natural that studies across regime types would not draw conclusions based on this principle. However, I argue that the stark differences found across between regime types would narrow with the inclusion of these

classifications. Second, while many studies are now separating repression based on civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations, these sub-types of repression contain considerable variation within them. Just as I argue in the first point, there is the potential for variation across regime types if future research narrows the types of repression examined *within* these sub-types. For example, there is considerable variation found within this study that goes against many assumptions in the repression literature around democracies. I argue that this is due, in part, to the narrowing of both the type of repression this study examines as well as the subjects of repression.

This research also has considerable implications about the public's own position in democratic repression. Public indifference has the potential to embolden coercive agents to violently repress those who exercise commonly considered constitutional rights (right to assembly and right to free speech) when the movement opposes the agency's interests. Here, a "bystander effect" has a determinant impact on the marginalization and perpetuation of violence and rights violations against minority groups. Additionally, this calls for greater accountability with regards to police funding sources. Police foundations, a primary broker of police-corporate capital exchange, are not required to disclose donor sources while under the protection of charity classification. This significantly stymies mechanisms of accountability in a democratic context. Finally, this has implications for Indigenous resistance strategy. If, for example, Indigenous communities or nations are in opposition to the coercive institution's interests, or the interests of particularly powerful elites, it is a minimum that they must also retain public support for their goals – or potentially face the threat of a show of force. If Indigenous resistance is able to garner significant public support, then instances in which a show of force does occur may

greatly increase the chances for the dissent to obtain concessions by public outcry or more saliently call for policing reform.

As my research has highlighted, democratic states may prescribe punishment schedules based on demographic characteristics and perceived threats to state (or institutional) interests. Based on my findings, I recommend that future research of repression in democracies assess the varying levels of targeted repression that link groups and behaviors that occur within these states, as well as the underlying reasons that repression varies within democracies and what types of repression are present. Finally, there is potential for variation based on context. In the absence of powerful economic elites that go against the interests of many Indigenous communities who can make these credible threats and rewards (Taiwan) or the presence of a high degree of collective Indigenous electoral power (Aotearoa) may make instances of a show of force extremely unlikely. The variation found in Aotearoa and Taiwan that decreases rates of violent repression of disruptive Indigenous dissent is unlikely to be a policy approach that could be applied to many other Western democratic cases, due to the fact that it would require removal of economic incentives and resources for elites (Taiwan) or massive population booms to occur within Indigenous populations (Aotearoa).

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