The Bonneville Power Administration in a Transformative Decade: A Study of Collaboration in Public Administration

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The Bonneville Power Administration in a Transformative Decade:

A Study of Collibration in Public Administration

by

Christopher M. Frost

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Public Affairs and Policy

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Abstract

In 1987, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) celebrated its 50th year as a federal agency. It was created in 1937 to market power produced by federal dam operations on the Columbia River and provide electric transmission service in the Pacific Northwest region. A decade later, while its organizational mission had largely remained the same, BPA had undergone a major transformation both in its governance role with regional partners and as an institution of the Pacific Northwest. This study seeks to understand how this change occurred.

My research identifies three factors that enabled BPA to successfully respond to external challenges to its mission over the transformative decade of the late 80’s and early 90’s: governance ‘collibration,’ agency capability, and executive leadership. Notably, my study examines the use of collibration, which involves mixing and shifting modes of governance (i.e., hierarchical control, market competition, collaborative networks, and community-based solidarity) in response to complex changes in an organization’s operating environment. Relying on a longitudinal case study of BPA’s annual reports and newspaper media coverage for a decade, my research provides an interpretive analysis of events and actions that explain how the agency transformed itself enabling it to maintain its strong leadership role in the Pacific Northwest region.

BPA’s annual reports were the core record set providing data for interpretive analysis of the agency’s own narrative of the decade. The annual reports provide a
gateway to understanding the operational well-being of BPA as well as changes in agency operations, strategy, and shifts in governance modes. I coded the annual reports using categories of Governance Collibration, Agency Capability, and Executive Leadership. They were further coded for sub-categories to provide additional nuance to understanding BPA’s self-narrative and how the agency transformed itself over the decade. The second record set, newspaper accounts and editorials from three major regional newspapers, provided additional evidence of the interaction between BPA and the external network of actors that created the environment within which BPA operated. In some contrast to the use of coding for the Annual Reports, for the newspaper articles and editorials, I relied on identifying the discursive narrative arcs within various newspapers’ coverage of BPA issues. As well, I used an iterative approach of reviewing articles/editorials against the coded annual reports both for consistency and for BPA’s retrospective of each year versus contemporaneous accounts by newspapers of BPA and other actors.

My findings show a significant change in governance collibration over the decade. In addition, these shifts in governance are closely associated with specific aspects of Agency Capability, such as shifts in strategy and policy. Based on these findings, my coding scheme appears to initially be effective, particularly in identifying the types of Governance Modes used as tools in conjunction with Agency Capability to effect change. Significantly, while BPA’s self-narrative for the first half of the decade, raises these narratives as challenges, there is little initial evidence of substantive change
to the agency. In contrast, the latter half of the decade, under the leadership of administrator Hardy, shows that the salmon, deregulation, and finance arcs all increased from what might be termed ‘challenges’ to ‘crises.’ Utilizing both aspects (i.e., the external influences and BPA narratives, as well as the internal dimensions of governance modes, agency capabilities, and executive actions), provides a rich description of BPA as an agency and a network actor over its transformative decade in facing challenges, responding to multiple crises, and engaging with the full network of stakeholders and actors across the Northwest region. Moreover, the interpretive analysis of BPA narratives (from the annual reports) and media coverage of both BPA and its network actors, identified three narrative arcs that were intertwined with one another to a large extent. These are 1) the salmon stock collapse; 2) increased competition among utilities due to deregulation; and 3) major challenges in BPA’s management of its budget, debt, income, and expense at least partially attributable to the first two arcs.

The BPA case study has some important implications for the following bodies of research: governance, organizational theory, and executive leadership. This includes the intersection of each with the others as well as implications for better integrating them through meta-governance as further described below. First, my research shows a viable means of connecting governance and organizational theory by identifying how an agency shifts its modes of governance using the mechanisms of agency capability. As well, my BPA case study elaborates the relative associations between modes of governance and categories of agency capability. As an example, there is a strong
connection between the statutory authority capability and the modes of governance available for the agency’s use with its network actors. However, within its statutory constraints, BPA emphasized different additional capabilities at different points in time to accomplish its transformation. Thus, analysis using both the lenses of governance and organizational theory provides a more robust understanding of how the agency evolved in a relatively short time period.

Second, the study shows how executive leadership transformed BPA and its approach to governance in the face of major regional attention on multiple crises. My research shows how the administrator’s leadership, through factors in both shifting governance modes and changing capabilities, mediated the agency’s reaction and response. As a result, given BPA’s positionality as a key regional actor, it helps explain the complex interactions among BPA, its federal partners, its customers, and regional stakeholders as the agency navigated the evolving tensions between energy and environmental sector policies.

Taken together, these give rise to a third important and potentially more far-reaching implication: my research offers the opportunity to develop a more robust understanding of the emerging concept of “meta-governance,” a term used by scholars to describe the framework by which governance actors at all levels steer and coordinate actions in complex networks. I believe there is sufficient evidence from my BPA case study to propose a Meta-Governance-In-Action (M-G-I-A) framework as a tool to understand the ‘how’ of BPA’s transformative decade. The M-G-I-A framework seeks to
explore the intersection of governance, organizational theory, and executive leadership using meta-governance to better integrate these bodies of literature and provide an analytical tool for understanding complex organizations facing diverse and dynamic operating environments and challenges. In support of the M-G-I-A framework, this research provides an approach for studying collaboration, agency change, and executive leadership, as well as examining correlative or causative relationships with external influences on the agency.

Importantly, this work will help bring meta-governance from the abstract into more readily usable models helping to better define, explain, and elaborate meta-governance concepts and theory. For example, many studies of meta-governance focus on the subject agency’s interactions within its network of actors. In my research, by integrating shifts in governance modes with changes to agency capabilities, it more clearly shows how BPA used meta-governance to steer and coordinate those interactions and accomplish its objectives. Further, by examining media reporting and particularly the statements, positions, and actions of BPA executives, the study indicates how executive leadership communicates its steering and coordination efforts, thus sending signals to other network actors. Those actors’ reactions and response, shown in media reports, provide a rich description of the complexities of Meta-Governance-In-Action in a real-world setting. In academic research and in public administration practice, this research shows the value of meta-governance in addressing the challenges confronting agencies such as BPA in a complex, diverse, and dynamic environment.
Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, Mona J. Frost, a lifelong educator and public servant in both schools and libraries. She instilled in me a passion for learning, reading, and understanding throughout my life.

_Ancora Imparo_

I am still learning
Acknowledgements

I owe an enormous thanks to numerous individuals and groups who have supported and encouraged me throughout this journey – without them, I would never have arrived at this final point in my own transformative decade.

I must begin with the faculty and staff of the Portland State University Executive Masters of Public Administration, some of whom served on my doctoral committee, but all of whom instructed, cultivated, and challenged me in myriad ways leading me to my deep interest in Public Administration and my commitment to both the scholarship and the practice of the field. No less an influence was my cohort in the EMPA, with whom I shared the unique experience and who have remained valuable and important colleagues throughout my career.

My dissertation committee, Masami Nishishiba, Craig Shinn, Kent Robinson, and particularly, my committee chair, Doug Morgan have all been unfailing in their encouragement and insights to help make the research more robust, the writing clearer, and the logic sound for my dissertation. I’m honored to call them colleagues and friends.

My entire family, who are too many to mention, but who have given me the courage to take this journey and a sense of humor when the challenge seemed too daunting. Finally, but by far the most important, is my thanks to my partner Thom Riese, who has been by my side, both supportive of, and patient with, my academic pursuits over this decade and more.
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Overview and Background for the BPA Case Study

In 1987, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) celebrated its 50th year as a federal agency created by Congress under the Bonneville Project Act “to market and transmit the power produced by Bonneville Dam on the Columbia River” (BPA, 1987, p. 57). Over those fifty years, the agency had grown in both size and complexity, selling power from 30 federal dams across the Columbia River Basin and building more than 14,000 miles of transmission lines to deliver the power, as well as funding conservation, fish and wildlife, and irrigation projects throughout the region. The celebration was an observance of the agency’s successes in fulfilling its mission as well acknowledging the cultural impact it had in the Pacific Northwest – including presenting six original recordings of Woodie Guthrie’s songs about the Columbia River to the National Archives (BPA, 2012).

Appendix A contains a full account of both the event and a brief history of the agency as a major institution of the Pacific Northwest (Lange, 1987, August 6; see also BPA, 2012, Power of the River). In his article, Lange recounts, through interviews, the challenges of life in the region prior to the creation of BPA and the building up the Federal Columbia River dams. He also summarizes the changes that BPA and the dams brought to the region, touching upon hydroelectric power, irrigation, navigation, recreation, and impacts on both industry and quality of life in the Pacific Northwest.
The article points to the outsized role BPA had played over the half-century as a federal agency and an institution in the region, all of which speaks to the importance of better understanding BPA as an organization, its evolution, and how it interacted with its operating environment over its transformational decade. Lange’s reporting provides key context for BPA as an organization and its role in the region: a cornerstone for this study.

However, in spite of the largely celebratory tone of the event’s newspaper coverage and the 1987 Annual Report, Administrator James J. Jura also noted the challenges the agency faced from an “unprecedented array of issues.” “During BPA’s 50th anniversary celebration the agency’s past challenges and difficulties were recalled, and we pointed with pride to the accomplishments and achievements of the past. The celebration also instilled a positive sense of our ability to face new challenges and overcome present adversities” (BPA, 1987, p. 2).

Ten years later, while its mission had largely remained the same, BPA had undergone a significant transformation as a federal agency, public utility, and major presence in the Pacific Northwest. As touted by Administrator Randall Hardy, “[i]n sum, we have changed BPA to meet changing public needs” (BPA, 1996, p. 5). The BPA annual reports, provided to the President, the Congress, and made available to BPA’s constituents across the region, reflected this change in myriad ways. Its organization structure and senior executive functions; its revenue and expense figures; and even its
statutory authorities and obligations in 1996 were distinctly different from 1987. In addition, in 1991, the agency had a new administrator and by 1996, BPA had developed and begun implementation of a business plan that both reflected on accomplishments of the prior five years, but more importantly charted a strategic and operational course into the 21st century as a response to increasing complexities and challenges in its direct operating environment as well the broader regional landscape.

As described, the agency accomplished significant organizational changes that essentially re-made the agency during the decade between its fiftieth and sixtieth anniversaries – or what I term ‘BPA’s transformational decade.’ The study of BPA’s transformation can bring a deeper understanding of both the agency and public administration. But in order to do so, we must begin with the gaining a sense of the agency as an organization. In addition to the newspaper account in Appendix A of the agency’s history and impact on the Pacific Northwest, understanding its basic structure and functions helps to explain its transformation.

BPA is a federal agency within the Department of Energy, with three significant operational areas. First, it markets power from thirty-one federal hydro-projects operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. Second, it provides roughly three-quarters of the transmission services in the Pacific Northwest. Finally, it is responsible for funding mitigation efforts around the Columbia River basin for the fish and wildlife population of the region. Created by the Bonneville Project Act
of 1937 (BPA, 2003, p. 32), BPA has a lengthy history as a significant economic engine within its territory, which covers Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, as well as the western portion of Montana and small territories in the states adjacent to the those four. From an organizational perspective, the agency is roughly structured along the operational areas noted above, along with the typical organization support services including offices of general counsel, finance, and corporate management. Of some note, the original BPA Act creates only three executive roles: Administrator, General Counsel, and Chief Engineer, but the Act also authorized the administrator to hire additional personnel and acquire resources as necessary to fulfill its mission.

**Decade of Change.**

The fiftieth anniversary celebration touted BPA as a Pacific Northwest institution, but although much of the rhetoric of the anniversary suggested that BPA enjoyed a stable state, major changes were on the way. A key consideration in understanding BPA’s decade of change is that fact that roughly halfway through that timeframe a series of events heightened focus on the impacts of the Federal Columbia River Power System. First, there was the rapid (and unforeseen) change in administrators from James Jura to Randall Hardy. Second, and perhaps the most significant in terms of the region’s consciousness, was the major change in the environment: the Pacific Northwest salmon stock suffered a collapse. While already experiencing a significant decline in the late 1980’s, where once “thousands returned to Idaho’s Redfish Lake . . . in 1989 biologists
could find only one of the fish that gave the lake its name” (BPA, 2012, p. 183). The responses to the collapse included Senator Mark Hatfield’s ‘Salmon Summit’ in 1990, the National Marine Fisheries Service declaring snake River sockeye salmon endangered in 1991, and additional salmon listings the following year. The result was an urgency across the region to shift means of operations, ongoing and critical coverage of prior efforts and ultimately litigation arguing that BPA and its federal partners’ efforts were insufficient to meet the crisis.

While the collapse of the salmon stocks and attendant Salmon Summit were major events garnering extended focus (Northwest newspapers outlets devoted substantial space to articles and editorials during this time period), other events of the time period must also be acknowledged. Market conditions for energy changed substantially, the utility industry began to reform itself as a result of national moves toward a deregulated, more competitive environment. As well, there had been various legislative efforts to sell off BPA’s transmission business. Moreover, under the Clinton-Gore Administration’s ‘Reinventing Government’ initiatives, there were efforts to reconstitute BPA as a government corporation in the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority. In spite of the rapidly changing operating environment and the tensions among competing external influences, the agency appeared to navigate these challenges by transforming itself while retaining its essential characteristics as a federal agency, a utility, and a powerhouse in the region. As Hardy noted ten years after BPA’s
Fiftieth Anniversary celebrations, “[t]he Pacific Northwest offers a diverse economy and clean environment. A cornerstone of the Northwest way of life is low cost, reliable power from the mighty Columbia River” (BPA, 1996, p. 2), and BPA was the central actor.

The Northwest Operating Environment and Governance Ecosystem.

While BPA was the central actor – and therefore the focus of my study – in its transformative decade, this should not be mis-interpreted to mean BPA was the sole actor. Indeed, BPA’s transformation was both driven by the significant changes in the agency’s operating environment as well as the complex and diverse array of actors that were themselves responding to multiple crises and influencing BPA’s actions. I term the network of actors influencing and/or being governed/influenced by BPA as the ‘BPA governance ecosystem’ to distinguish it from the more formal governance networks as examined by Koliba, Meek, and Zia (2011) and others. The BPA governance ecosystem in its transformational decade included: 1) the Pacific Northwest Congressional delegations and three successive Presidential administrations; 2) the federal complex of BPA’s partner agencies, the Department of Energy, as well as other federal governing offices such as the Office of Management and Budget and associated Inspectors General offices; 3) state and local governing individuals and legislative bodies; 4) regional sovereign tribes; 5) customers, utility/industry stakeholders, and trade groups; and 6)
interest groups, environmental organizations, and regional constituents; as well as 7
newspapers and similar media both covering and editorializing on BPA’s actions.

**Research Problem**

The above overview and background of BPA’s ‘transformative decade’ and
positionality as a network actor can be considered the first part of what Neustadt and
May (1986) describe as ‘events and details.’ Their approach forms the basis for
analyzing decision-making, policy development and implementation, and even
organizational or institutional change. But the details and interpretation of such a
decade – i.e., understanding the ‘how’ of those events and details impacted BPA is the
focus of my interest. With the unique positionality of BPA as an agency, a utility and –
arguably – a cultural touchstone of the Pacific Northwest, understanding the agency’s
transformation in a relatively short period of time can provide insights to administrative
behavior, organizational theory and – of particular interest – to how administrative
executives respond to crises in the environment in which they must lead by shifting how
an agency performs its function, or ‘governs.’

The research problem is perhaps best summed up by BPA itself. “As BPA
approaches the 21st century, it faces more external changes than at any time in its
history. It is entering a new era defined by intense competition, deregulation of
wholesale power marketing, utility industry restructuring, fish-oriented hydro
operations, and a changing federal role.” (BPA, 1995b, p. 1). While the statement was
forward-looking, it also captured the essence of the challenges BPA had been attempting to meet over the last several years, which brought about substantive change to the agency. Change in bureaucratic or public administrative agencies is typically slow, yet BPA’s changes to its organization and administrative behavior occurred in less than ten years. Very often, major change is accepted *de facto* without understanding exactly how multiple factors came together to make the change occur. The myriad actors involved in, influencing, or subject to, the outcomes of organizational change and shifts in governance by an institution such as BPA were themselves responding and adjusting to change in near real-time. But the mechanisms – their rewards and pitfalls are often ill-understood as events occur or there is little opportunity for retrospection. However, as Neustadt and May (1986) and Allison and Zelikow (1999) have shown, re-visiting the events and details of such change through a new lens will provide valuable insights for public administration scholars, researchers, and practitioners.

While acknowledging that organizations naturally evolve over time and – when necessary – even do so rapidly in response to the external operating environment, we must also understand BPA’s individual circumstances: its specific attributes and qualities that create a unique opportunity for in-depth study. There are, of course, other federal agencies that market power from federally operated dams (e.g., Western Area Power Administration, Southwest Power Administration, Southeast Power Administration) as well as a quasi-federal agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority (a public corporation).
But, none of these entities experienced the collapse of salmon stocks in their area of operations, nor did they have similar obligations to salmon as a significant environmental, economic, and cultural resource of the region. Moreover, utilities such as Public Utility Districts are also governmental organizations, but their scope is substantially more limited, unlike BPA’s vast operational territory. In short, BPA’s profile and circumstances are only partially analogous to other governmental utilities.

**Research Question and Purpose**

Given the intersection of these elements in 1) a complex and rapidly evolving operating environment; 2) the rapid change BPA undertook; and 3) the agency’s particular positionality in a diverse governance ecosystem, I undertook to answer the following research question:

*How did BPA’s executive leadership shift the organization’s governance collaboration and change its agency capabilities in response to a rapidly evolving operating environment.*

While there are many approaches to answering a ‘how’ question about agency change (Selznick, 1949/2011; Wilson, 2000; Carpenter, 2001), fundamentally agencies are charged with governance in some form. A big part of governance is how the work gets done, as Lasswell (1936/2018) argues in his classic book titled “Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.” My research falls into existing broad scholarly efforts to explain the
‘how’: how government agencies respond and change in the face of sudden shifts in a dynamic environment; how that change is implemented through the executive function, leadership, and actions of senior agency officials; and how both of those activities, in turn, change the mission, structure, capacity, and culture of the agency.

In developing my dissertation, I was interested in understanding the “how” or governance dimension by using the Bonneville Power Administration as a case study to explore the means by which mediating actions of the organization’s executive function adapt to sudden and significant changes in the external environment by shifting modes of governance and changing agency capabilities. Relying on a longitudinal study of BPA’s annual reports and media coverage of the agency from 1987 through 1996, my study provides an interpretive analysis of events and actions causing the agency to transform itself and preserve its role in the Pacific Northwest region. My dissertation shows how BPA responded to a dynamic, complex operating environment in the nineties to effect changes that aided in maintaining its viability as a federal agency, a utility, and a major energy, economic, and environmental driver in the Pacific Northwest. As important, it shows how the executive leadership accomplished those changes in a diverse, complex governance ecosystem.

The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, it provides a rich description of BPA as a uniquely situated federal agency seeking to retain its legitimacy, level of autonomy, and place as an institution of the Pacific Northwest region when faced with a
significant crises and challenges from the stakeholders (political, commercial, environmental, tribal, and constituent) that relied on it. Second, it explores – through the lens of meta-governance – the dimensions of executive leadership, agency change, and the influence of complex external environments on a public administrative agency. In doing so, I explore the viability of an analytical framework using meta-governance, which will provide a firm foundation for a robust future research agenda. Further, my study provides additional tools for analysis and understanding of agencies, how they function, and how they change. As well, I provide further insights to BPA’s ability to respond to crises in order to continue functioning and indeed survive as an organization.

**Overview of Meta-governance and Collibration in Public Administrative Agencies**

Scholars have developed various theories of governance used to examine public administrative agencies. For example, Weber delineates a rules-based system of objective, jurisdictional, specialized competency wherein the execution of governance responsibilities mirrors the internal “monocratically organized” bureaucratic organization (Weber, 1946/2005, p. 73). This classical hierarchy model of “government” is the most “potent and universal instrument” (Wilson, 1918, p. 62). In contrast, and as a corrective to perceived failures of Weber’s hierarchical, legal-rational model, other scholars postulate a theory of flexible and adaptable forms of governance. In particular, governance driven by competition, customer service, and contracting out government services uses a market-based model (Hirst, 2023; Cohen and Eimicke, 2013).
The market-based approach of the New Public Management movement shifts the role of governance “to systems that separate policy decisions (steering) from service delivery (rowing)” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 35). A third theory – network governance – posits a move from direct to indirect governance tools, acknowledging that “the term ‘network’ merely denotes, in a suggestive manner, the fact that policy making involves a large number and wide variety of public and private actors from different levels and functional areas of government and society” (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978, p 12). More recently, theories have gravitated toward collaboration through public engagement (Blomgren Bingham, 2013) and countering the emphasis on markets with models foregrounding the community or ‘polis’ as central to governance efforts (Stone, 2012).

Most recently the broader theory of “meta-governance” has emerged, which attempts to synthesize the prior efforts in explaining how agencies behave in response to pressures in the external environment. Jessop defines meta-governance as the “the structures and practices involved in coordinating social relations that are marked by complex, reciprocal interdependence” (2013, p. 108). Similarly, Kooiman (2003) argues that societal diversity, dynamics, and complexity require a third order of governance, i.e., meta-governance, “conceptually the place dedicated to normative governance issues” (2003, p. 170). Building on this foundation, attempts have been made to further develop theories of meta-governance. In particular, Jessop examines four modes of governance (hierarchy, markets, networks, and solidarity) and uses this as a foundation
for elaborating Dunsire’s (1996) concept of ‘collibration’ as a form of meta-governance. In doing so, he argues that collibration is a key aspect of governance, consisting of “the judicious re-articulating and rebalancing of modes of governance to manage complexity, plurality, and tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes of coordination” (Jessop, 2013, p. 115).

As illustrated in the previous discussion, meta-governance theory generally has remained at the highest levels of analysis as well as being largely abstract and theoretical. While scholars have provided valuable theoretical insight, I argue that meta-governance and collibration must evolve from abstract concepts of systems or societal state power to become an analytical lens through which operational actions by public administrators can be better understood and utilized to enhance public administration as a competency and a profession. The current state of meta-governance theory remains at a remove – if not a de facto disconnect – from the prior work of scholars focusing on agency action. Rather, the better approach is examining how the public administrator within the agency works to fulfil the agency’s mission and protects the agency’s legitimacy and autonomy, while responding to a rapidly changing environment. This brings collibration from the abstract to the concrete and from the theoretical to the empirical. Doing so closes the gap between conceptual meta-governance and how ‘agencies behave’ as well as providing the benefits of operationalizing meta-governance as a tool for use by public administrators. In
addition, there is an opportunity to construct an integrated model bringing together meta-governance, organization theory, and public administration as a profession to further the public administration field of study.

Myriad examples exist of collaboration across levels of government, types of bureaucracies, and operational sectors. Of course, the prime example and object of my case study lies in the energy sector with BPA as a federal agency. BPA quickly shifted to markets as the dominant governance mode in the early nineties. While a catastrophic change to the natural environment (the collapse of salmon stocks) might be attributable for a change in governance modes, it is somewhat counter-intuitive that such an environmental change would drive an agency to be more market-driven. As I explore in my study of BPA’s transformational decade, there were much more complex factors at play in both the operating environment (including increased competition and financial constraints) and in the BPA governance ecosystem. Federal and state agencies, public and private utilities, key political actors, and a variety of interest groups exerted pressure to implement significant policy commitments for fish mitigation, energy efficiency measures, and additional energy resources being integrated into BPA’s power markets and transmission system.

Although BPA responded to a significant change in the operational and political landscape where energy policy and environmental policy intersect, such change can also occur within a single policy domain and as a result of a perceived failure as to how an
agency executes on its mission. Bell & Park examined governance of water management in New South Wales by networked management committees but found that governance reverted toward a more centralized approach where “emphasis was placed on ‘hierarchy’ in this case of ‘networks in the shadow of hierarchy’” (2006, p. 77). This “re-collibration” from network governance mode to hierarchy, they argue, was primarily due to the apparent failure of those governance network committees to manage and respond to stakeholder concerns.

Conversely, an agency may in fact be charged by its statute and mission to change its mode of governance over time. One such instance is the State of Hawaii’s Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). OHA is designed to provide resources and facilitate collaborations for Native Hawaiian communities – indicating a form of network governance. However, the ultimate intent is that OHA will dissolve and be replaced by a system of self-government of the Native Hawaiian community. “To restore pono [well-being] and ea [sovereignty], Native Hawaiians will achieve self-governance, after which the assets of OHA will be transferred to the new governing entity” (Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 2019). Thus, as defined by its mission, OHA will ultimately shift from network governance to solidarity and – having fulfilled that mission – would be expected to cease its existence.

Such fundamental changes in collibration can also occur in rapid and possibly devastating fashion, as with the Irish Republic’s Revenue Commissioners, which are
charged with border and customs enforcement. Ferriter writes of a hundred years of disputes, political change, and violence on the border having finally, through a formal peace process and entry into the European Union, made “many aspects of cross-border movement and co-operation quietly convenient and successful” (2019, p. 136), only to have a no-deal Brexit raise the specter of a “reinstated ‘hard’ border becoming a target for violence” (2019, p. 140). Ferriter indicates that the prior mix of network and solidarity governance would shift to hierarchy through enforcement as well as market governance through competition.

In addition to the works of Carpenter (2001), Kooiman (2003), and Wilson (2000) noted above, examples include examination of patterns of engagement between government and communities (Selznick, 1949/2011; Kaufman, 1960/2006; Acheson and Laforest, 2013); theories on interconnections and interactions of citizen participation in policy development (Edelenbos, van Schie, and Gerrits, 2010); development of theories on network governance and democratic anchorage (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009); and the argument for associative self-governance (Hirst, 2023). These examples argue for the use of collaboration as a lens through which scholars and practitioners can make sense out of the environmental changes in which the agency must operate. As societal challenges continue to evolve, public administrators also change the ways and means by which they meet those challenges so that they, their administrative organizations, and public institutions, may be better equipped to function, fulfill their mission, and
maintain legitimacy – or attain autonomy (Carpenter). Thus, public administrators, through their role as agency executives, act as ‘meta-governors’ by re-collibrating the agency’s capabilities and modes of governance. The focus of my dissertation is how these three aspects (executive leadership, agency capability, and governance modes) interact to effect internal change in response to external influences.

**Dissertation Structure**

My BPA case study explores meta-governance in the context of public administrative agencies and executive leadership and is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is an in-depth literature review that begins with an overview of network theory, then examines meta-governance, governance collibration and the modes of governance that collibration encompasses. I also include general organization theory with the sub-fields of executive leadership and the public administrative agency design. Chapter 3 details the design of my case study with a rationale for the specific longitudinal BPA case study; the two records and data sets used for my research; as well as the analytical approach used to gain an understanding of BPA’s transformational decade. My findings are divided among two chapters. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of BPA’s annual reports using a coding scheme that captures the dimensions of governance collibration, agency capability, and executive leadership. Chapter 5 juxtaposes the annual report findings with the narratives of BPA over the decade found in the three major regional newspapers. I conclude in Chapter 6 by summarizing and integrating my finding and
observations. As well, I propose an analytical framework for future research on governance collibration in public administrative agencies along with a robust future research agenda. I then make some final observation regarding my case study research and its contribution to the field of public administration.

**Value of the Study**

The implications of my research touch upon meta-governance theory, research in collibration, policy, and practice. Foremost, the research provides a means of elaborating a meta-governance theory of collibration that enables us to better understand how external influences on public administrators and agencies interact to produce organizational changes in structure, capacity, leadership, culture, etc. Importantly, this work will help to bring meta-governance from the abstract into more readily testable models that will help to better define, explain, and elaborate meta-governance concepts and theory. In addition, my research provides a meta-governance lens through which to examine executive leadership and agency capability.

The most significant limitation on the research is one that has been identified in other meta-governance research efforts. Because the field of meta-governance is relatively new and underdeveloped (as most scholars concede), there is not a strong agreement as to conceptual definitions, theoretical frameworks, or research models. While my study attempts to provide a robust framework for studying meta-governance, it is likely that competing models and theories of meta-governance are being developed.
concurrently. This may result in my research having a limited “shelf-life” or being in
direct conflict with other efforts. However, that is inherent in the nature of new theory
domains and the work proposed will contribute to resolving questions about what
direction the meta-governance field should take.

While meta-governance theory has remained largely conceptual and focused on
systems or the state, its use for my research provided insights to how agencies behave –
as Wilson (2000) notes – by better understanding the ways in which the structures,
capacity, and culture of the agency reflect governance modes they use and emphasize.
More importantly, my research connects theories of the role of the executive and
bureaucratic leadership with the more recent theories of the meta-governor’s role,
providing an additional means to better understand and analyze the unique and
significant challenges of the public administrator in a complex, diverse, and dynamic
environment. As well, my case study attempts to integrate organizational theories of
executive leadership and agency capability through the use of governance collibration.

Strongly associated with the theoretical implications, this study serves as a
potential model for further research on the use of meta-governance and collibration by
public administrators. In particular, by explicating the means of identifying and
measuring collibration in case studies, this research can then be replicated for other
agencies at a national, state, and local level, as well as in additional policy domains. As
important for the meta-governance field, it may then be used as a basis for examining
collibration at a national or systems level of analysis. As important, there is the potential for using the research as a policy analysis and design tool. My efforts further support ways of examining agency actions within policy domains to better understand positive collibration for efficiency, effectiveness, and value congruence. Similarly, by collibration analysis, public administrators will have a new lens through which to approach their work and profession, as well as an additional tool for their use. This in turn may support the knowledge and skills necessary to function as meta-governors and address the complex issues facing public administrators today.
Chapter 2: Review of Literature

In studying BPA as a complex public agency through the lens of meta-governance, I used three associated bodies of literature: governance and collaboration; administrative agency design and behavior; and the executive function and bureaucratic leadership. While previous theories, scholarship, and research in these areas overlap to varying degrees, dividing them into three distinct bodies supports and further elaborates my case study approach. I use a review of the literature in each of these areas to understand meta-governance. However, it must be noted that the executive function/leadership and administrative agency design/behavior literatures are sub-fields of organizational theory as a whole. Therefore, I have included an organizational theory overview prior to delving into the separate aspects of organizations and executives. As well, the literature on meta-governance and collaboration arises from broader network theory. I will thus begin with a short overview of network theory, then meta-governance and collaboration. I then move to an organizational theory overview. Finally, I examine the literatures on the role of the executive and the design of administrative agencies respectively. I close by synthesizing the three facets of governance collaboration, executive leadership, and administrative agency design in support of my approach in studying BPA in its transformative decade.
Network Theory

Governance theory and practice have continued to evolve in recent decades in attempts toward a better understanding of its successes and failures with eye to improving government structure. In recent decades governance theory and practice have shown a greater focus on network theory as a field of inquiry into the complex structures found in modern governance, or the “processes of social organization and social coordination” (Bevir, 2013, p. 3). Notably there have been disagreements as to whether network theory is a separate and distinct aspect of governance (Torfing, 2012) or a fundamental, underlying attribute of society (Ferguson, 2018). By way of example, Ferguson argues that even hierarchy (as a form of governance) “is just a special kind of network” (2018, p. 39).

The premise of network theory is grounded in twin concepts: first, that current society is a ‘plural state’ meaning “multiple inter-dependent actors contribute to the delivery of public service”; and second, that current society is also a ‘pluralist state’ “where multiple processes inform the policy making system” (Osborne, 2006, p. 384). It should also be noted that the complexities inherent in this framing of general network theory gives rise to analogies that lend themselves to literature on the topic such as Slaughter’s (2018) ‘The Chessboard and the Web,’ and Ferguson’s (2018) ‘The Square and the Tower.’ Importantly, in the context of my study, it must be acknowledged that each individual, organization, or entity within a network necessarily views itself and the
surrounding network through its own self-interested lens of self-sufficiency and survival – or autopoiesis (Dunsire, 1996) – by means of legitimacy (Considine and Afzal, 2013), autonomy, (Carpenter, 2001), resilience (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2013), and thus, transformation (Katz and Kahn, 1966/2005). Therefore, research focusing on a single organizational case must use network theory in identifying the organization within a complex, diverse, and dynamic network (Kooiman, 2003) with which it interacts to pursue its mission.

At its most basic, the characteristics of general network theory consist of vertical, horizontal, or diagonal relationships (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Torfing, 2012). Vertical ties are found in hierarchies, are centralized, and evidenced by a “power over” authority, whereas, horizontal ties appear in markets (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan, 1999). Although the term ‘market’ suggests independent authority, Torfing argues that horizontal ties include instances of “shared beliefs [and] interdependency” as well (2012, p. 86). In exploring vertical and horizontal ties, Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan also observe that vertical ties are more formal and compulsory whereas horizontal ties will tend toward more informal, voluntary associations. Diagonal ties, in Koliba, Meek and Zia’s view, then speak to instances that are neither strictly speaking vertical nor horizontal relationships, but are a mix of the two, thus creating more complex governance network characteristics.
Koliba, Meek, and Zia (2011) further build on the vertical, horizontal, and diagonal relationships by arguing that each includes a type of social power. In so doing, they add to the taxonomy of network theory through an exploration of the types of interaction between actors. Implied in these relationships is the bi-directionality of the ties, which may be stronger (as in networks) or weaker (as in hierarchy). Thus, vertical, hierarchical relations utilize ‘command and control,’ or ‘principal-agent’ social power. This can be described as “the kind of authority that strong states employ when providing centralized direction over society” (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011, p. 107).

Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1999) also note that command and control are hallmarks of bureaucratic organizations. Koliba, Meek, and Zia use the labels of collaboration and cooperation as the social power construct in horizontal tie relationships. Collaboration and cooperation include instances of “partnerships, coalitions, and strategic alliance” (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011, p. 109). Significantly, Koliba, Meek, and Zia distinguish between these types of horizontal ties and competition as social power, which they associate with market ties, but frame as ‘no ties’ rather than horizontal ties. This is distinct from other authors (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan, 1999; Torfing, 2012) who encompass markets within the characteristics of horizontal ties. Finally, Koliba, Meek, and Zia suggest concession and compromise as the paramount characteristic of diagonal ties. “We argue that authority over becomes more a matter of negotiated between in most governance networks” (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011, p. 109).
The means by which the ties described above are established and function gives rise to the concept of meta-governance. When discussing meta-governance, Kooiman posits “meta-x is something over and beyond x” (2003, p. 170). Put another way, it is the thing about the thing: just as metadata is data about data, so then meta-governance is governance about governance. Thus, where Jessop refers to governance as “the structures and practices involved in coordinating social relations that are marked by complex, reciprocal interdependence,” then “meta-governance refers in turn to the coordination of these structures and practices” (2013, p. 108), or “the governance of governance” (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009, p. 245). Put another way, meta-governance or the “governance of governance . . . involves deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage, and direct more or less self-regulating processes of interactive governance” (Torfing, 2012, p. 122). At its most basic, meta-governance captures the objectives, means, and forms by which governance functions through general network theory.

As seen with these authors, there is a concerted effort in moving from theory to practice. Therefore, identifying existing empirical research in this field should give some sense of its success. Admittedly, research studies using meta-governance theory – and more specifically, collibration – are somewhat sparse, perhaps due to an undeveloped sense of the underlying theories or “messiness of this field” (Jessop, 2013, p. 120). Added to this are the difficulties in how these studies are framed. Some may ostensibly frame the work as meta-governance but are more accurately described as network
governance studies (Bell and Park, 2006). Others are framed in terms such as “co-governance” but appear to be using a meta-governance lens (Fenwick, Miller, and McTavish, 2012).

These challenges have also been explored in the literature attempting to better crystalize and understand meta-governance. As an example, Gjaltema, Biesbrock, and Termeer examine some 200 journal articles from various resources to help better understand the many ways in which the meta-governance concept is used and to help “make the abstract concept of meta-governance more concrete” (2020, p. 1760). Similarly, Hooge, Waslander and Theisens (2022) consider broad meta-governance strategies (though firmly grounded in network theory) used by central governments in education policy. Finally, Ek Osterberg and Qvist frame meta-governance as a means for “understanding attempts to create structure and order in the spaces between different formal organizations” (2023, p. 193). Moreover, Osterberg and Qvist observe that the “popularity of the [meta-governance] concept is reflected in a growing number of publications and empirical applications across a wide range of policy areas” (2023, p. 192). The difficulty is in both the broad interpretations and varying uses of the concept in research. However, some observations can be validly made, and associated gaps identified.

Meta-governance research primarily uses a single case study approach (Bell and Park, 2006; Whitehead, 2003), though instances also exist utilizing a comparative case
study framework (Fenwick, Miller, and McTavish, 2012). Significantly, the studies examine specific criteria of failure (Jessop, 2016) such as ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Bell and Park, 2006; Fenwick, Miller, and McTavish, 2012) or the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Koch, 2013; Whitehead, 2003). However other comparative case studies such as Fotel and Hanssen (2009) show a greater focus on the different means by which meta-governance is utilized in complex networks in regional policy-setting. In doing so, these studies use meta-governance as a means to analyze a governance phenomenon. As well, meta-governance theory – through collibration – then examines how the organization interacts with its network using different governance modes and the means of decision-making in the meta-governance context (Ek Osterberg and Qvist, 2023). Finally, it must be emphasized that meta-governance theories are used to examine governance phenomena in a variety of sectors including water management (Bell and Park, 2006) education (Hooge, Waslander and Theisens, 2022), and crisis management (Larsson, 2017).

These case study examples acknowledge the endogenous nature of organizations, and in particular, administrative agencies interacting with the surrounding network and broader operating environment. However, it does not appear that there have been significant studies to test and solidify the theories of Jessop (2016) or Kooiman (2003) into a consistent, comprehensive framework. As well, there is a lack of studies in applying a practical theory of collibration to existing instances of
operational meta-governance at an organizational level of analysis. Thus, there is an opportunity to develop such research. Focusing on Jessop’s model of collibration, my case study aims to do just that: move collibration into a more concrete form of analysis for administrative agencies.

**Governance Collibration**

I now turn to the key concepts of network theory that frame the relatively new concept of governance collibration. Jessop defines collibration as “the judicious re-articulating and rebalancing of modes of governance to manage complexity, plurality, and tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes of coordination” (2013, p. 108). Thus, using network theory and collibration we can then examine how an organization interacts with its network or ecosystem using different governance modes. However, much of the research thus far uses systems, or the state/central government as the level of analysis and the work and remains largely theoretical as shown by Gjaltema, Biesbrock, and Termeer’s (2020) meta-study. Although scholars have begun to operationalize meta-governance and collibration through case study examinations as previously noted, more work remains. Of note, Jones (2023), examines what he terms ‘spaces of collibration,’ which looks to dimensions of territory, place, scale and network as opportunities for mixing means and tools for achieving policy objectives. However, these efforts also largely remain with central governments. In order to further move from the conceptual to the operational and into a workable means for my research and
analysis, I have moved the level of analysis to organizations. I further focus on the agency rather than the state as the unit of analysis. To do so, I begin by providing an overview of the modes of governance that Jessop (2016) indicates in his theories on collibration. In addition, I look to Koliba, Meek, and Zia (2011) in their description of patterns of interaction associated with governance modes.

As an additional observation, the terms used for different governance modes are an adequate shorthand but consistency in usage and understanding can be problematic. As an example, Jessop, who has written extensively on modes of governance alternatively uses ‘command’ instead of ‘hierarchy;’ exchange rather than ‘markets;’ and even ‘dialogue’ versus ‘networks.’ Moreover, terms are interchanged even within the same work and Jessop himself has continued to evolve his theories and the associated terms throughout his scholarship (Jessop, 2013, 2016, 2022), which speaks to the dynamic nature of the field of meta-governance research and theory.

Foundationally, Jessop identifies and elaborates four governance modes: Hierarchy, Markets, Networks, and Solidarity. The interplay among the four provides insight as to how the agency in question functions through the modes of governance it utilizes to achieve its objectives and fulfill its mission. Collibration seeks “to alter the weight of individual modes of governance . . . at a higher or more comprehensive level of social organization” (Jessop, 2016, p. 171). Further, Jessop identifies a series of activities that are associated with governance including ground rules, regulatory order,
forums for community engagement and dialogue, subsidizing production of public
goods, creating limited monopolies, and acting as means of appeal and last resort,
among a host of other actions. Similarly, Eliadis, Hill and Howlett (2007) explore such
actions as being a suite of tools through which government agencies engage to achieve
policy ends. They posit spectrums of policy instruments (substantive and procedural)
that mesh well with governance modes moving from voluntary (akin to Solidarity)
through mixed means (which may align with Markets or Networks) to compulsory
(Hierarchic in nature). To better understand each of the governance modes in support
of an agency-based theory of collibration, each mode is discussed separately, noting (in
alignment with Eliadis, Hill and Howlett, 2007) that understanding collibration
necessitates an acknowledgement that the mix of modes creates overlap and gray areas
among the modes themselves. Finally, Hult and Walcott (1990) use the term
“governance structures” and posit their key characteristics, noting – in distinction from
Jessop – hierarchical, adjudicative, adversarial, and collegial-competitive governance
structures. These do align somewhat with Jessop’s model but have considerably more
overlap among the types of structures making this approach less effective for my
purposes. That being said, they are clearly situated at the agency unit of analysis as
compared to Jessop and therefore provide some insight and support to the
characteristics associated with Jessop’s modes of governance. A final caveat, which is
crucial to emphasize: while the terms used to categorize governance modes are readily
familiar to researchers and scholars in both the political administration and political
science fields, as I used them for my research, they have more specific meanings that should not be confused with other uses of those terms. Therefore, in each section devoted to one of the four governance modes, I focus on scholars and theories that most closely align with my use of Hierarchy, Markets, Networks, and Solidarity as governance modes for this study.

**Hierarchy Governance Mode.**

Hierarchy as a governance mode is perhaps the most-well defined and, in fact Ferguson, provides a brief history of the term, its usage, and its prevalence throughout history as an efficient exercise of power. Referring to its beginnings among familial clans and tribes, he notes “centralized control in the hands of the ‘big man’ eliminated or at least reduced time-consuming arguments about what to do” (Ferguson, 2018, p. 21). While the concept of hierarchy has evolved well beyond its authoritarian foundations to complex societal interactions, its basis still includes rules, centralization, and command and control or “power over” authority (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011, p. 105). However, in more recent scholarship, it is typically more defined in contrast to proposed alternatives (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011) or in cataloguing its failures (Ferguson, 2018; Jessop, 2016; Kooiman, 2003). Further, for the purpose of collaboration, we must be clear about the distinction between hierarchies as a form of internal organization governance (Bevir, 2013) and a pattern of external interaction (as defined above) between the governing and the governed. As a pattern of
interaction, Jessop refers to hierarchy as “top-down intervention” as well as “imperative coordination” (2012, p. 110, 112) both of which align with Koliba, Meek, and Zia’s (2011) vertical ties concept.

Lynn (2013), in particular, acknowledges the distinction from internal organizational hierarchy by offering a clear definition of hierarchy as a governance mode: “hierarchy is a ‘pattern of rule’, a means of coordinating social activity through the mechanism of rank ordering of authority within a society” (2013, p. 228). He further emphasizes its attributes of “coerciveness, directness, automaticity, and visibility” (Lynn, 2013, p.229, referencing Salomon, 2000). Moreover, he emphasizes the distinction between hierarchy and bureaucracy noting that bureaucracy is simply “the most elaborate form of hierarchically-ordered rule” (Lynn, 2013, p. 229). As a final note, a number of scholars (Lynn, 2013; Ferguson, 2018) argue that, in spite of theories about and arguments for the use of the governance modes described below, hierarchy is a fundamental aspect of the very concept of governance; that it is inevitably the foundation of governance, and that the other modes operate to a greater or lesser extent within its shadow. However, this observation is as much an argument for collibration as a dismissal of alternate modes. It is not that alternative modes do not exist; rather, “[t]he more plausible proposition is that we are witnessing an expansion of the array of tools democracies use to accomplish their purposes” (Lynn, 2013, p. 233).

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This holds even more true with administrative agencies and does not reduce the value of theories and analysis of the remaining modes of governance.

_Markets Governance Mode._

One initial point of clarity in understanding the Markets governance mode is in the use of the term ‘markets’ itself. Beyond the broader socio-economic systems and theories of ‘the market,’ the term as used in network theory and meta-governance outlines governance modalities through economic means of exchange and efficiency (see, e.g., Jessop, 2022). However, for network theory and governance collibration, Koliba, Meek, and Zia (2011) narrow the term ‘markets’ as referring to horizontal, competitive relational ties. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) summarize the core principles of what has come to be called New Public Management (NPM), three of which are closely aligned with competitive, horizontal ties. These principles include treating the public as the customer – or consumer – of public services and tout such an orientation as one that would increase transparency and user friendliness. In addition, NPM’s principle of contracting out or even privatizing certain government services is a means for increasing efficiency. Finally, they advocate for entrepreneurial government, which they argue requires appropriate incentives that supports innovation in use and allocation of government resources. They further argue that these (and other) NPM principles are effective in improving performance and reducing hierarchical rigidity, ultimately shifting form ‘government’ to governance.’
Notably, Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) arguments do not suggest a change in government organizational structure, *per se*, but they instead advocate for a significant shift in the methods and focus of service delivery by government agencies. As Peters and Pierre (1998) observe, this shift is one of management strategies, objectives, and direct competition with private companies. “NPM is essentially a philosophy of generic management because it argues that all management has similar challenges and hence should be resolved in similar way in public- and private-sector organizations” (Peters and Pierre, 1998, p. 229, *quoting Peters, 1996*). The critique of the Markets governance mode, however, is that by emphasizing competition and mirroring public agencies with private organizations, NPM blurs the distinction between market and bureaucratic institutions. “NPM seeks to transform the public bureaucracy to a set of organizations whose only difference from private, for-profit organizations is the product that is delivered” (Peters and Pierre, 1998, p. 232). However, as Koliba, Meek, and Zia (2011) detail, competition, customer-service, and a business model approach to providing services are the clear, observable criteria for identifying the Markets governance mode in public administrative agencies.

*Networks Governance Mode.*

To reiterate my prior point for clarity, my study considers *formal* governance networks as one of the four modes of governance, distinct from the general network governance theory that provides the foundation for meta-governance. The attributes of
networks are founded on two concepts: entities and interactions. The entities associated with the network form the nodes in the network construct. These entities may be formal organizations (whether government, private, or non-profit), informal organizations such as communities of interest (citizens groups, special interest groups, etc.), or in some circumstances, individuals. These organizations and entities are generically referred to as actors (Klijn, 1999; Torfing, 2012) or nodes (Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2011). The second concept is the interactions between actors within the network. Koliba, Meek and Zia refer to these as ‘inter-nodal ties,’ which include exchange of resources, power, and authority. Resources are exchanged among network participants, provided to the network as a whole, or made available as required. Koliba, Meek and Zia detail the types of resources as including financial, natural, physical/technological, or human resources as well as intangibles such as knowledge, information, social, political, or cultural resources or capital. These formal governance networks function through horizontal ties of collaboration and consensus that include “partnerships, coalitions, and strategic alliance” for the exchange of resources (in its broadest sense), power, and authority (Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2011, p. 109).

Provan and Kenis (2007) suggest three basic forms of governance networks: participant-governed, lead organization-governed, and network administration organizations. Koliba, Meek and Zia (2011) have adopted these forms but where Provan and Kenis use the term ‘participant-governed’ they use the term ‘self-governed.’
However, their observations of how these forms or models are structured and operate are largely consistent. Moreover, “no one model is universally superior or effective. Rather, each form has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, leading to outcomes that are likely to depend on the form chosen” (Provan and Kenis, 2007, p. 234). However, the significance of networks as a governance mode is less dependent on the structure of the formal governance network and more on the aspects of network interactions. Thus, networks as a governance mode include both formally and informally developed ties over extended time periods that include collaboration, cooperation, and exchange of resources both in more traditional forms (financial, physical/intellectual property, political, etc.) as well as social, cultural, and similar resources.

*Solidarity Governance Mode.*

Solidarity is the least conceptually well-developed mode of governance and in fact, Jessop defines solidarity as “a relatively unreflexive, value-oriented rationality that is premised on unconditional commitment and loyalty” (2011, p. 113). Subsequently, Jessop (2022) elaborates solidarity identifying three forms best suited for my research. The three forms are civic solidarity, democratic solidarity, redistributive solidarity. Recalling Jessop’s focus on governance at the state or systems level, it is important to consider solidarity specifically at the agency level. Thus, while each of Jessop’s categories offer a wealth of scholarship and theories, for my research, I focus on those
aspects of each form most closely aligned with use of the solidarity governance mode by a public administrative agency.

Beginning with civic solidarity and the Civil Society Movement, Putnam (1994) studies institutional performance as shaped by the socio-cultural context within which it operates, positing a theory mirroring Jessop's (2022) civic solidarity concept. Putnam argues that voluntary cooperation, reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement build strong relationships, social capital, and strengthened trust in community members between civic and governmental institutions. “Social trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement, and successful cooperation are mutually reinforcing” (Putnam, 1994, p. 180). Putnam’s socio-cultural approach provides one lens through which solidarity as a mode of governance can provide insight to complex interactions between institutions (in the form of government agencies) and civic communities.

Shifting to theories of democratic solidarity, the theories emphasize the good of the whole over the good of individual actors. Stone (2012), in developing a political community model – the ‘polis’ – as a policy lens, perhaps comes closest to Jessop’s (2022) democratic solidarity. With the polis concept as the foundation for her framework, she provides a means for applying that model to understand goals as community values; frame and define problems through political discourse; and identify policy tools to provide solutions. Similarly, Morgan and Shinn consider means of coproduction with the communities that government agencies serve through “politically
mediated expression of collectively determined preferences that the citizenry deems valuable” (2014, p. 5). Moreover, Morgan and Shinn emphasize the horizontal ties and reinforcing connections resulting from collective community engagement as a continuous feedback loop benefiting both the public institutions and the public they serve. This approach to solidarity translates into an administrative agency accomplishing its mission through the moral obligation to serve the public. “Because politics and policy can only happen in communities, community must be the starting point of our polis” (Stone, 2012, p. 20).

Finally, redistributive solidarity is addressed, albeit indirectly, by Lipsky (1980/2010) in examining public service engagement through direct service to constituents, communities, and clients. He uses the term ‘street-level bureaucrat,’ defining it as both “the public service with which citizens typically interact” and “public service employment of a certain sort, performed under certain conditions” (Lipsky, 1980/2010, p. xvii). The key to Lipsky for solidarity is the direct interaction with the public. In short, Lipsky’s theories are most salient to understanding solidarity in his focus on individual discretion (i.e., direct engagement with the public) by street-level bureaucrats and the de facto policy created as a result of that discretion.

There is less of a clear theoretical through-line in the solidarity governance mode than with the other modes. However, considering the scholars summarized here in light of Jessop’s (2022) abstract concept of solidarity, certain consistent attributes of
solidarity as a governance mode are discernible. As noted above, Jessop’s focus is at the state or systems level. But these additional authors help to operationalize solidarity at the organization level with the government agency as the unit of analysis. From an agency perspective, whether considered as community engagement, direct/deliberative democracy, or providing direct community services, solidarity at the agency level involves direct engagement as bottom-up approach of input and interaction from the constituency.

**Summary of Governance Modes.**

The four modes of governance (as well as the combination of their use by agencies) each provide certain benefits and challenges. While the Hierarchy governance mode, through top-down, mandated control is effective, it can lack responsiveness and it prioritizes outputs over outcomes. Similarly, the Markets governance mode emphasizes results through entrepreneurship, innovation, and competition, but may fall prey to capture of public services by private interests. The Networks governance mode offers synergies in resource allocation and effective collaboration but are criticized as potentially exclusionary to stakeholders outside the network itself, thus reducing accountability. Finally, the Solidarity governance mode touts direct service and engagement, yet may not be sufficiently scalable to meet the needs of the agency and its constituents. As an additional observation, we must not lose sight of the fact that, not only do these modes of governance co-exist within a single agency (which is the
core concept of collibration), but the modes themselves are not always clear and
distinct from one another in practice. However, collibration – and more importantly,
the ability to shift the agency’s collibrative mix – supports each form of governance as a
corrective to the potential failure of another. Moreover, collibration supports resilience
and agility within an agency if it can shift its mix of governance mode to respond to a
changing environment.

Governance as a concept, theory, and practice is ubiquitous today in part due to
the significant shifts in the ways the state and society inter-relate. Because governance
allows for multiple actors, it aids in a more robust analysis of the complexities of the
state and society as a whole. Using collibration we can better understand agencies,
their policy tools, and the modes of governance they utilize. Yet, we must also
acknowledge that the ubiquity of governance stems from the ability of it to mean many
things to many people – a different take on Bevir’s (2013) depiction of it as a ‘weasel
word.’ However, that does not diminish its value as a concept and theory. As seen by
the shifts in modalities of governance through collibration, it provides an effective
means for exploring patterns of rule.

The key to continuing this exploration is in coupling collibration and
organizational theory. While collibration provides a new lens through which to examine
agency action, it is insufficient by itself to provide a robust means of analysis. This may
be in part attributed to its still-nascent development as a field of study. As well,
collibration (and importantly, re-collibration) of modes by an agency can only be implemented through the executive function and ultimately in changes to the agency itself, whether re-organization of the internal structure, re-allocation of resources, changes to the agency culture, or – in more extreme instances, changes in mission and enabling statute. Therefore, in addition to examining the literature on meta-governance and collibration, we must also understand the literature on the executive function and the literature on organizational analysis at agencies.

**Organizational Theory**

While governance collibration is central to my research, organizational theory is important for enabling us to understand how collibration is put into practice. My research relies heavily on the broad field of organization theory, and more particularly, on two related sub-fields, each having a distinct approach. First is the executive function or bureaucratic leadership within public administration. Second is analysis of administrative agency design and behavior, specifically of bureaucratic government agencies. Notably, there is some overlap in the study of these two areas with many scholars addressing both as aspects of organizational theory before narrowing their focus to one or the other field of study. This emphasizes the intersectionality of the two fields and, as will be seen in my synthesis of the two, lends support to my case study approach. I begin with general organizational theory and the schools of thought
regarding organizations as distinct social phenomena, emphasizing those authors who
provide the underpinnings for the analytical approach I used in my research.

Organizations as Rational Systems.

The rational system theory of organizations, with its focus on goals, structures,
formal roles, and rules of operation posits a clear, well-defined image of the
organization as a machine (Morgan, 2006). Moreover, the mechanistic view argues for
the ability to optimally design both an organization and the individual positions within
that organization (Mintzberg, 1993) or considers the attributes of the ideal or the

Understanding organizations as rational systems begins with the objective
observation of an organization’s purpose and structure. As the label indicates, this
school of thought also relies heavily on rationality in pursuit of goals and design of the
organization. The rational systems school then argues that having established a goal or
purpose, organizational design establishes the means by which to achieve the goal in
the most effective and efficient means possible. The idea of design itself contemplates
organizations as simply a tool of sorts, which can be applied (as with any other tool) to
accomplish a purpose. Just as a lever and fulcrum can be applied to move a stone, an
organization can be designed to move myriad stones and thus build a structure. In fact,
the idea of a tool is inherent in the word itself: “This is reflected in the origins of the
word *organization*, which derives from the Greek *organon*, meaning a tool or instrument” (Morgan, 2006, p. 15).

However, Scott and Davis (2016) point out that the rational system focuses on pursuit and design rather than the goal itself, which could well be completely irrational. “It is perfectly possible to pursue irrational or foolish goals by rational means” (2016, p. 35). Moreover, they note that the mechanistic approach tends to downplay or ignore the complexities of organizations by reducing them to a mechanistic object. Because my focus is specifically on government agencies, as formal organizations, the rational systems, or mechanistic approach to analysis is appropriate to a large degree.

Two criticisms have been made of a rational system analysis when applied to government agencies. First, traditional rational system authors tend to examine industrial or factory-type settings regardless of the limited extensibility of the theory to all manner of organizations. Whether they use examples of pins (Smith, 1776/1994), shoes (Gulick, 1937/2005) or shoveling (Taylor, 1916/2005), these authors assume their approach is universally applicable to all organizations. Government organizations are different in many respects. In part, this is because government agencies, as creatures of statute (through law, regulation, and oversight), have numerous constraints in mission, structure, and authority. Therefore, a narrowly mechanistic approach to analysis (and even more, the argument for the best, most appropriate design of a governmental bureaucracy) does not capture the complex relationships and competing goals inherent
in such organizations. Secondly, there are a number of organizational aspects that are not accounted for – even in bureaucracies – in a strictly mechanistic consideration. These include the considerations of maintaining agency legitimacy and autonomy (Carpenter, 2001) as well as the dynamic landscape within which such agencies operate. As a final observation, the formality associated with the mechanistic view leads to cumbersome bureaucracy, hidebound functioning, and even Procrustean rigidity, each a ‘pathology’ as Scott and Davis (2016) note (referencing Stinchcombe). But we must also be aware that research often focuses on pathologies and failures or (perhaps less often) when an organization shows significant success or innovation. The focus is not on organizations that are smoothly functioning, delivering on goals – they can fade into the background. Providing alternative approaches (as seen below) avoids this conundrum to some degree because the mechanistic view foregrounds concepts of broken or ineffective machinery. With that in mind, I now turn to the natural systems approach that considers the inherent complexities of organization interactions over pure function.

**Organizations as Natural Systems.**

In immediate contrast to the rational system school of thought, “natural system advocates emphasize that organizations are, first and foremost, collectivities” (Scott and Davis, 2016, p. 59). Morgan (2006) elaborates on this concept, drawing a direct parallel to the natural sciences and analogizing organizations to different species of organisms, each of which exist in and adapt to their environments in order to be self-sustaining. He
then extends the analogy to the structure of the organization, using “molecules, cells, complex organisms, species and ecology” in the natural world as a parallel to individuals, groups, organizations (species) of organizations, and their social ecology” (Morgan, 2006, p. 34, emphasis in original). This construct of the level of analysis in turn has led to the development of different foci or sub-schools that all consider organizations from a biological perspective, including behavior, psychology, interrelations, survival, sustainment, and growth. This schema also serves well in understanding the research and scholarship that is based in the natural systems school.

Beginning at the most granular level – that of the individual – the scholarship has utilized behavioral psychology to great effect in understanding organizations as a collectivity of people. Foundational to this understanding is Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943/2005). Maslow notes it is not a strict hierarchy (e.g., basic needs are not always found to have been fully satisfied for the individual to pursue higher needs) and emphasizes the multiple motivations that individuals experience. More significant is his observation that threats to the pursuit of these basic needs will result in psychological defenses. Utilizing this understanding of motivation could then be used in helping us better understand and develop human relations with employees that would in turn benefit the organization itself, already a substantially different view from the mechanistic consideration of employees as tools or cogs in an efficiently designed and operating machine.
While scholars have attempted to provide insight to motivation and behaviors at the individual level, such behavioral analysis necessarily requires an exploration of the interactions that either frame or drive those behaviors. Individuals *de facto* act and behave within the context of relationships (both formal and informal) that are themselves cultivated within the organizations. Building on individual behavior, organizational theory then moves up in level of analysis to interrelationships within the organization and group dynamics. From the foundational precepts of workers as social animals functioning within organizations as collectivities, a number of scholars have explored the relationships, both formal and informal, that result (Follett, 1926/2005; Barnard, 1938/2002; Mintzberg, 2005; Nye, 2010). Research has explored power and politics within an organization; leadership, decision-making, and giving direction; and cooperation versus conflict in the organizational setting. As Perrow notes (referencing Miles), this is a shift in perspective “the former is concerned with ‘human relations’ while the latter is concerned with ‘human resource’” (2014, p. 97). Moreover, while areas of this research and theory remain centered on the individual, this work seeks to understand the interaction and relations between those individuals – both from an objective, descriptive perspective and from a normative perspective to develop group relations models.

The earliest work on interrelations (and growing directly from the research in behavioral psychology) is in those formal relationships between workers and those who
direct that work. Follett takes the mechanistic view in giving orders as a starting point. “[G]iving orders seems a very simple affair; [managers] expect to issue their own orders and have them obeyed without question” (Follett, 1926/2005, p. 152). She then argues that such an assumption is not only in error but is not beneficial; it is in fact bad for business. Her premise, rooted in psychology, is in the workers’ reaction to being given orders such that “the more you are ‘bossed’ the more your activity of thought will take place within the bossing-pattern” in opposition to bossing (Follett, 1926/2005, p. 154). The counter to these patterns is to ‘depersonalize’ giving orders by uniting “all concerned in the study of the situation, to discover the law of the situation and obey that” (Follett, 1926/2005, p. 154). Notably, while Follett’s solution is presented with examples across industrial sectors, it focuses on issues arising where there is not a clear prior standard or process that has previously been determined to meet the situation. That being said, her premises would still indicate, based on relational patterns, empowering the worker to provide input for increase efficiency, resilience, or response to changing circumstance.

Follett’s (1926/2005) ideas are further developed in scholarship moving from giving orders to concepts of authority and leadership. Barnard (1938/2002) elaborates on Follett’s ‘law of situation’ through his theory of authority. He begins with a definition of authority as “the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to or ‘member’ of the organization as
governing the action he contributes” (Barnard, 1938/2002, p. 163). Significantly, his premise relies on two assumptions: a formal organization and a formal relationship between the ‘member’ and the communicator (order-giver). In doing so, he focuses on the member’s acceptance of authority, essentially arguing that power derives from that acceptance rather than with the “persons of authority” (Barnard, 1938/2002, p. 163). He then elaborates the conditions of such acceptance (similar to Follett’s law of the situation). The member understands the communication, is physically and mentally capable of complying, and believes consistent with his personal interest and the purpose of the organization. Significantly, Barnard (and by implication, Follett) are criticized for a somewhat paternalistic view of authority as derived from ‘bottom-up’ relationships rather than ‘top down.’ In particular Perrow (2014) takes to task the unquestioning view by Barnard of “organizations as functional for all concerned” – i.e., mutually beneficial, with little consideration for the legalized and rationalized “imperatively coordinated systems of human effort” (Barnard, 1938/2002, p. 76).

Nye (2010) expands significantly beyond the narrow activity of Follett’s (1926/2005) giving orders and Barnard’s (1938/2002) concepts of authority, to apply these theories to re-conceptualizing leadership. Nye examines a variety of images and historical understandings of leaders, discussing in depth their use of hard and soft power. He then argues that the mixture of those (which he terms ‘smart power’) relies on the social relationships “with three key components – leaders, followers, and the
contexts in which they interact” (Nye, 2010, p. xviii) – a rough acknowledgement of Follett’s prior work, but in a much broader context. While there is a fairly direct line tracing back from Nye to Follett and Barnard, as Perrow (2014) points out, the concept of leadership has engendered numerous models (which I explore in greater detail below), most of which are found lacking in some regard. In examining the evolution of leadership studies and theories, he observes that each subsequent theory either builds upon or attempts to provide a corrective to prior theories but results in a more complicated model. Moreover, “simple models do not hold in most cases” (Perrow, 2014, p. 95). The complexities of the leader/follower (however it is termed or structured) make for similarly complex understandings of the goal; whether performance, out puts, outcomes, effectiveness, efficiency, or any of the other myriad terms used and phenomena examined.

Each of these authors offers additional insights into the evolution of analysis progressing beyond the individual, to small groups, coalitions, and consideration of the organization as a complex organism of competition, collaboration, conflict, and co-existence. In doing so, we are afforded various means of considering the organization as a complex, dynamic environment, but these theories largely remain focused on the organization from a closed-system perspective. Subsequently, authors have explored the organization as a whole within a broader external environment, but also as a single organism (organization qua organism) in socio-cultural terms.
The focus on behavior of organizations as a whole in part addresses a critique of theories focused solely on the individual in that they take little notice of the individual within “the larger institutional framework of our economic system” (Perrow, 2014, p. 83, quoting Bell). By exploring the macro-level of the organization as a system, these scholars move from cells or organs to the body or even species analogy in their theory and analysis. The shift in focus from the micro/meso units of analysis (individuals and groups within organizations) brings with it three lenses through which researchers and scholars view the organization qua organization: survival, institutionalization, and culture. First, an understanding of organizational survival, argues that, rather than the organization solely pursuing stated goals (production of goods, delivery of services, or other), it pursues both unstated goals and – more importantly – is primarily concerned with its own survival over and above those stated goals. In part, this is simply the fact of the ability of an organization to organize. “No organization can devote its full resources to producing products and services; each must expend energy maintaining itself” (Scott and Davis, 2016, p. 60). This concept is explicated by Mintzberg (1993) – although his approach is a rational, mechanistic one – in describing the support systems required for an organization to exist such that it can produce goods and deliver services. Similarly, Dunsire applies autopoiesis, or self-production, to organization theory (and more broadly to governance systems) observing that “the autopoiesis entity continuously
produces itself, referring only to itself, and varies its internal structure in doing so if that is called for to maintain its organization” (1996, p. 302). The distinction that Dunsire makes is that autopoiesis results in an organization continuing as an entity for the sake of continuing, but will also move into a ‘survival mode’ when necessary to sustain itself. Each of these authors speak to the organizational entity as a whole that includes in its purpose (regardless of stated goals) the fact of its sustained existence in some form.

The twin concepts of viewing an organization as an organism at the macro level, as well as then analyzing organizations in biological terms associated with organisms such as survival and self-production in turn is a cornerstone of the institutional school of organizational theory. “The injunction is to analyze the whole organization. To see it as a whole is to do justice to its ‘organic’ character” (Perrow, 2014, p. 157). Significantly, Perrow then argues that, in examining the organization as a whole, we consider that organization both through its uniqueness but also through the unique lifecycle of its existence. With a nod to Selznick (1949/2011), Perrow notes structural-functionalism as the key analytical concept to be used in the institutional approach to organizational theory. “[F]unctions determine the structure of organizations and [those] structures can be understood by analyzing their functions” (Perrow, 2014, p. 157). In essence, this is a feedback loop for better understanding organizations, but to do so, they must be looked at primarily as a whole.
Selznick (1949/2011) provides the core understanding of structural-functional analysis, doing so through his extensive case study of the Tennessee Valley Authority’ programs and grass-roots engagements in the 1930’s. Selznick posits a number of points drawn from his study of the TVA that create a framework for the institutionalism approach. Key to this framework is the premise that formal organizations experience forces outside their structure and goals; those forces create informal structures in response; and those informal structures will in turn influence and change the formal structures and goals, causing the organization to evolve as a means of survival. Notably, while Selznick focuses primarily on TVA being co-opted by external influences and stakeholders, his framework suggests that, as a complex adaptive social system, formal organizations are susceptible to a variety of “forces tangential to their rationally order structures and stated goals” (1949/2011, p. 238). This allows for conceptual flexibility in the way the researcher understands myriad potential forces (internal/external, social/economic/political, rational/non-rational) that may be at play and by which organizations are constrained. Moreover, Selznick’s frame acknowledges and attempts to address the complexities of the interactions and interrelationships among these forces and the organization’s response to them.

Powell and DiMaggio (1991) elaborate on the concept of forces constraining an organization by reframing the premise as more than constraints. “Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their
preferences” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 11). They go on to elaborate distinctions between the ‘old institutionalism’ (referencing Selznick (1949/2011) and others) and ‘neo institutionalism’ in particular pointing to environment, formality, and norms. As to environment, neo-institutionalism focuses more on sectors and systems than formal organizations in localized settings. Where old institutionalism argues that informal structures and influences within and without the organization provide significant constraints, neo-institutionalism posits that the formal structures themselves are the result of “inter-organizational influences, conformity, and the pervasiveness of cultural accounts rather than the functions they are intended to perform” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 13). Finally, where old institutionalism foregrounds norms and values as the way in which organizations become institutionalized, the new school argues that, rather than norms and values, “taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 15). Of particular significance in this approach, when focusing on the organization qua organization (rather than a systems perspective), neo-institutionalism incorporates theories and research into organizational culture.

As Shafritz, Ott and Jang (2005) observe, organizational culture theory is simply another lens through which we attempt to explain aspects of organizations that do not fit neatly into the rational, mechanistic model. But this lens also expands beyond the basic concepts in natural systems theory analogizing organizations to the cells, bodies,
and species of organisms. The terminology of cultural theory also strays from this analogy, instead identifying “basic patterns of assumptions” (Shafritz, Ott and Jang, 2005, p. 352), “common symbolic systems and shared meanings” (Scott and Davis, 2016 p. 260), myths and ceremony (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), and the socially constructed realities (Morgan, 2006) that organizations create and that create organizations.

Schein (1993/2005) attempts to bring some order to these associated terms and concepts by first acknowledging the varied understanding of culture, both as associated with organizations and as the broader sociological concept. He offers three elements to consider in examining organizational culture. First is socialization – how cultural elements are transmitted to new members and how new members come to share the basic assumptions of the organization. Second, he maintains that behavioral regularities or patterns must be carefully considered as to whether they derive from shared assumptions and patterns (cultural predisposition) or alternative behavioral motivations and reactions that may derive from individual psychology. Finally, he looks to the likelihood of cultural aspects as reflected across a large organization, essentially arguing that the size of the social unit (the organization, a section/division, or a group) may well have subcultures that are more or less aligned with the cultural aspects of the larger unit. While Schein attempts to clarify and solidify concepts of cultural theory so as to provide a consistent grounding for scholarship and research, his work also exposes the challenges associated with the complexity of this area.
As evidenced in this section, the natural systems school introduces myriad ways of examining, exploring, and understanding complex organizations. While the natural systems perspective focuses on organizations as collectivities, much of the literature and research examines individual actions within the collective. More significantly, there remains a primary focus on organizations in industrial settings, but the natural systems school of thought more overtly explores organizational behavior in governmental and other settings. Finally, the natural systems approach largely considers organizations as closed systems, but – as seen below – there is fairly significant overlap with the open systems school of thought. As Morgan notes, while the view of organizations as organisms acknowledges behavioral psychology and socio-political aspects of an organization, “attention is invariably drawn to the fact that they depend on a wider environment for various kinds of sustenance” (2006, p.38). To address how organizations are situated within larger systems of other organizations and social phenomena, I now turn to the open systems school of organizational theory.

**Open Systems.**

Notably, organization theory has experienced a significant shift toward open systems concepts, similar to the prior evolution from the mechanistic/rational to natural/behavioral models. This latest shift involves more complex ideas about organizations as systems rather than objects, considering “populations of organizations and their wider ecology” (Morgan, 2006, p. 59, emphasis in original). Moreover, open
systems theory emphasizes “the organization being viewed as a subsystem within a more comprehensive societal unit” which in turn acts “as a stabilizing element sustaining and legitimating the organization” (Scott and Davis, 2016, p. 84). In doing so, scholars have articulated an alternative theory to the concept that “an organization is a social device for efficiently accomplishing through group means some stated purpose” (Katz and Kahn, 1966/2005, p. 481). However, open systems theory is more direct in squarely placing organizations within the ecology Morgan references. Open systems theory considers “the organization being viewed as a subsystem within a more comprehensive societal unit” which in turn acts “as a stabilizing element sustaining and legitimating the organization” (Scott and Davis, 2016, p. 84). Katz and Kahn provide one of the earlier articulations of this shift in perspective by proposing an ‘energic’ model that draws heavily on environmental and biological images to then explore how organizations exist within and interact with their surroundings as open systems.

The systems model they posit looks to “energic input-output” and “energic return” as the means by which an organization functions as a system (Katz and Kahn, 1966/2005, p. 481). In doing so, they note the interdependent patterned activities inherent in such a system as a valid alternative theory to the mechanistic, closed-system approach and further frame the activities as three types: “the energic input into the system, the transformation of energies within the system, and the resulting product or energic output” (Katz and Kahn, 1966/2005, p. 482, emphasis in original). Using this as
its basis, they go on to identify the means of study as tracing the pattern of energy moving through the system, understanding the transaction costs associated with exchange, and determining how the energetic output then reactivates the system to renew the pattern.

Following on Katz and Kahn’s (1966/2005) theory of energetic exchange, other scholars have focused specifically on the point at which such exchanges occur by examining organizational boundaries. “Given the essence of organizations as open systems, their boundaries must necessarily be sieves, not shells” (Scott and Davis, 2016, p. 151). Scott and Davis begin by framing organizations as collectivities, which implies a less structured border between what is considered a part of the organization and what is understood as external. They define collectivity as a “delimited social structure” – or identifiable network of social relations and a “normative order and cultural-cognitive framework” applicable to and governing participants in the network (Scott and Davis, 2016, p. 153). However, having defined the collectivity, they acknowledge that merely defining the collectivity does not clearly establish either the boundaries or how they function. Instead, a second step is required that offers different foci used as a means to define boundaries. First is a focus on actors, emphasizing network participants in the collectivity. Second is using a social relations lens, where proximity among actors and density of relations determines boundaries. Lastly, defining boundaries by activities – or a sectoral approach – is also used. Each of these alternatives has advantages, but all
three favor a macro systems approach of network theory over the means by which a specific organization might be consider more or less ‘sieve-like’ in Katz and Kahn’s (1966/2005) energetic exchange model. Finally, it may also be noted that defining, delimiting, and understanding boundaries is an attempt to address and reduce uncertainty in decision making (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Simon, 1997). Acknowledging the ‘sieve’ that makes up the organization’s boundaries gives due consideration to the ambiguity inherent in an organizational environment and the potentially boundless inputs that influence and organizations behavior and likelihood of survival.

A third approach frames open systems as a higher level of responsibility that moves the organization from closed-system (technical and managerial aspects) to the institutional aspect, the organization as “part of a wider social system, which is the source of the ‘meaning’ of the organization and its goals (Thompson, 1967/2005, p. 495, referencing Parsons). This concept of institutions as key to open systems theory is further reflected in Powell and DiMaggio’s neo-institutional observation of “institutionalization as occurring at the sectoral or societal levels, and consequently interorganizational in locus” (1991, p. 14). However, they readily acknowledge the interplay between levels of analysis inherent in open systems theory by noting that “any macrosociology rests on a microsociology, however tacit” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 16) Moreover, their argument elaborates on Katz and Kahn’s (1966/2005) energetic
exchange and Scott and Davis’ (2016) examination of boundaries by incorporating exchange between levels (‘macro’ institutional influences to ‘micro’ roles actions and objects) as well as the ‘meso’ inter-organizational lens. Thus, institutional influences from the broader environment impact the technical and managerial levels of the organization. As Scott notes, “explanations, justifications, and meaningful accounts are more likely to be imported from the environment than to be manufactured from within” (1991, p. 170).

Integrated Theories.

Finally, efforts have also been made to integrate open systems and closed systems as “neither alone affords an adequate understanding of complex organizations” (Thompson, 1967/2005, p. 494). In what Thompson terms ‘a new tradition,’ he argues that, as open systems, complex organizations are faced with potentially boundless uncertainties in their environment and that energy and resources must be devoted to searching and learning to make sense of the environment, its interactions with, and impacts to the organization itself. In essence, Thompson argues that, to survive, organizations take in their surroundings as an open system, but then act as a closed system in response. Notably – to Katz and Kahn’s (1966/2005) point – multiple organizations, and systems, all engaged in this same way, results in an extremely complex energetic input/output process in what I term for the purposes of my case study, a ‘governance ecosystem.’
However, with rational systems theory engineering either individual positions as tools or organizations as machines; natural systems theory cultivating behaviors of individual roles or cultures of collectivities; and open systems theory elaborating networks of individuals or ecologies of systems, there is a clear ontological distinction within each school of an individualism or a structural-functional approach to research and scholarship. While both may be appropriate in varying degrees, they are equally valuable to using meta-governance as a robust analytical means for studying organizations. Using a mixed methods (Little, 1991) approach to research through emphasizing each as a facet of the organization being studied, enables the examination of the interaction of those two facets and ultimately, how they result in re-collibration.

**The Role of the Executive**

Having gained an understanding of the broad schools of thought and theories of organization, we can then apply those theories in an integrated fashion. I begin with theories on management and the role of the executive, which are devoted not only to designing the structure of complex formal organizations but also “to organize and institutionalize the executive function as such so that it may be more adequate in a complicated situation” (Gulick, 1937/2005, p. 86). Thus, there are strong parallels between organization design literature and management planning literature even to the extent of authors intermixing the two. As an example, Gulick not only refers to structural divisions of labor, but also reflects a mechanistic understanding of the
executive function. Therefore, while a number of authors examine both organizational structure and management functions, for the purposes of my case study, the two are addressed separately. Moreover, just as the broad field of organizational theory has continued to evolve over time, management and leadership fields within organizational theory have also evolved. In particular, there has been a move toward greater exploration of executive leadership in dynamic environments, versus a more mechanistic view, similar to the rational school in organizational theory. Executive leadership, as used here, encompasses management planning, management-in-action, and new public leadership.

To further frame the theoretical underpinnings, I will provide an overview of schools of thought providing different lenses into both the agency and the level of analysis. The first school is in the rational actor model, i.e., Classical and Neoclassical Management Theory (the ‘planning’); the second school reflects the New Institutionalism school of thought with its focus on socio-cognitive aspects of organizations (the ‘action’). A third school of thought emphasizes the role of the executive and the unique positionality of public administrative agencies (the ‘leadership’). In doing so, I also delineate how an approach incorporating meta-governance is beneficial in understanding an agency and how its executive plans, directs, communicates, decides (i.e., ‘acts’ in all its forms) to implement change in
support of mission and goals or alternatively, in response to changes in the operating and external environment.

*Management Through Planning.*

Examining management through planning can be modeled on Selznick’s (1949/2011) structural-functional analysis but does so at a level of analysis that Powell and DiMaggio describe as “low order/low construction” (1991, p. 154). That is, the focus is on the executive function, particularly in terms of planning and action. Further, approaching management in the neoclassical tradition as a planning exercise (just as with designing organizations) begins with foundational rational actor theory such that “organizations should be based on universally applicable scientific principles” (Shafritz, Ott, and Jang, 2005, p. 88). Fayol’s (1916/2005) management principles support this concept. Of the fourteen principles of management Fayol delineates, several – including Authority, Unity of Command, and Order – focus on the management function using a hierarchical worldview. Throughout, Fayol emphasizes discipline, obedience, and moral worth as elements of a manager’s competency to execute their function. However, she argues that the scientific manager creates opportunities for continuous improvement, particularly through the principles of gathering and analyzing data about the work and bringing that knowledge into training the workforce. “Scientific management makes no pretense that there is any finality to it” (Fayol, 1916/2005, p. 72) but instead provides a rational and objective means to fulfill the manager’s role in the organization.
Similarly, Gulick (1937/2005) explores specific management principles that mirror Fayol (1916/2005). While Gulick’s principle of “One Master” directly acknowledges Fayol’s “unity of command,” he also identifies span of control and technical expertise as key management elements. Significantly, Gulick challenges the idea of an ideal number of subordinates through the chain of command. Instead, he argues for a principled approach to identifying that best number based on three factors: diversification of function, time, and space. Here, time is associated with the dynamics of the situation, that is, the more rapidly changing an environment may be over a short period of time, the fewer subordinates an executive can effectively manage and direct. Space is approached in the same fashion where scattered locations require greater attention and therefore few direct subordinates of the executive. Closely associated with this principle is that of technical expertise. Although framed within the idea of technical efficiency as driven by homogeneity in work, process, and purpose, he argues that management for technical efficiency demands a level of expertise. “[A] unit based on a given specialization cannot be given technical direction by a layman” (Gulick, 1937/2005, p. 84). Lastly, Gulick notes the danger of the executive having technical expertise in one area therefore thinking that “competence is a general quality detachable from the field and inherent in themselves” (1937/2005, p. 85). Thus, Gulick’s principles argue for a strong understanding and situational awareness of the work (in diversification and technical aspects) and the environment (in time and space), to govern the means by which the executive manages.
Although both Fayol (1916/2005) and Gulick (1937/2005) incorporate management principles and planning into their broader theories of organization design and structure, Barnard (1938/2002) most directly addresses the executive function as a key and unique aspect of formal complex organizations. He theorizes the executive role in terms of central interconnections of communication to ensure coordination and execution. “The function of executives is to serve as channels of communication so far as communication passes through central positions” (Barnard, 1938/2002, p. 215).

There are two caveats to his premise, one implicit and one explicit. In his framing of the function, he implicitly acknowledges that communications may not, in fact, pass through central positions. While not directly addressing this issue in his description of the executive function he is at least aware of the influence and potential impact of informal communications and informal channels. The second caveat is explicit in that he acknowledges those in the role of executive do not fulfill the executive function exclusively (i.e., the coordination of work). He uses as examples sales, customer relations, and similar activities that may benefit from the executive’s office, but do not fit within his narrow conception of the executive function itself. “Executive work is not that of the organization, but the specialized work of maintaining the organization in operation” (Barnard, 1938/2005, p. 215, emphasis in original). Barnard then posits three elements of that function: maintenance of communication; formulation of purpose; and securing of services.
First, as already noted, Barnard (1938/2005) identifies maintenance of communication as the core function and includes both systems and means of communication. Notably, he begins with organizational scheme in his outline of communication, but Barnard immediately observes that there is often a preoccupation with organization charts as an element of the system of communication but emphasizes that the more important aspect from the executive perspective is selection of personnel as the means of communication. To Barnard’s point, the executive function devises, and revises structures to meet the needs of the organization within its operating and external environments. He also emphasizes that the more senior the position, the greater the need for and reliance on general abilities — “alertness, comprehensiveness of interest, flexibility, faculty of adjustment, poise, courage, etc.” (Barnard, 1938/2005, p. 221). In doing so, he emphasizes the importance of informal organization, which can reinforce formal (directive or planning) communications as well as strengthening organizational ties (e.g., loyalty, responsibility, etc.).

Second is the securing of services, which Barnard divides into two elements: recruiting and elicitation. Significantly, recruiting, in his view, is distinct from selection of personnel. Although recruitment may result in an individual being selected for a position within the organization, here Barnard’s focus is toward “acting upon persons who are in every sense outside [the organization]” (1938/2005, p. 227). Once recruited, the executive function turns to means “to intensify or multiply the contributions which
its members will make above the level or volume which would occur if no such effort were made” (Barnard, 1938/2005, p. 230). Doing so ensures the continued viability of the organization and responds to the cyclic nature of turnover. In essence, the securing of services element of the executive function is outward facing, whether bringing individuals within, or in association with, the organization and then developing ties in either instance such that the organization benefits from the contributions made. Here, the focus is not on control or ‘hard’ power, but rather ‘soft’ power, especially in terms of individuals outside of the organization.

The third element (though seemingly, it would be first in order of an executive’s role in development and execution of the function), is the formulation of purpose/objective. Barnard begins by acknowledging the aggregate nature of this element: “It is more apparent here than with other executive functions that it is an entire executive organization that formulates, redefines, breaks into details, and decides on the innumerable simultaneous and progressive actions that are the stream of synthesizes constituting purpose or action” (1938/2005, p. 231). In addition, this element is perhaps more closely aligned with structure in Barnard’s eye because he emphasizes the delegation of authority as a ‘critical aspect’ of the formulation function and he acknowledges the overlap between this particular aspect and the roles, positions, and system of communications previously discussed. Barnard also elaborates decision-making as to purpose and strategy through a pyramidal schema flowing downward from
the executive. However, Barnard’s focus on this pyramid of communication seems to not as clearly address the decision-making itself, nor examine the setting of goals. As will be seen in the next section, other authors are significantly more engaged in understanding decision-making and the bounds within which decision are made.

As is perhaps most clearly shown with Barnard (1938/2005), the management planning of the classical/neo-classical schools look at the executive or management function of complex formal organizations from a level of abstraction that not only reflects the machine view of organizations but suggests a well-oiled machine in a stable operating environment as well. Both Fayol (1916/2005) and Gulick (1937/2005) reinforce this idea through an assumption of planning and scientific management. Particularly with Barnard, we then see how the executive function controls, directs, ensures the maintenance of, and influences the development of agency capabilities (seen in particular through the executive function direction of organizational structure and influence of organization culture). However, management through planning does not sufficiently account for the complex environment (both internally and externally) within which these organizations exist and through which the executive function must operate. By also incorporating management in action as an analytical tool, we have a more robust understanding of the organization and the executive function itself.
“The new institutionalism in organization theory and sociology comprises a rejection of the rational-actor models” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 8), which shows a stark contrast to Neoclassical management theory. Moreover, these authors frame their micro-level of analysis – which could be considered as the executive – as a “theory of practical action” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 22). In doing so, the authors focus on cognitive behavioral aspects of the executive, drawing heavily on the work of Simon (1997) and others to examine and theorize “pre-conscious processes and schema as they enter routine, taken-for-granted behavior” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 22). While Powell and DiMaggio approach these concepts from a broad perspective inclusive of all individuals in organizations, the concepts hold especially true of the executive role. Similarly, other authors explore executive action through decision-making processes and how decision-makers explore and understand the issues they face (Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Neustadt and May, 1986). Finally, but most important for my research is placing decision-making and executive action in the context of networks. In particular, Denhardt and Denhardt (2013) argue that collaboration, resilience, dialogic resolution of issues, and citizen engagement are required of the leader or executive in a network paradigm.

As noted above, Simon (1997) argues against the rational, planning model of executive (and indeed all behavior) based on the limited ability to engage in truly
rational action. His concept of bounded rationality posits three limiting factors in rationality: 1) it requires complete knowledge; 2) the future value of alternatives cannot be completely understood or anticipated; and 3) it requires a clear choice among all available alternatives, but the first two factors prevent complete understanding or even knowledge of the alternatives. As a result – and Simon emphasizes the relevance in particular to the public administrator – the executive “satisfices – looks for a course of action that is satisfactory” (1997, p. 119). In doing so, Simon argues that administrators do not look to maximize the outcome value and so do not need to consider all alternatives, nor necessarily seek to even obtain complete knowledge for the course of action. Thompson (1967/2005) further emphasizes the development of searching and learning processes that attempt to reasonably limit the uncertainty and complexity that would otherwise overwhelm the executive, such that decisions can be made, and actions undertaken. “The focus is on organizational processes related to [the] choice of courses of action in an environment which does not fully disclose the alternatives available” (Thompson, 1967/2005, p. 494). Therefore, in support of Simon, Thompson argues that problem-facing and problem-solving actions, rather than management planning are at the crux of these processes. But he does not dismiss rationality and planning entirely. Instead, he observes the inherent incompatibility of uncertainty and rationality but argues that reasonableness in satisficing is a means to square the two.
Inherent in Simon’s (1997) satisficing and Thompson’s (1967/2005) problemsolving perspectives is the decision-making action itself on the part of the executive. Barnard offers a basic structure of occasions in which decisions are made: “(a) from authoritative communications from superiors; (b) from cases referred for decision by subordinates; (c) from cases originating in the initiative of the executive concerned” (1938/2002, p. 190). He further notes that such decision may be active (deciding and communicating the decision), delaying, or deferring, and Barnard also observes that even not deciding is in itself a decision. In addition, scholars posit certain decision-making principles describing the environment in which decisions are made including understanding ambiguity in values, technology, and interpretation; reducing uncertainty through rules, processes, and routines; and the ways in which focus on/attention to an issue is organized has an impact on how it may be resolved (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Simon, 1997). Moreover, they acknowledge the inherent political process in each of these principles given the interests and motivations driving the actors involved (Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Mintzberg, 1979/2005).

The executive role of decision-making also directly addresses power, albeit through a slightly different lens. Significantly, Perrow (2014) criticizes Barnard (1938/2002) in this regard due to neglecting power as a factor in his decision-making analysis. Therefore, to incorporate and understand power from the executive perspective, “one must be able to estimate (a) what would have happened in the
absence of the exercise of power; (b) the intentions of the actor attempting to exercise power; and (c) the effect of actions taken by that actor” (Pfeffer, 1981/2005, p. 290).

While Pfeffer’s premise is not solely within the bounds of decision-making processes, it provides a sound basis for examining the influence power dynamics exerts on decision-making. He emphasizes authority as the legitimizing of power and goes on to elaborate four models (rational, bureaucratic, decision process, political power) and the indicators of each. Importantly, his models encompass both rational and behavioral perspectives – acknowledging Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) work – and, although framed from an organizational perspective, provides insight to the executive role in decision-making. He notes the overlap or gray area among the models, acknowledges that bureaucratic controls serve to channel decision-making toward the rational model (though they themselves are susceptible to power dynamics), and observes that power dynamics are more likely evident in decision-making in areas of significant uncertainty, and limited information – the key aspects of bounded rationality.

**Executive Leadership.**

Following directly from the school of management-in-action and theories of decision-making, executive leadership has come to the fore. While much of the literature fails to distinguish between leadership in the public versus private sectors, there is a body of work specifically devoted to leadership in government (Terry, 2003; Nye, 2010; Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn, 2019; Gergen, 2022). Leadership theory in the
public sector distinguishes itself from management theory (including New Public
Management) by arguing that the unique circumstances of leadership in public service
require distinct considerations. This is in stark contrast to the principles of New Public
Management, which argues that the public sector must behave more in the nature of
the private sector with an entrepreneurial and innovative focus (Mazzucato, 2015) and
therefore, management practices of the two are largely fungible.

In addition to challenging the precepts of NPM, scholarship on leadership and
the executive this field may be further distinguished between broader qualities of
leadership (Nye, 2010; Gergen, 2022) and a focus more directly on the role of public
administrators leading agencies (Terry, 2003; Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn, 2019). Notably,
while Morgan, Ingle and Shinn emphasize leadership at all levels of the organization and
Terry focuses specifically on the executive role, both argue that a particular expertise in
all aspects of governance are crucial for leadership in public administration. Lastly,
leadership research considers the individual, the group, and the organization as levels of
analysis (Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn, 2019). However, for the purpose of my research, the
individual level of analysis provides the greatest insight. Moreover, there is a distinction
in the literature between leadership in all its forms in various roles versus the work
more specifically aimed toward that of senior (or ‘apex’) public administrators (Terry,
2003). Again, for my BPA case study, an understanding of the executive public
administrator is most appropriate.
Regardless of the level or unit of analysis, public leadership theory shifts from a more anodyne perspective of management (as previously detailed) as a simple, mechanistic planning approach. Instead, public leadership provides an understanding of unique challenges and tensions found in public administration organizations. These efforts to better understand leadership in public agencies have been driven in part as a response to perceptions of the inadequacies found in bureaucracies as a “referendum on quality of leadership” (Terry, 2003, p. 4). Terry goes on to detail the twin fears typically associated with bureaucratic leadership: neglect and overreach. In terms of neglect, he describes a “powerful bureaucracy controlled by a cadre of non-elected and unresponsive civil servants” (Terry, 2003, p. 159). He emphasizes that this in part a general fear and suspicion of “governmental power [that] is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society” (Terry, 2003, p. 5). That suspicion results in a demand for excellence and accomplishment by bureaucrats, while constraining the ‘cadre’ from having the discretion or autonomy likely need to excel. The result is a perceived neglect by bureaucrats to be responsive to the needs of the public they serve.

As well, the fear of overreach without sufficient accountability stems directly from the more general suspicion of un-elected bureaucrats. Terry (2003) notes particular instances of J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, as well as the more recent U.S. Postal Inspection Service drug sting operations as examples of egregious overreach. He then goes on to describe how such abuses are the result of both violations of the letter of the
law as well as the spirit of the law. He further emphasizes that some constraints on overreach are the result of “powerful forces beyond the control of individual leaders guide public bureaucracies” (Terry, 2003, p. 4). As well, he notes the need for a statesman-like approach that is “sensitive to the limits placed on [executive] authority” (Terry, 2003, p. 161).

Not only has scholarship in public leadership responded to these perceived fears, it has also drawn clear distinction between public and private sector leadership. The most significant distinctions include the unique obligations of public service; the complex and diverse networks (or ecosystem) of actors involved; the increasingly dynamic operating environment in which public administrators must lead; and the associated need for public leaders and agencies to respond quickly to crises. As well, these challenges are reflected in the public administrator’s multiple (and often competing) roles in preserving legitimacy, maintaining resilience, and sustaining the agency through autopoiesis. In addition, echoing Kooiman’s (2003) description of the complex, diverse and dynamic environment of modern society, leadership theory considers that “public service leadership is not simply measured by the capacity of leaders to accommodate increasing social complexity and moral diversity” (Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn, 2019, p. 12).

First among the distinctions are the particular responsibilities and obligations inherent in agencies serving the public. Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn (2019) succinctly
outline three aspects forming the basis for these responsibilities and the resulting need
to examine public service leadership in a special light. First (as previously alluded to),
public administrators act within a complex and sometimes conflicting legal and
regulatory structures that both constrain and enable their ability to act. Second, these
structures themselves arise from “the constellation of democratic values” (Morgan,
Ingle and Shinn, 2019, p. 13) that the public administrator must promote as well as
navigate in their leadership. Third, to accomplish the first two, the public administrator
must be equipped with the capabilities, understanding, and tools that are responsive to
“accommodate changing public values and conflicting priorities” (Morgan, Ingle and
Shinn, 2019, p. 13). They further note an inherent tension between innovation and
public responsibility that counters the arguments made in NPM to simply model the
public sector on the private sector. More specifically, they observe that “public
organizations are most often created not to innovate, but to ensure predictable, fair,
legally accountable, responsive, and continuous provision of public services and goods”
(Morgan, Ingle and Shinn, 2019, p. 56).

A second unique aspect of the executive leader in the public sector focuses on
theories reflective of the increasing complexity of organizations, their external operating
environments, and – from the perspective of meta-governance – their governance
ecosystems. Terry frames these complexities in terms of Madisonian democracy where
“active participation of multiple interest groups in the political process as well as the
dispersion and counterbalancing of governmental power” (2003, p. 15). He then notes the bureaucratic role in a pluralist governance paradigm in both ensuring access and participation by interest groups and a form of mediated forum for the contestation of interests for pursuing public interest policies. Importantly, Terry distinguishes his own concept of the bureaucratic leader role as an active participant in both aspects as well as a governance actor rather than that of “a passive role of referees” (2003, p. 15) of other pluralist scholars. In doing so, Terry presents a model of the executive as being responsible to meet the complex challenges and diverse interests while ‘conserving’ the agency’s mission, values, support – or as he terms the role, ‘Administrative Conservatorship.’

While the pluralist model is framed primarily in interest group terms, Morgan, Ingle and Shinn explore ‘polity leadership’ that “calls attention to the organic, fluid and interdependent relationships among the parts of our political economy in producing the collective good of the community” (2019, p. 66). Their framing of polity leadership is closely aligned with Terry’s (2003) though their emphasis and structuration of polity actors as sectoral with broad interest scopes arbitrated through either political or market forces. They further expand on polity leadership through an examination of the complex networks of governance actors as well the external forces interacting with them to meet the challenges facing the public.
As well, Morgan, Ingle and Shinn (2019) note two further specific aspects of the complexities in modern governance leadership, that derive from the pluralist model and polity leadership. First is the increasing presence of governmental, and quasi-governmental entities and jurisdictions, which require further negotiated coordination and collaboration among them. Closely associated with the increased number and complexity of governance institutions is the shifting boundaries among the public, private and nonprofit sectors. As the authors observe, “since the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan, the boundary shifts have been quite significant and will continue for the foreseeable future” (Morgan, Ingle and Shinn, 2019, p. 196).

The challenge of a complex and diverse landscape is further amplified by the dynamic environment in which most public agencies operate, as suggested by the acronym VUCA – Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (Gergen, 2022, p. 203 – 204). Similarly, Morgan, Ingle and Shinn (2019) focus on developing leadership using Complex Adaptive Systems Theory (CAST) for public administrators to respond to the interactive network systems in which agencies operate. Of particular note, Terry (2003) suggests that the external dynamism is matched to some degree through the resilience of administrative officials reacting and responding to external events, but also external efforts to constrain and formally control agency action. “Administrative officials were active participants in informal political activities designed to build and sustain support for their programs and policies” (Terry, 2003, p. 15).
Terry further emphasizes that “administrative officials are active participants in governance” (2003, p. xv). Nowhere is this more evident than in how public administrators respond to crises facing their agencies and the public they serve, which is the third unique element of executive leadership in public administration. While equally applicable to the complexity, diversity, and dynamism of modern governance in public administration, Terry emphasizes the importance in crisis of bureaucratic leaders’ responsiveness. He outlines three forms of executive responsiveness: to political officials, the public, and to the institution that they serve. In all three forms, Terry argues that administrative conservatorship “entails a receptivity and openness to changes . . .while at the same time remaining faithful to the values and unifying principles that define the agency’s distinctive competence” (2003, p. 57). Put another way, the key in responding to crisis is one that is not resistant to change, but foregrounds values/mission. Notably, Terry echoes – in a principled fashion – Dunsire’s (1996) idea of autopoiesis, in that the bureaucratic leader preserves institutional self-sustainment and legitimacy in crisis through its public service mission and values, while being responsive to the pressures from myriad influences in their governance ecosystem.

Given the unique obligations of public service, as well as the complexities of a dynamic operating environment and the myriad crises and challenges facing bureaucratic leadership, it might be forgiven if the result is a bureaucratic leadership
that appears hidebound, unresponsive and inward-looking. However, despite these challenges, Morgan, Ingle and Shinn argue that New Public Leadership equips public administrators to seek “opportunities that lie hidden beneath the seemingly bewildering array of external forces” (2019, p. 181). Moreover, Terry argues that the “concept of administrative conservatorship provides a valuable perspective by which public administrators and others may view their administrative leadership role in the American political system” (2003, p. 30). Taken together, these scholars provide a corrective to the theories and concepts associated with NPM suggesting government as a ‘business’ while also countering concerns of an uninterested and non-responsive bureaucracy.

Summary.

Similar to the broader organization design and behavior theories examined in the previous section, management planning, management action, and executive leadership reflect, respectively, the mechanistic, natural, and integrated systems schools of thought, but with a level of analysis at the individual level. This is a key aspect of integrating the meta-governance and executive leadership because it helps to better understand the interplay between the executive role and the organization as a whole. Moreover, integrating the two fields neatly ties to the idea of the meta-governor in that the executive role ‘plans’ in terms of governance modes and organization structure or functions; ‘acts’ in the sense of situational awareness, assessment, decision-making and direction to change the organization and its governance modes; and ‘leads’ by
navigating the complex operating environment as well as negotiating the diverse network of actors that comprise the governance ecosystem of a public administrative organization.

Recent scholarship and research advocate that “more intellectual resources should be devoted to trying to understand bureaucratic leadership instead of pretending that it does not or should not exist” (Terry, 2003, p. 160). As discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, executive leadership is an essential part of my study. As shown in this section, the literature has moved from the mechanistic view of organizations, through the management in action and the business-centric approach of New Public Management, to more recent research and scholarship on executive leadership in the unique environment of public administration. My research further expands on and explores executive leadership by using meta-governance and collibration as a new lens of analysis. As well, my BPA case study examines leadership of public administration agencies experiencing existential crises. Together, these provide a means through which to understand the role of the bureaucratic leader as a meta-governor in complex, diverse, and dynamic operating environments, the next logical step in this developing field of inquiry.
Agency Capability

Moving from the individual level of analysis and the role of the executive, theories of organization design provide the underpinning for agency change through various means. My case study uses four categories of what I term “Agency Capability.” The categories (labelled ‘C1 – CONSTITUTION,’ ‘C2 – COURSE,’ ‘C3 – CAPACITY,’ and ‘C4 – CULTURE’) are a shorthand for internal organizational attributes, their underpinnings are found in the literatures on organizational design and administrative behavior. I examine the literature associated with each and then summarize the two bodies and align them with my own categorization.

Organizational Design.

Understanding the organizational design of the subject agency provides insight as to how that design affects means of change, or conversely, how means of change affect the organization’s design. Organizational design is predicated upon general principles (in various forms), including the division of labor, coordination, authority or control, and technical capability (Smith, 1776/1994; Taylor, 1916/2005; Fayol, 1916/2005; Gulick, 1937/2005). The principles begin with Adam Smith, who opens his “Wealth of Nations” with the foundational aspect of organization in division of labor, which he argues, creates three distinct advantages in efficiency and effectiveness: increased dexterity, through repetition of a specific task; time savings that would
otherwise be lost in moving from one task to the next; and the ability to apply machinery to facilitate a specific task.

Smith’s (1776/1994) consideration of the division of labor is focused on industry (using the example of a pin factory). With his work as a grounding, ‘classical management theory’ continued to develop in the same manner, expanding consideration from industrial or factory settings to a variety of organizational sectors for examination. Moreover, much of the early literature argues that there is a definitive optimal design for an organization in order to achieve its goals. As Morgan observes, just as there is an optimal design for a machine as a “network of interdependent parts arranged in a specific sequence” (2006, p. 18), so the classical theory of scientific management argues there is a single best organizational design for executing on a specific purpose. Gulick (1937/2005) and Mintzberg (1993), respectively, provide key theories of organizational design and structure. Gulick emphasizes the twin elements of division of labor and coordination of work. His reasoning for division of labor takes an additional step beyond Smith and ventures more into the psychology of work by noting that division of labor is beneficial as workers “differ in nature, capacity and skill, and gain greatly in dexterity by specialization” (Gulick, 1937/2005, p. 79). But he further notes the limits of division as constrained by volume of work, technology, and what he terms ‘organic’ limits, i.e., splitting singular, interrelated activities. Gulick also explicates the concept of coordination. While observing that there is no single way to best
coordinate work, two principles are inherent in achieving coordination: 1) structure of authority (hierarchy) to direct coordination; and 2) singularity of purpose or a clear goal that coordination supports. Finally (in support of his ‘no one best way’), he notes that coordination can occur through a top-down approach of subdividing the organization or a bottom-up approach of aggregating functions. Using these principles, Gulick proposes that the work of an organization’s chief executive is POSDCORB – his acronym for the key functions or subdivisions of a complex organization: Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting. Thus Gulick, while acknowledging the myriad forms coordination of work and division of labor can take, and solidly placing his work in an industrial setting, forms a broad set of underlying organizational design elements that can apply to almost any formal organization and that have since been expanded and built upon.

Mintzberg (1993) further elaborates Gulick’s (1937/2005) two coordinating principles, expanding the elements of how an organization is designed to achieve coordination through mutual adjustment (in essence the feedback loop of informal communication); direct supervision; and several means of standardization (work processes, work outputs or deliverables, and knowledge, skills, and abilities). As with Gulick, Mintzberg posits that there is no one best design and offers the analogy of a ‘buffet’ where the organization designer can pick and choose among alternatives that will best suit the needs and goals of the organization. Notably, this effort does not
forestall future change or evolution of the organization. Just as there is no one best organizational design, any organization structure can and should be adjusted to meet changes to its operating environment as well as in response to the broader system ecology. With this in mind, Mintzberg then offers a basic, broad brushstroke structure – similar to POSDCORB – of a strategic apex, a middle line, and an operating core forming a hierarchical means of dividing labor and coordinating work, along with a technostructure and a support staff function that standardize and facilitate the organization qua organization to maximize the capability of the core functions. Finally, in support of his organizational design ‘buffet,’ Mintzberg offers insights into determining options in support of the organization purpose and goals such as means of planning work, controlling outputs, and means of decision-making and communication through alternative organizational structures.

Mintzberg’s design principles and structuration are inherent in his definition of a bureaucracy: “organizations that rely primarily on the formalization of behavior to achieve coordination” (1993, p. 35) and in fact, he references two models as ‘machine bureaucracies’ and ‘professional bureaucracies’. Moreover, and in some contrast to other organizational theorists, he also shifts focus from a largely industrial, production setting for his examination, but also looks to the unique aspects of what he terms ‘professional bureaucracies’; i.e., schools, accounting firms, social-work agencies, and similar service-oriented organizational configurations. This is particularly beneficial for
studies of government agencies in that its premise better accounts for multiple, sometimes conflicting, goals; a more complex relationship between the strategic apex and the operating core due to professionals who operate in a more autonomous and less standardized environments; and a larger planning and support function.

Shafritz, Ott and Jang (2005) use a similar definition of bureaucracy to Mintzberg (1993) but expand upon it to both behavior and structure. “Bureaucracy refers to a specific set of structural arrangements. It is also used to refer to specific patterns of behavior – patterns that are not restricted to formal bureaucracies” (Shafritz, Ott and Jang, 2005, p. 32, emphasis in original). Both definitions rely heavily on Weber (1946/2005) who posits the characteristics of the ideal bureaucracy, which, as Morgan observes, “emphasizes speed, clarity, regularity, reliability, and efficiency” (2006, p. 17). As Shafritz, Ott and Jang reiterate, Weber’s ‘ideal’ should not be understood as necessarily the optimum organizational design. Instead “his ideal-type bureaucracy is merely an identification of the major variables or features that characterize this type of social institution” (Shafritz, Ott and Jang, 2005, p. 33). Thus, Weber observes several principles, which are not structural (as indicated with scholars above), but are inherent in and permeate through a bureaucracy – or, as Weber terms it “modern officialdom” (1946/2005, p. 73). Foremost is jurisdiction, authority, and rules that both define the jurisdiction and authority, but also how those duties are fulfilled. He then elaborates authority, identifying a hierarchical internal structure through which decisions are
made, communicated, and implemented. Weber rounds out his principles with the bureaucracy’s reliance on written documents and record keeping; specialized office management created through training; the stability and extensiveness of rules covering actions; and the full commitment of the bureaucrat, i.e., the bureaucrat’s primary function is the role or office in which they are engaged.

While Weber’s (1946/2005) work can generally be considered the keystone to our understanding of organizations as bureaucracies, and is heavily relied upon by both Gulick (1937/2005) and Mintzberg (1993) in their mechanistic approach to organizational structure, other scholars take Weber’s ideal bureaucracy and observe both the shortcomings that arise in bureaucratic organizations as a result of the design and argue that much of organizational behavior is less by design and more as self-perpetuating myths and stories to sustain the organization. Martin (1946/2005), in particular, emphasizes Weber’s principle of authority and the formality component of Weber’s other principles in arguing that those very principles lead to dysfunction as a result of over-conformity and restrictive, defined patterns of behavior that grow out of the structures and process of a bureaucratic organization. “Formalism, even ritualism, ensues with an unchallenged insistence upon punctilious adherence to formalized procedures” (Merton, 1957/2005, p. 106). His critique is significant in part because he does not suggest that this dysfunction is a design flaw for which there may be a corrective, but rather, is a natural outgrowth of the design itself.
Meyer and Rowan (1977/2005), in contrast to the mechanistic lens through which Weber (1946/2005), Gulick (1937/2005), and Mintzberg (1993) view complex organizations formulate a theory of organizational structures and designs that arise more from socialized myths and ceremonies (i.e., accepted social practices) rather than efficient design. As with prior authors, they begin with a definition of formal organizations as “systems of coordinated and controlled activities that arise when work is embedded in complex networks of technical relations and boundary-spanning exchanges” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977/2005, p. 41). While similar to other descriptions, Meyer and Rowan’s definition emphasizes the social, interactive aspect of organizations. They then argue that institutionalization of organizations is driven in part by societal ideologies (e.g., professions, or the accepted forms in which labor is divided and coordinated) that result in “prefabricated formulas available for use by any given organization” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977/2005, p. 44). They posit these ideologies as myths that both create formal organizations as well as the need for formal organizations in a feedback loop of building blocks that are considered rational and appropriate. Significantly, their theory suggests that, while these myths can evolve (because they are essentially self-replicating), it becomes difficult to do so outside of a significant disruption because “they are legitimated externally, rather than in terms of efficiency” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977/2005, p. 49). Moreover, as noted below, Meyer and Rowan to some degree span organization design (seeing the organizations as an artifact) and
organization behavior (seeing the organization as patterns of interaction and interdependence).

Taken together, theories of organizational design attempt to synthesize a series of high-level principles, functions, and concepts governing complex organizations while acknowledging the myriad forms that organizations may take. Because they derive from different schools, they emphasize different aspects of those myriad forms, but also argue for different causes for organization design and function. Each has certain benefits in examining and explaining complex organization. However, in addition to the varying means by which organization design can be considered, agency behavior is also a factor, to which I will now turn.

Administrative Agency Behavior.

In contrast to the broad, mechanistic approach evidenced in most organizational design theory, Wilson posits a more organic “bottom-up view of the work of government agencies” (2000, p. 13) and theory of bureaucratic behavior countering organization design theory, which he views with some skepticism. He argues organization design theory is simply too abstract to provide real insight. Instead, he looks to evidence of operational practices across a spectrum of agencies at different levels of government and performing different functions (though he freely acknowledges his work is limited to government agencies in the United States). Wilson’s work provides a solid structure that encompasses constraints, roles, structures,
outputs, and types of government agencies and then argues for a series of behavioral (rather than design) principles, which include understanding both the internal and environmental culture; understanding the extent of constraints and empowerment through which the agency operates; matching authority to tasks; and assessing performance through results or outcomes. In doing so, he attempts to provide some modest correctives for improving government agencies that are “designed to allow imperfect people to use flawed procedures to cope with insoluble problem” (Wilson, 2000, p. 375).

In essence, Wilson (2000) emphasizes the functional aspect of Selznick’s (1949/2011) structural-functional analytic model and elaborates that aspect through both individual and group lenses, specifically targeting government agencies, rather than the markets, industrial, or broad societal organizations examined by other scholars. Similarly, Barnard (1938/2005) posits three key behavioral principles for the formation of an organization. “An organization comes into being when (1) there are persons able to communicate with each other (2) who are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a common purpose” (1938/2005, p. 82). He further argues that an organization can only continue its existence if the general cooperation, as outlined in his first three principles, operates in a sufficiently effective and efficient manner. Notably, Barnard’s principles are agnostic on how best to achieve effectiveness and efficiency so as to ensure the organization’s survival, instead maintaining only that the negative –
inefficient communication, insufficient inducements to cooperate, or lack of purpose – will result in the organization’s ultimate demise.

A third approach comes from Thompson (1967/2005) who argues that technology (in its broadest sense) significantly influences organizational outcomes and therefore behavior. Thompson identifies three components of organizational activity: inputs, technological activity, and outputs. His framework also offers three types of technology and their associated patterns of interdependence. The first is pooled technologies – so-called because the patterns of interdependence are arranged around shared services and clients. Interaction occurs between workers and their clientele, relying on standards and rules but with little need for interaction between branches of the organization. The second type is long-linked technology, which is most closely associated with assembly line mass production. Its pattern of interdependence is a sequential series of activities that require planning and coordination to ensure a smooth flow of work between units. The third type posited by Thompson is intensive technology, which involves reciprocal interdependence. In effect, these patterns involve continuing feedback loops and process adjustment to the work in order to achieve the desired output. Under Thompson’s theory, all three types of technology may exist within a single organization depending upon the patterns of interdependence required to achieve organizational goals. He further identifies means by which the organization will seek to protect those technologies from environmental elements (whether direct
inputs or broader influences) through actions of buffering against or smoothing the rate
of externalities; anticipating and adapting to externalities; or as a last resort, rationing
internal resources to respond to externalities. As Thompson notes, as an open system,
there is a constant need to employ such “maneuvering devices which provide the
organization with some self-control despite interdependence with the environment”

As a result, different organizations will function differently based on their core
technology posture. Similarly, and specific to government agencies, Wilson (2000)
argues that, based on the observability of outputs and outcomes, we can discern four
basic types of agencies: production (outputs and outcomes are observable); procedural
(only outputs are observable); craft (only outcomes are readily observable); and coping
(neither outputs nor outcomes are observable). Wilson and Thompson’s (1967/2005)
respective models are aligned to some degree while using different frames of
technology and visibility. Thompson’s long-linked technology tracks closely to Wilson’s
production agency and procedural agency models. It is less clear as to Thompson’s
pooled and intensive technologies, though it would appear that intensive technologies
would be more prevalent at a coping agency. This serves to re-emphasize Thompson’s
point that a single organization can utilize different technologies to varying degrees, but
also suggests that the same holds true for Wilson: an agency – particularly one with
complex or competing missions, may in fact behave like a mix of Wilson’s agency types.
Finally, in terms of behavioral aspects of an organization, two authors overtly introduce another element – power dynamics as a driver of agency behavior. Mintzberg begins with a definition of power as “means or systems . . . to control decisions and actions” (1979/2005, p. 334). He further attributes power to five bases: resources (money, assets, etc.); technical skill or abilities; a body of knowledge or information (though also sometimes considered an “asset”); “legal prerogatives – exclusive rights or privileges to impose choices” (Mintzberg, 1979/2005, p. 335); and finally, access (in the form of the ability to engage sources of the other four bases. Mintzberg then posits “players” – individuals, groups, and organizations exercising one or more bases of power – as falling into categories of either internal or external to the organization and being formal or informal. While he further elaborates the various player groups according to where they are positioned vis-à-vis the organization to arrive at eleven variations, his main focus is on understanding the drivers of players’ behavior such as Maslow’s (1943/2005) hierarchy of needs as well as the means by which power is exercised.

Perrow (2014) offers an organizational behavior theory of power similar to Mintzberg (1979/2005), which also begins with a slightly more specific definition of power. “[P]ower is the ability of persons or groups to extract for themselves valued outputs from a system in which other persons or groups either seek the same outputs for themselves or would prefer to expend their efforts toward other outputs” (Perrow, 2014, p. 259). He goes on to emphasize the zero-sum nature of this definition and its
relational aspect. Moreover, he places his power dynamic model clearly within formal organizations and argues for three propositions within that arena. First, he defines an organization as a tool that generates value to be appropriated by those with power, noting that hierarchy and the principles of bureaucracy from Weber (1946/2005) serve to achieve this appropriation. Second, he identifies March’s (1978) bounded rationality as a key aspect of exercising power through premise-setting and unobtrusive controls by those exercising power to change behavior for an identified benefit (or appropriation of value). Finally, in line with Mintzberg, he identifies the same four-quadrant categorization of internal/external and formal/informal mixes of “group usage” (what Mintzberg refers to as “players”). In Perrow’s view, this analysis is central to organizational theory because, as he unequivocally states, “[o]rganizations generate power; it is the inescapable accompaniment of the production of goods and services; it comes in many forms from many sources; it is contested; and it is certainly used” (2014, p. 265). Significantly, Perrow also critiques other organization theories as failing to sufficiently account for power. He argues that a mechanistic approach to formal organizations ignores power as a significant factor in cooperation, instead maintaining that rationality and efficiency are paramount. In addition, he maintains that theories of myth and symbolism as drivers of organizations is similarly misplaced in that the ‘myths and symbols’ viewpoint appears to assume that they are agreed upon for the benefit of all. However, more analysis is required: “The role of symbols is crucial, but we should search for powerful interests behind the distortions that the symbols hide” (Perrow,
As Perrow contends, power dynamics are central to analyzing complex organizations and are particularly important in understanding dynamic relations both within and without those organizations.

**Agency Capability Categories Used in This Case Study.**

Using the theories and concepts described in the literature, I have developed four agency capability analytical categories (the “four C’s”) mirroring the four governance modes for use in my case study. However, while there is fairly extensive literature specifically explicating the four governance modes, I have drawn primarily on the work of Wilson (2000) and Rainey (2009) in identifying these categories for the case study. The four Agency Capability categories include:

- **C1 – CONSTITUTION:** the statutory authorities creating, enabling and constraining the agency. It also covers regulatory requirements and directives that govern agency actions – the degree of “control by external authorities” (Rainey, 2009, p. 61).

- **C2 – COURSE:** the mission of the agency as allowed or dictated by its statutory authorities as well as agenda-setting and the strategies developed and implemented to achieve agency goals, i.e., Rainey’s concept of ‘official goals.’

- **C3 – CAPACITY:** the resources (financial, personnel, assets, and information) available to the agency and received or expended in pursuing its mission. This category also includes the structure, functions, and technology of the agency. Essentially the means by which an agency accomplishes Wilson’s ‘core tasks.’

- **C4 – CULTURE:** the patterns of behavior, values, relationships, and symbols of the agency and its collective personnel. As Wilson notes “Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual” (2000, p. 91).
These categories attempt to structure organizational and administrative behavior analysis in such a way as to integrate with the four governance modes. Doing so provides for a more nuanced understanding of how those governance modes are evidenced and operate in the context of the agency’s capabilities.

Agency Capability Summary.

As described above, theories and research in both organization design and administrative behavior, re-enforce different aspects of structural-functional analysis. I used both aspects in developing the categories of Agency Capability. As delineated above, C1 – CONSTITUTION and C3 – CAPACITY categories are drawn from organizational design literature. In addition, the C2 – COURSE and C4 – CULTURE, align with the literature on administrative behavior. It should be noted that, Simon (1997) takes both the organizational design and administrative behavior approaches to task, especially in instances where principles of good design and sound behavior have been theorized. “Before we can establish any immutable “principles” of administration, we must be able to describe, in words, exactly how an administrative organization look and exactly how it works” (Simon, 1997, p. xi). He goes on to provide specific critiques – particularly in definitional terms and concepts – of a number of principles such as specialization, hierarchy, span of control, and grouping, pointing out the seemingly contradictory nature or vagueness inherent in many of them. As further elaborated in
Chapter 3, by using BPA as a case study I offer an approach that helps to address Simon’s critique. I integrate structural-functional and collibrative analysis to better understand the complexities inherent in organizations – and in particular – those undergoing significant change.

**Summary of the Literature**

“The social sciences, at least in the area of complex organizations, have been desperate for ideas, not data” (Perrow, 2014, p. 83). Yet, as shown in this literature review, there is in fact, a wealth of ideas, but a significant challenge exists in integrating or synthesizing those myriad ideas into a general theory of organizations. Of course, this is due in part to the very complexities inherent in organizations. Within each school, scholars may well emphasize one aspect of complex organizations over another, such that some focus only on meta-governance, others on executive leadership, and still others on administrative behavior. However, integrating the three makes use of their respective strengths as analytical tools.

The literatures on meta-governance and organizational theory occupy different spaces in scholarly pursuits. The theory and research on meta-governance remains largely abstract and at a systems or state level of analysis while many concepts and associated terms continue to be developed and elaborated. By contrast, organizational theory is a mature field that has well-developed different schools of thought (i.e., rational systems, natural systems, and open systems), each of which provides certain
benefits and challenges in explaining organizations. By using both organization and
meta-governance theory in tandem, I make meta-governance concepts more useful in
empirical research while structuring organizational theory in a new way through the use
of those meta-governance concepts. In doing so, I attempt to find a reasonable middle
ground between a restrictive, abstract model and an unrestricted, realistic but less clear
model for exploring the intersection of these two fields (King, Keohane and Verba,
1994).
Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Design

This chapter provides the research design and methodology for this study. I explain the underlying principles and rationale for using a single case study as the focus of my research. I describe the record sets and means of data collection used for the study. I also describe the techniques used for analyzing the records and data sets as well as the techniques used for organizing the data to support my findings.

Important Principles and Concepts Guiding My Research Approach

My research seeks to understand how BPA underwent transformative change in a single decade and the implications of those changes for the agency to fulfill its mission and maintain itself through autopoiesis as a central governance institution in the Pacific Northwest. Three concepts in the organizational change literature are key to framing the research and the collection of data – governance collaboration, agency capability and executive leadership. Further, using Fischer’s (2003) interpretive analysis approach as described in this section, aids in understanding the role of these factors in shaping BPA organizational change during the period of my study.

My approach is also integrative. This means developing a holistic picture of organizational change rather than trying to interpret the meaning of change by understanding the causal influences of individual contributing parts. This approach can
be illustrated and elaborated by turning to two social science concepts that are central to my research design - new institutionalism and post-positivism.

Institutionalism “emphasizes the endogenous nature and social construction of political institutions” (March and Olsen, 2008). While March and Olsen acknowledge the wide spectrum of what may be considered an institution, they observe four characteristics common to institutions: 1) constitutive rules and practices that enable and constrain actors within them; 2) embedded structures of meaning; 3) common purposes and accounts; and 4) resources and capabilities to act. This integrative and holistic approach to understanding institutional change has two important consequences for understanding my research design. First, like March and Olson, I am interested in understanding how “institutionalized . . . actors are socialized into culturally defined purposes to be sought, as well as modes of appropriate procedures for pursuing purposes” (March and Olsen, 2008, p. 10). Second, like March and Olsen, I am interested in understanding the ways in which institutions interact with and adapt to their environment including other institutions. “Institutions, furthermore, operate in an environment populated by other institutions organized according to different principles and logics” (March and Olsen, 2008, p. 17) and therefore new institutionalism is placed firmly within network theory. These two principles drawn from March and Olsen provided the key driver from the integrated approach to gathering and analyzing
evidence for the transformative change BPA experienced in the late eighties and early nineties.

Not only is my research framework grounded in new institutionalism, it is also grounded in what has come to be known as post-positivism. This approach seeks to incorporate social, political, and discursive variables that positivism arguably neglects. “Emphasizing the integration of normative and empirical modes of discourse, post-empiricists understand the discursive processes of confirmation and falsification as complex activities” (Fischer, 2003, p. 13). Moreover, Fischer argues that language and discourse not only reflect perceptions but in fact shapes and interprets the world in a non-fixed, interactive way. The post-positivist approach acknowledges the power of ideas as part of the social construct of reality that has a significant impact on researching social phenomena. It seeks to account for discursive perceptions and interpretations even while attempting to explain the behaviors that actors (whether at an individual or institutional level) engage in based on those perceptions.

To summarize, my research design draws from the scholarship of new institutionalism by treating organizational change as a mutual process of adjustment among actors in the external environment. This focus helps explain the kinds of data collected to understand organizational change. As well, post-positivism’s emphasis on dialogical approaches to interpreting the meaning of change shapes the categories of analysis used in my research. Kooiman (2003) identifies image formation as a key
element of social construct formation, which can be associated with a post-positivist, discursive paradigm. Where the problem being researched is one of understanding how organizations change to survive, the post-positivist approach looks to develop interpretive categories as a meaningful way that provides insights to the immediate focus of examination but also supports developing analytical tools to aid in further research of organizations navigating change. Together, post-positivism and new institutionalism encourages the use of interpretive analysis and the power of ideas and actor narratives as part of the social constructs that this study attempts to interpret and explain.

The interpretive approach is particularly apt for a single case study, allowing for rich description of the events and issues being researched, but also where – as here – the case study is a longitudinal examination of how an organization evolved in response to a rapidly changing environment. Thus, we are able to develop an “interpretive reconstruction of the situational logic of social action” (Fischer, 2003, p. 140) affecting and influencing organizational change of an institution such as BPA. Fischer’s arguments for interpretive discourse analysis might suggest an individualist, behavioral lens. However, the institutional cultural and behavioral patterns at an organizational level as identified by March and Olsen (2008) fit neatly with my research. In particular, I align with Fischer’s interpretive analysis approach in three ways. First, is the focus on discursive narrative arcs that are embedded in how public administrators act and
engage in Jessop’s (2016) idea of collibration. Second, is the analysis of the means by which executive leadership effectuates changes in agency capabilities. Finally, is the examination of the ways in which certain governance modes may become more or less salient in response to external influences.

**Why a Case Study Focus**

My study of BPA in its transformative decade relies on Yin’s (2014) framework for longitudinal case studies. Using a case study to research BPA’s transformative decade is valuable in part because such case studies are “helpful in understanding success or failure in complex administrative settings” (Morgan, Green, Shinn, Robinson, and Banyan, 2022, p. 382). From a methodological perspective, case studies are a well-documented means of examining and testing organization theory and scholars such as Wilson (2000), Barnard (1938/2002), and Simon (1997) point to myriad case study examples in support of their theories and analysis of organization design and administrative behavior. Other scholars have used in-depth case studies to examine agencies as complex formal organizations. Such studies include examining autonomy, legitimacy, and resilience in agencies and their actions (Carpenter, 2001); the internal and external forces at play in influencing the behavior of agency actors (Kaufman, 1960/2006); and in turn, how agencies and – specifically – agency executives engage with the environment of constituents and stakeholders in pursuing their goals (Selznick, 1949/2011). Each of these examples point to the value and efficacy of the case study
approach in understanding complex social phenomena within “a holistic and real-world perspective” (Yin, 2014, p. 4).

However, given the inherent complexity of the case to be examined, a rigorous methodological approach is key to ensuring the validity of research using a case study methodology. As King, Keohane and Verba observe, “social science seeks to arrive at valid inferences by the systematic use of well-established procedures of inquiry” (1994, p. 6). Moreover, Yin (2014) emphasizes the need to clearly define the case, as well as delineating how to collect the relevant data and how to structure the data for valid analysis. My approach provides structure for each of those elements. It defines the aspects of the case being examined through focusing on BPA in a well-defined timeframe; it identifies the types of data of interest from two primary sources (the agency itself and newspaper media); and similarly (through use of consistent categorization) provides attributes for analyzing and understanding how BPA transformed in response to crises. Each of the elements of the approach will be addressed separately below.

Identifying BPA as the research focus incorporates a discrete unit of analysis in the agency, which also helps to define the level of analysis. As Yin notes, case studies provide value in the study of “individual life cycles, small group behavior, organizational and managerial processes . . . international relations, and the maturation of industries” (2014, p. 4). Yin’s observation implies the ability to use the case study approach at
different levels of analysis. The BPA case study positions the level of analysis at the organization. As detailed in Chapter 2, the three analytical dimensions developed for my case study – Governance Collibration, Agency Capability, and Executive Leadership – are effective at the organization level of analysis. Notably, most governance collibration theory is situated at the systems or state level. Moving the level of analysis to the organization brings the more abstract concepts of Governance Collibration to real-world issues and adds a new lens to understanding organizational behavior. In addition, both Agency Capability and Executive Leadership research have also used (though not exclusively) the organization as the level of analysis. Similar to Allison & Zelikow’s (1999) examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis, while the level of analysis could use the lens of the individual as a rational actor or the lens of groups of players in political power dynamics, the organizational level of analysis is also appropriate. In fact, Allison & Zelikow use the organizational level of analysis as a third lens, which more closely aligns with the purpose of my research. Placing the level of analysis for the BPA case study at the organization more fully takes advantage of the role of the executive integrated with Agency Capability and Governance Collibration.

**Rationale for Case Study Approach**

The BPA case study contains the key features for case study selection: it is a “technically distinctive situation” that relies on multiple data sources that “converge in a triangulating fashion” (Yin, 2014, p. 17). BPA offers a number of benefits as a case in a
distinctive dynamic, diverse, and complex operational environment in the study’s decade timeframe. Due to its statutory charge, BPA operates within both the energy and environmental policy arenas, which creates the potential for tension or even conflict between the two. In addition, because of its role in marketing power and offering electric transmission services across the region, it is subject to extensive media coverage across the region. For those same reasons it is the object of continuing attention from the legislatures of the four states encompassing its territory and as a federal entity, the congressional delegations of those four states. Finally, for the more immediate research purpose, it experienced significant crises as an organization and as a major governance actor in the region. The crises created an urgency to shift modes of governance, change means of agency capabilities, and adjust methods of executive leadership, all the while responding to ongoing and critical coverage that argued BPA’s and its federal partners’ efforts were insufficient to meet the crises. The result was a transformation in how BPA governed and operated; how executive roles were structured and led the agency; and how the agency interacted with stakeholders and constituents as well as how those respective narratives evolved.

Given this context, BPA is a strong selection for an in-depth case study. However, because I am using it as a single organizational unit of analysis, versus – as an example – a comparative case study, the parameters of the study must be clearly addressed. These aspects include generalizability, reliability, and validity. As a starting
point, my study is a longitudinal case study using a holistic approach. The longitudinal approach is particularly apt for studying and tracking the evolution of an organization over an extended period of time. While the study uses a single unit of analysis in examining BPA, the longitudinal approach essentially creates an N of 10, allowing for comparative observations between years as well as broader patterns over the decade timeframe. More specifically, using the decade timeframe allows for an examination of the different crises that faced the agency in relatively rapid succession, but also allows for understanding the complex and dynamic response by BPA to both individual events and to how those events intertwined with one another for a cascading effect that the agency had to address for its survival. Because of that complexity, the data sources used lend themselves to such an approach due to the broad, encompassing nature of the information they contain. The narratives of events and actions taken by BPA and its regional network; executive statements, arguments, and actions; and even local, regional, and national issues, all influence BPA throughout its transformation. These narratives are further supported by factual data such as budget, income and expense, and organizational structure found in the annual reports as well as rate increases and other financial information from BPA as reported in newspaper articles. Using rich description of these elements brings an in-depth and complete picture of BPA’s transformative decade. But, as emphasized previously, the varied data sources help to ensure this rich description is not merely one of my own first impressions, but rather that the observations and insights provided are drawn from solid evidence.
While a single case study of BPA is valuable both in understanding the agency’s transformation as well as insights to shifts in governance, change in capabilities, and leadership of its executives, it must be noted that its unique circumstances may limit its generalizability. However, as the first step in a broader research agenda, it provides an initial exploration of the approach used, which can be further revised and refined in future studies. This initial study and research approach can be used for future comparative cases, examination of additional organizational types, and studies of agency operating environments in support of theoretical replication, as further described in the Chapter 6 section on a research agenda. As well, the case study provides insight into agencies and organizations in times of crisis through its examination of shifts in governance modes and change in means of agency operations. Moreover, analysis of such crises includes the external influences that may be drivers or provide context for executive leadership actions leading to organizational change in an open system. BPA’s responses to the externalities of its operating environment may be specific to its circumstances. However, the governance modes, agency capabilities, executive leadership actions, and influence of external actors are all sufficiently clear for the same or similar tools/factors to be present in additional cases using this approach.

My research design also incorporates several factors to enhance the study’s rationale. The design emphasizes construct validity because of the unique approach used in emphasizing governance modes as a lens to understand BPA’s transformation.
As well, I integrate governance modes with agency capability and executive leadership for internal analysis and then juxtapose the analysis of internal change at BPA with how external actors in the BPA governance network influenced BPA’s transformation. This integrative method requires rigor in selecting sources to ensure sufficient triangulation and therefore consistency in data gathered for analysis. In particular, using multiple contemporaneous sources (BPA annual reports and three regional newspapers) allows for direct comparison among those sources to determine the greatest accuracy possible in complex narratives. As well, triangulation of data sources provides a more robust means of capturing and understanding potential rival theories. As an example, relying solely on BPA records such as the annual reports could easily create a narrow and likely inaccurate account of how the agency changed. But coupling the BPA annual reports (which include both objective data of agency operations and a narrative account of the prior year) with contemporaneous media reports helps verify the events and details that occurred. In addition, the newspaper reports on executive leadership statements, as well as those of other BPA governance ecosystem actors, provides additional crucial context for my analysis. Taken together, these allow for cogent observations rather than personal impressions of the events and their significance in driving BPA’s transformation. Also, a clear record of the chain of evidence (the sources, how they were selected, and how the data was retrieved and analyzed) ensures replicability of the study design.
Because “a case study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly observed” (Yin, 2014, p. 47), the internal validity of this case study is crucial; this is even more true due to the time that elapsed between the events and actions being studied and the decade timeframe involved in the research parameters. To aid in ensuring internal validity, triangulation of data using different sources (as previously described) helps identify consistencies among the sources for interpretation and rich descriptions of events. In addition, where discrepancies may be found, these multiple sources provide support for identifying the most accurate account. In particular, where BPA’s account in the annual reports is different than the contemporaneous newspaper accounts, aids in determining which account is most objective and thus a basis for a valid inference. In contrast, if the three newspapers differ substantially, then only a limited (or no) inference should be made. Finally, consistent, clear categorization is important. Fortunately, as further described in the Data Collection section below, the structured information of the annual reports (even – to a limited extent – including the narrative) lends itself to categorization. Descriptions of the categories used to analyze the annual reports in the Data Analysis section as well as reasoning for those categories are an important means for ensuring rigor in substantiating resulting inferences.

While internal validity is important, so is the comparability, and translatability of the findings. Importantly, the underlying elements of the phenomenon being studied – an agency’s successful transformation when faced with unprecedented challenges – are
useful for other phenomena. Thus, by understanding the BPA case study, these findings can be used as a guide to better understand further instances where an organization must navigate the tensions of significant change in the operating environment while also continuing to provide for the essential governing obligations of the agency. The key to making the BPA case study more generalizable is in identifying means of comparability and translatability for additional research.

Comparability and translatability depend on a research strategy using consistent categorization allowing for similarly situated organizations or similar crises in the same competing policy arenas of energy and environment – an example of which, McCool refers to as “the hydro drama” (2014, p. 107). Similar organizations and crises can be studied using a similar research design with similar results. As further described below, for the purpose of coding and analyzing BPA’s annual reports, I have detailed the reasoning behind the categories used as well as the attributes associated with each of them. For the Governance Collibration dimension, the categories and attributes are relatively well-defined (see e.g., Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011; Jessop, 2016). But my reasoning is especially important for the Agency Capability categories because I have developed them as internal organizational attributes that are used to elaborate how governance modes are evidenced within the agency.

As well, a full description of BPA’s structure (by way of Agency Capability categories and definitions), ensures that any unique aspects of the agency are clearly
identified such that inappropriate comparisons between BPA and other agencies would be unlikely, but also that such unique attributes would be appropriately addressed in replicating this research design for use in examining another agency’s change and response to crisis. This will not only allow for comparability to other cases but also creates a translatable research approach for use in areas such as the Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, and multiple state agencies that are party to the Colorado River Compact responding to extended drought conditions impacting Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Castle and Fleck, 2019); the California Public Utilities Commission and the major Northern California wildfire events of 2018 (Blunt, 2022). This methodology may also be effective in researching agencies reacting to scandals of varying degrees, such as abuse of power allegations at the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission (Crombie, N., 2023, September 26) or conflict of interest allegations at the Port of Morrow (Rogoway, M., 2023, March 25). It must be noted that these examples include agencies and networks from different levels of government (local, state, federal, and combinations of those actors), but the analytical approach is feasible across these units of analysis because the methodological construct of governance modes, agency capabilities, and executive leadership are inherent to all agencies. The value of my current research is in elaborating an analytical framework for use in multiple settings.

Further support for comparability and translatability is found through the use of contemporaneous newspaper accounts. First, by using multiple newspaper sources but
accounting for each newspaper’s positionality, helps ensure that multiple viewpoints triangulate the data and information presented by the newspapers. In addition, using broad but consistent search terms across all newspapers, helps to avoid ‘cherry-picking’ data. If only one newspaper carries a particular story or narrative arc, it bears additional critical examination before inclusion in the findings. Also, replicability of either the BPA case study or the translatable use of this same research strategy is feasible due to the broad search terms. Specifically, using the term ‘BPA’ and administrator names, as well as ‘BPA’ and terms associated with crises (e.g., ‘salmon’ or ‘deregulation’) is a simple, consistent, and effective means of gathering data and records from newspaper sources. Similar terms would be reasonably expected to provide sufficient data and records for this type of analysis in other case studies (e.g., ‘wildfire,’ as a comparable term for crises facing federal or state agencies charged with forest management).

It should also be noted that BPA’s own history and positionality invariably leads to findings that are specific to the agency’s governance network, operating environment, and events impacting and influencing its evolution and even very existence. In this regard, it is important to clearly indicate any findings that are a direct result of BPA’s unique stature as a federal agency, regional utility, and institution in the Pacific Northwest. Notably, this is true of most longitudinal single-case studies. As Neustadt and May (1986) argue, while the events and details of any crisis facing an agency and its executive leadership will contain elements specific to it, analogies may
still be drawn and prove useful in addressing organizational challenges in similar circumstances. As described in this chapter, a thoughtful, consistent approach, with clear data collection and analysis strategies results not only in a holistic view and rich description of the BPA case – including the unique aspects of this study’s findings – but also a more holistic approach to the analytical tools used in examining BPA’s transformative decade that may be used in further research.

While the factors discussed above show the value of the BPA case study, my research also comes with two caveats: confirmation bias and researcher bias. Confirmation bias was limited through the triangulation of data for independent confirmation as detailed in this chapter. By using multiple, independent sources of extant records, I am able to compare and contrast contemporaneous accounts and interpretations of the events and details being studies. This not only diminishes the bias of BPA’s own account (and the concomitant potential for the author’s bias in favor of that account) because the newspaper media each provide their own account, but also the contrast among the newspapers as to salience and perspective on BPA issues in the region creates multiple sources that aid in confirming (or confounding) any preconceived notions of the study’s focus.

In addition, as both the author of this study and a current employee of the agency, mitigating the potential for bias in the development and execution of this study is important. Measures taken to ensure objectivity are a key means of mitigation for
researcher bias. The timeframe of the study being twenty-five to thirty-five years ago helps in that all the events, actions, and narrative arcs occurred substantially prior to my involvement with the agency. Second, the remote timeframe should mean that findings and observations provide neither direct benefit nor detriment to myself or the agency but may provide insights in responding to future events and crises. As with confirmation bias mitigation, the records and date available for analysis are all available to researchers and the general public, so there is no reliance on internal documents and information.

**Data and Records Collection**

As King, Keohane and Verba note “[t]he most important rule for all data collection is to report how the data were created and how we came to possess them” (1994, p. 51). This is particularly true in case studies that rely on categorization and interpretive analysis regarding the social phenomena being examined. Without a clear indication of the source of records and the use for which they have been collected, there is little chance of offering a rigorous, objective, and logically consistent analysis of collaboration in the agency executive function.

The design of data collection for this study was restricted to review of records created by BPA and by media reports evidencing external entities’ interactions with the agency. The purpose of restricting data collection to extant records (rather than, as an example, the use of surveys or interviews), was to examine the agency (in particular,
executive actions and communications) as well as external actors’ actions and discourse as they existed at the time of those actions, reactions, and agency counter-reactions in terms of Governance Collibration and Agency Capability. In instances using surveys and interviews after-the-fact (especially where a significant span of time has since elapsed) there is the real possibility of developing a new interpretation or explanation of the discourse as found in concurrent records. Further, a case study involving significant organizational change benefits from a longitudinal approach, which requires the ability to examine agency capability and governance collibration change an extended period of time. Therefore, the event being examined is likely to have occurred farther in the past, which makes surveys and interviews less viable because of the length of time involved. Notably, Carpenter’s (2001) work, as compared to the more contemporaneous research of Selznick (1949/2011) or Kaufman (1960/2006) is in line with this approach. Moreover, using the collapse of fish stocks in the nineties as the focal point for my research still allowed for a robust agency and external entity record to examine.

The time frame for records and data collection was keyed off of 1990 as the year of Senator Hatfield’s “Salmon Summit.” I initially included three years prior so as to establish the stable state set of records and five years post-Salmon Summit. However, I quickly determined that expanding the period to a full decade (from 1987 – BPA’s 50th Anniversary, to 1996 – five years after the Salmon Summit) provided benefits in both a better understanding of the ‘stable state’ prior to the Salmon Summit as well as the
number of changes in BPA’s operating environment in addition to the salmon crisis including two changes in Presidential administration; deregulation of the utility industry; multiple Endangered Species Act listings of Northwest Salmon stocks; increasing budget pressures and debt burden facing the agency; and a change in administrators in the same year as the Salmon Summit. While this may seem a significant time period that would produce an unmanageable number of records, the decade timeframe helped to better observe longer-term executive initiatives and actions, discernable change in BPA’s structure and function and associated shifts in governance collaboration. Moreover, the records/data set was limited in two ways to be more manageable and effective. First, with BPA-created records, there was a clearly defined set of key documents in the ten annual reports and three other sets of documents. The BPA records were also limited by the challenges in collecting data such as records of decision, administrator memoranda and the like. Second, the newspaper searches, while fairly broad, returned roughly 800 records after eliminating duplicates and non-responsive records.

*Record Set A: BPA Records and Documents.*

The first iteration of data collection and review was of BPA-created records including 1) annual reports from 1987 to 1996; 2) the *BPA Consolidated Statutes* (BPA, 2003); and 3) the *1995 BPA Business Plan*. The BPA annual reports were the core record set to provide data for reporting on changes in agency operations and strategy, which in
turn evidence shifts in calibration. However, the annual reports also served as key
documents showing BPA’s change over the decade as the self-described ‘hero’ of its
own narrative (Fischer, 2003; McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan, 2014). They further
provided evidence of BPA’s interactions and positionality with regard to external actors
and influences and were juxtaposed (as an annual ‘report card’ of sorts) with ongoing
media reports. As a result, the annual reports form the research’s cornerstone.

The ten BPA annual reports were downloaded in pdf format from BPA.gov and
saved in chronological order. They were then uploaded to MAXQDA, a qualitative
content analysis tool, for data management and analysis as detailed in the Analysis
section of this chapter. For a longitudinal case study, the annual reports also provided
other valuable data beyond narratives coding. Because of the formal, consistent,
structured format of the annual reports, there are several sections that allow for direct
comparison of each of the ten years of the study. These included the agency
organizational chart, key financial highlights of expenditures (in both capital and
expense), changes to the agency mission statement, and even the agency profile
description and ‘theme’ of each report. Each of these topics were captured in a
spreadsheet for tracking changes, which (as with the narrative section and
Administrator’s Letter section of each annual reports) served to identify both actual
changes and an interpretation of the relative importance of those changes to the
agency.
While the primary focus was the annual reports as evidence of agency changes in governance collibration and agency capability, the other two documents provided additional context and insights for the decade of change. It should be noted that—because these were self-contained documents and would not be used for longitudinal comparison—they were maintained separately (statutes in hard copy, business plan in pdf file) and were not uploaded to MAXQDA. The consolidated BPA Statutes were used to examine the powers and authorities the agency could use to fulfill its mission as well as the constraints to those powers. More importantly, the *BPA Consolidated Statutes* showed the key changes to BPA’s authority in that time frame, such as the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1994 (BPA, 2003, p. 79). It must be noted that, while all statutes affecting BPA were included in the document, not all were necessarily relevant to this research. Therefore, as further explained in the analysis section below, not all statutes contained in the document were reviewed and analyzed. There is an initial assumption that BPA had a level of collibration—i.e., that no organization uses only one governance mode—that can be determined from the *BPA Consolidated Statutes*. This provided additional foundational understanding of the agency and its operating authorities to understand the executive actions and agency change over the decade in question. Similarly, the 1995 *BPA Business Plan* was reviewed as a key document evidencing BPA’s strategic plan forward in at least partial response to the changes of the past decade. Notably, while this was produced near the end of the subject decade, it did describe some of the events and drivers for agency
change and gives insight to changes in agency strategy. However, it has limited applicability because of its forward focus beyond the time frame of this study.

Taken together, the annual reports, the *BPA Consolidated Statutes*, and 1995 *BPA Business Plan* were a fundamental source of information and insight to answer questions about the agency, its operations, positionality, and perspective during the decade. Table 1 below identifies questions to be answered using this record set. Moreover, by utilizing both interpretive analysis in the annual reports’ narratives, supported by legal-structural analysis (March and Olsen, 2008) through the formal reporting sections of the annual reports as well as the *BPA Consolidated Statutes* and the 1995 *BPA Business Plan*, I was able to integrate the analytical structure of governance collibration, agency capability, and executive leadership to create a complete view of BPA and its decade-long transformation.

**Table 1. Record Set A: BPA Annual Reports and Questions to Answer.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECORDS</th>
<th>QUESTIONS TO ANSWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Reports Narratives</td>
<td>• How did BPA frame the salmon crisis and/or other challenges faced in the study’s timeframe?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Did the annual report narratives suggest success or continuing struggles in responding to the salmon crisis and/or other challenges facing the agency in the study’s timeframe?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can BPA’s framing be clearly associated with particular shifts in governance modes, agency capabilities, executive leadership action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of Data</td>
<td>Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Organizational Charts from Annual Reports | • To what extent was BPA’s own narrative arc aligned with external (media and other) narrative arcs?  
• How did the organizational structure and executives’ titles change during the study’s timeframe?  
• To what extent can changes in organizational structure and executive titles reflect shifts in governance collaboration?  
• To what extent could organizational changes be associated with the challenges faced by the agency? |
| Operational Budgets from Annual Reports | • Did the agencies operating budget change significantly over the study’s decade?  
• To what extent can changes in budget allocation be associated with shifts in governance collaboration modes? |
| BPA Consolidated Statutes | • What are the key statutes that authorize (enable and constrain) BPA in using governance tools for collaboration?  
• To what extent did statutes affecting BPA enacted during the study’s decade change its authorities and shift its governance modes? |
| 1995 BPA Business Plan | • Does the Business Plan show a clear intent by the agency for a specific collaborative mix in them or long-term time frame?  
• Does the Business Plan reflect a strategic response to outside influences?  
• Does the Business Plan show alignment (or misalignment) with outside influences, in particular alignment with certain actors over other actors? |
Record Set B: BPA in the Newspaper Media.

Newspaper accounts and editorials provided additional evidence of the network of external actors (both individuals and organizations or similar entities) with which BPA interacted and the environment within which BPA operated. I emphasized the narrative arcs within the BPA Governance Ecosystem, which – as previously described in Chapter 1 – entailed the network of actors being governed/influenced by BPA, having varying levels of influence on BPA, or otherwise interacting with BPA in some fashion during the decade of my study. Included in the BPA Governance Ecosystem were: 1) the Pacific Northwest Congressional delegations and three successive Presidential administrations; 2) the federal complex of BPA’s partner agencies, its parent, the Department of Energy, as well as other federal governing offices such as the Office of Management and Budget and associated Inspectors General offices; 3) state and local governing individuals and legislative bodies; 4) regional sovereign tribes; 5) customers, utility/industry stakeholders, and trade groups; and 6) interest groups, environmental organizations, and regional constituents; as well as 7) newspapers and similar media both covering and editorializing on BPA’s actions. Newspaper media provided a key source of information from these actors as the newspaper accounts described their actions, quote key individuals, and offered a platform for actors to stake out positions in the public square.

As important for the purpose of my research, newspaper accounts and editorials showed evidence of potential sources of influence that would affect executive
leadership and organizational operations, as well as modes of governance. This was particularly true of the Northwest delegation and Presidential influence. But the sway that Northwest governors and BPA customers had in indirectly effecting change at the agency cannot be overestimated. Moreover, the editorial boards of the newspapers often provided a ‘bully pulpit’ that an agency going through significant changes in operating environment can ill afford to ignore. The editorial bully pulpit included the topics of opinions, arguments for action, and the selection of individuals (such as members of Congress or state governors, among others) for guest columns.

I limited my media sources to three major newspapers from across the Northwest region. The media resources were confined to print for two reasons: first, for convenience in analysis as print was more easily managed than video (television) or audio (radio); second and more importantly, print media – especially from newspapers of record – often was able to devote more space for in-depth coverage than typical television or radio coverage. The three newspapers initially selected were The Oregonian, The Seattle Times, and the Idaho Statesman. Each of these were included as a newspaper of record for each of the three states, which encompasses the vast majority of BPA’s territory. The archives of The Oregonian and The Seattle Times were readily available and searchable. However, while using consistent search terms as used with The Seattle Times and The Oregonian, I had zero returns for the Idaho Statesman searches. This may be attributable to the search engine supporting the archives, which
was different than that for *The Oregonian* and *The Seattle Times*. Both *The Oregonian* and *The Seattle Times* archives are supported by NewsBank, an online media archives aggregator and therefore had consistent returns with the search terms. I considered replacing the *Idaho Statesman* with another Washington newspaper, the *Seattle Post Intelligencer*, but wanted to ensure this would not skew the collective editorial positions of the newspapers regarding BPA.

To assess potential editorial liberal versus conservative viewpoint, I used Puglisi and Snyder’s (2015) assessment of media bias. Puglisi and Snyder developed a means through editorial endorsement of ballot measures in comparison with interest groups, political parties, and median voters on a scale ranging between -1.0 (Liberal) to +1.0 (Conservative). The authors assessed several states, among them, both Oregon and Washington. While the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* scored as demonstrably more liberal in viewpoint (-0.6), both *The Seattle Times* and *The Oregonian* scored as moderate (0.0). Therefore, including these three newspapers provided a reasonable range of editorial perspectives so as to produce valuable insights and differences of opinion vis-à-vis BPA. It must be emphasized that the assessment was of editorials only and not newspaper articles, which supports my approach of separating editorials from articles in my analysis.

Table 2 provides questions to answer using Record Set B and is divided between ‘issue’ questions (to be answered through review of articles) and ‘opinion’ questions.
(focusing on editorials, and OpEds). I further distinguish in organizing the question between ‘issues’ – those areas of heightened interest for the region in which BPA may play a part but is not the sole focus (e.g., the salmon crisis, drought in the region, etc.) – and ‘operations’ – those articles and editorials that are specific to BPA, its operations, and actions in the region.

Table 2. Record Set B: Newspaper Materials and Questions to Answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECORDS</th>
<th>QUESTIONS TO ANSWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Articles on NW Issues impacting BPA</td>
<td>Are there clear major narrative themes indicated consistently across the three newspapers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Articles on BPA Operations</td>
<td>What agency actions receive the greatest coverage/salience in the newspapers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do articles tend to focus on a specific attribute of governance modes, agency capabilities, or executive leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials on NW Issues impacting BPA</td>
<td>Are editorial positions consistent among the three newspapers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If not, are differing editorial positions attributable to the newspaper’s liberal or conservative leaning or specific editorial stance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials on BPA Operations</td>
<td>Do editorials argue for actions that imply shifts in governance modes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do editorials advocate for specific changes associated with the categories of agency capability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do editorials recommend specific executive leadership actions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpEds by Politicians, Customers, and key Constituents</td>
<td>Do Op Eds argue for actions that imply shifts in governance modes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do Op Eds advocate for specific changes associated with the categories of agency capability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do Op Eds recommend specific executive leadership actions?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 below provides the search terms used as well as the number of returns from each newspaper after removing duplicates and ‘false positives.’ The list of searches is organized by the order of the searches and used “BPA” in conjunction with each of the other terms as indicated.

Table 3. Search Terms and Returns by Newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Search Term Returns (less duplicates and false returns)</th>
<th>The Oregonian</th>
<th>The Seattle Times</th>
<th>Seattle Post-Intelligencer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Salmon Summit” &amp; BPA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardy &amp; BPA</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jura &amp; BPA</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deregulation &amp; BPA</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmon &amp; BPA</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPA &amp; “President’s Management Agenda” OR “Government Reinvention” OR “Innovation Center” OR “[Vice-President] Gore”</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL RETURNS BY NEWSPAPER</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notably, I also used several alternative search terms in conjunction with BPA to attempt to find articles referencing the Clinton administration’s initiative to make government agencies more efficient and effective, but with very limited success as compared to the other search terms. Once collected, I performed an initial review of articles for relevance and eliminated articles that included the search terms but were not relevant to the search. Many of these articles were from sport fishing and outdoor reports referencing the BPA-financed squawfish program. In one particular instance, the search terms of ‘Hardy’ and ‘BPA’ returned a reference to the BPA squawfish
program referencing how squawfish are a ‘hardy’ stock. In addition, while small in number, I also removed letters to the editor from individuals other than those Op Eds by members of the Northwest Congressional delegation, key government officials, officials of Public Utility Districts or other BPA customers, and environmental or industry stakeholder organizations addressing BPA issues.

In addition, I removed duplicate articles. The vast majority of these articles were duplicates resulting from an overlap in search terms (such as searching on ‘Salmon Summit’ and ‘BPA,’ then on the broader search for ‘salmon’ and ‘BPA.’ However, I also removed a small number of duplicates specifically from The Seattle Times that appeared to simply be an evening edition of the article. While most of these instances offered a slightly different headline, the body and substantive content of the articles were very nearly identical and, in my review, did not offer any additional value for analysis.

Collection and Management of Newspaper Records and Data.

After removing duplicates and false positives, I downloaded all remaining records and tagged each with a file name consisting of the publication date (yyyy-mm-dd), along with a topic summary and an abbreviation signifying the newspaper archive. I separated editorials/OpEds from articles and Jura years from the Hardy years (with separate folders specifically for the transition year (1991). These files were placed in six separate file folders as follows:
I identified the total number of records retrieved from each newspaper archive in order to understand the overall perceived importance of issues involving BPA to the media and the region, but also to gain an understanding of how issues involving BPA developed as narrative arcs and salience in the eyes of the newspaper. The number of articles or editorials served as another proxy for salience under the premise that more coverage indicated a greater interest and importance as to the issue being reported or editorialized. This further supported distinguishing the reporting and editorial posture of the respective newspapers with regard to BPA and regional issues involving the agency.

I also noted where there was a limited reference to BPA itself in an article concerning an associated topic, e.g., an article on acquiring power generation by Clark Public Utility District that notes its power purchases from BPA. Additionally, I noted what I refer to as ‘blurbs’ – articles of less than one printed pdf page. Even if not consisting of in-depth reporting, these shorter articles indicated an ongoing monitoring position by the newspapers of BPA and issues of importance to their readers – however, it must be noted that limited references and ‘blurbs’ appeared far more frequently in
As a final examination of salience, I recorded the number of articles and editorials by year. This was aided by the online newspaper archives indicating the number of returns by year for each search. However, the additional sorting by years provided both a year-over-year tracking of comparative salience, but also the comparison of articles and editorials suggests periods of time where the reporting of issues is associated with editorial opinion on those issues. This not only provided insight to potential correlations between issue salience and editorial stance, but also – by tracking the articles/editorials among the respective newspapers – suggested comparative salience of issues for those newspapers. Also, by tracking the two time periods for the two administrators as well as the transition year – when Jura resigned, and Hardy was selected – I was able to understand the importance of BPA issues to the region over the decade timeframe. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the number of articles and number of editorials by year and newspaper source. For further comparison among newspaper sources, I included yearly totals, totals for the decade timeframe, and averages for each of the administrators’ tenures.

Table 4. Newspaper Articles by Year and Newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR/ADMINISTRATOR</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>PI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JURA - 1987</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURA - 1988</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURA - 1989</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Newspaper Editorials by Year and Newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR/ADMINISTRATOR</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>PI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JURA - 1987</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURA - 1988</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURA - 1989</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURA - 1990</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JURA/HARDY - 1991</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDY - 1992</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDY - 1993</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDY - 1994</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDY - 1995</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDY - 1996</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>178</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average (cf. Articles Average)</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average Jura (excl transition)</td>
<td><strong>11.75</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.75</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average Hardy (excl transition)</td>
<td><strong>21.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While articles and editorials from the three newspapers helped to ensure sufficient saturation and triangulation of data, I also identified several considerations for my analysis and findings. As seen in Table 6, there are several observations to be made.
Table 6. Comparison of Article and Editorial Coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>PI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ARTICLES</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EDITORIALS</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BY NEWSPAPER</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, while *The Oregonian* had the most coverage overall, its newspaper articles coverage was roughly comparable to *The Seattle Times*. However, its editorial coverage was far greater than that of *The Seattle Times* and was on par with *The Seattle Times*. Conversely *The Seattle Times* published far fewer editorials than either of the other newspapers, largely devoting space to reporting rather than opinion. The *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* published more editorials and Op Eds in comparison to the other newspapers, while at the same time devoting less space overall to BPA issues. In addition, coverage for all three newspapers in both articles and editorials substantially increased during the Hardy years. This is indicated by the average number of articles and editorials respectively for each of the administrators during their tenures. Using the average accounts for the longer tenure of Hardy during the time frame of the study. Taken as a whole, however, the reporting and editorials across three newspapers provide good coverage for use in understanding both the narrative arcs present for the longitudinal study, but also as a robust comparison to the BPA narratives contained in the annual reports.
Record Set C: Executive Leadership.

The third record set for data collection was designed to capture indicators of executive leadership, including formulating purpose, decision-making, communications, securing services, and the attendant processes and responsibilities as framed by Barnard (1938/2002). In particular, my interest lay in those leadership actions of the two BPA administrators serving during the decade of this study. However, I substantially revised my initial proposed collection strategy due to challenges in data and record collection. While BPA maintains an agency library and archive, additional documents evidencing administrator actions (e.g., Records of Decision, Memoranda and similar) are currently only in hard copy and, due to the pandemic, were inaccessible for research. Fortunately, through the use of newspaper articles, which included extensive references to administrator actions as well as direct quotes from the Administrators and other key BPA personnel on issues being covered by the newspapers, this shortcoming was at least partially alleviated.

In revising my strategy due to these constraints, I instead focused on records drawn from the Administrator’s Letter that opens each annual report and specific references to administrator Jura and Hardy’s actions as well as their respective direct quotes in various newspaper articles and editorials as described in Record Set B. These records provided evidence of executive leadership through direction, decision-making and similar actions. Using the categorical schema derived from the annual reports, I
identified governance modes that could be associated with the actions captured in the Administrator Letters and newspaper accounts. As an example, in re-titling its senior leadership as “corporate-sounding names” the agency’s spokesperson discussed doing so would “focus the agency more sharply on competing in the region’s power-supply business (Colby, R. 1994, March 12, D10) thus signaling, through the focus on competition, a shift toward a Markets governance mode. More overtly, in terms of BPA operations (e.g., budget, initiatives, rate cases, partnerships, and contracts), the Administrator Letters and newspaper accounts indicated concrete leadership actions and decisions in allocating funds, setting rates, and policy postures on salmon, environment, and regional value propositions. This was evidenced in Jura’s letter in the 1990 Annual Report where he emphasizes BPA’s commitment to environmental concerns through expansion of energy conservation programs. The Administrator Letters also were an indicator of narrative positionality (i.e., comments on agency values, culture, challenges and successes, and BPA as an influential regional actor). Multiple, perhaps competing narratives could be shown in Hardy’s letter opening the 1992 Annual Report, where he indicated the rate increase challenges the agency faced while emphasizing BPAs cultural obligations toward the Northwest Tribes as part of Congress proclaiming 1992 as “The Year of the American Indian” (BPA, 1992. 1992 Annual Report, p. 3). As noted above, while not a full replacement for records and data from the BPA archives, using the Administrator Letters in conjunction with newspaper accounts (including quotes from BPA) provided secondary resources to both capture
data and evidence of Executive Leadership, but also afforded the opportunity to further triangulate narrative accounts using those sources.

One final challenge of the Executive Leadership record set was that both the annual report Administrator Letter section and newspaper reporting on the administrator’s and (to a lesser extent) other BPA executive’s actions were overtly public and ‘on-the-record.’ The additional social situations and conditions (particularly interpersonal relationships) may be contextually acknowledged in these records (e.g., the fact that Hardy came to BPA from Seattle City & Light, which was also a major BPA customer), but those informal connections may not be immediately evident. However, with this caveat in mind, triangulating data from the four sources described in this section alleviates this concern because the actions of executives driving shifts in governance modes and changes in agency capability will either be acknowledged (if not touted) in the Administrator Letters and reported or editorialized in the newspaper. In fact, in one such instance *The Oregonian’s* Editorial Board called for BPA to cease holding private meetings with the Northwest Power Planning Council and representatives of both Oregon and Washington’s governors (The Editorial Board, 1992b, March 15. *The Oregonian*, p. P02). While it is very possible that there were numerous private meetings and informal conversations between the BPA Administrator and various individuals within the BPA Governance Ecosystem, the most significant and impactful actions, positions, and pronouncements will have been reported on and
therefore appropriately collected for this case study. Table 7 provides questions to be answered using Record Set C.

**Table 7. Record Set C: Administrator Letters from Annual Reports and Questions to Answer.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECORDS</th>
<th>QUESTIONS TO ANSWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Administrator Letter from Annual Reports     | • Are there clear major narrative themes indicated consistently throughout the Administrator Letters?  
                                          | • Are the themes and narratives of the Administrator letter attributable to one or more governance modes?  
                                          | • Do the Administrator Letters show evidence of an emphasis on one or more governance mode sub-categories and agency capability categories? |
| Administrator actions and direct quotes in Newspaper Articles | • Do Administrator and BPA executive actions reported align with the Administrator Letters?  
                                          | • Is there evidence that Administrator and BPA executive quotes and reported actions are responding to newspaper accounts of agency actions? |

**Summary on Collection and Management of Records and Data Sets.**

The relatively disparate sets of record and data as described above provided ample support for internal validity in a single-case study. There were clear benefits to including records drawn directly from BPA as the subject agency (the annual reports, BPA Consolidated Statutes, and 1995 BPA Business Plan), but the BPA perspective was counter-balanced by the newspaper articles and editorials to provide both factual accounts and varying regional perspectives on BPA governance, capabilities, and
leadership as a northwest institution. However, given the variety of records, it is importan
to have clarity on how the records and data were collected before turning to how the records and data were analyzed.

Both the annual reports and all newspaper articles and editorials (including Op Eds) were downloaded and saved as pdfs. While the annual reports were then uploaded to MAXQDA for coding, I also maintained the pdfs in chronological order in a separate folder and copied the Administrator Letters into separate files as well. The 1995 BPA Business Plan was also preserved as a separate pdf in the Record Set A folder for materials from BPA. However, the BPA Consolidated Statutes were only available in hard copy, but key statutes and sections within those statutes were marked using color-coded flags for and key provisions and phrases indicating authorities and constraints in governance modes, agency capabilities, and executive leadership.

With regard to newspaper records, I separated the newspaper articles from the editorials and then created a file folder system for each, labelled according to type and administrator tenure. I created a separate folder for the year of transition from Administrator Jura to Administrator Hardy because of the amount of overlap in articles and editorials in that year specifically referencing either Administrator Jura or Administrator Hardy or both. Within each folder, the records were maintained in chronological order with a ‘shorthand’ file name indicating the topic, whether the article specifically referenced either Administrator and the newspaper source (OR for The
Oregonian, ST for The Seattle Times, and PI for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer). This structure aided in quick retrieval for analysis and greatly aided in cross-referencing among annual reports, articles, and editorials for understanding the different events and perspectives over the decade being examined.

To summarize, the records and data collected and the means by which they were preserved and managed achieved saturation such that this study could be replicated. Using varied sources of data and information collection helped to offset potential shortcomings in the “executive leadership” data set and triangulate data to ensure against undue bias. Careful and transparent records management as described above also provided assurance that other researchers could take the same or a similar approach with the same or similar expected results.

As a final note, a journal was maintained of actions taken throughout the research. It was effective to keep this in a simple spreadsheet format in the same Excel Workbook as the study’s project plan, annual reports narratives coding scheme, longitudinal summaries of the annual reports’ structured sections, and newspaper search terms and returns. The journal consisted of the date, the focus of work/accomplishments for that day and any notes or observations to be used in later iterations of the research itself or to form the basis of findings from the corpus of data and records based on the analyses I performed. Those analytical methods are detailed in the next section of this chapter.
Analysis of Records and Data

Overview of Mixed Means of Analysis.

Considering an appropriate analytical approach to the BPA case study begins with an understanding of the different means by which social inquiry can be pursued. As noted previously, the epistemology of social inquiry primarily divides into quantitative and qualitative methods while acknowledging opportunities for mixed methods approaches. Noting the tension between these methodological schools in examining social phenomena, King, Keohane, and Verba argue that “the differences between the quantitative and qualitative tradition are only stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant” (1994, p. 4). Yin (2014) further offers guidance on when to use either branch to the best advantage by outlining specific methods associated with each and noting a series of possible questions to pose in determining the most appropriate method for the research in question. By using this guide, the researcher can weigh the benefits and challenges of each method in answering the research question. Of note, three of Yin’s methods (archival analysis, history, case study) have some overlap and are best suited for ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions “because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2014, p. 10).

Finally, there is the issue of what methodology will best serve the research design. Although a mixed methods approach using both qualitative and quantitative
methods will provide a more robust and insightful result, as Little (1991) observes, there is often a sense of competition and exclusivity between use of qualitative and quantitative methods. Instead, he argues that scholars are better served in addressing a research domain “with a sensitivity to the diversity of social processes and a well-stocked toolbox filled with the findings of various parts of social theory” (Little, 1991, p. 8). This must be tempered by acknowledging that one of the two methods employed will be the more prominent means of analysis, but use of both qualitative and quantitative analysis serves to strengthen both (Ahmed and Sil, 2012). This is especially important in using a somewhat unique, integrated approach because it may be more susceptible to any flaws resulting from a particular method. In addition, because this research consists of a single case study, as Yin (2014) argues, the use of various qualitative methods provides additional tools in Little’s ‘toolbox’ to ensure a robust analytical means for research.

For the purpose of this research, therefore, the emphasis was on qualitative interpretive analysis to identify narrative arcs across all three records sets, supported by limited quantitative methods focusing on numerical rather than statistical elements (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994) using interpretive coding and categorization in the BPA annual reports. In addition, there was limited use of structural-functional analysis in examining organizational charts and financial statements contained in the annual
reports as well as for the *BPA Consolidated Statutes* and *1995 BPA Business Plan*. These analytical tools and their respective use are further detailed in the following sections.

*Interpretive Coding-Based Analysis.*

While this case study focused on interpretive analysis, it began with the coding-based analysis used for the BPA annual reports. Doing so had two purposes. First, as Fischer argues, there is a “fundamental role of interpretive analysis in rendering meaningful the categories employed in understanding real-life problems” (2003, p. 140). In seeking to understand the complexities of BPA’s transformative decade, it was crucial therefore to develop categories and sub-categories for coding the narratives and supporting materials of each annual report. Second, the use of coding enabled consistent identification the shifts in governance modes and changes in agency capability, specifically comparing the *1987 Annual Report* and the *1996 Annual Report*.

“Creating categories for coding is the first step of analysis; it is vital to the process of organizing the naturally occurring stream of behavior into manageable units” (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982, p. 39). Following this logic confirmed that both changes had occurred (the stream of behavior) over the ten-year period and also that those changes could be identified and coded by category/sub-category, which were manageable units with sufficient specificity to gain understanding and insight to the transformation of BPA.

The coding scheme used the three dimensions of governance collibration, agency capability, and executive leadership as categories, which were labelled as ΦGC,
ΦAC, and ΦEL respectively as a shorthand. Sub-categories were also developed for the first two dimensions (ΦGC, and ΦAC). However, while able to readily identify paragraph themes for those dimensions, there appeared to be insufficient distinction within the data to develop similar sub-categories within the ΦEL dimension. Therefore, the coding scheme was adjusted to reflect Executive Leadership actions and postures of any sort.

Table 8 identifies the three categories associated with the organizational dimensions as well as the four sub-categories for both ΦGC and ΦAC and the attributes associated with each sub-category.

Table 8. Conceptual Categories and sub-Categories Used for Coding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>CODING CATEGORY</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL SOURCES/IDENTIFIERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC</td>
<td>Hierarchy (π)</td>
<td>• Command/Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsion/Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Socio-Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC</td>
<td>Markets (α)</td>
<td>• Competition/Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Socio-Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC</td>
<td>Networks (γ)</td>
<td>• Concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Co-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC</td>
<td>Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>• Consensus/Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Socio-Cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC</td>
<td>Constitution – C1</td>
<td>• Statutory Authorities and Constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Regulatory/Legal Obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC</td>
<td>Course – C2</td>
<td>• Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategy and Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC</td>
<td>Capacity – C3</td>
<td>• Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In MAXQDA, the narrative of each report was coded by paragraph, using references in the reports within the categories of ΦGC and ΦAC and their respective sub-categories. Table 9 below shows sample key terms/phrases associated with the nine sub-categories in assigning codes. These sample terms and phrases reflect the themes of paragraphs. Appendix B includes a step-by-step description with screen shots that more explicitly shows the coding process used for the annual reports. While a full report of all coding results, was produced, the output (consisting of over 300 pages) was not feasible for inclusion in the dissertation but instead has been maintained with the complete data and records collection sets.

Table 9. Categories and Sub-Categories with Associated Key Terms Used to Identify Paragraphs for Coding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>CODING CATEGORY</th>
<th>KEY TERMS/PHRASES USED IN CODING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC</td>
<td>Hierarchy (π)</td>
<td>Enforcement; Right to regulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC</td>
<td>Markets (α)</td>
<td>Competition/Compete; Customer; Sales; Contracts; Buy/Sell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC</td>
<td>Networks (γ)</td>
<td>Partner/ship; Stakeholder; Coordinate activities; Operating agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BPA annual reports used a highly structured, largely consistent format.

However, not all sections of the reports could be considered ‘narrative’ for the purpose of coding and analysis. The three sections that contain unique narratives in each annual report were: the Administrator’s Letter; a “Year in Review” (variously captioned according to the underlying theme of the annual report); and Management’s Discussion and Analysis of operations and financial reporting, each of which were coded according to the schema described above. The remaining sections are further described in Appendix C using longitudinal analysis and were therefore not coded with the three narrative sections of each report. Simple counts of references in the reports to the sub-
categories within ΦGC and ΦAC were used as a measure of importance of different modes of governance and means of capabilities in operations. In addition, cross-coding those instances with the coding for ΦEL was used to identify the methods by which executive leadership accomplished those changes. As an example, Administrator quotations describing actions to attract and retain customers indicate an emphasis on the Markets governance mode. Table 10 shows the total instances for each coding category, along with totals from each individual annual report by year. Highlighted cells indicate years in which a particular code was significantly more (green) or less (yellow) present than in most other years.

It should also be noted that – largely due to coding by paragraph for topics and themes – there were also instances of co-coding of sub-categories within the same category (e.g., coding a paragraph for both Markets and Networks in ΦGC). It may be argued that co-coding of sub-categories within the same category is inappropriate. In fact, this dual coding simply indicates instances where equal weight or salience was given to those governance modes in that specific reference.

Table 10. Coding Counts by Category/Sub-Category per Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY/SUB-CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL REFS.</th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Hierarchy (π)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Markets (α)</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Networks (γ)</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC: C1 – CONSTITUTION</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In coding, particular attention was paid to instances of co-coding between dimensions to gain insights on the extent to which a particular governance mode may be closely associated with a specific agency capability. This co-coding is summarized in Table 11. Co-Coding between ΦGC and ΦAC resulted in a significant association between governance modes (specifically both Markets and Solidarity) and C2 – COURSE. In contrast, due to the extremely low instance of the Hierarchy governance mode in the annual reports, few if any insights were likely to be drawn since only one instance was co-coded. It should also be noted that the only other instance where no co-coding existed was between the Networks governance mode and C4 - CULTURE, but this is more attributable to the operational nature of narratives involving Networks (e.g., project partnerships, etc.). Lastly, it is unsurprising that the great majority of co-coding occurred between governance modes and either C2 – COURSE or C3 – CAPACITY, given the strategic and operational focus of annual reports in general.

Table 11. Counts of Co-Coding Between Governance Collibration and Agency Capability Categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO-CODING BETWEEN AGENCY CAPABILITIES &amp; GOVERNANCE MODES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>C1 – CONST.</th>
<th>C2 – COURSE</th>
<th>C3 – CAPACITY</th>
<th>C4 – CULTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy (π)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ΦAC: C2 – COURSE | 146 | 15 | 5 | 8 | 25 | 18 | 8 | 18 | 27 | 8 | 14 |
| ΦAC: C3 – CAPACITY | 215 | 25 | 18 | 48 | 20 | 19 | 13 | 24 | 16 | 17 | 15 |
| ΦAC: C4 – CULTURE | 56 | 15 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| ΦEC: Exec. Action | 19 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 1139 | 142 | 104 | 166 | 113 | 120 | 78 | 102 | 122 | 89 | 104 |
Lastly, particularly significant topical themes were coded both in support of the Salmon Summit and overall salmon stock crisis theory, but also topics and themes of potential rival theories of explanation for shifts in governance mode, agency change, and executive leadership. While themes in paragraphs were identified for category coding, specific phrases were also coded referencing the topics reflected in the following terms and phrases in Table 12. In the first instance, all such references (and variations of them) were coded. However, two specific phrases, ‘Fish and Wildlife’ and ‘Conservation’ were also used in the annual reports in the Financial Reporting sections showing capital asset value and expense spend levels for the Conservation and Fish and Wildlife Programs at BPA. Therefore, those instances of coding were removed to focus on instances occurring in the annual report narratives. Moreover, these search terms were used for aiding in analysis of the Governance Collibration and Agency Capability dimensions rather than engaging in a separate analysis of the terms themselves.

Table 12. Specific Search Terms Associated with Key Issues Identified for Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM/PHRASE</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks (γ)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets (α)</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Salmon Summit (specific reference), or Salmon stock declines
Fish & Wildlife
Conservation/Energy Efficiency (distinct from environmental conservation efforts)
Columbia Basin Accords (also called the ‘fish accords’)

145
Coding for the three categories, as well as the specific topical references thus allowed for an examination of major issues in the context of how BPA framed them in its self-narrative. These were then used to explore how Governance Collibration, Agency Capability, and Executive Leadership evolved over the transformative decade, as indicated in Table 13. The second column in Table 13 shows the total number of specific references for the annual reports – the ‘conservation’ and ‘fish and wildlife’ totals are the net of total instances less Financial Section instances.

Table 13. Coding Counts for Specific Search Terms by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERENCE/PHRASE</th>
<th>TOTAL REFs.</th>
<th>‘87</th>
<th>‘88</th>
<th>‘89</th>
<th>‘90</th>
<th>‘91</th>
<th>‘92</th>
<th>‘93</th>
<th>‘94</th>
<th>‘95</th>
<th>‘96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salmon Summit (specific reference)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmon stock declines</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish &amp; Wildlife</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Energy] Conservation/Energy Efficiency (NOTE: this is distinct from environmental conservation efforts)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia Basin Accords (also called the ‘fish accords’)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, Climate, or Global Warming</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply (surplus/deficit) and/or drought reference</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to coding the narratives from the reports, additional consistencies in the framing and formatting of the reports aided in examining structural-functional changes. The annual reports generally include the following non-narrative sections:

- Financial Highlights
- Balance Sheets
- Statements of Revenue and Expenses
- Statements of Changes in Capitalization
- Statements of Cash Flows
- Summary of General Accounting Policies
- Schedule of Amount and Allocation of Plant Investment
- Federal Repayment
- Report of Independent Accountants
- Organization Chart/Officer
- BPA Offices
- BPA Mission Statement
- BPA Profile

Because each of these additional elements of the annual reports were consistently structured (and limited, e.g., each organizational chart was a one-page visual depiction), these were not coded by paragraph as with the annual report narratives. Instead, these elements were used for a high-level longitudinal analysis of changes over the decade. By capturing key aspects and significant changes in areas such as capital and expense spending, re-structuring of organizational units and officers’ titles, and even small changes in the wording of the Mission Statement and BPA Profile,
aided in examining how, and the extent to which, such changes over the decade were reflective of, or driven by the broader narrative of the annual reports describing challenges and opportunities facing the agency and the means by which the agency addressed them. While the most obvious example is in the different organizational structure and executives’ titles that occurred between the 1993 Annual Report and the 1994 Annual Report in moving from a bureaucratic structure to a business-like structure, the longitudinal analysis of structured sections also provided evidence of actual change at BPA (and the extent to which those changes align with the coded narrative sections). As an example, it was informative to examine the reported spending levels for fish and Wildlife measure in conjunction with coding for ‘Fish and Wildlife’ or ‘Salmon’ in the narrative sections to identify whether salience in the narrative correlated with increased spending.

Using both coding and longitudinal analyses for the BPA annual reports provided an important baseline for understanding the transformative changes at the agency over the decade. The coded narrative sections of each report indicate BPA’s self-perception of the challenges and opportunities it faced as well as the strategies and actions to effect needed changes. Importantly, examining these narratives and coding them using the categories and sub-categories described above, provided substantial support for understanding BPA’s shifts in governance modes, changes in agency capabilities, and actions by executive leadership to transform the agency. Finally, the coding and
longitudinal analyses described served as a baseline for identifying significant internal narratives that could then be juxtaposed with external influences as presented in the newspaper media for deeper understanding and rich description of BPA as a Northwest institution undergoing substantial change. As a starting point for this juxtaposition, I examined the major events and details creating those narrative discourse arcs through my interpretive analysis strategy, to which we now turn.

*Interpretive Discourse Analysis.*

In choosing the case study approach and using it as an explanatory means of researching the complexities of governance collaboration, agency capabilities, and executive leadership, it was beneficial to identify different means of analysis to be used in the study. Because this approach seeks to integrate three complex facets of the agency as an organization and its response to the external environment, discourse theory provides an additional effective means of examining those complexities. Narrative discourse theories and frameworks arise in several ways and by differing names including discourse analysis (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005), Narrative Policy Framework (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan, 2014), or discursive interpretive policy analysis (Fischer, 2003). At the core of this body of literature there are certain concepts and tenets that are consistent throughout, even if labeled in slightly different ways. Moreover, while typically framed in the context of policy processes, it is notable that the underlying concepts may also be applied to organizational change because discourse
and narratives – in particular those associated with BPA’s self-narrative in the annual reports as well as multiple external, competing narratives evidenced through media reports – will drive change both as part of broader policy shifts and as part of organizational performance.

While being mindful of the nuances among scholars, I primarily relied on Fischer’s (2003) methodology for interpretive policy analysis, which may equally be applied to understanding transformative organizational changes in a complex governance network such as BPA’s. Fischer argues that narrative discourse is an important area of study because “the ‘storylines’ that symbolically condense facts and values basic to a belief system” hold policy coalitions together (2003, p. 102). Focusing on policy coalitions, he then posits a narrative policy analysis process that identifies artifacts of a policy issue; further identifies policy actors or coalitions associated with a policy subsystem; examines discourses associated with the actors and policy issues; and determines the resulting points of conflicts arising from competing coalitions and their narratives (Fischer, 2003, p. 173). Fischer’s interpretive frame fits nicely with the BPA case study, given the complex BPA Governance Network of actors and competing narratives that emerged over the study’s decade. As noted above, using these analytical tools through self-narratives and media reports provides value in understanding both the organization that is the unit of analysis and the broader network within which the organization governs, operates, and leads.
There are four elements to Fischer’s (2003) methodology for discourse analysis:

1) identification of artifacts giving meaning to a policy issue; 2) identifying the actors/communities relevant to the policy issue; 3) the discourses resulting from the first two elements; 4) determination of points of conflict within the discourses, their sources, and their differing interpretations. Fischer advocates starting with these four dimensions to go beyond narrative description and to frame the discourse as argument – in particular competing arguments as a means of deliberation for both actors and analysts to fully understand the policy issue. Notably, this does not appear to assume a winning argument or a given solution but is a continual interaction within the discourse itself. Framing discourse as argument (taking place in public through the media and, through editorials, by the media) is both apt and inherent in the tensions among network actors and competing policy arenas such as the energy sector and the environment. Finally, while not specifically called out in discourse analysis methods, this approach lends itself to time-based analysis. The life-cycle inherent in narratives naturally plays out over time and often in extended timeframes. “Structured sequentially with a beginning, a middle, and an end, the narrative tells us about the state of affairs, an intervening event or action, and the resulting consequences” (Fischer, 2003, p. 179). Time-based analysis over an extended period such as ten years or more considers the discourse through narrative arc(s) containing the elements of introduction, maturation, culmination, and resolution and therefore allows for a more complete understanding of the issues and actors and their interplay with one another.
Using the case study approach in conjunction with time-based discourse analysis proved effective in understanding both governance calibration shifts and agency capability changes through the organizational narratives of executive leadership as well as the competing narratives from external actors and the events influencing the agency. The BPA case study allowed for a series of data points and observations of 1) the initial prior or stable state; 2) the narratives of both BPA and external entities in the BPA Governance Network response to the decade’s crises; and 3) the end state. More specifically in terms of the narratives developed by the BPA Governance Ecosystem actors through newspaper reporting and editorializing, and the responding narratives of the agency executive leadership (both in framing positions and in directing actions), discourse analysis offers a sound means of explaining agency behavior through shifts in governance modes, changes in agency capability, and executive leadership.

As mentioned above, Fischer’s (2003) narratives model consists of four steps:

1) Identify artifacts - in this instance, the collected records for each stage of analysis.
2) Identify relevant interpretive actors/communities – the agency and external entities.
3) Identify relevant narratives and discourse – specifically, those that align with specific modes of governance in terms of congruence/incongruence between agency and external entities.
4) Identify points of conflict or agreement, their conceptual source, and interpretation by agency and external entities.

The first two steps were applied across the three newspaper sources in conjunction with the annual reports to identify issues of significance to BPA and the
Northwest region as well as elaborate the key actors in the BPA Governance Network.

For the third step, I began by sorting newspaper records according to the identified issues. I then developed a chronology (in keeping with Neustadt and May’s (1986) events and details approach) of the major narrative discourse arcs for the decade. The chronology included BPA actions and postures, positive/negative Governance Ecosystem actor feedback, and resulting agency response that effected shifts in governance, change in capabilities, and methods of executive leadership.

Owing to the search terms used in developing the research proposal, I categorized two of the major discourse narrative arcs as ‘salmon’ and ‘deregulation.’ However, by further using the Administrators as search terms, I identified additional major narrative arcs of ‘rates,’ ‘financial stability,’ and ‘agency accountability.’ In addition, certain minor (more limited in time and impact) narrative arcs were also included to provide further context in tracing the agency and external influences over the time period. I categorized minor narrative arcs as those where there was reporting/editorializing from at least two of the newspapers and the narrative arc extended for less than two years. Significantly, I categorized such discourse narrative arcs as minor when there was no mention in BPA’s annual report, but where BPA did respond in some fashion in the newspaper accounts themselves.

As a fourth step, after identifying narrative arcs in the newspapers for the complete timeline, I used an iterative approach of reviewing of articles/editorials against
coded annual reports for consistency and BPA perspective of the year versus the contemporaneous accounts by the newspapers of BPA itself and the BPA Governance Ecosystem actors to determine the extent to which BPA’s reflective narrative each year aligned or conflicted with contemporaneous accounts; responded or reacted by fiscal year’s end; and – most important – the extent to which there was evidence of shifts in governance modes, change in capabilities, or actions by executive leadership that aligned with the media accounts.

Together, these analytical efforts provided a time-based analysis of ways in which the agency reacted to salient issues and media coverage and the extent to which there was a reflexive adjustment in governance modes, agency capabilities, and executive leadership. Moreover, this approach identified emerging themes and patterns as to ways in which the agency’s self-perception and the public/media’s perception of the agency’s actions create an environment whereby the agency evolved in mission, culture, values, functions, and operations, thus providing an additional lens through which to research and analyze BPA. Using these narratives and rich description of the integrated accounts by newspapers and the BPA annual reports, I constructed the major and minor narrative arcs, to identify both the drivers of BPA’s transformation but also how those narratives were critical in effecting the transformation.
Chapter Summary: Research Design

Even in the instance of a single case study, the research design is of paramount importance. Adding to this is the inherent complexities of a longitudinal study that utilizes multiple lenses, including a relatively new approach through the use of governance collaboration in conjunction with agency capabilities and executive leadership. To help ensure this approach would provide a means to better understand how a complex organization such as BPA transformed itself in the face of multiple crises, I relied on the use of multiple methods to help ensure the findings were supportable, objective, repeatable and generalizable to the extent possible. As Denzin and Lincoln observe, “of course, qualitative research is inherently multimodal in focus” (2011, p. 5). It is even more true in a single case study that collects data and records from multiple sources and uses multiple modes of analysis such as interpretive coding, structural-functional, and discourse analysis. Importantly, the design of this study focused on an operational set of concepts to ensure a consistent means of analysis that is both robust and flexible to support the findings, observations, and insights as detailed in the following chapters.
Chapter 4: Findings and Analysis

Introduction and Overview of Annual Reports Coding and Findings

This chapter describes my findings from coding and analyzing the ten annual reports produced by BPA from 1987 to 1996. As detailed in Chapter 3, I coded each annual report using the three conceptual categories of Governance Collaboration (ΦGC), Agency Capability (ΦAC), and Executive Leadership (ΦEL). For clarity throughout this chapter, I use the following category names and accompanying subcategory identifiers:

For Governance Collaboration (ΦGC) sub-category identifiers:

- Hierarchy governance mode
- Markets governance mode
- Networks governance mode
- Solidarity governance mode

For Agency Capacity (ΦAC) sub-category identifiers:

- C1 – CONSTITUTION
- C2 – COURSE
- C3 – CAPACITY
- C4 – CULTURE

With both the ΦGC and ΦAC categories, I coded paragraphs by sub-categories as shown in Table 14. The Table also shows the total instances for each coding sub-category, along with totals from each individual annual report by year. Shaded cells indicate years in which a particular code was significantly more (bold, italic) or less (underlined, italic) present than in most other years.
Table 14. Coding by Category and Subcategory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY IDENTIFIERS</th>
<th>TOTAL REFs.</th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Hierarchy (π)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Markets (α)</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Networks (γ)</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC: Constitution (C1)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC: Course (C2)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC: Capacity (C3)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦAC: Culture (C4)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦEL: Exec. Leadership</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 supports the efficacy of my study design in analyzing the annual reports. This is at least in part due to the consistency of terms, language, and format in the reports’ narratives. While the format of the annual reports was generally consistent, there was a notable exception in its presentation in 1992. All other reports included comparable page counts, numbers of photographs, and similar graphics, but in 1992 the report overall was much shorter and devoted greater space to full-page graphics and photographs. However, in terms of my analysis, this outlier did not appear to have a significant impact on my findings.
It should be noted that – largely due to coding by paragraph for topics and themes – there were instances of intra-category coding (e.g., coding a paragraph for both Markets and Networks in ΦGC). It may be argued that intra-category coding within the same category is inappropriate, but coding in this way is not mutually exclusive among coding sub-categories. In fact, this dual coding simply indicates instances where equal weight or salience was given to more than one sub-category in the narrative. Intra-category coding occurred in each of the ΦGC and ΦAC categories. In addition, I captured and analyzed instances of co-coding between ΦGC and ΦAC sub-categories (e.g., coding a paragraph as both the Markets governance mode and the C2 – COURSE category).

My discussion of findings that follow is organized by category and then by sub-category in each section of this chapter. Because the focus of my study is on Governance Collibration, the discussion begins with the ΦGC dimension of findings. I then examine Agency Capability findings and their co-coding with Governance Collibration instances. The Agency Capability section also describes additional support for my findings from the BPA Consolidated Statutes and the 1995 BPA Business Plan documents. The final section focuses on the limited findings from coding for Executive Leadership. Each section begins by describing findings from counts of coding and associated patterns. These patterns are used as a basis to provide further detail and nuance to my findings using specific quotations from individual annual reports. It
should also be noted that each table summarizing the findings includes the administrator for each year, recalling Jura’s tenure from 1987 to late 1990, the transition year of 1991 from Jura to Hardy, and Hardy’s tenure from 1992 through 1996. As a result, each section also includes broader observations and comparisons of the respective tenures of the two administrators during its transformation decade. Each of these efforts serves to create an integrated description and understanding of how BPA transformed itself in the decade and how it shifted its modes of governance through changes to Agency Capability and Executive Leadership.

**Evidence of Governance Collibration in Annual Reports**

Using the four sub-categories of Governance Collibration, I easily identified and coded paragraph subjects in almost all instances throughout the annual reports. As shown in Table 14 above, there were clear indicators of each governance mode, which allowed for some initial observations. First, references to the Hierarchy governance mode were minimal. The absence of such references is likely attributable in large part to the constraints of BPA’s statutory authorities (as will be further explored in the section on Agency Capability). Second, considering BPA’s mission to market power from the federally operated dams, it is little surprise that the Markets governance mode was most prevalent (nearly half of all references coded) and consistent throughout the annual reports. Third, the paragraphs coded as Networks governance mode were largely discussions of various partnerships in which the agency engaged across (and
even outside) the region. Lastly, the Solidarity governance mode was mostly evidenced through public engagement efforts and broad-based initiatives to benefit the region as a whole. While these examples highlight the use of governance modes as a means of analysis, greater descriptive detail is provided in the sections devoted to each governance mode.

One final note is the importance of context in coding for each of the Governance Collibration sub-categories. The different governance modes were not always easily distinguishable especially when coding depends on singular instances of specific words. As an example, the annual reports regularly discuss BPA constituents. However, constituents could comprise customers, ratepayers, stakeholders, or communities. References to constituents as customers or ratepayers would indicate a Markets governance mode because the Markets concept of competition is associated with customers and ratepayers. However, where constituents were referenced as ‘stakeholders,’ any of the governance modes may be used in coding because stakeholders could be partnerships (denoting the Networks governance mode) or the public (denoting the Solidarity governance mode). Therefore, the context of the paragraph being coded and the way in which BPA engaged in the use of a governance mode became paramount. To further aid in this nuance, each section also provides a short overview for each governance mode section to frame the means for identifying
and coding that governance mode. Finally, numerous direct quotations from the annual reports are included to further support the reasoning behind the coding schema.

Each section on governance modes (Hierarchy, Markets, Networks, and Solidarity), provides background, context, search terms used, finding, and key observations. These sections are organized according to salience in reverse order, beginning with the least-coded governance mode (Hierarchy) and progressing to the most-coded (Markets). Each section also includes tables that summarize counts of the individual governance modes by year. These tables were used as a reference in understanding patterns through time as key indicators of BPA’s use of governance modes. Finally, use of the coding patterns and specific examples of governance modes aided in understanding their use and how such uses shifted throughout BPA’s transformative decade.

**Hierarchy Governance Mode.**

As indicated in Table 15 below, there were almost no references to the Hierarchy governance mode in the entire decade. In spite of developing a fairly broad coding scheme, which considered all terms suggesting command and control, enforcement, and authority to regulate, only three instances of the Hierarchy governance mode were identified.
Table 15. Counts of Hierarchy Governance Mode References by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Hierarchy (nit)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. of total counts</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a single reference to BPA’s regulatory authority, the narrative reporting that the “U.S. Supreme Court declined to review two challenges to BPA’s right to regulate use of the intertie” (BPA, 1991. 1991 Annual Report, p. 8, emphasis added).

There are two important observations to be made regarding this singular reference. First, the U.S. Supreme Court declining to review a challenge to BPA regulatory authority indicates that the agency did have the Hierarchy governance mode available to it as a means of governance. But the second observation is that – insofar as the Supreme Court weighed in – it appears to be a narrow authority (in this case over the Transmission Intertie between Oregon and California). It is reasonable to surmise that if BPA had a broader regulatory authority, it would more readily have exercised that authority and therefore more references would likely be found in the annual reports.

The remaining two instances coded as the Hierarchy governance mode reference law enforcement. In both the 1991 Annual Report and the 1992 Annual Report BPA makes note of law enforcement efforts to reduce salmon poaching on the Columbia
River. However, BPA did not engage directly in these enforcement efforts. Instead, BPA reported that the agency provided nearly $10 million in funding to state and tribal law enforcement efforts. These references suggest that BPA had no direct enforcement authority but was still able to engage in the Hierarchy governance mode indirectly by funding these efforts through partnerships with law enforcement agencies. This action was notable because it highlighted how an agency may accomplish its goals through the use of two governance modes in combination. Funding law enforcement by partnering with other agencies allowed BPA to use the Hierarchy governance mode through use of the Networks governance mode.

One final note should be made on the funded law enforcement activities and evidence of the hierarchy governance mode found in the annual reports. While BPA funded a three-year, roughly $10 million effort, it was only described in the 1991 Annual Report and the 1992 Annual Report. Even though the funding extended through 1993, there was no mention of the program in that annual report. This suggests that the program had lost its significance in terms of the BPA narrative as contained in the annual reports. More significantly, while the reference in the 1991 Annual Report was about the announcement of funding, the two subsequent annual reports made no mention of the BPA-funded efforts’ results. Ultimately, we have no way of knowing from the annual Reports whether BPA’s use of the Hierarchy governance mode through funding law enforcement was successful or effective. However, it is notable that other
ongoing and multi-year programs such as energy conservation efforts were regularly reported on in the annual reports (see e.g., BPA, 1989. *1989 Annual Report*, p. 8; BPA, 1990. *1990 Annual Report*, pp. 8-9). It is reasonable to surmise that a more successful and ongoing salmon poaching enforcement effort would have been included in subsequent annual reports.

*Solidarity Governance Mode.*

The Solidarity governance mode, while second least in number of coded instances, was significantly higher than the instances found of the Hierarchy governance mode. As shown in Table 16 below, there were 155 coded instances (23.4% of the total instances coded for governance modes), with an average of 15.5 instances per year. There were only two years (1993 and 1995) where the number of references were in single digits. In contrast, the three highest counts occurred in 1989, 1990, and 1991 – the final years of Jura’s administration.

*Table 16. Counts of Solidarity Governance Mode References by Year.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>‘87</th>
<th>‘88</th>
<th>‘89</th>
<th>‘90</th>
<th>‘91</th>
<th>‘92</th>
<th>‘93</th>
<th>‘94</th>
<th>‘95</th>
<th>‘96</th>
<th>Ave. by year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. of total counts</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coding for the Solidarity governance mode focused on instances where constituents, the public, and the region as a whole were the subject of the narrative. Concepts associated with the Solidarity governance mode included public benefit efforts such as funding for fish and wildlife, irrigation, and actions or initiatives that were framed as a general regional asset, value, or benefit. Regional assets included references to hydroelectric power benefits in general as well as the electric transmission grid and the emphasis on its reliability. In addition, specific programs (variously labelled ‘conservation’ or ‘energy efficiency’) supported by BPA through direct funding but “carried out by utilities, state and local contractors” (BPA, 1989, p. 8) were coded in the Solidarity governance mode. These programs helped weatherize and modernize buildings and homes (especially low-income housing) for heating and cooling, in communities across the region. Finally, the Solidarity governance mode encompassed general forward-looking statements about broad populations and communities of the Northwest, as well as future generations. In fact, the theme of the 1990 Annual Report was ‘future generations’ and included the following a specific quotation, “Our children will judge tomorrow the wisdom of the decisions we make today” (BPA, 1990, title page).

There was a greater emphasis on the Solidarity governance mode during the Jura years. The four years (1987-1990) of Jura’s tenure account for over 50% of the total references. In addition, the transition year from Jura to Hardy (1991) accounted for
nearly 13% of Solidarity governance mode references. This was in stark contrast to the five Hardy years, which accounted for roughly 34% of the total references. Even more significant is the fact that Solidarity governance modes dropped to single digits in 1993 (five references) and 1995 (seven references) while 1994 barely touched on double-digits, with ten references. Together these three years account for just over 14% of total Solidarity governance mode references in the decade of annual reports.

Also of note is that, while the 1996 Annual Report increased the number of references to seventeen (more than double the previous year), the tone was distinctly different. In the 1996 Annual Report, rather than a focus on the region itself, the narrative contextualized the Solidarity governance mode within the agency’s business transformation. This began with Hardy’s opening letter of the annual report. “In the last few years, BPA has transformed itself to fulfill its public responsibilities in a competitive, deregulated electric power industry” (BPA, 1996, p. 5). The one sentence was a lone paragraph, which was the second statement in the letter, serving to further emphasize its importance. This was not only a direct acknowledgement of BPA’s transformation but framed the transformation within the Solidarity governance mode as ‘fulfilling public responsibilities.’ Moreover, by referencing the ‘competitive’ industry, Hardy’s letter neatly juxtaposed the Solidarity governance mode with the Markets governance mode. In that statement he essentially argued that operating as a business (i.e., in the Markets governance mode) was how BPA served the region through the
Solidarity governance mode. However, it should be noted that Hardy’s approach foregrounded regional benefit, but did not overtly consider the broader concept of the agency as a public service moral entity (see e.g., Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn, 2019). The 1996 Annual Report highlighted the interplay among governance modes and stood as an indicator of collibrative mix in that both the Solidarity governance mode and the Markets governance mode were pursued by BPA to fulfill its mission. As important was the fact that governance modes themselves did not operate in a vacuum, but rather were an inherent part of the narratives framed by executive leadership in agencies.

The 1989 Annual Report bore striking similarity to the 1996 Annual Report. While it actually had the most Solidarity governance mode references (26 instances and 16.8% of all Solidarity governance references across the decade), it placed similar emphasis on BPA as a business. This also suggests the possible cyclical nature of annual reports: while each report approached the agency’s state of affairs and broader environment uniquely, the emphasis of the narrative in this case was similar to 1996. In both instances, the agency focused on how its mission and function were inherent parts of the Pacific Northwest – essentially a statement of solidarity with the region.

The title of the annual narrative was “Low, Stable Rates Fuel the Northwest” (BPA, 1989, p. 4), establishing the connection between BPA as a business and the regional benefits of that business. The report also emphasized “[t]he Power Transmission Grid: A Regional Asset” (BPA, 1989, p. 12). While framing agency assets as
belonging to the public is fairly typical of governmental entities, the BPA narrative was specific about the assets and their connection to the region and communities. The report noted several instances where the electric transmission lines brought power to BPA customers, which in turn benefited local communities, but it also recounted instances where that power supported local industry and called out the resulting employment for the communities where the industry is located. As an example, the report referenced a smelter in Riddle, Oregon that re-opened with BPA’s assistance in re-connecting power so the plant could “begin smelting as planned. The smelter now employs 220 [people]” (BPA, 1989, p. 12).

More important was the emphasis on regional benefits from BPA’s energy conservation programs (i.e., programs improving weatherization of homes and reducing energy usage in homes, businesses, and industry). While both the 1987 Annual Report and the 1988 Annual Report included numerous references to energy conservation, those references were dry reports of dollars spent. In 1989, the report highlighted the value proposition of energy conservation, noting that “[c]onservation is Bonneville’s first choice in a mixed portfolio of potential new resources” (BPA, 1989, p. 8). As well, the report included greater detail as to those energy conservation efforts. The annual report noted the importance of energy conservation as a result of constrained resources such that “the Northwest no longer has a comfortable cushion of extra energy to call upon” (BPA, 1989, p.8). The annual report then detailed the various efforts undertaken
to use energy conservation as a key component of BPA’s resource portfolio. These efforts included the Super Good Cents programs that assisted homeowners, through local utilities, in weatherizing their homes. Similarly, the annual report discussed the means by which BPA funded modernization of industrial plants (both aluminum smelters and a potato processing plant) to reduce energy consumption. While these examples might seem to indicate a Markets governance mode (since the plants were BPA customers), BPA’s approach was distinctly one of broad regional benefit. The money invested in these efforts helped the region as a whole by reducing its energy needs, therefore ensuring sufficient energy resources for all. One additional note to BPA’s narrative on energy conservation is that it exemplified the intersection of multiple governance modes. Not only did the narrative focus on the regional benefits (Solidarity governance mode), but it also highlighted how funding was accomplished through BPA’s partnership with local utilities (Networks governance mode). Even more notable, the narrative referenced BPA customers and their ability to better compete through reduced costs. This is an important example of BPA using the Markets governance mode by assisting its customers in their own markets rather than solely focusing on BPA’s own ability to compete in the energy markets.

In other years, there was a stark contrast to the 1996 Annual Report and 1989 Annual Report contextualizing the Solidarity governance mode within the ‘business of BPA.’ Three other annual reports overtly foregrounded the Solidarity governance mode
through themes of “Children of Tomorrow” (BPA, 1990), ‘Seasons of the River’ (BPA, 1991), and ‘Keepers of the Earth/Year of the American Indian’ (BPA, 1992). Each of these themes put a strong emphasis on the Solidarity governance mode. They positioned BPA with broad narrative contexts of the region, the nation, and even the sweep of future generations. As seen in the discussion of each report, while the agency never strayed far from its role as a business in the Markets governance mode and a partner in the Networks governance mode, these narratives touted BPA as an institutional driver that served the public in all its forms.

The Solidarity governance mode, framed as public service, was most evident in the 1990 Annual Report. There were twenty-three references coded to the Solidarity governance mode (14.8% of total Solidarity reference across all annual reports). The Solidarity governance mode references in the report keyed off of words and phrases involving ‘the public’ and ‘the region’ in large part. Significantly, the idea of public involvement in the 1990 Annual Report was reinforced by BPA’s introduction of its ‘Programs in Perspective’ initiative. Programs in Perspective was an effort where “Bonneville opened its books for customers and the public to review proposed 1992-93 program levels and long-term financial strategy” (BPA, 1990, p. 12). In describing the public engagement efforts made through the program, the narrative had repeated efforts to ‘the region’ as providing input and describing public involvement as a “way of life” (BPA, 1990, p. 13) at the agency. While public involvement or engagement was
present in prior annual reports, the Programs in Perspective initiative and its narrative placement are a strong example of BPA using the Solidarity governance mode and emphasizing it as a means of pursuing its goals.

However, in the 1990 Annual Report, there were also numerous references that went beyond the typical Solidarity governance mode references of ‘public’ and ‘region.’ As indicated in the report’s theme, the narrative emphasized ‘our children’ and ‘the future.’ There were five references to ‘our children’ including the cover page quote and Jura’s closing paragraph in the Administrator’s letter. Both of these indicated the primacy of the concept (and its association with the Solidarity governance mode). Even more significant were the number of photographs and associated quotes emphasizing ‘our children.’ There were seven instances of children being depicted in photographs with either accompanying quotes or descriptive text. Moreover, several of the photographs were juxtaposed with typical BPA operational activities such as a photograph of BPA employee working on machinery placed next to a photograph of a child walking along a forest road (see BPA, 1990, p. 6). While the photographs did not depict direct Solidarity governance mode activities in the vein of public engagement meetings, they did show BPA’s prioritization of the public through the importance of ‘our children’ and future generations. It is a clear indication that BPA’s self-perception was as an institutional entity with a significant role to play in everyday lives in the Pacific Northwest, all indicators of the Solidarity governance mode.
The 1991 Annual Report contained twenty references coded for the Solidarity governance mode (12.9% of all such references), closely following behind the 1989 Annual Report and the 1990 Annual Report. This was the year of transition from Jura to Hardy as administrator, Hardy having taken on the leadership role in September – the end of the fiscal year. Yet Jura’s influence was not only evident in the narrative but was called out in Hardy’s Administrator’s Letter. As Hardy states in the first line of his report, “I am reporting about the Bonneville Power Administration under the guidance of my predecessor, Jim Jura” (BPA, 1991, p. 3). Moreover, Hardy’s letter directly acknowledged Jura’s efforts in using the Solidarity governance mode. “During Jim Jura’s tenure, BPA became more open and responsive to its public” (BPA, 1991, p. 3).

As with the prior two annual reports, Hardy re-emphasized these efforts as indicated by three references coded for the Solidarity governance mode in the space of the single-page Administrator’s letter. The theme of the annual report was “A River for All Seasons” (BPA, 1991, p. 3), which provided a rough structure for the report itself. While the theme did not directly suggest a Solidarity governance mode, the narrative derived from the theme incorporated the concepts of ‘the public’ and ‘the region’ throughout. This framing of the annual report was likely due in part to Senator Mark Hatfield having convened the ‘Salmon Summit’ earlier in the year with the idea of bringing the region together to solve the salmon stock crisis (the National Marine Fisheries Service had listed its first wild salmon run under the Endangered Species Act).
BPA’s narrative of the Salmon summit emphasized the ‘region,’ which indicates the Solidarity governance mode. “[BPA] is no stranger to regionwide cooperative efforts on behalf of fish and wildlife” (BPA, 1991, p. 6). More importantly, whether in reference to the Salmon Summit itself, or BPA’s ongoing efforts to mitigate impacts of its operations to salmon runs, there was an emphasis on benefits to the public and the region. The summer season narrative noted the benefits of reservoirs to anglers and boaters (i.e., the ‘public’) where “all the turbines at the dams are spinning” (BPA, 1991, p. 12). In addition, the agency touted an energy swap with California (usually done for economic reasons, as “the first exchange specifically for environmental reasons” (BPA, 1991, p. 10). Perhaps more significant was BPA’s use of the terminology in reference to the public. The narrative included a report on BPA’s annual program offering a bounty for catching squawfish to reduce their predation on young salmon. In reporting that “[t]housands of Northwest citizens took up the call” (BPA, 1991, p. 12), BPA used the term ‘citizens’ rather than ‘fishermen’ or ‘anglers.’ This indicates a thoughtful use of terminology in order to emphasize BPA’s partnership with the public for the public’s own environmental benefits. While seeming to be a subtle distinction, it is an important one, especially given BPA’s focus on the environment and the public throughout this annual report.

However, the Salmon Summit and environmental activities for public benefit were not the sole focus of references coded for the Solidarity governance mode. As
with the prior two reports, there was an emphasis on specific activities supporting homeowners and businesses in energy conservation. As well, BPA underscored the importance of the public in its decision-making, policy, and actions. “All of Bonneville’s activities are accompanied by a process of open public involvement” (BPA, 1991, p. 6). Moreover, the public process narrative focused on being responsive to the public and the region. One example was the growing public concern over electric and magnetic fields (EMF). BPA limited certain right-of-way uses and location of new transmission lines as a result of public concern over the potential health effects of EMF (BPA, 1991, p. 14). Even more significant was BPA’s use of the public process as part of its vision to be “the most competitive and socially responsible power system in the nation” (BPA, 1991, p. 15). By highlighting its public processes and touting its drive to social responsibility, BPA’s narrative in the 1991 Annual Report indicated a continuing – if not increased – emphasis on the Solidarity governance mode as foundational to its role in the Pacific Northwest.

Although in the following year (1992), the references coded for the Solidarity governance mode dropped by nearly a third (14 total references, and 9% of all references across the decade), there was still a major emphasis on the region, the public, and in particular, the Pacific Northwest tribes. The theme of ‘Keepers of the Earth’ was an acknowledgement of values espoused in Native American culture. BPA’s narrative espoused these values as called out by Hardy’s Administrator’s letter in
highlighting BPA’s “commitments to wise stewardship of the environment” and “the need for the long view, as expressed in Northwest Indian art and thought” (BPA, 1992, p. 3). The theme of the annual report was driven nationally. “Congress proclaimed 1992 ‘The Year of the American Indian’” (BPA, 1992, p. 3). But the annual report embraced Congress’ proclamation with pictures, graphics, and quotations from Pacific Northwest Tribes.

In addition, Hardy himself accentuated the annual report theme through a full-page, all-caps, large-font quotation on page one of the report:

In 1992, the Year of the American Indian, we do well to remember the special place Native Americans hold in our society. Their art and words show us the wisdom of living and working in harmony with nature. In this fast-changing world, we can all learn from our lands first keepers (BPA, 1992, p. 3).

As a further observation, the theme – and its association with the Solidarity governance mode – was accomplished through greater use of photos and quotations. The fourteen pages used for the 1992 Annual Report devoted to narrative were largely in line with the other annual reports; six of the ten annual reports (including 1992) were between twelve and fifteen pages of narrative. However, in 1992, of the fourteen pages, seven are full-page photos with short quotations, rather than the typical two to three columns of text. This may be attributable to the general approach used in the prior three years, but it is notable that fifty percent of space devoted to narrative was
largely visual. The greater significance, however, is that in instances where annual report narratives indicated an emphasis on the Solidarity governance mode there was a greater use of visuals and quotations. These visuals and quotes offered suggestions of a Solidarity governance posture rather than direct governance actions. This may also indicate that the Solidarity governance mode – apart from direct actions such as public meetings – was evidenced more indirectly than other governance modes.

Coding for the Solidarity governance mode proved to be the most challenging among the four modes used in collaboration analysis. In some cases, this was due to the highly contextual aspects of the concept of solidarity. While using terms such as “the public” or “the region” as the key for coding, the Solidarity governance mode appeared much more in the abstract. It was indicated by BPA’s values, forward-looking narratives, and framing of itself as a Pacific Northwest institution. There were fewer instances where a direct action by the Administrator indicated the use of the Solidarity governance mode. Instead, references code to the Solidarity governance mode were more attributable to creating, signaling, or reinforcing BPA’s self-image. Also, as noted above, the posture of the narratives that were more closely associated with the Solidarity governance mode, made less use of description, and relied to a greater extent on pictorial depictions of the agency’s focus and values. One final observation is that the increased number of references coded to the Solidarity governance mode came at a time in the decade when concern for the condition of the wild salmon stocks became of
increasing importance to the region. Culminating in Senator Hatfield’s Salmon Summit, this focus on the impacts of the northwest hydropower system on fish and wildlife, suggests an associated increased need for BPA to engage with the public and the region using the Solidarity governance mode.

**Networks Governance Mode.**

There were 199 references coded to the Networks governance mode, roughly a third more than coding for the Solidarity governance mode, as summarized in Table 17. Networks governance mode references were fairly evenly distributed over the ten annual reports with the exception of 1993, which had only six instances. All other years were in double digits and 1989 had 31 instances, slightly more than five times that of 1993. The average number of references coded for the Networks governance mode was nearly 20. Similar to the Solidarity governance mode coding, nearly fifty percent (48.7%) of references occurred in the Jura years.

**Table 17. Counts of Networks Governance Mode References by Year.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL: 199</th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
<th>Ave. by year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ØGC: Networks (γ)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. of total counts</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another similarity between coding for the Networks and Solidarity governance modes was both the drop-off during the first four Hardy years (1992 – 1995) and the significant increase of references in 1996. Also notable, 1989 had a nearly one-third increase in references coded for the Networks governance mode when compared to the prior and subsequent years (1988 and 1990). Contrast this with the opposite effect in 1993, where the total number of references was less than half of the prior and subsequent years (1992 and 1994). These two instances of significant variance between years suggest that the Network governance mode was more often driven by opportunity as is more fully explained in the observations below.

The significant observation about the Networks governance mode is not the prevalence of the mode in the ten annual reports. Instead, it is the myriad means of network governance and the varied organizations called out in those Networks references. Even in the space of 1993’s six references the annual reports noted five separate agreements or structures of network governance with five specific organizations referenced:

- Bureau of Reclamation (USBOR)
- National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
- Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC)
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
- Washington Public Power System (WPPS)
Moreover, these organizations consistently appeared in most, if not all of the ten annual report narratives. Three of these (USBOR, USACE, NMFS) were statutory partners with BPA in operating the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). In addition, NPPC was also a statutory partner in ensuring that FCRPS operational impacts on fish and wildlife were appropriately mitigated. Finally, WPPS was a long-term partnership with the state of Washington to finance development of nuclear energy supplies in the state.

Given the prevalence of these organizations’ partnerships and interactions with BPA, it would be reasonable to expect a highly consistent number of references coded for the Networks governance mode across the decade. However, as noted previously, this was not the case. Instead, there was a wide spectrum of references indicated. But closer examination of the Networks governance mode references showed a broad array of organizations interacting with BPA in the Network governance mode, differing opportunities for those interactions, and a wide variety of ways in which BPA partnered with external entities and organizations. While not explicit, given the nature of the annual report narratives, this may be an indicator of Jura and Hardy’s own preferences in how they used the Networks governance mode, as well as the external political and other influences on them as administrators (more fully explored in Chapter 5).

The broad array of organizations included the federal partners noted above, as well as state and local governmental entities, tribes, special interest organizations, and
utilities. In many instances, the organizations were specifically named (thirty-six) including fourteen governmental entities (federal, state, and local), ten customer utilities, five tribes, three energy sector associations, two industrial customers, a public interest group, and an academic institution. Notably, customers were only coded for the Networks governance mode where the narrative indicated a partnership of some sort rather than as a buyer/seller of power or transmission services.

The differing opportunities for BPA to engage with external entities in the Networks governance mode were myriad. This was in no small part due to the complex environment in which BPA operated that ranged from ensuring the reliability of the electric power grid and mitigating the impacts of its hydropower operations, to advancing regional economic development and advancing the energy sector. In several instances, the annual reports described coordinating with utilities and other entities in emergencies such as flooding.

On Feb. 6, the Columbia flooded. To reduce flooding, the Bureau of Reclamation shut off flows through its huge Grand Coulee Dam almost entirely. To keep the lights on, BPA power marketers made more than 100 replacement power purchases in six hours flat. Quick interagency action kept seven feet of water out of downtown Portland, Ore., averting an even larger disaster and an estimated $3 billion in damage (BPA, 1996, p. 9).

In this instance, BPA used the Markets governance mode in support of the Networks governance mode in responding to a crisis. Further, the agency regularly
partnered with governmental entities such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to build transmission lines (BPA, 1988), and various Northwest tribes to study hydropower impacts on fish and build facilities to help mitigate those impacts (BPA, 1987; BPA, 1992). BPA similarly partnered with and funded fish research at Oregon State University (BPA, 1987), Finally, there were multiple instances where BPA partnered to sponsor economic development (BPA, 1991), energy conservation technology (BPA, 1996), and energy sector forums (BPA, 1989).

Additional evidence of the complexity in BPA’s use of the Networks governance mode was the myriad means of engagement, which ranged from informal coordination to limited, project-based agreements, and even the creation of formal governance entities. Most instances of informal coordination occurred in emergency situations such as preventing flooding and power swaps to avoid or alleviate constraints on the electric power grid (BPA, 1996). BPA made extensive use of Memoranda of Agreements to support and fund fish mitigation (BPA, 1995a; BPA, 1996) and build power generation and transmission projects (BPA, 1988; BPA, 1994. 1994 Annual Report). As well, BPA either formed or participated in the formation of regional energy strategies such as the West Coast Energy Vision (BPA, 1990) and formal network governance entities such as the Northwest Energy Efficiency Alliance (BPA, 1996). Each of these engagements and the instruments by which they were enacted speaks to the flexibility BPA had in utilizing the Network governance mode as well as the agency’s willingness to tailor those
interactions to meet its mission and goals. One caveat to these observations on use of
the Networks governance mode is that the annual reports narratives were not
consistent in referencing the underlying instruments used. In some instances, a specific
form of agreement was noted (e.g., a memorandum of agreement or a contract), but
elsewhere the annual report narrative simply indicated a Networks governance mode
activity such as “BPA increasingly seeks to partner with other Northwest entities to build
truly regional conservation programs” (BPA, 1996, p. 13). It is reasonable to assume
such partnerships would be formalized in some fashion, but the annual reports lack
sufficient detail to further explore such agreements.

Perhaps the most significant instance of a quasi-informal effort in the Networks
governance mode was one where BPA was not the lead organization, but rather a key
participant. In 1991, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon convened the “Salmon Summit”
in an attempt to bring together the various regional stakeholders “to search for a
comprehensive regionwide plan to help wild [salmon] stocks” (BPA, 1991, p. 6). The
Salmon Summit could be termed a quasi-formal governance network because it was
limited in duration and designed to produce more formal partnerships and agreements
for future coordination among stakeholders (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2011). BPA did just
that by making a proposal to formalize activities in the Network governance mode.
“BPA proposed the Columbia Basin Accord, a comprehensive, $1.5 billion, 10-year effort
to stabilize and increase native salmon and steelhead runs” (BPA, 1991, p. 6). The
accord provided the framework for BPA to engage in partnerships involving power swaps with generating utilities to allow greater water flows through the hydropower system as well as partnering with various entities to develop projects for improving salmon migration and habitat management.

The 1991 Annual Report narrative of the Salmon Summit and the Columbia Accord proposal were indicators of the complexity and nuance involved in the Networks governance mode. However, BPA’s own depiction of the Salmon summit also provided insight to the nuance of the agency’s use of governance modes. In fact, while most of the references were coded in the Networks governance mode, the initial Salmon Summit references in the Administrator’s letter emphasized the regional lens through which the Salmon Summit was convened and the social impacts of agency actions, all under the caption of “Giving Back to Nature” (BPA, 1991, p. 3), thus indicating the Solidarity governance mode. References to participation in the Salmon Summit both in terms of the Solidarity governance mode and the Networks governance mode was another example of two modes governance modes intersecting. Such intersections also reinforce the concept that governance modes were not necessarily mutually exclusive. They overlapped and agency actions may be difficult to clearly ascribe to any single governance mode.
Markets Governance Mode.

As was expected, the Markets governance mode was by far the most frequent governance mode evident in the annual reports. Of course, the very nature of annual reports is financially focused, making references coded in the Markets governance mode far more likely. This prevalence was attributable to the emphasis on the sales of power and transmission products and services, which were reflected in the income statements and accompanying narrative. This was part of the reason for focusing analysis of the annual reports on the narrative section rather than including the Financial Sections.

There were 306 references coded for the Markets governance mode – a third more than references coded for the Networks governance mode and nearly twice the number of references coded for the Solidarity governance mode. Table 18 below summarizes the references coded for the Markets governance mode over the decade.

Coding was straightforward for the Markets governance mode. In nearly all instances coded, there was a direct reference to the terms indicating competition, customers, or buying/selling products and services. Unlike with the Solidarity and Networks governance modes’ coding, the context of the paragraph was apparent.
Table 18. Counts of Markets Governance Mode References by Year.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TOTAL: 306</th>
<th>‘87</th>
<th>‘88</th>
<th>‘89</th>
<th>‘90</th>
<th>‘91</th>
<th>‘92</th>
<th>‘93</th>
<th>‘94</th>
<th>‘95</th>
<th>‘96</th>
<th>Ave. by Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Markets (α)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. of total counts</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
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</table>

Interestingly, in spite of the high overall count of references, the Markets governance mode references also had the widest variation in counts with seven in 1992 and forty-six in 1995. This is particularly notable given that both of those counts were in Hardy’s tenure, which might suggest a shift in Hardy’s priorities as further discussed below. At the same time, the Markets governance mode references were more consistent across the tenures of the two BPA administrators than the other governance modes. The six highest counts were equally split between Jura’s first three years and Hardy’s last three years as administrator.

1991 was omitted from the initial examination of the Markets governance mode average distribution because it was the transition year between Jura and Hardy. But 1991, and the years directly before and after, were notable in that they had the three lowest counts of references to the Markets governance mode. 1990 had 18 references (5.9% of the total), 1991 had 24 references (7.8% of the total), and 1992 had just seven references (2.3% of the total). These were the last year of Jura’s tenure, the transition year, and the first year of Hardy’s tenure, respectively.
A simple look at the overarching themes of these three years helps to understand why. Both before and after these years, BPA was focused on markets, competition, and customers. In these three years however, the annual report themes were Children of the Future (1990), Seasons of Salmon (1991 – coinciding with the Salmon Summit), and Year of the Indian (1992). As previously discussed, these themes were aligned with the Solidarity governance mode. While coming in rapid sequence around the time in which BPA changed administrators, there is little evidence that the change in administration was a driver of the lower counts of references to the Markets governance mode. Instead, the significant environmental issues surrounding the collapse of the Northwest salmon stocks appear to have had an effect on BPA’s posture, shifting quickly from an emphasis on markets, customers, and business, to an emphasis on environmental concerns and BPA’s commitment to the public and the region. In addition, references to the Markets governance mode were framed in those same terms. In 1992 as an example, BPA touted the intersection of environment and business:

In the long run, sound environmental practices make good business sense. In January, Bonneville summarized its "Business Goal for the Environment" as follows: "While maintaining its competitive ability to serve, BPA will become an exemplary steward of the rich and diverse environment it affects, so that future generations will enjoy greater environmental and economic opportunities." (BPA, 1992, p. 9)
In connecting BPA’s business goals with its environmental and regional obligations to the broader public shows the balancing of governance modes to better engage with competing interests, especially in a time of crisis such as the salmon stock collapse. This is a further indication of the fluidity of governance collaboration change over periods of time as an agency responds to externalities and the broader operating environment.

The reasoning for the three years where the Markets governance mode was at least somewhat rebalanced with the Solidarity governance mode is further reinforced by an examination of Hardy’s tenure from 1992 to 1996. While three successive annual reports foregrounded the environment, the future, and Native American cultural importance in the region, the subsequent year moved quickly back to a business focus and stressed BPA’s ‘transformation’ to a more business-like entity. This shift was first indicated by the jump in references to the Markets governance mode from seven in 1992 to thirty-five in both 1993 and 1994, then another increase to forty-six in 1995. Not only was there a significant increase in Markets governance mode references, but there was also a stark contrast between the themes of the 1989 through 1991 annual reports and the 1992 through 1995 annual reports. In fact, the cover page of the 1993 Annual Report directly addresses the shift with its title: “Reinventing Bonneville – Market-Driven, Customer-Focused, Cost-Conscious, Results-Oriented” (BPA, 1993. 1993 Annual Report, p. 1). Similarly, the theme and title of the 1994 Annual Report was
“Serving the Northwest” (BPA, 1994, p.1) with a line drawing of a briefcase opened to depict a dam and transmission lines, presumably in the shadow of Mt. Hood. Finally, the 1995 Annual Report uses the chiasmus rhetorical device of flipping concepts to make the point: “The Benefits of Power; The Power of Benefits” (BPA, 1995a, p. 1).

A closer examination of the 1993 Annual Report gave additional insight into this apparent rapid and aggressive shift. First, in the space of the two-page administrator’s letter, four of the five paragraphs were coded as the Markets governance mode, all of which described a vastly changed external operating environment. The administrator’s letter squarely addressed a proposed double-digit increase in rates, noted the sweeping change and deregulation in the electricity sector, acknowledged the need to “adopt a more business-like model,” and announced the launch of BPA’s “Competitiveness Project.” (BPA, 1993, p. 2). These changes were also partly attributable to the change in presidential administration and the administration’s focus on ‘reinventing government.’

Significantly, between 1987 and 1992, no mention was made of the prior two Presidential administrations (Reagan and Bush). Yet, the 1993 Annual Report highlighted quotations from both President Clinton – “It’s time government adjusted to the real world” (BPA, 1993, p. 12) and Vice-President Gore – “we need a Federal [sic] government that delivers more for less” (BPA, 1993, p. 13). Finally – and in a direct acknowledgement of both BPA’s challenges and its drive toward operating overtly in the competitive Markets governance mode, the annual report placed a single, large-font
quote from Charles Darwin on an otherwise blank page: “We will now discuss in a little more detail the struggle for existence” (BPA, 1993, p. 13). There is no better example of an agency adopting the posture of a particular governance mode and implicitly (if not directly) signaling its intent to use that governance mode (in this case, Markets) to ensure its survival.

The two subsequent years confirmed the primacy of the Markets governance mode. In both the 1994 Annual Report and the 1995 Annual Report, the number of references to the Markets governance mode far surpassed the combined number of references to the Networks and Solidarity modes, with thirty-five Markets references in 1994 and forty-six Markets references in 1995 (compared to combined totals of twenty-six in 1994 and twenty-three in 1995 for the other governance modes). Moreover, the references to the Markets governance mode in these years were squarely framed in transformative terms. In the 1994 Annual Report, Hardy led off his Administrator’s letter with a statement encapsulating the change and the reasoning for it:

In 1994 we completely reorganized the agency, with an eye toward making BPA - and our utility customers - more competitive. We surveyed our market and drafted a business strategy that shapes our products to fit what customers want and are willing to pay for” (BPA, 1994, p. 3)

The 1994 reorganization was key in making BPA look and behave more like a corporation in the Markets governance mode. BPA’s narrative touted utilizing
corporate titles such as “CEO,” “Chief Operating Officer,” “Group V.P.” (BPA, 1994, p. 50), and “Account Executive” (BPA, 1994, p. 6) as well as initiatives titled “The Competitiveness Project” (BPA, 1994, p. 6) and “Bonneville’s Strategic Business Plan” described as “the overall blueprint for constructing a more businesslike BPA” (BPA, 1994, p. 9). Moreover, the Markets governance mode references in 1994 continually referenced economic efficiency and competitiveness while distancing the agency from bureaucracy. “We eliminated, or won waivers on, much of the bureaucratic red tape that slowed things down” (BPA, 1994, p. 3).

While much of the 1994 Annual Report focused on actions being initiated to transform BPA as a business-like entity, the 1995 Annual Report offered the Markets governance mode successes the agency had accomplished:

In 1993 and 1994, the agency identified its customers’ needs: price, stability and ease of doing business with BPA. It reorganized around these needs, cut costs and staff, and strove to do business more quickly and efficiently, subjecting customers less to endless bureaucratic “maybes” (BPA, 1995a, p. 7).

In a reference back to the 1993 Annual Report theme, the annual report touted the success of its “efforts to become a government agency that works better and costs less, [receiving] a ‘Reinventing Government’ award from Vice President Al Gore for the competitiveness project” (BPA, 1995a, p. 9). However, the narrative was not one solely of accomplishment, but appeared to commit to further efforts in the Markets
governance mode by posing a simple question: “can BPA continue to win the business of its largest customers and the revenue they provide?” (BPA, 1995a, p. 6). This rhetoric, coupled with the relative counts of governance mode references previously noted, strongly suggests that competition and the Markets governance mode were first and foremost for the agency and would continue to be so in the future.

Of course, competition is inherent in an agency whose primary mission was marketing electric power and transmission services. But the narrative of the Hardy years suggested that competition (resulting from deregulation) was a more recent development in the operational landscape. Hardy noted this in his Administrator’s letter for 1995. “As a result, in the face of its first competition in nearly 60 years, BPA appears to be keeping most of its customer base and is beginning to attract new customers” (BPA, 1995a, p. 3, emphasis added). But Hardy’s statement was undercut to some extent when looking across the decade of annual reports. Admittedly, the highest number of references coded for the Markets governance mode was in 1995 (forty-six), but this count was followed fairly closely by 1989 and 1987. In 1987 there were forty references to competition, customers, and sales coded to the Markets governance mode. Moreover, in three and a half pages of the Administrator’s letter, Jura made thirteen references that I coded to the Markets governance mode. Even as the agency celebrated its fiftieth year, “competition from inside and outside the region,” “increased competition in the energy market,” “mounting customer dissatisfaction,” and
“improving customer service” (BPA, 1987, p. 3) were evidence of both BPA’s focus on the Markets governance mode and the challenges it faced in changing markets.

This indicates there was little to nothing significant to distinguish between the Jura and Hardy years as to the salience of the Markets governance mode. Instead, it was within each Administrator’s tenure that we see these shifts towards and away from references to the Markets governance mode. In addition, there is a distinction to be made in the ways in which each administrator engaged in the Markets governance mode. In spite of a seemingly equal focus on Markets in the early years but in an administrative agency structure, the business focus in the latter Hardy years accompanied a wholesale change to business-oriented structure and leadership titles. Because the restructuring occurred in the latter part of my study’s timeframe, it is difficult to determine the full impact of restructuring the agency on a corporate model. However, in terms of BPA’s use of the Markets governance mode, the Jura and Hardy tenures indicate that the governance mode should not be considered as being a single approach. Instead, the Markets governance mode is more nuanced. Competition, customer service, and similar markets concepts (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) may happen in a variety of ways and the efficacy of those various ways must be considered when using a Markets governance mode approach. As indicated by the annual reports, while there is a consistency in the importance of the Markets governance mode to the
agency, the specifics of how the Markets governance mode was engaged by BPA shifted over time to meet its challenges.

**Summary of Governance Modes**

As seen in this section, the use of governance modes (Hierarchy, Solidarity, Networks, and Markets) could be fairly readily ascertained through BPA’s annual reports. While identifying the use of certain governance modes required some contextual interpretation of the Administrator’s letters and annual report narratives, the indicators of each governance mode were for the most part easily identified. Moreover, in looking at the total number of references of all governance modes across the decade time frame, there was considerable consistency. The range of total references coded was generally between sixty and one hundred, with an average of 66.3 references.

More importantly for the purpose of my research was both the context of the operating environment in which the agency exists, as well as the ways in which the BPA calibrated the four governance modes. This is evident in the different emphases seen within the Solidarity governance mode in the 1990, 1991, and 1992 annual reports. As well, the different contexts within which BPA used the Markets governance mode in the Jura versus the Hardy administrations speaks to variations in the tools an agency may use within each governance mode. Furthermore, the annual reports indicated the use of more than one governance mode in given instances as shown by the instances of intra-category coding between two or more governance modes. This was in line with
Jessop’s depiction of primary and secondary governance mode roles or what he terms “two-dimensional hybridity” in collibration (2022, p. 26).

A final, but important, aspect in understanding the evidence of governance modes and collibration in the annual reports was the distinction between narrative posture and executive action. Narrative posture was shown across the annual reports in terms of values or conceptual importance from BPA’s view of each year in retrospect, but was not directly associated with agency accomplishments, actions, or decisions. Nowhere was this more evident than in the themes of various annual reports. The most significant instances were shown in the themes of ‘Children of Tomorrow (BPA, 1990) and ‘Keepers of the Earth’ (BPA, 1991). It is notable that narrative postures in the annual reports have a strong association with the Solidarity governance mode, but they were present to some degree for the Markets governance mode and the Networks governance mode as well. As previously discussed, the paucity of references coded to the Hierarchy governance mode makes any further insights to BPA’s posture in regard to its use inconclusive.

In contrast, executive action references such as proposing the Columbia Accord, working with utilities in response to emergencies, or re-structuring the agency, were actual accomplishments the administrator emphasized in the annual report narratives. Fundamentally, this distinction between narrative and action suggests that the mix of the two in narratives is not necessarily a strong indicator of a specific collibrative mix.
As a result, coding solely for governance modes may be insufficient, as they may be considered the means rather than the ends of BPA fulfilling its mission and maintaining its legitimacy as a Northwest institution. Instead, co-coding for governance mode and agency capability is necessary to analyze more robustly BPA’s transformation. Therefore, I now turn to examining evidence of Agency Capability in the annual reports as they occurred in conjunction with Governance Collibration.

**Agency Capabilities – Co-coding with Governance Modes**

As previously described in Chapter 3, I developed four coding categories for Agency Capabilities (ΦAC):

- C1 – CONSTITUTION
- C2 – COURSE
- C3 – CAPACITY
- C4 – CULTURE

These categories were used to code and understand how BPA changed operationally through the transformative decade. Using these categories resulted in coding a total of 468 references in the annual reports, about two-thirds as many as the references coded to Governance Collibration. The distribution by year, as shown in Table 19, was more consistent across the decade with seven of the ten years’ counts between forty-five and fifty-five. For comparison, Table 19 also includes the distribution of Governance Collibration counts across the ten annual reports.
Table 19. Total References Coded for Governance Modes and Agency Capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency Capability</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Collaboration</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that my research approach of excluding non-narrative and ‘pro forma’ language sections was particularly effective with Agency Capability references due to the operational nature of these sections and use of roughly the same language across all ten annual reports. The most obvious example can be seen in the annual reports’ section titled “Report of the Independent Auditors.” While much of the language in these sections could be considered operational observations that would be coded for C3 – CAPACITY, doing so would provide little insight to the agency’s means of facing challenges and how it changed over the decade.

Given the emphasis on understanding Governance Collaboration in BPA’s transformative decade, the analysis focused on connections and the interplay between governance modes and agency capabilities through instances of co-coding in the annual reports. This co-coding resulted in 293 instances of a co-relationship between Governance Modes and Agency Capabilities as summarized in Table 20.
As with the previous section on Governance Collibration, each section on Agency Capability, provides background, context, findings, and key observations. However, with the Agency Capability coding categories, the findings are organized sequentially rather than by salience. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is due to the nature of the categories themselves in that each one builds on the prior category. That is, C1 – CONSTITUTION enables and constrains C2 – COURSE, which in turn directs C3 – CAPACITY. Further, these three categories essentially join to influence C4 – CULTURE. After exploring each of the four Agency Capability sub-categories and their relationship to governance modes through co-coding, there is also a discussion of instances of intra-category coding. The findings are then summarized in a short summary that considers the efficacy of co-coding between Governance Collibration and Agency Capability.

Co-Coding between Governance Collibration and Agency Capability resulted in a significant association between governance modes and both C2 – COURSE and C3 – CAPACITY. However, due to the extremely low instance of the Hierarchy governance
mode in the annual reports, few if any insights are likely to be drawn since only one instance was co-coded. It should also be noted that the second lowest occurrence of co-coding was between the Networks governance mode and C4 – CULTURE, but this is more attributable to the operational nature of narratives involved (e.g., project partnerships, etc.). Lastly, it is unsurprising that the great majority of co-coding occurred between governance modes and either C2 – COURSE or C3 – CAPACITY, given the strategic and operational focus of annual reports in general. Due to the focus and structure of the annual reports, this preponderance of references to C2 – COURSE and C3 – CAPACITY was certainly to be expected.

**C1 – CONSTITUTION Co-Coding with Governance Modes.**

The co-coding instances between C1 – CONSTITUTION and the four governance modes were relatively few in number, with a total of only thirty-seven among the ten annual reports. Moreover, as indicated in Table 21, the counts of co-coding with each individual governance mode were low enough to make conclusions about any patterns in co-coding somewhat of a challenge. This challenge was heightened by the extremely low counts in each individual year. As a counterfactual example, if there were high counts in only one year, the analysis might support an examination of major changes to the agency’s organic and governing statutes. This was not the case. The final two years (1995 and 1996) accounted for over 40% of the co-coding instances may suggest an increased focus on statutes, directives, and mandates covering the agency. But the
individual counts (eight in each year) remain too low to see evidence of strong patterns or correlations. However, even within this context, some observations may be made.

Table 21. Co-Coding Between C1 - CONSTITUTION and Governance Mode Sub-Categories by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Hierarchy (π)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Markets (α)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Networks (γ)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total count of co-coding by years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total counts per year</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over BPA’s Decade of Transformation, the annual reports made a number of references (with the somewhat notable exception of 1992) to its statutory authorities. While overall, coding for C1 – CONSTITUTION was relatively low (12.8% of Agency Capability coding and on a par with Coding for C4 – CULTURE) it cannot be denied that these instances had an outsized impact and a significant emphasis in the agency’s
annual report narratives. In all instances change at the agency was attributable in the annual reports to changes in the authorities of BPA, as coded for C1- CONSTITUTION.

**Markets.** The highest count of co-coding was for the Markets governance mode (totaling eighteen). Notably in the first half of the decade, references to the Bonneville Project Act creating BPA were included in the agency’s profile statement, totaling five of the eighteen total Markets governance mode co-coded references. More significantly for my study, the early annual reports (1987 – 1991) referenced the Bonneville Project Act and the note:

> Since then, Congress has directed BPA to sell at wholesale the power produced at a total of 30 Federal dams in the Pacific Northwest, and to acquire conservation and generating resources sufficient to meet the needs of BPA's customer utilities. (BPA, 1987, p. 43).

These references indicated a direction from Congress for BPA to engage in the Markets governance mode. However, the latter years (starting in the 1992 Annual Report) omitted this language. Subsequently, the references co-coded for C1 – CONSTITUTION and the Markets governance mode (a total of thirteen reference) were part of the annual reports narrative section rather than the agency profile statement. As part of the narratives, they focused on actions of Congress and the Presidential administration that directed or supported BPA’s use of the Markets governance mode to compete in a newly deregulated utilities sector:
Since passage of the Energy Policy Act in 1992, transmission lines are more open and accessible throughout the industry, giving rise to new forms of competition and new opportunities for cooperation (BPA, 1992, p. 24).

However, the most significant instance of co-coding between C1 – CONSTITUTION and the Markets governance mode, was a single reference in the 1993 Annual Report. Administrator Hardy’s letter to President Clinton notes that “[i]f the sooner the better – BPA gains government corporation status, we can cut red tape and move faster” (BPA, 1993, p. 4). The reference to BPA’s efforts to become a government corporation, which would require an act of Congress, lay squarely at the intersection of C1 – CONSTITUTION and the Markets governance mode. Such an act of Congress changing BPA into a government corporation envisioned a business-like entity competing with other business to provide power and transmission similar to a privately-owned utility. As an additional note, this was also an instance of intra-category coding between C1 – CONSTITUTION and C2 – COURSE. Here, BPA attempted to revise its statutory authority and organizational state into a more traditional competitive business as a utility, perhaps in the vein of the Tennessee Valley Authority (also a government corporation). However, this single reference also highlighted the limitations on BPA transforming itself using the C1 – CONSTITUTION capability. Apart from this single reference toward the end of the decade there was only on other instance, which noted the agency was “proposing draft legislation that would make BPA a federal corporation” (BPA, 1994, p. 5). Yet there was no indication that BPA’s attempt at becoming a
government corporation was a serious effort. As further explored in Chapter 5, this may well be attributable to concerns expressed over such a move from the Northwest delegation (and other stakeholders). Moreover, such a move (even if supported by the delegation) would require substantial effort to move through the Congress. Such an effort would also likely have extra-regional implications for the other federal Power Marketing Administrations, which would only add to the complexities of the proposal. Ultimately, the proposed transformation was unsuccessful as BPA has remained a federal agency for its entire existence.

**Networks.** Thirteen references were coded in the annual reports to both C1 – CONSTITUTION and the Networks governance mode. As with co-coding of the Markets governance mode, patterns and correlations were difficult to ascertain, given these numbers. This was especially true in that there were no instances of co-coding for the Networks governance mode in the *1992 Annual Report* and the *1993 Annual Reports*.

Interestingly, while BPA’s federal partners – the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation – figured prominently in the Networks governance mode throughout the decade, there are only two instances of co-coding with C1 – CONSTITUTION. In the first instance, the annual report discussed new authorities under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 allowing BPA to directly fund maintenance and improvements at the hydropower facilities operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. The second instance of co-coding derived
from Congressional action that “established a 10-year framework to stabilize fish and wildlife funding” (BPA, 1995a, p. 26). While the change in funding in 1995 was directed toward BPA itself, it allowed for BPA to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (and other federal entities) to fund fish and wildlife operations. Significantly, BPA’s narrative in both 1995 and 1996 made multiple references to working with Congress and the Clinton Administration to stabilize its funding obligations and appropriated debt under the Federal Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996. These references to C1-CONSTITUTION actions, and their co-coding with the Networks governance mode were strong indicators of BPA’s efforts to work with its federal partners, Congress, and the Administration to meet its “additional court-ordered financial obligations [that] drive BPA’s fish and wildlife costs (BPA, 1995a, p. 26).

The most extensive instances of co-coding with the Networks governance mode were references to BPA’s work with the Northwest Power Planning Council and to negotiations regarding the Columbia River Treaty. The Northwest Power Planning Council co-coding references were all in the early years of the decade (1987, 1989, 1991) and were simple indicators of BPA’s work with the Council in planning and funding fish and wildlife mitigation activities under the Northwest Power Act of 1980. The references to the Columbia River Treaty, were co-coded with the Network governance mode because of BPA’s partnership with B.C. Hydro and the Canadian government (through the U.S. State department). The partnership was an effort to adjust the terms
of the Northwest Coordination Agreement. These references were more significant because they were an indicator of other forms of C1 – CONSTITUTION instruments and actions. Unlike the statutes and laws shown above, in this instance, the Columbia River Treaty with Canada, as well as the supporting Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement were instances of a C1 – CONSTITUTION instrument requiring that BPA operate in the Markets governance mode by partnering with B.C. Hydro and its own federal partners to manage the Columbia River Hydropower system.

Finally, there was a single reference to BPA and others banding together in the Networks governance mode to change its C1 – CONSTITUTION capability. In this instance, “BPA joined with 40 others in British Columbia and the western U.S. in asking the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to make the Western Systems Power Pool a permanent arrangement” (BPA, 1991, p. 9). Similar to the previous discussion of BPA’s attempt at becoming a government corporation, this reference indicates an action, but neither in the 1991 Annual Report, nor in subsequent annual reports, was there any reference to an outcome. There was a subsequent reference to the “Western Systems Coordinating Council” (BPA, 1996, p. 16), which suggests a continuation of this partnership entity in some form, but no direct evidence of the efforts to make the entity permanent through FERC action.

The success or failure of an attempt at creating a network governance entity through C1 – CONSTITUTION action (i.e., a FERC Order) is less important than the
observation that shifts in governance modes through changes to the agency’s C1 – CONSTITUTION capability are a significant effort and challenge. Just as with the prior initiative to re-make BPA into a government corporation through an Act of Congress was also unsuccessful, in both instances, without broad regional and Northwest delegation support for changes to BPA’s enabling statutes, the efforts were unsustainable. The counter to this observation is the instances described above regarding the Columbia River Treaty and Congressional Action to stabilize BPA funding. However, both of those efforts were called out in multiple annual reports. It indicated the need for multi-year initiatives where the agency considers making C1 – CONSTITUTION changes. As well, it speaks to BPA’s self-narrative over a period of time. Where there was not success, or at least solid progress, in an initiative, that narrative no longer appeared in the annual report. Rather than BPA reporting on all outcomes (positive or negative), it appears that the annual reports were primarily focused on success.

**Solidarity.** There were only six references co-coded to C1 – CONSTITUTION and the Solidarity governance mode. It is reasonable to expect that an agency’s organic and governing statutes may indicate the use of the Solidarity governance mode (as noted in Chapter 1, referencing the Office of Hawaiian Affairs). But the low number of references in the annual reports suggests that BPA did not rely on overt statutory authorities in making use of the Solidarity governance mode. Moreover, the references to statutory authority co-coded with the Solidarity were primarily to the Northwest
Power Act of 1980 in support of environmental obligations to benefit the region as a whole. As previously discussed, BPA’s use of the Solidarity governance mode emphasized public involvement and cultural aspects rather than direct authority.

**Hierarchy.** Finally, there were no instances of co-coding between C1 – CONSTITUTION and the Hierarchy governance mode. Of course, this was in large part due to the paucity of any reference to the Hierarchy governance mode in the annual reports. However, it was somewhat surprising in that there is an expectation – particularly in the case of the Hierarchy governance mode – to rely upon statutory or similar authority to underpin agency action. This lack of co-coding between these two categories strongly supports the idea that BPA’s statutes did not contemplate the agency in this light. BPA was not an enforcing or mandating agency, but instead relied on the other three governance modes to accomplish its mission.

One additional aspect of the Agency Capability dimension that is less evident from the co-coding between the C1 – CONSTITUTION Category and the governance modes is the references within the annual reports to BPA’s governing statutes. In particular, there are three significant statutes governing BPA: the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, the Transmission System Act of 1974, and the Northwest Power Act of 1980, (BPA, 2003). Together, these enabled, constrained, and shaped all other aspects of BPA, including the analytical dimensions and categories of my study and the ways in which those are referenced in the annual reports.
First, the substance of the three significant statutes all pre-dated the decade studied. However, as noted above, there were references to the Northwest Power Act of 1980 used to describe certain actions of the agency in the annual report narrative sections. As well, the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 was consistently referenced in the BPA Profile section of the annual reports and directly indicated BPA’s positionality as an agency primarily operating in the Markets governance mode.

Interestingly, a short review of the Bonneville Project Act itself reinforced the importance of the Markets governance mode to BPA’s mission and operations. While statutory analysis was not the focus of my study, it is worthwhile making a few key observations. Specifically, section 832 of the Bonneville Project Act references multiple Markets governance mode terms and phrases such as “sales and disposition of electric energy (section 832a(a)),” “prevent monopolization (832a(b)),” “the administrator shall negotiate and enter into contracts (section 832d(a))” (BPA, 2003, pp. 32 – 37). Further, section 832d(a) contains provisions prohibiting BPA from entering into contracts with purchasers for resale of electric energy, essentially creating market constraints to prevent BPA from becoming an electric futures/stock exchange.

Finally, there were a number of statutes enacted or revised during the decade that changed BPA’s authorities and obligations. These changes, as indicated by C1 - CONSTITUTION references, shifted its governance modes. While the statutes enable and constrain, they were evidenced in the annual reports in small part through the
governance modes because they underlie C1 – CONSTITUTION. However, they were not typically directly referenced unless they changed or formed the basis for a specific decision or action.

C2 – COURSE Co-Coding with Governance Modes.

C2 – COURSE co-coding was much more pervasive with a total of 112 instances across the ten annual reports. As with C1 – CONSTITUTION, there were no instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and the Hierarchy governance mode. Table 22, shows fifty-seven instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and the Markets governance mode, and a further thirty instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and the Solidarity governance mode. These instances of co-coding were a strong indicator of competing agency strategic drivers in competition for customers as well as engagement with regional stakeholders as BPA charted a course through the crises of the nineties. In addition, I identified twenty-five instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and the Networks governance mode. These instances of co-coding were indicators that BPA’s strategies and initiatives required working with other actors in its governance network. Each of the governance modes are further discussed individually.
Table 22. Co-Coding Between C2 - COURSE and Governance Mode Sub-Categories by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Hierarchy (π)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Markets (α)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Solidarity (δ)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total count of co-coding by years</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of total counts per year</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Markets. Counts of co-coding between C2 - COURSE and the Markets governance mode were the highest and were more than those of the Solidarity and Networks governance modes combined, requiring a closer examination. While far greater than those of the Networks and Solidarity governance modes, the instances of co-coding with the Markets governance mode were largely consistent and in single digits in eight of the ten annual reports. As C2 – COURSE references focused on long-term strategies, challenges, and major initiatives, BPA’s efforts in the energy markets were evident. The four instances of co-coding in the 1987 Annual Report (celebrating
BPA’s 50th Anniversary) discussed market-based accomplishments and competitive challenges. Two of the references were in the Administrator’s letter and noted BPA’s customers in terms of BPA “improving customer service” and “customer support” as crucial to BPA’s future success (BPA, 1987, pp. 3, 5).

The narrative section of the 1987 Annual Report also referenced BPA’s future and the challenges the agency faced as to customers considering whether or not to do business with it. “Many of BPA’s customers have stated strongly that they do not plan to place their future loads with BPA” (BPA, 1987, p. 15). This particular challenge of remaining competitive and retaining customers was the underlying theme across most of the decade for BPA’s strategy and the Markets governance mode. As an example, Table 23 is a comparison of themes from the 1987 Annual Report and the 1993 Annual Report. The themes were called out in the Administrator’s letter from 1987 Annual Report and were the 1993 Annual Report’s cover page. These two instances reinforce BPA’s ongoing C2 - COURSE focus on the Markets governance mode. The similarities are significant; the only real distinction between the two sets of goals or priorities is that the 1987 Annual Report called out financial uncertainty, which may well have been driven by customers looking elsewhere in the marketplace. What was perhaps more significant is the fact that the same themes occurred six years later, which suggests either that BPA was at least somewhat ineffective in accomplishing the stated goals from 1987 or that
BPA’s operational environment was always one of developing new means to pursue its underlying competitive goals through the Markets governance mode.


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a result, we see four primary areas of emphasis for the future: • improving our competitive position in the marketplace; • increasing internal cost efficiency; • dealing effectively with revenue uncertainties; and • improving customer service.</td>
<td>Reinventing Bonneville • Market-Driven • Customer-Focused • Cost-Conscious • Results-Oriented (BPA, 1993, p. 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(BPA, 1987, p. 5)

Regardless of thematic similarities between Jura’s 1987 Annual Report Administrator’s Letter, and Hardy’s 1993 Annual Report cover page themes, the instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and the Markets governance mode showed a dramatic increase in 1993 and 1994. Combined, these two years made up nearly two-thirds of all Markets governance mode co-coding in the annual reports. The contrast in co-coded instances was even more stark when considering the prior year (1991), which was also Hardy’s first full year as Administrator. In 1991, there was a single instance of C1 – COURSE co-coding with the Markets governance mode:
In the long run, sound environment practices make good business sense. In January, Bonneville summarized its ‘Business Goal for the Environment’ as follows: ‘While maintaining its competitive ability to serve, BPA will become an exemplary steward of the rich and diverse environment it affects so that future generations will enjoy environmental benefits and economic opportunities. (BPA, 1992, p. 8).

Also of note, this instance of co-coding was not only between C2 – COURSE and Markets, but also coded for the Solidarity governance mode due to the references to ‘exemplary steward’ and ‘future generations.’

One year later, BPA’s narrative tone was significantly different, with market-focused short and long-term goals. Of the fourteen instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and Markets governance mode, several directly referred to ‘markets’ in some form such as “the new marketplace” and “market-driven,” with, one section of the annual report titled “Market Driven” (BPA, pp. 2 – 6). In this section BPA made its first reference to a “new business plan, to be in place by mid-1994,” described as a “revision of the 10-year strategic plans for each of BPA’s key activities” (BPA, pp. 2 – 6).

In taking a broader look across both the 1993 Annual Report and the 1994 Annual Report, there were two drivers of this shift in course toward a greater (and different) Markets governance mode. The first driver was the significant financial challenges BPA was experiencing, described in a section titled “Financial Squeeze” (BPA, 1993, p. 4), which led off the annual report narrative. In this section, the annual report described inadequate reservoir levels for hydroelectric production, increased demand due to a colder than normal winter, and increasing costs to fulfill its fish & wildlife
mitigation obligations. These challenges combined to reduce BPA’s reserves by nearly three-fourths (from $877 million to $221 million). It should also be noted, that the financial squeeze BPA experienced was also due to the enormous debt load it was carrying at the time – roughly $7 billion (BPA, 1993, p. 43). While shifting to the Markets governance mode would not reasonably be thought to solve the debt burden – and in fact, Congress acted to assist BPA in that regard – the rapid shift to the Markets governance mode would send a signal of BPA’s commitment to the region in its financial management.

The second driver of BPA’s strategy was the ‘reinventing government’ initiative of the Clinton administration under Vice-President Gore. Hardy showed BPA’s deep commitment to being a part of it in his Administrator’s letter: “the Vice President has named Bonneville as a government “reinvention laboratory . . . [w]e have an opportunity here, as urgent as it is unique and exciting to make BPA a more dynamic place. This annual report addresses how we’re building that New BPA” (BPA, 1993, p. 3). As previously noted in the Markets governance mode section above, this commitment was further indicated by the quotes from President Clinton and Vice-President Gore included in the 1993 Annual Report. It should also be noted that the 1993 Annual Report did not indicate whether BPA approached the Vice-President Gore to be named a reinvention laboratory, nor did it specify what being a reinvention laboratory entailed: we are left to speculate on whether it gave BPA additional
flexibilities or authorities to execute on its Market governance mode approach.

However, BPA’s narrative did emphasize the Markets governance approach to be taken in resolving the financial challenges and reinvention drivers as a course-correcting strategy:

To keep pace in this rapidly-changing environment, BPA must adopt a more Market-Driven and Customer-Focused model for doing business. On a scale where one is pure government and ten is pure business, BPA has been a two or a three. Our challenge is to become a six or a seven. The move does not signal a rejection of BPA's social and environmental responsibilities. But only by becoming more Cost-Conscious and Results-Oriented can Bonneville compete successfully and carry out those responsibilities in the new marketplace. (BPA, 1993, p. 5).

One final, but crucial, point must be made on BPA’s strategies as indicated by the C2-COURSE and Markets governance mode co-coding. The 1993 Annual Report could rightly be considered the inflection point for BPA’s course to meet the challenges it faced by a more aggressive and overt use of the Markets governance mode in its long-term strategy. It is of no small significance that an aggressive Markets governance mode approach arrived two scant years after the regional focus on salmon stock collapse and the Salmon Summit. As well, the 1994 Annual Report related some of the C2 – COURSE actions taken, most importantly, that BPA underwent an organizational restructuring. “In 1994 we completely reorganized the agency, with an eye toward making BPA – and our customers – more competitive.” (BPA, 1994, p. 3). The organization chart of 1994 eliminated deputy and assistant administrator titles in favor
of vice presidents. As well, the agency was structured along four business functions: Sales, Marketing, Transmission Services, and Environment, Fish & Wildlife. The support organizations did not change significantly other than the shift to Vice President titles. BPA’s narrative was now one of a business-oriented utility prepared to successfully compete in the marketplace.

The inflection point for BPA’s transformation was further reinforced by the 1995 BPA Business Plan. The 1995 BPA Business Plan elaborated on many of the concepts and narratives captured in the 1993 Annual Report and 1994 Annual Reports in that it laid out BPA’s short and long-term strategies, current challenges and the ways in which the strategies would meet those challenges, as well as the organizational changes supporting the strategies. While the 1994 Annual Report showed the new organizational structure and senior executive titles, the 1995 BPA Business Plan included key details and principles of the re-organization. It began with a description of the prior state:

Like many government agencies, as BPA’s sales expanded and its missions grew over the years, it evolved into a large hierarchical structure with five or more layers of management between line workers and the chief executive. Decision-making tended to be centralized, based on time-consuming briefing, reviews and approvals. (BPA, 1995b, p. 39).

To counter the stated bureaucratic drawbacks of a government agency, the business plan emphasized the steps taken for BPA “to reorient its organization to be responsive, flexible and competitive” (BPA, 1995b, p. 40). The business plan detailed a
restructuring to make the organization flatter (eliminating layers of management and decision-making steps). It also highlighted the creation of customer-focused function and organization (listed as Sales & customer Service in the revised organizational chart), which had previously not existed. Finally, the business plan outlined the elimination of roughly 1,000 full-time equivalent employees and contract personnel to make the business more efficient. Throughout the description of these and other activities of the 1995 BPA Business Plan, BPA reiterated its focus on the Markets governance mode in its short and long-term strategies. The references in the business plan to a customer focus and competition – both key terms in identifying the Market governance mode – were found throughout the 1995 BPA Business Plan. As outlined in Chapter 3, the 1995 BPA Business Plan was not included in coding with the annual reports to ensure a discrete and consistent set of records for analysis. However, the additional context the business plan adds additional insight in understanding to both the enormity of the transformation and its significant driver.

**Networks and Solidarity.** In some contrast to the co-coding with the Markets governance mode, instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and both the Networks and Solidarity governance modes were low and fairly evenly distributed across the ten s. References to the Solidarity governance mode and C2 – COURSE were primarily focused on broad regional benefits and BPA’s obligation toward stewardship of the region’s resources and the environment in general. However, during the Hardy years, there was
an increased emphasis on public involvement and public engagement for BPA’s strategy and planning. This was particularly evident in the narratives concerning the 1991 Programs in Perspective initiative, which was an overt move by BPA toward greater public engagement.

As an outgrowth of the Programs in Perspective, BPA also devoted multiple years to public engagement in developing a ten-year financial plan to help address the challenges previously noted in the Financial Squeeze section. Starting in 1990 with a reference to working with customers on the 10-year financial plan, BPA began referencing public involvement in the financial plan initiative. BPA then touted public engagement alongside its customers as the plan is finalized. “In 1992, after thorough discussions with customers and the public, BPA proposed a 10-year financial plan for fiscal years 1992 through 2001” (BPA, 1992, p. 21). Notably, the 1993 Annual Report used almost identical language in then issuing the ten-year financial plan. Even as BPA shifted to its more business-oriented model, the agency continued to include Solidarity governance mode language in association with strategy and long-term planning. In these instance BPA essentially argued that a business orientation was the best means to “fulfill its public responsibilities” and that the agency had changed “to meet public needs” (BPA, 1996, p. 5). Co-coding between C2 – COURSE and Solidarity throughout the decade suggested that an integral part of BPA’s strategy never strayed far from recognizing its obligations to the public and the region.
Similarly, in the twenty-five instances of co-coding between C2 – COURSE and the Networks governance mode, most were references to partnerships with BPA’s federal partners and other entities on regional energy strategies. A key instance was in regard to Columbia River System management and a discussion of “an interagency effort [being] necessary to address multiple uses of the Columbia River system” (BPA, 1990, p. 12). While two years (1988 and 1989) had no instances of co-coding, the absence in those two years appears insignificant because most other years had only two or three references. What is perhaps more significant was the consistent (albeit low) counts in the latter years of the decade, even in the face of a move toward the Markets governance mode in planning and strategy. As evidenced by consistent Markets and Solidarity governance mode references co-coded with C2 – COURSE, BPA acknowledged the need for working closely with its federal partners and other entities as well as the public and the region as a whole for support in its change toward a more aggressive Markets governance mode positionality. Such co-coding between C2 – COURSE and the three governance modes used by BPA re-emphasizes how closely intertwined they were in BPA’s consideration of strategies and plans to meet the challenges of the 1990’s.

**C3 – CAPACITY Co-Coding with Governance Modes.**

Similar to co-coding of C2 – COURSE with governance modes, C3 – CAPACITY had 109 instances across the ten annual reports, only three fewer than co-coding with C2 – COURSE. Again, this was unsurprising given that the annual reports, even in the
narrative sections, had a significant focus on operational accomplishments and activities. As shown in Table 24, the counts for the Markets (fifty-eight) and Networks (thirty-four) governance modes were in similar proportions to C2 – COURSE counts. This consistency is reflective of the narrative focus in the annual reports in that they served two major purposes: they reported out the prior year’s activities (i.e., agency capacity) and they discussed long-term initiatives and strategies (i.e., the agency’s course). However, the low counts of co-coding with the Solidarity governance mode (sixteen) suggest that public engagement and similar activities had a closer tie to the long-term strategies than to operational activities. There were no instances of C3 – CAPACITY co-coding with the Hierarchy governance mode. Thus, while further exploring instances of co-coding between C3 – CAPACITY and the respective governance modes, the Hierarchy governance mode has been excluded altogether.

Table 24. Co-Coding Between C3 - CAPACITY and Governance Mode Sub-Categories by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy (π)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets (α)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks (γ)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Solidarity.** Solidarity co-coding was both more consistent and had lower counts (only half as many as Networks and less than a third of Markets) across the annual reports. The co-coded instances of the Solidarity governance mode and C3 – CAPACITY were largely focused on energy conservation programs and fish and wildlife spending, often in the same paragraph. Part of this was due to the nature of these efforts. Both energy conservation and fish and wildlife programs directed funding toward public benefit. BPA engaged in individual public benefit through energy conservation by funding weatherization of homes and to “support energy-efficiency building and appliance codes” (BPA, 1989, p. 9). Collective public benefit occurred where BPA funded broad fish and wildlife mitigation efforts:

To make up for habitat lost to Dworshak Dam and its reservoir, for example, BPA in 1992 purchased a large tract of land south of Lewiston Idaho . . . for properties that provide habitat for elk, deer, river otter and many species of waterfowl. (BPA, 1992, p. 8)

In addition to these activities in both energy conservation and in fish and wildlife mitigation, BPA also directly engaged with the public in other C3 – CAPACITY efforts.
“The region discussed increasing investments in conservation and other energy resources, in fish and wildlife, and in refurbishing the transmission system” (BPA, 1990, p. 12). BPA also worked with the public in response to their concerns. The 1991 Annual Report noted research BPA undertook on the effects of electro-magnetic fields from its transmission lines “due to public concern and scientific uncertainty” (BPA, 1991, p. 14). As these examples indicate, BPA engaged with the public through various means for both benefit to the region and feedback from the region on its varied operations.

Unlike counts of co-coding between the Solidarity governance mode and C3 – CAPACITY, there was greater variation in co-coding counts for individual years in Networks and Markets governance modes, which indicates the cyclical nature of those efforts. The wide variation was particularly notable in the Jura years with the Networks governance mode co-coding counts going from zero instances in 1988, to ten instances in 1989 and two instances in 1990. Similarly, Markets governance mode co-coding had three instances in 1988, twelve in 1989, then back to three in 1990.

Networks. Generally, co-coding between C3 – CAPACITY and the Networks governance mode was simply a depiction of BPA partnering with other entities. One such instance was building electric transmission infrastructure such as the Third AC Intertie, which increased opportunities for energy swaps between BPA and its partner entities in California. Other instances of co-coding focused on partnerships for energy conservation efforts or fish and wildlife mitigation, indicating costs and specific projects.
being undertaken. Even the ‘outlier’ year of 1989, with its ten instances of co-coding, was similar. Four of the ten instances were distributed in similar proportions to the other annual reports’ co-coding. The primary distinction between 1987 and other years was that the 1987 Annual Report included one page titled “The Power Transmission Grid: A Regional Asset” (BPA, 1989, p. 12), which offered greater detail on various transmission infrastructure projects. This page alone accounted for four of the ten references in 1989.

An additional two references were to BPA’s financing of the Washington Public Power Supply System. Unfortunately, there was little in the Administrator’s Letter or the remainder of the report to indicate why this particular year emphasized instances of the Network governance mode being used to build out transmission capacity of BPA. Jura did not tout the importance of partnering to build infrastructure, nor did the financial reports suggest a different or increased pattern in spending on transmission construction. Ultimately, we are left with 1989 being as I previously described it: simply an outlier and not a strong indicator of agency change in its use of governance modes in executing on its C3 – CAPACITY efforts.

**Markets.** In contrast, while 1989 was also an outlier in instance of co-coding between C3 – CAPACITY and the Markets governance mode, the reason for the increase was much clearer. The co-coding instances in 1989 appeared to be primarily attributable to the successful financial year with BPA acknowledging its customers and
their market successes. In particular, BPA highlighted BPA’s increasing flexibility in managing its own marketplace. Early in the year, with low water flows, BPA “met the power needs of . . . Northwest customers by restricting sales outside the region” but the report also noted “when water conditions return to normal, we expect sales to California to increase” (BPA, 1989, p. 2). The annual report also emphasized a shift in how BPA competed. “BPA’s marketing focus shifted from sales of surplus energy to sales or exchanges of surplus capacity” (BPA, 1989, p. 10). BPA’s highlight of these efforts to more efficiently leverage and exploit its resources indicated the importance of the agency continually exploring new means of competing and using the Markets governance mode.

Other than 1989’s marketing and capacity emphasis, the Jura years generally referenced BPA’s commitment to customer involvement in budgeting. Notably, in the subsequent annual reports in the Jura years, there were fewer instances and less detail in co-coding. This is likely attributable in some part to the shift in annual report themes to ones emphasizing the Solidarity governance mode rather than the Markets governance mode. As an example, Jura’s Administrator’s Letter in the 1990 Annual Report framed financial success less in Market terms. While the Administrator’s Letter noted BPA’s increasing financial strength, it placed greater emphasis on “the responsibilities of stewardship” (BPA, 1990, p. 2) and downplayed or even omitted references to competition and the marketplace. It should be noted, however, that a
shift in emphasis in the annual reports such as this one, was not necessarily a strong indicator of shifts in the underlying governance modes. The annual reports can often be described as the agency’s posture as much as the agency’s actions.

In some contrast to the Jura years, the Hardy years had more consistent counts of co-coding with both the Networks and Markets governance modes. Co-coding with the Networks governance mode fell in mid-single digits, with the exception of 1993, where there were zero instances. For co-coding with the Markets governance mode, 1993 – 1995 showed a marked increase: ten instances in 1993, eight instances in 1994, and ten instance in 1995. These three short years accounted for nearly half of the total co-coding counts for the decade. More significant is the fact that this pattern largely coincided with the C2 – COURSE instances of co-coding in the same years and – as described above – indicated that Hardy’s wholesale changes at the agency that were implemented through both C2 – COURSE and C3 – CAPACITY. While the co-coding with C2 – COURSE largely consisted of forward-looking statements and description of strategy, the co-coding of C3 – CAPACITY and the Markets governance mode showed the immediate actions BPA took to move more aggressively in the business model. This movement included both cost-cutting measures and finding new resources for use in a fiercely competitive energy markets environment.

The cost-cutting measures looked toward becoming more stream-lined and efficient. “[W]ith our customers looking over our shoulder, we conducted an internal
review of everything BPA does, to see if we can do it with fewer staff and at lower cost” (BPA, 1993, p. 10). The internal review resulted in a commitment to reduce staff, to measure performance more stringently (BPA, 1993), to waive or adjust government rules on purchasing, remove “layers of management” (BPA, 1994, p. 6), and to create account executives to increase customer service (BPA, 1994). The efforts to become more business-like in both 1993 and 1994 were then highlighted the following year. “1995 also saw a series of decisions that bear the fruit of several years of hard work to transform BPA into an efficient organization that can operate effectively in today’s competitive utility industry” (BPA, 1995a, p. 5). However, this was accompanied by a reference to cutting costs for “new generation projects and new transmission” (BPA, 1995a, p. 6) indicating an inherent tension between cost-cutting and developing new resources.

BPA appeared to navigate this tension in its approach to finding new resources (essentially the ability to market power and to provide electric transmission services), showing significant activity in both 1993 and 1994 as shown by the co-coding counts. Rather than new generation and transmission, BPA focused on acquiring existing resources such as the Tenaska gas-fired turbine power plant (BPA, 1993). BPA also emphasized technology solutions as in improving its Slatt substation switching equipment to be more efficient along with plans to expand use of the same technology on a wider basis over time (BPA, 1993). Finally, the agency took aim at stabilizing its
rates through increased reliance on energy conservation and tying their customers’
efforts to “tiered rates, which reward those who conserve” (BPA, 1994, p. 10). Taken
together, both these resource efforts and the cost-cutting previously described were
indicators of the salience of the Markets governance mode in BPA’s narrative
surrounding C2 – CAPACITY. The annual reports between 1993 and 1995 delivered a
strong message of BPA meeting the myriad challenges it faced through use of the
Markets governance mode in both the C2 – COURSE and the C3 – CAPACITY categories.
It is an indicator that Hardy shifted BPA towards not only a greater use of the Markets
governance mode, but also one that was different in nature than use of the Markets
governance mode in the Jura years.

*Key Longitudinal Observations.*

A final, but important, note associated with the C3 - CAPACITY coding category,
is in regard to the longitudinal analysis of BPA’s transformational decade. Because of
the highly structured format of the annual report, it was fairly easy to ascertain change
over time, especially in areas associated with C3 – CAPACITY. But including a somewhat
broader longitudinal review of additional data supporting C3 – CAPACITY provided
additional insights. Of course, the agency’s financials were a key and consistent aspect
of all annual reports. While it was an easy matter to report on the agency’s financials
for each year, they were only reflective of agency changes and shifts on governance
mode in an extremely limited way. Moreover, the narrative sections and the
Administrator’s Letter provided greater insight than did the raw financial numbers themselves. This is in large part due to the lack of detail. While an indicator of the agency’s continuing viability, financial highlights, revenues and expenses were not necessarily strong indicators of how BPA implemented change to meet the decade’s challenges. With those caveats, there are still insights to be gained from certain financial figures and organization charts of the annual reports using a longitudinal review of the decade. This additional review is included in Appendix C, as it is not directly related to the coding analysis used for the Agency Capability category, but provides additional insights to understanding BPA’s evolution through the decade.

**C4 – CULTURE Co-Coding with Governance Modes.**

Finally, C4 – CULTURE co-coding with governance modes was the least effective in terms of specific references in the ten annual reports. Only thirty-five instances of C4 – CULTURE and all governance modes were co-coded. Unsurprisingly, over two-thirds of the instance were co-coded with the Solidarity governance mode. Moreover, as shown in Table 25, even the instance of co-coding with the Solidarity governance mode were low in each year. The low counts overall and – based on those counts – the strong association between C4 – CULTURE and the Solidarity governance mode were largely attributable to two factors. First, while the annual reports made regular (if sparse) mention of culture at BPA, their strategic and operational focus would tend to make organizational culture references more of a background context.
Table 25. Co-Coding Between C4 - CULTURE and Governance Mode Sub-Categories by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>‘87</th>
<th>‘88</th>
<th>‘89</th>
<th>‘90</th>
<th>‘91</th>
<th>‘92</th>
<th>‘93</th>
<th>‘94</th>
<th>‘95</th>
<th>‘96</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Hierarchy (π)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Markets (α)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Networks (γ)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΦGC: Solidarity (δ)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total count of co-coding by years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total counts per year</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, unlike the other Agency Capability categories, cultural aspects are often either aspirational or framed in an abstract sense. While it is easy to describe a governing statute (C1 – CONSTITUTION), a strategic initiative (C2 – COURSE), or an operational action (C3 – CAPACITY), organizational culture is less easily depicted through actions. As well, there is the challenge scholars have examined of multiple cultures – the culture an organization may ascribe to itself; the culture indicated by organizational artifacts; and the underlying culture found in day-to-day behavioral patterns among the organizational population (Martin, 1946/2005). This challenge is supported when examining the three annual reports that had strong cultural themes of “Children of Tomorrow” (1990), “Seasons of the River” (1991) and “Keepers of the Earth” (1992). In
spite of cultural themes referencing future generations, the importance of the environment, and the connection between Northwest tribes and stewardship, the instances of co-coding were not significantly greater than in most other years of the decade. While understanding these challenges, some observations and insights from the ten annual reports and co-coding may be made.

An initial observation was that the Mission Statement in most annual reports spoke to BPA’s culture and therefore was coded to C4 – CULTURE. Importantly, I co-coded the single paragraph to C4 – CULTURE to both the Markets governance mode and the Solidarity governance mode. In its commitment to providing the region’s power supply and electric transmission service, BPA states:

We will do so in an open and businesslike way, responsive to citizens’ concerns and to our obligations as a Federal [sic] agency. We will provide creative leadership and fulfill our responsibilities with professional excellence. (BPA, 1988, p. 53)

Use of the terms ‘businesslike way’ and ‘citizens’ concerns’ were indicators of BPA’s commitment through the Mission Statement to a culture that incorporated both the Markets governance mode and the Solidarity governance mode. The caveat is that a Mission Statement is an aspirational message and not necessarily reflective of the day-to-day culture within the agency. It must therefore be considered a fairly weak indicator and, in fact, as described further in the Markets governance mode sub-section, not necessarily accurate in all instances. Turning to instances of co-coding between C4 –
CULTURE and individual governance modes, I address them in the following sub-sections according to their salience.

**Solidarity.** The Solidarity governance mode was by far the most prevalent co-coding with C4 – CULTURE in the annual reports. It accounted for nearly seventy percent of co-coding instances. While this may seem intuitive, C4 – CULTURE coding is focused on internal aspects of the organization and the Solidarity governance mode (as with all four governance modes) considers patterns of interaction between the organization and the external operating environment. Therefore, the two categories should not be assumed to be co-extensive. Instead, co-coding with the Solidarity governance mode captures instances where the agency culture is focused on the region, community involvement, and collective public benefit (emphasizing the environment).

With a broad focus on the region as a whole, including Federal partners, Northwest tribes, and the public, the description of BPA’s fifty-year anniversary celebration covered two pages in the *1987 Annual Report*, including pictures of the event. The celebration at Bonneville dam made use of the Solidarity governance mode in reaffirming BPA’s commitment to the region and reinforced its stature as a Northwest institution that was more than a power marketer and transmission service provider. BPA’s narrative of the event was one of the agency acting as a servant of the public interwoven into the region’s culture. Recounting the significance of Bonneville dam, the songs Woody Guthrie wrote (commissioned by BPA), and producing “an award-winning
educational film – ‘River of Power’” (BPA, 1987, p. 24), were distinctive cultural artifacts of the agency emphasizing BPA’s public engagement and its role in the Northwest region.

The 1987 Annual Report and the 1989 Annual Report each highlighted BPA’s culture of community involvement. Both annual reports included a section entitled ‘Energizing the Community’ highlighting BPA employees’ community involvement including campaigns by the agency staff to raise money for charitable causes. In describing the activities, the report emphasized how “BPA employees want to help make the Pacific Northwest a good place to live and work” (BPA, 1989, p. 16). However, the Energizing the Community section was only included in those two reports for the first part of the decade. Moreover, in the latter part of the decade (1993 – 1996), references co-coded between C4 – CULTURE and the Solidarity governance mode were either non-existent or were solely part of the previously discussed Mission Statement.

Beyond its employees’ community involvement, BPA closely intertwined the cultural public element with the themes of both the 1991 Annual Report (using ‘Seasons of the River’) and the 1992 Annual Report (the ‘Year of the American Indian’). The themes and descriptions of these annual reports were more indirect instances of co-coding between C4 – CULTURE and Solidarity because they did not directly indicate action by BPA, but instead noted how integral these cultural themes were to the agency. As an example, the 1991 Annual Report emphasized BPA’s commitment to the Columbia
River beyond its function in creating hydropower. “As the Columbia River flows, renewing its life-giving gifts each year, so will BPA protect and enhance this great natural resource for the economic benefit and quality of life of many generations to come” (BPA, 1991, p. 15). Similarly, in the following year Hardy remarked: “In 1992, the Year of the American Indian, we do well to remember the special place Native American Hold in our society” (BPA, 1992, p. 1). As previously cautioned, these themes and quotations implicate the Solidarity governance mode as integral to BPA culture, but recall that this is BPA’s self-narrative. It was on display as a cultural artifact of the agency, but may not be a completely accurate reflection of the internal culture at BPA at the time. It should also be noted, that the subsequent years (1993 – 1996) included only two instances of co-coding between C4 – CULTURE and the Solidarity governance mode. This coincided with the shift toward a more business-like model (and Markets governance mode) at the agency as is further described below.

Markets. With only nine instances of co-coding between C4 – CULTURE and the Markets governance mode, there were few strong conclusions to be drawn. As previously noted, the most consistent reference to BPA’s culture in the Markets governance mode was in the Mission Statements from 1988 to 1992, which account for half of the co-coding instance with the Markets governance mode. Given that another four years (1987, 1994, 1995, and 1996) contained no instances of co-coding with the
Markets governance mode, there appeared to be little connection between BPA culture and markets with the notable exception of 1993.

1993’s position as an inflection point for the agency to become a business-like entity was reinforced by the co-coding instances that year between C4 – CULTURE and the Markets governance mode. While there were only three co-coded instances in the 1993 Annual Report, they had an outsized significance. As part of the new business model, the annual report directly called for cultural change: “The new business plan also aims to create the internal cultural changes that will turn BPA from a traditional process-oriented agency into an organization that responds quickly to market opportunities and delivers service that are specifically tailored to customers’ needs” (BPA, 1993, p. 6). Moreover, this same year included the sole instance of activity focused on the organization’s culture. “A cultural audit completed in May concluded that BPA has some strengths that will help us meet the competition, but the audit also found serious weaknesses” (BPA, 1993, p. 9). The annual report then discussed cultivating a culture of teamwork and individual empowerment to make BPA more competitive, more business-like, and more responsive to customers. Use of a cultural audit and the commitment to a major cultural shift within the agency to one reflective of the Markets governance mode stood in stark contrast to most C4 – CULTURE references across the decade. It showed that BPA was determined to use all tools at its disposal to meet the challenges it faced.
Hierarchy and Networks. The lack of co-coding with the Hierarchy governance mode (zero instances) was simply reflective of the almost complete absence of the mode at BPA. Somewhat more surprising was that there were only two instances of co-coding with the Networks governance mode. As previously discussed, the Networks governance mode was the second-most prevalent coding in the annual reports. This prevalence was also consistent in the other Agency Capability categories. While it would be reasonable to assume a culture that emphasized the Networks governance mode, there was little direct evidence of it in the annual reports. Of the two co-coded instances between C4 – CULTURE and the Networks governance mode, the first one was merely a description of BPA’s partnership with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers in celebrating the agency’s fiftieth anniversary in 1987. The second reference, however, was a direct reference to the Networks governance mode and BPA culture. “In the last several years, BPA has developed a unique culture of collaboration and consultation” (BPA, 1990, p. 12). The result is that there is surprisingly little to be learned from co-coding between C4 - CULTURE and the Networks governance mode from the annual reports.

Summary of Agency Capability Co-coding with Governance Modes.

Agency Capability categories were less effective for coding and analysis than the Governance Collibration categories. A challenge in coding for Agency Capability was the conceptual overlap among the categories themselves, resulting in what I term “intra-
category coding.” As shown in the Governance Collaboration findings of this chapter, intra-category coding also occurred in governance modes, but not to the extent I found with Agency Capability categories. As an example, there were multiple instances where the annual report narratives described both operational resources such as building transmission lines (coded to C3 – CAPACITY) and connecting that work with the longer-term strategy (coded to C2 – COURSE). Table 26 provides a summary of Intra-Category Coding for Agency Capability.

Table 26. Intra-Category Coding of Agency Capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>C1 – CONST.</th>
<th>C2 - COURSE</th>
<th>C3 - CAPACITY</th>
<th>C4 - CULTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1 – CONSTITUTION</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 – COURSE</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 – CAPACITY</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 – CULTURE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL COUNTS OF INTRA-CATEGORY CODING</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of note is the fact that most intra-category coding occurred between C2 – COURSE and C3 – CAPACITY. This is largely attributable to the structure and nature of the annual reports. These reports were structured as a ‘report card’ over the past year and a ‘vision statement’ of what the future holds for the agency. As such, many of the narratives included both aspects – essentially a review of the past with an eye toward the future. There were also a number of instances with intra-category coding between C1 – CONSTITUTION and either C2 – COURSE or C3 – CAPACITY. These were explained
by the emphasis in the annual reports on the constraints or authorities provided by C1 – CONSTITUTION and their impacts on agency strategy or resources. Finally, the intra-category coding between C4 – CULTURE and other categories was almost exclusively with C2 – COURSE, which was an indicator primarily of BPA’s attempts at charting its strategy through cultivating key cultural aspects such as collaboration, innovation, responsiveness, or community involvement, all of which have been described in elsewhere in the Agency Capability findings.

However, co-coding between the Agency Capability sub-categories and Governance Collibration sub-categories proved invaluable in understanding how governance modes were effectively shifted over the decade. This does raise the consideration of a need for a more nuanced approach to defining and framing Agency Capability sub-categories to better understand both how they may be used in analyzing organizational change, but also in their use through the lens of governance collibration.

In spite of the need for more nuance in the conceptual Agency sub-categories, the sub-categories did provide a more operational lens on the shifts in governance modes through the decade. As a result, they provided significant insights through my co-coding analysis as described in my findings. Relying solely on Governance Collibration coding and shifts in governance modes only provided a high-level understanding of the shifts themselves. Coupling them with Agency Capability allowed a more in-depth understanding of how BPA effected change as an organization to realize
the shift from one combination of governance modes to another. As detailed in this section, the reorganization touted in the 1987 Annual Report had little impact in BPA’s collibrative mix in the first part of the transformative decade. In contrast, the reorganization (and other actions) detailed in the 1994 Annual Report showed the massive Agency Capability undertaking in foregrounding the Markets governance mode to meet the challenges of the nineties. More significantly, comparing the Agency Capability co-coding with governance modes in the Jura years and the Hardy years, uncovered another nuance to governance collibration. The means by which BPA used the Markets governance mode in the Jura years was starkly different than in the Hardy years. Where the Jura years and the Hardy years had similar emphasis on the Markets governance mode, the Hardy years brought all Agency Capability tools (i.e., coding sub-categories) to bear on the challenges of the day. From attempted change in statutes and developing a strategic business plan to a complete re-organization on a corporate model and a full cultural audit, Hardy left no part of the agency untouched in his efforts to preserve BPA and transform it. Turning next to the Executive Leadership coding and findings will further elaborate the fundamentally different approach of the two administrators to the agency and to Governance Collibration.

**Executive Leadership**

Coding for Executive Leadership was unfortunately the least effective aspect of the coding scheme. As noted in Chapter 3, I had initially identified sub-categories
similar in structure to those used in ΦGC and ΦAC, but they proved of little use.

Instead, coding for the dimension of Executive Leadership (ΦEL) through specific actions by the Administrator and other agency leaders that were called out in annual report narratives at least allowed for the capture of some important findings through coding. However, even this higher level of coding produced only thirteen instances across the ten annual reports. Moreover, instances of co-coding with sub-categories in the other two dimensions were all in the single digits. As a result, a year-by-year table of the counts is not included for this section.

The low counts are attributable to both the conceptual framing for coding Executive Leadership and the purpose of the annual reports. The conceptual framing for coding used paragraphs that described an executive’s actions or posture. As an example of an executive posture, Hardy’s quotation from the 1992 Annual Report regarding the year of the American Indian was coded to Executive Leadership as a position he had taken in emphasizing the importance of Native American philosophy towards nature. Another set of examples was where an executive’s specific actions were indicated. In this instance, the 1990 Annual Report described a meeting between Jura and the B.C. Hydro Chairman Larry Bell, among others. Elsewhere, in the 1991 Annual Report, Hardy applauded the actions of his predecessor Jura:

I am reporting about the Bonneville Power Administration under the guidance of my predecessor, Jim Jura. [...]
The financial health reflected in BPA’s balance sheet is a credit to his [Jura’s] leadership, which put us on solid ground to face the challenges of the 1990’s. [...] Thanks to his [Jura’s] vision – and the cooperation of our customers – we are well positioned to meet today’s challenges” (BPA, 1991, p. 3).

Upon further analysis and coding of the annual reports, it became evident that the lack of direct Executive Leadership actions was a result of the way in which the annual reports were framed. They were recounting actions and issues in a collective manner, as an organization, rather than as a narrative of an individuals’ actions. Essentially, there was a mis-match between the unit of analysis and the available evidence. Therefore, there was little expectation there would be many instances that could be coded to Executive Leadership according to these coding concepts. Therefore, the low specific instances made it difficult to draw conclusions as to Executive Leadership in the annual reports themselves. Instead, as will be seen in Chapter 5, the administrator and other executives’ statements, quotations and positions were more readily evidenced in Newspaper articles and editorials.

However, it must be recalled that the annual reports themselves speak to the importance of Executive Leadership in framing the narrative of the agency’s governance, capability, activities, and plans as an institution. The theme, salience of issues, and events that were included in the annual reports, as well as – in particular – the content of the Administrator’s Letter were all evidence of Executive Leadership. Importantly, as described throughout this chapter, the framing of the agency narrative was attributable
to the two Administrators. It is significant that throughout the coding of Governance Collibration and Agency Capability, there was a natural divide BPA’s transformational decade according to the tenures of Jura and Hardy. Their respective postures on all aspects of BPA over the decade were the real evidence of Executive Leadership and how that leadership drove, directed, and influenced both the agency and the region. As a result, while coding for Executive Leadership was not an effective analysis, the fact of Executive Leadership is woven throughout my study.

Chapter Summary: Annual Report Findings

Based on the findings presented in this chapter, the coding scheme initially appears to be at least effective, particularly in identifying the types of governance modes used as tools in conjunction with agency capabilities to effect change. Importantly for this research, the use of the governance mode sub-categories strongly suggests that Governance Collibration analysis is useful in understanding how public administration organizations in the United States evolve over time in order to meet new challenges presented in their operating environment. Further, as discussed in Chapter 6, the underlying concepts of governance collibration may stem from the American Constitutional principles of checks and balances (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, 1788/1988) and elaborated in scholarship drawn from the European Union (see e.g., Sørensen and Torfing, 2009).
Use of the coding scheme in both Governance Collibration sub-categories and Agency Capability sub-categories was reasonably consistent among the annual reports. As previously noted, this was supported to a great degree by the consistency in formatting and language used in the reports. That being said, some sub-categories had limited usefulness. Specifically, the hierarchy governance mode of governance was apparently so little-used or evidenced in the annual reports that it is difficult to make any connection or draw any conclusion regarding it.

Another broad observation for the annual reports is the efficacy of coding each annual report in the context of a longitudinal study. Coding for each of the categories and capturing them in a year-over-year basis, assisted in discerning broad shifts and patterns in how BPA operated using a Governance Collibration. These shifts were particularly evident in the inflection point of 1992 where Hardy began to put BPA on a new path toward a corporate model using an aggressive Markets governance mode approach.

In addition to the shifts in governance modes themselves, the coding and analysis indicated how BPA changed through its use of the tools available to it in the sub-categories of Agency Capability. As described in the Agency Capability findings, BPA made regular use of all four sub-categories to varying degrees. However, the 1994 Annual Report described the myriad means associated with those sub-categories undertaken to transform BPA over the prior two years to its new corporate model. This
is particularly evident in Hardy’s Administrator’s letter where a single paragraph was coded for multiple sub-categories in both Governance Collibration and Agency Capability.

The *1992 Annual Report* and *1994 Annual Report* indicated a final important finding. The tenures of Jura and Hardy were starkly different in both style and substance as reflected in their respective use of Governance Collibration and Agency Capability. Both had similar opportunities to shift governance modes through use of the agency capabilities. However, Hardy appears to have been more effective in changing BPA. Admittedly, while there were challenges to be faced in the Jura years, the agency was in a ‘prefect storm’ of crises during Hardy’s tenure. Increased competitiveness, dire financial constraints, and the salmon stock collapse came together in a short span (and influenced one another as well). While BPA had always operated to a great degree in the Markets governance mode, the shift to a more robust use of the mode was evident in the wholesale changes made throughout the agency in all sub-categories of Agency Capability. Hardy’s different approach to the Markets governance mode does support a nuanced understanding of Governance Collibration as well. It is not only the mix of governance modes used by an organization, but also important to identify the means by which the governance modes are utilized. As a result, the concept that Governance Collibration must be analyzed in the context of both Agency Capacity and Executive Leadership becomes a key element of this organizational analysis.
As a final note it must be remember that the findings and observations in this chapter are reflective only of BPA’s self-narrative through the annual reports. In essence, the annual reports provide only BPA’s perspective on its challenges, successes and (to a lesser extent) its failures. A final element in understanding how the agency changed over its transformative decade is juxtaposing the agency’s self-narrative with that of external governance networks actors influencing the agency change. This was accomplished through the use of comparing media reports about BPA with the agency’s annual reports, which is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 5: BPA’s Transformative Decade in Newspaper Narrative Arcs

Introduction and Overview of Media Coverage and BPA Narratives Comparison

Coding and analyzing BPA’s annual reports in Chapter 4 provided strong evidence of organizational change and shifts in the agency’s governance modes over BPA’s transformational decade. However, as previously emphasized, these efforts alone do not provide a complete understanding of how BPA transformed itself. There are two reasons for this. First, because the annual reports are BPA’s self-narrative, they are BPA’s own perspective and BPA is the hero of its own story. Second, the annual reports do not give the complete context of events and external influences that might affect the agency’s transformation. While the annual reports reference actors and stakeholders impacting or influencing BPA’s actions (i.e., the BPA governance ecosystem), the references are entirely from BPA’s perspective. Therefore, it was important to include an interpretive analysis of media coverage for both the BPA governance ecosystem and the resulting narratives juxtaposed with BPA’s annual reports narratives.

Note that there were not simply two narratives – BPA’s self-narrative and the regional newspapers. Instead, there were multiple perspectives to the narratives as captured in regional newspapers, including the respective newspapers themselves, as well as the perspectives of the stakeholders from both the Northwest region and beyond. Many of these perspectives themselves were competing in one way or another. The more obvious ones reflect tensions between BPA customers and
environmental groups or the Tribes. As well, the political perspectives of the governors, senators, and representatives of each of the states in the BPA operations area were often in conflict. Therefore, analysis of media narratives identified instances where the media reported on BPA’s actions and activities and – to the extent possible – examined those instances in terms of governance collaboration. Figure 1 provides the model for identification, capture, analysis, and reporting findings regarding narratives of BPA in its transformational decade.

Figure 1. Model of Narratives Analysis with Sources, Themes, and Key Events of the Transformative Decade.

The sources used – newspaper reports and editorial, juxtaposed to some degree with the BPA annual report narratives, are shown to the right. The tenures of Jura and Hardy are depicted at the top of the figure. The left side of the figure indicates the four
broad ‘themes’ found in the newspaper narratives. These are further elaborated by the associated arrows moving from left to right indicating periods when a theme was more or less salient. Finally, the narratives of the decade were organized into three timeframes shown with the associated years and – finally – key important events are indicated in the hexagons within the center of the figure to provide further context that is key to the narratives analysis. Each of these elements is further detailed in the sub-sections that follow.

In the analysis, several factors were considered for salience of the narrative arcs the articles or editorials provided. Due to the downloaded format of the articles and editorials, using a typical count of columns devoted to the topic was not feasible. Instead, a simple word count was used, which was included in the downloaded version of each article or editorial. I also noted where there was only a limited reference to BPA or where the article was a blurb to better understand instances where the issue was sufficient to warrant inclusion in the newspaper but not so substantive as to devote a major article. Finally, it should be noted that the location of the articles or editorial in the newspaper is important and not to be overlooked. As a result, I emphasized front page or front section articles and editorials.

*Newspaper Articles and Editorials.*

The newspaper narratives were contained in two types of coverage: articles and editorials. The first was largely objective and fact-based reporting of events, but certain
biases of the respective newspapers might still be discerned. Of particular interest was
key individuals’ quotations from these articles as indicators of perspectives on BPA and
its actions. The second type of coverage was the editorial pieces by the newspapers’
editorial board and opinion pieces provided to the newspapers by major regional actors
– especially politicians. In distinguishing between article and editorial content,
considered was given to the multiple types of perspectives found in the newspaper
narratives. Characteristic of most all newspaper articles, the newspapers acted as
reporters (relating the facts of an event involving BPA), but also as ‘watchdogs’ (serving
the function of monitoring the activities of BPA to help ensure the agency was fulfilling
its obligations as a public service agency). The reporting was often as simple as an
article on BPA’s rate proposals or its budget. The watchdog articles varied but one
example is several articles on the cost of furniture for BPA’s new headquarters building
– an issue raised by a former employee whistleblower. In addition, the editorial and
opinion pieces in the newspaper media served as both a ‘bully pulpit’ (raising and
opining on issues deemed important to the public by the newspapers’ editorial boards)
or a ‘soapbox’ (giving space to politicians and other key stakeholders to provide their
perspectives and opinions on BPA). As a ‘bully pulpit’ the newspapers offered numerous
opinion pieces on the importance of salmon to the region. Examples of the ‘soapbox’
guest editorials included several from Oregon Congressional Representative Peter
DeFazio specifically on BPA’s organizational structure. Each of these examples are more
fully explored in this chapter.
**Themes of Narrative Arcs Identified.**

Using this approach described, there were four themes in the narrative arcs over the decade that are intertwined with one another to a large extent. Table 27 provides high-level themes, descriptions, and examples drawn from the newspapers (specifically, articles and editorial titles evocative of the themes). As noted above, these themes are not completely separate and distinct from one another. As an example, the Rates theme is intertwined with the Operations theme because customers began considering alternatives to buying power from BPA due to rates and, in response, BPA looked to reduce its costs in order to avoid raising rates. However, these four broad thematic categories provide sufficient distinction in associating articles and editorials with one another such that they were suitable for the analytical approach.

**Table 27. Narrative Themes and Description in Newspaper Coverage of BPA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salmon</td>
<td>The salmon stock collapse, Endangered Species Act listing, the Salmon Summit, and environmental influences</td>
<td>“Summit Proposes Measures to Save Columbia Salmon Runs” (Koberstein, P. 1991, January 8, B3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates</td>
<td>Competition among utilities, deregulation and rates impacts, BPA’s relationship with its customers, and customer influences</td>
<td>“BPA Clients Start to Look at Other Sources for Their Power” (Lange, L. 1987, August 19, D3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These four themes provided a structure for the major narrative arcs examined over the decade. Table 28 shows the number of articles and editorials as categorized in the four themes. The table further compares the total numbers of articles and editorials showing that the Salmon and Rates themes were the most prevalent. However, this should not be taken to suggest that material categorized in the Operations or Politics themes should be discounted or considered less salient in terms of the region's interest in BPA. This is particularly true of the Politics theme where the materials focused on key aspects such as the change in Administrators or national and regional policy issues implicating BPA.

Table 28. Thematic Counts of Articles and Editorials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SALMON</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc.</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Narrative Timeframes.

While these themes are present to varying degrees throughout the ten years of my study, they have been broadly arranged in this chapter in three timeframes according to the two administrators’ tenures and multi-year narrative time periods. The first three years of the decade during Jura’s tenure are labelled the ‘Stability Years’ (1987 – 1989). The second timeframe is from 1990 – 1992, spanning Jura’s last year and a half, the short (three-month) transition from Jura to Hardy, and Hardy’s first year. Owing to the change in administrators, this timeframe is labelled the ‘Transition Years.’ The final four years of the decade in Hardy’s tenure (1993 – 1996) are termed the ‘Transformation Years,’ owing to the environmental, marketplace, and political challenges BPA faced and attempted to overcome.

Table 29 shows the comparative counts of articles and editorials associated with each narrative theme in the three timeframes. The Transformation Years is four years whereas the other two timeframes are three years each. As a result, the Transformation Years would be expected to contain more material than the other timeframes. However, the Transformation Years accounts for 50% of the total number of articles and editorials. Put another way, the average number of articles and editorials each year over the decade is just under eighty, yet the average number for the Transformation timeframe is one hundred. This is an indicator of the increased
coverage and salience of BPA issues in the newspapers during the latter part of the agency’s transformative decade.

Table 29. Comparative Counts of Articles and Editorials by Timeframe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SALMON</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Perc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability Years</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition Years</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1990 – 1992)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation Years</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these three timeframes include significant narrative arcs indicating regional interest in issues regarding BPA, BPA response to that interest, shifts in governance modes, and organizational change at BPA. Particular attention was given to material involving quotations from key individuals – including both BPA Administrators, the Northwest Congressional delegation, and regional officials. The articles and editorials from the three newspapers were also juxtaposed, to a limited extent, against the BPA annual reports. Doing so allowed for an examination of how the newspapers either elaborated or countered the annual reports’ narratives. In addition, the newspapers called out narratives that BPA omitted in its annual reports, an important aspect to better understanding the external influences of the region on BPA’s transformation. Each of the three timeframes are described in separate sections below, after which I summarize and synthesize BPA’s transformative decade as seen in the
newspapers and the associated implications for governance collaboration and organizational change.

**The Stability Years**

BPA’s Transformative Decade begins with the Stability Years (1987 – 1989). This term should not be used in the sense that no change, evolution, or activity occurred at BPA. Rather, it is used in the sense of establishing a baseline in the media for coverage of BPA as the agency progressed over the ensuing decade. Table 30 shows the respective counts of articles and editorials within each narrative arc theme.

**Table 30. Thematic Counts of Articles and Editorials in the Stability Years.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SALMON</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc.</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eighty articles and editorials were categorized with Rates-themed narratives, significantly more than any other themes. While almost as many articles were categorized in the Operations-themed narrative arc (fifty-five for Operations and fifty-seven for Rates), there were substantially more editorials on rates. Similar numbers for the Rate and the Operations themes indicate the importance of BPA’s operational expenses to the newspapers because of the impact on customer rates. However, where there was a significant number of editorials associated with the Rates theme, there
were only three editorials associated with the Operations theme, one of which focused on the Army Corps of Engineers, while only noting BPA in passing. These counts suggest that the Operations theme was less salient for the newspaper editorial boards.

However, the Operations theme in this timeframe is notable because of the salience of a sub-narrative regarding purchase of furniture for the new BPA headquarters, which is further explored below.

Both the Salmon and the Politics themes of narrative arcs are notable for their small numbers when compared to both the Rates and the Operations themes. Additionally, in light of the later years' Politics themed narrative arcs, which (as will be seen) showed significant attempts to influence BPA as an organization, the Stability Years had little evidence of similar attempts. Most of the articles were from 1988 and covered Northwest issues in the presidential election or BPA’s fiftieth anniversary celebration. More importantly, this three-year period had substantially fewer articles and editorials associated with the Politics theme than the following Transition Years (1990 – 1992) and were fairly evenly distributed among the three newspapers (four instances in The Oregonian, five in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, and seven in The Seattle Times). As a result, I focused primarily on the 50th anniversary year events, which touched on each of the four narrative themes. I also included a sub-narrative of that year that highlights the watchdog function of the newspapers. Finally, I examined the challenges BPA faced that were looming in the longer term.
1987: The 50th Anniversary.

As BPA observed its fiftieth anniversary, the 1987 Annual Report noted a cause for celebration and the three newspapers largely reflected the same tone. All three newspapers devoted an article to the event, but the space each devoted to the article varied widely: the Seattle Post-Intelligencer article was 2,275 words, twice that of The Seattle Times article (1,131 words), and roughly four times that of The Oregonian (562 words). None of the articles made the front page and only the Seattle Post-Intelligencer article was in section A of the newspaper. Most of the coverage in the three newspapers was aligned with BPA’s own one-page narrative in the 1987 Annual Report on the fiftieth anniversary. The notable attendees and the ceremony taking place at Bonneville Dam were the main focus. As well, coverage highlighted the cultural significance of Bonneville Dam and its construction in 1937, including reference to the Woodie Guthrie’s songs (contracted by BPA) written for what “later proved to be an inspired public relations move” (Jackson, K. 1987, August 9, B2).

Additionally, only The Seattle Times included an editorial that referenced BPA’s fiftieth anniversary. The editorial board praised BPA for reducing its proposed rate increase and connected the region’s praise for the move with the anniversary celebration. While short, the editorial suggests that concerns over increasing rates was never far from mind across the region. The editorial also touts how BPA arrived at the lower rate increase, emphasizing BPA’s use of the Solidarity governance mode in which
the agency “held nine public meetings and received more than 20,000 written comments” (The Editorial Board, 1987, August 8, A15). Also, as emphasized in the 1987 Annual Report, the editorial referenced BPA’s commitment to reducing personnel by 300 positions, which, as was shown in Chapter 4, never actually came to pass.

The real distinction among the three newspapers was the Seattle Post-Intelligencer’s approach compared to the other two. Both The Oregonian and The Seattle Times provided a description of the festivities and included quotations from Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon and Governor Booth Gardner of Washington. Significantly, in the much shorter space devoted to the event in The Oregonian, much of the focus was on the “several key themes” Hatfield underscored (Hortsch, D. 1987, August 9, B03). The themes Hatfield spoke to were the historical significance of the project, restoration of the fish runs, and – importantly – his commitment to withstand efforts by the Reagan Administration to privatize BPA. As is evident throughout this chapter, the presidential administrations’ emphasis on privatization, the concerns for fish stocks, and BPA’s regional significance were a continuing thread in all narrative arcs.

In contrast, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer included only a passing reference to the celebration itself and instead provided a review of the fifty years since the Bonneville Dam’s construction and BPA’s inception. It recounted the challenges of rural life in the 1920s and 1930s, how Bonneville dam came into being, and the vast changes it brought to the region. The article also focused on the damage done by the hydropower system
to fish and wildlife and the public pressure rising over the years to find ways to mitigate
the damage such as installing fish ladders at the dams. The article ended with a short
consideration of what the future may hold in both enhancing the energy benefits, but
also the associated increasing challenges of fish management. Taken as a whole, the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer took up a narrative of all the benefits and detriments the
hydropower system and BPA had provided to the Northwest. It was in-depth reporting
that used the fiftieth anniversary as a starting point rather than the focusing on
celebration itself and provided a good framing for what was to take place in BPA’s
transformative decade.

Just as the Seattle Post-Intelligencer included both benefits and detriments
rather than merely the celebration itself, The Seattle Times’ coverage of the fiftieth
anniversary also included an Associated Press article with a different perspective on
BPA’s tenure in the Northwest. The lead paragraph is unequivocal: “Northwest Indians
are marking the 50th anniversary of Bonneville Dam with a 50-hour vigil intended to
illustrate the losses suffered by the tribes as power lines were stretched across the
Northwest” (Associated Press, 1987, August 7, E4). There was a further mention of the
vigil in The Seattle Times’ main articles, but the vigil was only briefly mentioned in The
Oregonian and there was no mention in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer’s coverage. The
vigil was a somber observance of “[t]he price of progress” and its impact on tribal
culture and fish resources integral to that culture. (Associated Press, 1987, August 7, E4,
quoting Roy Sampsel). In retrospect, it is at least possible to consider the report on the Northwest Tribes’ vigil as the beginning of the Salmon-themed narrative arc and the challenges BPA was to face in the coming years.

The ‘Furniture-gate’ sub-narrative.

A final item reported by the three newspapers in 1987 (in spite of the fiftieth anniversary celebrations) was what might be called ‘furniture-gate’ Scandal. Coincident with BPA’s fiftieth year, the agency moved into its new headquarters building in the Lloyd District. However, Antoinette Hatfield, standing in for Senator Hatfield to dedicate the new building, joked in passing “I have nothing to say about the furniture” (Colby, R. 1987, September 26, B02). While Antoinette Hatfield made light of BPA’s new furniture, it belied the critical coverage by the newspapers of BPA purchasing new furniture – specifically for BPA’s executives. The Seattle Times initial front-page article on the topic offered a blunt headline: “BPA’s $3 Million Furniture Giveaway – as Power Rates Rose, so did Agency’s Taste in Desk, Chairs” (LaLonde, J. 1987, September 17, A01). Falling squarely within the media’s ‘watchdog’ role and coming to light a short month after the anniversary celebrations, the newspapers reported extensively on the issue, framing it within BPA’s proposed rate increases. Fourteen articles over the next six months tracked the issue, most of which were in The Seattle Times. While it was ultimately reported that BPA was within its statutory authority to make the purchases, there are three important elements to this sub-narrative. First, it shows the different perspectives
of the three newspapers. *The Seattle Times* broke the story and closely tracked the ensuing investigation, while both *The Oregonian* and the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* had reduced coverage. Second, it indicates the importance of the external perspectives in understanding BPA’s transformation and BPA’s self-narrative. The BPA annual reports make no mention of the furniture purchase, nor of the investigation Jura ordered as a result of the newspaper reports. More importantly, ‘furniture-gate’ shows, in an encapsulated instance, that BPA was attuned and responsive to the newspapers and acted accordingly. Jura ordered an investigation into whether the purchase had been appropriately authorized and completed according to federal rules and procedures.

“’What we are talking about is an extremely serious threat to our organization’ said Jura . . . ‘The purchasing process must have integrity’” (LaLonde & Nalder, 1987, September 24, A1). It is notable that no mention is made in the 1987 Annual Report regarding the furniture scandal, only that BPA had moved into its new Headquarters. As will be further seen in the remaining years of the decade, newspapers were a significant platform for raising and tracking issues facing BPA and how the agency responded, even when the agency omitted issues from its annual reports.

**Challenges and Shifts in Perspectives.**

While ‘furniture-gate’ may be considered a sub-narrative that still provided insights to BPA’s relationship with the newspapers, the Stability Years narrative arcs in each of the themes categorized indicates increasing challenges to the agency. As is
necessarily the case in a study of this nature, the starting point of 1987 cannot be taken
an absolute. That is, although 1987 is a useful starting point for this study’s decade
timeframe, pre-existing issues and narratives are also evident. An example of this is the
series of articles in early 1987 regarding the Reagan Administration’s prior (and
obviously failed) attempt to sell BPA. That attempt is prior to the study’s timeframe, but
selling BPA remained a part of Presidential politics in both the 1988 election and the
1992 election. It also served as a background to narratives in each of the four narrative
arc themes. However, while the sale of BPA deserved mention in the Stability Years, the
newspapers were far more focused on issues associated with the Rates theme and the
Operations theme (in both reporting and editorializing). As previously shown, articles
associated with both of these themes were orders of magnitude greater than either the
Salmon or Politics themes. As well, the Rates theme encompassed far more opinion
pieces than any of the other themes.

The narrative arcs in the media began to shift as the challenges of borrowing
authority and debt restructuring came to the fore with the ever-present rates
narratives. As well, the opinions and positions of key actors and stakeholders within the
BPA governance ecosystem increased over time. Hardy (in his prior position as Seattle
City Light superintendent) became a prominent figure in the narratives. Moreover, new
figures at the national level appeared in the newspapers including the first reference to
Peter DeFazio as “the first-term congressman from Springfield” (Church, F. 1987,
September 6, E02) as well as the new Secretary of Energy, retired Admiral James Watkins. The DeFazio article references his presence on the House Interior Committee and his knowledge of (and advocacy for) BPA in discussions regarding the agency’s policy on the California Electric Transmission Intertie and its potential rates impact.

Just as with the Fiftieth Anniversary narratives, Hatfield continued his outsized presence in the newspapers. Although only a passing reference in one article, the hearings on Watkins’ nomination as Secretary of Energy noted Hatfield’s questions about the new Bush administration’s attempt to re-structure BPA debt, which would impact rates. Hatfield’s questioning was a continuation of his advocacy for BPA’s borrowing authority and existing debt structure – a holdover issue from the Reagan Administration (Church, F. 1988, June 8, D11). This narrative and Hatfield’s advocacy would continue throughout his tenure as Oregon’s senior senator. The borrowing authority question was associated with both the California Intertie and, as Hatfield noted in the article, could “limit Bonneville’s capacity to borrow for projects relating to fish and wildlife enhancement and the environment” (Church, F. 1988, March 29, D09). While not directly calling out salmon mitigation (which would become a major effort on Hatfield’s part), both the Salmon and the Operations themes were evident in this arc in implicating BPA’s ability to fund salmon mitigation efforts and to build other projects in the vein of the California Intertie. Further, debt and borrowing capacity would continue as significant narratives through Jura’s tenure and well into Hardy’s tenure.
A major challenge associated with debt and the borrowing authority of BPA was the agency’s obligations for funding the Washington Public Power Supply System (‘WPPSS’) nuclear projects. WPPSS figured prominently because of the contentiousness of nuclear power in general, but also because of the challenges in funding, building, and operating the five nuclear plants contemplated by WPPSS. Only one plant was completed, and the articles of the Stability Years closely follow BPA’s actions regarding mothballing two plants for possible future use or dismantling them altogether (another two never made it past the drawing board). An in-depth section D front page article in 1987 interviewed Jura and crystallized the WPPSS challenge:

“BOND DEFAULT: Jura said the BPA thinks there’s a possibility that if construction were halted, the trustees of the bonds sold to finance construction might declare a default and demand immediate payment of the $3.7 billion debt on the two plants. The amount exceeds the agency’s current $2.9 billion budget. (Lange, L. 1987, March 26, D1)

As the guarantor of the bonds, BPA (and Jura) had the ultimate decision-making authority, but regional stakeholders exerted influence on BPA’s considerations. The Seattle Times reported on a public meeting regarding re-financing the bonds (Staff Reports, 1987, February 18, D2). Jura testified on the topic in a House Committee hearing and Hardy opined as well, saying “[w]e probably ought to cut our losses now” (Lange, L. 1987, March 26, D1, quoting Hardy). Notably, in spite of the prominence WPPSS held in articles during the Stability Years, there were no editorials on the topics.
Ultimately, BPA asked the Department of Justice to file lawsuits over whether terminating the two plants would create a default on the bonds. Several of the bond purchasers (and customers of BPA) settled the lawsuits and, while the WPPSS board was not in favor of the move, other stakeholders, such as DeFazio also favored the move. It should also be noted that, while in later years, additional articles and editorials referenced the single WPPS plant still in operation, the issue’s salience rapidly receded with the litigations’ settlements.

As previously noted, while the WPPSS narrative arc was driven by concerns with BPA’s debt and borrowing authority (categorized within the Operations theme), the concerns stemmed from potential rates impacts. But rates concerns were even more prominent in 1987, prior to the WPPSS narrative. The rates articles tracked customer dissatisfaction with BPA’s initial rates proposal and subsequent attempts to reduce those rates. While BPA did reduce the rates proposal such that it was favorably commented on in the fiftieth anniversary reporting, there are two notable aspects to the Rates-themed narrative arcs in this period. First, customers either warned BPA against the rate increase or considered leaving BPA altogether. In particular, the Snohomish County Public Utility District (PUD) figured prominently in BPA customers’ pushback on the rates. Snohomish PUD continued to play a significant role as a major player among BPA customers throughout the decade and the rates issue was a constant point of contention. It must also be noted that the Snohomish PUD articles were driven
by the Washington Newspapers (there was no mention about rates in *The Oregonian* articles from this period). However, *The Oregonian* included articles referencing another significant customer – Clark County PUD – which expressed concern about BPA’s surplus power sales and the impact on PUD rates. As well, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* devoted an article to a collection of PUDs and others who hired consultants to explore finding alternatives to purchasing power from BPA (Lange, L. 1987, August 19, D3). Finally, the Northwest Congressional delegation was another actor regarding BPA rates, albeit not as significant in reporting. A short (93 words) *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* article references DeFazio and Rep. John Miller of Washington writing a letter to Jura asking BPA to reconsider the level of the rate increase.

The second notable aspect of the narrative arc within the Rates theme is that Hardy figured prominently in both *The Seattle Times* and *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* articles. This was due in large part to his position as Seattle City Light’s superintendent in the years before moving into the BPA administrator position. However, Hardy figured in fifteen articles over the Stability Years (on rates as well as energy conservation and the California intertie). The articles indicate that even prior to his role at BPA, Hardy’s voice and role in the Northwest energy sector and – importantly – his stance on challenges facing BPA in this period figured prominently in Washington state, if not the entire Northwest region.
Rates were also drivers within the California Intertie narrative, which tracked BPA’s plan limiting Northwest utilities’ ability to use the Intertie for sales into California. Interestingly, only the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* included editorials on the Intertie and BPA’s plans for its use, but they were supportive of BPA’s approach. Hardy not only figured prominently in the newspaper articles of this period, but he also figured in two editorials and an opinion piece regarding the California Intertie and potential power swaps between California and Northwest utilities utilizing the intertie. However, the primary driver of editorials was not the California Intertie, but – as with articles in this period – BPA’s rate proposals. Over a quarter of the editorials (six of twenty-three) discussed rates. Also, as with the articles, there was a clear call for BPA to reduce the initial proposed rate increases and praise for BPA’s efforts to reduce costs and keep rate increases reasonable. Taken together, the articles and editorials on rates indicate the salience of the issue within the Northwest and further emphasize that the Rates theme of narrative arcs was a key aspect of BPA’s position in the Stability Years. It also indicates that rates were always of concern across the region, but that (as will be shown below) managing rates was a major challenge BPA would continue to face throughout the decade.

While rates played the major role in narrative arcs of the Stability Years, the newspapers also devoted space to the role BPA has a governance actor. In the Jura years, a single editorial from *The Oregonian* provided significant relevance for my study.
as it directly implicated the Solidarity governance mode. Simply titled “BPA needs Client Advice,” the editorial noted BPA had committed to “hold annual public forums, beginning this month, to allow its retail customers and other interested groups to influence the agency’s cost-control strategies and power-marketing policies” (Editorial Board, 1988, January 5, B08). The editorial, while fairly short (389 words), called the effort “unprecedented and laudatory,” a clear sign of The Oregonian’s support for “a federal agency to demonstrate accountability and openness.” The editorial is a direct narrative response to an action by BPA (as touted in the 1988 Annual Report) that indicated both BPA’s shift toward the Solidarity governance mode and the importance of that shift to The Oregonian’s editors. Notably, however, neither of the Washington newspapers commented on the shift to greater direct public engagement.

In addition to the newspaper editorial boards opining on BPA’s governance activities, they also devoted some space to Administrator Jura himself. Unsurprisingly, opinions on Jura were clustered in early 1989, as the new Bush Administration began. All three newspapers expressed strong support for Jura’s reappointment variously referring to Jura as “a skillful negotiator and conciliator” (The Editorial Board, 1989, February 26, E02), “a steady presence” (The Editorial Board, 1989, February 11, A17), and “a bright, energetic, thoughtful administrator” (The Editorial Board, 1989, February 5, F2). Moreover, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer included a separate opinion article noting the Northwest Congressional delegation’s unwavering support for Jura’s re-
appointment and observed “running the BPA may be the most critical public task in the Pacific Northwest” (Scates, S. 1989, February 7, A6). The Congressional delegation may have had greater sway than the editorials themselves, however, it was clear that Jura would continue in his role. “There is good news for the Pacific Northwest in Energy Secretary Designate James Watkins’ comment that he does not intend to replace James J. Jura as head of the Bonneville Power Administration” (The Editorial Board, 1989, February 26, p. E02).

In expressing support for Jura, the three editorial boards noted the same challenges that were evident in the narrative arcs described above: rates and debt (but at least one also noted the ‘furniture-gate’ issue). They also took note of key executive leadership aspects Jura utilized including increased transparency in decision-making, and his negotiation skills with varied stakeholders (customers, conservationists and others). Notably, while the editorials were all published in the early part of the Bush administration, they do not appear to have been new opinions. Nearly two years prior, in 1987, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer also opined on Jura’s competency while observing the challenges he faced. “He may be one of the best public servants in the Pacific Northwest, which is good for us because Jim Jura certainly has one of the toughest jobs” (Scates, S. 1987, August 6, A14). Scates goes on in the column to recount the issues of rates, debt, and the California Intertie, though the WPPSS issue is notably absent. Again, while focusing on Jura’s capabilities as administrator, all of the columns and
editorials crystalized the key issues for the region in this timeframe – and the salmon stocks have yet to play a significant role. As a final note – and as will be explored in the Transition Years section – in spite of the widespread support, Jura’s tenure lasted only two years in the Bush administration.

Finally, and importantly, there was limited coverage of impending salmon stock issues. In terms of both comparative number of articles and focus, the emerging Salmon-themed narrative was in its earliest stages. However, a key article appeared in The Oregonian in July of 1988 on the front page. In the article, the newspaper called out the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers’ (USACE) operation of the Columbia River dams and their increasingly negative impact on salmon migration. There was an associated narrative arc regarding BPA’s fish plan, which included limiting power sales and penalizing construction of new hydroelectric dams by limiting sales of that power outside the region using the California Intertie. However, the major articles were squarely aimed at the USACE, including “questioning whether the corps should supervise any longer the annual downstream migration of the Columbia River system’s [salmon stocks]” (Koberstein, P. 1988, July 3, A01). Both articles and editorials, spanning 1988 and 1989, tracked the narrative of pressure on the USACE to increase water spills to protect juvenile salmon migration downstream. BPA, while not at the center of the issue, was mentioned as an important player in arriving at a plan to help fish migration. “Groups endorsing the agreement include the Northwest Planning Council, Bonneville

"
Power Administration, public and private utilities, Indian tribes, state and federal fisheries agencies, and conservation groups” (Koberstein, P. 1989, February 9, B01). The list of actors in the BPA Governance Ecosystem supporting the plan, along with BPA, is a clear instance of consensus around the region exerting pressure on an agency, in this case, the USACE (which also ultimately agreed to the plan). Moreover, they are an indicator of the importance of the Networks governance mode that BPA would utilize as this particular challenge materialized and took on paramount importance for the region. Not only the USACE, but other BPA Federal partners were to become key figures in the Salmon-themed narrative arcs, but the other regional actors noted above cannot be underestimated in their influence. As will be seen in the Transition Years, the Salmon theme even overtook (and impacted) the narrative arcs within the Rates theme.

*Stability Years Summary.*

The Stability Years provided a good baseline and framing of the three newspapers’ perspectives on BPA and its administrator. Moreover, this timeframe introduced key individuals (Hatfield, DeFazio, and Hardy) and entities (Snohomish PUD, and WPPSS) that were an integral part of the narrative arcs depicted in newspaper coverage. For the most part, both articles and editorials were supportive of the agency’s actions. In particular, measures to limit rate increases as well as navigating the challenges of the WPPSS debt, and the largely appreciative coverage of BPA’s fiftieth anniversary indicate the first years of BPA’s transformational decade were stable and
show a baseline for how the agency functioned, the positionality of Jura and major figures in the region, as well as hinting at the challenges to come.

The major narrative arcs aligned within the four thematic categories, but it is significant that there was comparatively less in the way of Salmon-themed narratives. Although the issue of the Columbia River dams’ negative impact on fish populations garnered coverage, the narrative arc had yet to be fully developed. Instead, the emphasis throughout the Stability Years was on Rates, Operations and Politics. Each of these themes had attention devoted to it throughout the timeframe. Within the Operations theme, both BPA’s debt (in the WPPSS articles) and cost control were foremost. As well, the newspapers served as a watchdog when there was a perception – as in furniture-gate – of waste or inappropriate spending. The Politics theme was driven in part by the transition of Presidential administrations. This emphasis is unsurprising given the new Secretary of Energy, the new Congress, and the importance to the region of the BPA administrator position. Yet the Rates theme overshadowed all others and in fact, both the Operations and Politics themes played into the Rates narrative. Opinions of Jura from the Northwest Congressional Delegation and the newspapers themselves were supportive because of his management of rates. Similarly, Jura’s work on cost control and management of the WPPSS debt obligations necessarily impacted BPA rates. The Stability Years as an initial timeframe therefore allowed for
tracking any shifts in emphasis among the narrative arc themes in the subsequent narrative timeframes.

With the exception of the furniture-gate narrative, the narrative arcs aligned with the annual reports from this timeframe as well. Of course, the narrative arcs indicated the back and forth (especially with the rates narrative) of a more ‘real-time’ report of activities, whereas the annual reports were a retrospective that emphasized accomplishments and successes each year. However, it is significant that the perspective of the newspapers did not differ significantly from BPA’s perspective. Moreover, the shifts in governance modes examined in Chapter 4 for 1987 through 1989 were also aligned between the newspaper perspectives and the annual reports. As noted previously, the shift to public meetings, an indicator of the Solidarity governance mode, was called out in the annual reports and viewed favorably by the newspapers. Less overt, but no less important, the Markets governance mode was in full display in the narratives on rate increases potentially driving BPA customers to look elsewhere. More significantly, BPA responded in kind through the Markets governance mode by ensuring it remained sufficiently competitive to retain those customers. Finally, the newspapers alluded to the Networks governance mode in their editorials in support of Jura, emphasizing his ability to partner with the broad range of stakeholders in the region, including customers, conservationists and others. This alignment between BPA and the newspapers reinforced the stability of the early years in the BPA’s
transformative decade. As will be shown in the subsequent sections of this chapter, the newspapers’ narratives began to diverge from BPA’s annual reports as the challenges facing the agency and the region became more pronounced in the following years.

**The Transition Years: from Jura to Hardy**

The Transition Years timeframe (1990 to 1992) is marked by two elements. First, it is the transition period between Jura and Hardy as administrators. Second, it is marked by the cultural themes of the annual reports for each of the three years. Notably, the themes of the annual reports were not reflective of newspaper coverage of BPA over this timeframe. Over the three-year period, there was a noticeable (roughly 16%) increase in coverage of BPA. Along with the increase in coverage, the mix of narrative theme changed substantially. Table 31 shows the counts of articles and editorials according to narrative arc theme.

**Table 31. Thematic Counts of Articles and Editorials in the Transition Years.**

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<th>SALMON</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>51.5%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the Stability Years, the Salmon theme accounted for nearly half of all material in the newspapers. This is particularly significant given the focus on BPA rates in the prior timeframe. The increased focus is attributable to the listing under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) of one wild salmon run and the convening of Hatfield’s Salmon Summit in 1991. There was a roughly equivalent increase in both articles and editorials indicating that the editorial boards were eager to weigh in on the issues as well as provide space for opinion pieces throughout the narrative arc. It should also be noted that, within the Salmon-themed narrative arcs, most coverage took place in 1990 and early 1991 with the Salmon Summit itself taking place in January of 1991.

While the Salmon theme became prominent in the Transition years, the Rates theme continued in relevance to the region with the second-greatest number of articles and editorials. The continuing concerns in the region over BPA rates during this period was compounded by the salmon stocks issue as the increasing costs for fish mitigation would negatively impact BPA’s rates. Because the Rates and Salmon themes were so closely intertwined, the Rates-themed material, especially editorials, could be placed in either category, however, in categorizing material, the primary driver of the article or editorial in most cases was the salmon stock collapse, ESA listing, and Salmon Summit. That is not to suggest that fish mitigation was the only driver of rates coverage. Years of drought in the Northwest, increased demand for electric power or load, as well as pressure on BPA regarding debt repayment all influenced the Rates-themed narratives.

Both the Operations theme and the Politics theme were less salient in the Transition years than the Stability years. The few articles and editorials categorized as Operations-themed included continuing, but limited, coverage of the WPPSS nuclear
plants. Otherwise, there was a focus on power resources such as natural gas and energy conservation as alternatives to hydroelectric in order to meet the increasing power needs of the region. Somewhat surprisingly, given the change in administrators, the Politics-themed material was fairly low. However, the counts are not necessarily reflective of salience. In this instance, as further examined below, the extremely short timeframe of the transition (from July to September of 1991) likely impacted the coverage. However, the short timeframe for a significant event such as a new BPA administrator is significant itself. With these narrative arcs in mind, the focus in the Transition Years was on the Salmon summit and the transition from Jura to Hardy. These two narrative arcs significantly outweighed other narratives in the timeframe and were also the setting for the following time period, the Transformation Years.

While the two major narratives from 1990 to 1992 were focused on Hatfield’s Salmon Summit and the rapid change of Administrators from Jura to Hardy, there were other continuing narratives with both rates and debt as well. Once again, the three themes of Rates, Operations, and Politics were closely intertwined. Interestingly, as part of the Bush administration’s continuing efforts to force a reduction in BPA debt by requiring the agency to drastically increase rates, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also became more of an overt actor in the BPA governance ecosystem. The Oregonian called out OMB program associate director Bob Grady who worked with BPA and Northwest lawmakers to reduce rate increases proposed in the Bush budget. The
rates increase was intended to pay for an attendant increase in the interest rates BPA would pay on its federal loans. Led by Hatfield, the Northwest delegations had long been protecting BPA’s low loan rates.

Notably, while the lower rate increase was first reported in October of 1991, the debt narrative continued well into early 1992. It was partially resolved by Congress (again, led by Hatfield) passing a bill to allow BPA direct funding of USACE and Bureau of Reclamation operations. Prior to that, funding had to go through the regular appropriations process and OMB would often not fully fund hydropower operations. In spite of this change, an editorial in *The Oregonian* called BPA’s debt “an Albatross” (The Editorial Board, 1992, March 6, D06). The editorial went on to argue against the Bush administration’s continued attempts to restructure BPA’s debt by increasing interest payments when building the electric transmission system and the hydropower dams.

The rates narrative continued throughout the Transition Years. With rates proposals going as high as 20 percent being driven by both the debt issue and fish mitigation plans, the narrative showed the constant tension among operational debt burdens, increasing costs for salmon mitigation, and the rates impacts on customers.

Also tied to both the Rates and Operations themes, were minor narratives on BPA’s search for additional power resources. Two major power resources were energy conservation and natural gas power plants. Jura was a strong proponent of maximizing energy conservation to ease rates and operational pressures. “‘We need to prove that
conservation is a reliable energy source” (Klahn, J. 1991, March 27, F2, quoting Jura).

He was somewhat successful with customers, as shown in an article about Puget Sound Energy’s CEO “pushing conservation with a vengeance” (Gwinn, M. 1991, June 23, B6).

In addition to Jura, the Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC) pushed for “its innovative electricity conservation plan” (Koberstein, P. 1991, February 1, C07). The 10-year plan ultimately approved by NPPC and implemented by BPA brought together a broad network of customer utilities in public engagement, indicating both the Networks and Solidarity governance modes in developing the strategy.

The natural gas narrative initially arose as part of the energy conservation push toward additional alternative energy resources. However, advocating for greater use of natural gas, referred to as ‘fuel switching,’ succumbed to both external pressure and the transition in administrators. “BPA’s electric utility customers were furious when Bonneville, under former administrator Jim Jura attempted to study potential benefits of switching customers to natural gas” (Weiland Nogaki, S. 1992, April 2, A1). The article goes on to describe Hardy changing course. “Hardy says he wasn’t in a position to push fuel switching in the face of strong opposition from Bonneville’s utility customers, especially since Bonneville already was pushing conservation, another revenue loser for utilities” (Weiland Nogaki, S. 1992, April 2, A1). These two relatively short narrative arcs are strong indicators of both the Rates theme’s importance to BPA as well as the way in which BPA necessarily navigated its relationship with its customers. BPA was able to
push for greater energy conservation, but not a move to natural gas because of its customers. As well, it indicates the different approaches to issues taken by Jura and Hardy, perhaps in part due to Hardy being early in his tenure at the time of the issue, whereas Jura had been more willing to spend political capital due to his longer tenure. As will be further explored below, however, the fact that Jura left the agency shortly after his push towards natural gas may also have been a caution to Hardy as he embarked on his tenure.

Another minor narrative arc was notable because it follows the limited use by BPA of the Hierarchy governance mode. While only noted in passing in the 1991 Annual Report and the 1992 Annual Report, there were three articles (one from each of the three newspapers) on salmon poaching enforcement activities. Funded to the tune of nearly $10 million by BPA, the program would allow state agencies to “begin an intensive long-term dragnet to stop illegal fishing” (Baker, D. 1991, September 12, D06). Also of note was the Seattle Post-Intelligencer’s editorial “BPA Beefs Up Salmon Police” (The Editorial Board, 1991, September 16, A9), commending the agency for its actions. Finally, while The Oregonian and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported on the announcement of the anti-poaching enforcement efforts, only The Seattle Times (a year and a half later) reported on its efforts and the methods used, including high tech systems for finding poachers on the river. Salmon anti-poaching references were one of only two instances of the Hierarchy governance mode from the annual reports, which
only noted the funding in passing. Newspaper coverage expanded on the details of the program but did not indicate any measure of success in using enforcement as a tool for mitigating the depletion of salmon stocks in the Columbia River. While the newspaper coverage is a good example of narratives associated with new ways to mitigate impacts to fish, it appears the interest was driven more by the unusual method rather than any direct success the programs may have enjoyed. As will be shown in the next section, the salmon issue quickly became the central concern across the region for BPA and its governance ecosystem.

*The Salmon Summit.*

Newspaper coverage of salmon issues substantially increased during the Transition Years timeframe, with Hatfield’s Salmon Summit being the centerpiece of the narrative arc. The Salmon Summit began as a task force convened by Hatfield in 1990 and involved federal agencies, northwest governments and tribes, as well as regional industry and environmental stakeholders to study continuing salmon run declines and develop a recovery plan (Koberstein, P. 1990, November 1, D01). However, the narrative arc consisted of three stages: the collapse of salmon stock and the eventual ESA listing; the Salmon Summit and salmon recovery plans presented; and the outcome of the summit as well as the ongoing efforts to implement the recovery plans.

The first indication of a possible ESA listing appeared in late April of 1990 where the USACE suggested that listing salmon runs, with the associated requirements for
increased water flows, would not be possible on the Snake River dams because the
dams had widened the riverbed (Associated Press, 1990, April 29, B2). A short month
later, in an extensive front-page article, the headline sums up the Salmon theme
narrative arc: “Battle Lines Form Over Wild Salmon’s Future (Koberstein, P. 1990, May
27, A01). The article goes on to report that both scientific and environmental
stakeholders, led by Oregon Trout, would petition to have two wild salmon stocks listed
under the ESA. Almost immediately, key individuals and stakeholder groups positioned
themselves regarding both the potential listing and plans for recovery, just as was
suggested by the ‘Battle Lines’ headline. Hatfield warned that “listing salmon runs as
endangered could cause an ‘economic and social tidal wave’ in the Northwest”
(Koberstein, P. 1990, July 1, C01) and urged for quick development of recovery plans. As
well, Senator Bob Packwood (along with Hatfield) scheduled field hearings on the issue
and possible recovery plans in Portland, St. Helens, and The Dalles. While BPA
participated in the hearings, it is notable that BPA did not, itself, object to the possible
ESA listing. Sharon Blair, speaking for BPA, indicated that “BPA did not oppose the
petition. ‘Absolutely not,’ she said, noting that the BPA has spent $1 billion in the past
10 years to restore habitats and develop hatcheries” (Laatz, J. 1990, May 31, B04). BPA,
the Bureau of Reclamation, and the USACE were all major participants in the Hatfield-
Packwood hearings, along with tribal representatives, state public utility commission
members, and northwest utilities. As a clear indicator of the Networks governance
mode, Jura summed up the need for collaboration to solve the crisis. “‘We aim to get all
the competing interests around one table, review the [Columbia River] system, and adjust the [fish recovery] allocations’” (Scates, S. 1990, July 15, D1, quoting Jura). The field hearings set the stage for Hatfield’s Salmon Summit, which would convene early the following year.

The Hatfield-Packwood hearings themselves drove initial development of plans for salmon recovery as well as driving key stakeholders’ positions on salmon, salmon recovery plans, and even the ESA. Between the hearings in July and Hatfield convening his task force in November, there were five editorials on the issues. Both the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and The Oregonian weighed in, though The Seattle Times editorial board remained silent. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer columnists and editorials focused on the potential impacts of any ESA listing on industry and the Northwest economy. As well, the newspaper called out political efforts to change the ESA noting that industry had “a brilliant and formidable advocate in the Senate, Slade Gorton, R-Wash., who has earned the wrath of environmentalists by suggesting the law should be changed” (Scates, S. 1990, August 2, A10). The Seattle Post-Intelligencer focused on the complexities of managing the Columbia, stating flatly “The region needs power, it needs food, and it needs fish” (The Editorial Board, 1990, August 14, A8). In contrast, The Oregonian editorial board advocated for data-driven outcomes in BPA’s fish programs, exhorting the region to “Stop Bickering Over Fish” (The Editorial Board, 1990, August 19,
In addition to the opinion pieces, all three newspapers provided coverage on the scientific studies underway and proposed salmon plans, as well as the plans’ impacts on available power and rates. The articles indicate an active and contentious narrative of stakeholders’ interactions including the senate hearings, additional state hearings, meetings among the federal agencies on salmon plans, and environmental groups proposing their own salmon plans. As well, the salmon issue arrived in the courthouse with both *The Oregonian* and the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* reporting that environmental groups filed lawsuits over BPA’s pact with B.C. Hydro “to double the amount of water the two agencies manage cooperatively from the Mica dam reservoir” (Kiyomura, October 5, 1990. *The Oregonian*, C04). In addition, *The Seattle Times* reported on the firm denial from federal agencies of any prospect that dams would be removed, even in light of a salmon listing by the ESA. “Power-industry officials and the Army Corps of Engineers said . . . the proposals were ridiculous” (Staff Reports, 1990, October 14, B2).

These activities on the Northwest salmon stocks culminated in front page reporting of Hatfield’s call “for a summit on the seagoing fish as reports cite drastically reduced wild runs” (Koberstein, P. 1990, October 28, A01). Hatfield convened a task force of some thirty members of state governments, tribal, industry and environmental leaders. While none of the articles over the course of the Salmon Summit meetings
directly profiled the task force, numerous members were noted (and quoted) in the various articles. However, at least some of the task force member and stakeholders were identified in the first major article on Salmon Summit meetings. Table 32 shows a non-exhaustive list of task force members and affiliations as reported in the newspapers. While not a complete list, the task force members were those either quoted or referred to in newspaper coverage over the course of the Salmon Summit.

Table 32. Salmon Summit Participants as Reported in Newspapers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK FORCE MEMBER/AFFILIATION*</th>
<th>CITATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large industrial users – BPA direct power customers</td>
<td>Koberstein, P. 1990 November 1, D01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Columbia River public utility districts</td>
<td>Lange, L. 1990, November 22, F1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Arndt, fish biologist, USACE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Bakke, executive director of Oregon Trout</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Ted Bottinger, a former Washington state senator serving as the Northwest Power Planning Council’s alternate</td>
<td>Danks, H. 1990, November 16, E05.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Braun, a Portland attorney representing Oregon Trout</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy Brunelle, special assistant to Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Chaney, a spokesman for Idaho Steelhead and Salmon Unlimited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angus Duncan, Oregon member of the Northwest Power Planning Council</td>
<td>Koberstein, P. 1990 November 1, D01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Haughan, special assistant to the U.S. Forest Service’s regional director on fishery issues.</td>
<td>Koberstein, P. 1990 November 1, D01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Koss, Washington Department of Fisheries</td>
<td>Lange, L. 1990, November 22, F1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don McIsaac, salmon program manager for the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife</td>
<td>Koberstein, P. 1990 December 18, C06.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Pedde, assistant regional director of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation</td>
<td>Danks, H. 1990, November 16, E05.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hatfield charged the task force with finding a means “to avoid the listing of rare salmon stocks without placing an economic burden on the region” (Koberstein, P. 1990 November 1, D01). The task force was further divided into subcommittees, each given a specific aspect of the issue: “fish passage through dams and reservoirs; habitat and fish production; harvest; economic, operational and environmental issues; and legal issues” (Koberstein, P. 1990 November 1, D01). The five components would then be crafted into a management plan to be submitted to the National Marine Fisheries Service by its deadline of February 15, 1991.

The first meetings were October 30th and 31st and had little substantive movement other than that the “committee agrees the fish need a minimum amount of water but doesn’t know where it will come from” (Koberstein, P. 1990 November 1, D01). Additional meetings took place throughout November and December in Portland; Pasco, Washington; and Boise, Idaho, and were all challenging. As an example, the summit meetings in Boise, “laid bare long-forgotten regional contentions over water”
and “the idea that Idaho irrigators might lose water to fish has stirred resentment” (Koberstein, P. 1990 December 30, D01). Notably, just a week prior to the December meetings, the lawsuit challenging BPA’s water sharing agreement was appealed to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, raising the stakes for all parties. Significantly, the organizations that filed the lawsuit – Oregon Trout, Idaho Steelhead and Salmon Unlimited – were all members of the Salmon Summit. “But the suit is really the brainchild of Ed Chaney [of Idaho Steelhead and Salmon Unlimited, who] said it’s time the issue is resolved so fish can get real help without further delay” (Lange, L. 1990, December 10, A1). As shown further below, the court proceedings likely impacted the reaction to proposed plans at the Salmon Summit meetings.

It is little surprise that by the final originally scheduled meeting in late January, no consensus had yet been achieved. An additional meeting was then scheduled for February 4th, just ten days before the NMFS deadline. The result of that meeting was that it caused participants to come closer to agreeing on an accord on augmenting flows along the Snake River, “to drop reservoir levels sharply . . . or to reconstruct dams so they pass fish more effectively” (Koberstein, P. 1991, February 6, C03). Ultimately, however, the Salmon Summit missed its initial target for an agreed-upon plan. The Salmon Summit meetings continued to take place through March and even as late as August of 1991, before essentially disbanding without bringing “a united position to the Northwest Power Planning Council for possible enactment as part of its salmon-recovery
program” so that the NMFS might prevent listing salmon stocks under the ESA (Koberstein, P. 1991, August 8, A19).

Throughout the sequence of meetings, the different stakeholders brought proposals to mitigate the impacts of hydropower operations. “Proposals to restore runs have included curtailed hydroelectric production, reduced water allocations to irrigators and diminished fish harvests for sportsmen, commercial gill-netters and Indians” (Koberstein, P. 1990, October 28, A01). BPA’s plans, revised several times over the year, were a particular focus of the meetings, but most parties to the Salmon Summit presented plans at different times. The parties noted in newspapers as presenting plans in one form or another included the Bureau of Reclamation and the State of Idaho (though neither Washington nor Oregon submitted plans), as well as the coalition of Conservation Groups (Idaho Salmon and Steelhead unlimited among them).

The initial plans that were offered received strong criticism from opposing interests. In the early January meetings, mediators “hired to resolve disputes among interest groups” then presented broad solutions from the various plan (Koberstein, P. 1991, January 8, B03). Andy Brunelle, Governor Andrus’ representative noted “the mediators had done a good job distributing ‘pain’ among the various groups. ‘But by noon tomorrow,’ he said, ‘it will be so full of arrows it will look like a porcupine’” (Koberstein, P. 1991, January 8, B03). Brunelle’s comments were notable both because it highlighted the tensions among the Salmon Summit Stakeholders but also due to his
role as Andrus’ representative. As the article notes, Andrus sent a letter to Hatfield accusing BPA and the Army Corps of Engineers of offering no substantive changes to hydropower operations.

Moreover, even while the state of Idaho had previously offered a plan to the Salmon Summit, newspapers focused attention on a revised plan presented by Andrus at the later January meetings. Significantly, Andrus’ plan emphasized an element that was a major narrative in the Stability Years previously discussed. He called for BPA to “cut off the sale of surplus power to California during the salmon’s spring migration” and to send a message to “Californians who use Columbia River hydropower to run their hot tubs and air conditioners: ‘Drop dead’” (Koberstein, P. 1991, January 23, B03).

Again, the rhetoric is an indicator of the strong opinions and conflicting interests among the parties to the Salmon Summit. While BPA appears to have been measured in its interactions through the Salmon Summit (and gave no indication of these challenges in its annual reports), the agency’s participation in this Network governance mode effort shows the complexities involved in the salmon crisis.

Despite these initial efforts, the Salmon Summit was unsuccessful in avoiding the ESA listing. As early as February of 1991, even while the Salmon Summit meetings continued, both The Oregonian and The Seattle Times reported on the high likelihood of multiple listings. The front page of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer in March stated “[t]he salmon, victim of the Northwest’s extraordinary development, is about to exact some
compensation” (Lange, L. and Taylor, R. 1991, March 4, A1). The predictions came true just over a year after the Salmon Summit first convened. Both The Oregonian and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer ran front page articles November 14 on the listing. “The National Marine Fisheries Service will list the Snake River sockeye salmon as an endangered species” (Ulrich, R. 1991, November 14, A01). While The Seattle Times did not include an article on the listing itself, only the day before, the newspaper had referenced the likelihood of the listing in an article on the salmon plan being considered by the NPPC.

With more listings occurring the following spring, the salmon listing narrative arc reached an inflection point. As will be seen in the section on the Transformation Years, the multiple ESA listings had a significant impact on BPA’s operations. Moreover, an article and an editorial called out BPA for hosting meetings after the listings with some stakeholders of the now disbanded Salmon Summit, but without environmental groups. “[T]he meetings were attended by representatives of the governors of Oregon and Washington, the BPA, the Northwest Power Planning Council, Indian tribes and the power industry” (Koberstein, P. 1992, March 12, B03). Notably absent were representatives of organizations such as Save Our Wild Salmon, or of Governor Andrus and Idaho. The meetings brought a strong rebuke from The Oregonian editorial board, starkly titled “Knock Off Secret Meetings” and further stating BPA “should go back to its policy of openess that earned the agency national recognition from environmental
groups and the public just two years ago” (The Editorial Board, 1992b, March 15, p. P02). The drastic change from openness and public involvement to secret meetings of what was termed the “shadow summiteers” (Koberstein, P. 1992, March 12, B03) may have been driven by the ESA listings, but also may as easily have been the result of the shift from Jura to Hardy as administrator, a major narrative arc to which I now turn.

The Rapid Change in Administrators.

In spite of the extensive coverage of salmon issues by all three newspapers in the Transition Years, of possibly greater importance was the short but intense narrative arc of Jura leaving as BPA Administrator and Hardy beginning his tenure at the agency. First appearing at the end of July in all three newspapers, came the announcement that Jura “who was named BPA administrator in 1986, will step down Sept. 3 to become general manager of Associated Electric Cooperative Inc. in Springfield, Mo.” (Bella, R. 1991, July 25, C01). It is notable that the announcement came while Salmon Summit meetings continued, though none of the newspapers referenced the ongoing talks in their coverage. Instead, reporting and editorials turned immediately to his possible successors, aligning with the Politics theme.

Within two weeks of the announcement both Washington newspapers ran articles on potential candidates to replace Jura. The Seattle Times ran a headline indicating Washington Senator Slade Gorton favored Seattle mediation specialist James Waldo. “He has more proven experience than anyone in the Northwest at bringing
people of divergent interests together,’ said Jay Vender Stoep, Gorton’s top aide” (Schaeffer, D. 1991, August 1, B6). Other candidates noted in the coverage included Bill Clagett, the Western Area Power Administration’s chief and Jack Roberston of BPA (Hatfield’s choice), who stepped in as interim administrator after Jura departed. Also of note was a blurb in *The Seattle Times* indicating that J. Michael Davis, an assistant secretary for the Department of Energy, charged with interviewing candidates, was considering the position for himself. “[T]here’s been speculation that Davis himself might want the job and, in fact, he was quoted as saying he’s ‘interested in the job’” (Larsen, R. W. 1991, August 28, A6). The columnist goes on to argue such a move would be problematic and an image issue for DOE. Davis’s interviews of candidates also occurred within the context of past selections. “Traditionally, the director [sic] of the BPA is chosen in turn by senators from Idaho, Oregon, and Washington” (Schaeffer, D. 1991, August 1, B6). Under that premise, Gorton’s choice of Waldo would be assumed. However, in pushing for Robertson, Hatfield indicated that the selection of Jura was “not because he was an Oregonian but because the agency needed an experienced career official at its helm” (Schaeffer, D. 1991, August 1, B6). The argument suggests the tension between a traditionally political selection and the competing interest of direct experience given the challenges facing the agency and seen in the Salmon Summit narrative.
All three newspaper editorial boards opined over the next month on the three leading candidates, each supporting a different contender; *The Seattle Times* argued for Waldo; the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* supported Hardy; *The Oregonian* favored Roberston. It is unsurprising that the respective newspapers would come out for native sons. Somewhat ironically, each newspaper made a similar argument for their favored candidate, citing “knotty policy issues and daunting conflicts” (The Editorial Board. 1991, September 1, A20); “issues facing BPA into the next century” (The Editorial Board, 1991, August 20, C08); and “difficulties [that] will grow in the next several years” (The Editorial Board, 1991, August 5, A5). The opinions were a strong acknowledgement of BPA’s position in the region, the challenges the agency faced, and – importantly – the role of its executive in leading the agency and the region in facing those challenges.

With only two months between Jura’s announced departure and Hardy’s selection (and a scant month later for his swearing in), the urgency of a quick selection was clear. By September 20, all three newspapers reported Hardy was the top contender. The next day, front page articles in both the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* and *The Seattle Times* confirmed Hardy’s selection. Interestingly, *The Oregonian* did not cover the announcement of Hardy’s selection, only the actual swearing-in ceremony. Moreover, unlike both *The Seattle Times* and *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, who applauded the selection in editorials, *The Oregonian* remained silent. The ceremony coverage highlighted Hardy’s remarks in the Operations theme – the Trojan Nuclear plant – with a
short blurb on his additional priorities. “[Hardy] said his top priorities as BPA administrator will include conservation of power and increased transmission, along with protection of natural resources – including threatened salmon species. . . he also wants to bring more cultural diversity to the BPA work force” (Baker, D. 1991, October 23, C06). Hardy’s comments set the tone for the beginning of his tenure focusing on issues falling within the Operations and Salmon themes. Notably, given the prevalence of the Rates theme over time (and Hardy’s own comments on rates issues as Seattle City Light superintendent) his priorities belied what was to become a major factor in his leadership of the agency in the Transformation timeframe.

There was a significant post-script to the Transition timeframe after Hardy took his position as BPA administrator. While the initial reporting on Jura’s departure simply noted he was moving to a new job in Missouri, articles in both The Oregonian and Seattle Post-Intelligencer later indicated that Jura was, in fact, forced out. Documents obtained by the newspapers suggested that “Jura resigned as agency head after politicians pushed him to rescind controversial policies on global warming” (Koberstein, P. 1992, January 20, B01). While not showing a cause and effect (and noting that Jura did not comment on the articles), the Seattle Post-Intelligencer made the direct connection between the two events. DOE Secretary Watkins received a letter from three coal-producing states’ senators regarding Jura’s proposal penalizing coal-fired plants for carbon dioxide emissions. “Watkins summoned Jura to Washington, D.C. By
June 3 Jura had dropped his proposal, and a month later he resigned […] Jura’s proposal was scrapped shortly after Randy Hardy took over as BPA chief in October” (Associated Press. 1992, January 21, p. C8). While the Salmon theme was a significant and extended part of the narratives in the Transition Years, both the rapid move from Jura to Hardy as administrator and the additional reporting on reasons for Jura’s departure, show how the Politics theme was always intertwined with any narrative. The political actors in the BPA Governance Ecosystem were a constant presence and pressure on Watkins as well as Jura. They are indicators of how wide and far-reaching any governance ecosystem can be, even a regional agency, and the challenges governance ecosystems bring to executive leadership.

Transition Years Summary.

The Transition Years fully exposed the challenges hinted at in the Stability Years. These same challenges also brought to light additional individual and organizational actors in the BPA Governance Ecosystem. As evidenced in the newspaper reporting, BPA was navigating complex issues around the salmon stocks collapse and potential ESA listing but was not always – or even necessarily – the key actor. As seen in the presentation of salmon recovery plans to the Salmon Summit task force members, BPA’s plan was just one of several and was by no means the assumed plan to be adopted. The reports and editorials revealed stakeholders and interests in opposition to one another, such as with Gov. Andrus’ plan. As well, the opposition extended beyond policy and into
governing processes as shown in the reaction by both stakeholders and even newspaper editorial boards to closed door meeting between BPA and specific stakeholders.

The Transition Years also saw the limits of BPA’s own influence and autonomy (i.e., in the sense that BPA could act alone to suit its own interests). BPA was subject to not just influence, but direction from other actors. Jura’s resignation and the revelation some months later that he may have been pressured to resign indicates that although BPA was a major regional player, it still answered to Washington D.C. and the DOE Secretary. In turn, the reporting was reflective of the extended network of influences by way of senators from outside the region. Both the Salmon Summit and Jura’s departure highlight the complexity of the BPA Governance Ecosystem and emphasize that, while BPA was the central actor for the purposes of my study, the agency was itself subject to other actors and influences.

The Salmon and Politics Themes were obviously at the forefront of reporting during this timeframe and were closely intertwined given the competing interests among Northwest stakeholders participating in the Salmon Summit. As well, the departure of Jura and coverage of the search for his replacement was a narrative that was almost exclusively one within the Politics theme. It is also of some note that Hardy’s comments at his swearing in ceremony focused almost exclusively on his operational plans rather than the more sensitive topics associated with the Salmon or Politics themes. As with the Stability Years, the Rates theme was ever-present, but in
the Transition Years they were tied almost entirely to implications that the salmon recovery plans would have to BPA rates. Similarly, the Operations theme was a backdrop, but was not the focus of the major narratives.

While unsurprising, given the general tone in the annual reports, the stark difference between the 1990 through 1992 annual reports’ largely positive, culturally-focused narratives and the newspaper reporting on both the Salmon Summit and the change in administrators was notable. As discussed in Chapter 4, the three annual reports used themes of “Children of Tomorrow (1990), “Seasons of the River” (1991), and “Keepers of the Earth” (1992). While perhaps not overtly connected to the salmon crisis, they suggest a sensitivity to the region’s focus in this timeframe. The annual reports included material on both the Salmon Summit and the Jura/Hardy transition but unsurprisingly revealed neither the contentiousness of the Salmon Summit nor any reasons for Jura’s departure and Hardy’s selection. As to the latter, BPA would of course, not opine on its own administrator, though Hardy’s administrator’s letter acknowledged with gratitude Jura’s aid in writing the annual Report in spite of having already left for Missouri.

What is of greater note than the carefully neutral self-narrative of the annual reports is that the newspapers themselves took no note of the annual reports. There is no coverage of the three annual reports from the Transition timeframe in spite of them being an opportunity to reflect BPA’s position on the challenging issues of the time. This
lack of attention to BPA annual reports by the newspapers may be due to the fact that the reporting and editorializing were contemporaneous to events, whereas the annual reports were retrospective and less in-depth. They were, in effect, a summary of the year and a high-level view of the future. Ignoring the annual reports may also be due to the fact that their focus – in spite of the extended narrative they incorporate – was on agency finances. Again, the newspapers included BPA finance topics (rates, debt, and revenue) in its contemporaneous reporting, but did not directly utilize the annual reports as such.

Finally, through the lens of governance collaboration, it is apparent that the Networks governance mode prevailed throughout the Transition years. As previously described, the number and variety of stakeholders interacting with one another by way of the Salmon Summit places the primary governance mode squarely within the Networks category. What is most notable is that the Networks governance mode is typically considered as utilizing partnerships and compromise. However, when Hatfield brought the various regional interests together to craft a salmon recovery plan that would also preserve economic and other interests, it is easy to see that even semi-formal networks can be a forum for contentious interactions.

It could be argued that the Northwest region was facing an existential crisis in the collapse of the Northwest salmon stocks. BPA, perhaps facing its own existential crisis given the potential negative impacts of listing multiple salmon stock under the
ESA, was only one of many actors engaged in the Salmon Summit. While the agency participated with others in a Network governance mode to arrive at a solution for the crisis, BPA was not in a position to frame how it would operate in this mode. Instead, it was driven, influenced, and even directed by others either leading the Salmon Summit (such as Hatfield) or actors from outside the Salmon Summit (such as DOE Secretary Watkins). As previously noted, the Transition Years for BPA indicate the complexities inherent in the Networks governance mode when facing regional crises. As seen in the following section, the Transformation years, these complexities only increased and brought BPA’s existential crisis to a head.

**The Transformation Years**

While labelling the final four years of the decade as the Transformation Years is obvious from the perspective that these years saw BPA’s re-organization, it is also appropriate from the broader perspective of the Northwest regional environment. As will be examined in the newspaper materials from this timeframe, the Transformation Years saw issues including salmon stock management, deregulation of the energy sector, increasing financial constraints, and the start of the Clinton administration. Each of these transformative pressures align with the narrative theme categories. Table 33 shows the counts of articles and editorials in each thematic category along with totals for each theme and percentage of the total newspaper material from this timeframe. Of note is the total of articles and editorials, which is roughly twice that of either of the
other timeframes of the decade. While this is partially explained by the fact that this timeframe covers four years and the other two timeframes are three years each, it would be reasonable to assume only a one-third increase to account for the additional year. The increased focus by newspaper coverage of BPA is a strong indicator of the interest in the agency in its transformation.

Table 33. Thematic Counts of Articles and Editorials in the Transformation Years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SALMON</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc.</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the ongoing salmon crisis as well as the increased competition due to deregulation, it is unsurprising that the Salmon and the Rates themes each account for more than a third of the total newspaper coverage. Notably, the Salmon theme also garnered half again as many editorials as articles on the issues. The editorializing on the Salmon narrative theme also substantially increased as compared to the prior timeframes, with double the number that occurred in the Transition Years and a tenfold increase over the Stability Years editorials.

In contrast, the newspaper coverage associated with the Operations and Politics narrative themes was substantially less than either the Salmon or Rates themes. Operations-themed coverage was less notable than in the prior timeframe but focused on the ongoing debt and cost issues including continuing (though limited) coverage of
the WPPSS. In contrast, although there were only slightly more articles associated with
the Politics theme, their significance cannot be understated and commanded the
attention of the region for the entirety of the Transformation Years. Notably, editorials
in all but the Operations theme staked out more opposing positions and (unlike the
prior timeframes) issues were litigated after a fashion in the editorial pages with opinion
pieces being written in direct response to one another.

As a result, I begin with general observations and narrative arcs of note in the
Operations narrative theme. From these lesser narratives, I turn to what I term the
organizational inflection point and associated narratives. The inflection point consists of
three converging narratives covered in the newspapers that highlighted the enormous
and increasing pressure on Hardy as administrator and BPA as an organization. I then
focus on the extended narrative arc showing the many and competing external
influences in the BPA Governance Ecosystem that were directly to bear on the agency
for organizational transformation. Finally, I note a lesser, but no less important,
narrative arc toward the end of my study’s subject decade that suggests organizational
pressures were to continue in the following years and even into the new millennium.

As noted above, less newspaper coverage was devoted to the Operations theme
than in the previous two timeframes, though the theme played some part in the major
narrative arcs of the inflection point and subsequent organizational transformation. The
WPPS narrative continued to play out with articles (including the front page in the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer) and the decision to abandon the unfinished nuclear power plants. “Confronted with cost-cutting demands by the Bonneville Power Administration, which underwrote the plants’ financing, the directors agreed it is time to resolve legal and logistical steps leading to abandonment” (Lange, L. 1992, April 10, A1). Of greater significance to the BPA Governance Ecosystem, however, was prior coverage (again, front page) of state and federal investigations over the WPPSS managing director’s salary of more than $250,000. “Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., said he will investigate what role the federal Bonneville Power Administration played in making [Managing Director] Counsil the region’s highest-paid public employee” (Connelly, J. 1993, March 5, A1). However, the article goes on to report that Hardy had given his approval to the WPPSS executive board for the hire. The coverage is notable for both the newspaper’s watchdog role of both actors within the ambit of the BPA Governance Ecosystem, but also of the watchdog role played by political actors, particularly DeFazio.

A similar watchdog narrative also briefly came to the fore in early 1996 when the NPPC approved a more than a quarter million-dollar confidential severance agreement. As with WPPSS, the article points out that the NPPC “budget comes from a share of BPA revenue” (Associated Press. 1996, January 13, B8). Members of the Northwest delegation, including both Rep. Wes Cooley, R-Ore. and Sen. Slade Gorton, of Washington expressed concern over both the amount of the severance package and the secrecy around it. As well, The Oregonian editorial board called for “No More Secret
Deals” and argued, because it is funded by BPA, the NPPC “should open its budget to public scrutiny the same way that BPA does” (The Editorial Board. 1996, January 19, B08). In both of these narratives we can easily see that the funding provided by BPA necessarily involved the agency in myriad operational issues of other Northwest organizations, showing the complexity of the BPA Governance Ecosystem.

While most of the material within the Salmon, Rates, and Politics themes fit within the major inflection point and transformation narratives, there were multiple Politics-themed minor narratives in newspaper coverage. As was to be expected, as a result of the 1992 elections, the incoming Congress and the new Clinton Administration engendered some general coverage of the implications for the Northwest region. More specifically, having been in his role as BPA Administrator for roughly fifteen months, Hardy’s supporters and critics quickly lined up to advocate for his ouster or retention. Idaho Governor Andrus, “determined to fight for his ‘Idaho Plan’ to save the state’s dwindling salmon runs” was “convinced a key is getting rid of Randy Hardy” (Associated Press, 1993, March 28, B1). However, newspaper accounts and editorials suggest his opinion was an outlier. In a direct counter to Andrus, The Oregonian editorial board argued that “Hardy, contrary to Andrus’ evaluation, has done an effective job at BPA during his one-year stint there” (The Editorial Board. 1993, January 4, B06). Moreover, “Washington state’s congressional heavyweights are lobbying to protect” Hardy’s job “in a new era of governmental change” (Associated Press, 1993, January 25, D2) and the
newly elected Washington Governor, Mike Lowry also recommended keeping Hardy (Connelly, J. 1993, January 20, A4). Of course, Hardy retained his position, but BPA immediately became the focus of DeFazio leading “a House task force studying the future of the Bonneville Power Administration, including such critical issues as fish protection, power supply and costs” (Ulrich, R. 1993, February 6, B08). These issues became the ongoing focus for BPA, its governance ecosystem and the Northwest region over the ensuing years, and created the inflection point narrative as explained below.

*Inflection Point – ‘Perfect Storm.’*

The initial premise for studying BPA was a consideration of the Northwest salmon stock collapse and the Salmon Summit as the inflection point for BPA’s organizational change. While this premise was shown to be at least partially inaccurate in analysis of the BPA annual reports, the narrative arcs found in newspaper materials gave additional context and nuance to BPA’s transformation. Increasing competition with the advent of deregulation, the ‘financial squeeze’ (as it was called by BPA), along with expanding obligations for salmon recovery created a ‘perfect storm’ and major inflection point for BPA as an organization.

These internal and external pressures facing BPA were summed up in a leadership profile by *The Oregonian* bluntly stating “[y]ou’ve got to wonder how Randy Hardy sleeps at night” (Laatz, J. and Colby, R. 1993, June 20, K01). The article observed that many in the region may not know who Hardy was, but that his decisions affected
the entire Northwest. Laatz and Colby then listed the impacts of potential rates increase, the financial pressures driving the rates, and the environmental costs of protecting salmon. As well, the reporters observed “BPA is attacked as wasteful and bogged down in process” and that “[i]t’s a bureaucratic beast: Hardy must either tame it or be thrown from the saddle” (Laatz, J. and Colby, R.). However, from an executive leadership perspective, there were two quotes from Hardy capturing his leadership style and his perspective on the agency’s challenges. As to his role at BPA, “‘It’s a great job if you love adversity,’ Hardy says wryly” (Laatz, J. and Colby, R.). His perspective on BPA’s role was equally blunt. “There’s an (analogy) Hardy likes to use: the BPA as a punch bowl. Ratepayers’ money makes the punch; BPA customers hold the straws. ‘Whoever sucks the fastest,’ Hardy says, ‘gets the mostest’” (Laatz, J. and Colby, R.). With Hardy’s perspective on his role and on BPA as a whole as background, the three elements of BPA’s perfect storm fit well in the three narrative themes of Rates, Operations (by way of financial pressures), and Salmon. I examine each of these in turn before exploring the resulting organizational transformation that aligns with the Politics theme.

The Rates-themed narratives of the Transformation Years took on a substantially different tone from the prior timeframes in both urgency and in newspaper coverage. In the two prior timeframes, the newspapers covered the negotiation of BPA proposing rates and customers (and others) responding in a largely open process. In contrast, Rates narratives were driven by a more acrimonious and urgent sense starting in 1993.
Moreover, the newspapers covered not only the rates themselves, but additional activities between BPA and its customers that appeared more adversarial in nature.

There was little in the way of coverage about BPA rates in the first half of 1993 with an article in June only noting that Hardy was “committed to devising a ‘tiered’ rate structure that by late 1995 would charge BPA’s customers extra for high-volume electricity use.” (Colby, R. 1993, June 4, D01), the first such mention of a tiered rate structure. That same month, rates tied to aluminum prices, unique among BPA customers, were called out as needing to change, even though increased prices might force smelters to shut down (Colby, R. 1993, June 20, K01). The tiered-rate construct, as well as specific rate increase proposals (ranging from as much as 20 percent in 1993 and as little as 5 percent in 1995) were consistent with prior timeframe narratives. Similarly, coverage of Federal budgets’ pressure on rates were part of the newspapers’ coverage of the Clinton administration, which had also occurred during the Bush administration.

What was different in the Transformation Years was the way in which customers reacted to rate hikes. The prime example of the more adversarial relationship was the Washington PUDs’ reaction to the 1993 initial fourteen to twenty percent rate increase proposal. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer editorial board opined on a series of “television commercials attacking the Bonneville Power Administration’s impending double-digit electric rate increase” (The Editorial Board, 1993, June 22, A8). After speculating that most viewers of the ads may not even be aware of the issue, the opinion piece flatly
states “Hardy makes a more persuasive case for increasing BPA rates . . . than the PUDs make for a lower rate hike” (The Editorial Board, 1993, June 22, A8). In addition, Clark PUD in Vancouver, Washington accused BPA of being “overstaffed and not serious about putting itself on a money diet,” arguing the proposed rate made “BPA uncompetitive and may lead to its demise” (Stewart, B and Colby, R. 1993, July 3, E01). Later articles confirm rates closer to the 15% target, but prior rates coverage had not shown the same tactics from BPA customers. This may be in part due to the double-digit increases proposed but may also be attributable to the increased opportunities for BPA customers to go elsewhere for their power.

Of further note was a protest letter from both the Snohomish and Clark PUDs “asking [BPA] to withdraw a legal motion to strike all public testimony calling for major spending cuts [at the agency]” (Staff Reports, 1993, March 17, E3). The testimony was part of BPA’s regular rate-making process and the motion to strike was based on the premise that BPA’s “rate-making directives do not require that program issues be considered when rate increases are set” (Staff Reports, 1993, March 17, E3). There was no further coverage of the issue, so one can only speculate as to whether the protest letter was effective, but the later articles on the rates fight with the two PUDs show that the PUDs were willing to take the fight public. In addition, the protest letter article indicates less openness on the part of BPA during Hardy’s tenure than had occurred in Jura’s tenure. The fact that Jura had been touted for his openness and public
engagement (in the Solidarity governance mode) stands in stark contrast to the agency’s approach under Hardy’s leadership BPA.

The rates issues and the ongoing tension between proposed rates from BPA and what the agency’s customers believed they could absorb, or bear was an ongoing narrative throughout Hardy’s tenure. Rates and competitiveness challenges were largely attributed to the Clinton administration’s push for deregulation of the energy sector. However, it should be recalled that, even in the Stability years, customers contemplated looking elsewhere for power every time BPA raised its rates. Therefore, rates and competitiveness were not new issues to the agency, but when intertwined with the financial squeeze, BPA attempted to reduce the impact of its rates through its re-organization.

While not framed as a rates issue, competitiveness was also a driver in the financial squeeze BPA endured. Just as the inflection point narrative was nicely summed up in the profile on Hardy, the rates narrative was encapsulated in an Oregonian editorial on BPA’s Competitiveness Project (from the 1993 Annual Report). While noting the agency would be “designing cost-effective ways to do business and purging itself of a bureaucratic time-isn’t-money operating style” (The Editorial Board, 1993, December 24, D06), the opinion piece didn’t directly opine on BPA competitiveness, but rather called for BPA to show how it would be more responsive, faster, and less bureaucratic to ensure its competitiveness.
Beyond criticism of BPA’s bureaucratic processes, the financial squeeze narrative arc called for the agency to cut costs. Of some note, the drive by external stakeholders for BPA to cut costs largely played out over the course of 1993. In the latter years newspapers primarily reported on specific cost-cutting measures, such as the elimination of jobs. Throughout the Transformation Years, rates pressures and competitiveness underlay the cost-cutting narrative, but there was also a strong perception (as indicated above) that BPA’s structure was to blame for its costs, reinforcing the idea that BPA could do its job just as well with fewer employees. As a result, over Hardy’s tenure, various job cuts were announced with some 800 (over four years) initially reported, which would “cut BPA’s workforce by 15 percent (Seattle Times News Service, 1993, September 22, B2). Then, in September the following year, a second announcement stated the agency would “eliminate 500 in-house workers and 500 contract employees, most by attrition . . . over the next two years” (MacKenzie, B. 1994, September 8, E01). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the cuts – at least of federal employees – between 1994 and 1996 only amounted to 300 fewer jobs.

While regional stakeholders advocated for BPA to cut costs aggressively, it must also be noted that articles – and especially – editorials outlined specific priorities for cost cutting. As an example, The Oregonian editorial board called for six measures including tiered rates, and mothballing WPPSS nuclear plants – both previously discussed – but cutting jobs are not one of the suggestions proposed (The Editorial
Board, 1993, April 9, D08). Moreover, the editorial board continually advocated for preserving energy conservation programs, arguing that a “big budget reduction in the level of conservation and renewable-energy spending would only postpone the inevitable” need for investing in the programs in later years at greater cost (The Editorial Board, 1993, March 17, C08). *The Oregonian* editorial board published an additional three editorials over the next year ultimately stating “[t]he wrong thing is to abandon investment in conservation and renewable energy in the interest of cost-cutting” (The Editorial Board, 1994, May 23, C08). Interestingly, Hardy was not directly indicating cutting conservation programs, but needing “to find new ways to pay for it” (The Editorial Board, 1994, May 23, C08). Hardy had previously expressed concern that the Clinton administration’s proposed energy tax, which would raise rates in the region would “force utilities to abandon energy conservation programs” (Laatz, J. 1993, February 20, B12). The cost-cutting narrative ultimately centered on reducing jobs and changing the way BPA did business, presumably through its re-organization, as reporting on energy conservation programs was absent in the 1995 and 1996 timeframe.

While there is some indication that regional influence largely preserved BPA energy conservation programs intact, the ongoing struggles over salmon recovery plans had much more complex interactions between BPA and stakeholders, as well as less clear outcomes. As examined in this section, actions and interactions ranged from simple reporting on fish mitigation measures either taken by or funded by BPA to
additional salmon recovery plans proposed, and even new lawsuits challenging BPA’s and others’ activities affecting the salmon stocks. Newspaper coverage was more extensive than any other of the narrative themes and – importantly – the number of editorials about salmon issues was more than double that of rates issue. The importance of the ongoing salmon recovery issue was succinctly described in the headline “Salmon Battle Could Dwarf Other Fights” (Laatz, J. 1993, June 20, K01).

Although most reporting and editorials focused on the various salmon plans proposed by stakeholders, which had continued after Hatfield’s salmon summit, newspapers also reported on specific activities undertaken in the Transformation Years. One of the more notable activities involved a U.S. Coast Guard escort of salmon migrating up the Columbia to protect them from illegal poaching. The USS Corliss served “as a 24-hour base of operations for two smaller patrol boats and a multi-agency police force to deter . . . illegally killing salmon” (Associated Press, 1993, May 2, B3). The cost was relatively miniscule ($15 million) relative to overall salmon recovery costs. “Salmon recovery efforts cost the BPA $1 billion in the past decade, said Jack Roberston, deputy administrator” of BPA (Laatz, J. 1993, June 25, C01). However, as previously described in Chapter 4, it was one of the few instances where – by funding enforcement actions – BPA engaged (albeit indirectly) in the Hierarchy governance mode.

In contrast, and as something of a bookend to earlier fish protection activities, August of 1996 saw multiple articles on fish kills resulting from increasing water flows
sending salmon into power-generating turbines at The Dalles Dam. The action occurred “to generate additional power for energy-strapped California . . . to prevent a possible collapse of the West’s power system” (Thompson, C. 1996, August 14, B01). While there was little disagreement in the region about the necessity of the activity, industry and conservation stakeholders immediately took opposing positions.

Most significantly, an opinion piece took BPA to task for essentially creating the crisis, that then necessitated the salmon kill. It noted that the West coast blackout had resulted because of “transmission lines all over the BPA system heated and sagged . . . which ultimately led to two major short circuits . . . voltage collapsed . . . and the West blacked out” (Baker, J. and Bodi, L. 1996, September 4, A7). Baker and Bodi went on to argue that BPA’s failed maintenance was to blame for the event and noted that “the region’s electric utility industry is blaming its woes on recovery of wild salmon runs” while, in spite of the transmission failures in August “BPA has trimmed another $24 million out of next year’s [maintenance] budget” (Baker, J. and Bodi, L.) The opinion piece shows how the Salmon and Operations-themed narratives were intertwined in both activities and opinions throughout the Transformation Years. It also indicates that, years after the initial attempts to come together for the Salmon Summit, stakeholders in the region continued to be diametrically opposed to one another, both sides taking BPA to task for its actions.
These two examples of specific activities (escorting fish upriver and sacrificing salmon to generate emergency power) by BPA, however, were something of outliers in the broader salmon recovery planning for the region. And just as was seen in the Baker and Bodi opinion piece, each iteration of any salmon plan engendered opposition from one stakeholder group or another. As an example, the NMFS draft plan in 1994 was ill-received by both sides of the issue. “Environmentalists charge that the [NMFS draft] proposal will not save fish, while industry officials say it could drive up electric rates” (Laatz, J. 1994, February 4, B11). The draft plan then failed in the courts with U.S District Judge Malcolm Marsh ruling the process used by the NMFS was “too heavily geared to the status quo that has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed” (Lange, L. 1994, March 30, B2). Of note, at the same time of the ruling, Northwest Tribes agreed to work with the NPPC “to push Bonneville Power Administration into faster action to help fish and wildlife affected by the Northwest dam system. . . when [the Tribes’] interests coincide with the council’s” (Ulrich, R. 1994, March 30, C04). The significance of the court striking down the NMFS fish recovery plan concurrently with increased pressure on BPA from the NPPC and the Tribes indicates the various fronts on which federal agencies were engaged by varied and competing influences.

In this same timeframe, The Oregonian called for “doing a better job of telling the Northwest’s salmon story” (The Editorial Board, 1994, March 31, B06). As well, Hatfield warned that the “Northwest must remain united and put all of its save-the-
salmon program into effect” or risk that “the federal government – courts or Congress – will seize control of the issue” (Ulrich, R. 1994, April 3, D09). Hatfield continued as a key stakeholder to navigate the salmon recovery over the next two years with additional hearings (though it was not framed as a continuation of the Salmon Summit). The most notable effort by Hatfield was to bring together all eight of the Northwest senators (Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Idaho) “to consider proposals – some of them revolutionary – to restore the health of both Snake River salmon runs and the Bonneville Power Administration” (Ulrich, R. 1995, June 9, E01). It is significant that Hatfield was direct in his efforts to ensure both the recovery of the salmon stocks and also BPA’s viability as an agency. Based on newspaper coverage from the following year, it appears that the Northwest senators, while not supporting a specific salmon recovery plan, agreed to attempt taking some of the politics out of determining the best plan. Sen. Slade Gorton, R-Wash., sponsored an amendment to an Appropriation Committee bill on allocating funds for salmon recovery. The amendment “would put a panel of independent scientists – instead of regional managers from American Indian tribes and fish and wildlife agencies – in charge of prioritizing projects aimed at restoring salmon runs” (Laatz Jewett, J. 1996, July 17, B01). Thus, the BPA Governance Ecosystem became even more complex with the introduction of a new stakeholder that would influence, if not direct, activities of BPA and other federal agencies in the salmon recovery narrative.
Finally, just as the independent scientific panel became part of the BPA Governance Ecosystem, other federal oversight agencies also weighed in during this timeframe. First, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) issued an audit report critical of BPA debt financing. The audit – requested by Hatfield – examined BPA financing but tied the agency’s challenges to the salmon issue. In short, BPA was “handcuffed in dealing with a looming salmon crisis because it relies too much on the ‘risky’ practice of borrowing money to pay its bills” (P-I Staff and News Services, 1994, May 11, B2). Less than six months later, a Department of Energy Inspector General audit reported that BPA wasted roughly half a million dollars due to poor management of its fish and wildlife programs. The Inspector General report “concluded that the agency was manipulated by state and tribal agencies, which came to view the huge federal bureaucracy as a major source of funding for their fish and wildlife programs” (Laatz, J. 1994, October 15, C01).

Both of these critiques, from two independent federal oversight entities, intertwine the Salmon and Operations narrative themes, indicating how impactful actions in one aspect of BPA were to another. As important is the introduction of additional organizations to the BPA Governance Ecosystem, exercising governance over the agency in some form. The GAO and OMB audits are an example of how the patterns of governance are not unidirectional: BPA was governed in similar measure to how much it governed.
As shown in this section, BPA faced increasing pressure in three primary areas: rates and competition; finances and operations; and salmon recovery efforts. While BPA’s organizational structure and functions might change to respond to any one of these pressures, it is little wonder that all three coming together in a perfect storm of sorts necessitated Hardy and the agency to consider significant changes to BPA. Moreover, the increasing complexities of both issues and of the BPA Governance Ecosystem created the ‘inflection point’ where BPA responded by transforming itself as an organization. However, two points must be emphasized. First, there is little indication that such a re-organization was seen as a simple solution to the complex problems facing the agency, but rather was a change designed to help face the challenges without surety that the reorganization would do so. Second, and as important, the re-organization was part of a transformative narrative that included a variety of organizational change plans explored in the next section.

Transforming BPA.

The aftereffects or outgrowth of the inflection point shows several significant organizational changes. First, BPA re-structured by splitting its Power Marketing and Transmission Service business lines (reflected in 1994 Organization Chart). Second, BPA re-titled all senior agency roles from administrative ones (e.g., Assistant Administrators, Division Chiefs, etc.) to ones modeled on private enterprise (Vice Presidents and the addition of “Chief Executive Officer” to the Administrator title). Third, the agency
engaged in major austerity measures, reducing staff and operating expenses in order to prevent raising rates to such a degree that the agency would lose customers.

However, the structural and functional changes at BPA to emulate a business model more closely, was one of several plans to ‘save the agency’ in one way or another, some of which were proposed even after BPA re-structured. As a result, BPA’s re-organization was itself a major narrative arc in the Transformation Years. Moreover, BPA’s re-organization, as well as the various plans for saving the agency, and even Hardy’s leadership, were all subject to criticism from various stakeholders in the BPA Governance Ecosystem. I examine each of these separately, beginning with views on Hardy’s leadership and reaction to his re-organization of BPA, then the non-organizational plans for BPA and their criticisms, and finally, the organizational sub-narrative of BPA as a government corporation.

The context for, and timing of, BPA’s re-organization under Hardy began with the incoming Clinton administration in early 1993. Even before Clinton’s inauguration, the Oregonian editorialized on continuing Hardy’s tenure, while observing Andrus’ efforts to remove him. “Idaho’s Gov. Andrus wants [Hardy] replaced; but the BPA chief deserves a longer stint” (The Editorial Board, 1993 January 4, B06). The editorial summarized Hardy’s efforts toward salmon recovery, stabilizing power rates, and managing BPA debt – essentially the three major elements of BPA’s perfect storm. At the end of January an
opinion piece from one Oregonian editor is even more of a champion for Hardy and the Clinton administration.

This is an agency just right for Clinton’s goal of making government an agent of change. The BPA should flourish under his rule. It has been a model of moderation; its policies mimic the slogan of Alexander Dumas’ “Three Musketeers”: “All for One and One for All” (Thompson, W. 1993, January 31, K01).

In spite of this fulsome praise and the general support for Hardy across the region, BPA came under immediate scrutiny. “U.S. Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., will lead a House task force studying the future of the Bonneville Power Administration” (Ulrich, R. 1993, February 6, B08). The same issues (rates, salmon, and debt) called out in support of Hardy, were identified as those being examined by the task force.

The first meeting of the task force gave DeFazio a bully pulpit for reforming BPA in multiple ways. DeFazio argued the agency must behave “more like a business and less like a ‘bloated bureaucracy’ . . . describing BPA as being at ‘a crossroads’” (Laatz, J. 1993, April 29, E11). The article goes on to describe two possible plans; one with BPA being re-structured as a federal corporation, the other suggesting the NPPC might be given authority over BPA in the vein of an independent oversight commission or board of directors. Both of these potential solutions garnered further coverage over the next months. As to the NPPC, “[w]hile the Northwest Power Act that created the council said the BPA ‘shall’ implement the council’s policies, it gave the council no enforcement
authority over the BPA” (Laatz, J. 1993, June 20, K13). In contrast to additional oversight from NPPC, the other alternative being considered was part of Vice President Gore’s ‘reinventing government’ program whereby BPA “could gain more control over its operations and would act more like a private business” as a government corporation or similar entity (Seattle Time News Service, 1993, September 3, B2). This second alternative became a sub-narrative, which examined separately below (but was one of many proposals) and reactions to DeFazio’s task force and BPA’s re-organization efforts, that were implemented a short six months later.

In March of 1994 BPA announced that it had undertaken a major re-organization. The headline “BPA Joins Corporate Culture With Its Own CEO” (Colby, R. 1994, March 12, D10) indicates the emphasis the agency placed on setting itself on a new footing through both titles and organizational structures. The article goes on to note the corporate titles (e.g., chief executive officer rather than administrator), the additional key position of chief operating officer, and re-structuring the agency along seven organizational services. While the organizational transformation is detailed in Chapter 4 and Appendix C, two observations can be made in regard to the announcement itself. First, there was no direct indication in the newspaper report (or the 1994 Annual Report) that the move was a response to the suggested alternatives described above. Instead, in response to “[s]ome local utilities and industrial customers . . . calling the agency bloated and inefficient” the re-organization was “to focus the
agency more sharply on competing on the region’s power-supply business” (Colby, R. 1994, March 12, D10). Second, the re-organization emphasizes what was within Hardy and BPA’s ability to accomplish without external actions – as would be required by either the NPPC oversight alternative or the government corporation alternative.

A further consideration in understanding the re-organization is the possibility of the effort being an attempt to forestall or ameliorate the DeFazio task force recommendations for the agency. However, two months later the task force issued its observations and recommendations on BPA. The task force criticized where BPA was cutting budgets and reinforced concerns that, as DeFazio is quoted, “‘[t]he fat is in Bonneville’s cumbersome bureaucracy’” (Laatz, J. 1994, May 18, B01). Notably, as reported by The Oregonian, the task force did not comment on the re-organization at BPA; admittedly, only two months after the re-organization announcement, positive outcomes were unlikely to have become evident. Finally, in terms of structures and functions at the agency, the report endorsed moving responsibility for salmon recovery out of BPA through “the creation, with certain conditions, of a new regional body responsible for salmon recovery in the Columbia River Basin” (Laatz, J.). As the article itself points out, the task force report “carrie[d] no authority to force changes at the BPA” and it must be emphasized that the recommendation for a regional body for salmon recovery did not move forward (Laatz, J.).
In spite of the re-organization and the task force recommendations in 1993, a year later the major pressures of rates, debt/operating costs, and salmon recovery had not eased. Over the summer of 1995, multiple articles critically examined BPA in terms of its very survival. Whether a full year was actually sufficient time to see any benefits from the agency’s re-organization and new business model is arguable, but newspaper reporting and editorials indicated BPA had yet to weather its perfect storm. The NPPC hosted regional energy sector experts to help BPA navigate the three issues. “With congress threatening to overhaul or even eliminate the agency, Northwest power experts yesterday sought solutions for a pending crisis” (Williams, M. 1995, June 15, D3). The NPPC meeting also introduced another actor into the BPA debate with Gov. John Kitzhaber’s salmon policy adviser, Roy Hemmingway, offering a blunt assessment of the discourse.

[Hemmingway] told the Northwest Power Planning Council at a Seattle meeting Wednesday that the governor wants a “nothing taken for granted” examination of the federal power marketing agency. Hemmingway added there is a remarkable disparity between public and private discussion about BPA. “In public settings, the discussion is about getting Bonneville’s costs down and preserving the institution,” he said. “In private, however, there is a great deal of discussion, at very high levels in the industry, about whether the institution can or ought to be saved (MacKenzie, B. 1995, June 16, B01)

In turn, after the NPPC meeting, a similar review of BPA was “the subject of a public meeting hastily ordered up by BPA’s parent agency, the Department of Energy” (The Editorial Board, 1995, September 22, A14). The editorial notes the same major
pressures on BPA as well as some of the organizational changes being proposed such as splitting BPA into two agencies (for transmission services and power marketing), and independent oversight in some form.

The narrative of whether BPA should exist, or in what form continued over the next year and coalesced around two ideas: 1) re-forming BPA as a government – sometimes referred to as federal – corporation, or 2) selling all or significant portions (such as transmission assets) of BPA, essentially eliminating the agency. However, neither of these possible courses were unique to the crisis of the mid-nineties and were ongoing narratives at least through the majority of Hardy’s tenure and (in the case of the government corporation) had even pre-dated his tenure and the re-organization.

While the government corporation narratives were typically driven by stakeholders external to BPA (whether presidential administrations, Congress, or regional interests), in the Transformation Years, the idea re-emerged from within BPA itself.

Nearly 50 years after it began [sic], the Bonneville Power Administration wants to reinvent itself in the name of leaner bureaucracy and lower rates. The goals are desirable, but the scissors for cutting the red tape might be reformation as a government corporation, something akin to Amtrak, the Postal Service or BPA’s giant cousin, the Tennessee Valley Authority” (The Editorial Board, 1994, January 16, B6).
Although acknowledging the need for a more business-like approach, the editors expressed concern for a potential lack of accountability should the reformation come to pass. “Constituents exert influence through a variety of regulatory channels to get BPA’s attention. From the halls of Congress to the meeting halls of Northwest conservation groups, there is legitimate concern that BPA’s new status means greater detachment.” (The Editorial Board, 1994, January 16, B6).

The concerns were echoed in further reporting up to the announcement in March of BPA’s re-organization with Hardy as the CEO. A meeting of the NPPC devoted time to the idea with some support evidenced for changing BPA “which critics claim stands for ‘Big Pile of Administrators.’ BPA chief Randy Hardy tends to agree with them” (Laatz, J. 1994, January 27, F03). Hardy continued to advocate for the government corporation reformation with the energy sector supporting it in terms of lower rates and greater efficiency and conservation groups expressing greater concerns about reduced accountability. DeFazio weighed in as well, not opposing the move to a government corporation, but expressing caution. “‘I recognize Bonneville needs to evolve, be more efficient,’ DeFazio [said]. But I’m waiting to be convinced incorporation is the best way.” (Williams, M. 1994, February 8, B3). Significantly, the government corporation idea gained no further traction, with later reporting indicating the DeFazio task force “was cautious about BPA’s plan to become a government organization . . . saying there was no agreement the move would be good for the region” (Laatz, J. 1994, May 18,
Finally, at year’s end Hardy was still advocating for the change to a government corporation, then arguing the freedom “from the glue of bureaucracy and inefficiency” would allow the agency to “emerge a real player in the competitive energy world. [. . .] Do nothing, Hardy warns, and Congress might carve up the agency and sell it off” (MacKenzie, B. 1994, December 6, B16).

In spite of Hardy’s efforts, reforming as a government corporation never gained traction within the region. While BPA made initial steps in the direction – perhaps preparing in advance for its culmination by way of the March 1994 re-organization, the effort showed the agency’s limits. Both in terms of the constraints on Hardy to go beyond internal re-organization, and the limits of organizational autonomy for BPA to re-form itself, the complexity and influence of the BPA Governance Ecosystem were clearly seen. Northwest politicians, energy sector interests, and environmental stakeholders all weighed in but the enormity of reforming as a government corporation proved too much. Somewhat ironically, as well, Hardy’ argument about the threat that the agency might be ‘carved up and sold’ was later seen with the mid-nineties’ various proposals to do just that.

In understanding proposals for selling BPA, it must be emphasized that the idea was neither new nor unique to the early nineties landscape in the region. Budget proposals from both the Reagan and Clinton administrations included a proposal to sell the agency at one time or another (P-I Staff and News Services, 1987, January 6, A1;
Associated Press, 1994, December 14, B5). These earlier proposals, as was the case for Clinton’s Presidential budgets, met with regional resistance. Newspaper editorial boards lined up against the idea in short but effective headlines: “Don’t Sell BPA” (The Editorial Board, 1994, December 15, B12); “Selling BPA Foolish Idea” (The Editorial Board, 1994 December 18, D2). However, by the 1995 – 1996 timeframe, opinions – at least from stakeholders had changed. “Several House Republicans have proposed selling all the government’s power-marketing agencies, including BPA” (Williams, M. 1995, June 15, D3). Driven by the rates and competition pressures, some argued BPA’s business model was no longer sustainable. “Should the Pacific Northwest keep [BPA] as marketing and transmission agent for 80 percent of the regions electrical power? Maybe not says [energy consultant] Lon Peters” (Ramsey, B. 1996, March 13, B5). The column goes on to note however, that Peters was against selling BPA, and skeptical of selling the federal dams, but argued that opening competition for the power generated by the dams might be an answer. However, other stakeholders were harsher in their assessment of BPA very existence. “‘Self-preservation should not be the objective of a government agency,’ said Dick Reiten, [Portland General Electric’s] president and chief operating officer” (MacKenzie, B. July 30, G01).

The rapid, significant, and ongoing changes to BPA operating environment also led to the governors of the four states covering BPA territory (Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington) convening “a panel of experts . . . to prepare recommendations on
[BPA’s] fate to Congress (Torvik, S. 1996, April 7, F1). The column went on to note the options that might come from the panel including parts of BPA becoming a co-op run by its customers and selling off some portions of the agency to private interests.

Both the government corporation narrative and the selling BPA narrative offer three insights. First, as readily seen in the Transformative Years narratives, the challenges facing BPA continued and even increased over time. Second, the agency’s – as well as the region’s – reactions and responses in this timeframe suggest that re-organizing BPA in 1994 along a business model did not obviously achieve the hoped-for resolution. While the effects of organizational change may take years to see fruition, it appears the changes were not rapid enough to forestall external stakeholders looking to reform or even sell BPA. Finally, the ongoing narratives point out a limitation in longitudinal studies such as mine. In choosing a decade for examination there is necessarily a single cutoff point. But in studying complex organizational change as well as changes to an organization’s governance ecosystem, we are not always able to fully examine a resolution – if there even is one to be had.

**Chapter Summary: BPA and Newspaper Narrative Arcs**

Before summarizing my observations derived from this chapter, there are two caveats to be noted. First, I did not attempt, nor would it have been effective, to recount every article or editorial referencing BPA throughout the decade. As well, I did not include every quotation by Jura, Hardy, or other key actors in the BPA Governance
Ecosystem. To do so would make it far more difficult to maintain the focus of my research on governance collaboration and organizational change. However, while narrowing the focus to the extent possible, doing so created my own meta-narrative of BPA through its transformative decade, which proved beneficial in connecting the narratives analysis with the organizational analysis of Chapter 4. The second caveat, previously noted in the study design from Chapter 3, is that newspapers were not the only communications means for stakeholder to signal and influence BPA, but it was certainly a major means of signaling, staking out positions, and attempting publicly to influence the agency’s direction. Moreover, the individual newspapers emphasized different aspects of narratives and actors in the BPA Governance Ecosystem. An important example is the local focus of *The Oregonian*’s coverage of Clark County PUD in Vancouver Washington contrasted to *The Seattle Times* coverage of Snohomish PUD outside of Seattle. Fortunately, using all three newspapers to identify and examine narrative arcs alleviated, to a great extent, the potential single newspaper perspective or bias regarding BPA, the issues it faced, and its transformation.

With those caveats in mind, some broad observations can be made in terms of the narrative arcs, executive leadership, and the BPA Governance Ecosystem over the decade. Considering the four thematic categories, multiple narratives and the results described in this chapter, three broad drivers affected how BPA was structured and the modes of governance the agency utilized to pursue its mission and preserve itself in
some (albeit changed) form. The salmon stock collapse and attempted recovery, the financial challenges and debt, and the increased competition from deregulation were all significant narratives as BPA moved through the Stability, Transition, and Transformation timeframes of the decade. Using the governance collaboration lens, there was clear shift from a fairly even mix among the Networks, Solidarity, and Markets governance modes, to one where the Markets governance mode became the prime driver of the agency.

Significantly, while BPA’s self-narrative, as found in annual reports for the first half of the decade, raised these challenges, there was little initial evidence of substantive change to the agency’s collaborative governance or to the capabilities in organizational structure, capacity, or strategy in that timeframe. In contrast, the latter half of the decade, under the leadership of Hardy, showed the salmon, competition, and debt narrative arcs all increasing from what might be termed ‘challenges’ to ‘crises.’ Along with increasing media coverage and – importantly – stances being taken by actors in the BPA network (especially customers and politicians), the years after the 1991 Salmon Summit resulted in the transformation of the agency.

As emphasized in the findings from Chapter 4, indications of the Executive Leadership dimension for this study’s analytical framework were limited due to the nature of the annual reports. Newspaper coverage helped to correct this limitation through the contemporaneous reporting of BPA administrator actions and – more
importantly – direct quotations from both Jura and Hardy on issues facing the agency. The clearest example of this insight is the stark (though understandable) difference in the transition from Jura to Hardy as depicted in the 1991 Annual Report compared to newspaper coverage indicating Jura was forced out and quickly replaced. As well quotations from both Jura and Hardy indicated their alignment with, or opposition to, the stances taken and arguments made by both newspapers and stakeholders for BPA’s activities.

Moreover, the additional color provided by quotations (e.g., Hardy’s ‘punchbowl’ comments) showed Jura and Hardy’s respective Executive Leadership styles. Admittedly, it appeared that Hardy was quoted more often and in greater detail than Jura. However, this is partially due to Hardy’s longer tenure in my study’s timeframe, but also likely due to the increased pressures attendant to the ‘perfect storm’ of the early and mid-nineties. Regardless, understanding how organizational changes and shifts in governance modes over the decade was greatly enhanced by the newspaper coverage of BPA. Finally, it should be noted that Hardy was the subject of more widely differing opinions from stakeholders than Jura. Again, this may be the result of the inordinate pressures and issues facing Hardy rather than Jura but could as well be attributable to their leadership styles and approaches to both leading BPA and interacting with the BPA Governance Ecosystem.
With BPA’s Governance Ecosystem, it was immediately evident in examining newspaper coverage that the region’s multiple actors created a complex web of interests coinciding or competing at different times and with different issues. Even with the level of coverage by the newspapers, it is difficult to discern specific influences by individuals or entities. There were few, if any instances, where a posture or stance by an entity or individual resulted in a direct organizational change or shift in governance by BPA. Notably, DeFazio focused more on BPA organization change and BPA evidenced greater activity in organizational change. Whether or not the changes were a direct response to DeFazio’s actions or stances is not entirely clear.

Admittedly, even in its organizational change, BPA was unable to reform itself as a government corporation in spite of Hardy’s interest in doing so. While not a new idea on Hardy’s part (privatization had been considered in the Reagan Administration), two factors constrained BPA effecting such a change. Foremost, it would require an act of Congress since BPA is a statutorily created agency. Attempting statutory change would require major support from most of the Northwest delegation, which was far from sure. Concomitant to this need for delegation support, would be constituent support for the delegation’s efforts from across the region. The competing stakeholder interests, as indicated in both articles and editorials indicated that there was little appetite for the government corporation idea.
In contrast, Hatfield’s activity and ability to effect change such as BPA re-organization was more limited even though he was an outsized figure in both the region and nationally. It is significant that for most of BPA’s Transformational Decade, the salmon stock collapse and plans for recovery were a major issue in the region, though there was no settled plan or resolution by 1996. In spite of Hatfield’s stature, the complexity of the issues and the stakeholders advocating for their preferred vision of salmon recovery were notable constraints on BPA’s ability to act. BPA had greater ability to re-organize internally than it had to act in a similar unilateral fashion regarding salmon recovery, which was Hatfield’s significant focus.

The purpose of this chapter was to appropriately place BPA’s decade of transformation within the broader regional context as shown in newspaper coverage of the agency. Doing so provided multiple research benefits that would have been absent if limited solely to BPA’s higher-level self-narrative of the ten annual reports examined and analyzed in Chapter 4. The contemporaneous, detailed accounts of actions, postures, and responses of BPA and regional stakeholders showed greater nuance and understanding of Neustadt and May’s (1986) “events and details” approach to organizational change analysis. More importantly, examination of the narrative arcs over the decade helped to correct for the limitations to the Executive Leadership dimension in the study. Lastly, analysis of newspaper coverage gave a more in-depth
understanding of both organizational and individual stakeholders and their influence on BPA’s organizational change and governance modes.

Notably, attempts to influence organizational change were overt, calling for restructuring or reforming BPA. However, attempts to influence BPA governance modes – while not framed as such – were no less evident. Calls for greater public engagement (Solidarity governance mode), increased competitive ability (Markets governance mode), or partnerships with entities across the region (Networks governance mode) all indicated an interest in how BPA governed, even if the term itself was not directly used. In all of these instances, we see the effects and complexities of both BPA and other actors in its governance ecosystem using the Networks governance mode to influence one another. In particular, the newspapers capture in stark terms the attempts of the BPA Governance Ecosystem actors to delay, adjust, or temper the use of the other three governance modes by BPA. These findings provided additional support for the value of governance collaboration as a means for analyzing organizational change in (as Kooiman, 2003, argues) complex, diverse, and dynamic environments such as BPA throughout its decade of transformation.
Chapter 6: Discussion and Implications of the Research

Introduction

This study of BPA’s transformative decade used a new lens – governance collibration – to examine how the agency changed in response to multiple pressures in its operating environment. The use of governance collibration as a key dimension of the agency proved useful in understanding administrative behavior with rapidly evolving and far-reaching issues that challenged BPA’s very existence as an institution of the Pacific Northwest. Recalling from Chapter 2, Governance Collibration refers to how the four governance modes (Hierarchy, Markets, Networks, and Solidarity) are mixed and balanced by the executive to fulfil the agency mission and accomplish agency goals. However, solely focusing on the Governance Collibration dimension would have been insufficient to completely understand both the challenges BPA faced and how it responded to them. Also incorporating the dimensions of Agency Capability and Executive Leadership, I was provided a richer description of BPA, the pressures creating the need for organizational change, and the resulting transformation. Admittedly, my research does not weigh the success of BPA’s transformation, nor does it consider the longer-term outcomes. As previously noted, this is a constraint of scoping with longitudinal studies, but it does not reduce the value of such research. Examining and understanding BPA’s transformation provides insights to both organizational change theory and the use of meta-governance theory, as discussed in this chapter.
In this chapter, I begin by summarizing BPA’s transformative decade through juxtaposing the two records sets – BPA’s annual reports and relevant newspaper coverage – to highlight the governance shifts and key organizational changes the agency made in response to its dynamic operating environment. I then discuss the use of Governance Collibration as the keystone means for an iterative approach to a longitudinal study of BPA. Next, I consider the implications of governance collibration as a lens through which to examine administrative agencies. I then follow with an associated discussion of governance collibration for executive leadership. Finally, I propose a framework for the future use of governance collibration in a research agenda for organizational theory and administrative behavior.

**BPA’s Decade of Transformation**

BPA’s transformational decade began auspiciously with the agency’s celebration of its fiftieth anniversary as a federal power marketing administration that had become a regional institution. In both the 1987 Annual Report and newspaper coverage of the event, BPA and its administrator, Jim Jura, were largely viewed in laudatory terms. While Jura’s Administrator’s Letter noted recent challenges in drought conditions, customer concerns about access to power, and rate stability (BPA, 1987, p. 3), the fiftieth anniversary acknowledged the importance of BPA as a Pacific Northwest institution and reflected a stable and successful environment. The only negative
observation was *The Seattle Times*’ coverage of the tribal vigil over the impact that hydropower and electric transmission had on the salmon stocks and the tribes’ cultures.

The collaborative mix of governance modes in the Jura years indicated that BPA prioritized its competitive capability in the Markets governance. However, the importance of competition was tempered by both the Networks governance mode and the Solidarity governance mode. Importantly, in the annual reports and newspaper coverage, Jura was touted for both his efforts in partnering across the region with stakeholders, as well as highlighting the public meeting and public engagement initiatives he led. Of particular note was the absence of the Hierarchy governance mode. No mention in either annual reports or newspaper coverage of Jura’s tenure suggested the agency’s use of this governance mode in any substantive fashion. As previously discussed, even the later limited references were in regard to funding of salmon poaching enforcement, but not directly engaging in enforcement actions. As an additional note, the only other reference indicating the Hierarchy governance mode was confirming BPA’s ability to regulate its transmission system. The sole reference to a direct ability to regulate at least suggested a close tie between governance modes and the agency’s statutory constraints in the C1 – CONSTITUTION category of Agency Capability, discussed further below.

The surprising and rapid change in administrators raised several significant observations. First, it indicated how quickly change may happen in specific
circumstances. There was no signaling of Jura’s imminent departure and neither the annual reports nor prior newspaper coverage suggested such a major change in leadership might occur. Moreover, the coverage of Jura up to and after his departure were all supportive of his tenure as administrator. As well, there was no indication in the Salmon Summit coverage about a change in BPA administration.

Second, Jura’s quick departure showed the divergence between BPA’s self-narrative and newspaper coverage, particularly in after-the-fact reporting on why Jura left. Unsurprisingly, the annual reports made no mention of possible reasons for Jura leaving, only indicating his efforts supporting a smooth transition by assisting Randy Hardy in the 1991 Annual Report, which included laudatory commentary on Jura’s tenure. In addition, the importance of the BPA administrator to the region was evident in the various stances and signals from both newspapers and key stakeholders – especially Sens. Hatfield and Gorton. The opinions on who would be best as BPA administrator were varied, though all supported different candidates by touting similar traits.

Finally, Jura’s unexpected departure showed the complexity of the BPA Governance Ecosystem, especially in terms of external actors either influencing (or in the case of Jura’s departure, more overtly directing) actions being taken at the agency. It was easy to identify stakeholder entities such as BPA’s federal partners (USACE, Bureau of Reclamation) or customers (Snohomish PUD, Clark PUD) throughout the
materials collected. Moreover, key individuals such as Sens. Hatfield and Gorton or Rep. DeFazio, as well as the governors of the Pacific Northwest states were evident. What was notable in Jura’s departure was the extensive and complex networks that may be brought to bear on an agency such as BPA. The ‘coal state’ senators going to Energy Sec. Watkins and, by all accounts, forcing Jura to resign was an indicator of both the complexity and dynamic nature of BPA’s operating environment.

The transition from Jura to Hardy provided insights to the limits of the BPA administrator’s autonomy, constraints and pressures on executive leadership, and the influences of the BPA Governance Ecosystem. However, there was little evidence of shifts in governance mode or changes in agency capability during the transition. The Transition Years showed no significant changes to the agency itself. Notably, while the annual reports highlighted cultural themes (i.e., an emphasis on the C4 – CULTURE capability), there was no indication of substantive governance mode shifts or organizational changes to be found in the annual reports or newspaper coverage. In fact, in spite of Hardy’s comments on increasing diversity (attributable to C4 – CULTURE) at the agency, any reporting on such efforts in annual reports or newspapers was absent.

Similarly, Hardy’s administrator’s letter of 1991, prepared shortly after assuming leadership of BPA, was somewhat reflective of the priorities he outlined in his swearing-in ceremony: increased transmission, the need for additional regional resources beyond
hydropower, and preserving the region’s natural resources, with an emphasis on salmon. In the following year, the 1992 Annual Report reflected the same themes while the aspects of the Agency Capability dimension were largely unchanged. In particular, as reflected in the comparative Financial Highlights section (BPA, 1992, p. 2), expenses and numbers of employees (C3 – CAPACITY) both increased slightly, but there was no reference to changes in statutory authority (C1 – CONSTITUTION) or a discussion of BPA’s long-term strategy (C2 – COURSE).

The lack of change in the Agency Capability dimension suggested that Hardy’s first full year as BPA Administrator was largely focused on providing a steady hand to the agency. But his leadership style was already becoming evident in that there were no significant shifts in the mix of governance modes BPA used, with the notable exception of the Solidarity governance mode. While other governance mode references were similar between the 1991 Annual Report and 1992 Annual Report, the number of references to the Solidarity governance mode dropped drastically, by roughly two thirds. Significantly (and as previously discussed), in this same year, The Oregonian reported on BPA holding “closed meetings” that excluded environmental stakeholders and argued that BPA should “go back to its policy of openness” (Editorial Board, 1992, March 13, P02). Openness and public engagement on the part of Jura had been touted multiple times and this shift away from the Solidarity governance mode by Hardy was clearly not well-received.
Hardy’s approach may have been a result of his leadership style, but might also be attributable to the increasing pressures now coming to bear on the agency. The challenges merely suggested in the earlier part of the decade through newspaper coverage and annual reports quickly came to the fore early in Hardy’s tenure. In particular, the salmon crisis and Sen. Hatfield’s Salmon Summit overlapped the transition from Jura to Hardy. The pressures from the salmon crisis, competition, and BPA’s financial health received increasing attention in the newspapers who demanded change from the agency. From the Agency Capability dimension perspective, deregulation at the national level (C1 – CONSTITUTION) was a major change in the landscape for BPA. Other factors also came into play: the need to cut costs (C2 – CAPACITY), the need to develop a long-term strategy (C2 – COURSE) that would successfully navigate the tensions between the costs of salmon mitigation and the need to avoid rate increases. Yet, at least initially, BPA did not significantly shift its mix of governance modes. In fact, references in the 1993 Annual Report for both the Networks and the Solidarity governance modes were much more limited, even though regional efforts among stakeholders and public engagement in the salmon crisis increased. While references to the Markets governance mode increased substantially in the 1993 Annual Report, they were references to BPA’s need for a customer-focused, competitive stance. However, these references were largely forward-looking, perhaps signaling the imminent transformation of the agency the following year.
In spite of limited changes in the Agency Capability dimension or shifts in the Governance Collaboration dimension, Hardy’s leadership already showed some distinction from Jura. Further, it would only increase as he implemented changes at BPA in response to multiple crises. Moreover, the challenges of salmon, competition, and finances also increased the pressures from the BPA Governance Ecosystem. The various stakeholders from across the ecosystem’s spectrum sought to influence or directly impact BPA in how the agency would meet the challenges it faced. The various individuals and entities used BPA’s challenges as a means for arguing in favor of their own respective (and competing) visions of the Northwest region’s direction. These ranged from Sen. Gorton’s urging an end to protection of salmon in the Northwest under the ESA (Walth, B. and Ulrich, R. 1995, Jun. 20, A01) to BPA customers’ protests over BPA’s proposed rate cuts for the aluminum industry (Nelson, B. 1995, September 19, B1). As well, Hardy’s own push for BPA to be re-formed as a government corporation (BPA, 1993; Editorial Board, 1993, December 5, J2) should be considered as an unsuccessful attempt by BPA to influence its governance ecosystem to aid in re-forming of the agency.

The shift in collaboration from a relatively consistent mix among the Networks, Solidarity, and Markets governance modes to one primarily emphasizing the Markets governance mode occurred quickly and overtly. In fact, the 1994 Annual Report directly indicated that BPA, although a public agency, would operate in the model of private
business and utilities. The shift was signaled on the cover of the 1994 Annual Report showing a briefcase. As well, The Oregonian ran a headline earlier that year stating “BPA Joins the Corporate Culture with its Own CEO” (Colby, R. 1994, March 12, D10).

Both the newspaper reporting on the transformation and its description in the 1994 Annual Report highlight how BPA’s organizational change both implemented and reflected its shift in governance modes.

While BPA’s transformation was designed to foreground the Markets governance mode, this shift must not be taken to mean that the other governance modes were ignored or eliminated. Not only did BPA continue engaging in both the Networks and the Solidarity governance modes, both played a role in the shift to the Markets governance mode itself. In devising how the agency would use the Markets governance mode, BPA “huddled with customers and interest groups and came out with a new strategic mission” as well as garnering “input from advisory groups and sounding boards” for the agency’s revised business objectives (BPA, 1994, p. 6). In turn, these efforts engendered the 1995 BPA Business Plan, which was vetted by way of the Solidarity governance mode. “A draft of the Business Plan, for public review and comment, came out in June. These comments were due near the end of the financial year” (BPA, 1994, p. 9). However, there was no change in BPA’s engagement through the Hierarchy governance mode. This was likely due to two factors. First, the agency was constrained by its organic statutes in its use of the Hierarchy governance mode in
any substantive way. Second, it is difficult to imagine how the Hierarchy governance mode tools such as enforcement or regulation by the agency over its governance ecosystem would comport with the competitiveness of the Markets governance mode. As a result, there is little significance to the lack of the Hierarchy governance mode’s use in BPA’s transformation.

BPA’s transformation toward a more business-like model in the Markets governance mode occurred primarily through two of the Agency Capability categories: C2 – COURSE and C3 – CAPACITY. As discussed above, BPA developed a strategic mission, a business plan, and a marketing plan, all designed “to make both BPA and its customers more competitive” (BPA, 1994, p. 8). These efforts and outputs were part of the C2 – COURSE category of Agency Capability. The organizational change that occurred in the C3 – CAPACITY category was equally significant. Reducing the number of organizational units and adding the Chief Operating Officer role were noted on both the 1994 Annual Report and newspaper coverage. However, a more significant change in terms of the shift toward the Markets governance mode came in the creation of “segment managers, each of them watching the special needs of a customer group” and “account executives, each of them answerable to one or more individual customers” (BPA, 1993, p. 6). These changes in the C3 – CAPACITY category emphasized competitiveness and customer service, with both roles being responsible for – and accountable to – BPA customers. Again, BPA emphasized how these changes would
affect its operations using transformational terms. “The transformation is designed to make Bonneville not just smaller and cheaper, but also smarter and more businesslike” (BPA, 1994, p. 7).

The rapid transformation effected in 1994 suggests these two Agency Capabilities (C2 – COURSE and C3 - CAPACITY) are the capabilities most easily changed when an agency must respond to major challenges or crises in its operating environment because they are largely within the agency’s control. In contrast, the C1 – CONSTITUTION category would be a longer-term effort if used to shift toward the Markets governance mode simply because of the length of time involved in developing proposals for statutory or regulatory change, as well as the need for political will from the Northwest delegation and others in the BPA Governance Ecosystem. This was certainly the case with BPA’s transformation since Hardy had advocated changing BPA from a federal agency to a government corporation (which, he suggested, would be in the private business model). Yet, in spite of those efforts from Hardy, no significant changes to BPA’s statutory structure came to pass.

Finally, it could be argued that BPA’s changes in structure, resource allocation, and – importantly – self-narrative would also show a change in the C4 – CULTURE category, but any cultural change would be a lagging indicator. Simply creating a narrative or an emphasis on competitiveness or customer-service (both aspects of the Markets governance mode), would not immediately translate to a transformed culture.
Instead, indicators of a cultural shift resulting from the shift in governance modes were not immediately evident. The number of references to C4 – CULTURE in the 1994 Annual Report through to the 1996 Annual Report were very limited. Additionally, any newspaper coverage indicating a cultural shift was also difficult to discern. The coverage from 1995 to 1996 focused on BPA’s attempts to be more competitive and customer-oriented, primarily through reporting on rates and on major contracts between BPA and key customers. However, reporting of this nature did not clearly indicate the internal culture of the agency, only its actions. Therefore, no strong conclusions could be drawn about the shift to the Markets governance mode in terms of C4 – CULTURE.

What is far more evident was Hardy’s executive leadership in the transformation of BPA. While advocating for the agency to become a government corporation, Hardy led the agency in making what changes he could to facilitate BPA operating in a Markets governance mode. Over time, it became evident that Hardy and Jura were a contrast in leadership styles, with Hardy’s aggressive efforts in transforming the agency through his use of C2 – COURSE and C3 – CAPACITY showing how rapidly executive leadership could effect change. In roughly a year and half from his swearing-in, Hardy had identified the need to shift its governance collibrative mix (though it is unlikely he thought in overtly in terms of governance modes) and swiftly used the tools within his control to make the shift. Admittedly, he benefitted to a large extent from the Clinton Administration’s
reinventing government initiative and it was unclear whether Hardy and BPA drove the
effort to become one of Gore’s reinvention laboratories or if the administration itself
saw the opportunity in BPA and the multiple crises facing the Pacific Northwest.
Moreover, both the engagement with stakeholders in developing strategy and the
support of the Clinton administration indicated the importance and influence of the BPA
Governance Ecosystem in the agency’s transformation. Not only did the engagement
help in garnering support for the organizational changes that did occur, the apparent
lack of support for also becoming a government corporation showed how the BPA
Governance Ecosystem both enabled and constrained the agency’s transformation.
While the effects and reactions to BPA’s transformation continued to play out in the
years subsequent to 1994, it is important to emphasize that the agency maintained its
new emphasis on the Markets governance mode and retained the organizational
changes it made. Moreover, in spite of continuing challenges in rates pressures, salmon
mitigation issues, and financial stability, the 1995 Annual Report and the 1996 Annual
Report, as well as the continuing newspaper coverage suggested that the full impacts
would take longer to be fully realized. As late as the end of 1996 the agency was
included in “critical Northwest issues such as restructuring the Bonneville Power
Administration, . . . and restoring Columbia River salmon runs” (Kinsey Hill, G. 1996,
November 10, A01). While the transformation of BPA had been accomplished in the
decade timeframe of my study, the resulting outcomes would continue to reveal
themselves over time.
**Implications for Governance Collibration**

As discussed in some detail in Chapter 2, meta-governance theory and its use as an analytical tool are still relatively new. Although Kooiman’s (2003) theories and observations and Jessop’s successive iterations (2013, 2016, 2022) exploring governance collibration span the last two decades, their theories have been applied to research in a somewhat limited capacity. While research such as that of Gjaltema, Biesbrock, and Termeer (2020) and Jones (2023) among others has begun to explore those theories, they remain focused on systems and the state. My study was designed to move meta-governance into new areas of analysis and develop governance collibration concepts into useful analytical tools for real world organizations. Based on my research and findings, the case study of BPA’s transformational decade both provided insights to the agency’s organizational change and elaborated governance collibration at the organizational level of analysis.

That being said, there are certain limitations to be noted in my study’s use of governance collibration as an analytical tool. First, although a longitudinal study over a decade timeframe, the ten annual reports coded and analyzed limited the records and data available. However, as a first foray into analyzing an organization using the governance collibration lens, the consistent structure the annual reports provided supported the identification of the four governance modes. Additionally, the
consistency of an annual record describing agency actions provided a solid means for identification and comparison of governance modes.

A second caution in analyzing governance collaboration through annual reports is that the number of references identified doesn’t necessarily correlate to agency’s use of the governance mode in activities. There are several reasons for this. First, references may be signaling (or even posturing) rather than action. In the most obvious example of governance mode signaling, Jura emphasized that “BPA needs to increase its competitiveness in the marketplace” (BPA, 1987, p. 3). Jura signaled the importance of the Markets governance mode in emphasizing competition and noted several programs aimed to increase rate flexibility. Yet there was little evidence in the subsequent annual reports of any overt shift toward the Markets governance mode. In fact, the number of references to the Markets governance mode remained roughly the same in 1988 and 1989 and dropped significantly in 1991. Moreover, Jura’s signaling and the lack of subsequent actions shifting toward the Markets governance mode stands in stark contrast to Hardy’s later efforts. As well, Jura’s quotation was a reference to forward-looking statements (in the C2 – COURSE category) in terms of intent or strategy, which don’t necessarily translate into action indicating any governance modes shifts.

Finally, simple comparative counts of references to a given governance mode can be mis-leading. As an example, the 1990 Annual Report and the 1992 Annual Report had the highest number of Solidarity governance mode references, but the more
significant reference to the Solidarity governance mode was in the 1988 introduction of BPA’s Programs in Perspective using public forums for the agency’s financial planning. Notably, changes in the number of references in a longitudinal study are a better (though not absolute) measure because the longitudinal focus corrects for forward-looking statements by reporting to varying degrees on what the agency did or what happened to the agency over time. While the limitations of my research necessarily constrain the extent to which a governance collibration method is useful in organizational analysis, my study begins to elaborate governance collibration and (as further discussed below) is a first step to its use.

**Governance Modes in General.**

With these limitations in mind, several observations regarding governance collibration and governance modes can be made. First and foremost, the ability to identify indicators of the four governance modes became readily evident in my research. Using the terms and phrases presented in Chapter 2, coding the annual reports showed mostly clear references to one or another governance mode.

Some instances were reasonably open to interpretation, but by using an iterative approach of comparing clear examples to those that were less initially clear achieved a level of consistency throughout. This approach was further supported by examining newspaper articles, which were independent observations of BPA’s actions and proposals. The clearest example is in the *1991 Annual Report* and the *1992 Annual*
Report referencing funding of salmon poaching prevention efforts, an indicator of the Hierarchy governance mode. The activities funded by BPA (which did not go into any detail in either of the annual reports) were described in detail by the newspapers (Baker, D. 1991, September 12, D06; Editorial Board, 1991, September 16, 1991, A9) and therefore gave a clearer understanding of BPA’s use – albeit limited – of the Hierarchy governance mode.

These efforts confirmed the initial operational sources and identifiers – as developed by Koliba, Meek, and Zia, (2014) – from Table 8 found in Chapter 2. It also helped to evolve those identifiers into key terms and phrases consistently observed in both the annual reports and newspaper materials that indicated the respective governance modes of Hierarchy, Solidarity, Networks, and Markets. With the Hierarchy governance mode identifiers of command, control, or compulsion, the small number of instances provided limited evidence. However, the references showed the regulatory authority – i.e., control – by BPA over electric transmission in the region. More importantly, the enforcement references suggested a nuance in the use of the mode. It indicates that the Hierarchy governance mode is an available tool through funding enforcement activities (in this instance to clamp down on salmon poaching) even when direct enforcement authority was unavailable to BPA.

As noted previously, the identifiers of the Solidarity governance mode (consensus, cooperation, commitment), evolved to be instances of direct engagement
with the public – as suggested by Lipsky (2010). Public engagement efforts and grass-roots efforts in both environmental issues and in foregrounding regional socio-cultural priorities (as seen in the 1989 through 1991 annual reports) provided evidence of how the Solidarity governance mode is utilized at a greater remove from the storefront or street-level Lipsky examines. However, the Solidarity governance remained more abstract. The references made (with the exception of the public engagement process BPA implemented) were less about activities and more about intangible viewpoints. References were more often to commitment to the public, to citizens of the region, and BPA’s public service obligations. That being said, the references to the Solidarity governance mode were clear in most instances, regardless of whether they were actions or principles.

The identifiers of the Networks governance mode – collaboration, coalition, collaboration, co-governance and concession – were largely seen through two types of indicators. First, was the use of partners, partnerships, and stakeholders. BPA heavily invested in efforts at working with in this fashion with organizations of all types (customers, tribes, environmental groups among them). Second, was the means by which BPA engaged with partners through the Networks governance mode. Memorandums of Understanding or Agreement were first and foremost as identifiers of this governance mode. However, there were many references to informal partnering as well. As a result, the Network governance mode should not be taken to solely refer to
formally constituted governance networks. Rather, the governance mode was evidenced by the myriad ways in which BPA collaborated and interacted with other organizations of all types across the region.

Finally, although the Markets governance mode was the most evident, it also was the most straightforward in usage of terms and references. The conceptual identifiers of competition, contract, and entrepreneurship appeared as specific terms throughout both the annual reports and newspapers. These were further elaborated through BPA’s continual use of terms and phrases emphasizing customer service, operating in a business-like fashion, and overtly referring to markets and the marketplace. The clarity of the Markets governance mode references was partly attributable to its underlying mission but – particularly in the Hardy years – was the result of the renewed focus of BPA in the marketplace itself.

In each of the four governance modes, the underlying conceptual identifiers offered in Table 8 of Chapter 2 were sound, but the BPA and newspaper records both elaborated and provided nuance to their usage. This is an important point in developing governance collaboration at the organizational level and agency unit of analysis for research. It reinforces the usability of governance modes as a means of analysis, even though prior theory and research has been at the systems or state level of analysis. The evidence provided in this case study strongly supports the ability to identify and analyze
instances of the Hierarchy, Solidarity, Networks, and Markets governance mode in additional arenas of research.

*Mixed Governance Modes and Their Alignment.*

Importantly for understanding governance collaboration, my research reinforces the idea that an agency does not – and realistically cannot – utilize a single governance mode to the exclusion of all others. In examining BPA’s annual reports, the instances of co-coding provided important insights to the complexities and nuances of both analyzing for governance collaboration and the mix of governance modes that might occur. This was particularly true for instances where both the Solidarity and Networks governance modes were indicated. BPA’s use of partnerships with stakeholders through public forums, which were open to all, shows the two governance modes in operation together but also suggests that further exploration into the distinctions between the two governance modes would be valuable. However, it is also reasonable to surmise that the Solidarity and Networks governance modes are closely associated, with the primary distinction being the types of tools used to engage in the respective governance modes. That is, the Solidarity governance mode was largely implemented through public meetings and calls to the region as a whole for input whereas the Networks governance mode made use of agreements and engagements with specific entities in the BPA Governance Ecosystem. It should also be noted that the close association between the Solidarity and Networks governance modes stands in contrast to the likely
disjuncture between the Markets and Hierarchy governance modes previously noted. Unfortunately, my research of BPA had so few indicators of the Hierarchy governance mode – due largely to BPA’s statutory limits – that no clear conclusions can be made. However, further focus in the relationship between the Hierarchy and Markets governance modes is warranted.

Of course, the joint use of both the Solidarity and Networks governance modes was not the sole instance of BPA using more than one governance mode at any given time or in any particular action. Instead, my findings speak to the fact that use of a particular governance mode is not singular, but more than one governance mode may be used with regard to agency actions. As previously discussed, BPA made use of both the Solidarity and Networks governance modes to implement its shift toward a more robust use of the Markets governance mode. By engaging with the public and involving customers in development of business plans and strategy, BPA gained support for its business-oriented model. While newspaper coverage of BPA’s “perfect storm” indicated a strong appetite in the region for BPA to look for new approaches to fulfilling its mission, it is reasonable to surmise that BPA’s engagement through these governance modes helped to ensure it could accomplish its new strategy and organizational structure. This raises an additional nuance in terms of governance collaboration in that we should not think of governance collaboration in simple terms of using each governance mode in certain proportions that are siloed from the other governance modes. Instead,
the collibrative mix of governance modes includes both the comparative use of each governance mode, but also the means by which one governance mode is used in tandem with another or used as a means to accomplish a shift toward greater use of another governance mode.

Finally, BPA’s use of the Networks governance mode in its transformation speaks directly to the significance of the Networks governance mode overall. In both formal (such as the Salmon Summit) and informal (whether through signaling in articles and editorials or even the “secret meetings” of 1992), the network of relationships that consist the BPA Governance Ecosystem influenced BPA’s use of the other three governance modes. Throughout the decade, the BPA Governance Ecosystem acted to influence the agency, whether re-directing, reinforcing, downplaying, delaying, or even directly preventing BPA’s shift from one governance mode to another. In particular with the transformation of BPA, it was clear that customers, stakeholders, and the region largely supported BPA’s new organizational model operating in a business-like manner. But Hardy’s push to re-form the agency as a government corporation, as well as the various efforts over the decade to sell BPA, remained unsuccessful in part because of the BPA Governance Ecosystem. Moreover, this example shows that the BPA Governance Ecosystem does not consist solely of BPA engaging in governance – the other entities within the ecosystem are either those engaging in their own governance modes (e.g., the Northwest delegation, presidential administration, federal partners,
states, tribes, etc.) or are those responding to governance actions (e.g., the public, customers, non-governmental stakeholders). The complexity in analyzing and understanding governance collaboration is thus readily evident even within the scope and limitations in my research.

**Agency Capability Tools Used in Governance Collibration.**

It must be re-emphasized that solely analyzing references to government modes in the records and data is insufficient. Coupling those references with Agency Capabilities and/or Executive Leadership provided additional support and evidence of the shifts in governance modes. More importantly for the purposes of my research, the Agency Capability categories provided a schema for the tools used by an agency to effect shifts in governance modes. Based on my findings, the Agency Capability categories varied in evidentiary value as indicators of how BPA shifted its collaborative mix. This variance is driven largely by the categories themselves. Notably, the understanding and nuances of evidence indicating the four Agency Capability sub-categories did not evolve as much as with the four governance modes detailed above. This is largely due developing a clear categorization schema. Distinctions between C1 – CONSTITUTION and C3 – CAPACITY were clear because the categories describe not only functions but also the types of records and data to be examined in my research. C1 – CONSTITUTION data was specifically drawn from the organic statutes, regulations,
governing BPA as a federal agency, as well as the Columbia River Treaty. References to such authorities and strictures on the agency were clear and specific in all instances.

The most obvious instance of this evidence was found in the connections between governance collaboration and C1 – CONSTITUTION because the category encompasses authorities of the agency that enable and constrain its actions to specific governance modes. Moreover, in both annual reports and newspaper coverage, C1 – CONSTITUTION instances in the narrative referenced statutory authorities, attempts to change such authorities, and other legislation including the proposals to sell BPA or reconstitute it as a government corporation. The connection between statutory authorities and the Markets governance mode was most evident in the Bonneville Project Act itself through the numerous references to “sale and disposition,” “available for sale,” “contracts for sale,” and “markets” or “marketed” (BPA, 2003). The Networks governance mode also somewhat indirectly implicated C1 – CONSTITUTION in Sen. Hatfield’s convening of the Salmon Summit as the participants considered legislative fixes to address the salmon stock crisis.

C3 – CAPACITY instances were also readily identified in terms of organizational structure; budgets and expenses allocated to specific programs or initiatives; and staffing, including roles, positions, and offices. In this Agency Capability category, the language used could be readily associated with a particular governance mode, examples of which abound. The Hierarchy governance mode was evidenced through C3 –
CAPACITY in the salmon poaching effort funding. More significantly, BPA’s Programs in Perspectives, engaging in public meetings to ask for input on the agency’s budget and spending priorities was a clear example connecting C3 – CAPACITY and the Solidarity governance mode. As well, the myriad instances of operational partnerships, particularly for construction projects indicated the use of C3 – CAPACITY in the Networks governance mode. Finally, the organizational, functional and structural changes of the nineties, all associated with C3 – CAPACITY, were primary tools of BPA’s move toward the Markets governance mode.

Both the C2 – COURSE and C4 – CULTURE categories were more difficult to use in showing evidence of shifts in governance modes than either the C1 – CONSTITUTION or the C3 – CAPACITY categories. The C2 – COURSE category presented some difficulties because the components factors (mission, strategy, business plans, etc.) were forward-looking statements, signaling intent over a (usually) extended time period. A longitudinal study corrected for this by examining the extent to which a shift in governance was indicated in strategic references and later came to pass. The C4 – CULTURE category is clearly the most challenging simply because, as many scholars point out, organizational culture consists of shared assumptions and patterns of behavior that are not necessarily in alignment with artifacts purporting to indicate a cultural stance (Schein, 1993/2005). Moreover, evidence such as the annual reports was not a reliable indicator of culture since they presented a primarily positive and self-
referential narrative. A partial corrective was the use of newspaper articles and editorials that may suggest a certain culture, but even these do not necessarily accurately reflect the culture because of their limited external view. Moreover, C4 – CULTURE appears to develop over time through changes in the other three Agency Capability categories as they each contribute (to varying degrees) to the culture of an organization. Finally, and similar to the C2 – COURSE category, ascertaining the effect of change in the C4 – CULTURE category is typically seen over time, especially in terms of shifts in governance modes.

Fundamentally, all four Agency Capability categories were used in shifting the collibrative mix at BPA. Most obviously, Hardy’s work to transform the agency toward a primarily Markets governance mode used tools from all four Agency Capability categories, including the attempt to make BPA a government corporation (C1 – CONSTITUTION); creating a strategic business plan and marketing plan (C2 – COURSE); re-structuring the organization and creating the Chief Operating Officer position (C3 – CAPACITY); and – to a lesser extent – touting BPA’s new customer-service and responsive, competitive principles in every facet of the agency (C4 – CULTURE). The more significant implication for understanding governance collibration is the length of time and level of effort involved when considering use of the different Agency Capability tools to effect shifts in governance modes. A further consideration for governance collibration analysis was the varying ability to identify clear use of the different tools
within each Agency Capability category. This difficulty suggests a potential need for
different approaches to gathering and analyzing data for each category. While
statutory/legislative analysis for C1 – CONSTITUTION or budgetary and financial reports
for C3 – CAPACITY both were easily accessible and provide ready evidence, C3 – COURSE
evidence may require gathering records that are less consistent in form. Most
important, C4 – CULTURE evidence more likely requires surveys or interviews over a
period of time.

The issues I have described also reflect the challenge of direct comparisons
between the categories because the underlying evidence is measured through different
means. As an example, direct comparisons between budgetary allocations (C3 –
CAPACITY) and statutory authorities (C1 – CONSTITUTION) is largely an ‘apples to
oranges’ comparison of dollar figures and textual analysis. As well, using simple counts
of references in documents is problematic approach. As emphasized previously, the
counts of references can only be a starting point for a qualitative understanding of
Agency Capability through the salience of any one category in shifting Governance
Collibration. However, taken together, the Agency Capability categories and analysis
provided an important contribution for an integrated analysis of a complex organization
such as BPA.
Executive Leadership and Governance Collibration.

The primary focus of my research was on the use of governance collaboration as an analytical tool to better understand organizational change in public administrative agencies. However, along with the implications of my research for governance collaboration, the use of governance collaboration has implications for analyzing and understanding executive leadership in public administration. This is because leadership success depends on an acute understanding of what types of leadership tools and styles best align with each governance mode. As an example, a hierarchical style of leadership is ill-suited to use of the collaborative tools used in the Networks governance mode.

Note only do these implications touch on executives’ use of different governance modes, but also the tools in the Agency Capability categories they use to accomplish their goals. Further the executive faces the challenge of ‘optimum collaboration,’ that is, maintaining the right mix of governance modes in the immediate and long-term circumstances facing the agency. Moreover, my study resulted in comparative observations on executive leadership due to the timeframe at least partially spanning the tenures of two BPA Administrators.

Much of the previous discussion covered how Jura and Hardy used and shifted governance modes in response to changes in BPA’s operating environment. The discussion also showed how Jura and Hardy used the tools within each Agency Capability category to accomplish changes at BPA acknowledges the role played by Jura
and Hardy as BPA administrators. These observations are partially attributable to the record sets used in my research. The annual reports were narratives largely driven by the BPA administrator; the Administrator’s Letter that opened each report was a clear example of the head of an agency setting the agenda and the tone for the agency. In addition, newspaper coverage tended to emphasize and provide quotations from Jura or Hardy on behalf of BPA. As well, in both articles and editorials, Hardy or Jura were referred to (though not exclusively) as essentially embodying BPA. In line with Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) examination of different means of understanding and analyzing decision-making in crises, the annual reports would be less dispositive of such a focus solely on the administrative head of the agency than the broader view of newspaper coverage.

This caveat does not take away from the fact that the evidence of governance modes used at BPA came directly from the quotations and other communications by Jura and Hardy. The extensive references and quotations by Hardy regarding BPA as a market-driven organization needing to transform into a competitive business model is obvious in light of the Market governance mode. But Jura’s emphasis on the Networks governance mode in partnering with stakeholders (and touted for doing so) lends support to the idea that both administrators were using and shifting governance modes to fulfill BPA’s mission and accomplish their goals.
It is unlikely either Hardy or Jura were thinking specifically in terms of meta-governance. This surmise is based on the fact that much of the literature on meta-governance and governance colliboration arose after the timeframe of my study. However, it is possible that – without overtly thinking of shifts in governance modes – these executives were considering approaches to governance in leading BPA. But without further evidence (i.e., interviews or internal records of the administrator’s office) we cannot clearly discern whether the leadership knowingly thought of their actions in meta-governance terms.

An additional observation with implications for executive leadership is that using a longitudinal study provided an opportunity to compare Jura and Hardy in terms of the executive leadership, approach to governance colliboration, and use of the agency capability tools available to them. In this instance, the newspaper coverage proved more valuable. Although the administrator’s letters indicated the perspectives of the two administrators as well as the actions and accomplishments of each, they were agency oriented. In contrast, newspaper articles and editorials gave both descriptive accounts and opinions about the administrators, their positionality, intent, and actions.

Nowhere was this distinction between the two more evident than editorials calling for Hardy to end private meetings with certain stakeholders, arguing that BPA “should go back to its policy of openness” (Editorial Board, 1992b, March 15, p. P02) in a clear reference to Jura’s prior approach. The secret meetings issue provided two
distinct insights to Executive Leadership and Governance Collaboration. First, in criticizing
the lack of openness, the editorial indirectly argued for the Solidarity governance mode
of broad public engagement rather than the Networks governance mode of working
closely with specific stakeholders. Of note, Sørensen and Torfing (2009) argue that a
risk inherent in use of the Networks governance mode involves this type of potentially
exclusionary activity with specific stakeholders (here, environmental interest groups
that were involved in the Salmon Summit). Second, the issue also raised the prospect
that even within the Networks governance mode, there are different nuances in how it
might be used. Both Hardy and Jura used the Networks governance mode, but Hardy
(at least initially) appeared to focus on a subset of networks actors within the BPA
Governance Ecosystem. In contrast, and as touted by newspaper coverage, Jura’s
approach was directed toward openness and strong partnerships across the entire BPA
Governance Ecosystem.

The secret meetings were a good example of the different approaches taken by
Jura and Hardy to governance collaboration. However, it must also be acknowledged that
such direct comparisons are somewhat limited due to the rapid changes in BPA’s
external operating environment. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the ‘perfect storm’
of Hardy’s early years called for more substantial actions in shifting governance modes
than Jura’s largely stable tenure. Even in this instance, the difference in the external
operating environment, its pressures and its challenges, speaks to their respective use
of governance collibration. The suggestion of imminent challenges was present toward the end of Jura’s tenure. Moreover, in his administrator’s letters from 1987 to 1990, Jura indicated the need for increased competitiveness and improved customer service (both aspects of the Markets governance mode), just as Hardy did in his tenure, but there was no clear indication that Jura accomplished his proposed shift in governance modes.

Given these examples, the importance of Executive Leadership in using or shifting governance modes should not be discounted. The comparisons – even in a limited fashion – between Jura and Hardy’s tenures highlight the importance of examining and understanding the executive’s role in governance collibration. As previously noted, whether or not these two administrators were considering their strategies and actions from a governance collibration lens, my research provides evidence that both (to varying degrees of success) engaged in shifting governance modes to fulfill BPA’s mission and respond to both its governance ecosystem and external environment.

**Final Observations: Placing this Study in the Public Administration Field**

As described above, my case study of BPA’s transformative decade gave a rich description of the agency and how it changed to meet the increasing pressures and what might be termed the existential crises it faced moving from the late eighties through the early nineties. Using the tools of meta-governance, I was able to analyze
and bring a greater depth of understanding to BPA as an institution of the Pacific Northwest. My research showed that BPA could ill-afford to ignore or resist the changes in its external operating environment or the influences of the BPA Governance Ecosystem. Conversely, the Pacific northwest region had a significant interest in preserving the agency in some form to ensure the benefits it had brought – and would continue to bring – to the region while mitigating any negative effects, such as the impact on salmon stocks. As a result, BPA fundamentally transformed itself in the hopes of being better positioned to meet the drastically changed circumstances. Importantly, by using the Governance Collibration categories of analysis as the basis for my research, but incorporating both Agency Capability and Executive Leadership to further elaborate my analysis, I derived numerous insights to how the agency used these dimensions to accomplish needed change.

As detailed in Chapter 2, my research has attempted to explore and integrate the fields of network theory (through meta-governance and collibration) and organization theory (through structural-functional analysis and executive leadership). As a result, this study adds to the recent scholarship in both fields. Meuleman (2008) draws the connection between meta-governance and public management and Jones’ (2024) examination of the arenas within which collibration occurs among network entities is evidenced to some extent in my research. Although focusing on BPA and its re-collibration, there is a clear implication that other organizations (including USACE, BOR,
NMFS and others) were simultaneously engaging in their own collibrative efforts throughout the crisis. As well, Meek (2014) discusses the complex networks within which public agencies must coordinate to develop policy and provide services. Although his theories do not specifically reference meta-governance or collibration, BPA’s complex governance ecosystem and its mixing of governance modes does align with Meeks’ complexity theory.

Just as this study has implications for network theory, meta-governance, and governance collibration, it adds to organization theory as well. In particular, Dressel, Johansson, Ericsson, and Sandström (2020) examine adaptive capacity in the context of multi-level governance in an environmental management setting. As well, the complex influences brought to bear on institutions in tackling challenges is explored by Brandtner and Suarez (2021). Both these examples, while in very different settings, provide distinct parallels to the BPA case in its attempt to adapt to and navigate the influences of the BPA Governance Ecosystem. More importantly, the theories of porous organizational boundaries (Scott and Davis, 2016) and energetic exchange (Katz and Kahn, 1966/2005) were shown throughout BPA’s transformative decade as indicated by both actions (Jura’s removal) and signals (Hatfield and DeFazio’s respective stances on BPA operations over time). Moreover, Holland’s (2014) systems theories are supported by this case study, showing both the permeable organizational boundaries throughout the BPA Governance Ecosystem and the signals provided by the executive leadership of
administrative agency organizations, as well as other leaders in both the private sector and political arena.

In addition to Holland’s (2014) work, Terry’s (2003) ideas about the public agency administrator as a conservator are evident throughout BPA’s transformational decade. Both Jura and Hardy aimed to balance the success and survival of BPA against its public service mission, with varying degrees of success. As well, the insights drawn from BPA’s transformational decade regarding its capability as an agency and an institution indicate the importance of executive leadership in community engagement (Igalla, Edelenbos, and Van Meerkerk, 2020), and capacity for change in crisis (Schomaker and Bauer, 2020). Notably, as seen in these examples, the underlying issues, crises, and fields of inquiry are wide-ranging, but in all instances, the complexities of the operating environment and capability of the subject organization are a common theme of the research. BPA’s transformational decade provides additional insight and support for these theories.

This research also continues the exploration and understanding of the intersection between the energy and environmental sectors, especially in terms of crises. In addition to Selznick (1949/2011) and Kauffman (1960), previously discussed in Chapter 2, there are numerous examples from the same timeframe as BPA’s transformative decade. Research in natural resource policy and management (McCool, 1994; White, 1995), as well as crises and increasing risks (Yaffee, 1994; Perrow, 1999)
have provided ample opportunities to study public agencies, their governance ecosystems, and their evolving operating environments. In particular, Yaffee’s study of the spotted owl Endangered Species Act listing explores the challenges in fragmented policies among state and federal land management agencies. More recently, Blunt’s (2022) investigation of California wildfires, while not a direct examination of public agencies, considers the role of the California Public Utilities Commission and its relationship with investor-owned utilities. Clarke and McCool (1996) also provide a comprehensive study of natural resources agencies, comparing policy instruments and budgetary resources to identify successes and challenges in rapidly evolving operating environments.

Placing my research within the broader context of studies in both network theory and organization theory provides further context for this work and the ways in which it begins to integrate meta-governance theories into public administration research. As well, the BPA case study is a useful, if small, addition to the wealth of case studies that examine public administrative agencies, how they change, and how they respond to crises. As a result, I was not only able to explore and analyze BPA, its transformation, and its broader environment, I was able to develop a framework for further research into meta-governance, which is detailed in the following section.
The M-G-I-A Framework

Using the theories and findings of my case study, I propose the “Meta-Governance-In-Action” (M-G-I-A) framework. The framework emerged through my study examining the ‘how’ of BPA’s transformative decade. In developing this framework as part of my research, my goal is to elaborate it as an analytical tool for studying organizational change through meta-governance. As well, I drew upon the meta-governance theories and concepts as detailed in Chapter 2 for the underlying concepts of the framework. After a summary of the underlying concepts, I then give a detailed description of each aspect of the framework. I conclude this section with thoughts on using the M-G-I-A framework in organizational research and analysis.


The M-G-I-A framework is grounded in network theory, meta-governance, and organizational behavior. Moreover, it seeks to explore the intersection of the three and better integrate them as an analytical tool for understanding complex organizations facing diverse and dynamic operating environments and challenges. The purpose of the M-G-I-A framework is to operationalize, and to make better sense of, meta-governance theories at the organizational level, bringing those theories from the remote and abstract to the practical and concrete.
Several observations are crucial to the approach in arriving at this framework. First, while the M-G-I-A framework acknowledges internal influences, it focuses on external influences including socio-cultural or societal change; shifts in politics or law; and – more narrowly – crises or scandals an agency faces. Second, the framework also acknowledges the power dynamics inherent in the multiple external actors engaging with one another in times of crisis. The framework supports the governance coellaboration concept as the mix of ways in which patterns of governance interaction among agencies, stakeholders, and others develop in response to significant change in the agency’s operating environment. Further, coupling the M-G-I-A framework with interpretive analysis of events and details, as offered by Neustadt and May (1986), provides a fuller understanding of, and deeper insights into, organizational change as seen in BPA’s transformation as an agency and institution and its own influence in the Northwest region. Finally, the M-G-I-A framework is just that: a proposed means of analysis that can be explored, tested, and adjusted as additional research progresses. As King, Keohane and Verba observe, “we need not have a complete theory before collecting data nor must our theory remain fixed throughout” (1994, p. 46). I reasonably expect that, just as the model was initially conceived through my review of existing literature on both meta-governance and organizational theory, and became further elaborated in the research and findings from my case study, it will continue to evolve as part of a broader research agenda. The key factor is to have a robust research strategy and
design to test the framework, but to adjust the framework as necessary to reflect the findings of the research.

Description of the M-G-I-A Framework.

At its core, the M-G-I-A framework operates at the intersection between meta-governance and organizational theory. Synthesizing these theories has enabled developing a structure that considers the three dimensions labelled Governance Collaboration, Agency Capability, and Executive Leadership as a means of organizing the concepts and interactions as used in this case study. Doing so provides an understanding of how shifting governance modes and changing organizational structures and functions are used in an attempt to respond to complex, diverse, and dynamic environments. Moreover, this structure captures how public administrators act as “meta-governors” in attempting those shifts and changes. The structure captures the myriad concepts and theories of organizations as complex social phenomena, encompassing the Agency Capability and Executive Leadership dimensions, but brings further insight to these phenomena by exploring their connections with the Governance Collaboration dimension. The M-G-I-A framework also incorporates autopoiesis in the form of an agency’s drive to maintain legitimacy, autonomy, and resilience. Finally, but crucially for further research, the M-G-I-A framework develops an approach to examining and integrating external influences on public administrative agencies as an open system through the concept of the agency’s governance ecosystem.
The M-G-I-A framework, is depicted in a series of figures, which sequentially elaborate the concepts. Beginning with Figure 2 below, a subject organization (in this case study, BPA as a discrete federal agency) is depicted. The organization is shown within the boundary represented by the dashed hexagonal line. The outer hexagonal dashed-line border represents both the subject agency and the permeable nature of organizational boundaries (Scott and Davis, 2016) susceptible to exogenous actions on the agency as an organizational entity and network actor. The subject agency could be any federal, state, or local agency, but should be a discrete entity to make better use of the three dimensions depicted within the organizational boundary (e.g., the organization could be BPA or any of the federal agencies such as USACE, BOR, or NMFS referenced in these findings). Of particular note, the M-G-I-A framework could be used for multiple agencies. Though this adds significant complexity and was beyond the scope of this study, it would provide valuable comparisons among those organizational entities.
Within the organizational boundary, I include three ‘facets’ (indicated by Φ) to form a cube that reflects the interactions among the dimensions of Governance Collibration (ΦGC), Agency Capability (ΦAC), and Executive Leadership (ΦEL). These three dimensions, and their relation to one another provide the foundation for the organizational aspect of the M-G-I-A framework. In addition, both the Governance Collibration and Agency Capability dimensions are divided into four categories, as previously described in Chapter 3. The Governance Collibration categories are drawn directly from Jessop’s (2016), framing of four modes of governance: Hierarchies, Markets, Networks, and Solidarity. Using this as a basis, and relying on Wilson (2000), Rainey (2009) and others in my case study, I used a similar set of four categories within
the Agency Capability dimension that are labelled: C1 – CONSTITUTION (the organic or enabling statutes and regulatory or legal obligations); C2 – COURSE (the agency mission, strategy, and policy); C3 – CAPACITY (the organizational structure and resources gathered and expended by the agency); and C4 – CULTURE (the social influences, behavioral norms, and power dynamics of the internal environment). To further elaborate the framework, the two dimensions combine to create the internal environment by which means the public administrator pursues autopoiesis in the face of a changing external environment through the third dimension – Executive Leadership. Here, the means of autopoiesis are depicted in the M-G-I-A framework through maintaining legitimacy, retaining autonomy, and sustaining resilience. The three autopoietic elements are located on the dashed-line organizational boundary to acknowledge their outward-facing aspect as a key element of the interaction between the organization and its external operating environment. It must be noted that in my BPA case study as a first iteration of the M-G-I-A framework, I emphasized Governance Collibration in the Chapter 4 findings and analysis. However, an alternative focus could as well use Executive Leadership dimension as I explored in Chapter 5 to focus on the three means of autopoiesis depicted in the M-G-I-A framework.

Using network theory, Figure 3 then shows the subject agency’s organizational network – those other organizations with which the subject organization may engage in Katz and Kahn’s (1966/2005) energetic exchange. As with the dashed-line border around
the agency, the same hexagonal dashed-lines for each additional organization indicates the open-system nature of the governance ecosystem. The M-G-I-A framework allows that these additional actors may be of various types of organizations in such a network.

**Figure 3. Locating the Subject Organization and Other Organizations Within its Operational Network**
As described in my BPA case study, Figure 4 shows the additional stakeholders and types of actors beyond the organizational actors indicated in Figure 3. It should also be noted that in my case study I identified – in a broad sense – the tenor of the relationship between BPA and the actors in its governance ecosystem. As shown by the bi-directional arrows in both figures, the relationships of these actors influence the agency to varying degrees to which the agency may react and respond.

*Figure 4. Additional Sources of Influences on Organization*
Figure 5 then depicts the more complete Governance Ecosystem, with both organizations and other ecosystem actors, all interacting.

*Figure 5. Subject Organization and Governance Ecosystem*

This figure is a simplified version of the complete BPA Governance System as shown by Figure 6 below. It must be emphasized that – while this figure only indicates relationships between the subject agency and actors, real world case studies using the framework would necessarily also offer consideration of the relationships between ecosystem organizational actors (as indicated on the left), as well as the myriad interactions among actors of all types. For ease of understanding the framework, I have excluded these additional bidirectional arrows.
Finally, in Figure 7 below, the M-G-I-A framework depicts a ‘crisis’ event affecting the agency and requiring a response to which the external influences also react. I have focused on crises (e.g. in the BPA case study, the collapse of the salmon stocks; deregulation and competitive pressures; and financial challenges), which contemplate sudden and significant changes to the external or operating environment as the driver of external influences using Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen’s theory of “punctuated equilibrium” (2014). As well, the curved arrows depict the complex interplay among the entities within the governance ecosystem, including both actions (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) and signals (Holland, 2012), that attempt to influence and respond to the actions and signals of the subject agency as well as one another. The result is ‘feedback loops’ between the external actors and the agency as indicated by the curved arrows.
It must be noted that crisis is not the only means of disruption. Other forms (less salient but still present to a degree in my study) are myriad. One such example in my case study was the rapid change political priorities associated with the Clinton-Gore reinventing government initiative. Similarly, policy shifts in regulation of the agency – or in the case if BPA, deregulation – may not reach a crisis level as seen in my research, but can have a significant effect on the governance ecosystem interactions depicted in the M-G-I-A framework. Finally, a scandal or agency failure as seen in the reporting on BPA and ‘furniture-gate’ may be a similar driver of agency change. Whether termed a ‘crisis’ *per se* by the agency or its governance ecosystem actors, events such as those described...
would still be potential inflection points that may be examined through the M-G-I-A framework.

*Using the M-G-I-A Framework.*

As suggested above, using the M-G-I-A framework arms researchers with additional analytical tools to use in the study of an agency’s actions in fulfilling its mission and responding to the several forms of change in operating environments; the reactions, responses, positions taken, and counteractions of the multiple actors in an agency’s governance ecosystem; and the agency’s own counteractions as a result.

Having already addressed the level of analysis contemplated for the M-G-I-A framework as focusing on discrete organizations, there is still the matter of the unit of analysis. The M-G-I-A framework is feasible for administrative agencies at the local, state or federal level. This could also include special purpose districts. It is likely less valuable for examination of a general government (i.e., city government or county government) due to the added complexity of multiple departments within a general government organization, each having their own collaborative mix. Finally, in developing research designs using the M-G-I-A framework, identifying appropriate records and datasets for use is crucial. Multiple types of data may be used with the framework (e.g., budget figures, or similar agency reports). The key to a robust analysis is in using both internal and external sources for information and data about the subject agency.
An Observation on Meta-Governance Terms.

As a final note on meta-governance and the governance collaboration modes, a challenge is that of clear, concise terminology adequate to expand this field of study. Notably, concepts and theories within the meta-governance field are somewhat varied, including use of network systems theory more broadly and Kooiman’s (2003) own use of ‘third-order governance.’ Regardless of the terminology used, it is generally accepted that meta-governance involves understanding “shifts from hierarchical authority to networked or heterarchical coordination in other social fields” as an arena for significant investigation “which would link the language of governance to growing societal complexity” (Jessop, 2016, p. 164). In exploring theories, developing a sound research design, reporting findings, and contributing to academic discourse, the current terms and concepts may well be appropriate for meta-governance theory at the state or systems levels of analysis (Jessop, 2016; Kooiman, 2003). However, in attempting to use meta-governance – and especially governance collaboration – at the organizational level of analysis with an administrative agency as the unit of analysis, the terminology becomes overburdened.

As a starting point, some consideration must be given to the premise that – as Ferguson (2018) notes – all governance modes are by definition, ‘networks’ because governance is fundamentally between the governing and the governed (in the broadest sense). Similarly, Lynn (2013) argues that there is a false dichotomy between
hierarchical and collaborative (whether solidarity or networks) mechanisms in governance. Therefore, it is important to distinguish (and define terms) assuming that governmental entities – in this instance – engage in governance. Finally, there is a distinction to be made between Jessop’s (2022) observations on governance of markets and market economies versus the narrower approach of Osborne and Gaebler (1992) in arguing for government to act as a competitor in providing services. Using the Hierarchy, Markets, Networks, and Solidarity governance modes in the M-G-I-A framework has the potential to increase the confusion and diminishes preciseness in research and analysis efforts.

Therefore, as part of the M-G-I-A framework, I also propose terminology specific to use in organizational governance collibrative analysis. In suggesting this nomenclature, I turned back to Ferguson’s (2018) analogy of hierarchy to a ‘tower’ and his observation on the historical foundation of network theory using bridges to illustrate the concept. With this in mind, I simply used the Greek terms for tower and bridge and appended the Greek term for ‘rule,’ or ‘archy’ (as already found in the term hierarchy) to arrive at terms suitable to the specifics of engaging in and mixing governance modes for the M-G-I-A framework. Similarly, I used the Greek terms for market and street to complete the nomenclature. Table 34 indicates each term for the four respective governance modes; I use the Greek letter for each governance mode as a ‘shorthand,’ which is included as well. In the table I also note each term’s derivation and attributes
(as previously described in Chapter 2), and its associated meta-governance concept.

While these terms may be more representational than strictly descriptive, my purpose is to more clearly and narrowly identify them as specific to use in organizational analysis for the M-G-I-A Framework and distinguish them from the broader state or systems governance concepts.

Table 34. An Administrative Agency Governance Modes Nomenclature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Mode</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Associated Meta-Governance Concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pyrgosarchy ($\pi$)</td>
<td>From ‘tower’ and ‘rule,’ consisting of: - Command and Control - Compulsion/Coercion - Compliance - Regulation - Enforcement</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gefyrarchy ($\gamma$)</td>
<td>From ‘bridge’ and ‘rule,’ consisting of: - Concession - Collaboration - Coalition - Co-governance</td>
<td>Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agorarchy ($\alpha$)</td>
<td>From ‘market’ and ‘rule,’ consisting of: - Competition - Contract - Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dromosarchy ($\delta$)</td>
<td>From ‘street’ and ‘rule,’ consisting of: - Consensus - Cooperation - Commitment</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Future Research Agenda**

My study was necessary foundational work for using governance collibration as an analytical tool, which is part of a new set of explanatory tools in organizational change research and theory. Moreover, the M-G-I-A Framework developed through my study is the cornerstone for a robust research agenda to further elaborate and understand meta-governance through the use of governance collibration. Using the M-G-I-A framework in additional settings will in turn further explore, elaborate, and validate the framework itself as a valuable research and analytical tool. Here, I briefly consider some of those prospects for research. Each of these prospects isolates a specific aspect of the M-G-I-A framework and explores it through the Governance Collibration lens.

Using a narrow scope, research isolating one of the Agency Capability categories as an individual study of how that capability is used to implement the four governance modes would further elaborate and clarify the Agency Capability categories as well as provide insights to the governance modes themselves. Perhaps the easiest Agency Capability category using this approach is C1 – CONSITUTION. This would primarily involve analysis of one or more agencies’ enabling statutes as the independent variable with the governance modes as the dependent variable. The approach would be most beneficial for examining multiple agencies functioning in the same policy field or operational sector. As an example in the environmental sector, an examination of the
enabling statutes for multiple states’ Fish and Wildlife departments would potentially show distinctions between enforcement authority in the Hierarchy governance mode or partnerships obligations in the Networks governance mode. Similarly, budgetary analysis in C3 – CAPACITY would be a relatively clear and consistent data set to isolate and analyze through the governance collaboration lens.

While my BPA case study focused on a single agency in its analysis, it could easily form the basis for a comparative case study using the M-G-I-A framework with BPA and one or more of its federal partner agencies. As an alternative, a comparative case study of the USACE and Bureau of Reclamation would robustly explore how those two similarly situated federal agencies make use of governance collaboration. As well, two similarly situated agencies at the local, state, or international level of analysis would provide insights into how governance collaboration is utilized where the mission and function is similar, but the agencies’ operating environments are distinct. Keeping with the energy sector, a comparative study of two or more states’ Public Utility Commissions would prove valuable in examining organizational change across state lines. Additional opportunities involve using a comparative case study approach that would explore how two agencies responding to the same crisis (as depicted in the M-G-I-A framework) make use of the different governance modes in response. Here, a comparison of emergency management services agencies and fish and wildlife agencies respond to wildfire risk would be informative.
The prior examples consider the agency as the unit of analysis. However, the M-G-I-A framework would also be useful in comparative case studies of executive leadership. Just as my BPA case study compared (in an admittedly limited fashion) the tenures of Jura and Hardy, use of the Executive Leadership dimension for two heads of agencies in a similar longitudinal study would further explore how the executive role makes use of Agency Capability to effect Governance Collibration change in response to crises or other operating environment changes.

In addition to the more specific studies described above, building upon my BPA case study and the M-G-I-A framework also presents opportunities for further exploration of meta-governance at the ‘macro’ level. Specifically, it would provide additional insights to the theoretical concepts posited by Kooiman (2003), Jessop (2016), and Sørensen and Torfing (2009), among others. By further exploring the governance collibration in the variety of settings described above, we can also better understand and postulate theories of meta-governance and their provenance. Such research would build upon the foundational work of Sørensen and Torfing on the use of meta-governance in western democratic institutions and the controls or correctives required to ensure accountability to the public in the use of governance collibration.

Finally, a robust research agenda for governance collibration would bring insights to meta-governance as being a natural outgrowth of western democracies in particular. Such consideration would include the implications of meta-governance as a natural
progression of the American constitutional order of checks and balances (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, 1788/1988) or the more complex development of treaties and institutions developed to form the European union (Reid, 2004). Finally, studies of governance collaboration might well further inform Dahl’s (1956/2006) theories of polyarchal democracy. In each of these areas, meta-governance and governance collaboration should be explored both as arising from such complex institutional structures and theories, but also as informing (in a feedback loop) the theories’ own continuing evolution to explain and to meet the challenges inherent in Kooiman’s (2003) diverse, dynamic and complex worldview.

Summary

My research began with a seemingly simple proposition, to answer the question of how BPA’s executive leadership changed the organization’s governance collaboration and its agency capabilities in response to a rapidly evolving operating environment. The purpose was to bring the concepts and tools of meta-governance to bear on a specific agency so as to provide new insights to organizational change and network theory. However, in order to provide a robust study, the research ultimately involved myriad aspects of understanding BPA and its transformational decade. It required a deep exploration of how governance modes might be evidenced by an agency as well as creating a schema for categorizing aspects of the agency’s capability. Further, understanding the competing narratives of BPA and the region (through newspaper
accounts) across a decade of rapid change was crucial to answering how the agency evolved as an organization and an institution of the Pacific Northwest. Finally, it required a comprehensive understanding of the complex governance ecosystem within which BPA operated. Only through an extensive examination using a longitudinal case study approach could the purposes of my research be accomplished.

Tracing BPA’s rapid evolution and ultimate transformation over the decade from 1987 to 1996 combined organizational analysis and narratives analysis in a longitudinal, in-depth case study of a major Pacific Northwest public administration institution. Utilizing the approaches of analyzing the internal dimensions of governance modes, agency capabilities, and executive leadership, I achieved an understanding of how BPA’s structures and functions changed through governance collaboration. In particular, coding the four categories of Governance Collaboration as shown in the agency’s annual report narratives clearly indicated an organization engaged in shifting governance to meet the challenges it faced. But identifying governance modes in operation at the agency was supplemented and strengthened in my analysis by also coding for the Agency Capability categories in conjunction with Governance Collaboration. Doing so showed the means by which BPA shifted its governance mode and approach to the issues confronting it throughout the decade. Admittedly, the Agency Capability categories were not all equally discernable for coding in the annual reports, which gave rise to utilizing additional data outside of the annual report narratives. The BPA Consolidated Statutes,
the 1995 BPA Business Plan, and data from the Financial Sections of the annual reports helped to clarify and reinforce the findings from the narratives themselves. Finally, the Executive Leadership dimension proved to be a factor that was less useful initially due to the limitations of how annual reports are presented. Other than the Administrator’s Letter section, the annual reports did not show clear indications of the administrator’s role as the apex executive of the agency. In addition, as described in Chapter 3, no additional records from BPA were readily available to me for examining administrator actions.

Fortunately, the extensive coverage of BPA and both of its administrators over the decade, provided sufficient data and insights to the Executive Leadership dimension of my study. Moreover, examining the narratives of regional external influences and BPA’s self-narratives provided a rich description of BPA as an agency and a governance actor over its transformative decade. Importantly, the newspaper narratives more clearly showed both Jura’s and Hardy’s respective roles in facing challenges, responding to multiple crises, and engaging with the full network of stakeholders and actors across the Northwest region.

My research adds to the suite of tools used to analyze and understand organizational change (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) and autopoiesis (Dunsire, 1996). While it is a case study of a single agency, the longitudinal analysis of BPA’s organizational transformation using the lens of governance collibration provides a
strong foundation for expanded use of the governance collabration lens. However, it is important to re-emphasize that using the three dimensions for analysis on their own does not appropriately place agency change in full context, so the external influences and narratives analysis is crucial in forming a complete picture and understanding of the events and details that occurred. Further, using the internal organization categories provides crucial observations of the ways in which the agency responds to external influences. Therefore, this initial iteration of an integrated approach can furnish insights, understanding, and a consistent framework for studying networks and organizational change, but most significantly, it brings meta-governance theories and concepts to bear on networks and organizations in such a way as to provide value to researchers, theorists, and public administrators.

One of the personal great benefits of my study is that it provided the impetus for my development of an analytical framework incorporating meta-governance theory into organizational change analysis. As a result, the M-G-I-A framework offers opportunities for a robust research agenda that will not only further elaborate and test the framework itself but will provide a useful means to better analyze and understand organizational change in public administration agencies. My study affirmatively indicates that organizations actively (if perhaps unwittingly) use meta-governance in a concrete and operationalized fashion in pursuit of their mission as agencies and goals in preserving the organization qua organization. Moreover, my findings show that public
administrators are intimately involved in shifting governance and changing agency operations in response to the myriad external influences that result from a complex, dynamic, and diverse network of actors as stakeholders in agency behavior.

The implications of my research touch upon meta-governance theory, collaboration, policy, and practice. My study provides a better understanding of BPA’s positionality as a key regional governance actor navigating the evolving tensions between energy and environmental sector policies. Further, it helps explain the BPA Governance Ecosystem and the complex interactions among BPA, its federal partners, its customers, and regional stakeholders. Finally, the study shows the means by which executives transformed BPA and its approach to governance in the face of major regional attention on the multiple crises from salmon stock collapse and industry deregulation to increasing financial constraints. Importantly, my work helps bring meta-governance concepts such as governance collaboration from the abstract into more readily usable frameworks helping to better define, explain, and elaborate meta-governance concepts and theory. Of greater significance for meta-governance and organizational theory, this research provides a framework for examining governance collaboration, organizational change, executive leadership and the multi-directional influences from the governance ecosystem on public administrative organizations and their executives. In so doing, the study of organizational change and the fields of meta-
governance, public administration, and leadership behavior stand to benefit from my research and findings on BPA’s transformative decade.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Seattle Post-Intelligencer Article “The Power Broker – BPA: 50 Years of Water Over the Dam (Lange, L., 1987, August 6).”

THE POWER BROKER -
BPA: 50 YEARS OF WATER OVER THE DAM

By Larry Lange P-I Reporter August 6, 1987 Publication: Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Page: 44 Word Count: 2275

Uncle Sam took up the challenge in the year of ’33 For the farmers and the workers and for all humanity.

He said, roll on, Columbia, you can ramble to the sea

But river while you’re rambling, you can do some work for me.

- Woody Guthrie, from ‘Ballad of the Great Grand Coulee’

Ludlow Music, Inc.,/TRO, New York

Harold Hill and Gerald Fenston remember life before the revolution of 1937.

They lived on Klickitat County ranches in those days, back in the 1920s and 1930s, and they remember hauling water by hand or hand-pumping it from wells.

They remember outdoor toilets and gasoline-fired generators powering a few lights. They remember radios run by batteries that were recharged by rooftop windmills.

Before the revolution, taking a hot bath took 1 1/2 hours. Washing clothes consumed a day.
They remember that, too.

Back then, before the Bonneville Power Administration pitted its dams against the wild power of the Columbia River and subdued it to create what Hill refers to as a "social revolution," the private power company serving the area provided service in towns but charged isolated farms a $500 installation fee.

Almost no one could afford that.


So when the revolution came, most rural Klickitat County residents were more than willing to get electrical service to their homes, courtesy of the new Bonneville Power Administration that was formed in 1937 to sell the power produced by Columbia River dams.

Dam construction actually started in 1933, after President Franklin Roosevelt took office and kept a campaign promise to build the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams. BPA historian Gene Tollefson says Roosevelt wanted to help farmers by bringing them electricity and wanted to break the power of private utilities by creating more electricity, thus lowering the price.

Klickitat County farmers watched one of the early BPA transmission lines being built through their county. They approved the creation of a public utility district in 1938, took over power service from the private utility and by the mid-1940s the Hill ranch and others had electricity.

And indoor toilets.

Truly, a revolution. Ask anyone who has used a privy on a cold and rainy morning.

Eventually, 30 such PUDs were formed statewide.

BPA's rates were less than a penny per kilowatt hour in those days and the rate was the same for everyone on the system, regardless of where they lived. Private power companies had charged as much as 17 cents per kilowatt hour.

Farmers scrambled to get onto the new system. Once the Hill ranch was electrified, Hill's father put a radio in the barn, which meant he could regularly listen to the news. His mother, relieved of many household duties, found herself with time to join a local businesswomen's group.
Suddenly "you were part of the community," Hill recalled. "You were on the same level as your city brothers. The social structure of the country changed completely."

The BPA marks the 50th anniversary of its official creation - and completion of the Bonneville Dam - this weekend.

That is 50 years of change in the Pacific Northwest because a chain of dams, said to be the biggest in the world, has done the work Guthrie sang about. And - in the case of harm to fish and wildlife - some he did not sing about.

This is what has been done:

Hydroelectric power. The 1,242-mile Columbia River and its 150 tributaries, once tumbling uncontrolled out of the mountains through gorges and rapids, have been tamed by 55 dams, 30 of them built by federal agencies and capable of producing 19,500 megawatts of electricity - enough to supply 20 cities the size of Seattle. The other 25 dams, most of them on smaller rivers that feed the Columbia, were built by private utilities or by public utilities for their use.

Fifteen of the biggest dams are on the Columbia and Snake Rivers in Washington (see map), 10 of them operated by federal agencies that feed BPA's 14,000-mile electrical supply grid.

Last year, BPA moved 122.7 billion kilowatt hours of electricity over its system. The Army Corps of Engineers estimates it would take more than 204 million barrels of oil to produce the same amount of energy.

Irrigation. Water stored behind Grand Coulee Dam, the biggest in the system, has turned Eastern Washington desert into gold by irrigating some 557,000 acres of farm land. The land now produces 70 different crops.

Before the dam, farmers "might have been successful two or three years... then they'd go into 15 or 20 years of drought, when those farmers would starve to death and leave," said Gene Bye of the Bureau of Reclamation, which built Grand Coulee.

Industry. The dams brought major industry to the Pacific Northwest. BPA historian Tollefson noted that the dams and their cheap electricity helped bring the aluminum smelters to the Northwest, partly because of the onset of World War II.
Alcoa and Reynolds built smelters in the early 1940s. The federal government built several defense smelters, which were sold to private firms after the war. Other privately developed smelters followed at Wenatchee, The Dalles and Goldendale.

The Northwest Power Planning Council estimates that 400,000 jobs in six regional industries, including aluminum, depend on inexpensive power.

Navigation. Eight of the 15 dams on the main stems of the Columbia and Snake rivers have navigation locks used extensively by the region's barge industry, primarily to move inland wheat to downstream ports.

A recent Army Corps of Engineers study estimated that shippers save nearly $35 million annually by moving goods through the locks. The study did not determine the total value of the goods moved.

Recreation. More than 50 parks have been developed on the dam reservoirs. There also are at least two major state game land areas on two mid-Columbia reservoirs and at least half a dozen more parks are in the planning stages.

The corps estimates that there are 15 million visits every year just to the parks it operates and 60 million a year to facilities the length of the Columbia and Snake rivers. The corps also estimates that visitors spend $588 million a year fishing, swimming or picnicking at the parks throughout the region.

The dams and their recreation facilities made Eastern Washington "a much more attractive place to live," said Marion Marts, a retired professor of geography and environmental studies at the University of Washington.

Federal finances. BPA doesn't own or operate the federal dams, but, under federal law, it was directed to sell the power and repay the federal treasury $8.6 billion of the cost of the dams' power and irrigation facilities. At this point BPA has repaid just over half of that. It kept current with payments to the treasury through the mid-1970s, when it encountered two years of dry conditions and took on massive debt for three Washington Public Power Supply System nuclear plants.

Depressed Northwest economic conditions in the early 1980s compounded the problem. BPA
has raised its wholesale power rates six times since 1973 in an attempt to keep current. The last increase was announced last week. BPA's yearly debt payment, $610 million, is due in September. Congress periodically threatens to raise BPA's rates by accelerating its debt payments. BPA Administrator Jim Jura said he intends not to miss any more payments.

Fish. The dams restricted passage of migratory fish. Juvenile fish passing downstream were chewed up by the blades of turbines, eaten by predators, infected with diseases in reservoirs or killed by nitrogen supersaturation in water below some dams. Grand Coulee and Chief Joseph dams, which weren't built with fish ladders, blocked fish runs in the upper reaches of the river.

The Columbia, once home to as many as 16 million salmon and steelhead each year, now supports perhaps 2.5 million, according to Northwest Power Planning Council estimates. "We used to have large runs of June salmon that would go all the way up the system and up into Canada if there were no obstacles, but those runs have slowly disappeared," said Jack Marineovich, a gillnet fisherman and executive director of the Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union in Astoria.

Public pressure in the 1930s forced the Corps of Engineers to include fish ladders at Bonneville Dam, the first one completed on the Columbia. Restrictions on harvesting and a recent treaty with Canada are said to have improved the runs somewhat.

The power council has proposed an ambitious program to double the fish run by the end of the century. The program could cost $50 million a year, depending on how long it takes. The corps said it already has spent more than $550 million on fish facilities such as ladders and hatcheries.

River flow. The dams, by restricting the flow of the river, have all but eliminated the Columbia's destructive seasonal flooding. The corps estimates that the dam system has prevented $8.7 billion in damage since the barriers were built.

On the other hand, the dams also have reduced the river's ability to cleanse sediment from its lower reaches. Oceanographers think the slower current may be causing the river estuary below Puget Island in Wahkiakum County to slowly fill with silt. It will require regular dredging.

Wildlife. The dams flooded countless acres of habitat used by birds and other wildlife along the shores. Mart of the UW said drops in reservoir water levels, caused when water was spilled to generate electricity during peak hours, frequently eliminated water barriers to islands where
waterfowl nested, exposing them to coyotes and other predators.

Work to restore lost wildlife habitat is in progress.

But while some wildlife habitat has been lost, some also has been created in the reservoir pools and elsewhere. Marris said heavy irrigation in the Columbia Basin area of Eastern Washington, using water from Grand Coulee dam, actually created new lakes and marshy areas, many of them now part of the National Basin Wildlife Refuge near Othello.

But some benefits were closer to home.

Hill and Fenton said once BPA power came to the countryside near Goldendale, farm homes acquired the niceties of city living and produced a surprise: barn lights that made chickens lay more eggs by prolonging light.

And for the first time each farmer could plant a lawn around his house, said Fenton, 82.

"God, how nice that was."

What of the future? There's more energy to be extracted from the Columbia and its tributaries, officials say, but there are some hurdles to getting it.

There may be a lesson in how the Army Corps of Engineers tried to wrest more power from the Bonneville Dam, for example.

After eight years of work, the corps completed a second powerhouse at the dam in 1962. It forced the relocation of a highway, a railroad and an entire town and cost $663 million. It more than doubled the dam's output of electricity.

Now it runs only eight months of the year, because it kills too many young fish as they try to migrate downstream. Expenses are mounting as the corps tries to find out what's killing so many fish.

Tiny smolts, or juvenile salmon and steelhead, must swim to the ocean past dams by going over spillways or by entering passageways inside the dam. The second maneuver forces them to go past intakes for huge turbines, where they can be sucked into the blades and killed.
At most dams, about 70 percent of the tiny fish make it around turbines. At the new Bonneville powerhouse, only 25 percent do. Overall, about 12 percent of the fish die trying to pass the powerhouse. At most corps dams, the loss is 10 percent or less.

The corps isn't sure why more young fish die at Bonneville - but it's trying to find out. So far, it has spent about $900,000 trying and has "had some successes . . . but we still haven't been able to solve the problem," said corps fish biologist Jim Kaskie.

The corps has stopped running the powerhouse during the April-to-August fish migration season, at the request of the Northwest Power Planning Council, which is charged with restoring fish runs.

That's not the only restriction placed on the system.

The council also has persuaded the dam operators to provide extra water each spring to help fish migration. That's a big chunk of water that could produce a lot of electricity, but it's sacrificed to help fish. Jim Litchfield, the council power planner, said there's "every expectation" that water will continue to be used for fish instead of power.

"The hydro power system is a delicate balance of a lot of different pressures all the time," he said. "New constraints could come up in almost any area. It's hard to forecast."

One way of getting more energy from the dams might be through conservation or greater efficiency, perhaps with the benefit of so-called superconductors if those are ever perfected.

Such developments could increase efficiencies of transmission lines, which now lose about 5 percent of the power they carry, said Stig Annesrand, BPA's manager of research and development.

Single strands of superconductors could replace the huge strands of conventional transmission cable. Another possibility, Annesrand said, is storage of electricity in superconductive material, reducing the need for additional power plants.

Meanwhile, experts say there's no need for the energy because the region has a power surplus. Annesrand said that if more dams are built, they likely will be on smaller streams by private interests, not the federal government, as efforts continue to deregulate the power industry.
The result? More competition, he guessed, and "hopefully, lower prices on energy."

(1)P-I Harold Hill (2)P-I Gerald Fenton (3)GRANT M. HALLER/P-I Not only do the dams along the Columbia provide electrical power and better navigation, they also offer plenty of recreational facilities. John Kolb of Portland, Ore., caught this sturgeon just below the Bonneville Dam.

PHOTO MAP
Appendix B: Step-By-Step Coding Example for BPA Annual Reports Using MAXQDA

This Appendix elaborates the coding process used for this study. It utilizes a series of screenshots captured from the MAXQDA data analysis tool. Each screenshot is accompanied by a short description indicating how the tool was used for coding and analysis.

Figure B.1 is the ‘home screen’ for the coding library used. The upper left window shows the documents to be coded – in this instance, the ten BPA annual reports, in chronological order. The lower left window shows the coding categories used, including specific terms/phrase, the Executive Action code, the four Agency Capability codes, and the four Governance Codes. To the right of each code, the number of instances coded in the annual reports is shown.

The righthand window shows the cover page of the 1994 Annual Report. As shown in the subsequent screenshots, coding takes place by highlighting paragraphs in the righthand window and then assigning one or more codes according to the schema in the lower left window.
In Figures B.2 and B.3, the same paragraph from the 1994 BPA Annual Report is highlighted and coded to both the Markets Governance Mode (due to the “customer service” reference) and the Solidarity Governance Mode (due to the “public service” reference) as an instance of intra-code coding as discussed in Chapter 4.

Figure B.2  Screenshot of MAXQDA Showing a Paragraph Coded and Highlighted for the Markets Governance Mode.

Figure B.3  Screenshot of MAXQDA Showing a Paragraph Coded and Highlighted for the Solidarity Governance Mode.
In Figures B.4 and B.5, the same paragraph is highlighted and coded to both the Markets Governance Mode (due to the “utility customers” and “market” references) and the C3 – CAPACITY Category (due to the “budgeted costs” and “Fewer people work here” references) as an instance of co-coding as discussed in Chapter 4.

Figure B.4 Screenshot of MAXQDA Showing a Paragraph Coded and Highlighted for the Markets Governance Mode.

Figure B.5 Screenshot of MAXQDA Showing a Paragraph Coded and Highlighted for the C3 – CAPACITY Agency Capability Category.
Figure B.6 shows the coding analysis performed by inserting the Markets code in the analysis field (indicated by the orange arrow). The instances where the same paragraph was coded for the Solidarity Governance Mode (the green arrow) and the C3 – CAPACITY category (the blue arrow) indicated below allowed for analysis of patterns or potential correlations among the coding categories.

Figure B.6  Screenshot of MAXQDA Showing a Pop-Up Screen with Instances of Intra-Code Coding Between the Markets and Solidarity Governance Modes and between the Markets Governance Mode and the C3 - CAPACITY category.
Appendix C: Longitudinal Analysis of Annual Report Financial Figures and Organizational Charts

The longitudinal analysis of annual reports focuses on two aspects associated with the C3 – CAPACITY category: financial figures and organization chart changes, each of which are addressed separately in this Appendix. I included Operating Expenses from the Annual Report Financial Highlights section as those were indicators of significant increases/decreases in spending as reported in the annual report narratives. I also included the Total Assets from the Financial Highlights sections. I further included the value of the FCRPS Balance Sheet Fish & Wildlife Assets to compare their value against the agency’s total assets. While the percentages were miniscule, the key observation was the increase in value over the decade as an indicator of increasing efforts to address fish mitigation. With all three sets of financial figures (Operating Expenses, Total Assets, and Fish & Wildlife Assets), I also calculated the percentage change year-over-year to examine overall financial trends as well as outliers. As further described below, I then considered these trends and outliers in light of the associated narratives from each of the annual reports to identify the extent to which the narratives aligned with the financial trends as part of C3 - CAPACITY.

I included the number of BPA employees in this high-level longitudinal overview because employment figures were an important part of the annual report narratives. This comes with one important caveat – the numbers reported in the Financial Highlights only reflect “Permanent Employees.” Part of the cost-cutting narratives in
both the Jura years and the Hardy years also reference contract workers. As a result, there is little way of telling from the annual reports whether there were reductions (or increases) in that workforce.

The Longitudinal figures have been split into two tables for ease of understanding with the Jura years included in Table C-1.1 and the Hardy years included in Table C-1.2. Although 1991 was the transition year between Jura and Hardy and Hardy wrote the Administrator’s letter, 1991 is included in the “Jura years” because most of the annual report’s activities happened on Jura’s watch. Moreover, Hardy acknowledged the annual report was written in conjunction between the two.

Table C-1.1   Annual Report Financial Figures Highlights: Jura Years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'87 Jura</th>
<th>'88 Jura</th>
<th>'89 Jura</th>
<th>'90 Jura</th>
<th>'91 Jura/Hardy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Operating Expenses (FROM Financial Highlights section) in thousands</td>
<td>$1,510,215</td>
<td>$1,553,084</td>
<td>$1,670,475</td>
<td>$1,453,153</td>
<td>$1,488,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Inc./Dec. Year-to-year</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2.84%</td>
<td>7.56%</td>
<td>-13.01%</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets (FROM Financial Highlights section) in thousands</td>
<td>$14,144,582</td>
<td>$14,064,567</td>
<td>$14,260,965</td>
<td>$15,051,014</td>
<td>$15,697,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Inc./Dec. Year-to-year</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>5.54%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCRPS Balance Sheets: Fish &amp; Wildlife Assets in thousands</td>
<td>$13,197</td>
<td>$19,783</td>
<td>$26,334</td>
<td>$40,148</td>
<td>$54,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Inc./Dec. Year-to-year</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>49.91%</td>
<td>33.11%</td>
<td>52.46%</td>
<td>34.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F&amp;W as Percentage of Total Assets</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Employees</td>
<td>3,269</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>3,399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C-1.2  Annual Report Financial Figures Highlights: Hardy Years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'92 Hardy</th>
<th>'93 Hardy</th>
<th>'94 Hardy</th>
<th>'95 Hardy</th>
<th>'96 Hardy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Operating Expenses (FROM Financial Highlights section) in thousands</td>
<td>$1,888,896</td>
<td>$1,879,694</td>
<td>$1,880,334</td>
<td>$1,889,464</td>
<td>$1,958,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Inc./Dec. Year-to-year</td>
<td>26.93%</td>
<td>-0.49%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>3.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets (FROM Financial Highlights section) in thousands</td>
<td>$15,766,878</td>
<td>$16,274,391</td>
<td>$16,618,875</td>
<td>$16,804,282</td>
<td>$16,709,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Inc./Dec. Year-to-year</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>3.22%</td>
<td>2.12%</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
<td>-0.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCRPS Balance Sheets: Fish &amp; Wildlife Assets in thousands</td>
<td>$60,757</td>
<td>$72,567</td>
<td>$86,216</td>
<td>$110,204</td>
<td>$125,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Inc./Dec. Year-to-year</td>
<td>12.12%</td>
<td>19.44%</td>
<td>18.81%</td>
<td>27.82%</td>
<td>14.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F&amp;W as Percentage of Total Assets</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Employees (FROM Financial Highlights section)</td>
<td>3,666</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>3,444</td>
<td>3,271</td>
<td>3,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Inc./Dec. Year-to-year</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
<td>-0.30%</td>
<td>-5.77%</td>
<td>-5.02%</td>
<td>-3.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While not an in-depth financial analysis, there are a couple of observations to be made. First is the significant jump in operating expenses (over 25%) between 1991 and 1992. As this was Hardy’s first full year as administrator, he tackled the issue immediately in the Administrator’s letter, noting “new mandates to protect fish and a
need to buy new resources” (BPA, 1992, p. 3). Coincidentally, this year included a 7.86% jump in permanent employees. While Hardy did not make note of the increase in the 1992 Annual Report, as further described below, it was a focus of his attention in subsequent years. The other ‘outlier’ year, 1990, reported a contrasting drop in Operating Expenses of just over 13%. The narrative of the 1990 Annual Report indicated that the success in reducing operating expenses came primarily from BPA restructuring its debt – specifically regarding the Washington Public Power System costs that BPA paid. By completing a series of bond sales that paid off previous, higher interest bonds, “these bond sales reduced BPA’s high fixed costs” (BPA, 1990, p. 4). While the 1990 narrative also generally attributed the reduced operating costs to streamlining operations and cost-cutting measures, the debt restructuring was the only specific action described to explain the significant drop in operating expenses.

As stated above, the total value of assets was included in my longitudinal review primarily as a means of using the year-over-year value of fish and wildlife assets to ascertain the changes in resources allocated to fish mitigation efforts. However, the increase in total asset value for both 1990 and 1991 (a 5.54% and 4.30% respectively, increase year-over-year) was only notable in that the average increase in value year-over-year was just under two percent. Some of this was certainly attributable to the increase in Fish & Wildlife Assets value, but as seen in Table 26, the total value of Fish & Wildlife Assets was minuscule in comparison to BPA’s total asset value. Neither the annual
report narrative, nor the Management Analysis & Discussion sections directly addressed the change in asset value. However, closer examination of the Balance Sheet in the 1990 Annual Report indicated that, similar to the changes in Operating Expense figures in the same period, this was primarily attributable to re-structuring the WPPSS debt. The 1991 Annual Report then suggests that debt re-structuring resulted in a substantial increase in cash assets, rising from roughly $210 million to just over $323 million (BPA, 1990, p. 22). Interestingly, the debt re-structuring for the WPPSS plants was a key indicator of BPA’s efforts and commitments to its partner entities in the Networks governance mode using its C3 – CAPACITY resource tools.

Using the increase in the value of Fish & Wildlife assets as an indicator of fish mitigation activities lacks detail. But it does show the increasing importance of these efforts to BPA as the salmon stock collapse issue came to the fore. It must be noted that the average year-over-year increase in the Fish & Wildlife assets figures was nearly 30% throughout the decade. In fact, the year-over-year increase between the first two years of the decade (1987 and 1988) was significant in spite of there being no mention of salmon stocks decline or particular concern regarding fish mitigation efforts in the 1988 Annual Report. Rather, the report noted recent salmon runs “exceeded those of other recent years” and stated BPA and the Northwest Power Planning Council’s shared goal “to double the size of steelhead and salmon runs, from 2.5 million fish to 5 million fish” (BPA, 1987, p. 23). This commitment was evident in the steadily increasing value of
the Fish & Wildlife assets each year, particularly in both 1988 and 1990, where the asset values jumped by roughly 50% in each of those years. The result was that, in the space of ten years the value of Fish & Wildlife assets was nearly tenfold, rising from $13 million in 1987 to over $125 million in 1996. Again, the asset value was not a complete picture of BPA’s fish mitigation efforts. The annual report narratives, especially in the Hardy years, continually called out the increasing costs of addressing the salmon stock declines, stating that “projections of future additional fish obligations ranged from an added $300 million to $600 million a year” (BPA, 1995a, p. 11). The projected expense figures showed the limitations of relying on the Fish & Wildlife asset value in analyzing BPA’s fish mitigation efforts, but it also provided two further insights. First, BPA faced significant challenges (as previously described) in terms of its C3 – CAPACITY efforts; the obligations BPA had toward fish mitigation were far outpacing its ability (indicated by the Fish & Wildlife Asset figures) to accomplish real mitigation. Second, C3 – CAPACITY constraints had a significant impact on BPA’s ability and obligation to use the Solidarity governance mode. Fish mitigation, as a collective public benefit, is a form of the Solidarity governance mode, but it – as with all governance modes – comes with costs. BPA’s ability to fulfill commitments with increasingly constrained resources was strong evidence of how an agency must navigate the tensions among its use of governance modes in the face of major challenges in its operating environment and the limits of its C3 – CAPACITY tools.
Finally, my longitudinal review included two items of note in the permanent employee trends across the decade. First there was a significant jump in permanent employees between 1991 and 1992 – increasing from 3,399 to 3,666, or a nearly 8% increase. However, the commitment to streamlining and reducing staff indicated in the subsequent annual report narratives was reflected in an overall reduction from that 3,666 figure in 1992 to 3,152 in 1996. Notably, the year-over-year reductions in 1994 and 1995 were over 5% each year, bringing the agency back to numbers below the Jura years. Second, the raw numbers of permanent employees do not tell the whole story because the financial highlights did not break out personnel expenses from total operating expenses. Thus, we are left to speculate on the full financial impact of the reduced employment numbers on the operating expenses line. The narratives in both the Jura and the Hardy years seemed to suggest that personnel costs were a significant driver of operating expenses. Jura committed in 1987 to reduce “employment by nearly 9 percent, with approximately 300 positions eliminated” (BPA, 1987, p. 4), which did not come to pass. Yet Operating Expenses dropped by 13% between 1989 and 1990, while the number of employees dropped by only 30 individuals. It is reasonable to surmise that the change in employment figures were not the primary driver of the reduced operating expense. Conversely, while employment figures dropped in the Hardy years, operating expenses continued to increase, albeit by very low percentages. While Hardy reduced staff by roughly 500 between 1993 and 1996, the operating expense increases suggests that savings in personnel costs were simply used elsewhere in the agency’s
budget. However, as stated before, the Annual Report Financial Highlights sections lack sufficient detail to draw any firm conclusions.

BPA’s organization charts (in various forms) were included in the annual reports and provide some further insights. Without including every organization chart while still capturing notable changes, I summarize those changes in Table C-2, below. I did not include the full list and structure of organizations from each year’s organizational chart in part because 1995 and 1996 do not include the traditional ‘box and line’ layout, so reporting structure was lacking for those two years. In addition, the earlier years of the decade had an extensive box-and-line layout with twenty to thirty organizations depicted. Moreover, most of the organizational boxes then listed multiple management positions within them. Finally, most of those middle management organizations and roles changed very little over the decade. Therefore, I focused on notable changes in senior management or executive titles and the addition, removal, or change in title of specific organizations and functions.

Table C-2 Key Organizational Chart Changes from 1987 to 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'87 Jura</th>
<th>Eighteen direct reports to the Administrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Positions are Traditional Public Administrative Titles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization is arranged along:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Power Services; Power Sales (both Sr. Asst. Administrators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Financial Management; Management Services (both Asst. Administrators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Eight Assts. to the Administrator covering special areas (e.g., EEO, Environment, Planning, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o General Counsel; Chief Auditor or unique positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'88 Jura</td>
<td>Twenty direct reports to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No significant changes in senior management titles or structure, only in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the layout of the Organization Chart on the page: all Assistants to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrator positions are grouped in a single box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added “ADP Study Project” Assistant to the Administrator position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added “Contracts and Property Management” Assistant to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'89 Jura</td>
<td>Twenty direct reports to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One dotted line addition of “Area Executive Officer” to the Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Columbia Regional office, presumably a direct report to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removed “ADP Study Project” Assistant to the Administrator position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added “Information Resources” Assistant to the Administrator position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'90 Jura</td>
<td>Twenty-three direct reports to the Administrator, including</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional offices (Lower Columbia, Puget Sound, Upper Columbia, Snake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>River), which appear to be coordinated by the Area Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>position created the prior year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional Executive Management Positions are listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added a Senior Assistant Administrator with the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Listed three Assistant General Counsel positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changed “Information Resources Assistant” to “Information Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manager” and moved to its own organization box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removed the two Senior Assistant Administrator positions (Power Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Power Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'91 Jura/Hardy</td>
<td>Twenty-five direct reports to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added a “Quality Assurance” Assistant to the Administrator positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added a “Program Management Officer” to the Assistants to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrator positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Environment” moved from Assistant to the Administrator to Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrator and given its own box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'92 Hardy</td>
<td>Twenty-six direct reports to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added “Fish &amp; Wildlife” Assistant to the Administrator (distinct from the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Environment” Assistant Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'93 Hardy</td>
<td>Twenty-six direct reports to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Notable changes from previous year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'94 Hardy</td>
<td>Wholesale change in structure and titles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five direct reports to the Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Deputy CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Chief Operating Officer (COO) - new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Washington Liaison Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Council Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Internal Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title changed from Administrator to Administrator/CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COO position has nine direct reports – seven of which are listed as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group Vice Presidents; new positions reporting to the COO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Sales &amp; Customer Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Marketing Conservation &amp; Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Transmission Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in Table C-2 the organizational charts showed some changes in almost every year, but for the most part, these were fairly minimal. I included the direct reports to the Administrator under the theory that more direct reports to the Administrator indicate greater centralization in decision-making at the agency. I also included changes in titles in part because of the wholesale change in titles and reporting structure that occurred in 1994. Lastly, I included a summary of the starting structural state of the agency in 1987 to assist in tracking subsequent changes over the decade of transformation. “In 1987 BPA underwent extensive reorganization to reduce costs by streamlining expenses. It was the first major reorganization in more than 20 years” (BPA, 1987, p. 4). While the organizational changes from 1986 to 1987 are outside the scope of my study, this does provide a fairly stable starting point for tracking further organization change in the subsequent decade.

Table C-2 indicates that change in organizational structure and management titles was an inherent part of BPA’s evolution over the decade and would be expected in
most organizations operating in a dynamic environment such as the energy sector.

Reflective of the stable state we might assume after the major reorganization between 1986 and 1987, there are only small changes seen in 1988 and 1989. These changes included adding two Assistants to the Administrator and an Area Executive Officer and are reflective of this natural evolution that suggests response to operating environment changes. However, as previously described, the 1987 Annual Report stated that BPA would continue its reorganization efforts through 1989. To the extent that this occurred, it was not reflected in the organization charts from 1987 to 1989. There was no reduction in direct reports to the Administrator, nor were there fewer (or even different) organization boxes on the chart. Along with the lack of reduction in permanent employees described previously, the narrative in the 1987 Annual Report on reorganization did not occur in any substantive way.

Contrast this failed effort early in the decade of transformation with the wholesale changes made by Hardy during his tenure. Even prior to his re-structuring of the agency on a corporate model, the transition year between Jura and Hardy added an organization devoted to “Environment.” Prior to that year the role was listed as an Assistant to the Administrator, but the function became its own organization. While the addition of this organization was not directly called out in the 1991 Annual Report narrative, it was likely as a result of the significant increased focus on fish mitigation due to the collapse of salmon stocks and the impending Salmon Summit.
1994 showed the transformation of BPA as an organization. Direct reports to the Administrator were reduced from twenty-six to five. Notably, even with the addition of the Chief Operating Officer position with its own nine direct reports, the total number of reports between these two roles was only fourteen. The additional roles originally reporting to the Administrator had been moved further down the reporting structure, changing the overall structure from a more centralized, horizontal form to a more devolved, vertical form. In the 1994 Annual Report Hardy emphasizes the ability for faster decision-making that is more responsive to customers in the increasingly dynamic operating environment. Ironically, while the organization chart suggested a more vertical structure, the narrative on the reorganization suggested otherwise. “Gone are layers of management that often frustrated customers’ attempts to find the person who could get the job done” (BPA, 1994, p. 6). While the organization chart would seem to suggest the addition of management layers (in particular the addition of a COO), the devolution of decision-making and decentralization was the key distinction. While not directly described, the creation of Vice-President positions at least suggests the ability of the roles to perform executory decisions without going to the Administrator. This is a key implied point. Changing titles alone would not necessarily change the role and its authority to act. It was the devolved decision-making authority that presumably allowed the agency to act more quickly and in a more responsive fashion. While in theory, the Administrator could have simply delegated such authority broadly throughout the agency while retaining bureaucratic titles such as Assistant
Administrator or Assistant to the Administrator (as seen in the Jura years), it appeared that the title-changes were designed as a signal to the region. Hardy emphasized the need for a corporate model as a result of the “recent and dramatic narrowing of the gap between what Bonneville and its competitors could offer in the way of power rates and delivery service” (BPA, 1994, p. 6). The structural and title changes at BPA signaled a commitment on the part of Hardy to operate on the model of private utilities. It also strongly suggested that the multiple challenges facing BPA in the nineties, including financial constraints, a fiercely competitive market, and increasing fish mitigation obligations, demanded the wholesale change Hardy undertook in reorganizing the agency.