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Book Review of, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life

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of love is a traditional topic in Roman Catholic moral theology; it designates the attempt to determine, in the context of Christ’s command to love our neighbor, who has greater or lesser claims to our love. Pope criticizes contemporary Catholic theologians for neglecting this topic: personalist theologians of love (e.g., Robert Johann) restrict their analyses to close interpersonal relationships, while liberation theologians (e.g., Gustavo Gutiérrez) view love mainly as solidarity with the poor and oppressed. Accepting Aquinas’s dictum that grace perfects human nature and following his example of turning to contemporary (for him, Aristotelian) biology to better understand human nature before formulating a doctrine of the order of love (Summa Theologiae 2.2.26), Pope argues that “the accounts of human altruism developed by behavioral biology can be used to correct the deficiencies of recent Catholic interpretations of love” (p. 7).

Pope gives a balanced and well-documented treatment of his topic, rightly pointing out that moral theologians must take seriously our evolutionary heritage. The book would benefit, however, from the addition of an index.

D. C. A.


Though not as analytical as D. W. Hamlyn’s study, or as entertaining as Rüdiger Safranski’s recent book, Janaway’s text fulfills the mission of Oxford’s Past Masters series by presenting Schopenhauer concisely and accessibly. Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system is traversed briskly, with accounts of his idealism and identification of agency-as-noumenon with a romantic élan vital permeating nature. Janaway is impatient with Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, and rightly so: Schopenhauer ignored what was most interesting in Kant (the argument of the first *Critique* beyond the Aesthetic and his ethics) and fastened on what has proven to be most sterile: transcendental idealism. Schopenhauer applied his metaphysics to a wide range of lively topics (e.g., sexuality, death, compassion, transcendence through art). Clearly Janaway wishes us to regard Schopenhauer as an important thinker in his own right, but this claim is doubtful. His contribution to philosophy is a vision of action and cognition as deeply embedded in a naturalistic and pragmatic context. This achievement is even more remarkable for occurring before Darwin. He is the first philosopher to seriously grapple with the irrational. But in the end his value lay more in the model and impetus he gave to Nietzsche, Freud, and Wittgenstein.

R. K. H.


Analytic philosophy of science largely regards scientific knowledge as a fait accompli. According to Babich, however, Nietzsche has shown that science’s
epistemological credentials are inadequate. Attention to the "ecophysiological" roots of science—our situatedness in an environment with limited cognitive resources—reveals science's cognitive shortcomings. We should overcome the illusion of epistemic success (truth) in favor of consciously created illusions, to be judged by aesthetic criteria.

Babich leans on material criticizing science and praising art in *The Birth of Tragedy* and "On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense," largely ignoring some later material reversing this evaluation. Also, such a critique of science would depend upon the correctness of the "ecophysiological" account itself: truth has returned through the back door, and with it, the question of how we acquired it.

Her final three chapters focus on Nietzsche's axiological critique of science and are far more successful. In particular, "Nietzsche's Genealogy of Science," which discusses the will to truth and asceticism, will reward careful reading and discussion.

Babich correctly identifies the naturalistic commitments (or "hyperrealism," as she puts it) in Nietzsche's epistemology. How his skepticism can be reconciled with such commitments remains unexplained.  

R. K. H.


This book contains what is likely to remain for some time the most comprehensive and most ramified account of Cavell's work. It is a tour de force, at once densely argued and lucidly written, destined to become required reading in these fields. Mulhall aims at providing a kind of intellectual itinerary wherein Cavell's positions emerge against his central and persisting concern with skepticism and also against the widening regions of his other explorations. He provides a series of virtuoso renditions of the different pathways taken by Cavell's encounters with skepticism. His account will make it harder to quarantine certain aspects of Cavell's treatment of the skeptic as merely literary or merely psychological—as opposed to the "strictly philosophical." Mulhall thus puts us in a better position to understand Cavell's readings of figures (from Shakespeare to Freud and Emerson) that most philosophers still treat as foreign to philosophy and as disparate from one another. Among the rare passages where Mulhall's interpretive tact seems to flag are an uncharacteristically one-sided account of Cavell's "hostility to Christianity" (p. 292) and an overly schematic assimilation of Cavell's engagements with psychoanalysis to Mulhall's interpretation of "redemptive reading" (pp. 216–21).  

T. D. G.