New West, New South, New Region: The Discovery of the Sunbelt

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NEW WEST, NEW SOUTH, NEW REGION
THE DISCOVERY OF THE SUNBELT

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It is not often that a new term enters the American language to describe our pattern of economic and cultural regions. We have happily used North, South, and West since the beginning of the nation. New England dates from the seventeenth century. George Washington talked about the Middle States. Even with relative newcomers, we find that the Pacific Northwest goes back a century and that the twelve states from Ohio to the Dakotas have been the Middle West since the years when Teddy Roosevelt and William Howard Taft filled the White House.

In recent years, people have been intrigued by new coinages like those used by Joel Garreau to describe the "nine nations of North America," but few Americans sprinkle references to "the empty quarter" or "the foundry" into everyday conversations. Schemes to consolidate and redraw state boundaries to match natural and economic divisions have a long lineage but limited impact. Neither Rexford Tugwell's proposal to designate twenty "United Republics" nor Stanley Brunn's Angelina and Tropicana have penetrated the national consciousness. Ecotopia, introduced by Ernest Callenbach's utopian novel in 1975, appears occasionally in the Pacific Northwest. In most cases, however, the use is mildly ironic rather than serious.

One great exception to the generalization is the seemingly instant success of Sunbelt. In the 1970s, "Sunbelt" became a sort of superstar of business and political journalism. It is,
perhaps, our newest "Middle West." The term appears to be deeply entrenched in popular use and essentially immune to criticism that the vernacular region does not coincide with important measurable patterns in economic activity or social and cultural behavior.

Given the speed with which we have embraced the idea and terminology of a Sunbelt, this essay attempts to explore several related issues. As an introduction, it will briefly review the process of introduction and acceptance of the term. It will then explore possible reasons for the "discovery" of the Sunbelt, its seemingly quick success, and its persistent use after it has slipped to the status of cliche in national journalism. The underlying concern is to understand why Americans took the new terminology so readily to heart by examining what it is that "Sunbelt" explains or implies that lies beyond the connotations of our more traditional regional terms.

From Coinage to Cliche

In standard accounts, credit for introduction of the term Sunbelt goes to Kevin Phillips and his 1969 analysis of The Emerging Republican Majority in national politics. Phillips used "Sun Belt" and "Sun Country" interchangeably to describe a region of conservative voting habits where Republicans could work to build their status as a new majority party. Phillips' sunbelters were the mobile, leisure-oriented middle class supplemented by the new generation of relatively affluent and mobile retirees.

The attribution is partially misleading. Like the
differential calculus and the theory of natural selection, the idea of a Sunbelt has had at least two independent formulations. Phillips was unaware of previous use and considered the term his own coinage, but Army Air Force planners as early as the 1940s had already defined and described a "sunshine belt" south of the 37th parallel as the acceptable location for new air training facilities. It seems fair to suggest that the "sunshine belt" remained buried in Pentagon documents not only for the technical reason that it was intended for internal military use but also because it was an idea whose time had not yet come.

Secondly, Phillips used "Sunbelt" without clear definition of either its territory or characteristics. Given his basic concern with voting behavior, he was more interested in generalizations about the social consequences of Sunbelt growth than in its economic and demographic causes. Indeed, the book did not so much describe the region as cite four leading states. His prime examples were variously the "Florida-California Sun country," or the "new urban complexes of Texas and Florida," or the four boom states of California, Arizona, Florida, and Texas. To a substantial degree, this analysis looked backward to previous studies of regional growth rather than forward to a new regional definition. It substantially restated classic work from the 1950s in which Edward Ullman and Harvey Perloff and his associates identified certain parts of Florida and the Southwest as benefitting from environmental amenities, resource endowment, and expanding local markets.

Indeed, the time was no more ripe for "Sunbelt" in 1969 than...
for "sunshine belt" twenty-five years earlier. Perhaps because of the lack of innovation in its application, Phillips' new term languished for another six years. Political analyst Samuel Lubell tried it the next year but preferred to organize his discussion of voting trends around traditional regions. Austin apparently pioneered the use of "Sunbelt" in promotional advertising in 1973, but national magazine articles on boom times in the old Confederacy continued to talk about the "South," "new South," and "new rich South" through the first half of the 1970s. As has been widely noted, it was Kirkpatrick Sale's *Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and its Challenge to the Northern Establishment* and a series of *New York Times* articles on February 9-13, 1976, that first popularized the idea of a Sunbelt (even though Sale used different terminology) and provided the rudiments of an operational definition.

The term passed from coinage to cliche in 1976 and 1977. The *Times* seal of significance made it an instant hit in the press. One sunbelt scholar has called the bicentennial year "the Golden Age of Sunbelt promotion," with articles in nearly every trend-setting periodical on the Sunbelt's growing political and economic power and emerging image. Appearing at a time when many northeastern and middle western states and cities were finding it difficult to recover from economic recession, the idea that federal policy had long favored the growth of what was now identified as the Sunbelt became the pivot for a major policy debate in 1976-78. Although popular attention to the Sunbelt began to fade in the late 1970s, scholarship in the 1980s reflects the customary five-year lag between identification of a
phenomenon and completion of substantial social science research. A set of social science and humanities data bases shows nine citations to "Sunbelt" in 1976, an average of 32 per year for 1977-79, and an average of 53 per year for 1980-82. As a sure sign of academic respectability, "sunbelt" has become a catchword that is used in scholarly titles where the less glamorous but sometimes more accurate West or South would do just as well.

Sunbelt as a Regional Concept

The volume of attention has supported what can be called a "smoke and fire" approach which assumes that the Sunbelt must exist if so many people are talking about it, writing about it, and using the term in promotional literature. The working definition is fuzzy at best, bundling together a wide set of characteristics that seem to be spatially associated. One identifiable set of traits relate to the Sunbelt as a regional development phenomenon resulting from a secular shift in the comparative advantage of regions. Specific explanations for the recent rapid growth of the Sunbelt variously emphasize locational decisions in response to amenities; locational decisions in response to regional market growth; migration and industrialization based on traditional agricultural and mineral resources; and migration in response to basic changes in the industrial mix of the American economy. A second set of characteristics relate to the Sunbelt as a distinct socio-cultural environment involving both lifestyle choices that are
most easily expressed in low-density, automobile-oriented communities with easy access to outdoor recreation and distinct political values that support rapid growth.

Taking a step back to reexamine the Sunbelt as a concept, however, we find several peculiarities that throw doubt on its regional identity. Most obviously, it is difficult to use the presumptive defining characteristics to generate objective measures whose distribution coincides with the territory south of the 37th parallel—the consensual Sunbelt boundary as defined by journalistic convention and popular usage. Key factors reflecting the emergence of a Sunbelt might be rates of metropolitan growth, location of national and regional metropolitan centers with high levels of producer services, and distribution of the interrelated high technology manufacturing, research and development, and military-defense spending. None of these key regional development factors has been confined to the Sunbelt nor distributed evenly within the consensual Sunbelt. I have argued elsewhere that these same factors allow division of the "census South" into a rapidly developing "Outer South" of the Chesapeake Bay states, Florida, and Texas-Oklahoma, a transitional "Middle South" of Louisiana, Georgia, and the Carolinas, and a more slowly growing "Inner South" dominated by old industries. An extension of the same analysis suggests that Texas-Oklahoma can simultaneously be viewed as part of a western-southwestern growth zone that includes Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, and all of the Pacific states (Map 1). An earlier study by Browning and Gesler using 1970-76 data on federal spending, population growth, and economic well-being
concluded that neither Maryland-Virginia nor Florida belonged with the South and that the West had "more characteristics associated with the Sunbelt than the Sunbelt itself."

Cultural factors also show discontinuity rather than uniformity across the Sunbelt states. As one obvious example, ethnic mix and the resulting social and political tensions vary markedly from the eastern to western ends of the Sunbelt, with a divide west of Waco and Fort Worth. The South and Southwest have shown different patterns of ethnic assimilation and majority-minority relations. Religious affiliation links the entirety of the historic South and sets it apart from the West and Southwest. Tastes in magazine reading, however, place Texas and Oklahoma with California and Oregon while separating Florida and Virginia from the rest of the southeast. As a transitional subregion, Texas effectively functions with the dual identity of a southern and a western state.

It is equally difficult to find a uniform set of political values across the Sunbelt. States tilt from liberal to conservative, or mix the two in odd local brews, on the basis of internal dynamics of personality, party organization, and parochial issues. Sunbelt voters have been inconsistent in enlisting in Phillips' emerging Republican majority. Charlotte, Nashville, Atlanta, Memphis, Little Rock, Corpus Christi, and Austin gave fewer than half their votes to Ronald Reagan in 1980. Miami, Tampa, Tucson, and Baton Rouge gave fewer than 51 percent. The typical Sunbelt politician of the last decade may have been Jesse Helms, Jeremiah Denton, John Tower, or Barry Goldwater. It
may also have been Tom Hayden, Jerry Brown, Bruce Babbitt, Henry Cisneros, or Andrew Young.

In addition to lacking consistent defining characteristics, the consensual Sunbelt is less firmly fixed than might first appear. Many southeasterners use "Sunbelt" as another name for the South Atlantic and Gulf states with a spillover into the desert. To many southwesterners, however, the real Sunbelt runs from California to Texas, with Florida as an outlier. We find similar results in comparing the Sunbelt images of political journalists and of college students in Chapel Hill, Grand Junction, Phoenix, and Davis, California. Regional leaders also define partial Sunbelts. David Mathews, a former southern university president and Ford cabinet member, uses Sunbelt as a synonym for South, but Colorado governor Richard Lamm defines the Sunbelt as "the West and Southwest."

All of these problems of ambiguous definition bring us back to the basic issue of why Americans have found the idea or terminology of a Sunbelt so appealing, even when we can't quite figure out what it is. Indeed, we have devised and accepted a term that reverses our customary pattern of regional coinage. In the past, Americans have either renamed the same region ("West" becomes successively "Northwest," "Old Northwest," and "Middle West") or responded to increasing density of settlement and variety of development by subdividing a large region into subareas ("West" becomes "West Coast," "Pacific Northwest," "Southwest," "Mountain States," and the like). In the later 1970s, however, we recombined portions of regions that had historically maintained very distinct identities. Given the
limited match with measurable factors and the continuing economic and cultural differences between South and West/Southwest, it is appropriate to ask (1) what purpose or need has been served by the identification and publicizing of a Sunbelt and (2) what factors account for the time-specific acceptance of the new terminology in the later 1970s?

West, South, and Sunbelt: Growth and Change in Regional Images

One approach to these questions is to examine the historic regional images of the South and West, the components from which the idea of a Sunbelt has been assembled, utilizing the broad categories of economic growth and socio-cultural distinctiveness that are the chief pillars of the Sunbelt definition. In brief summary, such a review suggests that the definition of a "Sunbelt" has incorporated many characteristics long associated with the reputation of the American West but has required a substantial revaluation of the South. Whereas the West has been able to evolve smoothly into the Sunbelt, the "Sunbelting" of the South has required a fundamental transformation of regional reputation and self-image.

The American West provides the easy case, for its historic image as a society reborn and remolded has in many ways previewed the bundle of traits associated with the Sunbelt. The "New West" beyond the 95th meridian has simultaneously epitomized American society and represented its future. A parade of writers in the middle nineteenth century depicted the West as the logical
extension and climax of American growth. Growth of the West, claimed a Chicago editor in 1856, was "laying the foundation for an empire of whose wealth, intelligence and power the sun in all his course has never seen the equal." The eccentric politician and promoter William Gilpin thought the Rockies to be "the key-point of centrality . . . and unrivaled excellence" whose settlement would "stir the sleep of a hundred centuries . . . teach old nations a new civilization . . . shed a new and resplendent glory upon mankind." The West was a land of new beginnings open to individual initiative and social opportunity. The "Imperial Period of National Greatness," said John Wilstach, would rise in the Mississippi, Colorado, and Columbia basins, where there was "nothing to prevent the freest scope of the inventive and moral energies of man."

A new generation of observers repeated the same themes at the end of the century. Charles Dudley Warner in 1888 reported the "joyousness of conquest and achievement" and the "marvellous building up of new societies" on the northern plains of the Great West. William Thayer's Marvels of the New West included "populous and wealthy cities that have grown into power and beauty as if by magic." In another hundred years, he predicted, western cities would surpass those of the East in enterprise and economic power, with the result "a national growth and consummation without a parallel in human history." The scholarly and always quotable James Bryce after a series of visits in the 1880s found the West "the most American part of America," a land of "passionate eagerness" where "men seem to
live in the future rather than the present." Even Josiah Strong, who feared the impacts of immigration, urbanization, Mormonism, Romanism, socialism, and whiskey on America's moral stability, was convinced by 1890 that the West held the key to the nation's future. With twice the population, wealth, and political weight of the East, its "preponderating influence" would soon determine "national character, and therefore, destiny." (Strong, 1890).

The new residents of the mountain and Pacific West shared the dominant view. Kevin Starr has documented in detail the "California Dream" of creating a new society in a new land. Hubert Howe Bancroft found on the Pacific coast "the ringing up of universal intelligence for a final display of what man can do at his best . . . surrounded by conditions such as had never before befallen the lot of man to enjoy." Historian Gunther Barth has examined the dimensions of urban patriotism in Denver and San Francisco, whose residents shared dreams of economic success, overweening confidence in the towns, and faith that their growth made a direct contribution to the national purpose.

The strongest countertheme to western optimism and confidence appeared during the 1920s and 1930s, when deep depressions in mining and agriculture reminded many westerners of their dependence on eastern capital and corporations. In particular, the Rockies and Great Plains produced a series of writers who described and deplored the "colonial" dependency of their states. However, the literature was as much for the promotion of an internal political agenda as for external consumption. The concern largely bypassed the relatively
prosperous oil regions of Texas, Oklahoma, and southern California, where agricultural crisis coexisted with metropolitan boom.

The flush times after 1940 brought restatement and reaffirmation of the West's special status. Wallace Stegner and Earl Pomeroy, among others, argued that the West was the most typically American part of the nation. The Pacific coast in particular was like the rest of the United States, only more so, expressing the national culture at its most energetic. It was urban, opulent, energetic, mobile, and individualistic, a region of economic growth and openness to change—a list of characteristics that matched America's favorite self-image and previewed the common description of the Sunbelt. From the idea that the West was America at the extreme, it took only a short step to the belief that the West embodied the national future. The region in the postwar era, said historian Gerald Nash anticipated economic and social trends by a generation. Neil Morgan asserted that "the West of today is very likely a close kin of the America of tomorrow." California, in turn, was the future of the West--Carey McWilliams' "Great Exception" and Neil Morgan's "center of gravity in the westward tilt."

The western image has also embraced several more specific subthemes that were established between 1870 and 1920 and reaffirmed after 1945. Like the broader enthusiasm about the regional future, they anticipate in detail some of the traits associated with the contemporary Sunbelt. The dry and benign environment of the Rockies and Southwest, for example, attracted
tens of thousands of nineteenth-century health seekers and created a sanatorium belt that curved from Denver to Pasadena. The same areas formed the heart of a post-World War II retirement zone that has spread from an historic base in Southern California. They have also offered prime examples of high-amenity areas that have grown because of their attraction for footloose industries such as electronics, where the original Silicon Valley has been followed by a silicon prairie in Texas, a silicon desert in Arizona, a silicon mountain in Colorado, and a silicon forest in Oregon.

The West has also been a land of new starts. California, Colorado, and Puget Sound were all centers for utopian communities in the several decades after the Civil War. Twentieth-century manifestations of the same impulse have ranged from Southern California's image as a haven for crackpots in the 1920s and 1930s to the diffusion of 1965-75 communes through California, New Mexico-Colorado, and the Pacific Northwest. Western states pioneered in the expansion of legal rights for women such as presidential suffrage and liberal divorce laws. In the mid-twentieth century, the Mountain and Pacific states have ranked consistently high on indicators of social opportunity such as political participation and levels of health, welfare support, and education. Their metropolitan areas have scored relatively high on indicators of social well-being from the 1930s to the 1970s.

The South has had no such luck. For more than a century after the Civil War, the core of the southern image was backwardness. It was poor, it was rural, and it lacked major
industrial development. A laggard economy implied a society that was only half modern, with strong agrarian values, high levels of violence, and limited attention to or investment in education. The racial caste system not only burdened the regional economy but also denied the concepts of individual opportunity and careers open to talent that formed the foundation of North Atlantic liberalism. From one perspective the South might be quaintly or reassuringly traditional. From another, its twin burdens of race and poverty made it the nation's great social problem. In either case, its defining characteristic was its failure to participate fully in the growth of the modern nation.

The counterimage of a "New South" was essentially rooted in the same negative comparison. As a prescription for regional change, advocates of a New South in the 1880s and its various reincarnations in the twentieth century offered an agenda for industrialization in imitation of the North. The idea of a laggard South converging on national norms dominated southern social science through much of the present century. Although the degree to which southern manufacturing actually disturbed the political and social status quo was limited, its development was commonly presumed to be a transforming cause that would bring large cities, a cosmopolitan middle class, modernization of values, and a more open and tolerant society. Dozens of sociologists and economists stated the theory of convergence, analyzed its implications, and mined each decennial census for data on urbanization, occupational structure, health, income, and
education that would confirm or postpone the "national incorporation" of the region.

The popular image of the South as shaped by news and entertainment media was equally negative. Jack Temple Kirby has traced the evolution from sharecropper and gothic novels and documentary photography in the 1920s and 1930s to the "tribal, passionate, and neurotic" South of the 1940s and 1950s. Civil rights agitation and reactive violence in the 1960s brought "neoabolitionist" dramas that confronted the evils of the "devilish South."

At start of 1970s, the South and West were still sharply contrasted in public image and public opinion. The same year that brought The Emerging Republican Majority to the bookstores also brought Easy Rider to the nation’s movie theaters. Its pair of drugged-soaked buddies, as Americans over 30 will remember, took a motorcycle tour across the southern tier of the United States. They did not ride through a "Sunbelt." Instead, the movie contrasted a positive image of the West--an idyllic commune in the mountains of New Mexico--with increasingly negative and violent images of the South that include an acid trip in a New Orleans cemetery and a final confrontation with the deadly violence of the deep South. The contrasting southern chic of the mid-1970s, which ranged from "The Waltons" to the national popularity of country music, still functioned within the framework of negative comparison. The South supplied pastoral simplicity in contrast to the complexity of the North. In a very different sector of the communications industry, Wall Street Journal articles on the South remained heavily negative through
the first half of the 1970s. A national survey during the same years found that southerners were relatively happy with their own region, but that only Florida was significantly attractive to outsiders. The population of the mountain states, by comparison, would have increased by 124 percent and the Pacific states by 41 percent if everyone desiring to live elsewhere moved to their region of preference.

In the middle and late 1970s, in contrast, the public reputation of the South changed drastically with the discovery of the Sunbelt. For the first time since the Civil War, the idea of a Sunbelt allowed the newest New South to deny its dependence and subordination to the North. Regional progress could suddenly be defined in terms of convergence or kinship with the dynamic West as part of a new leading sector marked by fast growth and fast living. In a sense, the idea of a Sunbelt allowed the South to escape its own history and transform instantly from "backward" to "forward" region.

The jump out of history was possible for two somewhat contradictory reasons. One reason, of course, was the culmination of the social revolution anticipated and applauded by the convergence theory. Whatever its stand on issues of lifestyle, the South crossed the threshold of liberal society in terms of individual opportunity in the early 1970s. The relatively peaceful climax of the civil rights revolution and peaceful school integration of the 1970s gave the South an unexpected reputation for racial moderation, as did the arrival of a more progressive political generation represented in the
national media by the gubernatorial ABCs of Askew, Bumpers, and Carter. The reversal of black outmigration during the 1970s gained wide recognition as a reflection of both the realignment of the southern political system and the economic problems of old industrial core.

The second reason, ironically, was the previously mentioned divergence of economic fortunes within the South. Texas, Florida, and secondarily the South Atlantic states were changing so rapidly by the middle 1970s that the economic imagery of "South" and "New South" no longer seemed adequate. The result was the adoption of the Sunbelt and its associated imagery as appropriate for the booming periphery of the South, with the rest of the region drawn along by the force of the new terminology.

Conclusions

The discovery of the Sunbelt has created an enlarged vision for the South that is essentially an enlarged version of the West. The idea of a Sunbelt has meant more for the former region than for the latter. The West/Southwest hasn't really needed the Sunbelt, since it has already had a positive regional reputation. California surfers and Texas "superAmericans" merge easily and directly into the idea of a Sunbelt. The South, however, is fundamentally redefined when it is viewed in terms of the Sunbelt. Having been historically defined in negative terms, the South has found a sort of rescue from its past on the coattails of the Sunbelt.

Both this specific conclusion and the preceding analysis
strongly suggest the value of disaggregating the consensual Sunbelt among subregions and states. Very preliminary evidence indicates that the Sunbelt may have found its first and perhaps strongest home in Texas and Oklahoma, a pattern that may reflect both the ambiguity of their regional identity (cultural South and economic West) and their potential role in bridging perceived and real differences between Southeast and Southwest. It would be useful to examine in more depth and detail whether Sunbelt imagery has been adopted more readily or extensively in some states and cities than in others and whether there are subregional differences in the context or content of such use that reflect the different experiences and needs of West, Outer South, and Inner South.

A related issue is the extent to which patterns of metropolitan growth, which lies at the heart of the processes associated with the development of a Sunbelt, confirm or deny its regional identity. My own suggestion is that patterns of economic and demographic change can no longer be understood in terms of the traditional South however named, since the strongest growth areas are increasingly oriented away from the southern heartland. In contrast, the same sorts of growth factors may well be operating to maintain unity between the northern and southern West. Several strings of cities that stretch north and south across regional and even international boundaries share certain growth histories, economic functions, and probable futures. Indeed, much of the contemporary regional patterning of the West (and Sunbelt) can be understood in terms of the
expansion and intensification of influence of Greater Texas (reaching from the Louisiana oil country and Ozark retirement zone into the oil regions of Colorado and Wyoming) and Greater California (including Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Hawaii). Texas and California influence have deep historic roots and can be measured in patterns of finance and investment, permanent and seasonal migration, distribution, and recreational travel. Florida, which maintains stronger ties with the Caribbean and the Snowbelt than with the interior South, appears to lack the same sort of regional "empire" but to fill a growing role in international commerce. Atlanta is an important regional center but lacks the national standing of Los Angeles or Houston. Interestingly, it appears to have become relatively more oriented to the South Atlantic than to the inner South over the last generation.

Given the contention that the discovery of a Sunbelt has been of special significance for the South, a final question is the extent to which the Sunbelt idea may be seen as a denial rather than a vindication of the South. A number of specialists on southern history and society have recently called attention to the cultural distinctiveness that persists in spite of economic and demographic change. The broad reevaluation of what John S. Reed calls The Enduring South has led historians, geographers, and sociologists to explore the continuing identity of the South as a cultural region. Southern cities, says historian David Goldfield, have remained peculiarly southern in many aspects of their everyday life even while participating the great postwar boom. The prototypical Phillips-Sale Sunbeler is a deracinated
and isolated individual adrift in the suburbs or Dallas or retirement communities of Florida. The Goldfield-Reed southerner, rooted in networks of kinship and religion and committed to traditional patterns of social behavior, in contrast, may enjoy some of the fruits of "sunbelt" prosperity but retains more in common with the nineteenth century South than with contemporary La Jolla or Las Vegas.

The basic uncertainty about the idea of a Sunbelt is the mismatch between regional need and regional performance. The emergence of the idea of a Sunbelt is tied directly to the modernization of the South, but California, Arizona, Texas, and the Florida peninsula have been its centers of development and change. The traditional core South makes the smallest contribution to the consensual Sunbelt in terms of population growth, metropolitan development, leading economic sectors, or cultural innovation, yet the idea of a Sunbelt is of greatest potential benefit for states such as Mississippi, Tennessee, and Arkansas. We are left with the need for detailed research on the regional and subregional incidence of sunbelt imagery that is accompanied by objective analysis of social and economic patterns. Taken alone, either approach gives us a partial view of the Sunbelt. Taken together, they can help us understand the emergence of the Sunbelt as a region and its discovery as an idea.
NOTES


8. Larry D. Gustke, "Mental Images of the Sunbelt as a Travel Region" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas A&M University, 1982),


12. For examples of routine use, see Kathleen Butler and Ben Chinitz, "Urban Growth in the Sunbelt," in Gary Gappert and Richard Knight, eds., Cities in the 21st Century (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 97-111; Steven Ballard and Thomas James, eds., The Future of the Sunbelt: Managing Growth and Change (New York: Praeger, 1983); Franklin James, Minorities in the Sunbelt (New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1984). It is interesting to note that academic adoption of the Sunbelt came at the same time that a number of influential journalists were consciously rejecting the term. John Naisbitt
in *Megatrends* (New York: Warner Books, 1982), removed the geographic core of the Sunbelt with a redefinition that harkens back to the regional analysis of the 1950s, arguing that "the North-South shift is really a shift to the West, the Southwest, and Florida" (p. 234). Richard Louv, *America II* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985) has rejected it as "a conceptual framework whose time has passed" because it cannot account for many of the important trends in American society (p. 29). Other journalists have ignored the Sunbelt entirely. Joel Garreau in *The Nine Nations of North America* writes about the Latin Americaning of the United States. Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb, *Empires in the Sun* (New York: Putman, 1982) focus on the rise of a super-Southwest.


19. Donald Meinig, Imperial Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969); James S. Payne, "Texas Historiography in the Twentieth Century: A Study of Eugene C. Barker, Charles W. Ramsdell, and Walter P. Webb" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Denver, 1972). There are also a number of continuities between the West South Central states and Southern California, many of which originated in the westward migration of Okies, Arkies, and war workers in the 1930s and 1940s. Expressions range from Texas-Pacific kinship networks among blacks to the diffusion of
country music to the central valley of California.


24. Kevin Starr, Americans and the California Dream (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) and Inventing the Dream: California through the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Hubert Howe Bancroft, Literary Industries (San Francisco: The History Company Publishers, 1890),


30. Ullman, "Amenities;" John Garwood, "An Analysis of


43. Abbott, "End of the Southern City."

44. The Great Plains gateways of San Antonio, Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, Oklahoma City, Wichita, Omaha, and Winnipeg all lie within 100 miles of the 98th meridian. El Paso, Denver, Casper, Billings, Calgary, and Edmonton have grown as center for the development of mineral regions in or along the Rockies. The West Coast ports from Los Angeles-Long Beach to Vancouver compete for the international commerce of the Pacific Rim.


46. In some interpretations, Virginia and Maryland are directly parts of Megalopolis and Florida is a Megalopolitan
