Five Downtown Strategies: Policy Discourse and Downtown Planning Since 1945

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Americans have planned for their downtowns within a continually changing framework of images and assumptions about the nature of central business districts. During each decade since World War II, discussion of downtown problems and possibilities has been dominated by a distinct set of assumptions that has conditioned academic research, federal policy, and local planning. From decade to decade, experts on downtowns have chosen different themes as central to the interpretation of downtown growth, change, and policy needs. As the understanding of the situation has changed, so have the preferred planning solutions and public interventions.

This argument about the importance of understanding the history of "downtown" as an intellectual construct can be contrasted with three major approaches that have dominated the analysis of downtown planning and policy in the United States over the last half century.

A number of writers have analyzed downtown policy as an expression of interest-group or class politics. In this interpretation, downtown is one of several arenas in which different groups contest for control of urban land patterns. Most common, the battle for downtown is seen as a one-sided contest between the city's large corporations, banks, and land owners on one side and small businesses and low-income residents on the other. Influential examples include Clarence Stone's work on Atlanta, Arnold Hirsch's study of Chicago, Chester Hartman's work on San Francisco, and Chris Silver's history of Richmond. Gerald Suttles's recent examination of contemporary Chicago in *The Man-Made City* recycles the same approach with sympathy for the goals of gentrification and land conversion rather than the more common concern with the social costs of downtown
redevelopment. A comparative analysis of six current downtown plans by Norman Krumholz and Dennis Keating implicitly places the documents in the context of group politics by testing their balance between economic development and social equity.¹

Other analysts have adopted a structure-driven model in which downtown development and redevelopment programs are seen as rational responses to specific socioeconomic circumstances and problems. A pure structural model is organized around a dynamic of challenge and response. Changes external to the policy system, such as new technologies, immigration, or the regional readjustment of economic activity, create problems that call forth policy solutions. In turn, altered circumstances may give rise to new problems that call forth new solutions. This model assumes that policies are logically situated between problems and programs, although policies may have unintended as well as intended consequences.²

A detailed recent application of the structural approach is Jon Teaford's *The Rough Road to Urban Renaissance*, which examines revitalization policy in twelve northern cities and finds a series of partial successes that lead repeatedly to more complex problems. Teaford treats downtown planning and urban renewal as elements in comprehensive revitalization programs that have also included annexation, public housing, industrial development, and transportation. He finds a broad shift from optimism to pessimism and diminished expectations during the 1960s. Nevertheless, city leaders are seen as fighting gamely against a shifting set of problems, winning occasional battles but neither winning nor losing the larger war.³

A third approach follows a teleological model that traces the roots of present successes. Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn, for example, are modern equivalents of the Whig historians who celebrated the progress of liberty in the growth of the English Constitution. Their study, *Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Its Cities*, essentially follows a structural model written as the story of progress. A single clear problem is identified in the 1940s and 1950s. Politicians and planners then work through trial and error toward an increasingly effective solution, moving from urban renewal to festival markets and downtown malls. There is room for detours but not for the blind alleys that Teaford describes.⁴

Without rejecting these three approaches to the history of downtown policy, this article offers a supplementary perspective. I believe that many scholars and planners have shared an underlying assumption that "downtown" is a singular knowable entity—a basic category of urban analysis. In this common conception, academic and applied research presumably illuminate more and more aspects of this knowable entity, allowing the fine tuning of plans and policies. My emphasis, in contrast, is on "downtown"
as a constructed concept whose meaning or understanding has undergone surprisingly rapid changes. As the structural model argues, these mutable understandings have certainly been rooted in the changing social and economic structure of American cities, and they have certainly proved of varying use to different groups and interests. However, they have also had lives of their own as intellectual constructs, with the thematic understanding of one decade defined in part as a reaction against earlier ideas. In turn, these ideas about downtowns can be seen as filtered reflections of broader trends in political thought or cultural expression.

This article explores these changing ideas by examining the contents and assumptions of a variety of formal and informal texts. One obvious set of sources is academic and professional analysis of downtowns by geographers, planners, and real estate specialists. The discussion is also based on my understanding of implementation efforts and programs, from urban renewal to the pursuit of amenity projects. Situated between the analysis and the programs have been formal downtown plans and planning processes that have tried to link theory and practice. Chronologically parallel shifts in content and emphasis among the three sorts of texts help to substantiate the assumption that public action about central business districts has been rooted in a partially autonomous realm of changing ideas.

The shift from one thematic understanding to another has not been unidirectional. Downtown policy has been characterized by sharp discontinuities and the repeated implementation of policies at right angles to those of the previous decade. The changing themes and recommended solutions can be summarized as a set of ideal types. No single city has exactly matched the sequence, and thematic elements from one policy era have carried over into the following decades. Nevertheless, the historian can define five successive themes and related policies.

• 1945–55: The downtown as the unitary center of the American metropolis required improved access through highway improvements and downtown ring roads.
• 1955–65: Downtown understood as a failing real estate market appeared to require the land assembly and clearance associated with the urban renewal program.
• 1965–75: Downtown as a federation of subdistricts called for community conservation, historic preservation, and "human scale" planning.
• 1975–85: Downtown as a set of individual experiences required regulation of private design and public assistance for cultural facilities, retail markets, open space, and other amenities.
• 1985—: Viewed as a command post in the global economy, downtown has required planning for expanded office districts and supporting facilities.

Downtown as the Unitary Center of the Metropolitan Area: 1945–55

Thinking about American downtowns during the first half of the twentieth century was shaped by the idea of the unified metropolitan community. Although the metropolitan area concept was developed in the early twentieth century, it gained broad popularity with the definition of the easily grasped Standard Metropolitan Area for the 1950 census. The idea assumed the existence of a dominant central city, which was itself structured around a downtown core. Academic analysis of downtowns therefore operated within the framework of Ernest Burgess's zonal model and Homer Hoyt's sectoral model of urban land use, both of which posited that cities were organized around unitary centers.

Building on work from the 1920s and 1930s, experts in the postwar decade analyzed land values to identify the precise center of central business districts (CBDs) and the gradient of real estate values away from that center. John Rannels utilized a detailed survey of central Philadelphia land uses to define the "center of gravity" and degree of dispersion of CBD activities. Other researchers tried to define "downtown" as distinguished from its surrounding blocks of deteriorated or transitional uses. Raymond Murphy, James Vance, and Bart Epstein epitomized the research effort with an elaborate analytical definition of the downtown based on building heights and the percentage of total floor space on each block that was devoted to a carefully limited list of "central business uses." Their standardized definition was intended to allow easy comparisons among downtown areas taken as units.

Related studies of commuting and shopping patterns found that the golden age of the 1920s, when downtowns were the place to go, was alive and well after World War II. Gerald Breese found that total daytime population in downtown Chicago in 1946 matched the previous peak of 1929. Sociologist Donald Foley documented a strong upward trend in the number of people entering the CBDs of small and mid-sized metropolitan areas between 1926 and 1950 and concluded that there was little substance to the notion that suburban dispersion was undermining central business districts. Most planning projections of downtown land-use needs assumed a straight-line continuation of past relationships between metro-
politan growth and size and the roles and size of the central business district.\textsuperscript{10}

Business and marketing literature agreed on the strength of downtown as an office and retail center. C. T. Jonassen's analyses of shopper preferences in Columbus, Seattle, and Houston found that downtowns held a significant edge over struggling suburban shopping centers. "The advantages now enjoyed by the central business district," he concluded, "are not easily alterable, for they are rooted in the ecological structure of American cities and in their cultural and social system." Downtowns, said J. D. Carroll, were the "only focus" and the "only sites" for essential urban activities. The sole requirement was successful treatment of traffic congestion and parking.\textsuperscript{11} Whatever the changes in metropolitan areas, concluded the Central Business District Council of the Urban Land Institute in 1954, "downtown continues to hold its position as the gathering place of America—the center of business and finance, the center of shopping on its most lavish scale, the center for theaters and for culture."\textsuperscript{12}

The assumption that everyone still wanted to get downtown defined the logical focus of planning activity as the improvement of access and circulation. Downtown itself was taken as a given—as a unique and essential element within a metropolitan structure. The postwar development plans that dozens of cities prepared in 1943, 1944, and 1945 offered broadly inclusive programs for capital investment with little special targeting for downtown.\textsuperscript{13} The last generation of classic master plans during the 1940s gave little explicit attention to the downtown itself as a special problem. Instead, the typical proposal was for the opening of new circumferential highways closely bordering the downtown, to improve access and set off surrounding residential areas. Also prominent were proposals for civic centers as metropolitan foci, a recycling of a key idea from the City Beautiful—era century that assumed the natural centering of the metropolis.\textsuperscript{14}

Two points stand out in a set of major comprehensive plans prepared in the mid- and late 1940s for Washington, D.C., Richmond, Dallas, and Cincinnati.\textsuperscript{15} The first is that few of the planners considered the CBD to be seriously at risk. The plans tended to give greatest attention to housing, neighborhood identity, and neighborhood conservation. In turn, neighborhoods were to be linked together into a single metropolitan community by transportation improvements and by their common relation to the downtown. For example, Cincinnati's Metropolitan Master Plan of 1948 acknowledged the "close relationship between the Central Business District and each community" but did not see the CBD itself as
requiring attention. The Dallas plan ran to fourteen volumes, none focused specifically on downtown.16

When downtown did need attention, the solution was improved access through peripheral freeways. Harlan Bartholomew wanted to use the 1946 Master Plan for Richmond to promote the vision of a tightly centralized city, in part by expanding the central business district and tying it to neighborhoods by a set of highways and widened boulevards. As Chris Silver has noted, the new or improved roads would define the boundaries for an expanded business core. The result, said the document, would be "continued stability and protection of values within the central business district." Elsewhere in the South, Nashville cleared the back slopes of its Capitol Hill in 1954 to provide space for a park, parking lots, and the James Robertson Parkway to loop traffic around the back side of the CBD and across the Cumberland River on a new Victory Memorial Bridge.17

The National Capital Park and Planning Commission offered a similar prescription in its 1950 plan for the Washington region. Its proposal for an inner highway loop drawing a one-mile circle around the White House and the retail-office core was the work of Harland Bartholomew in his role as chief consultant to the NCPCC. The idea was seconded by the influential Washington architect Louis Justement, who had made a similar proposal in a 1946 book, New Cities for Old. It was supported as well by the transportation subcommittee of the Committee of 100, a local good planning/good government organization.18

Victor Gruen's highly publicized plan for downtown Fort Worth is a climax of thinking about a unitary downtown. An architect with experience in shopping center design, Gruen proposed a grand scheme to isolate the core of Fort Worth within a ring of six grand parking garages served by a highway loop. With its streets freed from automobiles, downtown Fort Worth could recapitulate the suburban shopping mall. Had Fort Worth acted on the plan, it would have given physical expression to Gruen's valuation of freeway loops and ring roads as "defense lines" and "fortification systems" around the downtown. It would also have expressed his understanding of the "metropolitan core" as the "heart of the city."19

Downtown as a Failing Business Center: 1955–65

In January 1955, J. Ross McKeever summarized the real estate trends of the past year for the readers of Urban Land, the trade journal of the real estate development industry. He left no doubt that downtown was "the functional heart of a metropolitan area" and the "focal point of commu-
nity life." Two years later, Baltimore developer James Rouse told the same readership that downtowns were in serious trouble. They were physically obsolete and could not effectively reach the growing suburban market. Planners so far had dealt only with symptoms rather than sources of downtown problems. Only drastic action could assure the rebirth of the central business district.20

The contrast between the two views demonstrates the rapid emergence during the mid-1950s of a new understanding of downtown as a declining activity center and failing real estate market. By the early 1960s, most Americans understood downtown as a district in crisis because of the relative or absolute decline of its attractiveness to shoppers, theatergoers, and service businesses. The 1958 Census of Business played an important role by documenting the shift of retailing and personal services to suburban locations. The 1960 Census of Population administered an additional shock by showing that many central cities had fallen far short of their expected populations.21 With these "heralded indicators of decadence" as background, scholars analyzed the decline of downtown business in a group of studies that examined 1948–58 data and appeared in a cluster between 1960 and 1964. As in the previous decade, however, most of these studies continued to treat downtowns as economic units, comparing aggregated data on sales and employment.22

One local response was to organize a business group devoted specifically to upgrading the competitiveness of downtown. Unlike areawide chambers of commerce or the ubiquitous postwar planning committees of the 1940s, these downtown groups battled for a share of the retail and service market rather than working for aggregate economic development. Examples can be found in Denver and Cincinnati, San Diego, Portland, and Richmond. The Committee for Downtown Baltimore grew out of the Retail Merchants Association in 1954. The Minneapolis Downtown Council appeared in 1955, the same year that the Indianapolis Civic Progress Association incorporated "to enhance the attractiveness and utility of the central downtown area." "Downtown in St. Louis, Inc." organized in 1958 to engage in a "crusade" to renew downtown.23

The later 1950s and early 1960s also brought a round of focused downtown plans that worried explicitly about the future of the central business district. City planners now expressed the new understanding that downtown could easily lose its logical and organic predominance. Cleveland planners in 1959 worried that the future vitality of their downtown was threatened by suburbanization and blight as well as traffic. Dallas's revision of Bartholomew's master plan included a separate report on the "Dallas Central District" (1961). Cincinnati's Central Business District
Plan (1958), *Central Business District and Riverfront Report* (1961), and *Plan for Downtown Cincinnati* (1964) noted the shortfall of new private investment, proposed new zoning, and called for redevelopment of blighted land.24

As Cincinnatians and Clevelanders realized, the most obvious policy response to downtown business decline was urban renewal. Amendments in 1954 and 1959 transformed the Housing Act of 1949 into a downtown renewal program. Urban renewal advocates assumed that downtown could be made competitive by underwriting the real estate market and adding in public projects as attractors. The preferred target was underutilized or “blighted” land just beyond the retail and office core. The nearly universal results were peripheral clearance projects and construction of public facilities. Renewal in cities such as New Haven, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Washington was abundantly documented in newspapers, magazines, and books such as Jeanne Lowe’s *Cities in a Race with Time* (1967).25 The underlying impulse, as many critics were to point out, was to impose the universal rationalism of modern design on large segments of American downtowns.

Academic research in the later 1950s supported the renewal strategy by emphasizing the distinction between an intensively used downtown core and a less intensively used “frame.” The idea of a frame was a more limited restatement of the historic “zone in transition.” Downtown frames were hodge-podge zones of warehouses, light industry, cheap housing, transportation terminals, auto dealers, and public institutions such as hospitals. The idea evolved in applied work in Seattle and Cincinnati and was elaborated in detail by Edgar Horwood and Ronald Boyce in 1959.26 Ernest Jurkat presented a similar concept with different terminology when he defined a “belt” zone in cities like St. Louis that roughly matched the functions of the frame.27 The analysis justified land clearance in downtown fringe areas to protect and enhance the core.

Plans in Oakland and Baltimore were good summaries of the new views. A reviewer for the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* called Baltimore’s *Plan for the Central Business District* the “prototype of the comprehensive CBD plan.” Increases in private and public offices partially balanced the projected declines in retail, wholesale, and industrial uses. Downtown not only needed new facilities such as parking garages but also required much broader replanning of land uses to support a selected set of region-serving functions. The centerpiece for implementation was the Charles Center redevelopment project to remake the downtown core. Oakland’s *Central District Plan* in 1966 distinguished among a
core, inner ring, and peripheral ring, each of which called for a different set of public interventions.\(^{28}\)

**Downtown as a Federation of Everyday Environments: 1965–75**

The massive land clearances of the 1950s fueled a reaction against urban renewal in the early 1960s from both the conservative and liberal sides of the political spectrum. The former emphasized the economic failures of urban renewal and its inability to improve on the private market in land and housing. The latter described its unwanted social impacts and the destruction of viable lower-income communities.\(^{29}\) One of the perhaps unexpected side effects was the redefinition of downtown as a set of distinct functional subdistricts, each of which appeared to foster a different sort of activity and each of which needed particularized treatment.

This new vision or image drew on the work of Herbert Gans, Jane Jacobs, and Kevin Lynch, all of whom suggested that downtowns had to be experienced on the relatively small scale of individual buildings, blocks, and districts.\(^{30}\) The contrast between older and newer views can be read in a comparison of Gruen’s 1955 plan for Fort Worth and his plan for Boston from the early 1960s. In the latter he identified a dozen and a half “pedestrian nuclei, each devoted to a variety of land uses, with an emphasis, however, on those which have developed historically.” Seven of the nuclei were in the “so-called CBD” and eleven just outside.\(^{31}\) The transition can also be seen in a comparison of 1961 statements by Jacobs and Charles Abrams. Drawing their sense of the American city from New York, both Jacobs and Abrams hoped to achieve vibrant, active downtown districts. Abrams also reaffirmed the idea of downtown as a single unit, asserting that “a downtown area is a cohesive unit which lives or dies as a whole.” Jacobs, in contrast, treated downtown as a set of intertwined activity centers. In the best-selling *Death and Life of Great American Cities*, she wrote about diversity, subdistricts, and concentrated “pools of use.” “Every city primary use,” she wrote, “needs its intimate matrix of ‘profane’ city to work to best advantage. The courts building in San Francisco needs one kind of matrix with its secondary diversity. The opera needs another kind.”\(^{32}\)

Academics participated in the new understanding of downtowns as multiple centers with behavioral studies of user subareas and efforts to define the social and economic geography of downtowns. Common products of the 1960s were studies of retail clustering and the mapping of
functional subdistricts for cities such as Dallas, New Orleans, and Chicago. University of Washington researchers found that downtown Seattle was composed of “user subsystems” and activity nodes that should be delineated before the city undertook any new plans and projects. Historical geographers such as David Ward and Martyn Bowden supplemented the current mapping efforts by studying the historical coalescence of downtown out of a variety of functional subareas.

It is clear that subarea analysis was in the air by the later 1960s. In 1963, consultant Donald Monson had responded to the concerns of the Central Association of Seattle with a Comprehensive Plan for the Central Business District. Monson’s proposal was Gruenesque, ignoring the constraints of the city’s steep hills to propose a ring highway defining a unitary downtown, fringe parking garages, and pedestrianized shopping streets. Seven years later, the Central Association’s own annual report stated that downtown Seattle was best understood in terms of a “system of functional zones, each with a distinct character that, when integrated into the whole, make up the central nervous system of our metropolitan community.” Each of the six districts “has its own role to play and potential to fulfill” in the expected development of Seattle as a headquarters city.

Omaha’s formal plans also displayed the changing policy orientations of the three postwar decades. As Janet Daly has shown, the “Omaha Plan” of 1956 scarcely recognized downtown as a problem and emphasized infrastructure investment. Ten years later, the Central Omaha Plan (1966) recognized special downtown needs but placed its faith in interstate highways and urban renewal. The next seven years, however, brought a generational transition in civic leadership and a willingness to focus on the multiple experiences that downtown had to offer. A new central business district plan in 1973 divided downtown Omaha into eight “neighborhoods” or functional areas. Planners hoped that a variety of functions and attractions would pull residents back downtown, and that each identifiable district would strengthen the others.

The story was the same in Portland. Urban renewal planners in 1957–60 envisioned a compact downtown defined by a freeway loop and peripheral parking lots. The local downtown business lobby supported the proposals in the hope that property values could be stabilized in a small, limited-function business district. A decade later, a new generation of business leaders, politicians, and citizens redefined downtown Portland around the theme of variety. The citizen advisory committee that wrote the planning guidelines for the new Downtown Plan of 1972 divided the core into twenty-one districts on the basis of current uses, opportunities
for redevelopment, and visual coherence. The plan inventoried current uses for each area and focused on possibilities for new housing, secondary retail centers, pedestrian circulation, public transit, and waterfront open space. Previous plans for downtown Portland had offered bird’s-eye views in which tiny automobiles coursed along looping highways between toy houses and skyscrapers. The 1972 plan depicted downtown Portland as a sequence of sidewalk scenes. Retired men played chess in the park, students munched junk food near Portland State University, shoppers strolled a transit mall, and children played around a new foundation.

By the early 1970s, the subdistricted downtown was as much a staple of planning documents as the unitary downtown had been in 1950. Indeed, subarea analysis remained a standard for downtown description into the 1990s. After 1975, however, it became accepted background rather than an exciting discovery. A sampling of downtown plans from 1976 to 1986 shows that Dallas and Atlanta each identified three districts. Dayton identified seven, Washington seven (or perhaps ten), Richmond eight, and Oakland eleven. Denver found six districts in its core and four more in a surrounding transition zone. Seattle built its downtown plan on eleven “areas of varied character.”

Downtown as a Set of Individual Experiences: 1975–85

As American cities recovered from the severe real estate recession of 1973–74, planners and policymakers reevaluated their discovery of the multiple downtown. Subdistrict analysis identified a wider range of development opportunities than a unitary analysis. At the same time, its recognition of residential groups and secondary business clusters built in a bias in favor of conservation and enhancement rather than redevelopment.

The desire to stimulate downtown business and investment brought a renewed interest in downtowns as consciously manipulated artifacts. In this newest understanding, downtown was less a set of distinct social environments than a collection of opportunities for individual experiences. Downtown areas were increasingly seen as environments to be consciously designed in the interest of enjoyment and tourism. This conception of downtown as a theme park accepted its loss of primacy within the metropolitan community. It was to be reconstructed to serve tourists, conventioneers, and occasional visitors on safari from the suburbs. It also accepted that suburban “outer cities” were emerging as co-equals to downtown and then borrowed some of the ideas of the consciously designed suburban environment. If direct retail competition with suburban malls
was a failure, planners asked, why not emphasize specialized entertainment and shopping. The results were downtowns conceived as museums, cultural centers, amenity districts, and amusement parks.

An obvious reflection of the new understanding was a flood of interest in the academic and professional literature on the economic role of the arts and on the recovery of physical amenities, especially along waterfronts. Books and articles on the arts as contributors to urban development policy peaked in the early 1980s. Beginning in the early 1970s, William H. Whyte examined the environmental determinants of individual responses to parks, plazas, sidewalks, and other downtown public spaces. He helped to popularize a view of downtown as a series of personal experiences and choices. A number of educational programs and public-interest lobbying groups with an interest in the promotion of enjoyable downtowns also emerged or expanded during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Examples include the Main Street program of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Waterfront Center, and Partners for Livable Places.

Although usually read as cultural criticism rather than policy analysis, Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Stephen Izenour's manifesto, *Learning from Las Vegas* (1972), documents the same emerging understanding of downtowns. The result of a Yale architecture seminar, the book defined Las Vegas as the populist alternative to the carefully ordered and centered city. The city's "downtown" is its commercial strip, a new main street of activity nodes that are connected by automobiles and announced by huge signs. The purpose of commercial Las Vegas is to present a series of surfaces. It is a city whose business district is explicitly designed as a sequence of fragmented and individualized experiences.

In rejecting the necessity and value of a unitary downtown, *Learning from Las Vegas* was an early example of the postmodern turn in Western culture. Postmodernism emerged in art, architecture, and literature as a reaction against the austerity, universalism, or formalism of mid-twentieth-century culture. Given its name in the early 1970s, its emergence as a set of linked ideas or artistic preferences has been dated variously to the early 1960s by Fredric Jameson and Charles Jencks and to the 1970s by David Harvey. Jane Jacobs, Robert Venturi, and the advocacy planning movement have all earned a place as early examples of the political side of postmodernism, with its emphasis on popular culture and open pluralism. The revaluation of subdistricts as primary to the functioning of downtowns clearly expressed the same ideas.

Likewise, the elevation of downtown as a stage set in the mid-1970s fit with an increasing emphasis on the inherent value of the unexpected.
The self-consciously theatrical design of the show-off buildings that characterized postmodernism by the later 1970s depended on juxtaposition of styles, jumbling of spaces, and playful use of historical allusion. City centers themselves were increasingly presented as open theaters of individualism. Jonathan Raban’s *Soft City* (1974), offered by David Harvey as one of the first postmodern treatments of the city, depicted London as an “encyclopedia” or “emporium of styles.” In Raban’s version, living in the city was an art in itself, making the physical setting a stage or canvas for its inhabitants. In practical application, the new aesthetic meant downtown plans that emphasized design values and aimed for special attractions to appeal to the maturing baby boomers who would soon find themselves caricatured as “yuppies.”

Boston and Baltimore are easily identified as pioneers of the American downtown as artifact. In the later 1960s and early 1970s, efforts to promote new downtown retail centers had produced some prominent failures as well as profitable developments. Baltimore’s Inner Harbor redevelopment program and Boston’s initial efforts in the Fanueil Hall/Waterfront area dated to the same problematic years of the late 1960s. However, they bore fruit between 1976 and 1981 with attractive new open space and spectacularly successful retail complexes that were quickly dubbed “festival markets.” Frieden and Sagalyn have documented more than one hundred comparable projects between 1970 and 1988, most of them since the late 1970s, when the Boston and Baltimore examples encouraged city governments to become active partners.

Many of these festival market projects are open to Harvey’s critical description of “an architecture of spectacle, with its sense of surface glitter and transitory participatory pleasure.” A climax product of the species is Horton Plaza in San Diego, first planned in the 1970s and opened in 1987. The “Plaza” is a contrived environment that draws visitors into a mildly but deliberately confusing shopping mall. The interior spaces offer multiple levels, bridges, passageways, and curving corridors. They are programmed with safely interesting activities. They are decked out in painful pseudo-Mediterranean pastels. They are explicitly presented as a “fun” alternative to the “gray” office towers of downtown San Diego.

Festival markets were part of a long shopping list of amenity projects for the 1980s. Exhibition space in major convention cities doubled between 1975 and 1990. Cities added performing arts centers, arts districts, waterfront redevelopment, downtown open space, historic districts, rehabilitated hotels, and museum/aquarium complexes. San Antonio’s roster of projects for the 1980s included the River Center festival market, an expanded convention center, a domed stadium, a restored theater, a new
art museum in an adapted historic building, a luxury hotel, and a transit mall. Most of the projects on the standard list aimed at the creation of low-end service jobs to replace the lost manufacturing and warehousing jobs that were no longer located on the downtown fringe.

In formal planning, the emphasis shifted significantly to design control, preservation planning, fine-tuning of floor-area ratios, amenities bonuses, and similar approaches that treated downtowns as visual experiences. Federal allowance of accelerated depreciation for historic buildings in 1976 and investment tax credits after 1981 encouraged a boom in the designation of buildings and downtown districts. The interest built on the earlier thematic understanding of downtown as a set of subareas. It took off when the designation of historic districts also appeared to meet the newly perceived need to turn downtown into a collection of stage sets.49

Downtown planners by the early 1980s tended to see the task of downtown planning as promoting and linking groups of experiences from which visitors could pick and choose.50 New Orleans’s Growth Management Program (1975) used historic districts and incentive zoning for pedestrian amenities. The innovative *Time for Springfield* [Massachusetts] plan of 1978 emphasized recycling historical structures, open space, cultural facilities, reclamation of the Connecticut riverfront, and aggressive programming of public festivals. Chicago’s 1981 *Comprehensive Plan* mentioned leisure-time activities first, cultural institutions second, offices third, and manufacturing last. A privately commissioned Central Area Plan (1984) envisioned central Chicago as a complementary mix of housing, retailing, tourism, cultural facilities, new offices, and old landmarks. Milwaukee’s *Downtown Goals and Policies* (1985) stressed pedestrian linkages among hotels, a convention center, retailers, and cultural attractions; it placed design review and improved lakefront access near the top of implementation measures. Richmond’s *Downtown Plan* (1984) similarly emphasized the need to maintain an attractive environment, to cluster amenities, to expand cultural activities, and to tie together the downtown subdistricts. It placed marketing, public relations, advertising, and special events on the same level with financial assistance and transportation in the implementation program. “A more alive Downtown,” said the plan, “means more culture and leisure time offerings, special shopping opportunities and other uniquely urban qualities which add to the quality of life in Richmond. Bit by bit it all results in an improved national image, a better local identity, and an increased sense of pride in one’s city.”51

The new directions of aesthetic planning were anticipated in New York’s extensive design overlay districts and reached a climax in the San Francisco *Downtown Plan* of 1985. New York first used special zoning
districts in 1968 to protect the special character of the Manhattan theater
district. By the early 1980s it had adopted thirty such districts to preserve
design values. San Francisco's heralded plan responded to a downtown
development boom that doubled office space between 1965 and 1983. The 1985 document was presented as a growth management plan, but it built on the city's Urban Design Plan of 1971. Although the plan claimed to aim at maintaining San Francisco's predominance as a world commercial city, it gave nearly half its space to issues such as protecting solar access, increasing open space, requiring the preservation of 271 historic buildings, and promoting an interesting skyline through design review of new buildings by a panel of experts.

Downtown as Command Post: 1985–

Since the late nineteenth century, skyscrapers filled with executives and typists have been the essential symbol for downtowns. After spending the 1970s arm and arm with pedestrians, by the mid-1980s experts had rediscovered downtown's continuing importance as a transaction center. The recognition was triggered by the continued downtown building boom that ran from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, dwarfing the earlier booms of the 1920s and the urban renewal era and bringing newspaper stories that headlined "U.S. Downtowns: No Longer Downtrodden." In the thirty largest metropolitan areas, office construction in the first half of the 1980s ran at twice the rate of the 1970s, which had in turn outpaced the 1960s by 50 percent. The boom hit more than New York, Boston, and Los Angeles. Less glamorous cities like Louisville added three million square feet of office space and Cleveland added six million.

The office boom held out the hope that downtowns could tap into the global service economy at the high end of managerial, professional, finance, and consulting jobs as well as at the low end of entertainment and personal services. It substantially re-created an understanding of downtowns as unique centers. In this case, however, they were seen less as the unitary center of an individual metropolis than as centralized nodes of activity within national and global networks. This newest understanding sees downtown as floating freely in global economic space, just as the high-rise office towers of Atlanta or Houston float above their surrounding parking fields with little connection to nearby neighborhoods. Indeed, the decision by the Department of Commerce that the 1987 Census of Retailing would cease to report data for central business districts was an official declaration that general retailing for the metro-
politically market is no longer viewed as an important downtown function. Landscape critic J. B. Jackson agrees that the urban center has lost its role in daily life, transformed instead into “an impressive symbol of remote power and unattainable wealth.” The downtown as command post is “dedicated to power and money and technology, not to traditional human activities or institutions.”

One academic response in the last decade has been a large literature on the restructuring of economic space within the globalized economy. Much of this literature is Marxist in approach, with downtowns as the most visible expressions of the structure of economic power. As John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff have put it, world cities are increasingly divided between worker “ghettoes” and capitalists in their office tower “cathedrals.” Traditional geographers and economists explain the emergence of the high-rise downtown in terms of the continuing value of central locations for face-to-face contact and the quick exchange of sensitive or specialized information—what Gail Garfield Schwartz calls “off-the-record information [which] cannot be transmitted on any way except in person.” Writers such as Richard Child Hill and Joe Feagin in the mid-1980s analyzed the public policies that promote high-rise downtowns as the “corporate center” strategy.

A second academic and professional response has been a new interest in the politics of real estate development and deal making. Paul Peterson’s City Limits set a theme for the 1980s by arguing that economic development is the primary and proper role for local government. Urban policy specialists have zeroed in on cases such as the North Loop project in Chicago as examples of the political complexities of contemporary development. The downtown development case studies in the Urban Land Institute’s Cities Reborn are matched by such university press books as Downtown, Inc. The 1980s saw a new academic interest in real estate development curricula that span the interests of planning programs and business schools. Traditional regulatory planning is now matched by the newer subdiscipline of development planning, whose practitioners mobilize public resources to encourage growth on a project-by-project basis.

In formal planning, the 1980s brought a renewed attention to accommodating the perceived needs for downtown growth, at least in the form of office space. Philadelphia’s extensively analyzed downtown plan of 1988 is characterized as an “economic development plan” whose first goal is to “achieve significant economic growth” by developing the “enormous potential” of the “office-based information and service economy.” New plans for Denver (1986) and Cleveland (1988) aim to reinforce downtowns as financial and administrative centers. The plans accept a vision of
quaternary- and quinary-sector growth and propose ways to capture much of the new economic activity within the city core. New York City pointed the growth of its mid-Manhattan business core westward to Seventh and Eighth avenues and beyond to the proposed Lincoln West project. Springfield’s Visions 1989 replaced the 1979 goal of enriching individual experiences with a strategy aimed at securing office expansion spilling over from Boston and New York. Planners in San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, and Chicago accepted the desirability of new office towers and debated whether to direct such growth upward through amenity bonuses and higher floor-area ratios or outward by rezoning and redeveloping the downtown frame. The operative question was not “whether” but “where.”

The emphasis on the networked downtown suggests the continued strength of the generalizing forces of modernization. The current idea of downtown as command post affirms the essential characteristics of modernism—abstraction, deracination, universalism. It calls for architecture and planning in which the function of information exchange over-rides complexities and variations in form. The rise of this newest interpre-tation implies that the postmodern themes of the 1970s and 1980s are ordinary turns in an ongoing discourse. Postmodernism as seen from downtown is part of a continuing dialogue rather than an epochal rewriting of a century-old understanding of urban development.

The primary texts of downtown policy show that we think differently about cities now than we did in earlier decades. Not only do we know more and different things, but we fit this knowledge together around different understandings and assumptions that seem too obvious to articu-late. We already know to be careful in projecting economic and demo-graphic trends. We need to exercise the same caution about intellectual trends, for accepted preferences in planning ideas can change with nearly the speed of artistic or architectural fashion. New understandings are as likely to reject or ignore the recent past as to amplify its particular themes. Only by taking the historian’s backward step can we see how far and how quickly those understandings have moved.

An obvious lesson for policymakers is that our mutable understanding of downtown has built contradictions into its planning goals and physical fabric. Downtowns show an unresolved tension between the goals of the current and previous decades. At the street level, for example, they are structured as a grab bag of individual choices. Above the street they are utilized intensely by the corporate sector. The contemporary mixed-use development, with its lower-floor shops, restaurants, and theaters and upper-level offices, is a tangible manifestation of the tension. At the same
time, the office expansion agenda can clash directly with the earlier understanding of downtown as a coalition of subareas. Office development planning offers little place to districts that do not contribute to the explicit corporate center strategy. Given these contradictions, policymakers should not be surprised that the legitimation of subdistricts and the promotion of amenities created constituencies that may challenge the plans of the 1990s. Seattle is a case in point of popular resistance to plans with a tight focus on control functions. Many residents in the late 1980s came to view downtown development and the preservation of a downtown usable by average citizens as competing goals. In 1989 they voted a symbolic limit on downtown development when it appeared that the new Land Use and Transportation Plan for Downtown Seattle (1985) failed to protect either the appearance of downtown or the livability of close-in neighborhoods.67

The challenge in Seattle and other cities such as San Francisco suggests that planners and policymakers need to turn their attention to the characteristics that make downtown different from other nodes in the transactional grid. Whether we call them outer cities or outtowns or edge cities, peripheral office clusters can house many transactional functions as effectively as established downtowns. Nevertheless, downtown continues to offer the urban advantages of variety and intensity in ways not possible on the edge. Indeed, the one advantage of core over periphery is its social inclusiveness. Downtown is certainly a natural home for plugged-in executives, but it can also be an effective setting for integrating old minorities, new minorities, and majority society. It remains the one part of the metropolis that most effectively generates new ideas by bringing together the greatest range of groups and individuals. The idea of a socially inclusive downtown could logically recombine the old idea of a unitary center with the mid-1960s vision of downtown as the home to distinct groups and communities. Such a reconstructed understanding of downtown as everybody's neighborhood would also reaffirm the belief in cities as single metropolitan systems that offer comparable sets of opportunities to all their citizens.

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Notes

1. Clarence Stone, Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent: System Bias in the Urban Renewal Program of Atlanta (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976); Arnold Hirsch, Making

2. Terrence McDonald, The Parameters of Urban Fiscal Policy: Socioeconomic Change and Political Culture in San Francisco, 1860–1906 (Berkeley, 1986), 1–18, criticizes the structural-functional approach for leaving out human agency and the political process and for assuming that what did happen was what had to happen.


15. The plans are summarized and analyzed in the following: Howard Gillette, Jr., “A National Workshop for Urban Policy: The Metroplitanization of Washington, 1946–
18. Gillette, "National Workshop"; Louis Justement, New Cities for Old (New York, 1946), 95–144. Tracy Augur was the chair of the transportation subcommittee.
21. Teaford, Rough Road to Renaissance, 123.

D.C.:

ningConcepts

alized and routinized neighborhood participation by the 1980s. with its revaluation of small-scale and everyday environments. Many cities had Planning and Current Issues

Central Business Process, 1960-1989, (Atlanta, 1988); Dayton Department of Planning, Downtown

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39. The neighborhood movement of 1965-80 paralleled this era of downtown analysis with its revaluation of small-scale and everyday environments. Many cities had institutionalized and routinized neighborhood participation by the 1980s.


55. Frieden and Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc., 265.


57. John B. Jackson, “The Sunbelt City: The Modern City, the Strip, and the Civic Center,” in The Southern Landscape Tradition in Texas (Fort Worth, 1980), 32–33.

Community Development Strategy

America's Cisco, Seattle, and other cities in Richard Collins, Elizabeth Waters, and A. Bruce Dotson, Janet Daly examined the period from 1945 to 1973 and found a basic change of attitudes in fulfillment.

Zane Miller and Bruce Tucker, Snowbelt fitting the change within a larger argument about a shift of American political culture from the remnants of republicanism to consumer liberalism and the promotion of individual Politics in the late 1960s. This article is not the first to find major turning points in ideas about downtowns.


Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 347–51.


This article is not the first to find major turning points in ideas about downtowns.

Janet Daly examined the period from 1945 to 1973 and found a basic change of attitudes in the late 1960s. Robert Fairbanks and Zane Miller have put the divide in the late 1950s, fitting the change within a larger argument about a shift of American political culture from the remnants of republicanism to consumer liberalism and the promotion of individual self-fulfillment. See Daly, "Planning for Downtown Omaha"; Zane Miller, "History and the Politics of Community Change in Cincinnati," The Public Historian 5 (Fall 1983): 17–35; Zane Miller and Bruce Tucker, "Cincinnati: The New Urban Politics," in Bernard, Snowbelt Cities, 91; Robert B. Fairbanks, Making Better Citizens: Housing Reform and the Community Development Strategy in Cincinnati (Urbana, Ill., 1989).

For example, see the preservation/development tensions described for San Francisco, Seattle, and other cities in Richard Collins, Elizabeth Waters, and A. Bruce Dotson, America's Downtowns: Growth, Politics, and Preservation (Washington, D.C., 1991).