5-9-2003

Community Policing in Portland

City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.)

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City Club of Portland
Presents Its Report:

Community Policing in Portland

“Community policing is in a shifting, uneasy stage of evolution. Its general principles are accepted as desirable goals, but the strategies to achieve them are hotly debated.”

--Urban Institute, 1999
The City Club of Portland Mission
To inform its members and the community in public matters and to arouse in them a realization of the obligations of citizenship.

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Layout and design: Niki M. Clark

Printing: Ron Laster, Print Results

Cover Art : community policing insignia, Portland Police Bureau

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COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

Executive Summary

Community policing is a philosophy and practice that has gained wide acceptance in many cities across the United States. Escalating crime rates in the 1980s increased public frustration with police practices and bolstered public support for alternative approaches to traditional law enforcement. Community policing is the outcome of this social movement in Portland and many other cities. While community policing is implemented in varied ways, all community policing embodies the fundamental concepts of problem solving, i.e., looking beyond arrest to the underlying causes of crime, and partnership, i.e., sharing responsibility for public safety and neighborhood livability between the community and the police.

Community policing is distinctly different from traditional policing and requires organizational development and active reinforcement of its philosophy to sustain a problem-solving and partnership approach to public safety. This sustained effort is the most difficult aspect of successfully implementing community policing in all cities, including Portland. The tension between the principles of problem solving and partnership and the more traditional approaches of law enforcement is constant, and recent concerns about homeland security have increased this tension.

Portland Mayor Bud Clark and the City Council passed two resolutions introducing community policing to Portland in 1989. Chief of Police Tom Potter translated the philosophy of community policing into action. Potter instituted numerous committees and working groups of community members and Portland Police Bureau staff to guide the implementation of community policing. Potter also established an internal vocabulary and set of personnel practices that brought about a cultural shift within the Police Bureau that led to the acceptance of community policing as the new standard for policing in Portland. Each successive chief since Potter has been charged with continuing the advancement of community policing in Portland.

On the community side, the Office of Neighborhood Involvement, which includes the Crime Prevention Center and neighborhood associations, is the city bureau that works most closely with the Portland Police Bureau. Other city bureaus also partner with the police on specific issues, e.g., the Bureau of Development Services is a critical player in efforts to shut down drug houses. Local non-profit organizations and businesses, such as Central City Concern, which operates the Hooper Detoxification Center, and Central Eastside Industrial Council, are also important parts of the community policing.
network. In addition, the county judicial system provides invaluable support to community policing through the Neighborhood District Attorney and Community Court programs.

The arrival of Chief Mark Kroeker in 1999 began a period of intense public scrutiny of policing in Portland. Some of this attention was stimulated by controversy surrounding some of Chief Kroeker’s decisions and directives. This environment set the stage for a critical look at the state of community policing in Portland and to the decision of the City Club of Portland to undertake this study. While the controversy surrounding Chief Kroeker has raised questions about the city’s commitment to community policing, your committee was asked to evaluate community policing in general, not Chief Kroeker’s performance specifically.

In particular, your committee was charged with a number of questions about whether community policing has lived up to its promise. Has the vision of community policing been broadly understood and accepted? Has it been fully implemented in the community and within the Police Bureau? What impact has community policing had on public safety and the perception of safety by community members? Have evaluation efforts been meaningful? How does community policing in Portland compare to other American cities? Finally, is community policing in Portland worth a renewed commitment from city officials, community members and the police bureau?

Your committee looked to a number of sources to answer these questions. We reviewed extensive background materials and conducted numerous interviews with elected officials, community members and personnel from every level of the police bureau.

Your committee drew the following conclusions:

- Since 1990 when community policing was introduced in Portland, crime has decreased significantly and the public’s perception of safety has increased markedly. The majority of citizens are satisfied with the performance of the Portland Police Bureau.

- The citizens of Portland consider community policing the accepted standard for policing. The community expects—even demands—community policing.

- Mechanisms for community input and particularly for shared decision making are weak in spite of Portland’s strong tradition of neighborhood involvement.

- Some members of the community and the Portland Police Bureau believe that Chief Kroeker does not fully support community policing. The perception that community policing is “off the radar screen” is a serious concern.

- Within the Portland Police Bureau, organizational development and personnel practices that support community policing are weak
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...and may be further weakened by budget cuts. Minority recruiting efforts are ineffective, the absence of employee performance evaluations and incentives to adopt community policing practices hinder progress, and training specific to community policing is inadequate.

Leadership for community policing is a serious problem within the City Council and the Portland Police Bureau. Community policing is rarely discussed by the City Council, and usually in response to a crisis. An aloof style of communication and a focus on results to the detriment of process have weakened Chief Kroeker’s effectiveness as a leader and as an advocate for community policing. The leadership provided by Chief Kroeker or any future chief is key to establishing community policing as the model of policing for Portland.

The infrastructure, budgetary support, planning and evaluation needed on the community side to complement and support the community policing practices within the Portland Police Bureau are seriously deficient. These problems began with the 1989 City Council resolution that directed all its expectations to the Portland Police Bureau and neglected other parts of city government that affect the community.

Based on these conclusions, your committee developed an extensive list of recommendations. Among these are the following:

- The mayor and other city commissioners should show their unequivocal and visible support for community policing and should ensure that all city bureaus are fully committed. Budgetary impacts on community policing should be monitored closely.

- The police chief should be a visible advocate for community policing and should use face-to-face communication to build relationships inside the Police Bureau and in the community.

- The original vision, i.e., the 1989 and 1990 City Council resolutions, and subsequent strategic planning for community policing should be revised to encompass the crime prevention expectations incumbent upon the community. The Portland Police Bureau and appropriate structures within the community must share accountability.

- Personnel practices within the Portland Police Bureau should be revised to support community policing. Improvement in recruiting minority officers is especially important and should be emphasized.

- Outside evaluations of community policing should be conducted regularly. Measures that are currently weak, namely evaluations of partnerships, leadership and community activities that support community policing should be strengthened.
A note to the reader:

Your committee interviewed many Portland Police Bureau employees and individuals who work closely with the Bureau. Most of them were candid and forthcoming and did not request anonymity. However, inasmuch as the Police Bureau is a tightly closed organization, your committee chose not to attribute quotes that could be construed as negative.

Most interviews were conducted in the summer of 2002. In the intervening months some witnesses have changed positions or employment. In the body of the report, your committee uses the title that the witness had at the time of the interview. Changes in title and employment since the interviews took place are noted in Appendix A.
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I. INTRODUCTION

With great fanfare the City of Portland instituted community policing in 1989. Portland quickly gained national recognition for the depth and breadth of its community policing efforts and the enthusiasm and dedication of its leadership. Now, after more than a decade of community policing in Portland, City Club of Portland has undertaken a review of the philosophy, strategies and outcomes of community policing.

Though City Club’s decision to study community policing was made in 2001 amidst public concern about police activities and criticism of Chief of Police Mark Kroeker’s leadership, these concerns were not the driving force behind the study, nor did they become the major focus of the study. Nonetheless, it was impossible to separate entirely the issues relating to community policing from the landscape of controversy that was present during most of the study period.

City Club formed a study committee composed of Club members who were screened for possible conflict of interest to ensure that no member had a stake in the outcome of the study or was publicly identified with a position on community policing. The committee began its work in June 2002 and met weekly until November 2002. Committee members interviewed members of the Portland Police Bureau, current and former elected officials, and numerous representatives from the community. Committee members also participated in police ride-alongs and attended relevant police task force meetings and community court sessions. Your committee also reviewed extensive background material about community policing, both local and national. Witnesses are listed in Appendices A and B. Resources are listed in Appendix C.

A. STUDY CHARGE

City Club’s Board of Governors charged your committee with the following:

- Describe the general origin, definition, purpose and forms of community policing.
- Describe the origins of Portland’s community policing program and the evolution of the original vision and objectives.
- Describe Portland’s current community policing program.
Describe how the City of Portland monitors and evaluates the impact and success of the community policing program, and the Portland Police Bureau’s response to reviews of its community policing strategy.

Compare Portland’s approach to community policing programs with other comparable cities—including program monitoring and evaluation.

Summarize community opinions on the role and performance of community policing in Portland, including a review of support or concern about the strategy as well as support for alternative strategies or revisions to the existing strategy.

Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Portland’s community policing strategy and program.

Recommend changes to the City Council, Portland Police Bureau and other responsible parties where appropriate.

The charge also instructed your committee not to study citizen oversight of police misconduct because the City Auditor’s office was, in July 2001, just initiating a process for that purpose. The topic was not critical to our conclusions and is not discussed in this report.

B. DEFINITION AND EXAMPLES OF COMMUNITY POLICING

Your committee found widespread agreement about the fundamental definition of community policing. Community policing is a philosophy, as opposed to a program. Its key principles are problem solving and partnership between the police and the community. The challenge of community policing is how to develop and sustain the structures and strategies within the community and the police department that support problem solving and shared responsibility. On this latter point, i.e., implementation, your committee found substantial disagreement nationwide.

Community policing is not solely the responsibility of the police. The community has a parallel responsibility to work with the police to reduce crime and the fear of crime and to promote neighborhood livability. City government is responsible for ensuring that the infrastructure necessary for successful community policing is in place in the police department, other government bureaus and in neighborhoods.

The City of Portland’s official definition of community policing, developed in 1989, is in keeping with the national consensus. City Council Resolution No. 34587 reads as follows:
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"Community policing is based on a philosophy which recognizes the interdependence and shared responsibility of the police and community in making Portland a safer, more livable city...Community policing reflects the values of: community participation; problem solving; officer involvement in decision-making; police accountability; and deployment of police personnel at a level closer to the neighborhood."

Thirteen years later, Portland’s 2000-02 community policing strategic plan uses similar language. From Chief Kroeker’s vision statement:

"This vision for community policing recognizes a shared responsibility and connection between the police and community in making Portland a safer, more livable city. This vision relies on a problem-solving partnership between citizens and police. These partners jointly identify community safety issues, determine resources, and apply innovative strategies designed to create and sustain healthy, vital crime resistant neighborhoods."

The language in the City Auditor’s 2002 Service Efforts and Accomplishments report, an annual performance review of the city’s nine largest bureaus, uses similar language and also addresses accountability.

"The primary goal of the Bureau is to reduce crime and the fear of crime. The Bureau has adopted community policing practices in order to address its mission and goals. Community policing requires...a shared responsibility between police and the community for addressing underlying problems contributing to crime and the fear of crime. Factors intended to promote the success of community policing include: partnerships between the community, other city bureaus, service agencies, and the criminal justice system; empowerment of citizens and police employees to solve problems; specific problem-solving approaches to reduce the incidence and fear of crime; shared accountability among bureau management and employees, the community, and the city council; orientation to citizens and co-workers as customers."

Knowing what community policing is not is also important. Community policing is not a public relations campaign. It is not necessarily police officers on foot in every neighborhood, officers waving at citizens from their patrol cars or police officers playing basketball with teenagers. Though most people would probably agree
that friendly interaction between police officers and the community is a good idea, community policing is much more than that.

Community policing is not a public relations campaign.

To help readers understand the distinction between community policing and traditional policing, your committee offers the following example:

Car break-ins were a major problem in the Goose Hollow neighborhood in 2002. Neighborhood Patrol Officer Jeff Myers concluded that the break-ins were largely crimes of opportunity; when items of value inside the car were visible, thieves took the opportunity to smash a window and grab the contents. Twenty-five cents lying on the dashboard might be appealing to someone hoping to buy a beer; a gym bag or briefcase might contain saleable items; a credit card or an invoice might provide information for an identity theft. Officer Myers determined that if these opportunities didn’t exist, break-ins could be avoided. In response, he spoke with area employers, building managers and neighborhood groups about the importance of keeping valuables out of sight. He also patrolled the neighborhood taking the license numbers of cars in which items of value could be seen. The State Department of Motor Vehicles provided the names and addresses of the license holders, and the owners were sent letters advising them not to leave items of value visible in their cars. Because the Goose Hollow neighborhood had several encampments of transients living in the bushes on the margins of Interstate 405, the officer also arranged to have most of the bushes along the freeway cut back. This example illustrates the classic elements of community policing--problem solving, partnerships and citizen participation.

A more traditional policing approach might have included stakeouts, searching pawnshops and rousting transients in the neighborhood. However, the reality was that these were low-priority crimes that could not be efficiently pursued on a case-by-case basis by busy police officers faced with overcrowded jails and an overburdened court system. In this particular instance, crime prevention was far more effective than law enforcement.

II. BACKGROUND

A. HISTORY OF COMMUNITY POLICING

Community policing traces its origin to 19th century England where Sir Robert Peel developed the London Metropolitan Police Force whose operation was based on a philosophy of cooperation between police and community. Peel believed that developing respect for law and authority would help maintain order with minimum force.
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This philosophy remains at the heart of community policing and is sometimes expressed as "the police are the public and the public are the police."

The London model was adopted in the late 19th century by U.S. cities, including New York. By the early 20th century, however, the close relationship between the police and the community had evolved into a system in which politics controlled not only the hiring, promotion and discipline of police officers but also decisions about which laws were enforced and who was arrested. Corruption was widespread during this period.

In the 1930s, responding to corruption and gangsterism, police forces across the United States became more professional, i.e., better trained, better supervised, better equipped and better paid. J. Edgar Hoover's FBI became a model for city police emphasizing military discipline and seeing community involvement as a threat to good policing. An exemplar of professional policing was the Los Angeles Police Department in the 1950s under the legendary Chief William Parker whose "kick ass and take names" approach has come to characterize traditional policing.

However, even in those years, other ideas were being explored. August Vollmer, founder of the University of California's School of Criminology, was pioneering a new approach that stressed problem solving and community involvement as essential tools for fighting crime and promoting public safety.

In the 1960s and 70s, increasing crime, racial strife and anti-war agitation increased the growing rift between police and citizenry. Two decades of so-called professional policing had isolated the police from the community, particularly as the use of patrol cars became more common. African-American communities were especially alienated. The social movements of these years painted the police as a symbol of everything that was perceived to be wrong with the American way of life.

By the 1980s exhausted communities across the United States were questioning the efficacy of traditional policing and were ready to try a new approach. Portland was one of those communities.
B. HISTORY OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

A crime explosion in Portland in the late 1980s, fueled by crack cocaine and an attendant proliferation of drug houses, gang activity and drive-by shootings, created a high level of community frustration. Simmering racial tensions added to the problem. Police and citizens recognized that current policing methods and the dozen or so crime prevention specialists who had been working for neighborhood associations since 1978 would not be able to solve these problems.

One event in particular highlighted the situation, and the reaction to the event offered a promising model. In 1988 teenager Joseph "RayRay" Winston was murdered at Columbia Villa, a North Portland housing project. An investigation revealed extensive gang activity at Columbia Villa. Don Clark, then executive director of the Housing Authority of Portland, contracted with the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office to establish a presence at Columbia Villa and to work with residents to rid the area of gang members. This problem-solving and partnership-building approach was highly successful. At about the same time, the Portland Police Bureau initiated a similar approach, partnering with motel owners and residents of the Overlook neighborhood to solve a previously intractable crime problem on North Interstate Avenue.

In late 1988 Mayor Bud Clark attended the U.S. Conference of Mayors at which Lee Brown, chief of police in Houston and a former Multnomah County sheriff, made a presentation about community policing. Immediately upon his return, Mayor Clark directed the Portland Police Bureau to prepare a strategic management plan that focused on community policing. Tom Potter, a captain at the time, had recently returned from a community policing tour of Japan and was appointed head of the planning team.

Potter’s team eventually assembled twelve committees of five to thirty-five people each with participants from city bureaus, community groups and institutions, businesses and police representatives. The committee reports were circulated widely in the community, and by the end of 1989, the City Council resolved to adopt community policing, defined the outcomes expected and approved hiring up to one hundred additional police officers. In January 1990 the City Council adopted the Police Bureau’s transition plan.

In 1990 Mayor Clark appointed Tom Potter chief of police with responsibility for implementing community policing. Chief Potter built internal and external support for community policing. Externally he developed a strong relationship with the Office of Neighborhood Associations and particularly with its most visible crime prevention specialist, Sharon McCormack. He also worked closely with the
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Portland Organizing Project, a nonprofit organization responsible for a number of community forums, to inform and educate citizens about community policing. The Police Bureau developed ongoing internal and external media campaigns and organized several regional and national conferences. To gain credibility with the public, Potter developed an advisory group known as the Chief’s Forum, which represented many of the diverse interests of the city. Some of these interest groups, such as sexual minorities, had not previously been represented in dialogue between the police and community.

Internally, Chief Potter built support by publicizing community policing success stories and by using the Police Bureau’s promotion policies to reward those who were committed to community policing and to motivate those who were not. Potter also began the work, which continues to this day, of making changes in personnel policies and training to support community policing. During his three years as chief, Potter built a management team that was committed to community policing—a commitment that endured after his tenure as chief.

In addition, Potter developed community advisory committees, in-service trainings on community policing and diversity issues, and partnership agreements with other city bureaus, non-profit organizations and neighborhood associations. Under Potter’s leadership, the police budget increased by 37 percent and 142 new officers were sworn in.

Chief Potter retired in mid-1993, and Mayor Vera Katz announced a national search for his successor. Police Bureau insiders were much relieved when an internal candidate, Charles Moose, was selected.1 Moose, Portland’s first African-American police chief, was a Potter-appointed commander who held the community policing vision. As a precinct commander, Moose had introduced neighborhood liaison officers, who had long-term responsibility for specified neighborhoods and were expected to attend neighborhood meetings. He also initiated neighborhood response teams composed of two to three officers who were based at each precinct headquarters and supported patrol officers by coordinating the individuals and organizations needed to solve a particular problem in a neighborhood.

Chief Moose added employee and community satisfaction surveys and Portland-Multnomah County Progress Board benchmarks to the Police Bureau’s self-evaluation process, and began to include performance measures in the budget presented to the City Council. In 1999 the Institute for Law and Justice, a consulting firm specializing in

criminal justice issues, began a major planning process with the Police Bureau to "take community policing to the next level."

Chief Moose took advantage of the Clinton-era COPS (Community-Oriented Policing Services) grants to purchase computer and camera technology and to replace police officers with civilians as front desk staff. The police budget increased 42 percent during Moose’s tenure and about one hundred new positions were created, both sworn officers and non-sworn employees. Crime rates declined markedly in 1996 and continued to drop in the late 1990s. Citizen satisfaction showed marked increases.

Chief Moose’s annual reports were organized by the four major goals of the Police Bureau’s strategic plans developed during his tenure: (1) reduce crime and the fear of crime; (2) empower the community; (3) develop and empower personnel; and (4) strengthen planning, evaluation and fiscal support. Special missions such as reducing downtown drug dealing and summer gang violence and task forces for auto theft and youth with guns were highlighted in his reports. Much attention was also given to the addition of two new precincts in East and Southeast Portland, the building of new facilities for the North and Northeast precincts, and the Police Bureau’s response to the shooting deaths of two officers in 1997 and 1998. The last mention of specific partnership agreements in an annual report was in Chief Moose’s 1996 report. Partnership agreements had been prominent in Chief Potter’s annual reports.

Chief Moose resigned in June 1999, and Mayor Katz initiated another national search for his replacement. Mark Kroeker, who had spent most of his career with the Los Angeles Police Department, became chief of police in December 1999. His first year was marked by controversy, including questions about his ability to be fair with sexual minorities and about the use of excessive police force at a May Day demonstration in 2000.

Upon his arrival, Chief Kroeker inherited the recently released report from the Institute for Law and Justice with its recommendations for enhancing community policing in Portland. He also received a report from a 24-member steering committee, made up mainly of Police Bureau employees, that prioritized the Institute’s vision statements and strategies for implementation. (See page 15.)

Chief Kroeker revised and updated the Police Bureau’s strategic plan by adding cornerstones, a vision and two new goals: (1) obtain and make effective use of technology and (2) continuously improve work processes. Chief Kroeker introduced senior neighborhood officers in each precinct and is phasing out the neighborhood liaison officers, at least in some neighborhoods. He enhanced Neighbor Safe, a program
to provide crime prevention materials to each household, and he is reorganizing the Block Captain program to include emergency preparedness (a response to the events of September 11, 2001) and to ensure that all block captains have been screened for security purposes. Chief Kroeker also established a racial profiling panel in response to citizen complaints, as well as an Arab-Muslim Police Advisory Council in 2002 to help mitigate discrimination following the terrorist attacks of September 11. Kroeker also put more resources into traffic control, a major livability issue in citizen surveys.

III. EVALUATING COMMUNITY POLICING

A. WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY: ACADEMICIANS AND POLICE PROFESSIONALS

When speaking about community policing, academic experts tend to focus on community building as the ultimate goal and view the strategies of community policing, i.e., crime prevention, victim assistance and building greater rapport with minority communities as means to achieve this goal. In general, academic experts believe successful community policing leads to results in the following three areas:

1. Crime and public safety problems; i.e., changes in reported crime, changes in calls for police service, solutions to specific problems (e.g., drug houses), and whether crime was really reduced or just displaced either temporally or spatially to other locations;

2. Community capacity, social capital and informal social control; i.e., changes in willingness, ability and confidence of community residents to solve varied problems and to intervene in informal social control;

3. Community health and livability; i.e., changes in willingness to use public places, community volunteerism, business start-ups, home ownership, home improvements and local perceptions about safety and police.

The Community Policing Consortium, a national organization of police chiefs and law enforcement agencies, recommends evaluating community policing efforts for effectiveness, efficiency and equity. To assess effectiveness, the Consortium recommends measuring reduction of neighborhood crime, decrease in citizen’s fear of crime and an enhanced quality of life in the community. They note that while improved quality of life is difficult to measure, it can be captured, to
some extent, in comments on surveys of community members.

To assess efficiency, the Community Policing Consortium is primarily interested in cost effectiveness. This requires that outcomes be clearly described and measured and costs be clearly allocated to the strategies and activities being measured. City Club’s study charge does not include the efficiency of community policing; therefore, your committee spent little time on the relationship between costs and benefits.

The Community Policing Consortium also believes equity is critical to community policing. Measurements of equity include equal access to police services, equal treatment under the Constitution and fair distribution of police services and resources among communities. In this context, the way police officers treat disenfranchised persons and members of minority groups assumes special importance. As with efficiency, your committee was not charged to consider equity issues. However, we did hear testimony on the treatment of minorities and disenfranchised persons, and we did consider the allocation of police resources among precincts.

The Community Policing Consortium emphasizes, however, that more important than any particular assessment parameter is the constant assessment of change and the commitment to make adjustments based on data and feedback. Developing the tools and the commitment to measuring the impact of community policing provides opportunities to look at the strength of partnerships and problem-solving approaches. Just as important, according to the Consortium, assessment and change help maintain strong ties between the police and the community.

Two local academic researchers, Professors Annette Jolin and Brian Renauer, both from Portland State University’s Administration of Justice division, highlighted several aspects of sound evaluation and noted the following obstacles to doing rigorous evaluation of the outcomes of community policing in Portland:

- Inconsistent application of strategies;
- Reliance on “beliefs” as opposed to data;
- Objectives (as articulated in the 2000-02 strategic plan for community policing) that were so broad as to be immeasurable.

Professor Jolin, formerly an officer with the Portland Police Bureau, also cautioned that quantitative outcome measures alone may have limited value because community policing relies heavily on relationships between the police and the community.

Wesley Skogan, a Northwestern University professor who writes extensively about community policing and particularly about the
community policing program in Chicago, believes that regular and objective evaluations are key to the successful implementation and evolution of community policing. Chicago’s highly regarded community policing is evaluated every year by an independent outside group drawn from the city’s universities.

B. EVALUATING COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

1. City Council's Expected Outcomes (Resolution No 34627)

After Portland’s City Council passed Resolution No 34587 authorizing the implementation of community policing in July 1989, it then passed Resolution No 34627 in October 1989 specifying expected outcomes. The second resolution was the product of many focus groups, community meetings and Police Bureau committees. The expectations match the definition of community policing adopted in the first resolution and appear to synthesize the thinking of local and national groups and other experts in community policing.

Resolution No 34627 is directed only at the Police Bureau. It does not specify expectations of the community or other government entities. The resolution organizes the City Council’s expectations under two major headings: (1) increased public safety and (2) increased opportunities for officer initiative.

Measures of increased public safety were defined as follows:
- Reduced incidence of crime;
- Reduced fear of crime;
- Increased neighborhood livability;
- Increased citizen satisfaction with services provided by the Police Bureau;
- Increased citizen empowerment to prevent and fight crime and disorder, achieved in a partnership with the Police Bureau;
- Engagement by appropriate city bureaus to support this partnership;
- Better coordination and allocation of responsibilities among social, criminal justice and other service agencies to prevent and solve problems.

Measures of increased opportunities for officer initiative include the following:
- More time spent by officers on pro-active missions;
- Empowerment of officers to design strategies to solve problems;
- Increased job satisfaction by Police Bureau members.
This method of organizing expectations demonstrates that the City Council believed increasing officer initiative was not just a means to achieving other outcomes of community policing but was an important outcome itself.

Resolution № 34627 is largely about how City Council expects these outcomes to be accomplished. The resolution lays out detailed expectations for organizational structures within the Police Bureau, including an extensive list of committees necessary to do the job. More recently, Portland-Multnomah County Progress Board benchmarks, which include annual measures of public safety and community livability, were added to the list of expected outcomes.

2. Evaluation Tools Used by the Portland Police Bureau

The Portland Police Bureau 2000-02 strategic plan identifies the following six major goals:

**Community Goals**
1. Reduce crime and the fear of crime;
2. Improve the quality of life in neighborhoods;
3. Improve the community and police partnership.

**Organizational Goals**
4. Develop and encourage personnel;
5. Obtain and make effective use of technology and equipment;
6. Continuously improve work processes.

The first four goals appear to relate generally to the expected outcomes in City Council Resolution № 34627, while the last two are entirely new. Community and employee empowerment and decentralization and coordination with other city bureaus and service providers are not mentioned, even though they are stated specifically in Resolution № 34587, Portland’s original community policing resolution.

The Portland Police Bureau uses the following five major evaluation tools to track expected outcomes:

1. Reported crime and crime response data collected by the Police Bureau;
2. Annual citizen survey conducted by the City Auditor that measures citizen perceptions of crime, victimization and satisfaction with police services;
3. Biennial community survey conducted by the Police Bureau which measures perception of public safety, victimization and satisfaction with police service in more detail than the City Auditor’s survey;
4. Portland-Multnomah County Progress Board benchmarks
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for the Police Bureau, including rate of person-to-person crimes, victimization rates, graffiti reports, juvenile arrest rate, hate crime rates, citizen attitudes and death and injuries from firearms;


Some of the City Council’s expected outcomes are not measured, such as decentralization, coordination with other bureaus and service providers, and citizen empowerment.

3. The Institute for Law and Justice 1999 Review

The most recent comprehensive look at community policing in Portland took place in 1998-99 and was intended as a planning exercise rather than a formal evaluation. Using community and Portland Police Bureau focus groups, the Institute for Law and Justice assembled a body of opinion about what would be necessary to take community policing in Portland "to the next level." Ten major vision recommendations, each with supporting strategies, were produced.

During the summer of 1999 a steering committee composed primarily of Police Bureau insiders reviewed the broad vision recommendations from the Institute for Law and Justice and selected "expand the role of the officer" as their highest priority. They also identified five other vision statements as either highest priority in themselves or interdependent with expanding the role of the officer. These five were: (1) improve the human resources system; (2) enhance organizational structure; (3) increase prevention emphasis; (4) improve police discipline and review; and (5) maximize technology.

Of the ten vision recommendations from the Institute for Law and Justice, the steering committee assigned low priority to four of which the most significant was "increase number of civilians in the Bureau." The steering committee assigned lower priority to "civilianization" because they believed (1) it might come about naturally as a side effect of enhancing the organizational structure and maximizing the use of technology, and (2) it would decrease the amount of routine contact between police officers and citizens, contact which the steering committee felt was very important to citizens.

The steering committee also reviewed the Institute’s ninety-five recommended strategies for implementation and identified twenty of them as "highest priority." Of those twenty, ten were recommended for immediate implementation. These were related to internal organizational changes that would improve morale, effectiveness and
customer satisfaction. They included the following:

1. Loosen organizational supervision and process;
2. Stabilize assignments;
3. Create a master patrol officer program;
4. Set goals to reduce repeat calls for service;
5. Improve the process for crime reporting;
6. Install a simpler and faster telephone answering system;
7. Make Portland officers the highest paid police officers in the state;
8. Adopt an ordinance mandating adequate staff levels;
9. Project retirement and attrition rates;
10. Over-hire (to compensate for predictable annual attrition).

The remaining ten highest priority strategies were considered "near term," defined as implementation in one to three years (by the end of 2002). Most of these related to technology improvements and personnel policy, while two were directed at practices in the community. These ten strategies included the following:

1. Align the Bureau's disciplinary policy with community policing mission, vision and values;
2. Reestablish understanding and support for disciplinary process;
3. Establish a separate training academy for the Portland Police Bureau only;
4. Include community policing principles and practices throughout the curriculum;
5. Ensure that field training officers reflect the best community policing practices;
6. Bring the management information system up to date;
7. Use technology to improve traffic safety;
8. Explore use of other technology;
9. Engender a citywide commitment to problem solving;
10. Create a greater emphasis on customer service.

The steering committee conveyed these recommendations to Chief Kroeker while the 2000-02 strategic plan was being developed. The status of their implementation is reported in Section IV (Findings).

4. Your Committee's Evaluation Criteria

To develop its evaluation criteria, your committee looked at the goals that the Portland Police Bureau has set for itself and the measures that it uses to demonstrate its progress toward these goals. Information and opinions obtained from witnesses led your committee to ask additional questions. What isn’t the Police Bureau measuring? How well do the current goals for community policing address the original
mandate of the City Council and the subsequent recommendations made by outside reviewers?

Your committee also wanted to determine whether the principles of community policing have been thoroughly integrated into both police and community practice and whether the expected impacts of community policing have been obtained. Thus, your committee has added measures to those described above in order to look at the institutionalization of community policing within the Portland Police Bureau and the community.

To measure the institutionalization of community policing within the Portland Police Bureau, your committee looked for the following:

- Evidence that the police chief regularly reinforces the importance of community policing to the entire Police Bureau and demonstrates his personal commitment to it;
- Evidence that neighborhood services have an appropriate priority in the Police Bureau budget;
- Evidence of regular problem solving;
- Clear goals and objectives for community policing in the strategic plan, including how to protect community policing in the face of reduced resources;
- Use of community advisory committees for precinct commanders;
- A reward structure that encourages and recognizes community policing;
- Training for recruits and ongoing in-service training that teaches problem solving, cultural diversity, mediation and partnership skills;
- A performance evaluation process that measures community policing commitment and skill;
- Job descriptions with specific expectations regarding community policing;
- Recruiting and hiring practices that support community policing;
- Success in recruiting and retaining senior neighborhood officers (or other officers who spend more time on community liaison than regular patrol officers);
- Stable assignments (at least two years) for officers with problem-solving and partnership responsibilities in specific neighborhoods;
- Work schedules or overtime allocations that enable patrol officers to attend community meetings.
To measure institutionalization of community policing within city government and the community and to measure community capacity, i.e., willingness and ability of community members to solve problems, your committee looked for the following:

- Evidence that the mayor regularly reinforces to all commissioners and bureau heads the importance of community policing and her commitment to it;
- Evidence that crime prevention activities have an appropriate priority in the city budget;
- Evidence of regular problem solving;
- Status of partnership agreements (How many? How recent? How viable? Signed by current elected officials and bureau heads?);
- Satisfaction of neighborhood groups (as opposed to individual citizens) with community policing;
- Satisfaction of citizens with the Neighborhood Watch program and neighborhood associations in regard to crime prevention;
- Success of neighborhood watch and block captain recruiting efforts;
- Citizen’s knowledge of crime prevention and solution resources (police, crime prevention specialist, neighborhood volunteer, etc.);
- Number of citizens involved in neighborhood associations and other voluntary neighborhood activities.

Your committee made every effort to locate resources that would provide information about each of these issues. However, unlike the wealth of material available about the Police Bureau, information related to the community’s participation in community policing was not readily available.

IV. FINDINGS

This section presents a snapshot of community policing as it existed in the last half of 2002 in the Police Bureau and in the community. Factual information and witness testimony—sometimes inconsistent and contradictory—are included. Your committee’s analysis and conclusions appear in Sections VI and VII respectively.

A. COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND TODAY

1. Portland City Council and Community Policing

In the late 1980s, Portland City Council expressed its unanimous support for community policing via Resolutions No. 34587 and No. 34627. As described in Section III (Evaluating Community
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Policing), Resolution № 34627 established expected outcomes of community policing and laid out comprehensive and detailed implementation instructions to the Portland Police Bureau. These resolutions have not been supplanted by other resolutions that would delete, modify or add to either the definition of community policing or its expected outcomes. Two police officers interviewed by your committee described the original resolutions as vehicles that not only promoted the concept, but also created a partnership between the City Council and Portland Police Bureau. Now however, according to one of the officers, "it seems that it’s just another ordinance that sits on the books unused."

City commissioners review and approve the Police Bureau's budget and, according to testimony from two commissioners, become further involved only when their constituencies or their assigned bureaus are involved in a crisis. Otherwise oversight of the Police Bureau is left to the mayor. Your committee found no evidence of coordinating mechanisms among city commissioners, their bureaus and the Police Bureau.

Interviews with Mayor Katz and city commissioners yielded a mixed picture of their commitment to community policing. Mayor Katz, the commissioner responsible for the Portland Police Bureau, expressed unwavering commitment to community policing. In an interview with your committee, Mayor Katz described high visibility task forces and the handling of the May Day 2002 demonstrations as current examples of successful community policing. She did not describe the framework or vision for community policing in Portland, nor did she mention the key elements of the original City Council resolution that were later reinforced by the Institute for Law and Justice (e.g., officer empowerment and neighborhood partnerships). She acknowledged that police roles in neighborhoods were a work in progress. Other commissioners indicated that community policing is rarely discussed in City Council meetings. In fact, several city commissioners seemed to have little idea how community policing is carried out. Former Commissioner Charlie Hales said that, during his tenure, community policing received lip service but little real support or visibility within the City Council.

Other than the Police Bureau, the city bureau most directly involved with community policing is the Office of Neighborhood Involvement, which includes the crime prevention specialists and all neighborhood associations. The Office of Neighborhood Involvement is responsible for working with the police and neighborhood associations on many community policing initiatives including the Block Captain and Neighbor Safe programs.
Historically Mayor Katz has assigned the Office of Neighborhood Involvement to the most recently elected City Council member. Commissioner Dan Saltzman had responsibility for the Office of Neighborhood Involvement from 1999 until mid-2002 when it was reassigned for six months to Commissioner Jim Francesconi. Francesconi recommended a strategic planning process for the crime prevention specialists with emphasis on developing priorities for community policing. In our interview with Commissioner Francesconi, he stated that to make community policing effective, an agreement between the Office of Neighborhood Involvement and the Police Bureau should be written and the City Council should show more visible support for community policing. With the reassignment of the Office of Neighborhood Involvement to Commissioner Randy Leonard following the November 2002 election, the fate of Francesconi’s planning initiative and his emphasis on community policing are unknown.²

2. Portland Police Bureau and Community Policing

a. Organization of the Bureau

One key to understanding the current status of community policing in Portland is to examine the organizational aspects of the Police Bureau that ultimately support or undermine the culture and philosophy of community policing. Beginning with Chief Potter, the belief that community policing is everybody’s job has been a fundamental tenet of the Portland Police Bureau’s community policing strategy. To that end, the Police Bureau has no job titles that incorporate the words “community policing” and no management position, office or division is specifically accountable for community policing.

The basic structure of the Portland Police Bureau is as follows: the police chief is appointed by and reports to the mayor. The Bureau is made up of four divisions, plus the chief’s office. A simplified organizational chart displaying this basic structure can be found in Appendix D. The largest of the divisions is Operations, which includes the five precincts and the traffic division. Fifty-four percent of the Police Bureau staff, or 693 positions, is assigned to Operations.³

Data from the 2002 City Auditor’s Service Efforts and Accomplishments report indicates a steady decline in precinct officers since fiscal year 1999-2000, even though total personnel and the city’s overall population have both increased. Many of the members of the Police Bureau interviewed by your committee spoke openly of their

²Randy Leonard was elected to City Council after your committee completed its research and was therefore not included in the interviews conducted with other City Council members.

³Organizational chart, Portland Police Bureau budget, December 5, 2002.
concerns about the consequences of staff reductions, particularly of
the desk clerks and patrol officers. Assistant Chief of Operations Greg
Clark characterized the Bureau’s staffing as "cut right to the bone" and
said, "it’s like running an engine designed for 3,500 rpm at 4,500
rpm... at some point it gets dangerous."

Each of the five precincts—North, Northeast, Southeast, East and
Central—includes three organizational levels below the precinct
commander. They are lieutenants, sergeants and detectives, and
officers. Roughly 564 police officers are assigned to patrol the sixty
patrol districts over three daily shifts across the city. Their primary
responsibility is responding to radio calls and patrolling their beats.
During our first interview with Chief Kroeker, at midday during the
summer of 2002, he noted that probably no more than fifty officers
were on patrol in the entire city at that moment.

Each precinct also has a neighborhood response team which
supports patrol officers by coordinating the individuals and
organizations needed to solve problems. In some precincts some of
the patrol officers also are designated neighborhood liaison officers
and serve as the Police Bureau’s primary link to neighborhood
associations.

The precincts can turn to two other resources for help. The crisis
intervention team, made up of specially trained police officers, works
with community groups and individuals with special needs, such as
the mentally ill. The crisis response team, made up of a Police Bureau
coordinator and citizen volunteers, provides assistance and
follow-up support for hot button issues that have long-term effects on
the community.

In January 2003 Chief Kroeker officially introduced the Senior
Neighborhood Officer program in each precinct, although some senior
neighborhood officers had been on the job since early 2002. Chief
Kroeker’s goal is to have three to seven senior neighborhood officers in
each precinct. These officers are specifically charged with furthering
community policing. Unlike neighborhood liaison officers, senior
neighborhood officers do not take radio calls. Instead of a call load,
they have a problem load—a set of problems they are responsible for
addressing. Witnesses told your committee that recruitment for these
positions has been difficult and that the Police Bureau was still refining
the program. Critics inside and outside the Police Bureau say the
distinctions among the senior neighborhood officers, neighborhood
liaison officers and neighborhood response teams are confusing. As
senior neighborhood officers are phased in, the future of

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4The number of patrol districts may be expanded or contracted depending upon the staffing
and coverage demands of particular shifts.
neighborhood liaison officers is unclear.

Although all officers are expected to apply the techniques of problem solving and partnership to all policing activities, both Chief Kroeker and others within the Police Bureau spoke candidly about the risk of creating a "split force" by adding senior neighborhood officers. That is, regular police officers may be tempted to relegate community policing to senior neighborhood officers. A memo dated September 12, 2001 from Assistant Chief of Operations Greg Clark to all the precincts communicated the expectation that all officers should use community policing practices, but your committee found no evidence of follow up to the memo. Another tactic described for overcoming this danger of "split force" was making sergeants responsible for communicating expectations to patrol officers under their supervision. Your committee heard evidence that supervisory practices regarding this expectation are highly inconsistent.

Precincts have considerable autonomy in determining district hours and district assignments. Because the conditions in precincts vary considerably, the allocation of personnel also varies. Overall personnel allocation to the precincts is based on call volume and driven by the goal of keeping response time to 9-1-1 calls below five minutes. Each precinct also determines how it will further the goals of community policing. Precinct commanders play key roles in modeling expected behaviors, and roll call is also supposed to support problem-solving objectives and expectations.

The Police Bureau’s other three branches are Investigations with 17 percent (217) of the total positions; Operations Support with 15 percent (194) of the total positions; and Administrative Services with 12 percent (149) of the total positions. The chief’s office has thirty-nine authorized positions, or 3 percent of the total.5 City Auditor Gary Blackmer said in an interview that, despite a 41 percent increase in the number of sworn officers between 1988 and 2001, fewer than one-third of those officers have been added to neighborhood patrols.

Historically, the Police Bureau has routinely overspent its annual overtime budget with no consequences from City Hall. In 2002, Mayor Katz directed Chief Kroeker to bring overtime under control. For the first time, Police Bureau managers are being held to a strict overtime cap.6 This change affects community policing because community meetings and activities do not always occur during assigned shifts and, without overtime pay, officers are sometimes reluctant to attend. In response to this dilemma, City Auditor Gary Blackmer suggested that the bureau adopt a more flexible schedule that would allow officers to cover day and evening obligations without incurring overtime pay.

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5Organizational chart, Portland Police Bureau budget, December 5, 2002.
In addition to the permanent classifications and special community-oriented teams described above, the mayor and the police chief have established a number of task forces to address specific problems. The number and visibility of these task forces have increased in recent years. While they often represent a high-profile response to problems such as gang violence, the opinions of those interviewed about whether they support community policing were mixed. One officer noted that, for ethnic and minority groups, the task forces provide an alternative to neighborhood associations and offer a way of connecting the community with the police. On the other hand, another witness observed that task forces take officers off neighborhood patrol duty and decrease the stability of the working relationships between officers and their neighborhoods. Also, once established, task forces are reportedly very difficult to disband.

The Institute for Law and Justice report and the subsequent report from the 24-person steering committee made "organizational issues" their top priority. Only one of the highest priority recommendations -- the master patrol officer, i.e., the senior neighborhood officer, has been implemented. The remaining highest priority recommendations have not been implemented or have been only partially implemented. These include: (1) loosen organizational supervision process; (2) stabilize assignments; (3) develop citywide commitment to problem solving; (4) pass an ordinance mandating adequate sworn and non-sworn staffing levels (in order to "expand the role of the officer"); and (5) project retirements and attrition rates and adopt an over-hire policy to guarantee adequate staffing.

b. Leadership

Witnesses repeatedly said that role modeling of behavior and relationships remain at the heart of effective leadership. Bureau employees, including patrol officers and managers, were divided in how they view Chief Kroeker’s leadership. Those closest to him view his commitment to community policing most favorably. Yet even some of his staunchest supporters believe that he has inadequately conveyed the importance of community policing. Veteran members of the force recalled Tom Potter’s visionary leadership and commitment to integrating every aspect of community policing and contrasted it to what they regard as the primarily symbolic support of community policing by Chief Kroeker. One member of the force noted that, in the absence of leadership, police culture quickly returns to old style enforcement. Another perspective offered by a city commissioner is that Chief Kroeker is an outsider who has had trouble finding a comfortable fit in Portland, and whose views about what makes
community policing work are probably colored by his long experience with the Los Angeles Police Department. Another City Hall insider said, when asked if there has been a diminution of the vision for community policing, "The Bureau would switch to homeland security in an eye blink."

Several witnesses said they believed Chief Kroeker’s commitment to community policing is sincere, but that he is much more interested in results than in process, a characterization that Chief Kroeker confirmed in an interview. Witnesses said Kroeker tends to spend less time in face-to-face meetings and building relationships with community members than did his predecessors. This is perceived by many in the community as a lack of commitment to community policing. Some community members were even more pointed in their critique. One of the crime prevention specialists stated that community policing lacks a cheerleader; another stated that the sense that everyone is doing community policing is gone.

Also troubling were the suggestions that Chief Kroeker is insensitive to racial and minority issues. The awarding of medals to two officers involved in the shooting of a Mexican man with epilepsy in a psychiatric facility galvanized some members of the community to call for Kroeker’s resignation and led Senator Avel Gordley, to declare that "the heart of community policing has been ripped out by the chief’s action and he cannot repair the damage." Some Police Bureau employees also consider Kroeker’s dress and hairstyle codes to be culturally insensitive to some minority officers.

Your committee also heard mixed messages about how consistently commanders and supervising sergeants reinforce community policing practices. Testimony suggests a great variance from precinct to precinct, particularly among sergeants, in how community policing is supported. However, without a formal performance evaluation system, knowing how this happens on a day-to-day basis is difficult to determine.

c. Decision Making

The steering committee for the 1999 Institute for Law and Justice report listed "decentralizing and flattening of the Bureau’s organizational structure" as one of its highest priority recommendations. This has not occurred. In fact, your committee interviewed numerous witnesses both inside and outside the Police Bureau who said the Bureau is more hierarchical and bureaucratic now than it was under Chief Moose and Chief Potter.

Officers complained about an increase in paperwork and not being able to make a decision without consulting their superiors. They
characterized the current environment as a military orientation of "reporting up the ladder." Some community members confirmed that officers do not seem able to make decisions independently. One officer interviewed by your committee disagreed with this assessment. He said confidence to make decisions comes with maturity. He believes younger officers are fearful of making decisions and does not believe the Police Bureau's leadership discourages initiative by the officers.

Community members also described their own problems with police bureaucracy. Several witnesses said developing working relationships with the police has become more difficult. Getting through to the right person is a problem.

Community input into decision making is theoretically mediated through the Chief's Forum and precinct advisory committees. In practice, these venues appear to be used more for one-way communication from the Police Bureau than as forums for citizen input. The Chief's Forum is held every other week but, according to one witness who regularly attends the Forum, it is frequently cancelled by Chief Kroeker. At least one witness stated that participation in the Chief's Forum began to decline when community members--especially minorities--perceived that they were no longer "part of the process."

Advisory groups formed at the precinct level are known by many different names and are typically seen by the Police Bureau as creations of the Office of Neighborhood Involvement. The Police Bureau regards them as useful for communication and identification of citizen concerns, but not functional as official vehicles for soliciting citizen input into police policy or practice. The effectiveness of these meetings has never been formally measured.

d. Recruiting

The Portland Police Bureau's focus on community policing practices is evident in its recruiting material and training curricula. The Police Bureau mentions its long tradition of community policing on its Web site and in its recruiting material, using mostly testimonials from officers. However, several witnesses believed that the emphasis on community policing in recruiting and training new officers has diminished over the years.

Witnesses from inside and outside the Police Bureau mentioned the relationship between enhancing community policing efforts and
recruiting more minorities and women. In 2000 the Police Bureau instituted the Lateral Entry Officer program to recruit experienced officers from outside the metro area. The Bureau also lowered its educational requirements from a four-year to a two-year college degree or equivalent, thereby doubling the total number of candidates that year. In recent years the Police Bureau has focused on minority media outlets and community organizations in an effort to recruit more minority officers, often mentioning its commitment to community policing. Despite these efforts, minority representation on the force is still low.

The Police Bureau’s published statistics about minority representation on the force differ from document to document. For instance, the 2002-03 budget submission shows minority representation at about 9 percent from 1993 to 1999 with a sudden increase to almost 14 percent in 2000. The 2000-02 strategic plan shows minority representation at about 9 percent for the period of 1995 to 2000 with the exception of a one-year jump to 13 percent in 1997. The city government average has been above 12 percent since 1996. A highly placed Police Bureau insider mentioned "lack of minority representation" on the force as one of the distinct failures of implementing community policing in Portland. It was also his opinion that the commitment to minority recruitment has deteriorated over the twelve years that community policing has been in place. The number of ethnic minorities in Portland has grown significantly in the last decade. According to U.S. census data, Portland’s ethnic minority population has increased from 15 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 2000.

e. Training

The Police Bureau employs a variety of strategies for training police recruits. Entry-level (new) officers attend a twelve-week basic police academy plus a twelve-week advanced police academy. The basic academy, designed by the State Department of Public Safety Standards and Training and taught by the Portland Police Bureau, is held on the campus of Western Oregon University in Monmouth, while the advanced academy is conducted in Portland. Police recruits from the entire state attend the basic academy.

A four-week entry phase of training for entry-level officers completing the basic academy and lateral-entry (experienced) officers joining the Bureau is also required. Recruits are assigned to field training officers and move through five phases of training that focus on the Police Bureau’s basic fundamentals of police work. Field training officers mentor and supervise new recruits for the first year of their service and play a major role in transmitting the Bureau’s internal culture. The field training officers receive sixteen hours of specialized training. One
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of the highest priority recommendations that came from the steering committee for the 1999 Institute for Law and Justice report was that field training officers should embody the best practices of community policing. Your committee was not able to ascertain whether or how the training for and evaluation of field training officers has improved.

Community policing strategies are incorporated into the twelve-week basic academy training curriculum in two eight-hour blocks. The stated goal of this instruction is "to develop an understanding of the principles and practices of modern community policing, and to encourage the adoption of community policing as a professional and personal philosophy." The basic training curriculum does not include a specific module for community policing. Darrel Schenck, captain of the Internal Affairs Division and formerly associated with the Western Community Policing Center (a training center), believes this is evidence that community policing has been integrated into the entire curriculum. Another witness well-versed in the training curriculum suggested that while community policing is incorporated into the basic academy’s curriculum, this is not the same as saying that community policing is the prevailing philosophy taught at Monmouth. He also noted that the Portland Police Bureau has wanted its own basic academy for years, citing differences related to community policing and differences between urban and non-urban policing. Establishment of a Portland Police Bureau training academy was one of the highest priority recommendations from the Institute for Law and Justice report. To date, budgetary constraints have made this impossible.

While the basic academy lays the groundwork for an understanding of community policing concepts, the advanced academy curriculum is said to be built around problem solving, partnerships, and organizational development. Your committee was unable to see the curriculum, but Police Bureau insiders told us that the lesson plans do not provide officers with the skills they need to do effective community policing. The steering committee that reviewed the Institute for Law & Justice report assigned highest priority to the incorporation of community policing principles and practices into training. It appears that little has been done in this regard though your committee was told the curriculum is being revised.

Many of the Police Bureau insiders interviewed by your committee mentioned training as a weak link in the implementation of community policing. A highly placed Police Bureau insider spoke candidly about the typical officer’s "terror" when facing a citizen group. In his words, most officers would rather "face a bad guy with a gun."
Yet, by general consensus within the Bureau, police work is 95 percent communication. According to the same witness, the basic training includes a preponderance of modules directed at traditional law enforcement skills (e.g., driving a vehicle, handling a gun, etc.) while giving short shrift to the development of communication, problem-solving, community meeting and mediation skills. In-service trainings and other continuing education efforts that could address these needs have been greatly curtailed because of budget cuts.

f. Job Descriptions

The Portland Police Bureau uses an array of documents related to job descriptions. "Position vacancy announcements" provide a general description of responsibilities and requirements for a position. "Job descriptions" are used for major job classifications (e.g., chief, commander, sergeant, etc.) and vary greatly in how they reference expectations for community policing skills and activities. "Job-related job descriptions," are tied to specific jobs, rather than classifications, are lengthy (as many as twenty pages) and were described by the personnel division as "internal documents." Although these are the documents that include the most detailed expectations about community policing, they are rarely consulted by officers and are not shared with job applicants.

g. Performance Evaluations

The Portland Police Bureau last conducted individual employee performance evaluations in the 1980s. According to the results of the 2002 employee survey, 46 percent of Portland Police Bureau employees support implementing a performance evaluation system for all employees. However, despite extensive testimony from witnesses about the importance of employee evaluations, this was not included as an objective in the 2000-02 strategic plan. Instead, an objective to have supervisors meet twice yearly with all personnel to provide "feedback" about their performance was included. Your committee was told that implementation of an evaluation process would likely require two or three additional positions in the personnel department and a substantial investment in training for supervisors. Current budgetary restrictions preclude these additional expenses.

The performance evaluation system that Chief Kroeker would like to implement would add incentives to adopt the community policing philosophy. Kroeker said his evaluation criteria for senior neighborhood officers would include measures of how well the officer is known in the neighborhood, how well problems are being solved
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and how quality of life measures, such as fear of crime, are affected. "How well the officer is known in the neighborhood" and "crime rates and fear of crime" are currently measured in the aggregate.

One of the highest priority recommendations from the steering committee for the 1999 Institute for Law and Justice report was to "align the Bureau's disciplinary policy with community policing mission, vision and values." The discipline and complaint process has been and continues to be a sore point with officers. They describe the discipline process as "inconsistent" and inordinately time-consuming and, in the 2002 employee survey, only 28 percent of respondents agreed with the statement "in general, the outcomes of the internal affairs division's complaints are fair." The Bureau-wide disciplinary process includes nothing specific to community policing. Personnel Captain Donna Henderson, said individual managers are responsible for discipline, and managers may differ in what behaviors trigger disciplinary action.

h. Rewards and Incentives

The Portland Police Bureau uses very few formal rewards or incentives to encourage officers to adopt community policing practices. In fact, the Police Bureau does not have a specific community policing award and tries to draw a clear distinction between awards issued by the Bureau and those issued by outside organizations such as the Chief's Forum. The Chief's Forum issues multiple awards to police officers and community members. Among them are the Nathan Thomas Memorial Award, which is awarded to "any individual for an act of outstanding performance...which further the goals of community policing..." and the Community Policing Problem Solving Award, which can also be awarded to any individual or group. In addition, the Chief's Forum awards Certificates of Appreciation and Youth Recognition Certificates for promotion of community policing in distinctive ways. The awarding of medals by the Police Bureau in 2002 to the officers involved in the shooting at a psychiatric facility was intended as recognition of bravery under duress. To many in the community, it appeared to reward behavior that is at odds with the values and goals of community policing.

Your committee also considered the impact of salary structure on community policing. Senior neighborhood officers do not receive a pay differential, meaning they do not receive additional compensation based on their designation as senior neighborhood officers. Until recently, overtime pay was a significant source of income for officers including those doing neighborhood liaison work. However, with recent budget cutbacks, overtime is reserved for court appearances and "backfill." Many of the positions with the greatest access to overtime are non-uniformed officers such as narcotics officers.
Most of the rewards that senior neighborhood officers and other officers described as attendant on community policing are what one officer styled as "intrinsic rewards." By that, he meant the non-financial reward of solving problems. Another officer (not a senior neighborhood officer) described his interactions with citizens as "fun," adding further evidence that positive relationships with neighborhood associations and other community members are rewarding for some officers. For some, the advantages of being a senior neighborhood officer are also disadvantages. This is illustrated by the fact that some officers resent senior neighborhood officers because they do not respond to radio calls.

According to Chief Kroeker, community policing is considered in promotions and commendations. In contrast, several officers interviewed by your committee said community policing performance is barely mentioned in today’s promotion process. Darrel Schenck, head of the Internal Affairs Division, said that community policing questions might be incorporated into promotion interviews without being explicit. Personnel Captain Henderson stated that "it would be a stretch" to say that community policing is a major consideration in the promotion process. Under Chief Potter, community policing was emphasized in the interview assessment for promotions. Officers that served under Potter said that associating someone or something with community policing was beneficial. Now, according to some, it seems to have no impact.

A recurrent theme among many of the witnesses interviewed for this study was that community policing is more time consuming than traditional policing. Officers almost unanimously reported that community policing is more work without additional pay. One officer noted that patrol officers previously had more paperwork barriers cleared for them by the command structure so that they could spend more time in the community. This appears to be less true now. According to the City Auditor’s 2002 Service Efforts and accomplishments report, “time available for problem solving” decreased slightly from 1999 to 2002. Assistant Chief Greg Clark attributes the change to a broadened scope, the multi-dimensional nature of community policing and a lack of outside resources.

### Planning

Every two years the Police Bureau produces a strategic plan. The 2000-02 strategic plan was based on input from community members and members of the Bureau and took into account the steering committee’s recommendations from the 1999 Institute for Law and Justice report. The same basic goal structure of past strategic plans was retained, but the current plan adds cornerstones and two new goals: (1) expanded use of technology and (2) continuous improvement of work
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processes. The goals, objectives and strategies are clearly stated, and the plan conveys the expectation that community policing constitutes both the philosophy and practice of all policing in Portland. The strategic plan is a widely disseminated document and is available on the Bureau’s Web site.

The strategies for implementing the goals, however, are so numerous that deriving a clear sense of priorities is almost impossible. This is one of the criticisms made by PSU Professor Renauer. While many of the people in leadership positions at the Police Bureau made references to the strategic plan, those at the lower levels appear to be less familiar with the plan or less likely to take it seriously. Furthermore, your committee could not determine if lieutenants and sergeants are expected to use planning as a tool for supervision, problem solving or establishing accountability.

j. Communication

Several witnesses from the Police Bureau mentioned that "police work is 95 percent communication," and this appears to be a widely accepted view. During our interview, Chief Kroeker said, "In fact, communication is so important you could almost call community policing communication policing."

The Police Bureau’s public information officer is charged with managing official communications with the public and assumes a major responsibility for communicating the goals and accomplishments of community policing to the public. Chief Kroeker attributes much of his own difficulty convincing the community and some internal critics of his commitment to community policing to a failure of communication. He has attempted to remedy this by writing op-ed pieces for local newspapers and communicating within the force via a weekly videotaped message. Your committee noticed a spike in Bureau-generated media coverage about community policing between December 2002 and February 2003.

The Police Bureau publishes an external newsletter, Community Policing News, for the general public six times per year, though the most recent issue posted on the Bureau’s Web site is February/March 2002. Some police personnel believe that current external communication is adequate. However, in the Portland Police Bureau’s 2002 employee survey only 25 percent of respondents said the Bureau communicates effectively with the public.

“In fact, communication is so important you could almost call community policing communication policing.”
--Chief Mark Kroeker
Portland Police Bureau’s Web site (www.portlandpolicebureau.com) provides a wide range of information about the Bureau, including crime statistics, employment opportunities, policies and procedures, and results from community surveys. As a resource to community members or persons doing research on community policing in Portland, the Web site is valuable although some of the information is extremely dated.

The steering committee for the 1999 Institute for Law and Justice report listed customer service as one of its highest priority strategies, and as an immediate highest priority strategy, recommended installing a simpler and faster telephone answering system. This has not been implemented due to budget constraints. They also considered "hiring a professional public relations specialist" a high (but not the highest) priority.

Almost all witnesses interviewed by your committee believe internal communication is inadequate. This is consistent with the results of the 2002 employee survey where "there is widespread sharing of information within the Bureau" ranked last in a list of thirty-three statements related to job satisfaction. In addition, only 19 percent of respondents believed that the Bureau communicates effectively with them, and only 30 percent believed Chief Kroeker’s weekly videotaped message keeps them well informed.

k. Facilities

The fortress-like downtown Justice Center contains the Central Precinct, most of the Police Bureau's administrative and support offices and a Multnomah County jail. The other four precinct buildings are more user-friendly. In fact, the Northeast Precinct headquarters contains rooms specifically for community use.

At the beginning of fiscal year 2003, all precincts except the Central Precinct began closing at 6:00 p.m. They were previously open round the clock. The change in office hours is the result of thirty-seven desk clerk positions being eliminated. Since then, precincts have effectively become a daytime-only resource, not available for community members to come during the hours when a high percentage of neighborhood problems occur.

In addition, the Police Bureau operates eleven "Community Contact Offices," a few of which are staffed by volunteers. While the number of offices has remained constant, the locations of these offices are not listed in telephone directories or on the Portland Police Bureau’s Web site. Patrol officers use these offices to make phone calls and complete paperwork.
COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

Findings

1. Technology

The Portland Police Bureau’s 2000-02 strategic plan included a goal of obtaining and making effective use of technology and equipment, repeating a recommendation made by the steering committee for the Institute for Law and Justice report. This recommendation was tied to the highest priority recommendation of empowering officers. In fact, the Police Bureau has enhanced its technology considerably. Much of the new technology is related to crime solving and supports the Police Bureau’s primary goal of reducing crime. Computers in patrol cars are networked with the Police Bureau’s mainframe computer and provide officers access to information through touch screen and keyboard operations. A crime mapper system, an intranet and sophisticated crime analysis software have also been added. Technology, such as cameras at dangerous intersections, are helping with traffic problems, an important neighborhood livability issue according to citizen surveys.

Significant upgrades in the Police Bureau’s communication technology have also been made. All supervisory personnel and many specialized positions, such as senior neighborhood officers, have Internet access and e-mail addresses in the Police Bureau’s internal communication system. Patrol officers have access to a GroupWise e-mail that is part of the Bureau’s mobile digital computer system but it does not “talk to” the Bureau’s internal e-mail system. With the exception of senior neighborhood officers, patrol officers do not have mobile phones. Some officers use their personal mobile phones for police work. According to some witnesses the lack of mobile phones and notebook computers leaves officers tethered to their vehicles, making it more difficult for them to interact with citizens, access non-police services, make referrals and gather information.

3. Portland Community and Community Policing

Although City Council’s authorizing resolutions in 1989 and 1990 did not require anything from or provide anything for the community side of community policing, your committee believes understanding how the community is organized to participate in community policing is essential.

a. Organization of the Community

Portland’s ninety-five neighborhoods are organized into seven coalitions that receive funding from the City of Portland. They are (1) Central Northeast Neighbors; (2) East Portland Neighborhood Office; (3) Northeast Coalition of Neighborhoods; (4) North Portland Neighborhood Services; (5) Southeast Uplift (6) Southwest Neighborhoods, Inc.; and

8Mobile phones were removed from patrol cars after a 1997 internal review revealed excessive use for personal calls.
(7) Neighbors West/Northwest. The Office of Neighborhood Involvement coordinates and supports the activities of the neighborhood associations. The downtown area is served with crime prevention services through the Portland Business Alliance. This is also funded through the Office of Neighborhood Involvement. According to statistics gathered by the Office of Neighborhood Involvement, citizen participation in neighborhood association meetings has risen steadily from 1997 to 2001 giving credence to Portland's reputation for civic activism.

*The roots of effective community policing in Portland lie in the strength of its neighborhoods.*

Your committee heard strong testimony that the roots of effective community policing in Portland lie in the strength of its neighborhoods. Chief Kroeker said he believes focusing on neighborhoods is a basic ingredient of community policing. "We can build a crime-resistant neighborhood if not a crime resistant society," said Kroeker. He called Portland's network of neighborhoods a boon to a community policing structure. Captain Darrel Schenck said Portland has the strongest neighborhood support system of any city in the United States and that it is an essential connection between the neighborhoods and the police. Art Hendricks, Crime Prevention Center manager for the Office of Neighborhood Involvement, noted that Portland's culture of consensus building, shared decision making and extensive community involvement in decisions support community policing.

Your committee also uncovered some negative findings in the generally positive picture of Portland's neighborhood activism. The 2002 Service Efforts and Accomplishments report shows a 9 percent decline in "citizens' willingness to work with police to improve their neighborhoods." Several witnesses also observed a decline in citizen participation in crime prevention activities, and Chief Kroeker has also lamented a lack of citizen involvement. Civic apathy and declining crime rates appear to be the causes of waning citizen participation according to witnesses. One witness who works directly with neighborhood associations offered the opinion that citizen commitment in some neighborhoods has declined because they no longer feel that they are full partners with the police.

*b. Crime Prevention Specialists*

Crime prevention specialists are one of the community's key links to the Portland Police Bureau. They were first hired in 1978 with funds from a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant awarded to the Portland Police Bureau and distributed directly to the neighborhood coalitions. The purpose of this grant was to develop neighborhood association-based crime prevention programs to create safer and stronger neighborhoods. Crime prevention specialists were established in each of the seven neighborhood coalition offices.
As the neighborhood association-based program matured, the Police Bureau’s own crime prevention activities, such as bike safety and burglary prevention, were phased out. In some ways, the neighborhood crime prevention programs helped set the stage for the transition to community policing that would come ten years later. The duties of crime prevention specialists include the following:

1. Train block captains and support the Neighborhood Watch program;
2. Work on neighborhood-based crime prevention projects;
3. Facilitate communication between neighborhoods and the police;
4. Provide information to the neighborhood associations about crime fighting activities;
5. Communicate neighborhood livability concerns to the police;
6. Provide training to citizen groups about crime prevention;
7. Promote attendance of police and citizens at community meetings.

Crime prevention specialists also encourage neighborhood associations to feature information about crime prevention efforts and senior neighborhood officers in neighborhood newsletters.

Funding for the neighborhood crime prevention program shifted in 1997 from the seven neighborhood coalitions to the city’s Crime Prevention Center, a program of the Office of Neighborhood Involvement. Since 2000, the program has been managed by Art Hendricks, who reports to David Lane, director of the Office of Neighborhood Involvement. As a result of the funding shift, crime prevention specialists became city employees rather than employees of the neighborhoods where they worked. However, the specialists continue to be housed in the coalition offices. Cost cutting has reduced their number from sixteen to eleven.

Chief Kroeker believes the crime prevention specialists should be Portland Police Bureau employees as they are in many other cities. However, Hendricks believes, if the specialists moved to the Police Bureau, their focus would be narrower and tension could arise between the police and the neighborhood. "Sometimes communities need an advocate outside the police to make change," he said. Several specialists also said the security of the crime prevention program (and hence their own job security) is enhanced by being outside the Bureau, and cite the layoff of many of the Police Bureau’s desk clerks as evidence.
The Crime Prevention Center is measured by two benchmarks: (1) the number of crime prevention and community policing projects undertaken and (2) the number of neighborhood watch programs developed and maintained. Since 1997, when the crime prevention specialists became city employees, block captains have increased from 265 to about 400 in 2001-02, and the number of projects undertaken has risen from 362 in 1996-97 to 430 in 1999-2000 (a single meeting can be designated a project). Hendricks said he was not entirely satisfied with the level of evaluation that is being done of the crime prevention specialist program. Nonetheless, Hendricks believes the program is successful and cites the Police Bureau's 2000 community survey by Campbell DeLong Resources that revealed 23 percent of those surveyed had heard of their neighborhood crime prevention specialist whereas only 18 percent knew their neighborhood liaison officer.

Crime prevention specialists receive training through courses offered by the Crime Prevention Association of Oregon. They, along with other citizens recommended for training, once took part in the Portland Police Bureau's Citizens Academy. The Citizens Academy, a community-oriented training program staffed by Police Bureau members, closed several years ago because of funding reductions and overtime restrictions.

One of the ten visions that came from the 1999 Institute for Law and Justice report was to increase the emphasis on crime prevention (as opposed to law enforcement). This dovetailed with another vision, increasing the number of civilians in the Police Bureau. In our interview with City Auditor Gary Blackmer, he said that a significant amount of community policing could be done by civilians at substantially less cost. However, he did not support moving the crime prevention specialists to the Police Bureau.

c. Neighborhood Watch and Block Captain Programs

The Block Captain program is an outgrowth of neighborhood watches that originated in the 1940s as part of World War II civilian defense and flowered in the 1970s. Block captains lead neighborhood watches. A watch generally covers the block where the captain and the watch members live, although sometimes it might cover more, or in the case of apartment buildings, less. The rule of thumb is one captain to every ten to fifteen households. Ideally every household on the block is represented on the watch.

Block captains are volunteers of the Portland Police Bureau but are trained by the crime prevention specialists. Chief Kroeker has showcased the Block Captain program and has established a goal of maintaining thirteen hundred block captains. As of the end of 2002, four hundred were registered. Once recruited, block captains undergo a Police Bureau background check and participate in an orientation and
training with crime prevention specialists and occasionally with senior neighborhood officers and neighborhood liaison officers. The names of block captains are confidential unless the block captains give permission for their names to be shared with other block captains and neighborhood associations. This policy of anonymity has caused confusion, and some critics believe it limits the effectiveness of the program.

A coordinator for the Block Captain program was hired in 2001 with a one-year Local Law Enforcement Block Grant to the Police Bureau. The coordinator established many of the program’s protocols and increased the number of block captains. When the position ended in August 2002, a chaotic transition period followed, according to one crime prevention specialist. Chief Kroeker acknowledged that recruiting volunteers is much easier than supporting and retaining them.

Opinions about the effectiveness of the Block Captain program vary. Several witnesses noted that the commitment of block captains is highest following an incident that threatens a neighborhood but is difficult to sustain once the problem has been solved. A long-time block captain in Southeast Portland is enthusiastic and believes the program has helped reduce crime by making residents more aware of what is going on in their neighborhood. A Piedmont neighborhood foot patrol received a 2002 "Spirit of Portland" award from Mayor Katz in recognition for its crime prevention activities. Foot patrols were created during the formative years of grassroots neighborhood watches which suggests that some elements of the Neighborhood Watch program, though not necessarily the Block Captain program, are active and effective. Nonetheless, members of the same Piedmont foot patrol note that police officers are becoming less involved with neighborhood activities, and residents worry that newly hired police officers will have no commitment to the neighborhoods they serve.

Other witnesses interviewed were less enthusiastic about the Block Captain program. One witness maintains that neighborhood watches work best where the neighbors themselves initiate them as opposed to the city requiring and managing them. He doesn’t believe that Chief Kroeker’s goal of thirteen hundred block captains is realistic and wonders if funding cuts will allow the continuation of background checks and identification cards. Oversight of the Block Captain program is now one of several responsibilities assigned to a manager in the Police Bureau’s Planning and Support Division. The program does not include a paid staff coordinator for the four hundred volunteers currently enrolled.
Overall responsibility for the Block Captain program also surfaced as a problem. Some of those interviewed believed the Police Bureau was responsible for block captains; others believed that the Office of Neighborhood Involvement was responsible for them. Another witness from within the Police Bureau regards the Block Captain program as a top down effort, an example of how Chief Kroeker has "reversed the pyramid" and doesn't encourage input like his predecessors did.

d. Beyond Neighborhoods: Task Forces and Partnerships

Task forces such as the Youth Gang Enforcement Team and police-community partnerships tackle problems such as hate crimes, gang violence, drugs, prostitution, homelessness and traffic nuisances such as cruising. Employees of the Police Bureau are the only staff for some of these task forces, while others include community members. Numerous informal issue-related groups, organized as coalitions or consortia, include members of the Portland Police Bureau and community members.

Tom Potter first initiated community policing partnerships. They included city agencies, such as the Bureau of Buildings, as well as non-profit organizations, neighborhood associations and other private sector entities. The agreements were formal and delineated the authority, responsibility and expectations of each partner.

Partnerships now exist in formal and informal terms, and on ad hoc and continuing bases. Most partnerships have multiple parties including the Portland Police Bureau, neighborhoods, non-profit service organizations, businesses and other city bureaus. Some of the older partnerships are obsolete or overlooked, some have been updated and given new life, and some are still working well in their original form. The Police Bureau’s Planning and Support Division maintains an "historic" list of 144 partnerships.

Not surprisingly, some of the greatest enthusiasm about partnership agreements is generated in the early phases of developing the agreement. Crime Prevention Specialist Katherine Anderson described the process of "revitalizing" a partnership agreement in Northeast Portland with a number of interest groups, including residents of Villa de Clara Vista in the Cully neighborhood. While the original partnership agreement goes back many years, current residents are working with other interested parties, including members of the Police Bureau, to create a new partnership agreement. Anderson noted that the new agreement is almost an incidental byproduct of the process itself. The real value is in establishing the relationships, roles and problem-solving strategies that are needed to overcome the problem that brought them together.
COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

Findings

Your committee also heard testimony about other successful and long-standing partnerships with community organizations. Among them are the following:

- New Avenues for Youth, which works with homeless youth;
- Central City Concern, which operates the David P. Hooper Detoxification Center;
- Project Respond, a mental health outreach team that works with the Portland Police Bureau on crises involving mentally ill individuals.

Project Respond members also provide training to members of the Police Bureau’s Crisis Intervention Team. Julie Larson, longtime head of Project Respond, described positive relationships with individual police officers, but acknowledged that developing new relationships as they expand their team has proven more difficult. The New Avenues for Youth Reception Center, which provides alternatives to arrest for homeless youth charged with minor crimes, has saved the police substantial resources, according to Jack Wigmore, coordinator of the center. The Hooper Center has, for many years, been a resource to police officers removing substance abusers from the streets.

e. The Judiciary in Neighborhoods

The judiciary system contributes to Portland’s community policing program by creating an important network of relationships. The Neighborhood District Attorney Unit was established in 1990 about the same time community policing was implemented in Portland. District Attorney Mike Schrunk supported the Neighborhood District Attorney Unit as a way of “bringing the judiciary into the community.”

While the Neighborhood District Attorney Unit was not specifically defined as a necessary element of community policing by those who were implementing it, the program was, and still is, regarded by the judiciary system as one of the legs of the three-legged stool that is community policing. Attorneys in the District Attorney’s office volunteer for a rotation as a neighborhood district attorney, and community assignments are completely voluntary. Neighborhood district attorneys work with the police, neighborhood associations and the community courts to solve problems and to find community service alternatives for cases being heard in the community courts. This aspect of the judiciary system exemplifies the partnership and problem solving that parallels and supports similar efforts in community policing.

Community courts, which started in 1998 in Northeast Portland,
followed later by courts in Southeast and downtown Portland, are
described as the "fourth leg" of a four-legged stool. Community courts
are (as of the end of 2002) located in neighborhood community
centers. The judge is robed, but sits in an informal meeting room at
the same level as the other participants. Misdemeanor cases are often
heard in community courts and are frequently resolved through
problem solving, referral for mental health treatment or community
service. In such cases criminal charges do not appear on the
defendant’s record. A patrol officer and a neighborhood district
attorney are usually in the courtroom and work closely with the judge
to find solutions and monitor the outcome. Cuts in the Multnomah
County justice system’s 2003 budget will force the community courts
to move from their neighborhood locations to the downtown Justice
Center. While each community will retain a docket on particular days,
some community members describe the move out of the community
as "the death of the community courts."

Examples of successful problem solving mentioned by Neighborhood
District Attorney Jim Hayden, a seven year veteran, was the creation of
drug-free zones, agreements with motels about prostitution and drug
use, and the streamlining of search affidavits. Hayden recently
implemented a streamlined process that correlates neighborhood
observations with police officer observations to obtain speedy search
warrants for gaining access to suspected drug houses. Police are able
to apply misdemeanor charges to low-level neighborhood livability
problems, bring the offenders into the community court, use
treatment rather than arrest and then work with the landlord to evict
them. Hayden believes this combination will be a major advance in
dealing with drug houses. Hayden also noted that he works with all
officers in problem solving, regardless of their title, and he has always
had an excellent working relationship with neighborhood response
teams, neighborhood liaison officers and now senior neighborhood
officers.

4. Funding for Community Policing

a. Portland Police Bureau

Because community policing is not a program, but rather the
underlying philosophy of Portland’s policing efforts, it does not appear
as a line item in any budget. The Police Bureau’s budget for fiscal year
2002-03 is approximately $128 million, making it the largest single
component of the city’s overall budget. Ninety percent of the Police
Bureau’s budget comes from the city’s general fund. The balance
comes from the Police Bureau’s own revenue sources, e.g., alarm
permit fees and grants.

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9See Table 1 for Police Bureau spending and staffing data from fiscal year 1989 to 2002.
These data are taken from the City Auditor’s Service Efforts and Accomplishments reports.
Total budget figures in Table 1 include retirement and disability payments to sworn officers
thereby increasing the budget number used by the Portland Police Bureau in its official
budget submission to City Council by more than 25 percent. The City Auditor included
retirement and disability payments because they are a cost to the city even though the
Police Bureau has little control over them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total Budget**</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
<th>Precinct Officers*</th>
<th>Spending Per Capita**</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sworn</td>
<td>Non-Sworn</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% Increase 1999-2002</td>
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<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Increase Since 1988</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>18%</td>
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</table>

*Total officers and sergeants assigned to all shifts in precincts, traffic, mounted patrol, canine units, and neighborhood response teams.

**Adjusted to 2001-02 dollars.
The Portland Police Bureau’s budget for fiscal year 2002-03 is almost $2 million greater than for fiscal year 2001-02. However, adjusting for population growth and inflation, the Bureau claims a 4 percent budget cut.

The number of authorized full-time positions (1,284) is unchanged from fiscal year 2001-02 to fiscal year 2002-03, although this number does not include the approximately seventy grant-funded positions. More than one thousand of these positions are sworn officers. Again, adjusting for population growth, the Police Bureau says it has taken a 5.5 percent cut in personnel.10

To balance its 2001-02 budget and meet budget cut targets in 2002-03, the Portland Police Bureau cut thirty-seven desk clerks (more than half of the total), froze eight officer positions and eliminated an additional twenty non-sworn positions. The effect of the desk clerk reductions is described in a review of Police Bureau facilities in Section IV (Findings).

In fiscal year 2002-03, the number of positions devoted to neighborhood policing (five precincts and the traffic division) will shrink from 830 to 794, a 4 percent decrease. Meanwhile, the number of positions in Investigative Services (detectives, internal affairs, family services and forensic evidence) will increase 9 percent and the number of positions in Support Services (chief’s office, personnel, training, records, data processing, planning and support, and management and fiscal services) will increase 14 percent.11

Seventy-five percent of the Portland Police Bureau budget is personnel-related. To balance its fiscal year 2002-03 budget and to respond to the City Auditor’s criticism of poor management control, the Police Bureau has cut its overtime budget by 37 percent and obligated each departmental manager to work within an overtime budget. One of the highest priority recommendations from the Institute for Law and Justice report was to make Portland’s police officers the highest paid in the state. This has not occurred.

Forces outside the control of the Portland Police Bureau have also had an impact on its budget. Obligations to the new federal Department of Homeland Security have been costly. Assistant Chief Clark noted that federal security alerts and terror warnings without specific targets are extremely difficult for the police to manage efficiently. In addition, the failure of Ballot Measure 28 (three-year statewide income tax surcharge) in January 2003 resulted in the release of prisoners from Multnomah County jails and increased pressure on the city’s general fund.
b. Office of Neighborhood Involvement, Community Courts and Neighborhood District Attorneys

Funding for the crime prevention specialists, which is the primary financial investment in the community side of community policing, comes from the city's general fund and is included in the Office of Neighborhood Involvement's budget. In 2000-01, the Office of Neighborhood Involvement funded twelve crime prevention positions --eleven specialists and one manager--with $742,358. In 2001-02, the same positions were funded with $788,328. In the current year, $819,789 is budgeted for these positions, an approximate increase of 4 percent. The annual increases reflect increases in cost of living, materials and services and overhead expenses. The manager of the Crime Prevention Center also administers the graffiti removal program, with a 2002-03 budget of $339,580, most of which is contracted out to the Youth Employment Institute.

The neighborhood district attorneys and the community courts are considered one program, the Community District Attorney Program, for budgeting purposes. The program is funded by multiple partners with a total budget of approximately one million dollars. Funds are contributed by the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office, the State Department of Human Services, Portland Business Alliance and the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office. The community courts were previously funded with $450,000 in federal grants and local Weed and Seed grants, but these grants have ended. For fiscal year 2002-03, the Multnomah County District Attorney’s office has contributed $263,000 in support of the community courts, but for fiscal year 2003-04, only one legal assistant, funded by a Weed and Seed grant, is proposed. This reduction combined with state budget cuts caused the closure of the community courts in Northeast and Southeast Portland. Budget pressure on the other funding partners has resulted in further cuts to this program, which is a national model and has received attention and visitors from all over the world.12

The Neighborhood District Attorney Unit has also been affected by shrinking resources. Workloads have increased and availability to work on long-term projects has decreased. In the current budget year, funds for the neighborhood district attorneys were reduced from $792,000 in the prior budget year to $512,000. This reduced the number of neighborhood district attorneys from nine to six. In the next fiscal year (2003-04), the budget will be further reduced by $83,000, causing the loss of one more district attorney. Operationally, in east Portland, four neighborhood district attorney positions have been reduced to two, making each district attorney responsible for two precincts. This

12Scott Marcy, Finance Officer, Multnomah County Community District Attorney Program.
means more than just a workload increase for the district attorneys and a decrease in the number of neighborhood cases they handle. Neighborhood District Attorney Jim Hayden and his supervisor, Wayne Pearson, both described the "multiplier effect" of not having neighborhood district attorneys consistently available in the precincts. District officers lose the habit--and the encouragement--of seeking alternative problem solving approaches when they are not sure when they will see the district attorney or how long it will take to follow up on a complicated problem.

B. EXPECTED OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

In its authorizing resolution of 1989, Portland City Council explicitly stated its two major categories of outcomes expected from community policing: "increased public safety" and "increased opportunity for officer initiative." Your committee used the Police Bureau’s performance measures (see Section III.B.2, Evaluation Tools Used by the Portland Police Bureau) and information gained from witnesses to assemble a summary of how well the City Council’s original expectations have been met. Table 2, displayed below and taken from the City Auditor’s Service Efforts and Accomplishments reports, displays data on crime, fear of crime, citizen satisfaction with police, and citizens’ knowledge of their neighborhood officers from 1989 to 2001.

1. Increased Public Safety

a. Incidence of Crime

Incidence of crime is probably the measure reported most extensively and watched most closely by the police and the community. It is also the outcome that is most difficult to relate definitively to community policing. An extensive body of literature deliberates on what causes fluctuations in crime rates. Most experts agree that the causes are multivariate and probably interdependent. The economic health of the country, growth of prisons, maturation of drug markets and the demographics of the age cohort most responsible for crime all play roles. A careful analysis of crime rates across the country has shown that the rates are remarkably consistent across many communities, reinforcing the idea that crime rates are influenced by factors that are not just local.

The most general statement that can be made about crime in Portland is that, from 1990 to 2001, the crime rate for Part I Person and Property crimes--the most serious crimes such as murder, aggravated assault, arson, motor vehicle theft--has decreased significantly. The most dramatic decrease occurred after 1995. Part I Person crime rates alone declined 47 percent from 1997 to 2001 and Part I Property crime rates
### Table 2
Portland Police Bureau
Crime Rates, Fear of Crime and Citizen Satisfaction
Calendar Years 1989-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Night</th>
<th>Part I Crimes/1000*</th>
<th>Citizens Who Feel Safe/Very Safe</th>
<th>Victimization Rates</th>
<th>Citizens Rating Police Good/Very Good</th>
<th>Citizens Who Know Neighborhood Officer</th>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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*Part I crimes defined by the FBI are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.*
declined 19 percent in the same time period. Victimization rates, which include burglary and theft from vehicle, also declined though not as dramatically.\textsuperscript{13}

Chief Kroeker noted, however, that crime rates have been increasing recently. In fact the Police Bureau’s performance measures for 2002 (not yet published) show Part I crimes have been consistently higher than in 2001. Nationwide, crime rates also fell after 1993, but began showing similar increases in 2002.

\textit{b. Fear of Crime}

Portland residents have not only experienced less crime, but they also feel safer. The change is particularly dramatic in the number of citizens who report feeling safe walking in their neighborhoods at night. This figure increased from 34 percent to 50 percent from 1990 to 2002.

\textit{c. Neighborhood Livability}

Neighborhood livability is somewhat difficult to track. One measure is how safe people feel in their neighborhoods; those data are reported above. Other measures of livability are more indirect and present a mixed picture. The incidence of graffiti, a Portland-Multnomah Progress Board benchmark, fell by 18 percent from 1995 to 1997. Although the Youth Employment Institute, which contracts for graffiti removal, has collected graffiti data for each neighborhood since 1997, the data has not been aggregated nor reported by the Progress Board since then. According to the Portland-Multnomah County Progress Board’s Bob MacKay, not every benchmark is updated every year, but the five-year hiatus in reporting the incidence of graffiti is unusually long. Graffiti could be a particularly useful indicator of a successful community policing process because graffiti removal requires cooperation among police, citizens, businesses and schools. Similarly, the number of complaints about drug houses is another useful indicator reflecting both on neighborhood livability and successful community policing processes since police depend on citizen involvement to shut down drug houses. The number of complaints dropped 39 percent from 1996 to 2000, but showed a 22 percent jump from 2000 to 2001. Finally, citizen’s rating of the physical condition of their neighborhood barely changed between 1994 and 2000. On a five-point scale, the rating has hovered around 3.8.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{d. Citizens’ Satisfaction with Police Services}

Since 1992 more than two-thirds of Portland’s citizens have rated police service as good or very good. In the City Auditor’s Service Efforts and Accomplishments report, Office the Auditor, City of Portland; the Portland Police Bureau’s 2002 strategic plan; and the Portland Police Bureau’s performance measures, 2001-02 and 2002-03 (July-October 2002 only).\textsuperscript{13}Community Assessment Survey, as reported in Portland Police Bureau Strategic Plan, 2000-2002.

\textsuperscript{13}Statistics taken from the 2001-02 Service Efforts and Accomplishments report, Office the Auditor, City of Portland; the Portland Police Bureau’s 2002 strategic plan; and the Portland Police Bureau’s performance measures, 2001-02 and 2002-03 (July-October 2002 only).

\textsuperscript{14}Community Assessment Survey, as reported in Portland Police Bureau Strategic Plan, 2000-2002.
Community Assessment Survey, satisfaction data are aggregated for the entire city. With only aggregated data, determining whether dissatisfied citizens are clustered in specific neighborhoods or precincts was impossible.

While the overall trend in citizen satisfaction from 1990 to 1998 showed a 22 percent improvement, the rating declined 7 percent from 1998 to 2001.\textsuperscript{15} Citizen’s complaints to the Police Bureau’s Internal Affairs Division decreased slightly during the first four months of fiscal year 2003 (July through October, 2002) over a similar period in the previous year, but sufficient historical data is not yet available to draw conclusions. One of the goals of the Independent Police Review Division in the City Auditor’s Office formed in 2001 is to track and organize this information in a database that will make analysis more straightforward. Chief Kroeker cites this as a key index of successful community policing, making it an important measure to follow.

e. Partnerships with Citizens and Citizen Groups

In its 2000-02 strategic plan, the Portland Police Bureau looked at the citizen rating of police service (already described) and the willingness of residents to work with police to improve neighborhoods. Both measures are taken from the annual community survey done by the City Auditor’s office and documented in the annual Service Efforts and Accomplishments report. Over the ten-year period from 1991 to 2001, the “willingness of residents to work with the police to improve their neighborhoods” has dropped 9 percent. The City Auditor also reports the percent of citizens who know their neighborhood police officer. This indicator has remained virtually unchanged at 14 percent for the last ten years. As noted above, the data from the biennial community survey done in 2000 for the Police Bureau by Campbell DeLong Resources reports that 18 percent of those interviewed had heard of their neighborhood liaison officer whereas 23 percent had heard of their crime prevention specialist.\textsuperscript{16} Another indicator of successful citizen-police partnership is the status of the Neighborhood Watch and Block Captain programs. Recruiting block captains appears to have stalled, and as noted earlier in this report, confusion about authority and responsibility is evident.

A comprehensive evaluation of the quality of partnership agreements with the Portland Police Bureau was last undertaken in 1996 by Campbell DeLong Resources. At that time, the Police Bureau perceived cooperation with the neighborhood associations to be the best, while cooperation with government bureaus to be the worst. Unfortunately, since this is the only evaluation of its kind, your committee could not make comparisons or draw conclusions about trends. Witnesses who

\textsuperscript{15}Service Efforts and Accomplishments Report, Office of the City Auditor, 2002.
were interviewed about partnership agreements differed in their opinions about whether the agreements were used to their fullest extent. They generally agreed that the most positive effects of the partnership agreements came in the early phase of their development and were derived from the process of communication and problem solving.

f. Partnerships with City Bureaus

The Portland Police Bureau tracks neither the nature, nor the quality, of partnerships between the Police Bureau and other city bureaus. Anecdotally, your committee heard from a number of witnesses that cooperation between bureaus has deteriorated. We also heard from several witnesses that a lack of coordination at the City Council translated into indifferent or unresponsive relationships between the bureaus relative to community policing.

The relationship between the Portland Police Bureau and the Bureau of Buildings was mentioned repeatedly as a particularly important one because of the high incidence of complaints about drug houses, abandoned buildings and code violations, all of which require a high level of cooperation to solve. Some police officers spoke positively about their working relationship with the Bureau of Buildings, while others were quite negative.

g. Coordination and Allocation of Responsibilities Among Social, Criminal Justice and Other Service Agencies

The Portland Police Bureau enjoys numerous partnerships with a variety of legal, social service and provider organizations in the community. Formal and informal partnerships have been established. Most of the witnesses interviewed described positively their working relationships and agreements with the police. The Neighborhood District Attorney Unit and community courts developed parallel to community policing, but it was clear to your committee that their major mission was to support community policing efforts. Although a written agreement does not exist, this appears to be an example of successful community policing partnership.

2. Increased Opportunity for Officer Initiative

The second major category of expected outcomes specified by the City Council in its original community policing resolution was described as "increased opportunities for officer initiative." Presumably the importance given to this set of outcomes conveyed the belief that community policing could only be accomplished through a major change in how officers approach their work. This outcome is further broken down as follows: (1) more time spent by officers in proactive missions; (2) empowerment of officers to design problem-solving
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strategies; and (3) increased job satisfaction among employees of the Portland Police Bureau. Measuring these desired outcomes was a challenge for your committee, as it has undoubtedly been for the Portland Police Bureau.

a. More Time Spent by Officers in Proactive Mission

In an effort to find an objective measure of "self-initiated activity," the Police Bureau began tracking data from officer’s logs in 1999. The workload statistics showed a steady increase in "officer initiated incidents" from 1997 to 2000, followed by a 12 percent drop in 2001 and a very slight rise in 2002. However, a closer look at one of the years (presumably representative of all the years) revealed that the vast majority of the self-initiated activities were traffic stops, which are not indicative of the problem solving expected in community policing.

Although a "soft measure," officers’ perceptions of how much time and opportunity they have to solve problems is also important. As noted elsewhere, several officers described a deterioration in "paperwork protection" from their superiors, which has reduced their time for proactive problem solving.

b. Empowerment of Officers to Design Problem-Solving Strategies

The Police Bureau attempts to measure "empowerment" as a desired outcome through its biennial employee survey. The results in the Police Bureau’s 2000-02 strategic plan, combined with the Bureau’s most recent employee survey, show that employees’ autonomy (presumably a measure of empowerment) has held constant at 3.7 (on a five-point scale) from 1996 to 2002, though this represents a slight drop from 3.9 reported for 1993-96. A look at other measures of empowerment suggests a decline. Only one out of three statements related to independence and autonomy improved while the other two slipped in rank. "I am encouraged to use initiative in my work" improved slightly, moving up the ranking from sixteen to fifteen. "I have the appropriate amount of independence on the job" slipped from seven to ten, and "I am given the right level of decision-making authority" dropped from eleven to thirteen.

Your committee heard testimony from officers about what they saw as increased obstacles to doing their job independently. On one police ride-along, an officer complained of having nothing to do because he had received no radio calls during his shift, implying that he didn’t feel free to choose problems to work on. However, another officer described during a ride-along his self-initiated plan to reduce car...
prowls and noted that the precinct commander had been entirely supportive.

c. Increased Job Satisfaction at the Portland Police Bureau

The 2000-02 strategic plan reports remarkable consistency in job satisfaction from 1993 to 2000. The score of 4.1 (out of five) has held from 1993 to the most recent employee survey. On the other hand, among the ranked statements, "The Police Bureau is a good organization to work for" showed the largest decrease, dropping from twelve to nineteen in 2002.

V. COMMUNITY POLICING IN OTHER CITIES

In the last decade many cities in the United States and elsewhere have adopted community policing philosophies. Community policing has received a lot of positive public relations, but substantive evaluations of community policing practices and results are rare. A 1999 Urban Institute study of thirty communities was particularly useful. Your committee also looked closely at community policing in Chicago because PSU Professor Renauer had commended its strategies and the quality of its evaluation.

A. URBAN INSTITUTE EVALUATION

In April 1999 the Urban Institute, a national social policy research organization, issued a research paper entitled Breaking Down Barriers. The report was drawn largely from case studies of thirty cities, including Portland, that implemented or enhanced community policing with the help of COPS grants from the Department of Justice in the mid-1990s.

The Urban Institute report notes that community policing has become the "new orthodoxy" for policing in the United States, with 70 percent of the law enforcement agencies surveyed claiming in 1995 that they practiced some form of community policing. Among the survey sample of thirty cities, problem-solving and community partnerships are widely accepted as the fundamental building blocks of community policing.

The Urban Institute found six organizational models for community policing and studied the three most prevalent. Those three are: (1) the specialized unit in which two or more police officers are dedicated to jurisdiction-wide community policing and problem solving and do not answer radio calls; (2) the split force in which a community police officer is assigned to each area served by one patrol unit (a beat, precinct, sector, zone or district). The community police officer is charged with developing partnerships and engaging in problem
problem solving with the community; the officer is separate from patrol officers and does not answer radio calls; (3) the generalist model in which all patrol officers respond to radio calls and engage in community policing.

The Urban Institute identified four major barriers to implementation of community policing:

- Resistance to change: "the core principles at the heart of community policing run counter to many internal and external expectations of police, the training provided in the academy and field, the paramilitary structure and rigid chain of command of departments, and the reasons why many young people are drawn to policing, i.e., catching bad guys."

- "Soft on crime" image: Activities "focusing on quality of life crimes and prevention have filled local newspapers and officers' minds with pictures of police officers...painting youth centers and playing basketball with teenagers."

- Tyranny of the police car radio -- When officers dedicated to community policing are freed from responding to radio calls, friction develops with regular patrol officers who believe they are carrying a greater load and are more exposed to danger. This is commonplace in police departments with split forces or specialized units.

- Organizational jealousies - The special unit and split force models are often implemented by providing community police officers with perks such as mobile phones, flexible schedules and higher pay. These benefits, along with frequent and usually favorable media coverage, often cause resentment among officers.

Noting that implementation of community policing is rarely if ever straightforward and trouble-free, the Urban Institute study recognized four cities' efforts to break through the above barriers. Only two of the cities, Austin, Texas and San Diego, are large enough to compare to Portland.

**Austin, Texas**

The Austin Police Department uses a modified generalist approach. Patrol officers--one for each of Austin's fifty-four beats--work around the clock and are expected to participate in problem solving, develop neighborhood identity, collaborate with the community to resolve issues and develop relationships between community and police. The department has "worked to provide officers with more time for community policing activities through time-saving technologies and civilianization, and enhanced community policing by realigning beat

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17 See Section VI.C. (To What Extent is Community Policing Effectively Implemented in Portland--by the Police and by the Community?) for discussion of Portland's community policing model.
boundaries to neighborhood boundaries, assigning lieutenants areal [sic] rather than temporal responsibility, reducing management layers, and establishing decentralized and street detectives in addition to the centralized investigative unit.”

Austin also has a small problem-solving unit of twenty-four officers known as CRIME NET (Crime Neighborhood Enforcement Team), with patrol officers rotating in and out every ninety days. This system allows a large number of officers to have direct field training in problem solving. CRIME NET officers target problems identified by citizens, typically with enforcement and "take back the streets" tactics, mitigating a "soft on crime" image. Austin also has a Gang Enforcement Team and collaborates with local prosecutors to deal with repeat offenders and street crime.

San Diego, California
The San Diego Police Department also has a modified generalist system that grew out of a long-time commitment to problem solving that actually predated the department’s embrace of community policing. Setting priorities for problem solving is done exclusively by the police, and the chief does not allow the officers to become involved in activities such as neighborhood beautification or teen support projects. Patrol officers and their sergeant are configured as neighborhood policing teams to solve problems, respond to radio calls and investigate crime. The teams have rigorous field training in problem solving, lieutenants with 24-hour beat responsibility and special units for drug abatement, sexual assault and domestic violence.

Among the lessons learned from the thirty cities studied by the Urban Institute, your committee considered the following the most relevant:

- A considerable body of evidence indicates that, while community policing must involve everyone in the department, it is also necessary to have individual officers who are community policing specialists.
- The danger of a generalized approach to community policing is that officers will not find time to work within the communities, particularly if structures for community collaboration do not exist.
- Community police officers should be involved, to some degree, in radio response calls. This mitigates the resentment factor among regular patrol officers and prevents the community police officers from developing a specialist mentality.
- Retaining traditional police tactics, particularly the authority to arrest, as primary problem-solving tools is important. This is how "zero tolerance" has been made compatible with community policing. However, if the power to arrest is the primary problem-solving tactic and zero tolerance is the primary response to quality of life,

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18Roehl, Jan, "Breaking Down Barriers: Introducing Community Policing to Law Enforcement Agencies." The Urban Institute, April 1999, p. 6.
issues, partnerships with communities will be destroyed and the essence of community policing will be lost.

The Urban Institute concludes that "Community policing is in a shifting, uneasy stage of evolution. Its general principles are accepted as desirable goals, but the strategies to achieve them are hotly debated."

Police executives are caught in a bind: the strategies they use to build internal support--increased emphasis on arrest, adoption of zero tolerance policies and requiring community police officers to answer radio calls--are, to some extent, inconsistent with the principles of collaborative partnerships and problem solving.

B. CHICAGO

Chicago was not one of the Urban Institute’s thirty case studies because extensive data on the program was already available. A consortium of Chicago-area universities, under the direction of Northwestern University Professor Wesley Skogan, a nationally recognized expert on community policing, has conducted annual evaluations of CAPS since its inception. The findings are used each year to fine-tune the implementation of community policing in Chicago.

Chicago’s approach to community policing, begun in 1993 and known as CAPS (Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy), is thought by many to be the gold standard for community policing in the United States. At the outset Chicago rejected the split force or special unit organizational models preferring a generalist model with a high degree of decentralization. However, Chicago recognized that successful implementation of community policing would require a major change in police attitudes. The tactics adopted included improving the quality of supervision, defining new roles for sergeants, providing leadership and vision, working effectively with the union and investing heavily in training.

Each of Chicago’s 279 police beats has a team of eight or nine officers who patrol the same beat on the same watch for at least one year, mostly in cars but sometimes on foot. They respond to calls on their beats, especially those of a non-emergency nature. The CAPS dispatch policy minimizes the number of 9-1-1 calls that are routed to beat officers. This system allows beat officers to know their community members, monitor community problems and help develop solutions. Beat officers from all shifts meet regularly as a team to review their strategies and progress, and their sergeants are responsible for maintaining a set of operational plans that outlines each beat’s priority problems and what is being done about them.
To support the work of beat officers and to ensure that 9-1-1 calls are answered promptly, teams of rapid response officers have been created in all twenty-five police districts. The rapid response teams also back up beat officers when the latter are busy with community meetings or community problem solving. Plainclothes tactical and gang officers assigned to each district also support the work of beat officers. Officers have no special perks and receive constant messages that support traditional police work and the use of arrests where appropriate.

Chicago Mayor Richard Daly has recognized that visible signs of community degeneration, e.g., abandoned vehicles, graffiti and malfunctioning streetlights, have an impact on crime. He has made CAPS a priority for all city agencies and has created a new, more efficient system for accessing city services that impact crime and public safety.

The Chicago police department has made a huge investment in training police personnel and the community in the CAPS philosophy and its prescribed method of problem solving. All members of the police department--sworn and civilian--receive some level of CAPS training, ranging from orientation to advanced problem-solving skills. Community members receive largely the same training in problem-solving techniques. Beat profiles--comprehensive records of the characteristics, resources and chronic crime problems on each beat--help the police and the community prioritize problems and develop solutions. Beat teams develop beat plans to address and document the problem-solving process. Managers use beat plans to set priorities and allocate resources at the district and area levels.

Public involvement is a major feature of CAPS, particularly the monthly beat meetings, which are co-chaired by a civilian resident and a beat officer. Public involvement is facilitated by a cadre of full-time community organizers and encouraged by an extensive publicity campaign. In some cases the community organizers are city employees; in other cases they work for neighborhood organizations. Each district also has an advisory committee to advise the district commander and to oversee a court advocacy program.

The most recent evaluation report on CAPS was issued in the summer of 2002 when CAPS was well into its eighth year. After eight years, only about half of the Chicago citizens surveyed believed the police were performing well and were responsive to community concerns. Community organizers continue to have difficulty involving residents in problem-solving projects in targeted communities. The community prosecution program was judged highly successful. Although many aspects of community policing have been assimilated into the department’s operations, problems still remain where a clear line of accountability has not been established at the district level.
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Chicago has recently further specialized its community policing function with the establishment of a CAPS manager to hold district managers accountable for their roles and responsibilities as delineated in a new manual.

VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. IS COMMUNITY POLICING RIGHT FOR PORTLAND?

From almost the first moments of witness testimony and literature review, it seemed clear to your committee that community policing is a natural fit in Portland. As Chief Kroeker noted, Portland’s strong neighborhoods and tradition of activism provide ready-made structures for testing and carrying out the basic principles of partnership and problem solving. Furthermore, all the interviews conducted with community members uncovered a widespread understanding and acceptance of community policing. The skepticism that your committee encountered was never about the concept of community policing, but with its leadership and implementation. This means that future tasks can be directed at improvement rather than starting anew.

Like most police bureaus, the Portland Police Bureau is saddled with traditional characteristics such as a quasi-military reporting structure, a culture that some characterize as macho and the need to protect and conceal information. However, the Police Bureau also has a long history of working constructively and respectfully with its citizens. This is true despite recurring and highly publicized incidents to the contrary. People who have lived elsewhere are quick to point out the high quality of Portland’s police and the generally congenial relationship between police and citizens. The trends of the past ten years create a positive "bank account" which can be drawn upon to support future efforts. At least conceptually, an institutional memory that amounts to accepted orthodoxy exists. The enlightened culture of the Police Bureau, while not synonymous with a culture of community policing, is at least hospitable to community policing. Your committee was told over and over again that citizens expect a community policing approach to public safety issues and should, if anything, increase their demands on the police and city government. Captain Darrel Schenck said, "We couldn’t do away with community policing even if we tried...citizens wouldn’t let us."
B. TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE VISION OF COMMUNITY POLICING UNDERSTOOD AND ARTICULATED BY THE CITY COUNCIL, POLICE BUREAU, CITY GOVERNMENT, NEIGHBORHOOD AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, AND OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS?

Your committee found substantial consistency in the definition and understanding of what constitutes community policing and no lack of support for the concept of community policing. This was true at all levels, from the City Council down to the beat officer and across all sectors of the community. However, your committee also found a lack of understanding about accountability for community policing and about the evolution of community policing since its adoption in Portland thirteen years ago.

External circumstances and trial and error have dictated some of this evolution, but some of it appears to arise from problems in the original resolutions. The vision for community policing in Portland goes back to City Council Resolution No 34587 which placed the strongest possible emphasis on the interdependence of the police and the community. The values of "community participation, problem solving, officer involvement in decision making, police accountability, and deployment of police personnel at a level closer to the neighborhood" were mentioned specifically. The subsequent resolution, No 34627, assigned virtually all of the responsibility for community policing to the police. Chief Tom Potter and Mayor Bud Clark, as authors of the original vision, were highly focused on developing a police-community partnership and invested hundreds of hours establishing the infrastructure to support the partnership. Accountability of the community was not an issue in the early years because the community was so thoroughly integrated into the process at that time.

The sense that community policing had dropped from the city’s collective “radar” was one of the factors that motivated City Club to study this topic. As Assistant Chief Greg Clark put it, community policing, like physical fitness, requires constant attention. Without the attention, the default position for the police is traditional policing, particularly if only the Police Bureau is accountable for maintaining community policing.

Your committee found a number of contradictions related to community policing among the city’s and Police Bureau’s leadership. The City Council seems committed to community policing but uninformed about its current status or of the necessary components for its success. Chief Kroeker was praised by some for his sincere commitment to community policing, but the majority of witnesses...
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believed he was not truly interested in the same vision of community policing that Chief Potter and Chief Moose had implemented. Witnesses described Kroeker’s style of communication as aloof, and his use of weekly videos as a mode of internal communication supports this portrayal. While his results-oriented approach was viewed as a strength by some, his disinterest in process has been interpreted by others as a disinterest in community policing. The leadership role of Chief Kroeker or any future chief is critical if community policing is to remain the prevailing philosophy for policing in Portland.

Two highly placed Police Bureau employees noted that the words "community policing" had dropped from the Police Bureau’s parlance. "No one talks about it anymore," said one. However, in the last few months, that has changed as Chief Kroeker introduced senior neighborhood officers and submitted editorials supporting community policing to local newspapers.

Your committee found the most striking deficit in the community policing vision in the "community." The City Council, in its original community policing resolution, talked about the community, but its instructions and expectations were directed entirely to the police. The City Council did not articulate a vision that established a broader responsibility that included the community. Your committee found ample evidence that City Council members, albeit supportive of community policing, see it as the mayor’s responsibility because the Police Bureau is hers to oversee. Without coherence in the vision, subsequent problems in leadership, communication and implementation become magnified and cause rifts that can ultimately overturn the strengths of the original vision. Current literature emphasizes the importance of the community's full participation in community policing. This requires a vision and a strategic plan at the highest level that encompasses both police and community as responsible and accountable partners.

C. TO WHAT EXTENT IS COMMUNITY POLICING EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED IN PORTLAND--BY THE POLICE? BY THE COMMUNITY?

Your committee found a number of effectively implemented elements of community policing. Many of Portland’s community policing partnerships are valued by their members. Witnesses described numerous examples of successful problem solving. Officers talked about opportunities for initiative and problem solving. The Community Court program and Neighborhood District Attorney Unit
exemplify some of the highest standards of community policing. Within the communities, citizens continue to find ways of translating activism into effective crime prevention. In spite of this positive anecdotal evidence, your committee was disappointed that neither the Police Bureau, nor any other city office, tracks the effectiveness of police-community partnerships.

Your committee also found evidence of "lip service" to community policing within the Police Bureau. A majority of personnel practices, e.g., recruiting, performance evaluation, discipline and rewards and training, are weak and do not reinforce the philosophy and practice of community policing. Almost everyone seemed to recognize the importance of training, not just teaching entry-level skills, but in constantly "tuning up" the philosophy and practice of community policing. High-level Police Bureau employees talked about empowering officers to do "partnerships and problem solving," but this does not correlate with the officers' perceptions that appear in the Bureau's employee survey.

Your committee was also concerned about the under-representation of minorities in the Police Bureau. The importance of minority representation on the force, as an element of community policing, can hardly be overemphasized. Not only does it make an important statement about the Portland Police Bureau's commitment to social justice and equity but it is also key to partnership- and relationship-building in many communities. Minority members of the force are in a unique position to help Police Bureau employees overcome the suspicion and distrust of police found in many minority communities. They also provide positive role models to minority youth, which in turn supports the Bureau's recruiting efforts.

When comparing Portland's model of community policing with those of other cities (see Community Policing in Other Cities, p. 50), your committee determined that Chief Potter's original vision could be best likened to the generalist model in which all patrol officers are responsible for community policing. This model began to evolve under Chief Moose with the addition of neighborhood response teams (specialized units) and has continued to do so under Chief Kroeker with the addition of senior neighborhood officers (split force). Chief Kroeker claims the Senior Neighborhood Officer program to be a success, and it does indeed implement the recommendation from the Institute for Law and Justice to create a "master patrol officer" classification.
However, for many in the Bureau, this evolution contradicts Portland’s original vision for community policing. Your committee heard substantial concern that community policing is being relegated to specialists. Those at the top of the Police Bureau’s hierarchy discussed the risk of a “split force” but they did not discuss the larger risk of this change being viewed as a shift in the Bureau’s overall philosophy. More than one witness indicated that the lower ranks of the Police Bureau question whether community policing is being practiced and whether anyone cares if it is not. The perception of confusing or contradictory messages about community policing, now exacerbated by budget cuts and homeland security issues, is a significant problem.

Your committee considered the issue of specialization and the danger of a split force in light of the Urban Institute’s report and recent developments in Chicago. The trend toward specialization appears to be a nationwide phenomenon, and Portland is not an exception. However, both the Urban Institute study and the Chicago evaluation stress that while it may be necessary to have community policing specialists on the force, it is essential that all officers accept and practice the philosophy and precepts of community policing.

Another implementation issue at the Police Bureau that concerned your committee was the 2000-02 strategic plan which, to some degree, reflects the mixed messages and imperfectly implemented strategies described above. The plan clearly and succinctly defines the six overarching goals of community policing (listed on p. 14), but then presents an overwhelming inventory of strategies with no coherent chronology or prioritization.

On the community side, your committee looked for evidence of successful community policing and found a number of curious and inconsistent examples. Chief Kroeker views the Block Captain program as an example of successful community policing in Portland. However, your committee found confusion about who is in charge of the program and resentment that it has become a “top down program” supplanting a previously successful grass roots effort. At a minimum, having lost its only staff person, the program is perilously unsupervised and unsupported. With a goal of thirteen hundred volunteers, expecting successful outcomes without a significant increase in training and support is unrealistic.

On the other hand, the programs and activities of the neighborhood district attorneys and community courts are exemplars of what can be accomplished within the community, not to mention numerous examples of successful partnerships and crime prevention efforts.
spearheaded by grassroots community groups. Yet crime prevention specialists and members of neighborhood groups do not receive consistent training such as what once existed with the Citizens Academy. Finally, implementation of community policing by the community appears to be negatively affected by the absence of a clear vision and strategic plan.

D. ARE CURRENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES MEANINGFUL AND EFFECTIVE?

The Police Bureau tracks most of the performance measures recommended by experts in community policing, and most of the objective measures point to successful community policing in Portland. What isn’t being measured is of greatest concern. Your committee found that some of the most important aspects of community policing are not being measured. These include the "soft measures" of relationship- and community-building, which are at the heart of community policing. In addition, while virtually every witness talked about the importance of effective leadership, performance measures that capture this critical variable do not exist.

Being measured but not reported to the public are data on citizens’ satisfaction with the Portland Police Bureau on a district or neighborhood basis. These data should provide important information to the Police Bureau about the status of its relationship with minority communities. Your committee was not able to determine whether or not the data are used effectively.

Your committee found the weakest systems for evaluation on the community side: no rigorous evaluation of (1) community partnerships; (2) the Crime Prevention Center; (3) community training that supports community policing goals; nor (4) the level and quality of community participation in community policing committees, task forces, advisory councils and other groups. This deficiency reflects a flaw in City Council Resolution No. 34627, which does not articulate the role of the community in community policing. The original City Council resolution includes two pages of expected organizational outcomes for the Police Bureau. Your committee wonders how a parallel list would look for the community. And how would mutual accountability be assured so that the ultimate performance measures look at the entire system rather than just one element of it?

Finally, your committee discovered the absence of regular outside evaluations throughout the thirteen years of community policing in Portland. The Institute for Law and Justice study of 1999 was a review rather than a true evaluation. Partnerships, one of the acknowledged lynchpins of community policing, have been evaluated only once (1996 Campbell DeLong study). This stands in sharp contrast to
Chicago, which contracts for an annual outside evaluation of its community policing program.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Community policing is deeply rooted in the community and the Portland Police Bureau and, like many other cities across the United States, has become a matter of orthodoxy. In fact, some of the recent criticisms of the Portland Police Bureau and particularly of Chief Kroeker reflect the community’s expectation that community policing be the standard against which policing activities are measured. However, in spite of widespread evidence that community policing is the accepted standard in Portland, evidence also suggests that the implementation of community policing is faltering.

Your committee concluded the following:

1. Structures for shared decision-making are weak and are getting weaker. Partnership agreements exist and remain valuable, but their greatest value is probably in the early stages of development. Some are actively used. Others are functionally moribund. Few structures for genuinely shared decision making exist. The Chief’s Forum, while valuable for keeping the parties talking with each other, tends to alternate between information sharing by the police and “venting” by community members. Precinct advisory committees exist, but community attendance is quite irregular, and their mission, at least in practice, varies among precincts. Structures for mutual or shared accountability do not exist. The chief of police must answer to the mayor, but the Police Bureau and the community are not represented together before the City Council to answer for their shared successes and failures.

2. A lack of shared decision making is felt most acutely by members of minority communities. Minorities’ perception of exclusion from partnerships and decision making and their perception of Chief Kroeker’s insensitivity to minority concerns, combined with the Police Bureau’s difficulty recruiting minorities, paint a picture of fragile race relations. This would be a problem for any police department. It is particularly problematic for a police department that purports to live by the principles and values of community policing.

3. Many of the expectations for organizational development outlined in the original City Council resolution and reinforced by the Institute for Law and Justice have not been achieved or have been only partially achieved. Particularly, decentralization and flattening of the hierarchy has not occurred. In fact many witnesses described a worsening of
bureaucracy and paperwork. Officer empowerment appears to have declined.

4. Some personnel practices present problems that could worsen with budget cuts. The absence of a performance evaluation system sharply limits the Bureau’s ability to expand, track and correct community policing practice with individual officers. Training, as it is now, is barely adequate for developing necessary community policing skills. Virtually all officers up and down the hierarchy mentioned the importance of training specific to community policing. Rewards and incentives that reinforce the importance of all officers adopting community policing practices are not evident. Directives and memos tend to be used in their place. Minority recruitment efforts continue to be unsuccessful.

5. Budget cuts will expose all the stress points of community policing. A partial list of cuts over the past several years includes the following:

- Reduction in number of desk clerks, with a corresponding reduction of precinct hours;
- Closure of the Citizen’s Academy;
- Closure of community courts in Northeast and Southeast Portland;
- Restriction of overtime;
- Non-implementation of a Portland-based police academy;
- Reduction of training opportunities;
- Loss of coordination and support for the Block Captain program;
- Reduction in the number of neighborhood district attorneys.

Overestimating the corrosive effect of these cuts is impossible. As one Police Bureau leader put it, even though the philosophy of community policing may remain the same, the community identifies community policing with visible programs, and many of those have disappeared. As further budget cuts become necessary, your committee is not confident that budgeting decisions will be guided by the intent to uphold community policing as the centerpiece of the Police Bureau’s operations.

In addition to the cuts already made, the development of an individual employee performance evaluation system and more thorough training will likely be postponed. Activities such as attending community meetings and researching patterns and causes of crime may someday be viewed as unsupportable luxuries. While many within the Police Bureau repeat the mantra that “community policing is resource intensive but not resource dependent,” this may be a distinction without a difference. Continually expecting the activities that are “resource intensive,” i.e., labor intensive, to function successfully with
COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

Conclusions

no possibility of expanding or re-allocating resources will likely lead to burnout or cynicism.

6. Many facets of the community policing infrastructure within the community have weakened. Community activism, as it relates to involvement in community policing, is down. Cynicism about community policing appears to have grown, particularly in minority communities. The Block Captain program, while supported by many in the community, is at risk of stalling without the resources and commitment to provide training and support.

7. A serious problem in leadership exists at several levels. City commissioners report hearing little about community policing, and in fact, unless there is a highly visible incident, they are barely aware of how community policing is faring. While Mayor Katz claims a commitment to community policing, your committee found little evidence in the interviews with the mayor and other city council members that she has a comprehensive vision for community policing in Portland. Nor does it appear that she actively promotes community policing with the other commissioners.

8. Current levels of relationship building and communication are insufficient to meet the community's expectation for policing in Portland. Chief Kroeker was hired, at least in part, because of his commitment to community policing and your committee does not doubt his sincerity. However, some of his actions have created skepticism about his commitment to community policing. He readily acknowledges that he is primarily interested in “results,” and he appears to be less interested in “process.” This means a lack of visibility in the community, weak systems for communication and relationship building, and little interest in shared decision making. This fundamental difference between Chief Kroeker’s view and the community’s view of community policing has not only led to tense relations between the two, it has also undermined the very outcomes Chief Kroeker supports.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Mayor

- Make community policing a higher priority for city government, not just the Police Bureau. Instruct every bureau to make cooperation with the Police Bureau a priority.
- Do more targeted advocacy for community policing. Use the vocabulary of community policing to reinforce the principle that community policing is the expected norm for policing in Portland.
- Contract for an ongoing qualitative assessment of community policing in Portland. Include an evaluation of police-community partnerships.
- Track qualitative and quantitative measures for community capacity i.e., neighborhoods’ willingness and ability to solve problems. These could be useful for homeland security issues as well as community policing.
- Set a minority-hiring target in the Portland Police Bureau and among the crime prevention specialists that is proportional to current population demographics for the city.

To Portland City Council

- Revisit City Council Resolution No 34627. Determine whether the identified outcomes accurately reflect current expectations. Develop expected outcomes for other city bureaus and agencies whose activities impact community policing. Ensure accountability for the success of community policing in bureaus and agencies, not just the Police Bureau.
- Become advocates for community policing. Establish expectations for maintaining the infrastructure of community policing even during budget downturns. Support this during the annual budgeting process.
- Review partnership agreements between the Police Bureau and other city bureaus and agencies under your control. Discard the obsolete, fix the broken, reinforce the importance of all.
- (Mayor Katz and Commissioner Leonard) Review the Crime Prevention Center, its duties, goal and objectives, outcomes, performance measures, funding and its relationship with the Portland Police Bureau. Improve coordination between the Office of Neighborhood Involvement and the Portland Police Bureau by having the manager of the Crime Prevention Center report to the mayor.
To the Multnomah County District Attorney

- Protect the neighborhood district attorney program and the community courts. Reinstate the neighborhood-based community courts as soon as possible. Rebuild the staffing of the neighborhood district attorney program.

To the Chief of Police

- Improve communication and community relations
  - Become a more visible advocate for community policing, both internally and externally.
  - Increase direct communication with community members. Revitalize the Chief’s Forum by defining meaningful roles for all participants, maintain a regular schedule and use a format that allows more opportunity for two-way communication.
  - Improve internal communication. Reduce dependence on videos for communication with Bureau employees.
  - Update the Bureau’s Web site regularly.
  - Increase support for the Block Captain program. Resolve confusion about roles, responsibilities and accountability. Seek funding for a volunteer coordinator.

- Expand the role of the officer
  - Loosen the organizational supervision process to allow flexibility and to encourage creative problem solving and appropriate risk taking.
  - Keep officers who are specifically engaged in community policing activities, e.g., senior neighborhood officers, neighborhood liaison officers, etc., in the same neighborhoods or precincts for at least two years.
  - Ensure that work schedules of senior neighborhood officers and neighborhood liaison officers are flexible enough to allow attendance at neighborhood meetings without requiring overtime pay.

- Enhance human resources management
  - Hire professional human resources staff and ensure that the values of community policing are incorporated into all personnel practices.
  - Assure that community policing skills are taught at every level of the Bureau—from new recruits to the command levels.
  - Attain the minority-hiring target set by the mayor.
- Ensure that every employee has a job description that reflects the Bureau’s expectations regarding community policing and that job descriptions are used in performance evaluations.
- Institute employee performance evaluations.
- Bring disciplinary process in line with community policing values, make it more timely and reduce the perception of unfairness.
- Ensure that criteria for promotions specifically include community policing skills, experience and successes.
- Develop a Police Bureau award for police officer(s) that specifically rewards community policing successes.

**Address workload issues**
- Increase the percentage of officers working in the precincts.
- Explore "civilianization" of non-sensitive police functions as a way to maintain community policing in difficult economic times. Civilians offer a lower-cost option for maintaining community policing.

**Improve planning and evaluation**
- Improve the Police Bureau’s strategic plan by showing a clear relationship between performance data and the strategies adopted. Prioritize strategies. Include a strategy for protecting community policing in the face of budget downturns.
- Develop qualitative measures of community partnerships and structures for shared decision making.
- Ensure that planning continues down the chain of command so that all managers and supervisors understand and support the Police Bureau’s priorities. Use the biennial employee survey to determine how well employees understand departmental priorities.

*To the Executive Director, Office of Neighborhood Involvement*

- Encourage and support a strategic planning process for crime prevention activities within the Office of Neighborhood Involvement.
- Together with the chief of police, seek funding for volunteer coordinators for Neighborhood Watch and Block Captain programs.
COMMUNITY POLICING IN PORTLAND

Your Committee

Respectfully submitted,

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Ruby Apsler
Jim Gorter
Kit Ketcham
Richard Meyer
Julie Sterling
Kristin Angell, chief writer
Meredith Savery, chair

Pauline Anderson, research advisor
Gil Johnson, research advisor

Wade Fickler, research director
IX. APPENDICES

A. INTERVIEWS

Katherine Anderson, Crime Prevention Specialist, Office of Neighborhood Involvement
Amy Banta, Deputy, Corrections Department, Multnomah Sheriff’s Office; volunteer, Crisis Response Team
Ed Blackburn, Director, Chemical Dependency Unit, Central City Concern
Gary Blackmer, City Auditor, City of Portland
Jane Braaten, Manager, Planning and Support Division, Portland Police Bureau
Richard Brown, Member, Chief’s Advisory Forum
Victoria Burton, Officer, Crisis Response Team, Portland Police Bureau
Don Clark, former Multnomah County Sheriff, former Chair, Multnomah County Board of Commissioners; former Executive Director, Housing Authority of Portland
Greg Clark, Assistant Chief of Operations, Portland Police Bureau (retired December 2002)
Kenneth Edwards, Crime Prevention Specialist, Office of Neighborhood Involvement
Joanne Ferrero, President, Central Eastside Industrial Council
Derrick Foxworth, Assistant Chief, Portland Police Bureau
Jim Francesconi, Commissioner, Portland City Council
Charlie Hales, former Commissioner, Portland City Council
Jim Hayden, Neighborhood District Attorney, Multnomah County
Donna Henderson, Captain, head of Personnel, Portland Police Bureau
(transferred to another position, February 2003)
Art Hendricks, Manager, Crime Prevention Center, Office of Neighborhood Involvement
Vera Katz, Mayor, City of Portland
Robert King, Detective, Portland Police Bureau; President, Portland Police Association
Mark Kroeker, Chief of Police, Portland Police Bureau
Julie Larson, Director, Project Respond
Bob MacKay, Research Associate, Portland-Multnomah Progress Board
Ray Mathis, Executive Director, Citizens Crime Commission (retired summer 2002)
Ed May, retired Commander, Central Division, Portland Police Bureau
Kimberly McClain, Chair, Montavilla Neighborhood Association
Scott Marcy, Finance Officer, Multnomah County Community District Attorney Program
Marsha Palmer, Supervisor, Community Support Unit, Planning and Support Division, Portland Police Bureau
Wayne Pearson, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Multnomah County
Susan Pearce, Chair, Hosford-Abernathy Neighborhood Development Association
Tom Potter, former Chief of Police, Portland Police Bureau
Brian Renauer, Professor, Administration of Justice, Portland State University
Dan Saltzman, Commissioner, Portland City Council
Darrel Schenck, Captain, head of Internal Affairs Division, Portland Police Bureau
Mark Sponhauer, Officer, Portland Police Bureau Training Division
Erik Sten, Commissioner, Portland City Council
Susan Teruya, Block Watch Captain, Outer Southeast Portland
Jack Wigmore, Coordinator, Referral Reception Center, New Avenues for Youth (no longer employed by New Avenues for Youth)
B. POLICE RIDE-ALONGS

Larry Anderson, Patrol Officer, Northeast Precinct, Portland Police Bureau
Steve Andrusko, Senior Neighborhood Officer, Central Precinct, Portland Police Bureau
Cliff Bacigalupi, Senior Neighborhood Officer, North Precinct, Portland Police Bureau
Randy Brandt, Senior Neighborhood Officer, East Precinct, Portland Police Bureau
(transfered summer 02)
Jeff Myers, Patrol Officer, Central Precinct, Portland Police Bureau (currently Senior Neighborhood Officer, Central Precinct)

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