1-1-2011


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10.15760/etd.723
African Regime Types and International Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations:
A Comparative Study of the Relationships of Friends and Enemies.

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Political Science

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Portland State University
2011
Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between regime types and international humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Investigating 12 African regimes, varying between the governing types of autocratic and democratic over the last 50 years, and three specific humanitarian INGOs, I search to see if there is one regime type that works the best with this type of INGO. Using INGO presence, amount of funding, and amount of volunteers from each INGO in each country, I measure the presence of INGOs in democracies and autocracies.

Compiling both an aggregate view of all 12 countries, and a disaggregate view of 4 individual countries, with investigative case studies, I discover that democracies are not the regime type that works the best with these INGOs. Contrary to the assumption made by most, that democracies do work best with humanitarian INGOs and should have the greatest INGO presence, I find this not to be the case. Rather, by grouping these regimes cohesively into four categories (autocracy, democracy, interruption, and transition), I find that democracy has the least amount of INGO presence, and very low numbers regarding the amount of funding and number of volunteers. Autocracies, interruption, and transition countries have greater INGO presence.

In addition, as this question evolved over the course of writing it, other questions had to be asked and other variables considered. Issues of access, demands and needs of a country, and the domestic political environment all had to be enveloped into this question.
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Acronym Guide

African National Congress (ANC)

Amnesty International: AI

Cooperative Assistance and Relief Everywhere: CARE

Democratic Republic of the Congo: DRC

Human Rights Watch: HRW

International Committee of the Red Cross: ICRC

International Humanitarian Law: IHL

International Monetary Fund: IMF

International non-governmental organization: INGO

Medecins San Fronteiras (Doctors without Borders): MSF

Multinational Corporations: MNC

Non-governmental organization: NGO

Oxfam International: OI

Peace Corps: PC

Red Cross: RC

World Bank: WB

World Council of Churches: WCC
CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction: Factors contributing to INGO growth.

This thesis explores the relationship between regime types and international non-governmental humanitarian organizations. This is to discover if there is a specific regime type that fosters the best relationship possible with these types of INGOs. The study of regime type has a long history in which regime types have been scrutinized, judged, categorized, and observed by various scientists. The study of regime type is important for obvious reasons, such as: to attempt to understand the nature and decisions of the rulers of a state; how regime type may affect domestic policy; how regime type affects the population and different groups of people living under its rule and; how regime type affects the international community and international policy.

Similarly, NGOs and INGOs are becoming increasingly important players in both the domestic and international fields. With their increasing presence also comes increasing influence and power, sometimes equal to the role of the state. What this means is that NGOs and INGOs are coming into frequent contact with the state, and with various regime types around the world. Not only is the number of NGOs and INGOs increasing, but the services they offer are vast, varied, and expanding. These organizations perform functions that stretch across the entire spectrum, from political to developmental to social to humanitarian services. This means that these organizations are encountering and working in similar fields as those of states. Therefore, states have to deal with the presence, services, and abilities of these organizations in not just one, but many areas. Depending on multiple factors, this can either cause contentious or harmonious relations to arise.
To expound further, INGOs have had a presence in the national and international communities for over two hundred years, but a large proliferation of INGOs has occurred in just the last two to three decades. In the early 1900s, there were fewer than 300 INGOs. That number has since grown; currently, there are more than 6500 INGOs (Karns and Mingst, 2004). There is a diverse array of INGOs around the world, each performing various activities and offering unique services. Additionally, as the world changes and evolves, INGOs find themselves to be changing in nature as well, having to adapt to the different demands and needs of the global community.

While INGOs have exploded onto the international scene and are proving to be versatile, regime types have also diversified, changed, and evolved over the last few centuries. Regime types can be ranged along a wide spectrum, from democracies to autocracies. In this thesis, regime types are not equated exactly to the idea of “state” but highlight the type of governmental regime in power. However, the terms regime and state will be used interchangeably here. Regimes have been a constant fixture in world history, harking back to the regime of the Holy Roman Empire, feudalism, and sovereign power. In some manner, regimes have been in place for the governance of territory and people (Spruyt, 1994). For example, regimes can be considered as democracies, semi-democracies, hybrids, dictatorships, military rules, authoritarian, etc. The difficulty often lies in determining what type of regime one is dealing with, as each can include many different elements and features (Diamond, 2002).

INGOs and regime types are both of great importance in the global arena. As the world has grown increasingly interconnected and complex, INGOs and regime types are experiencing closer and more frequent contact with each other. There appear to be three
key factors that have contributed to the proliferation and expansion of INGOs:
globalization; the end of the Cold War (with a focus on democracy, sustainability, and
development) and; complex humanitarian crises. These factors have created the need for
more INGOs to help countries that cannot help themselves.

The first factor concerns globalization and interdependence. With increasing
human connectivity, the state can no longer take part in or have total control over
everything that might occur within their borders. Coinciding with a decrease in control is
the revolution in communications, in which news and information can pass across the
globe almost instantaneously (Karns and Mingst, 2004). Flood, drought, civil war, piracy,
bombings, genocide, disease, and other disasters are no longer borne in isolation. What
may occur in a remote corner of the globe can be known worldwide in seconds and
NGOs can offer quick aid.

The second main factor offered to explain the growth of NGOs is with the end of
the Cold War, less attention has been given to security issues. Instead, there has been an
increase of focus on spreading democracy. Space was available for other issues to take
precedence (Karns et al., 2004). Consequently, once security became a less important
issue, organizations were sent to aid governments that were transitioning from
autocracies to democracies, to help with development and to increase stability. As NGOs
proved to be capable and successful in many situations, their funding increased and more
trust was placed in the abilities of NGOs. Therefore, instrumentally, these organizations
were a welcome addition to assisting and completing the goals on the international
community’s agenda (Heyse, 2006). The expansion of NGOs is also due to their growing
sophistication. In the early days of NGO creation, they were organizations that were
burdened by uncertainty, old and slow-moving technology, and staff who lacked sufficient training. Now, however, NGOs benefit from advanced technology, global positioning systems, rapid methods of deployment, and trained professionals. (Barnett, 2005)

The third main factor for NGO proliferation is what is known as “complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE)”. Emergencies are no longer considered to be those composed of a single factor. Rather, they encompass a “combustible mixture” of a variety of factors. CHE’s are now thought to be conflicts that “(...) involve a high degree of breakdown and social dislocation (...) requiring a systemwide aid response from the international community.” Some of the CHE’s that are included in this definition would be: state failure, displacement of refugees, and populations at risk from hunger, disease, and violence (Barnett, 2005).

In a similar vein, Shamima Ahmed uses the term complex political emergencies (CPE). These have the following characteristics: civil conflicts (long and short term) that revolve around ethnic, tribal, and religious animosities; disintegration of national governments in which public services disappear and political control passes to provincial governors and warlords; mass population movements (displaced persons trying to escape); economic destruction in the form of hyperinflation, failing currency, and collapse of markets (all scenarios which can be exacerbated by drought and food insecurity) (Ahmed, 2006). This is also a plausible explanation why NGOs have proliferated, as CHE’s and CPE’s require a multifaceted response with new kinds of interventions and assistance tools offered by many groups.
Another key factor, according to Julie Fisher (1998), is the political context, which is critical for the success of NGOs. The political context includes type of regime, political culture, the degree of state capacity to implement policy, and the degree of political stability. Dependent upon these circumstances, the government can respond to NGOs in a variety of ways. A government may fear NGOs because of the possible loss of state power that could occur. NGOs are capable of changing the status quo because upon entering into civil society, these organizations can mobilize large, often marginalized groups of people, and highlight questionable activities and tactics of the government. The people and the international community may begin to question the methods and validity of the government which can ultimately threaten the control and power of the state. If governments don’t fear NGOs, they can take advantage of them, manipulating their resources and personnel for military or security purposes. On the other hand, governments can also form a relationship with these organizations, either allowing them freedom to work in civil society or using them to enhance legitimacy, both nationally and internationally. Often times a state gains legitimacy if NGOs are allowed the latitude to enter and work within a country, as this is seen as a progressive, liberal, and democratic value. It is positively regarded by the international community for a country to allow multiple organizations to work within their borders, toward further development and progress or for major reforms (Fisher, 1998).

Therefore, NGO activity and presence has increased greatly over the years, as well as the information on the numbers and types of NGOs. Data from the Yearbook of International Organizations (2004), shows this dramatic increase in the number of INGOs. At the turn of the century there were no established INGOs, though a few IGOs
existed. In the early 1900s the number of INGOs grew to 150 and current day boasts around 6500 INGOs (Karns et al., 2004).

**Figure 1: NGO Growth in the Last Century**

![NGO Growth in the Last Century](image)

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INGOS and REGIME TYPES**

Of the research that has been done, much is slightly outdated and current research appears somewhat lacking, with several gaps in the data. Most of the literature discussing NGOs focuses on four topics. The literature tries to explain why NGOs exist, the expansion of NGOs in recent decades, the relationship between NGO characteristics and behavior, and the diversity within the NGO community (Heyse, 2006). There have also been internal studies done regarding more functional aspects of the NGOs. Many have
investigated such factors as the decision-making process and organization of NGOs. For example, much literature discusses the organizational, political, and administrative structures of these organizations. In addition, the activities of specific NGOs have been investigated, to understand the services they provide, as well as the norms and principals which they follow. All of these are worthy investigations, but provide a more practical and functional approach (Heyse, 2006).

Additionally, NGO and INGO influence is felt in many ways, at times bolstering the role of the state, while at other times threatening the states power. Moreover, these organizations are influencing policy and the domestic political environments and situations of the place they are in. NGOs can provide support for the state and the decisions and policies that are made. Those considered to be the elites of the community often have a direct link to those in government, voicing opinion and concerns of the different NGOs or INGOs that they might hold membership to and which carry weight in civil society. On the other hand, political, developmental, and social NGOs and INGOs can represent different groups of civil society, becoming embedded within civil society in which their role is to challenge the state. These types of NGOs and INGOs are often found at the grass roots level, raising awareness of contentious issues, providing a place for people to gather, highlighting transgressions by the state, and challenging the state by demanding or creating arenas for transparency and accountability. Whatever the underlying motivation for an NGO or INGO may be or however their presence might be interpreted or felt, these groups are gaining influence and power, with increasing interaction with the position of the state.
While NGOs tend to have an impact on the domestic level, they can also have an effect at the international level. Some INGOs, such as Save the Children, Cooperative Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Oxfam International, World Council of Churches, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, can have a very large international impact. If one or more of those organizations is operating in a specific country and reporting the condition of the people and the behavior of the regime, not only is the domestic situation affected but so too is the international community. If serious transgressions are occurring and made public, suddenly what were small, private, and domestic issues, have now caught the attention of the world. All of this is due to the work and persistence of an INGO. Thus, the relationship between these two players cannot be ignored or overlooked. Depending on the nature of their relationship, the effects could be felt domestically and internationally, with positive or negative repercussions.

Therefore, are the relationships between regime types and NGOs or INGOs mostly good? Moreover, are regimes influencing these organizations or is it the other way around? Are all groups in civil society being represented? Have the elites of the community taken over these organizations, under the guise that they are helping, but really only motivated by their own ambitions and wants? Are those at the grass roots and lower classes being adequately represented? Additionally, is it true that NGOs are positive influences, furthering democratization around the world? Are NGOs and INGOs always good or is this perspective biased due to a western liberal democratic ideology? Is there a predominant bias as the western world uses these organizations to spread democratic thinking and values?
More importantly, the focus on humanitarian organizations is a crucial one. First, there is not much that cohesively addresses the impact of humanitarian INGOs. However, this is a mistake. These types of INGOs are too important and their work too vital to overlook as they provide the services and aid that are most desperately needed during times of conflict and strife. These INGOs offer assistance, food, water, medical attention, shelter for refugees, and much more. They aid in times of natural and man made disaster and address the issues, materially and politically, of those in need of help. These organizations need to be looked at closely, to see if theirs is a good relationship with certain regime types.

On the other hand, is there a different relationship present due to different motivations? For example, do regimes work better and have better relationships with NGOs that are only in their country to advance the economic infrastructure of the country? If an NGO is focused on increasing the productivity and usable resources of a country, will a regime have a better relationship with that NGO, more so than with an NGO that is there to highlight any human rights abuses that may be occurring? Some INGOs focus on development of different organizations or groups of people within civil society or on issues of sustainability and economic growth. Other INGOs are known to be politically motivated, designed specifically to promote and support the democratic transition, consolidation, and growth in countries. Do these INGOs have a more successful relationship, even if a regime doesn’t want or necessarily agree with the political agenda of certain INGOs? Still others might be motivated to aid grassroots organizations or push certain international political agendas. All of these organizations have different goals and motivations in which they are geared to do specific work. If
regimes don’t work well with these types of organizations, or don’t allow for aid, why is this the case? This question is important, especially when thinking of the two recent situations in China and Burma where aid was denied or delayed during natural and man made disasters. Are these two countries simply outliers or is rejection of outside assistance more common than believed?

The relationship between humanitarian INGOs and regime types appears to be one of great importance and yet, very little has been studied or written about this specific dynamic. Most of the literature focuses on INGOs that are political or developmental in nature and there appears to be many gaps and indecision in the literature today. In what little has been written, a constant debate between various peoples and perspectives has manifested. The people who are discussing regimes, INGOs, and their relationship, fall into two groups. The first group encompasses those whose opinions oscillate. At one time they say democracies might be better but at another time, autocracies are better. No firm consensus can be reached. The other group is represented by those people that don’t oscillate. Democracies will always be the regime type best able to foster a good relationship. It now appears that the idea that democracies are the most likely regime type to foster a good relationship with humanitarian INGOs has become the automatic assumption.

**MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION**

The evolution of this research question stems from the desire to attempt to fill the gap in the literature, while also seeking to find if there is one specific regime type that works best with humanitarian INGOS. Should it be the assumption that democracies are
the (only) regime types that do foster the best relationship possible? As such, the research question of this thesis is the following: Is there a specific regime type that is best able to foster a good relationship with an international humanitarian organization (INGO)? Is this regime type always a democracy? Essentially, is one type of regime more accommodating or more willing to allow an INGO latitude to do its work? To discover if there is a certain regime type, this thesis proposes an investigation, looking at several variables, that measures the relationship between regimes and INGOs.

Specifically, this investigation will look at the international humanitarian organizations Doctors without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres [MSF]), Peace Corps (PC), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). These organizations being similar and different, will provide a compelling analysis. While the ICRC and MSF focus mostly on medical aid, all 3 organizations provide humanitarian aid that is not strictly medical. All conduct a variety of activities encompassed in the broad sphere of humanitarianism. A study of the different INGOs will consider the following: internal organization, capabilities, resources, activities, planning, development, deployment, principals, norms, funding, services, and size of the organizations. Also, are there any countries where INGOs are conspicuously absent? This is to gain the greatest understanding of how, when, why, and where these organizations have the most success.

The specific regime types will be those in the region of (mostly) Sub-Saharan Africa. This region will include the regimes in the following countries: Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This investigation will look at the features of the regime. For example, some of the following are important features to
consider: regime type found in each country; regime (electoral) organizational and administrative structure; free elections; one party versus multiparty; transparency; leader (leadership); etc.

Moreover, this thesis will encompass a brief historical analysis, investigating not only the regime types and INGOS that have been present in the countries mentioned above for the last fifty years, but the various circumstances of 4 of these countries, in specific case studies. Observing this period allows for many factors to be considered. For example, while there are different periods of internal conflict within a country, the proliferation of INGOs, and specific types of INGOs, has mainly occurred in the last 20 to 30 years. Some INGOs are known as “briefcase” INGOs; they respond only to immediate and urgent crises (Stoddard, 2006). Once those crises have been managed and dealt with, many INGOs will then depart from the location, to leave the situation in the hands of the government. This thesis needs to account for these INGOs as well as those INGOs considered “chronic”. These types of INGOs are involved not only in cases of emergencies, but they are also placed in countries to handle long term care, development, planning, and sustainability. They look to not only deal with the urgent issues at hand, but they attempt to figure out a way to reverse situations and create capable citizens. These INGOs seek to formulate new ways of life and develop new opportunities.

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The history and evolution of NGOs, which includes humanitarian organizations, has been rapid, complex, and rich in diversity and content. The relationships between INGOs and regime types are exceptional to observe and study and additional questions must be considered. Is it possible to see a historical trend of certain regime types that
have asked for help? Have there have been moments when regimes have blatantly refused help when offered? These additional questions are important for several reasons. Any discernible pattern may help uncover what type of regime is best for fostering a good relationship. By discovering this, it could be anticipated where INGOs will have the most success. Specific patterns could also be observed to indicate when a country is deteriorating and preemptive measures could be taken to avoid worst-case scenarios. Not only would early intervention be a possibility, but the international community and INGOs would know which regimes would be able to work well and cooperatively with those INGOs.

If there are certain observable patterns, one should also be able to see both the presence and absence of different features and elements of the regime (e.g.: corruption). This implies that successful features and elements could either be applied to other regimes or replicated to be used by regimes that are struggling. If this could be done, the worth, significance, value, and reason for attempting to answer this research question could be great. This could change both the course and ability of regime types and INGOs to better serve their citizens. This would allow the international community to step in sooner, to alleviate suffering, to ease pain, and to help those who are unable to help themselves.

If it is possible to discover that there is a certain regime type that is the most conducive for fostering good relationships, it will pave a path of hope for the future. The international community and INGOs would possess the knowledge that certain regime types are less restrictive and INGOs will be able to have more influence. With this knowledge, INGOs could enter a country being more prepared and ready for problems or
special circumstances that might arise. They will be more aware if they are entering into a friendly environment or not. Capabilities and resources would be put to the best use and possible early intervention could occur.

This research question is also important for another reason. It will allow us to see if the common belief is true, if democracies do work better with INGOs. If this turns out to be correct, why then would this be the case? What are the reasons, factors, or demands that allow for democracies to work best with humanitarian INGOs? Is it about social need or are there issues of access? Is it wrong to assume that democracies will work better with these organizations because most people equate higher levels of democracy with higher levels of civil society? If there is a higher level of civil society, is there less of a need for INGOs? Are democracies better equipped to deal with natural and man made crises? Are they better able to serve their people? Is it correct of us to assume that just because a regime looks democratic and meets certain western, liberal, democratic markers, that the regime is democratic and better able to care for its community? Is it simply the case that regime type is the only factor affecting and influencing INGO presence and/or success within their country? Are there other factors to consider?

What can be stated now is that it is incorrect to simply make this type of assumption. Empirical investigation, when possible, is needed to either support or refute this argument. At the most basic level, this is what this research question is trying to address. The rest of the thesis is presented in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews literature looking at several different subject areas including INGOs, African civil society, and regime types. This is followed by my theoretical assessment and hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses the research design and methodology while chapter 4 is descriptive in nature,
looking at the 3 INGOs chosen for this thesis. Chapter 5 is the analysis of the data and how I measure this relationship, as well as specific case studies. Chapter 6 provides alternative explanations for discussion, as well as a summary of what has been discussed, my basic argument and findings, as well as the limitations of this study and possible future avenues to pursue.

My initial findings suggest that this relationship is not as clear as previously thought. There are many variables to consider, especially regarding the aspects of a democratic political environment and the level of demand or need by a regime. According to my data analysis and case studies, democracies have the least interaction with humanitarian INGOs and thus, don’t necessarily have better relationships, but simply have fewer relationships with these organizations. This would suggest, due to many reasons, that democracies have less need, or demand less assistance or aid, for humanitarian INGOs. This raises the question of what about democracies and the democratic political environment makes this the case. This also raises the question of how is the relationship between other regime types and humanitarian INGOs? What are their specific needs and demands? What other factors need to be considered? While my findings remain somewhat inconclusive, they do suggest that every time the regime type and political context of a country need to be investigated to determine if a relationship is present and what kind of relationship that may be.
CHAPTER TWO:  
Literature Review and Theory  
INGOs and NGOs

There is a large amount of literature that discusses regime types, NGOs, and INGOs separately, but not a lot is discussed concerning the relationship between the two. Specifically when assessing this relationship between regime type and humanitarian INGOs, very little is said. Most literature focuses on political or developmental NGOs and INGOs and their relationship with the state. Many agree that there is no clear answer, while others would state that democracies simply work better.

Therefore, much of this literature review focuses on the many types and motivations of NGOs, INGOs, and regime types, and the ambiguity created by such a vast and varied community of organizations. Also mentioned are the issues unearthed when labeling regime types (e.g.: if democracies are actual democracies) and the unique situation of NGOs and INGOs, civil society, and regime types in Africa. While these discussions do not pertain directly to the research question, it is necessary to discuss the variations of these organizations and the difficulty labeling regime types. These are factors that contribute to why there might be a possible gap in the literature. When assessing the relationship, all these factors add several layers of complexity to the entire situation, as nothing is clear, concise, or holding the majority opinion.

Owing to the gap in the literature, political and developmental NGOs and INGOs and their relationship with regime types are reviewed here, as well as multinational corporations (MNCs). This is in an attempt to broaden the field of this investigation, to see if there are any visible patterns in the relationships between regime types and other organizations, as little is said about humanitarian organizations. The goal is to offer the
most complete picture of the situation and how these factors could affect the work of humanitarian INGOs and the relationship with different regime types.

INGO/NGO COMMUNITY

A possible reason for the gap in the literature may be because the focus is not on the impact or relationship of INGOs with regime types, but because the focus is elsewhere. This focus is on factors such as the different definitions, roles, categorizations, types, and challenges for NGOs. The ongoing debates regarding these factors are both helpful and harmful. They are helpful as they allow for a greater picture of the NGO community. They are harmful because so many people are saying different things, creating further confusion. This doesn’t allow for frequent agreement or consensus in the NGO community, but simply more information to unravel and understand. For example, definitions of NGOs all vary slightly. According to Heyse, NGOs are “not-for-profit, private, self-governing organizations aiming at ‘improving the life of disadvantaged people’” (Heyse, 2006). Karns believes NGOs to be “voluntary organizations formed and organized by private individuals, operating at the local, national, or international level” (Karns, 2004). Shamima Ahmed and David Potter adopt the UN definition that states NGOs are “any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental agreement” (Ahmed and Potter, 2006).

Part of the confusion also stems from the wide variety of different types of organizations (both non-governmental and governmental organizations) with different aims and goals, working nationally, regionally, and internationally. Below are examples of some of the different NGOs in the NGO community. This list is simply meant to highlight the vast variety of organizations, each with different motivation and focus:
AGO: anti-governmental organizations
TRANGO: transnational NGOs
GONGO: government-organized NGOs
GRINGO: government-regulated and initiated NGOs
BINGO: business and industry NGOs
DONGO: donor-organized NGOs
ODANGO: ODA-financed NGOs
FLAMINGO: flashy-minded NGOs (representing rich countries)
PO: people’s organizations
ONGO: operational NGOs
ANGO: advocacy NGOs
SMO: transnational social movements
GSM: global social movements
(Karns, 19)

There are also many ways to categorize or conceptualize NGOs based on their varying types and the diverse services they provide. Along with the traditional role which includes disaster and famine relief, NGOs also now focus on economic and social development. This can include the following: political roles of advocacy (lobbying); agenda setting; public education; monitoring international agreements and; interacting with intergovernmental organizations (Ahmed, 2006). Lester M. Salaman and Helmut K. Anheier suggest twelve “major activity groups” that NGOs are engaged in: culture and recreation; education and research; health; social services; environment; development and housing; law, advocacy, and politics; philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion; international activities; religion; business and professional associations and unions and; groups “not elsewhere classified” (Iriye, 2002). When specifically considering humanitarian organizations, due to such variety, some of the literature suggests labeling NGOs as hybrid organizations. No longer serving only one purpose,
this type of organization is one that combines both human rights and development (Nelson and Dorsey, 2008).

Other categorizations of NGOs are those that were seen during the early years of NGO birth and development. During this time, NGOs were as “apolitical” as possible and neutrality was a key principal (for some organizations, they claim it still is). “(...) apolitical is understood as those actions that are not intended to be the cause of suffering” (Barnett and Snyder, 2008). The second variation would then be political, with specific ambitions and goals (Barnett and Snyder, 2008). Therefore, one issue currently debated is if certain humanitarian organizations are truly neutral or have other ambitions, using political means to achieve certain goals.

Coinciding with this debate is another type of categorization which encompasses two different strands. These two strands are known as “Dunantists” and “Wilsonians.” The “Dunantists” are named after Henry Dunant, the founder of the ICRC and who some consider to be the patriarch of modern humanitarianism. These humanitarian organizations define “(...) humanitarianism as the neutral, independent, and impartial provision of relief to victims of conflict and believe that humanitarianism and politics must be segregated” (Barnett, 2005). This type of organization stresses neutrality, seeking to address the issues at hand without creating any further political conflict.

The “Wilsonians” follow the path laid by Woodrow Wilson. He believed that it was “(...) possible and desirable to transform political, economic, and cultural structures so that they liberated individuals and produced peace and progress, (...) and attack the root causes that leave populations at risk” (Barnett, 2005). This type of organization attempts to counter the immediate crisis while also attacking the underlying problems.
Essentially, these underlying problems could be politically based which means possible conflict between INGOs and the host government. This becomes a gray area in which boundaries are less well defined as to which activities are permissible (by both the INGO and the regime) and which are not.

Other categories of NGOs have also been created regarding their relationship to the state. For example, NGOs can be seen as structures that are either competing with, paralleling, preexisting the state, or structures of the state itself (Aeberhard, 1996). This proves to be a significant grouping. Depending on if an NGO is competing, paralleling, preexisting, or a part of the state structure allows or disallows the NGO (and a government) to do its work efficiently and successfully. While no one specific categorization claims to be dominant, this is meant to illustrate the diverse categorization methods that have been employed to provide some kind of ordering system for NGOs.

One intriguing and important facet of NGO development has to do with the role of the state and the changing nature of the international system. Since 1648, the international community has operated under the Westphalian State system. This was decided upon by the international community after the Thirty Years War. Since that moment in history, the international community has (for the most part) strictly adhered to this overarching rule that internal sovereignty will be respected.

Nevertheless, there has been increasing complexity, confusion, and blurring as to the role of the state and the idea of sovereignty. Due to this blurring of responsibility, NGOs find themselves increasingly intervening and occupying more space domestically and internationally. According to R.J. Vincent (1975), intervention is “Activity undertaken (...) which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a
discrete event (...) is it not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations” (R.J. Vincent 1975, as cited by Bellamy and Wheeler, 2001).

However, this intervention can prove to be contentious in two ways. First, unless bound by treaty or convention (such as being a member signed to the Geneva Conventions), states (regimes) have to either give consent for help or aid to enter into their country, or they have to ask for help. Help and aid cannot be forced into a country. Additionally, while aid cannot be forced into a country, tension between NGOs and governments is still a possibility once NGOs have entered. This tension can arise because as organizational entities, NGOs are still subject to the rules and laws of the country in which they are operating. Therefore, in some countries, NGOs have a great amount of freedom and latitude while in others they might be severely restricted. In others, such as Myanmar, NGOs have a more limited role (Karns et al., 2004).

Second, humanitarian organizations assert that rights and values are intrinsic in all humans, simply because of their humanity. Value for human beings is found independent of the state. With this assertion, a set of claims are made that can counteract the claims made by the state. This implies that the agenda a state pursues must recognize not only national interests but the interests of its people. To some degree, this claim can constrict the state and limit its sovereignty and freedom (Finnemore, 1999). Thus, it is a delicate and changing relationship that has evolved over the years between NGOs and the state.

The relationship between NGOs and the state has also been influenced and challenged by several other factors, as well as operational and ethical obstacles. Some of these obstacles are due to the constant changing nature of the international system. For
example, globalization is driving the world to becoming increasingly connected, where space, time, and distance are shrinking. People, objects, and commodities are in more frequent and close contact to the other. News is known within seconds all around the world and political, cultural, and economic variables are interlacing in a complex web across the globe. These interlacing factors challenge the roles and boundaries of both NGOs and the state, as both have to deal with increasing and complex challenges (Iriye, 2002).

Moreover, there has been an increase in new waves of complex emergencies. These types of emergencies are multifaceted and tend to have a multitude of causes and consequences. For example, a drought or famine in one country can cause different parties to fight for food and water, which could lead to war, displacement of peoples, and refugee overflow into other countries. There are new forms of global poverty as well, due to a declining capacity of national governments to deal with these complex issues. Global institutions have also come under attack and shown weakness, as there have been new global pressures for accountability and efficiency (Lindenberg, 2001).

Obstacles are also found within the NGOs themselves. Factors such as the resources and man power available, as well as the legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of the NGOs all play a crucial role in the relationship between NGOs and the state (Lindenberg, 2001). Therefore, the changing international world, NGOs as organizations and self operated entities, and the relationship between NGOs and regime type, have all witnessed multiple changes and challenges which continue to make this field of study diverse and intriguing.
Finally, there is another possible reason why the literature discussing NGOs seems incomplete. Scholars use international relations theories to not only describe, explain, and predict various aspects of international relations, but for theories of global governance (Karns, 2004). The three major theoretical camps in international relations are liberalism, realism, and radicalism (Marxism). With the end of the Cold War a serious challenge was presented to international relations theorists, as the world paradigm shifted. As such, the discipline has become fragmented, with no dominant theory. This affects the study of NGOs because no one theory is used to study them, and many of the international relations theories used today seem an ill fit. Scholars and theorists appear unable to decide how to best investigate, measure, and judge NGOs in the international sphere (Ahmed, 2006).

According to Ahmed (2006) two approaches, to the study and understanding of NGOs, appear somewhat more compatible than others. One is liberalism, a theory that emerged out of interdependence theory, to broaden the study of international politics beyond the scope of the state. This theory posits that the international society and the relationships between countries are compiled of many more actors than just the state. Other actors, entities, persons, and organizations need to be considered. While this theory doesn’t focus exclusively on NGOs, it argues that there needs to be space in international relations theories for their growing importance. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Jacobson make the following comment:

The traditional view of the international system as hierarchical and focused almost exclusively on states has evolved into one that is nonhierarchical. While sovereign states continue as principal actors, and as the only ones that can levy taxes, and conscript and raise armies, these functions have declined in importance relative to newly important issues, such as environmental protection and sustainable
development. There are now many actors in addition to states: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations, enterprises, other non-state actors, and individuals... Nonstate actors are performing increasingly complex tasks, especially in the newer issue areas (Ahmed 2006, as cited by Weiss and Jacobson).

The second approach Ahmed believes could clarify what NGOs do in international politics is constructivism. Essentially, this sociological and philosophical approach emphasizes the importance of the interactions between individuals and institutions and the affect these interactions have on interests. Constructivists believe that interests, identities, and roles are socially defined. “[the] analysis focuses attention on ideas, norms, epistemic communities, global civil society, and regimes - areas of international politics most conducive to the exercise of NGO influence” (Ahmed, 2006). Therefore, constructivists believe that a state’s interests aren’t fixed but are malleable, able to be shaped and formed. NGOs are able to do that and wield influence at the state level. This has the potential to change the way the international sphere not only looks, but operates.

Consequently, while Ahmed believes these two approaches might be best suited to study and explain the NGO community, there still appears to be a lack of consensus about which theory to use. This indecision not only leads to gaps in the literature, but increases the complexity in this field of study. Therefore, it is entirely possible that this will remain a convoluted field, until some sort of agreement is reached on how best to study NGOs.

Marc Lindenberg and Coralie Bryant also see large gaps in the literature. Due to the multifaceted world of INGOs, the impact of those organizations has yet to be
adequately addressed or investigated. Lindenberg and Bryant believe that much of what is written about NGOs focuses on what they are doing, but little investigates the process of NGOs and how that affects the product, or final result (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001).

Paul Nelson and Ellen Dorsey also agree. Much has been done to study the functions and methods of NGOs, but little on their affect (Nelson, 2008). Akira Iriye also feels that the world’s focus has been elsewhere and this is perhaps why the literature regarding NGOs is not as extensive as it could be, despite the growing number, impact, and influence of NGOs. One reason is that the preoccupation of historians, scientists, and politicians has, until recently, been focused on state-centered activities, strictly those of a political, military, diplomatic, and economic nature. As Iriye states:

> Writers have focused on such themes as diplomacy, the rise and fall of great powers, the causes of wars, and the origins of the First (or the Second) World War ... so long as one continues to be fascinated by these topics, and of course they remain legitimate objects of scholarly inquiry - it will be easy to neglect international organizations, dismissing them as irrelevant to the diplomatic and military dramas being played out by the states (Iriye, 2002).

**AFRICA: NGOs and CIVIL SOCIETY**

While the previous section discussed the many facets of the NGO community, this section offers a general overview of NGOs and Africa. The relationship between international humanitarian organizations and regime type appears not to be a primary area of concern. While specifically investigating Africa, the most common theme found was the role of NGOs in civil society and their influence on democratization. Again, no firm consensus has been reached but rather, there are continued competing perspectives. One side argues that NGOs have and do help democratization in African countries. This side states that these countries, due to colonization and internal warfare and strife, have not
been able to further democracy on their own. Instead, additional outside help was and still is necessary for this process. The other side would state the NGOs have been harmful in the democratization process, infusing African countries with western, liberal ideals and goals, pushing the agenda of the West. This side suggests that the people of Africa have had little say in how political development has progressed in their countries. Therefore, this deserves mention here as international humanitarian organizations work within the sphere of civil society and have multiple interactions with the democratization process.

Philippe Schmitter surmises the following about NGOs and civil society:

[NGOs] are intermediary organizations and arrangements that lie between the primary units of society - individuals, families, clans, ethnic groups of various kinds, village units - and the ruling collective institutions and agencies of the society. They occupy a special place. They are integral, in short, to civil society. NGOs differ in principles, membership, and goals ... they seek to benefit society without necessary direct benefit to themselves (Welch, 1995).

Most agree that NGOs enjoyed a rapid expansion in Africa during the mid 1980s. By the mid 1990s, NGOs had expanded unpredictably in Africa. Common belief is that this expansion was due to two reasons. First, African governments were unable to handle the basic demands of the government process. Many NGOs were established out of desperation as governments were unable to provide or maintain basic services. This became especially evident during the 1970s. Worsening terms of trade increased already poor economic situations while also creating increased dependence upon international financial institutions. Africa needed the help of the voluntary sector as governments proved incapable (Pinkney, 2009).
Second, the expansion of Western ideology was important. NGOs grew strong in the West, as more attention and time was given to the development of the voluntary sector, as the state’s interests were focused on security and other issues in the global arena. NGOs were able to portray virtues enhanced by Western ideology, goals, values, and ideals. NGOs became important vehicles, as the state needed others to push the West’s global agenda and to pursue political and developmental goals. The Washington consensus helped to solidify these ideas as the consensus believed the voluntary sector was “administratively and morally superior to the state sector.” This consensus encouraged aiding third world countries that needed economic and developmental assistance. This appeared starkly evident in Africa, as countries were in economic decline and governments were unable to contend with multiple difficulties and increased demands by the African people. Western NGOs were able to fill the void and offer assistance, with more mobility and flexibility than Western states had at that time (Pinkney, 2009).

In this arena too, the relationship between NGOs and regimes remains unclear. Stephen Ndegwa finds that while intentions may be good, NGOs operating in the civil societies of African countries don’t always further democratization. He sees NGOs as two-faced, those actively opposing the state and furthering democracy and those accommodating the repressive state. At the same time, Ndegwa, quoting Larry Diamond states, “... civil society has become the cutting edge of the effort to build a viable democratic order” (Ndegwa, 1996). Additionally, the most outspoken advocates of democratization and opponents of authoritarianism in African countries have been voluntary and associational groups.
E. Gyimah-Boadi also finds the influence and impact of NGOs in civil society to be ambiguous. He believes, like Ndegwa, that there are two sides to consider. Opposition parties have become eager to support antiauthoritarian and democracy promoting regimes and use them for their benefit. However, the government also plays a role by attempting to co-opt and control those groups. Gyimah-Boadi finds that the autonomy, independence, and integrity of civil society organizations are typically threatened in one way or another and thus, not always able to implement democratic reform (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

Philippe Schmitter also finds civil society and NGOs having a precarious and often tenuous position in the democratization process. According to Schmitter, civil society can contribute to democratization in multiple ways. Civil society can stabilize expectations and social bargaining which means civil society can, by simply having a voice, make demands and highlight issues that need to be addressed and/or changed. Just by having a civil space in which to freely operate, civil society is able to generate a more civic normative environment which can then bring actors closer to the political process. Civil society also reduces the burdens of governance by taking on some of those responsibilities, while at the same time check potential abuses of power and act as a watchdog of the government.

However, Schmitter also notes that civil society can impede consolidation in other ways. Civil society can make political majorities more difficult to form, simply by trying to represent all the varied groups within civil society. With so many groups demanding changes and wishing to voice their opinion, this can exacerbate ethnic divisions and create pork-barrel politics, which can then entrench certain socioeconomic
biases. This can cause an unfair distribution of resources and certain influences to carry more weight than others (Schmitter, 1997). In addition, civil society needs a strong relationship with the state for consolidation of democracy. If institutions are unable to work with and accommodate NGOs working for democracy, or don’t allow for public space in which to facilitate the democratic process, civil society can remain weak (Diamond, 1996).

Claude Welch relates this directly to human rights and humanitarianism in Africa. Welch also finds tension between African governments and NGOs, as NGOs attempt to protect their autonomy and the state attempts to control them. When considering human rights, when NGOs monitor and report on governments’ human rights abuses, this is even more true. Welch notes that contemporary Africa is very different from other regions:

Because of the limits of civil society and to the power of the governments ... because of the shallow penetration of society by weak state institutions, there is a relatively larger realm of unoccupied political space in Africa than anywhere else in the world. This presents challenges and opportunities to NGOs. The quality of leadership, strategies selected, and the resources and organizational maneuvering room available limit what they can accomplish (Welch, 1995).

Welch and the others seem to find the influence and impact of NGOs in the consolidation of democracy to be middling, due to the dual nature of NGOs, weak civil societies, and state institutions.

In opposition, Robert Pinkney believes that for most part, NGOs are doing good work in Africa and the “missionary spirit” to improve the lives of African people continues. While African governments still continue to question the right of foreigners to interfere in their affairs, and Western governments continue to question the wisdom of funding countries that may support neocolonial or authoritarian policies, NGOs do
provide valuable services. They promote development, provide relief and aid, and take some of the burden off both African and Western governments. NGOs can’t be regarded as substitutes for political parties but can push public authorities towards addressing the needs and injustices that may be occurring (Pinkney, 2009).

REGIME TYPES

The literature investigating regime types is vast and the classification of regime types has been undertaken by many. Nevertheless, these various classifications make it difficult to state if a regime type is, for example, purely autocratic or purely democratic. Perhaps there are no pure democratic or autocratic regimes. However, this ambiguity might lead to being unable decisively state if humanitarian INGOs work best with democracies, if it is not possible to label a regime as being completely democratic? This is especially important to remember when discussing the countries within Africa that have been labeled as democratic. Many of these countries are very young democracies and despite being labeled as democratic, they still might maintain autocratic tendencies.

According to Larry Diamond, regimes are neither one type or another, but should be considered along a spectrum. There is such variety in regime types that it is no longer accurate to simply apply a label of democratic or non democratic. For example, the following are some labels that have been used when describing regime types: democratic, autocratic, authoritarian, despotic, dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian, absolutist, traditional, monarchic, oligarchic, plutocratic, aristocratic, and sultanistic. These can then be broken down into further subtypes (Schmitter and Karl, 1996). Therefore, there are a plethora of different regime types in the world, many of which that seem to always be making slight adjustments and changes.
In Africa, this is no exception as there are many different types of regimes. To offer the greatest understanding, it is necessary to be aware of the transition that Africa has undergone with democratization and the changing regime types. Samuel Huntington discusses three different waves of democratization, with the world currently in the third wave. African countries are part of the third wave and Huntington gives the following five reasons contributing to the occurrence and timing of this third wave: “the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values are widely accepted; the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s; a striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic church, which manifested as being opposed to authoritarianism; changes in the policies of external actors and; “snowballing” or the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization” (Huntington, 1996).

Despite the changes and consolidation of democracy for many countries, some countries have struggled, even experiencing a reversal away from democracy. A majority of those countries that have struggled with democracy and appear to have reverted to other forms of governance are found in Africa. Huntington believes this is due to a lack of political will and continued bad political leadership (Huntington, 1996).

E. Gyimah-Boadi agrees with Huntington that some African countries did initially show signs of progress, but that many have experienced a backslide. He gives a more detailed analysis of the political transition that African countries have recently experienced. He states that Africa has experienced a “second liberation”, with an end of formal single party rule and military dictatorships in many African countries. This has been complemented by the emergence of multiparty politics and competitive elections.
There has been a renewed interest in constitutionalism, a surge in civil society, emerging parliamentary systems, formal processes to semi-democratic governments, political reforms, advocacy for human rights, and a decrease in corruption (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

While there have been advances, there are several reasons why some countries have fallen away from democratic tendencies, and into other regime types. First, democratization missed some of the large and important African countries (e.g.: Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and in some countries where democratization did occur, it appears to have since stagnated. Africa’s new legislature remains deficient, autocrats have not relinquished control over the constitution making process, antidemocratic laws have been retained, and overall standards of democratic performance are low. Incumbent regimes and a machismo culture still exist, both factors that continue to perpetuate authoritarian values and traits. When there is the occasional show of democracy, it tends to be without any real democratic tendencies. Elections are often rigged and political involvement by the public remains low. Weak party development and an unstable infrastructure contribute to democracy still being a transitional process for many (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). What this implies is that African regimes vary by degree and in manner, all experiencing different levels of governance. This is important as one considers the relationship between regime type and international humanitarian organizations.

When considering regime type, one cannot overlook the explanation offered by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink. These authors believe in a more constructivist approach, which states that democracies might work better with INGOs due to the influence of actors and
institutions, domestic and international variables, and the implementation of norms. The international community and the principles articulated in the Declaration of Human Rights could be changing the general perceptions of countries regarding human rights norms by persuasion and raising moral consciousness. There could be a linked process between international mobilization around international human rights norms and those norms found at the domestic level. Essentially, they look to see if countries are being socialized to treat their people better. This is due, in part, to NGOs and INGOs highlighting the gap between rhetoric and reality of the government. If this gap is found to be present in any manner, these organizations, if allowed the space to do so, could demand change. (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999)

These authors believe that the literature is underspecified as to the causal mechanisms by which human rights norms spread. Nothing decisive has been stated about these possible causal mechanisms. Rather, the literature is very general and vague concerning how human rights norms may spread. They concur that the diffusion of international norms in human rights areas depends on domestic and transnational actors who connect with international regimes, alerting Western public opinion and governments. These norms have special status because they prescribe rules for appropriate behavior in the international community and help to define identities of liberal states. At the most fundamental level, good human rights performance is a crucial sign to identify a state as democratic and liberal. Therefore, if a country has been more amenable and open to the socialization and influence of the international community and
the norms it sets forth, there might be an increase in INGO and NGO presence in that country.

The authors focus on three key areas during the socialization of countries: instrumental adaptation, moral discourse, and institutionalization and habitualization. Reasons why democracies or those recently transitioned to democracies might be more agreeable to INGO presence is first due to instrumental or strategic motivation. Regimes could simply want to change their human rights norms and how they treat their populace because they are in need of resources or materials. They could also want to gain more favor with the international community, or be better liked. Typically, the first signs of change can be found for these reasons. Although these might not be the best underlying reasons for initial change, the key point is that change is occurring. This starts the process of domestic structural change and democratization. The transformation of identity has begun and these can later be more fully and permanently integrated into society.

Second, a moral dialogue about the norms they are promoting begins between the international community, INGOs, and the specific regime. This dialogue can include many factors, such as persuasion, shaming, and moral consciousness-raising. This dialogue, along with instrumental and strategic motivation, eventually can lead to greater institutionalization and habitualization of norms. This implies that a norm not only expresses a belief but creates the impetus for consistent behavior, where norms are simply ingrained in society and considered normal. They become taken for granted and depersonalized, an act done out of habit. (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999)
Checkel supports this viewpoint with additional stress on domestic structures and the institutionalization of a country. While the international community carries much influence, how a specific regime responds and adapts is largely dependent upon what is occurring within that country. What are the structures and institutions already set in place? What is the dialogue occurring between actors? How adaptable and flexible are the institutions and actors to change? Depending on these factors, the ability for a regime to change and/or create new policy is different for each, determined by domestic and political contexts (Checkel, 1997).

The interpretation is that most of these changes, with INGOs highlighting reality, is more often allowed in those countries most willing to emulate and take on values driven by the international community. These are countries that are democratic or wishing to emulate democratic norms (which include human rights). Therefore, another argument is that democratic countries tend to be more amenable and open to the ideas that are posited by the international community and at the domestic level, more willing to allow for such organizations that address social needs.

**Political and Developmental NGOs/INGOs and Democracy**

Finally, the following authors investigate different aspects of NGOs, INGOs, and multinational corporations (MNCs) in context with different regime types. They offer valuable arguments regarding political and developmental NGOs and INGOs in different situations, dealing with different regime types. As little is said about humanitarian INGOs, I want to discover if there is an agreement among these scholars, as to the regime
type that works the best with these organizations. Perhaps some conclusions could be
drawn from then when assessing humanitarian organizations.

Emilie Jelinke looks at political and developmental NGOs working in
Afghanistan. Jelinke assesses the success the NGOs have had, as well as their
relationship with the previous and current regimes, and finds the situation to be tenuous.
A difficult working environment, has produced both positive and negative results with the
work done by the NGOs. Most challenging to fostering a good relationship is that the
roles and boundaries are blurred between non-government and government actors.
Jelinek has found that the government is misinformed as to the ability of NGOs,
heightened by a general distrust of foreigners. Complicating these issues is a frustrated
populace and NGO community, feeling as though the government is not doing enough.
Overall, there needs to be much more communication and trust between all actors
involved. As this is not the case, currently NGOs find themselves very limited, facing
governmental obstacles, as they feel their position and authority is being challenged. In a
country that has little experience working with NGOs and INGOs, there continues to be
struggles (Jelinek, 2006).

David Fisher suggests that perhaps the quality of a relationship between NGOs
and INGOs is more due to functional barriers that might be put in place by the regime
type. Some of these barriers include the following. First, the capability and willingness of
domestic authorities to work with these organizations. Domestic authorities might feel as
though their position and control of the situation is being threatened by outside aid and
could prove unwilling to work with INGOs, as they don’t wish to lose their power.
Second, often there is a lack of regulated rules, rules that are simply regarded as the set
standard and everyone follows. Lack of regulated rules and adhering to one set of rules is especially an issue when discussing international humanitarian law during disaster scenarios and the willingness of regimes to follow IHL guidelines. The IHL guidelines, set by the ICRC, are the rules typically followed by the majority of the international community, but not every country follows these rules and as different situations arise, so do different responses to those crises. This means that there is not a committed adherence to the IHL guidelines and countries often do what they see is best regarding crises.

Third, questions of legal personality and fear of expulsion may arise, as well as functional problems such as entry into the country, renewing visas, and the importation of goods and aid. (Fisher, 2007) For example, as seen in Burma and China, the military junta and autocratic regime types, respectively, blocked or delayed aid for multiple reasons. When aid was allowed in, there were several issues of distribution and efficiency in helping the citizens of those countries. Due to the various barriers put in place by these two countries, many people suffered unnecessarily.

Bratton and Van de Walle believe that the transition in Africa, away from one party rule and military regimes and towards democratization, could explain why democracies might work better with NGOs and INGOs. They surmise how the transition took place can account for the relations between INGOs and democracies. Coupled with this is recognizing the importance of domestic political factors and outside influences on regime transitions. There were several phases of regime transitions. These transitions included crises of political legitimacy which led to public protest and confrontation, until enough pressure was given to change the situation. However, the key moment for Bratton and Van De Walle was when the public protested. In this moment, many diverse groups
of people banded together, to fight the current military or autocratic rule. When the protests didn’t dissipate or decrease, political liberalization by the government began. In that moment when different groups of people joined in protest, including NGOs, a space opened and there was a compatibility found between these groups, civil society, and NGOs. This space allowed for protest and voices to be recognized and heard (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).

Eve Sandberg also believes that there is a gap in the literature but confirms NGOs and INGOs as being influential during the democratization process. In addition, she believes that NGOs can and do affect state legitimacy. Therefore, those regimes not concerned about their legitimacy will not feel as threatened and will allow for the presence of these organizations. Thus, democracies would appear to be the better fit (Sandberg, 1994).

Jeffery Leonard\(^1\) investigates if MNCs warp politics and/or affect policy in developing countries. He determines there are many variables which contribute to a MNC having a positive or negative affect. He cites such factors as industry type, past and

\(^1\) While searching for patterns between autocracies and democracies, other organizations different from NGOs or INGOs were investigated. This was an attempt to see if anything had been written about the relationship between MNCs, regime types, and democracy and if this could then be applied to NGOs. However, even when investigating MNCs on this broader scale, there was nothing substantial that could be determined. Most of what is currently being discussed regarding MNCs is the constant debate about whether democracies or autocracies are better for foreign direct investment (FDI) flow. The consensus is that democracies are better for FDI. Jensen cites that democracies tend to be more “market friendly” and enhance stability of economic policy. In addition, democracies are better known for their system of checks and balances, creating incentives, ability to replace leaders, veto players, and the ability to prove to have credible commitments to secure investments (Jensen, 2003).
present relationships between country and company, resources and economic conditions, bargaining and conflict, impact of modernization, and political manipulation. However, he also acknowledges that nothing decisive can be stated. There are too many variables to consider, all of which could have an affect on the relationship between a MNC and regime (Leonard, 1980). Still, others look at the physical proximity and interdependency of states and how those have an affect on the relationship between MNCs and regime type, but with little consensus (Gleditsch, 2002). Despite this additional foray investigating MCNs, it doesn’t appear that this relationship can be useful, as no patterns were found that could be applied to the relationship between humanitarian INGOs and regimes.

Therefore, the literature review includes many areas of focus and all are important for grasping the largest understanding possible. The true affect of NGOs and INGOs and their relationship with various regimes remains unclear, due to layers of complexity found among these organizations, as well as the difficulty when labeling regime types. The unique history and situation of African countries also contributes to this confusion, as well as the void in the literature regarding humanitarian INGOs. Even when discussing political or developmental NGOs and INGOs, and MCNs, there is much indecision, or the belief is that democracies work best with these organizations, both tenuous arguments. The next section delves into different possibilities as to why the assumption that democracies work best with humanitarian INGOs is made. Different factors and demands are considered as to why there might be more or less INGO presence in democratic or autocratic countries.
Theory

To reiterate, the purpose of this research investigation is to see if it can be decisively stated if there is one specific regime type that fosters the best relationship with a humanitarian INGO. I believe, as mentioned previously, that humanitarian INGOs are hugely important and appear to be somewhat overlooked when considering their impact. These organizations provide foundational services to aid those in need.

Contributing to this interest is the dilemma, as can be seen from the literature review, that very little has been written about humanitarian INGOs and their relationships with specific regime types. They are, of course, discussed in other ways, but little is said from this perspective. Rather, the bulk of the material investigated concerns the relationship between political or developmental NGOs and INGOs. When the gap in the literature is addressed, it seems to be filled with either confusion and indecision, or the forgone conclusion that democracies work better. Hence, I wish to see if I can fill that gap and if this is true. Do democracies work better with these organizations and why might this be the case? What is it about democratic political environments and the services offered by these organizations that allow for a good relationship? What are the demand factors that lead to having INGO presence in a country? Is this question an issue of access or need? Moreover, does civil society play a greater role than anticipated? Do higher levels of civil society indicate that there is less need for these types of organizations? Does this imply there is less need for NGOs and INGOs in democracies, due to a supposed higher level of civil society, and consequently, these organizations are simply less active there?
The services offered by these organizations are vast and different and address various areas of need. Therefore, it should first be discussed why democracies, or the democratic political environment, appear as the most obvious choice, as there are several factors that could contribute to this assumption. One must also consider the odd balance between two competing factors. What contributes to a democratic political environment that easily allows access by these INGOs, and supposedly contributes to a greater level of civil society than autocracies? In the same sense, could this create a situation in which there is greater access but really less social need for their assistance? What are the conditions that stipulate access versus need or demand?

There are many factors contributing to a democratic political environment which could suggest why they might work best with humanitarian INGOs. Some factors could include the level of access allowed by a regime or the level of civil society in which greater levels of civil society might have less need for INGO presence. First, the general characteristics attributed to democracies are typically such things as tolerance, moderation, willingness to compromise, respect for opposing viewpoints, and greater voice allowed for citizens (Diamond, 1996). These are the traits that are valued in most democratic environments. These are the values that are to be emulated, the values that a country which is transitioning to a democracy wish to emulate. These characteristics are what people look for and expect to be present within countries labeled as democracies. Similar expectations are those set by the Freedom House political and civil liberties standards, which are the following:
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state (Freedom House, 2010).

Therefore, these characteristics are supposedly built upon a certain type of infrastructure within these countries. There are institutions and a civil society that focus on allowing for their peoples needs to be heard and met. Moreover, humanitarian needs can be addressed, either by the regime or INGOs. Citizens are able to voice concerns, which could include receiving assistance from INGOs. Civil societies of democracies allow for INGOs to do their work successfully and the working environment is easier due to greater trust and willingness of officials and citizens.

Democracies typically are not, as autocracies might be, worried about losing control or sharing power. Democracies are the accepted regime type of the international community, and what, at least according to western liberal bias, countries should strive to be. Whether this bias is accepted or not depends on individual countries and the international community as a whole. By becoming more democratic, there is a sense of security and reassurance that the country and regime should not feel threatened by other organizations entering their domain (Jelinik, 2006).

With democratic institutions and thought as the foundation, there are usually greater checks and balances put in place. This implies that there is typically less corruption with the government and officials are held accountable. Funds and access are allowed and distributed properly and there is no one person or one party to slow down the
process or even deny aid. Moreover, due to feeling secure and not feeling threatened by other organizations, as a member of the international community, the democratic state tends to allow for influence by international factors. As such, international society has to an extent created certain norms about humanitarianism and human rights. The common belief is that democracies are more willing to adhere to these norms than other regime types. Finally, and a more functional component, is that with democracies there are typically less issues regarding bureaucratic delays, customs barriers, visas, taxation of aid, questions of legal personality, entry, importation of goods, and medical qualification, all issues that could slow or deny humanitarian aid. (Fisher 2007)

These are all legitimate and common factors used to explain why democracies might be the regime type that is best able to foster a successful relationship with a humanitarian INGO. The western liberal democratic world does have certain expectations and standards to be met to be considered democratic. If these conditions are met, essentially it is assumed that democracies would be more willing to work with humanitarian INGOs and that the relationship would be good. There are institutions, checks and balances, transparency, accountability, responsibility, and general concern for the citizens of that state. It makes perfect sense why democracies are thought to be best suited to work with these organizations and why there would be less issues of access into a country and less INGO presence required.

There are also some other factors to consider, along with specific regime type, as to why INGOs are present and working well in a country. These factors consider the need for these types of INGOs. Depending on the type and capabilities of a regime, there could
be more or less need for assistance. These are also additional demand factors which could
necessitate or demand INGO presence. In a general sense, depending on the situation
within a country, there are several factors that could facilitate and/or increase the demand
for INGOs.

First, what has been (or is) the need or demand for INGOs to enter a country? What are (if any) the development and economic problems specific to one country? Depending on the levels of development and economic success of a country, if these are low or not progressing, there will be greater need for INGO interference. Industrialization (types of industry), modernization (degree and level of), institutionalization (political and social institutions), and resources of a state are important variables in both the development and economic spheres of a country. The state may be unable to provide the resources and infrastructure in which to have successful development of their country and additional help is necessary. Similarly, if there are economic problems and/or growth, they might demand more intervention and assistance from INGOs.

Second, the history of the relationship a country has had with INGOs is important as well. How a state has dealt with INGOs in the past might suggest if a future demand will be made, or if needs will be voiced. Do democracies have a better historical record when working with INGOs, simply because they have had a democratic past? Other factors in these relationships that need to be considered are factors such as foreign policy, domestic politics, the ability and willingness to work with outside groups, and the ability to make credible commitments. A country’s foreign policy and how it deals with outside groups is important as their foreign policy either allows intervention or it doesn’t. INGOs
must interact with politics at the domestic level, and the relationship can hinge upon the willingness of local officials to work with outsiders. All of these factors could either increase or decrease the demand for humanitarian INGOs.

Third, and most important for this discussion, the humanitarian issues (the humanitarian need) of countries need to be considered. If a country has a long history of turmoil and strife, along with the factors mentioned previously, they could have a higher need and/or demand for INGOs. Therefore, regime type might not be the first indicator of a good relationship, but the context, including the amount of suffering found within a country, will be the more deciding factor. Although some countries are democracies (or recently transitioned to), there could be a need for humanitarian INGOs to be present in these regimes, as well as others. In general, when speaking of African countries, they are relatively young. Due to the decolonization occurring within this century, multiple transitions and general chaos for many countries has caused a general inability of the state to control domestic situations.

For example, some countries have experienced many of the following problems: adverse humanitarian conflicts such as civil war, genocide, natural disaster, human rights abuses, and political, religious, and ethnic cleavages. Many have experienced situations in which the current government, democratic or autocratic, cannot by itself, aid its people. Moreover, there tends to be much spillover (e.g.: refugee flows, displacement, etc) into other countries. While one country could be experiencing relative stability, they may unable to fully enjoy this stability due to the situation of their neighbor(s). Also important to these countries is their political context. What has their history of regime and
political transition looked like, including such factors as political realignment, domestic structure, and the duration of regime? As mentioned in the literature review, this transition has been anything but easy for many countries.

If countries were autocratic for a long time, then went through a few years of transition, and have now been democratic for a number of years, this would suggest that perhaps they had an easier political transition. For the reasons mentioned above, this could imply an easier and better relationship with humanitarian INGOs. Coinciding with this is if a country has had a positive or negative history of working well with INGOs, during periods of disruption or transition. This would be in contrast to those countries that have oscillated between various types of regimes multiple times, experiencing coups, uprisings, and chaos for many years. For many countries, this means that there has been very little in the way of smooth political transitions. A rough political transition could indicate a worse relationship, as regimes struggle for power and control.

Finally, the demand and need for INGOs depends on the number and frequency of humanitarian crises, both man made and natural. In Africa, humanitarian crises, as well diseases that run rampant, are abundant here. Much of this is blamed upon the fact that the history of the continent has been so troubled. In addition, and complicating the situation, is a lack of any real medical infrastructure, assistance programs and plans, resources, and personnel to deal with famine, disease, overpopulation, and drought. Therefore, the need could be exceptionally high on this continent for humanitarian assistance. As such, are the needs of the people in democratic countries being better addressed, because democracies are better suited to dealing with crises, urged to help
their citizens? Or does this mean that democracies are better able to assist their own people and there is less demand for INGO presence? Should greater INGO presence be seen in autocracies as they prove unwilling or incapable of assisting their people? Or will INGO presence be less, due to issues of access?

Another angle to consider, which pertains to the idea of social need, is that which investigates the level of civil society. With all the factors that contribute to a democratic political environment, as mentioned above, the assumption seeming to be made by most is that there is also a higher level of civil society in democracies. As a country becomes more democratic, the space and freedom for civil society should increase, subsequently decreasing the need for assistance. With a higher level of civil society, the general assumption appears to be that civil society is taking care of social needs and there is no reason for an increased amount of INGOs. Domestic groups and organizations are in place to address situations or crises that may arise. Civil space allows for the mobilization of people, progress, change, and for all to be heard. Therefore, there should be an increased amount of INGOs in autocracies, as it is generally assumed that civil society is silenced, or its power is mitigated in the effort to address social needs.

However, this assumption is precarious. This assumption suggests that civil society might be a binary phenomena, where either a country has a thriving civil society and there is no room or need for any other organizations, or a country doesn’t and then something needs to fill the void. Civil society though, should not be seen as binary. Rather, civil society can be thought of as an openness to other actors, including NGOs and INGOs, and is more a way of life than a static phenomena. Should it be assumed that
with a higher level of democracy, there is a corresponding higher level of civil society and then less need for humanitarian aid and INGO presence? This would then create less demand and less INGO presence in democracies and more demand in autocracies.

Nevertheless, an additional problem is that autocracies are typically seen as the opposite of democracies. Autocracies are thought to be closed off, denying access, wanting to control their population by whatever means necessary, afraid of outside intervention and loss of that control, and lacking transparency, accountability, and responsibility. Also, they are thought to have less freedom and space for civil society. Those countries with the greatest need for assistance and aid could be the ones denying access and thus, INGO presence and activity.

In addition, remembering the argument posited by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, a regime’s receptivity to INGO presence may not only be due to levels of civil society, but to the influence of the international community. If a country has been more amenable and open to the socialization and influence of the international community and the norms it sets forth, there might be an increase in INGO and NGO presence in that country. This suggests that a certain regime type may be more willing to be influenced by international norms and over time, those norms become ingrained as habit. If this is the case, regimes following the international norms may be more open and willing to INGO presence, organizations often focused on spreading democracy and human rights.

Another argument to consider is that of Mercer (2002), who looks at the political dimensions of NGOs and why the automatic assumption is to believe NGOs are better associated with democracy. NGOs are typically viewed as autonomous actors, set to
pluralize and strengthen the institutional arena. They bring a watchdog role to civil society while working with grassroots organizations as they deepen and widen possibilities for citizen participation. Moreover, these organizations are thought to check state power and challenge its autonomy. INGOs and regimes are thought to have a mutually enhancing relationship and generally positive and progressive.

Mercer feels this belief is predominant because the ideological biases and normative assumptions that are reproduced in anglophone writings are based off a liberal democratic view. Mercer claims that context is much more important than previously realized and it is problematic that the default belief is NGOs do better and are more closely associated with democracies. Therefore, Mercer is one of the lone voices and proponents that suggests while still ambiguous as to which regime type might work best with INGOs, democracies might not be the best suited. Mercer’s argument stems from a different perspective, but one that is worth mentioning here. Mercer looks at the political affect of INGOs on democracies and democratization and their influence on civil society. She offers similar reasons as to those mentioned previously, as to why democracies are the common assumption. Her argument is valuable because she looks at the impact of INGOs, and their relationship with regimes.

Her main contention is that this assumption is created because most ideas associated with the success of INGOs derive from western historical experience and an ideological basis that the literature founds in a liberal democratic bias. This bias leads to these ideas that become universal and unequivocal. Many assume that democracies and
the democratic political environment are the best in which to work with INGOs. Mercer claims, however, that there has been a failure to theorize correctly about the (political) impact of INGOs. Due to this bias, more attention needs to be paid to the context of what is occurring in a country, with the specific regime and the various INGOs. Too much weight is given to ideological persuasion and assumption. The assumption needs to be less value and more context driven when under analysis.

Along with her main contention, Mercer also mentions a few other factors as to why we shouldn’t make this assumption. First, there tends to be a generalization of INGOs, despite the depth and variety found in the INGO community. This generalization leads to clustering and regionalizing the success of INGOs, even though this might not be the case. Simply because there has been success with INGOs in a few countries, this does not mean that is true for an entire region or continent. Often times this means there is an inattention to geography as well. The most frequently heard success stories are those that are clustered around democracies. Much, however, depends on the context, including: historical development of a country, the legacies of the colonial period, and the process of class formation and urbanization. There are many domestic factors and variables that must be considered to gain an accurate picture. Success of INGOs and NGOs can’t simply be seen as a spillover into one country from another. That is too large of a generalization to make. We can’t homogenize INGOs or the work they do, but need to pay more attention to the context, the local dynamics, and the history of the country and regime.
Second, regimes can be “streamlining civil services”. This streamlining is more often found with regime types that are not democratic in nature and exhibit greater concern over loss of power and control. What this means is that due to a variety of factors, INGOs could be thwarted in their goals, as well as run up against obstacles depending on regime type. For various reasons, they could not be representing or addressing the needs and wants of civil society. This means they could be restricted, in several ways, depending on the latitude given to them by the regime type they are working with. Regimes may allow for their presence, to show the international community of their support for these INGOs, while in reality, they are extremely uncooperative or create hardships along the way. Specifically, INGOs and NGOs could be used in such a way to represent the civil society space they are in. For example, these organizations, depending upon how long they have been in one country, in an authoritarian regime, could be fragmented, competitive, authoritarian in nature, with a more personalized rule. The question is then raised if these organizations are actually representing civil society, and most importantly, the marginalized groups? These organizations could be manipulated by the state or their services could be used in such a way to benefit the power and role of the state.

On the other hand, could it be possible, suggests Mercer, that INGOs could eat away at regime power and status, spreading their influence upwards and not vice versa, which is the usual expectation. Does regime type affect the success and ability of INGOs or do INGOs affect regime type? Depending on who is working within these organizations, elites, lower class, or grass roots, regimes can attempt to create
relationships with those people in a manner that benefits the state, and not the voices of the people or civil society. Simultaneously, the people working in these INGOs could have their own agenda, to gain power or access and this could change the motivation of the INGO. Therefore, as the previous authors mention as well, institutions and actors, as well as a multitude of other variables, must be taken into account.

For these reasons, Mercer believes we should not automatically assume democracies work better with INGOs but acknowledge that this argument could be premature. Instead, there needs to be careful consideration of where this bias is coming from and what are the specific individual contexts that need to be evaluated. The arguments that Mercer makes contribute to the validity of this question. Not only does she question the assumption that democracies work better, but Mercer also essentially switches variables. The traditional model would suggest that regime type is the independent variable which is affecting the INGO, the dependent variable. Mercer changes the entire situation by suggesting the possibility that the regime type is the dependent variable, being affected by the INGO, the independent variable. Therefore, there are many variables to this question and a plethora of possibilities. No matter what might be found at the end of this investigation, even if the general expectation is correct, that democracies do work better and there is less INGO presence, everything may not be as it appears. This implies that while some might not find it a surprise, if it is the case that democracies work better with INGOs, it shouldn’t be accepted as being that simple. The argument could be premature or not considering all the angles which means there could be different ways to interpret the results.
HYPOTHESES

As for the hypothesis of this paper, while controlling for various factors, such as need, demand, country situation, etc, I expect that greater levels of democracy will be associated with greater levels of civil society and greater INGO presence. I expect to see a positive relationship between these variables. However, after the literature review and the other possibilities that have added layers of complexity to this question, one other hypothesis can be tested. Hypothesis two states that there will be a negative relationship between variables and that with greater levels of democracy, there will be less INGO presence. However, this could either be due to the regime type being the independent variable and affecting INGO presence or, the regime type could be the dependent variable, being affected by INGO presence.

CHAPTER THREE: Research Design and Methodology

The research design of this thesis is to use information and data from 3 specific international humanitarian organizations and 12 Sub-Saharan Africa countries and their regime types. That data will be analyzed, controlling for specific factors, while searching for a possible regime type with the best relationship with an INGO. In this analysis, there are many factors to consider: the dependent and independent variables; a historical analysis investigating five specific variables and; two hypotheses. A range of sources including books, journals, articles, and databases were consulted for this analysis.

Th3 humanitarian INGOs, the PC, MSF, and the ICRC were chosen for specific reasons. There are thousands of INGOs and others could have been used for this analysis but for many reasons, these seemed the best fit for this research question. All three offer
services in the humanitarian sphere, and despite having similar motivations, are each broad in scope, providing these services in different ways. To illustrate this point, the following table gives some examples of the types of treatments offered by each INGO, within each of the 12 countries. As can be seen, all three organizations focus on aid and relief, but with slight variations.

Table 1: Types of treatments offered by each INGO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Treatment type: Peace Corps</th>
<th>Treatment type: ICRC</th>
<th>Treatment type: MSF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>material and medical assistance; implement IHL; strengthen emergency response capacity</td>
<td>outpatient, maternity, surgical care; treatment of HIV and TB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>small business development; information technology; education; public health; prevention of HIV/AIDS; sustainable income generating opportunities</td>
<td>implement IHL; restoring family links for refugees; visiting detainees; helping displaced/injured persons. Red Cross: disaster preparedness; health/social services; water/sanitation; supply chain; human capital and organizational development</td>
<td>specialized health care (people suffering from chronic and neglected diseases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>education; community economic development; community health</td>
<td>domestic coverage of various regions; implement IHL; restore family links for victims of conflict; support RCS Red Cross: health; first aid; disaster response</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment; develop models of clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Treatment type: Peace Corps</td>
<td>Treatment type: ICRC</td>
<td>Treatment type: MSF</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>promoting English; health education; child survival activities; natural resource management; community development</td>
<td>domestic coverage of various regions; implement IHL; restore family links for victims of conflict; support RCS</td>
<td>generates attention for this country; helping children; fighting malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS prevention; environment preservation/sustainability; education</td>
<td>domestic coverage of various regions; implement IHL; restore family links for victims of conflict; support RCS</td>
<td>prevention of HIV/AIDS; implementation of national plan for HIV/AIDS prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>reconstruction and expansion of education; health education</td>
<td>domestic coverage of various regions; implement IHL; restore family links for victims of conflict; support RCS</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS and TB prevention; transferring responsibility to local units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>meeting basic needs; agriculture; environment; community development; youth education; health; food security; sustainable development; promote HIV/AIDS awareness</td>
<td>Visiting detainees; facilitates the release of people on humanitarian grounds; treatment of injured soldiers; emergency supplies; implement IHL; repair sanitation facilities in prisons</td>
<td>fighting malnutrition; mobile nutrition centers, vaccinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS prevention; malnutrition; malaria prevention; vaccinations; income generation</td>
<td>visiting detainees (in prison and in communal lock ups); relinking unaccompanied children; implement IHL into legislation and national curricula</td>
<td>assist displaced people; war surgery; support for victims; improve access to health care; responding to epidemics; fighting HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Treatment type: Peace Corps</td>
<td>Treatment type: ICRC</td>
<td>Treatment type: MSF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>education; promotion of mutual understanding between cultural and ethnic groups; HIV/AIDS prevention</td>
<td>domestic coverage of various regions; implement IHL; restore family links for victims of conflict; support RCS</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment; response to emergencies; cholera and TB treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Red Cross: health and disaster management; empowering communities; tracing services; implement IHL; health awareness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>addresses needs of vulnerable people in rural areas; protection; relief aid; medical care/assistance; tracing; helping in Darfur</td>
<td>creation of mobile clinics; treatment of cholera and malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Red Cross: health and water improvement and awareness; emergency and relief; development; dissemination of IHL and peace culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>health education; basic village needs for conservation/development of natural resources; addressing poverty</td>
<td>restoring family links; implement IHL; helping displaced/injured people; visiting detainees</td>
<td>treatment of HIV/AIDS; working with refugees; food supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>health, agriculture, environment, education, HIV/AIDS awareness</td>
<td>assist and protect citizens displaced by violence; visiting detainees; helping separated civilians; implement IHL; health care projects</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment; increasing access to health centers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Peace Corps, ICRC, MSF, 2010).

Functionally, with the exception of the absence of the PC in the Sudan and the DRC, all three have operated or do currently operate in the 12 African countries chosen.
By using 3 organizations and not just one, it allows one to see if there have been different issues or problems with regime types and several INGOs. For example, in the history of the ICRC being in these countries, there might not have been any issues to arise, with a specific regime type for the last fifty years. This would suggest that the ICRC has had no problems working with any regime type. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate more than one organizations, to observe multiple relationships between INGOs and regimes.

The 12 countries chosen were because all 3 of these INGOs have had or do have a presence in those countries. While a random generator was not used, I chose countries that had the 3 INGOs present, while also looking for countries with different regime types. Since the goal is to discover if one regime type works best with a humanitarian INGO, multiple regime types (countries) need to be observed. This also explains why I chose to use the data from the Polity IV database and scoring system.

**POLITY IV SCALE**

After reviewing various databases and indices, the analysis provided by Polity IV proved to be the most applicable to this investigation. Other databases do not offer such a comprehensive review of regime types, nor such a large scale that measures autocracy to democracy. Polity IV has, over time, become one of the most widely used resources for “monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority.” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). For this analysis, Polity IV is used to observe the timing of regime changes and the different types of regimes.

According to Polity IV researchers,

The unit of analysis is the “polity.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary defines a “polity” as a “political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic.” Eckstein and Gurr
(1975, 26) provide a “simple, general definition of all ‘polities’ (or ‘governments’) as subsets of the class of ‘authority patterns.’” They further point out that “all authority patterns are ‘equivalents’ of state-organizations.” (25) Authority patterns are defined as “a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit.... The direction of a social unit involves the definition of its goals, the regulation of conduct of its members, and the allocation and coordination of roles within it” (22) (Marshall et al., 2009).

In creating an empirical analysis, Polity IV offers constructed annual measures for “both institutionalized democracy and autocracy, as many polities exhibit mixed qualities of both of these distinct authority patterns” (Marshall et al., 2009). Democratic and autocratic measurements are defined by the following specific variables. Institutionalized democracy is born out of three interdependent and vital elements: 1) “the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive; 3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other markers (such as rule of law, etc) of a democracy are thought to be intrinsic already in these specific three variables” (Marshall et all, 2009).

The indicator for measuring democracy is on a 0-10 point scale. Points are awarded and given different weights according to the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. It should be noted however that according to the researchers at Polity IV, there “is no ‘necessary condition' for characterizing a political system as democratic. Rather, democracy is treated as a variable” as some features which mark a regime as democratic can be misleading, and don’t guarantee democratic tendencies (Marshall et al., 2009).
Regarding the other measurement, Polity IV uses the term autocracy instead of authoritarian when speaking of regime type. Polity IV believes that authoritarian is a term used as a “catch all” for various types of regimes with a generally negative connotation. Their definition of autocracy includes the following elements: 1) “a distinctive set of political characteristics which sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation; 2) chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection but have little institutional constraints once in office; 3) a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity (although, this last variable is open for interpretation as democracies also have a high degree of directiveness” (Marshall et al., 2009).

The indicator for measuring autocracy is on an eleven point scale and the points and weights given for this measurement are the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Additionally, it should be recognized that the two scales, of democracy and autocracy, do not share any categories. However, many of these polities can have mixed authority traits, and thus can have middling scores on both the scales.

The two measurements of democracy and autocracy are then used to create a combined polity score. The polity score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score, resulting in a polity scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The factors mentioned here illustrate the reasons why these INGOs and countries were chosen, as well as why the Polity IV data set is being used to determine regime type. Consequently, the next step is to explain how this relationship, and the core of this research question, is to be tested.
VARIABLES

The dependent variable to be tested is the hospitality, or receptivity, shown by the regime type towards the international humanitarian organization, to determine if there is a specific regime type that is the most accommodating, allowing the most latitude to an INGO. The dependent variable will then be tested in many ways, specifically, measured by the following variables: 1) the length of time the humanitarian INGOs have been present in each specific country; 2) the number of INGO volunteers in each country and; 3) the amount of funding given/allotted to each country.

The first variable considers the length of time an INGO has been present in a country. This simply shows how long there has been an INGO presence in a country. This is important because depending on how long an INGO has been in a country, we can see if there have been any significant increases or decreases in the other variables (volunteers and funding), including any contentious issues. This also enables us to see if there has been a lack of INGO presence with certain regime types, if an INGO left for a certain number of years, and why this might be the case.

The second variable looks at the number of volunteers that have been and are working in each country. Understanding that each INGO used in this analysis is different regarding their own resources, funding, and personnel, one can still question if there is a significant decrease or increase in numbers during certain periods. Are there more volunteers in a democracy or in a country that is transitioning? Are there less volunteers in an autocracy and for what reasons? Is there a higher number of man made crises, in which certain regimes don’t want help but would rather control their issues internally and in isolation? Do natural crises require more assistance in countries that don’t have an
infrastructure to handle such problems? Therefore, volunteer numbers may tell an interesting story. The same can be said about funding. By looking at funding, we can observe if there are significant differences in the amount of funding a democracy or an autocracy receives.

Borrowing from the polity IV scale, the independent (explanatory) variable is how democratic a regime may be. While many other variables need to be controlled for (e.g.: need for INGOs, warfare, natural disasters, etc), by looking at the level of democracy of a regime, I can isolate the independent variable while controlling for these other factors. Therefore, does a specific regime type impact the time INGOs have been present, the number of volunteers within that country, the amount of funding received, or raise issues of access? I believe that by using these specific variables to test how receptive a regime is to INGO presence, it will be possible to see if there is one regime type that fosters the best relationship.

When looking at the different regime types of these countries for the past fifty years in conjunction with the three variables mentioned above, no visible patterns were easily seen. For example, when looking at the regime changes of the DRC, there has been so much variation that it was difficult to ascertain if volunteer numbers and funding changed significantly with different regime types. When looking at countries that had fewer transitions but experienced long years of being an autocracy before transitioning to a democracy, no patterns were evident here either. Overall, it was simply impossible to see any significant changes with the volunteer numbers, funding, and access issues when looking at so many regime changes for such a long period of time.
Therefore, the next set of graphs show a different representation and illustrate how I will test this relationship. To achieve greater consistency and seeking a cohesive manner in which to measure the relationship, I have grouped the countries into the following four categories: autocracy; democracy; transition; and interruption. By consolidating the countries into this type of categorization, it will allow for a more cohesive picture, as I was unable to decipher any patterns or significant findings when dealing with so many regime fluctuations. The countries labeled in the autocracy category are those that have been always labeled as autocracies. According to the Polity IV scale, they have never been labeled as anything but autocratic. Using this scale, these countries are Tanzania and Rwanda. These are the only two countries in this group of 12 that have always been known as autocratic. While these countries have changed position on the Polity IV scale, moving upwards and downwards on the scale, movement has always occurred on the autocratic side. They have never crossed over to become a positive number, to receive a democratic label on the -10 to +10 scale. Similarly, countries that fall under the democracy category are those countries that have never been labeled anything but democratic. For this case study, South Africa is the only country within this set of 12 that has always been considered democratic.

Transition countries are those that had an autocratic rule for many decades, experienced a few years of transition, and are now democratic. These countries typically did not experience much fluctuation. However, they could have been autocratic for over 30 years, had a year or two of transition, and have now been democratic for over 20 years. These countries include Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, and Madagascar.
Finally, the countries in the interruption category are those that have experienced massive transitions, interruptions, anarchy, both autocratic and democratic rules multiple times, and still find themselves to be tenuously balanced. These countries have known little stability regarding regime type and include the countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Lesotho, and Niger.

Therefore, the following graphs show the countries within their respective categorizations. The graphs represent the polity2 score, showing the -10 to +10 scale.

**Figure 2: Polity 2 Score for Democratic Countries**

Data Source: Polity IV 2010
Figure 3: Polity 2 Score for Autocratic Countries

Data Source: Polity IV 2010

Figure 4: Polity 2 Score for Transition Countries

Data Source: Polity IV 2010
Again, these graphs are meant to show the various changes and fluctuations of regime types over fifty years, illustrating the complexity when attempting to discover if there is one regime type that fosters the best relationship possible with an INGO. It is to be hoped that this categorization strategy makes it easier to observe if there have been, and are, any patterns that could answer this question. In chapter 5, this information and categorization is used in two ways. First, I look at the aggregate data for all of the countries, using this categorization method. Second, I choose one country from each categorization to present an individual, disaggregated account. Simultaneously, I will present these countries as 4 specific case studies, to look more closely at the INGO presence within that country, volunteer numbers, funding amounts, as well as the democratic political environment and other possible factors that could affect this relationship.
There are also many other variables that will need to be accounted for, with some overlap with the three main variables being used to test this relationship, within each country. These include the following:

1) **Natural versus Self-Created (Man-made) Disasters**
The presence or absence of man-made and/or natural disasters. Is there a difference in aid received or willingness by the government to work with INGOs when it is a man made or natural disaster?

2) **Timing of Historical Conflict**
This considers the conflict (if present) in a country and the time/duration of the conflict (e.g.: civil war, genocide, internal/external displacement of refugees and citizens).

3) **Regime Rigidity**
This is very similar to the variable regarding timing of historical conflict. This variable looks at the amount of time the regime has been in power and the instability of the current regime. Has there been consistent stability or has there been chaos, coup attempts, general challenges to the rule, etc?

4) **Prosperity and Wealth of the Country**
Is the country prosperous and able to provide for itself? Does the country possess natural resources? Is it able to access and benefit from those natural resources?

5) **Ability of Regime**
If they refuse help, would there be severe repercussions from the international community? (e.g.: would a loan from the IMF be denied; would economic sanctions be employed; would military action and force be taken, etc).

As stated previously, I hypothesize that greater levels of democracy will be associated with greater levels of INGO presence. I expect to see a positive relationship between these variables. This means that I expect South Africa to have had the best relationship with INGOs. I expect the longest INGO presence in that country, as well as the greatest number of volunteers and funding, and little to no issues of access. However, hypothesis two states that there could be a negative relationship between variables and that with greater levels of democracy, there will be less INGO presence. Again, this could
either be due to the level of democracy of a regime being the independent variable and affecting INGO presence or, the regime type could be the dependent variable, being affected by INGO presence. This would suggest that the opposite will be the case in South Africa. Nonetheless, it will be important to know and understand why this is or is not the case. Is there a better relationship, according to the variables being tested, with democracies, solely due to regime type, or are there other factors and demands to consider?

**CHAPTER FOUR:**
**Case descriptions of INGOs**
**Specific Organizations**

This section discusses the following for the 3 humanitarian INGOs used for this investigation: internal organization, capabilities, resources, activities, planning, development, deployment, principals, norms, funding, services, and size of the organization. When the relationship is measured later, it is done with the knowledge of the similarities and differences of each organization.

This chapter is more descriptive in nature because it is an important part of this research question. In order to gain the fullest understanding, by using the three variables (length of time, volunteer numbers, funding amount) to test the relationship between different regime types and humanitarian INGOs, one must also understand what is happening within these INGOs and the individual countries. As the theoretical section suggests, there is more complexity that underlies this relationship. One has to account for the demand and need factors or issues of access. To understand these, some of the following questions have to be asked: What are the motivations of these organizations?
Do they retain stances of neutrality or become embroiled in conflicts? What are their capabilities and resources? What services do they provide? Are they better able to help in certain disaster scenarios? What is their history with specific countries?

As mentioned previously, these specific organizations were chosen because of the services they all offer, as well as being similarly motivated, but with slight differences. Most operate in all of these countries, as well as having had a long term presence. This allows us to see if there have been significant issues or problems between INGOs and regime types for an extensive period of time. The 12 African countries were chosen more at random, largely due to the fact that all 3 INGOs have or do operate in most of them. I also wanted to investigate as many different regime types, (as well as their histories and country situations), to find if one regime type stood out among the rest.

PEACE CORPS

The PC is a unique organization to include in this analysis as it operates internationally (as do the others), but was created and is based out of the United States. It is a strictly voluntary organization in its nature. The countries in which the PC operates have to allow the presence of the PC (Iversen, 1963). While the PC is considered to be the creation of John F. Kennedy, the slow emergence of the concept for the PC can be found much earlier and could claim many parents. Throughout the 1900s, ideas were formulated, some of which were implemented, for peace armies, civilian conservation corps, and international voluntary service. However, the key moment came in 1960 when two bills were passed that became the foundation of the PC. Representative Henry Reuss and Senator Hubert Humphrey asked that the government consider the forming and establishment of the PC (The National Archives: Teaching with Documents, 2009).
While these bills did not pass, they did attract the attention of a young John F. Kennedy, shortly before he would be sworn in as President. He first launched the idea when he discovered he was a nominee. His famous speech at Ann Arbor, at the University of Michigan, would be the first of many. He called upon Americans, especially those at the university level, to step away from their comfortable surroundings and strike out boldly for new worlds, to help new people. Two months after Kennedy took office, he signed Resolution 10924 that officially created the PC (Ashabranner, 1971).

The PC underwent multiple phases of testing, study groups, pilot programs, and program revision. Since its inception, it has experienced both positive and negative reactions. The organization has three simple objectives, which at that time, were considered alternatives to hard power. These objectives are: 1) “to help the countries inviting volunteers to meet their needs for trained manpower; 2) to promote a better understanding of Americans and American society and; 3) to promote in the American people a broader understanding of other peoples” (Hapgood and Bennet, 1968). The issues that arise within foreign policy appeared much simpler when the PC was created. There was a straightforward dichotomy of good and bad the mission of the PC was to alleviate some of the suffering in the world (Hapgood et al., 1968).

While the PC has experienced both increases and decreases in membership, changes in administration, financial issues, shifting of foci (e.g.: to address such issues as HIV/AIDS), and the inclusion of new countries, the mission has stayed the same. In the 1980s, one of the most important changes that occurred in the PC history was when Congress passed legislation that created the PC as an independent federal agency within
the executive branch. The President has the power to appoint the PC director and deputy
director, with appointments confirmed by the U.S. Senate (Peace Corps: History, 2009).

As an administrative organ, there is one acting director and one deputy director.
Additionally, there are three acting regional directors and an Inspector General (IG). The
IG is an independent office within the PC and provides oversight on most issues that
arise. General oversight of the PC is given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and the House Committee on International Relations. The budget for the PC is decided
annually, as a result of the congressional budget and appropriations process. This is
folded within the foreign operations budget and usually amounts to 1% of that budget.
For the 2009 fiscal year, the budget allotted to 330.8 million dollars (Peace Corps:
Management, 2009).

Since its inception, 195,000 people have volunteered in over 139 countries.
Currently, there are 7,876 volunteers serving in 70 posts in 76 countries. The focus of the
PC is on the following issue areas: Education 35%, Health and HIV/AIDS 21%, Business
15%, Environment 15%, Youth 5%, Agriculture 5%, Other 4%. Countries and regions
that are currently hosting PC operations are:

- Eastern Caribbean, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho,
  Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
  South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Cambodia, China, Mongolia,
  Philippines, Thailand, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
  Nicaragua, Panama, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia,
  Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Turkmenistan, Jordan, Morocco,
  Fiji, Micronesia and Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay,
  Peru, and Suriname (Peace Corps: Countries, 2009).
Since the PC is based in the U.S., the organization, activities, and actions of the personnel are accountable to the Office of the Inspector General. As mentioned previously, this office is an independent entity that works within the PC. The inspector general reports to both the PC director and to Congress. Authorized by law, this office conducts investigations and reviews of all programs and operations. This includes audits, evaluations, oversight, and investigation of possible offenses (e.g.: theft, unexplained deficiencies in federal funds, false statements, drug use, conflict of interest, ethics violations, etc.) (Peace Corps: Inspector General, 2009). Internationally, the PC is subject to the rules and laws of the host nation and as the U.S. has ratified the Geneva Conventions, adheres to international humanitarian law.

While the PC is still primarily considered missionary in its application, the mentality has shifted somewhat. Initially, the PC exuded neutral tendencies but over time, this has changed. It is acknowledged that the PC has its own ideological tendencies and at least during the Cold War, was used as a tool for foreign policy purposes (Wetzel, 1966). Today, as foreign policy and international relations become increasingly complex, the PC’s true motivation and purpose are viewed differently by different groups and nations. Many believe it is no longer neutral but political in its nature.

Nonetheless, many still believe that the influence of the PC is a positive one, and is seen as widening circles. The inner most circle represents the immediate effect of the program “(...) skills, knowledge, understanding, institution-building, framework for cooperative effort with private organizations, research, and experiment (...).” The second ring expands outward, encompassing the PC’s influence on society, peoples, and a national sense of purpose. The third ring is one that seems to hold true for most
humanitarian organizations. This is the universal idea that all people are of worth and have a right to their intrinsic human dignity. The PC has been and continues to be seen as the hope and effort to join (and rejoin) the different peoples of this world together (Shriver, 1963).

Regarding the success of the PC, it is generally believed that the PC has had an overall positive effect. It has provided aid and enhanced cross-cultural understanding between many peoples and countries. In 1961 with the launch of the program, PC volunteers were sent to only 6 countries. Now they have served in 139 countries and multiple new programs have been developed. For example, new programs such as small-business development, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the African Food Systems Initiative have been created as the PC has expanded its focus and worked within new nations and with new governments.

DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS

The next international humanitarian organization to consider is Doctors Without Borders, more commonly referred to as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). Although there are some commonalities, this organization differs greatly from the PC. MSF was born out of a schism within the ICRC in the late 1960s, specifically during the Biafra-Nigeria war. The reason for the split is that one of the founding principles of the ICRC is neutrality. MSF was created because its founders, while still believing in this principle, did not accept the caveat that neutrality meant self-censorship, unable to speak out against atrocities. Therefore, MSF claimed it could both witness and report specific atrocities, while also reporting the larger political issues that might have led to them, something the ICRC typically refrains from doing (Barnett et al., 2008).
For this reason, MSF has been known as a more “rowdy” humanitarian organization (Barnett et al., 2008). While MSF avoids any kind of actual political activity and engagement (especially regarding armed conflict), it makes a statement that they find it their duty to observe and report (Calhoun, 2008). MSF publicly states that “(...) MSF may speak out publicly to bring a forgotten crisis to public attention, to alert the public to abuses occurring beyond the headlines, to criticize the inadequacies of the aid system, or to challenge the diversion of humanitarian aid for political interests” (MSF: History, 2009).

The history behind the creation of MSF began, as mentioned previously, with a break within the ICRC. Therefore, unlike the PC, it is not an organization created from nothing but has a solid foundation from which it launched its own mission and goals. Its main statement says that:

“MSF provides aid in nearly 60 countries to people whose survival is threatened by violence, neglect, or catastrophe, primarily due to armed conflict, epidemics, malnutrition, exclusion from health care, or natural disasters. MSF provides independent, impartial assistance to those most in need. MSF reserves the right to speak out, to bring attention to neglected crises, to challenge inadequacies or abuse of the aid system, and to advocate for improved medical treatments and protocols” (MSF: History and Principles, 2009).

As an organization, it claims its birth in 1971, stemming from the efforts of doctors and journalists in France. Like the PC, it is based on humanitarian principles, but its main focus concerns medical ethics and impartiality. This means that the organization operates as its own autonomous entity. It does not have any ties or obligations to political, military, or religious groups or agendas. The main focus is to quickly bring quality medical care and attention to any people or groups of people that are in the midst of a
crisis, regardless of political affiliation, religion, or race (MSF: History, 2009). Initially the organization was concerned with responding solely to emergency operations, but over the last 40 years, the scope of the organization has gradually changed and evolved. MSF now investigates and considers those humanitarian crises that might need long-term attention. These include such issues as HIV/AIDS, sexual violence, and mental health that could have serious social consequences. As such, solutions are not necessarily quick or easy (Calhoun, 2008).

Regarding the administrative and organizational structure, this also proves somewhat different from the PC, not only in structure but in size. MSF is more of an international network of interweaving branches, rather than one, small, cohesive organization. MSF, while originating in France, is much more of an international organization. While it operates in a many countries, there are different branches of the organization (“associative organizations”) that are found worldwide. There are 19 associative organizations in the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US (MSF: History, 2009).

Currently, there are more than 27,000 volunteers working for MSF. These include doctors, nurses, epidemiologists, laboratory technicians, mental health professionals, logistics experts, and administrators. The majority of these volunteers are from the countries that are currently experiencing the crisis. (MSF: History, 2009). It is also a unique organization because it is able to mobilize and deliver aid quickly, due to its independent funding. Unlike the PC, which is reliant upon government funding and its budget allowances, over 89% of the overall funding for MSF is derived from private
sources. Around the world, as late as 2006, MSF had over 3 million private funders and individual donors (MSF: History, 2009).

Those countries that have accepted assistance from MSF are:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dem. Rep. of Congo, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (MSF: Countries, 2009).

As stated previously, there are 19 associative organizations, each working as autonomous entities. The associative organizations operate under the same MSF guidelines and principles but experience some differences within their separate organizations. Each association does report to a Board of Directors who are elected during an annual general assembly (MSF: History, 2009). Additionally, the MSF, like the PC, does follow and adhere to the rules stipulated by international humanitarian law.

Therefore, MSF is a fascinating and complex international humanitarian organization. Unlike the PC, which appears fairly cohesive and straightforward, MSF operates on a much bigger scale, with multiple interweaving branches. It also appears that as an organization, it is surrounded by much more controversy as it claims impartiality, but not neutrality. It does not actively engage, but it retains the right to speak out and advocate against the wrongs faced by humanity.
When measuring success, MSF does appear to have had some success. They operate in many countries, a number that has increased over time. They won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 as the organization expanded into “(...) a multinational fixture of emergency responses to international health crises (...) combining an air of urgency with a critical sensibility (...) defining its mission in terms of “populations in danger” (...)” (Calhoun, 2008). MSF has also had an impact on policy and people. Impact on policy has come from speaking out and collaboration with different governments and organizations. For example, MSF has created or taken part in some of the following programs: vaccination campaigns, water and sanitation programs, campaign for access to essential medicines, drugs for neglected disease initiative, and programs for ready-to-use food (RUF). In 2006, MSF provided the following aid: “more than 9 million outpatient consultations; hospitalized almost half a million patients; delivered 99,000 babies; treated 1.8 million people for malaria; treated 150,000 malnourished children; provided 100,000 people living with HIV/AIDS with antiretroviral therapy; vaccinated 1.8 million people against meningitis; and conducted 64,000 surgeries” (MSF: Activities, 2009).

However, along with a more extensive reach comes more controversy. As MSF does not necessarily follow a core principal of neutrality, sometimes the services they offer and the activities they are engaged in are delayed or even refused. For example, MSF was recently asked by the Sudanese government to leave. The government, with multiple reasons, no longer required their services and now, the people caught in the situation in Darfur are without the aid or assistance MSF had been providing. While not confirmed, a possible reason for this expulsion could be that MSF has been politically
active, speaking out and highlighting the activities that are occurring. MSF has created a situation in which it no longer can provide humanitarian aid, due to its political stance.

**INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)**

The final organization to be considered is the International Committee of the Red Cross. This is also a multifaceted and complex organization, proving paradoxical in nature, like the other two organizations. It claims neutrality but has shown some political tendencies. It is a private organization pursuing public goals but is also one of the biggest and most influential organizations in the international humanitarian world. It strives for liberal ends, but with conservative means. The ICRC, like the PC, is a product of western-Judeo-Christian culture, with its roots founded in Christian charity. However, while it is missionary in its application, it strives to be as non-denominational as possible (Forsythe, 2005). The ICRC seems to be unlike the other organizations as it appears to take on the form of a supranational body, delving into both humanitarian aid and international humanitarian law.

Emerging from missionary roots, the birth of the ICRC came in the middle of the 19th century. European countries were flexing their military power and might and the state was concerned only with the state, not the bodies left on the battlefield. Henry Dunant, a Swiss businessman, stumbled upon the aftermath of the battle of Solferino in 1859, during the Italian wars of independence (Forsythe, 2005), and immersed himself by helping where he could. Shortly after, he published *A Memory of Solferino*, describing his experiences and proposing changes, in an attempt to remedy what he had seen in Italy. Dunant’s book was an instant success, catching the attention of the chairman of the Geneva Society for Public Welfare, Gustave Moynier. Moynier sought out Dunant and
suggested that his proposals be submitted at the next meeting. Three other men were assigned to investigate his proposal and along with Dunant and Moynier, they formed the International Committee to Aid the Military Wounded. This group eventually evolved into the ICRC (Finnemore, 1999).

It was decided that an international congress would be convened and any party that was interested could attend. Participants would implement the proposals put forth by Dunant in their home country. The effort to gather as many delegates as possible proved fruitful at the Geneva conference in 1863, when 31 delegates were in attendance. (1863 is the date considered to be the actual birth and implementation of the ICRC). Each country was instructed to establish a national relief society in their country to provide aid to the wounded casualties of war. These societies (later known as the Red Cross Societies) were to be private and voluntary in nature, and had to obtain recognition from national governments. They were only allowed to enter and give aid in times of war when invited by the military of that nation (Finnemore, 1999).

In 1864, there was a second convention at Geneva which established the international agreement marking ICRC volunteers and a neutrality status was recognized. This convention also provided the principal provisions of the ICRC, which laid the groundwork for constructing a treaty-based law of war (when before, laws of war had been based solely on customary law or legal opinion) (Finnemore, 1999).

The main principle of the ICRC focuses on the “(...) safeguarding of the basic worth and welfare of individuals in distress in conflict situations” (Forsythe, 2005). However, the agreed upon principal provisions of the 1984 Convention are as follows: “1) Ambulances, military hospitals, medical personnel, and the administrative, transport
and quartermasters’ staff which supports these will all have neutral status; 2) In the event of enemy occupation, these neutral personnel shall have the right to continue to carry out their functions. When they choose to return to their units, this return shall be facilitated by occupying forces; 3) Hospital materials captured may be retained by the occupying forces; ambulances may not; 4) Inhabitants of the country who provide aid to the wounded shall be respected and remain free. Generals of belligerent powers have a duty to notify those inhabitants of the neutrality such humane conduct will confer; 5) Wounded and sick combatants shall be collected and cared for. Those recovered, if unfit for further service, must be repatriated. Those fit for service shall be repatriated on the condition that they not take up arms again for the duration of the hostilities. Evacuation parties conducting these repatriation operations shall be neutral and; 6) Personnel, hospitals, and ambulances enjoying neutral status shall wear the emblem of neutrality, a red cross on a white background” (Finnemore, 1999).

Interestingly, since the ICRC was the organ that promoted the creation of national aid societies, a large part of their early focus was on development. This helps to explain the dual focus of the ICRC, regarding both the practical applications (the work in the field) and the legal standards. Consequently, the ICRC is seen as a governing body, lessening the tensions of war or attempting to stop or mitigate the escalation of violence. From the end of the 19th century through the 20th, the ICRC witnessed a variety of changes, as did the other organizations. As the world was changing and evolving, new crises were emerging, and world wars were wreaking havoc on the international community. In response, the ICRC had to adapt and change as well. For example, after the first world war, the ICRC began to investigate more closely the conditions for
detainees of war, not only in the international field but beyond, to include internal warfare as well (Forsythe, 2005). The ICRC now address more issues, including: biotechnology and weapons, land-mines, missing persons, women and war, children in war, war and displacement, social research on war, refugees, weapons, national implementation, and development (ICRC: About the ICRC, 2009).

Regarding the organizational and administrative structure of the ICRC, it is a vastly complex organization. The organization is structured as follows: an Assembly (the supreme governing body), in which the president resides; an Assembly Council, a Recruitment Commission, a Control Commission, and an Internal Audit; a Directorate, which is the second tier of power; and a multitude of other organizations found below the Directorate (Forsythe, 2005). Currently, there are 1,400 people working in the field for the ICRC with 11,000 acting as support personnel. The headquarters are in Geneva, which has a staff of 800. Funding is provided by contributions from “the states that are party to the Geneva Conventions, both the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, supranational organizations, and public and private sources. All funding is voluntary” (ICRC: Funding and Budget, 2009).

Currently there is ICRC staff in 80 countries and the following are those countries that have allowed the ICRC to enter:

Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen,
While a large emphasis is on medical assistance and victims of war, as mentioned earlier, the ICRC plays a substantial role in the international community, not only with medical assistance but with legal standards and IHL. Therefore, it could be argued that the magnitude and reach of the ICRC is much greater than the other two. Also, it has an interesting role due to its legal mandate from the international community that states, in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions: “(...) task the ICRC with visiting prisoners, organizing relief operations, reuniting separated families and similar humanitarian activities during armed conflicts and; the statutes of the IRC and Red Cross Movement which encourage it to undertake similar work in situations of internal violence where the Geneva Conventions do not apply” (ICRC: Mandate, 2009).

The question of whether the ICRC has remained neutral is still controversial. According to David Forsythe, “The ICRC, for instance, works famously behind the scenes, believing (...) this quintessentially apolitical agency sees its role as spreading humanitarian norms and changing national laws and international norms - that is, it is involved in “humanitarian politics”.” However, some criticism of the ICRC is that it has
been too silent on certain situations, by claiming neutrality (e.g.: not speaking out during the Holocaust) (Barnett et al., 2008).

The ICRC has been successful as over time as there has been an increase in the number of countries in which the ICRC has operated, the number of branch societies, (Red Cross and Red Crescent), and the aid that has been provided over the years to many different countries and peoples. It has been awarded four Nobel Peace Prizes (three to the organization and one to Henry Dunant). To give an example of its impact, the following activities were conducted by the ICRC in 2007: “food for more than 2.5 million people and emergency supplies such as tents and blankets for almost 4 million people; its water, sanitation and construction projects supported 14.3 million people; around 2.9 million, more than half of them children, benefited from ICRC supported health care facilities; delegates visited 518,277 people deprived of their freedom in 2,425 places of detention in 77 countries; in collaboration with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies around 485,000 messages were exchanged between family members separated by hostilities and other crises” (ICRC: Annual Report 2007, 2009).

CHAPTER FIVE
Empirical Analysis: Measuring the Relationship

This section investigates the three variables which measure the receptivity of regime type towards INGOs. Again, these variables are the following: the number of years each of the 3 INGOs have been present in each country; the amount of funding given to each country by each INGO and; the number of volunteers sent by each INGO to each country. This is done to see if there is one specific regime type that works best with a humanitarian INGO. These variables, acting as proxies for the relationship, are ones I
believe to be the most useful for determining if one regime type can be isolated as the best for fostering the most successful relationship with INGOs.

As previously mentioned, the three variables are measured within the four categories of regime types. The categorization of regime types is as follows: democracy, autocracy, transition, and interruption. This categorization was created in an attempt to cohesively view and analyze a significant amount of data over a long period of time. This categorization was used to provide both an aggregate perspective for all 12 countries, a broad view, as well as a disaggregated perspective, providing a closer, more individualistic look at one country per regime category.

With the first three variables, the data for each country was added, with the information available, and then divided by the number of countries within that categorization, to provide the average. Data was compiled from all 3 of the INGOs for this calculation. For example, when looking at the regime categorization of autocracy, two countries are represented, Rwanda and Tanzania. According to the Polity IV score, these are countries that have always been autocratic. The number of years each INGO has been present in each country were added together, and the total number was divided by 2, the number of countries in that category, to provide the average. The same calculation was done for the amount of funding given and the number of volunteers that were sent by each INGO. These numbers provide the average score for all categories, democracy, autocracy, transition, and interruption. This is done in both the aggregate and disaggregate manner as otherwise, the data cannot be fully explored and understood because there is so much variation and fluctuation of regime types in these countries. It should also be noted that this method of categorization was created for functional
purposes as well, as there was inconsistency with the data. For some of the variables, various years were missing, or not accessible. Due to a lack of data, this was the best way in which to provide the most consistent measurement possible.

The aggregate perspective and analysis of the 12 countries will be followed by 4 individual and specific case studies, investigating one country from each regime type categorization. These case studies will more closely investigate the specific political and civil situations of each country and what factors might be affecting either the need or the demand for humanitarian INGOs.

The first variable measured is the length of time (number of years) that INGOs have been present in all the countries. The data shows the number for all 3 of the INGOs, (PC, MSF, and ICRC) added together and then divided by the number of countries assigned within each category. This simply illustrates when each of these INGOs entered into the countries and how long they have maintained a presence. To reiterate, the following are the number of countries in each category: Autocracy (2); Democracy (1); Transition (5); Interruption (4).
As can be seen, on average, those countries in the transition category have had the longest presence of humanitarian INGOs. Transition is followed by interruption, autocracy, and then democracy. This could suggest a variety of possibilities. Transition regimes are in greater need for humanitarian assistance, as they are experiencing fluctuations in regime type. This is supported by the fact that they are closely followed by interruption regimes. Countries experiencing instability, subjected to constant change of governance, and difficulty in growing and/or progressing, could have a greater need for assistance. These regime types are also more prone, due to their instability, to man made crises, as well as being more susceptible and unable to deal with natural crises. As there is constant shifting and vying for power in the government, this leads to more fighting,
displacement of peoples, domestic issues, weak infrastructure, and much more. This instability leads to an inability to deal with major problems that might arise. These are some reasons that these regimes could have, or require more, INGO assistance and presence.

In addition, autocracies follow closely in third position in terms of INGO presence, with democracies having the least amount of presence. What this could suggest is that there has been less need or demand for INGO presence in democratic environments. If so, there would be fewer issues of access, as there is simply less interaction between this regime type and INGOs. What is interesting is that the other three regime types appear to have allowed, for the most part, the presence of humanitarian INGOs into their countries, suggesting that they do allow for aid and assistance when needed. Therefore, their demand and need might be higher than that of democracies. Ultimately, while it is difficult to determine if this means that democracies have better relationships, when using this variable, it does show that there are simply more relationships and greater levels of interaction with these three regime types and the INGOs.

The second variable measures the total amount of funding from all 3 INGOs. Again, the numbers shown for funding were calculated from all 3 INGOs for each specific regime category. This total number was then divided by the number of countries in each category to provide the average. These numbers represent the funding given per year from each INGO, when that information was available. In some instances, funding was given to regions. When this occurred, the funding for the region (in which there might be more than one country) was simply divided by how many countries were
included in that region and equally distributed. For example, the ICRC allotted money regionally. In the Nairobi region, the countries of Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania were included. Therefore, the total amount given to that region was divided by three, equally distributing the funds across all the countries, and then added to the whole.

**Figure 7: Total Amount of INGO Funding**

Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC (see data appendix)

This graph shows that the least amount of funding has been sent to democracies. Rather, interruption regimes have received the most amount of funding, followed by autocracies, transitions, and then democracies. While this changes the order compared to INGO presence, democracies again are the countries that come in last, with the least amount of funding. This coincides with the first variable meaning with more INGO presence, there is typically more funding. The next graph illustrates the same concept,
except it is showing the total number of volunteers for each category. The number of volunteers per year was taken, added together for all 3 INGOs for each country, and then divided by the number of countries within that category.

**Figure 8: Total of Volunteer Numbers**

Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC (see data appendix)

As can be seen, the number of volunteers is greatest in those countries in the interruption category, followed by transition, democracy, and closely behind, autocracy.

These results show, in correlation with the first two variables tested, that democratic countries, while not last, are close to last regarding the total number of volunteers that have operated within their country. Overall, it can be stated that democracies have had the least amount of presence and funding, and the second to lowest in terms of volunteer numbers. As such, it can’t be conclusively stated whether this data suggests that other regime types may be better suited to fostering the most conducive and best relationship
possible with these INGOs. However, it can be stated that democracies have had less relationships and interactions with these INGOs (due to varying levels of need or demand). This data also shows that all other regime categories (autocracy, transition, and interruption) have had high levels of interaction with all 3 INGOs. They have fostered relationships with these organizations while receiving a much larger amount of funding, number of volunteers, and greatest INGO presence, far above that of democratic regimes.

To more simply illustrate this data, the following graphs show the disaggregate perspective, looking at the individual countries within each of these categories of regime type, to expound upon the findings that are beginning to appear. Therefore, the numbers below represent only one country, but again using data from all 3 INGOs. As with the aggregate data, and continuing to use the same method of categorization, INGO presence, funding amount, and volunteer numbers were calculated for all 3 INGOs and added together. This time however, the numbers represent only one country. Tanzania is used for autocracy, South Africa for democracy, Zambia for transition, and Sudan for interruption.
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC

When investigating individual countries, Sudan as the representative of the interruption category has had the greatest presence of INGOs. Sudan is followed by Tanzania (autocracy), Zambia (transition), and finally South Africa (democracy). Again, as the aggregate data showed, it should be questioned as to why democracies have had the least amount of INGO presence. Is this due to a bad relationship or problems between these INGOs and a democratic regime? Is this because democracies have a better political and civil environment, better equipped to dealing with crises that arise? Do they simply experience less crises? Perhaps it shouldn’t be assumed that democracies have had the best relationship with humanitarian INGOs, as they seem to have fewer relationships overall. They might have good relationships but their interaction is fairly minimal compared to the other regime types. Therefore, if this is the case, autocratic, transition,
and interruption regimes might have better relationships simply because they have more of them, and because their need or demand is greater.

The following graphs show the same individual countries and the numbers from the 3 INGOs regarding total funding and volunteers.

**Figure 10: Total Funding of all INGOS (disaggregate)**

Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC (see data appendix)

For individual countries, the pattern again follows that of the aggregated data. Sudan has received the most funding from all the INGOs. Tanzania follows next, Zambia, and finally South Africa. This is the exact pattern provided by the aggregated data.
While the data regarding volunteers doesn’t exactly match the aggregate data, it does show, yet again, that non-democratic regimes, interruption and autocratic regimes, have had higher numbers of volunteers. The number of volunteers has been highest in Sudan, followed by Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia.

What the data shows is that democracies are not the regimes that have had the longest INGO presence, nor have they received the most amount of funding, or the greatest number of volunteers. Other regime types, autocracies, transitions, and interruptions are the regime types with greater numbers when using these three variables.

Therefore, it is again prudent to ask why this might be the case. As discussed in the theoretical section of this thesis, there are many possibilities to pursue. Do democracies work best with humanitarian INGOs because of their democratic political
environment and civil society? Or as the data suggests, are democracies simply better able to handle natural disasters and crises, experience less man made crises, due to the stability of their governance and regime type? Is there just less need or demand for these types of INGOs? Do other regime types, because of a higher need and/or demand, have better relationships with INGOs simply because there is more interaction and exposure to these INGOs? What are the variables that can affect these relationships? The next section offers 4 cases studies, looking at South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Sudan, to investigate the internal characteristics of each country to see if there are other reasons and variables that could explain INGO activity.

INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES

The 4 case studies offered in this section investigate one country from each regime category: South Africa (democracy), Tanzania (autocracy), Zambia (transition), and Sudan (interruption). Each country case study mentions the 5 variables mentioned earlier, as well as an historical analysis which looks at the political, social, and economic environments. In addition, the variables regarding INGO presence, funding, and volunteers are discussed here, as the data is broken down individually to be more closely assessed. Natural disasters are also investigated, to see if the timing of natural disasters correlated with any significant increases or decreases in INGO activity. This is all done in an attempt to better understand why there might be more or less INGO activity in a country with a certain regime type. As the earlier analysis suggests, democracies are not the regime types with the most INGO activity. As such, they might not be fostering the
best relationship out of the regime types discussed here. We need to know more about
why this might be the case, as the previous findings remain inconclusive.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**Table 2: Descriptive Variables for South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Variables</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters / Man Made Disasters</td>
<td>Since 1980, 70 events; 1,721 people killed; 18,420,182 affected; mass movt 1; extreme temperature 2; earthquake 6; epidemic 6; drought 7; wildfire 8; storm 17; flood 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Conflict</td>
<td>Much historical conflict; apartheid movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Stability</td>
<td>Stability more recently, but little in South Africa’s past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Many significant natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Currently</td>
<td>9 on Polity IV Scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Africa is the country representing the democracy category. According to the polity IV scale, South Africa has always been a democracy, beginning in 1910. The following years show the various polity scores South Africa has been given on the polity IV scale, over the last 60 years. The length of time for each individual score is shown in parentheses: 1910-1989: 4 (80 years); 1990-1991: 5 (5 years); 1992-1993: -88 (2 years) and; 2004-2008: 9 (15 years). The graph illustrates the polity2 score where only true value polity scores are shown. This is to show the fluctuation, or stability, of the polity scores denoting regime type and governance for South Africa over a significant period of time.
As can be seen, South Africa has always remained on the democratic side of the polity scale. What is intriguing about South Africa is that despite being labeled as democratic for so many years, it has experienced the least amount of INGO presence, in addition to very low levels of funding and volunteers (in comparison with the other countries). Out of the 12 countries studied here, South Africa is last for the amount of INGO presence. Specifically, the 3 INGOs entered in the following years: PC: 1997 (13 years); ICRC: 1995 (15 years) and; MSF: 1999 (11 years).

The following graphs represent the individual numbers for South Africa, looking at funding and volunteers for each INGO.
Figure 13: ICRC Funding for South Africa

Figure 14: MSF Funding for South Africa
Figure 15: PC Funding for South Africa

![Graph showing PC Funding for South Africa](image)

- South Africa: PC Funding: US millions

Figure 16: ICRC Volunteers for South Africa

![Graph showing ICRC Volunteers for South Africa](image)

- ICRC Volunteers: South Africa/Pretoria
As one can see, the ICRC’s funding has increased while MSF has seen fluctuation in their numbers and the PC has steadily increased since 1997, only dropping recently in 2007. The number of volunteers tells a similar story. In 2002, the number of ICRC
volunteers increased while the volunteers for MSF dramatically decreased. The PC has seen a steady increase (with a few moments of decline), since 1997. When compared to the other three countries in these specific case studies, Tanzania, Zambia, and Sudan, South Africa is the last in terms of INGO presence and funding, and second to last in terms of volunteers. While there is an obvious lack of data regarding the number of years for each INGO (as this data was not publicly available), this still presents a small glimpse into each country. When compared to the other countries and despite being a democratic country, South Africa is well behind the others, having very low levels of volunteers, funding, and INGO presence. Moreover, there are not any significant patterns when analyzing this data.

Natural disasters were also investigated, to see if there were any patterns between these variables and the timing of natural disasters. As assistance is typically needed to mitigate the impact and help with the aftermath of natural disasters, if there is a correlation between increased INGO activity and the timing of natural disasters, this could be a possible, supportive, explanation for INGO activity. In South Africa in the last 50 years, there have been 70 natural disasters, which is the second highest of the 12 countries and first highest of the other three individual countries. The graphs below illustrate the number of people that were both killed and affected during this time. The natural disasters in this analysis, for all the countries, include the following: drought, insect infestation, flood, epidemic, wildfire, storm, extreme temperature, and earthquake.
Figure 19: Number of People Killed by Natural Disasters in South Africa

![Graph showing the number of people killed by natural disasters in South Africa from 1952 to 2002.](image)

- Year: 1952
- South Africa: Killed

Figure 20: Number of People Affected by Natural Disasters in South Africa

![Graph showing the number of people affected by natural disasters in South Africa from 1984 to 2004.](image)

- Year: 1984
- South Africa: Affected

(PreventionWeb, 2010)
However, as can be seen, there is no correlation with the timing of natural disasters and INGO presence, funding, and volunteers. Therefore, the data in these graphs present a complex picture. Why is it that INGO presence, funding, and volunteer numbers are less, in a country that has been democratic for a generation, when I would expect INGO presence to be greatest in a country with this type of regime? INGOs should be present here, if my hypothesis remains true. To that end, an investigation into South Africa’s history is required, to search for possible explanatory reasons as to why there is less INGO presence in this country.

The history of South Africa is a complicated one as it has seen much turbulence and change for various reasons. South Africa is also a leader, not only on the African continent, but in the global context which makes her story extremely significant. Dutch traders landed in 1652 and were the ruling presence until the British arrived in 1806. South Africa is extremely wealthy in natural resources and such commodities as gold and diamonds spurred both wealth and immigration. After the Boer War ended in 1902, South Africa operated under the rule of apartheid, creating a separation in the development of races. In 1910, independence was achieved and the British and Afrikaners ruled together as a republic until 1961, after a whites-only referendum occurred. In 1948, a national party was voted in as the majority party and the policy of apartheid and the separate development of races, favoring the white minority, was officially put in place (CIA World Factbook, 2010).

With apartheid came massive problems and diverse and separated communities were extreme. Social engineering of society included such things as forced resettlement and horrific tactics against opponents which resulted in years of conflict and strife, the
cost of which is still being felt today (BBC South Africa Country Profile, 2010). The years between 1948 and 1950 saw the codifying and enforcing of increasingly strict policies for racial separation (State Department South Africa Country Profile, 2010). While resistance against apartheid began early, efforts were not truly consolidated and opposition initiated, by the African National Congress (ANC), until the late 1950s with guerrilla warfare. In the two decades following, there were massive uprisings, including internal protests, insurgency, and boycotts.

It wasn’t until 1989, due to much internal pressure and resistance, that the regime eventually began to negotiate for change, including a peaceful transition to majority rule. In addition to internal pressure, civil unrest, and the increasing power of the ANC, there was a corresponding increase in international pressure. The international community was not pleased with the conditions in Africa and therefore, the South African government was feeling pressure to change (Freedom House South Africa Country Profile, 2010). In 1994, South Africa had its first multiracial election, with Nelson Mandel winning as President. Mandela pushed for reform on many fronts, especially those concerning social issues. Unemployment, housing, crime, economic growth and stability, and the effort to decrease political violence were all attacked with vigor (State Department South Africa Country Profile, 2010). Since 1994, the elections following have been considered mostly fair and free and in 1996, a new constitution was adopted, one considered to be one of the most liberal in the world (Freedom House South Africa Country Profile, 2010). In 1998 apartheid was officially deemed as a crime against humanity and in 2004 the ANC won and enacted the “Black Economic Empowerment” program to address economic inequalities (World Information South Africa Country Profile, 2010). Therefore, as South
Africa has seen an increase in political stability, there has been a corresponding increase in economic stability.

South Africa is currently represented by 9 provinces, with the same person occupying the role of chief of state and head of government. In the past, South Africa had been divided into 4 provinces and 10 black homelands. However, even with this new division, there is still tension between the provincial and local administrators, at times causing disagreement and stagnation as both parties vie for power. There is a cabinet, a bicameral parliament, the president is elected by the national assembly, and there is a set code of ethics for the senior positions.

Despite the setbacks of apartheid, South Africa is still the most developed country on the continent. It has the most sophisticated economy with a quarter of the GDP and agriculturally, South Africa is very diverse with a plethora of natural resources, including minerals, gold, and platinum. While not perfect, the economy is highly diverse and open, which is attracting FDI from many countries. However, while having many natural resources and being seen as a leading international player and regional mediator, South Africa is not without problems (US State Department South Africa Profile, 2010). Despite the progress, South Africa has continued to struggle to address apartheid (BBC South Africa Country Profile, 2010). What must be highlighted is the extreme exclusionary nature of apartheid, which in turn creates great isolation. This means that the disparities created in the social, political, and economic spheres of South Africa are still very prominent.

Complicating the situation is that South Africa has to contend with the second highest number of HIV/AIDS patients in the world, while experiencing problems with
land redistribution (a component left over from the apartheid struggle), territorial issues, trafficking, drugs, a multitude of religions, and deep and continued ethnic division. Black Africans make up 79% of the people in South Africa, with 9.6% white, 8.9% colored, and 2.5% Indian/Asian (US State Department South Africa Country Profile, 2010). Over half the population lives in poverty with little access to any kind of assistance. While political violence has dropped, crime, corruption, violence, and general breakdown of law and order persists. There is also high unemployment and low wages in a population that is increasing (Freedom House South Africa Country Profile, 2010). Nevertheless, the consensus regarding South Africa is that positive strides are being made, despite having to overcome colossal obstacles from the past (US State Department South Africa Profile, 2010).

Therefore, what are possible reasons that could explain why there is less INGO activity in this country? According to the original hypothesis, with democratic countries, there should be greater INGO presence, funding, and volunteers. South Africa shows this is not the case. At the conclusion of the case studies, I will present three alternative explanations that might help explain INGO activity and the variables used here. I created these alternative explanations to see if one is better able to explain greater or lesser INGO presence, the factors that contribute to that presence, and if one can then be applied to all the countries.
TANZANIA

Table 3: Descriptive Variables for Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Variables</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters / Man Made Disasters</td>
<td>Since 1980, 65 events; 6,747 killed; 8,711,959 affected; insect infestation 1; mass movt. 1; storm 1; wildfire 1; earthquake 5; drought 6; flood 24; epidemic 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Conflict</td>
<td>Little historical conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Stability</td>
<td>Relative regime stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Not many natural resources, mostly minerals, but popular tourist destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Currently</td>
<td>-1 on Polity IV Scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tanzania is the country representative for autocracy. According to the polity IV scale, since 1961, Tanzania has always been autocratic. The following years show the various polity scores Tanzania has been given on the polity IV scale over the last 60 years. The length of time for each individual score is shown in parentheses: 1961-1991: -6 (31 years); 1992-1994: -5 (3 years); 1995-2008: -1 (14 years). These years are illustrated on the graph below. Again, this is to show the fluctuation, or stability, of the polity scores denoting regime type and governance for Tanzania over a significant period of time.
In comparison to the other three countries in these case studies, Tanzania has the second greatest numbers for all the variables. Behind Sudan, Tanzania is second for having the longest INGO presence, amount of funding, and volunteer numbers. Out of the entire 12 countries studied here, Tanzania is 7th. Therefore, as an autocracy, contrary to South Africa’s status as a democracy, Tanzania has had a large amount of INGO activity.

The 3 INGOs entered Tanzania in the following years: PC: 1972 (32 years); ICRC: n/a; MSF: 1993 (17 years).

The following graphs represent the individual numbers for funding and volunteers for Tanzania.
Figure 22: PC Funding for Tanzania

Figure 23: MSF Funding for Tanzania
Figure 24: ICRC Funding for Tanzania

Figure 25: PC Volunteers for Tanzania
Figure 26: MSF Volunteers for Tanzania

Figure 27: ICRC Volunteers for Tanzania
Regarding funding, while the MSF only offers three years of information, there appears to be a decline in funding recently. However, both the PC and the ICRC show signs of increased funding, with a large spike in 2002. Overall, the PC is the INGO which is shows consistently increased funding over time. There is a similar pattern with volunteer numbers. The MSF has seen a rather sharp decrease in volunteers over time, while the PC shows a steady increase of volunteers and the number of ICRC volunteers spiked early in this decade. This data simply shows that Tanzania, the autocracy, has the second greatest amount of INGO presence, funding, and volunteer numbers. This is contrary to the initial hypothesis of this thesis.

When looking at the natural disasters that have occurred in the last 50 years, Tanzania has experienced 65 natural disasters, which is fifth highest of the 12 countries and third highest of the three individual countries. The graphs below show the total number of people killed and affected by these natural disasters.
The one possible correlation with the variables mentioned above is seen during the early part of this decade. There was an increase in funding and volunteer numbers (for the ICRC and the PC) during the same time that many people were affected in the early
2000s by a natural disaster. This could suggest that more INGO activity was needed, as Tanzania might have been unable to cope with the natural disaster. Otherwise, there is no real correlation that can be seen between increases or decreases of variables and the timing of natural disasters in this country. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the data for Tanzania suggests the opposite of the hypothesis of this paper. Tanzania has shown that overall, it has more INGO activity than South Africa, the democratic country. An investigation into Tanzania’s history will consider why this might be the case.

Tanzania, unlike some of her neighbors, has had an unusually quiet history, with little internal conflict or strife. Tanzania slowly transformed over time, when Zanzibar split and Tanganyika was formed, under British and German rule. After World War I, Germany left the country and Tanzania finally gained independence from Britain in the early 1960s. The country was formed by Tanganyika and Zanzibar merging into one, ushered in with the mentality that if there was to be one state, there would be one party to rule (CIA World Factbook, 2010).

Julius Nyerere, a schoolteacher trained abroad, stepped in as President in 1961. With the mentality that there would be one party in one, whole, state, much emphasis was placed on social policies. Social practices were heavily enforced to forge a strong, national identity in which all Tanzanians could join together. Tanzanian national identity was created and shaped, in which ethnic, regional, or linguistic identities were and are much less significant for the Tanzanian people. According to the U.S. State Department, “Observers are nearly unanimous in attributing Tanzania’s unbroken record of political stability to Nyerere’s social policies.” Nyerere ruled his single party until 1985, enhanced by the constitution of 1977 which declared a real one-party state for the entire
country, with no other party opposition allowed. Nyerere eventually stepped down in 1985 when President Mwinyi took power, but one party rule was not abolished until 1995 (U.S. State Department Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).

While Nyerere had excellent social policies, his economic policies typically manifested as failures. Under Nyerere, his party supposedly rejected communism and desired not isolation, but wanted foreign assistance, intervention, and aid. Despite this claim, Nyerere and his “Arusha Declaration” called for egalitarianism, socialism, and self-reliance, which actually turned Tanzania inward. Nyerere relied mostly on cooperative farm villages, with familial and communal ties as the foundation for the nation, but along with the nationalization of factories, plantations, banks, and private companies. Very little clear and efficient focus however, was directed at these economic reforms. Nyerere was more focused on uniting the Tanzanian people and he was devoted to enforcing social policies and practices. In addition, undermining any real success and what caused most of these attempts at economic reform to fail was inefficiency, corruption, and resistance to economic changes, both internal and external to the government. Exacerbating the situation was when Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979, to force the dictator Idi Amin to flee. This proved extremely costly to the Tanzanian government, both financially and with state resources, a setback that took many years to recover from (BBC Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).

One party rule lasted until 1995, after changes had been made to the constitution in 1992 in which multiparty politics were allowed. Democratic elections were held, but under accusations of unfair elections resulting in rioting and clashes on the streets (WorldInformation, 2010). The 2005 elections were considered free and fair, with some
opposition allowed, but not much. As such, it has been a slow process to allow other
voices and parties into the political mix (US State Department Tanzania Country Profile,
2010). There has been a political union between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania for over
forty years, but Zanzibar does have its own parliament and president (BBC Tanzania
Country Profile, 2010).

Currently, Tanzania has 26 regions, a chief of state and head of government that
are officiated by the same person, a president elected by popular vote, and a unicameral
national assembly. With a GDP of 57.5 billion, many believe that while there is much
political stability, there is still slow growth and economic reform, despite the help of the
IMF (BBC Tanzania Country Profile, 2010). The slow economic growth and
development is very much attributed to Nyerere and his poor economic policies, policies
which produced a weak and inefficient infrastructure for Tanzania to successfully build
upon. Initially, in the early 1990s the IMF and the WB were deeply invested in helping
Tanzania, as the country was adopting their liberal practices. However, that aid has since
stagnated as Tanzania has been unable to show real signs of growth and improvement and
their industry infrastructure remains weak. Corruption and weak opposition parties
remain which implies that little legislature is being successfully created and passed.
Foreign investors are also wary because there is a history of Tanzanian courts being
unable to enforce contracts and the bureaucracy tends to be hostile. To invest in a country
that continues to have a poor infrastructure, little economic growth, an inability to uphold
contracts, and which exudes hostility, would prove to be a great risk (U.S. State
Department Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).
Within civil society, Tanzania has had and continues to have its share of issues. As mentioned previously, there are still major problems with elections and one party has been holding power for the last several years, despite the multiparty politics that are now allowed. Therefore, the government still controls much what happens in the everyday life of the Tanzanian people. They control the courts and media, the public can’t strike, and corruption and the drug trade are still very active (Freedom House Tanzania Country Profile, 2010). Tanzania also suffers from a high adult infection of the HIV/AIDS virus (12th in the world), a high risk of infectious diseases, and they host over 1/2 million refugees, more than any other country (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Their debt is over 8 billion and while there are a few natural resources such as hydropower, tin, phosphates, iron, and diamonds, these are limited. More effort is focused on drawing in tourists with such attractions as Mt. Kilimanjaro (U.S. State Department Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).

Despite the issues seen here, Tanzania, because she has been so politically stable, with little internal strife, does have good relations with neighboring countries and acts as a mediator. 99% of the people are African, but there are a plethora of different religious groups, including the following: Christian 30%; Muslim 35%; and Indigenous 35% (mainland) (US State Department Tanzania Profile, 2010). However, the emphasis placed on Tanzanian national identity, planted many years ago, remains strong. The cohesion of people under one identity has largely diffused possible ethnic, religious, and cultural rivalries, a problem that is very apparent for other countries in this study. Moreover, NGOs, according to Freedom House, are very active in Tanzania and have been seen to influence public policy (Freedom House Tanzania Country Profile, 2010).
Therefore, while Tanzania still struggles economically, socially, a solid foundation has been laid and is significant for the people of Tanzania today. Also significant is that Tanzania, as an autocracy, has had a greater amount of INGO presence, along with more funding and volunteers than South Africa.

ZAMBIA
Table 4: Descriptive Variables for Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Variables</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters / Man Made Disasters</td>
<td>Since 1982, 32 events; 998 killed; 8,719,915 affected; insect infestation 1; drought 5; flood 11; epidemic 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Conflict</td>
<td>Some historical conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Stability</td>
<td>One party rule for a long time, lack of flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Hugely dependent on copper but insufficient to use only one natural resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Currently</td>
<td>7 on Polity IV Scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zambia is the country representing the regime category of transition. Countries in this category are countries that experienced an autocratic rule for a long period of time, followed by a few years of transition, and have now experienced a long period under a democratic rule. These countries saw few interruptions or fluctuations in regime type. Rather, one regime type ruled for a very long time, followed by a second regime type. The following years show the various polity scores Zambia has been given on the polity IV scale over the last 60 years. The length of time for each individual score is shown in...
parentheses: 1967-1971: 0 (4 years); 1972-1990: -9 (19 years); 1991-1995: 6 (5 years); 1996-2000: 1 (5 years); 2001-2007: 5 (7 years) and; 2008: 7 (1 year). Essentially, the transition for Zambia from one major regime rule to another looks like this: 1967-1990: Autocracy (23 years), 1990-1991: Transition (2 years), and 1991-present: Democracy (19 years). The graph below shows these polity scores over time.

**Figure 30: Zambia Polity 2 Score**

What can be ascertained from this graph is that while under an autocratic rule, Zambia stayed for a long time at -9 on the polity scale until 1990, when they began the transition to a democracy. Since 1991, Zambia has been labeled as democratic but as shown, there have been fluctuations within that score. Zambia has moved up and down the polity scale, on the democratic side. When I speak of a transition period, it is noted that creating democracy and establishing democratic markers in a country does not happen instantly. Therefore, the fluctuations on the polity scale are explained by the fact
that democratization is a process, one that takes years and is not perfect. However, as of
2001, Zambia has seen a relatively steady increase on the polity scale.

When compared to the other three countries in these case studies, Zambia has had
the second lowest (in front of South Africa) amount of INGO presence and funding, and
the lowest number of volunteers. Out of the 12 countries, Zambia is tied for 3rd least
amount of INGO presence. The 3 INGOs entered during the following years (all INGOs
entered after the transition to democracy): PC: 1993 (17 years); ICRC: 1995 (15 years);
MSF: 1999 (11 years). The following graphs represent the individual numbers for
Zambia, regarding funding and volunteers.

**Figure 31: PC Funding for Zambia**

![PC Funding Graph for Zambia](image-url)
Figure 32: MSF Funding for Zambia

Figure 33: ICRC Funding for Zambia
Figure 34: PC Volunteers for Zambia

Figure 35: MSF Volunteers for Zambia
Funding for the PC steadily increases over time and ICRC funding increases as well, dramatically so in 2000. MSF seems to have shown an increase from 2004 to 2006, with a slight decline since 2007. The number of volunteers that each INGO has sent seems to correlate well with the funding that each INGO has given. The PC shows a steady increase in the number of volunteers over time while MSF shows both increases and decreases in volunteer numbers, but dropping off significantly in recent years. The ICRC shows a steady increase as well, only seeming to level off in the number of volunteers in the last few years.

While this data shows general increases for Zambia regarding the amount of funding and volunteers, when compared to the other three countries, Zambia is still second to last for INGO presence and funding, and last for volunteer numbers. What is
interesting however, is that as a transition country, Zambia has overall, had more INGO presence and activity than South Africa has had, as a democracy.

Like the other country case studies, natural disasters that occurred in the last 50 years were also investigated to see if there were any correlations between increases or decreases of INGO activity and the timing of natural disasters. In Zambia, there have been 32 natural disasters, the 10th lowest of the 12 countries, and the least amount of natural disasters of the 3 countries studied here. As there have been less natural disasters overall, the graphs below show both the number of people that have been affected and killed over only the last 20 to 30 years.

**Figure 37: Number of People Killed by Natural Disasters in Zambia**
What could be suggested is that some correlation may be found here. In the early 2000s, the number of people both affected and killed by natural disasters increased significantly. If we look back at the funding and volunteer numbers of the PC and the ICRC, those both increased at the same time. It is possible that this is one explanation as to why there was more INGO activity during this time. Increased INGO activity was needed as a response to natural disasters that the Zambian government could not control by themselves. However, this is not necessarily completely conclusive evidence, or the only reason, as to why Zambia has had more INGO activity than South Africa. Therefore, we must look further back into their history for possible explanations as to why a transition country has had some success with INGOs.

Like many other African countries, Zambia was colonized early and experienced one party rule until recently. Zambia used to be known as the territory of Northern
Rhodesia and was under the control of the British, beginning in 1891. In 1923 it was annexed into Northern and Southern Rhodesia until 1953, when Northern and Southern Rhodesia joined with Nyasaland (what is now known as Malawi) (U.S. State Department Zambia Country Profile, 2010). After two years of transition, in 1964, Zambia claimed its independence, along with claiming its new name (CIA World Factbook, 2010).

From 1964 until 1991, Zambia was under the rule of one party, the United National Independence Party, with the political figure Kenneth Kaunda as its leader. Kaunda did admittedly bridge many people together with the help of his party, but his rule was also known to be extremely repressive and corrupt, evident by the fact that in 1972, one party rule was firmly established and all other political parties were banned. While Zambia struggled with high levels of corruption and repression internally, Zambia was also supporting the anti-white rule movements of some of its neighboring countries, support which made it rather unpopular. Conflicts with neighbors caused Zambia to have to close its borders temporarily. This caused Zambia to be very self dependent, with some aid from China and other foreign investors. Issues such as refugees, civil wars in other countries, railroad and transport problems, and unhappy former Portuguese colonies all increased pressure on the Zambian government (U.S. State Department Zambia Country Profile, 2010).

It wasn’t until 1990 that opposition began to stir in protest (BBC Zambia Country Profile, 2010). In 1991 Zambia held its first multiparty elections but the same party held power and in 1996, there was blatant harassment of any opposition parties (CIA World Factbook, 2010). In addition, since independence, there have been various problems within the government, as many are not government trained and much of the direction of
their economy (as well as other areas) depends on foreign expertise (US State Department Zambia Profile, 2010). In 2001 and 2006 there were multiparty elections, but throughout both were charges of corruption and rigging of elections, issues that are still being dealt with today. Worthy to note here and specific to this investigation is in 1999, the government drafted a policy that would closely regulate INGOs and INGO activity. Therefore, the state continues to dominant all aspects, as it has for 50 years, through power plays, intimidation, and harassment (Freedom House Zambia Country Profile, 2010).

Similar to Tanzania, as Zambia was trying to protect itself from the problems of its neighbors and join the people of various countries (joining together both Rhodesia’s and Malawi), much effort was focused on building a national identity, with a focus on a “humanism” approach. Contrary to Tanzania however, some good economic policies were implemented and the economic liberalization and privatization that Zambia pursued, as well as their main export, copper, did attract foreign investment. However, despite Zambia receiving a substantial amount of foreign aid and assistance, internal factors such as corruption, debt, and lack of trained government officials has and continues to hamper true economic development and growth. While recently the economy has stabilized and there has been an increase in GDP, a decrease in interest rates, and an increase in trade, unemployment is rampant, high inflation is common, the currency is volatile, and over 2/3 of the population live in poverty (U.S. State Department Zambia Country Profile, 2010).

In terms of government, currently, Zambia is represented by 9 provinces, the same person occupies the positions of chief of state and head of government, a cabinet, and
presidential election by popular vote. Despite some democratic progress and political strides, Zambia is held back from further growth by some of the following factors: a ranking of 7th in the world for adult infection of HIV/AIDS; problems with boundary issues, refugees, trafficking, drugs; sparse population; little natural resources; extreme poverty; and many different religious groups (although ethnically, 99.5% are African) (CIA World Factbook, 2010). It would seem that Zambia is doing marginally better but much still needs to be done.

Therefore, when looking at Zambia as an individual country, a few things can be discussed. First, in comparison with other countries, Zambia has seen relative political stability over the last 50 years. With one party rule, governance did not vary greatly, like the Sudan has witnessed. Additionally, while living under one party rule, there were no major civil wars or internal strife. Rather, Zambia has acted as a mediator with other countries and much time has been spent on creating a national identity for Zambians. While the government remains corrupt and repressive, foreign aid is still desired and received, even if there are problems of distribution. This could be one explanation why Zambia has seen greater INGO activity than South Africa. Zambia has simply been more willing to allow for foreign intervention, as the state does not feel threatened by outside assistance, as it has a tight grip on its country.
SUDAN
Table 5: Descriptive Variables for Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Variables</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters</td>
<td>Since 1980, 68 events; 160,468 killed; 28,897,157 affected; storm 1; wildfire 1; earthquake 2; insect infestation 5; drought 7; flood 23; epidemic 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Conflict</td>
<td>Huge history of conflict; war; Darfur situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Stability</td>
<td>Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Many natural resources; most significant is oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Currently</td>
<td>-4 on Polity IV Scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sudan is the country representing the interruption category. The countries in the interruption category are those that have seen numerous fluctuations on the polity IV scale, vacillating all over the scale, experiencing both autocratic and democratic rule, as well as periods of transition, anarchy, and interregnum. The following years show the various polity scores Sudan has been given on the polity IV scale over the last 60 years. The length of time for each individual score is shown in parentheses: 1956-1957: 8 (2 years); 1958-1963: -7 (6 years); 1964: -88 (1 years); 1965-1968: 7 (4 years); 1969-1970: -88 (2 years); 1971-1984: -7 (14 years); 1985: -88 (1 year);1986-1988: 7 (3 years); 1989-2001: -7 (13 years); 2002-2004: -6 (3 years) and; 2005-2008: -4 (4 years). The graph shows the polity2 scores in which only true value polity scores are shown.
Figure 39: Sudan Polity 2 Score

As this graph shows, of the countries studied, Sudan has seen the greatest amount of fluctuation on the polity IV scale. Essentially, this implies massive fluctuations in governance. What this means is that political stability in Sudan has been almost nonexistent. Regarding the three other countries for the individual country analysis, Sudan has had the most INGO presence, funding, and volunteers. Specifically, when looking at INGO presence, these 3 INGOs entered in the following years: (Sudan is 5th out of the 12 countries for longest INGO presence and the INGOs entered in both times of democratic and autocratic rule): PC: n/a; ICRC: 1978 (32 years) and; MSF: 1979 (31 years). (The PC has never operated in the Sudan and hence, this could account for why out of the 12 countries, while receiving the most funding and volunteer numbers, they don’t have the greatest amount of presence.)

The following graphs represent the individual numbers for Sudan, looking at the funding and volunteer numbers given by the ICRC and MSF.
Figure 40: ICRC Funding for Sudan

Figure 41: MSF Funding for Sudan
Figure 42: ICRC Volunteers for Sudan

Figure 43: MSF Volunteers for Sudan
These graphs show that the funding and volunteers for both the MSF and the ICRC have not been consistent, but have fluctuated over time. The ICRC funding has increased, dipped drastically, stagnated, and then increased again. As for ICRC volunteers, the numbers of volunteers generally increased until 2004 to 2005 and this matches the spike in funding as well. 2006 begins to see a decrease in both of these variables for the ICRC. As for the MSF, while there are only a few years of funding available, the number of volunteers shows a pattern similar to the ICRC, with a lot of fluctuation at the beginning of this decade. Towards the middle and end of this decade, both funding and volunteers begin to decline.

Despite the absence of the PC and the obvious and significant fluctuations of funding and volunteers in Sudan, when compared to the other three countries in the individual case studies, this interruption country has had the most INGO activity and presence, with the most amount of funding and volunteers. As mentioned previously, of the 12 countries, except for the years of INGO presence, interruption countries were the ones that received the most funding and volunteers.

Regarding natural disasters, Sudan has experienced 68 natural disasters in the last 50 years. Sudan has the 4th highest number of natural disasters of the 12. Again, the graphs below show the number of Sudanese people both killed and affected during these natural disasters, to search for any correlation between an increase or decrease with funding and/or volunteer numbers and the timing of natural disasters.
When looking at the timing of these natural disasters and the number of Sudanese people killed, when compared with the three variables, there is no correlation with the
number of people killed. After 1988, while there were natural disasters, the number of people killed was not a large number. However, the number of people affected spiked in the early 1980s and early 1990s, dropping in the early 2000s, and then increasing again in the last few years. It is possible that the slight increase seen in funding and volunteers during the years of 2003 and 2004 (for the ICRC) matched with the number of people affected during those years. However, in 2007 there is a large increase in the number of people affected by natural disasters but both the ICRC and MSF funding and volunteer numbers dropped during that year. This would not suggest any correlation between these variables and the timing of natural disasters. Therefore, while the timing of natural disasters was a worthy variable to investigate, it would appear after looking at all the individual countries, that there doesn’t seem to be any significant correlations between these variables and the timing of natural disasters. As such, the historical analysis into Sudan might provide more answers as to why this country has had the most INGO activity, funding, and volunteers, despite a great lack of political stability and much fluctuation in regime type.

Sudan is a country that has been ravaged by several different factors, resulting in being at war with itself for more than 3/4 of its existence. As such, economic and political development and growth has been slow, even non existent at times. It is the largest country in Africa with the most diverse population on the African continent. In the early 1800s, Sudan was made up of several, small independent kingdoms, represented by various tribes. However, with such a variety of different tribes in one area, there was great fragmentation within the country, an environment that remains evident today. In the late 1880s, there was an attempt to join together these tribes under one leader but it was
short lived as the British entered in 1900 (U.S. State Department Sudan Country Profile, 2010).

Sudan gained independence from the British in 1956 but almost immediately, once the new government reneged on its promises to the people of the South to create a federal system and ignored the Islamic character of the state, a mutiny occurred by army officers. This in turn launched a 17 year civil war and domination by military regimes that favored governments of an Islamic nature. Conflicts arose out of the northern attempt to dominate the economic, political, and social spheres of the non-Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese (US State Department Sudan Profile, 2010).

In 1958, one of the commanding generals took power and strengthened the southerner side. Essentially, the battle was between those who wanted self-determination and those wishing for a federal state. However, he was overthrown in 1964 when a civilian government took power. The next five years saw a succession of unsuccessful governments until 1969 when communist and socialist officers took over. Complicating the situation in 1969 was that these commanders claimed socialism as the ideal form of government but in the process, isolated the Muslim population and the North. These officers then went to the South for support in which they granted autonomy and created a peace agreement. However, this proved unsuccessful as oil was found in the South and the North wanted to reap some of the benefits. The first civil war ended in 1971 but as these officers abolished the southern regime and took control as one central government, the peace agreement between the two halves of the country was erased and the South was put under the control of the North (U.S. State Department Sudan Profile, 2010).
This move was protested in 1983 when a second civil war broke out which resulted in more than 4 million displaced and over 2 million dead in two decades. Finally, in 1986, the socialist government was overthrown and a civilian government was put in place. In 1989, more change occurred when the National Islamic Front took over, a military government that practiced political repression and focused on Islam. They were sanctioned in 1996 for supporting terrorist groups and it wasn’t until the late 1990s that there began to be movements towards peace. This occurred because of the increased alienation by the government and due to this, even rebel groups joined together with the South to fight the current government. (US State Department Sudan Profile, 2010).

In 2002, efforts truly began to end the civil war with a massive peace agreement between the North and the South. It was decided that the South could have self determination and peace talks ensued. In 2005, the southern rebels were granted autonomy for the next six years and since then, there has been power and wealth sharing between the central government and the southern government (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Currently, the central government is a power share between the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

What might not be evident from this brief summary is that a large majority of the issues that have been present in Sudan since its beginning have been due to two factors. First, the variety of different groups of people that have lived in this country has been great. Since the early 1800s, cleavages between different tribes has been evident and cultural division has been wide. Second, there are deep religious cleavages, especially between the Islamic and non-Islamic communities. These cleavages, some which have been exacerbated by the government, have not only instigated civil war, insurgency,
rebellion, and much internal strife, but have created obstacles for true economic and social growth and development.

All of these factors present a complicated situation for Sudan. Due to cultural and religious cleavages, great political instability, two civil wars, rebel fighting, refugees, displacement, and the Darfur situation, Sudan has had little time to progress politically, socially, or economically. Currently, there is supposedly equal power and wealth sharing between the government of National Unity (North) and the Interim government of Southern Sudan, with a completely new constitution. There are 25 states, a chief of state and head of government that are the same, a cabinet, elections, and a bicameral national legislature (CIA World Factbook, 2010).

Economically, Sudan has a very limited infrastructure upon which to build. While there was a 6.4% increase in their GDP after the peace agreement, Sudan suffers from 21 billion dollars in debt and there is nothing that can be quickly done to change the damage of so many years of civil war. Sudan relies heavily on its agriculture but with the oil found recently in the South, oil has become major export for them, and an international focus (U.S. State Department Sudan Country Profile, 2010). The discovery of oil has also caused tension to rise between the North and the South, as the infrastructure and banking for the oil industry is in the North while the oil is in the South (Freedom House Sudan Country Profile, 2010). T

However, one of the most contentious issues that Sudan is currently facing is the separate conflict in Darfur, which is currently known as a complex emergency. In 2003, there was a reported 2 million people displaced and between 200,000 to 400,000 deaths. While the UN did intervene, conflict and chaos reign, despite the most recent peace
agreement of 2010 between the government and rebels. Due to the rocky past of Sudan and the situation in Darfur, there are many humanitarian problems as well, regarding displaced people, violence, famine, disease, lack of basic infrastructure, and poverty. Additionally, the ethnic and rebel fighting has spilled over into neighboring countries (currently 52% of Sudanese are Black, 39% are Arab, 6% are Beja, 2% are Foreigners, and 1% other). Sudan is also one of the world’s most corrupt countries and most freedoms (religion, press, academic, assembly, etc) are severely limited (Freedom House Sudan Country Profile, 2010). Moreover, even with these significant humanitarian issues, the government of Sudan has expelled 13 international humanitarian organizations and has shut down three national aid organizations (US State Department Sudan Profile, 2010).

As can be seen by the historical analyses of the different countries, there are some similarities but there are also great differences. Some countries have experienced only one party rule for decades, while others have known nothing but turnovers and challenges to power. Others have dealt with major humanitarian crises issues such as genocide or multiple civil wars, while others have lived in relative stability. The reason for this analysis is to highlight that each country has arrived at the current moment with very different histories and contexts. These contexts show varying types of environments in which INGOs can either work successfully or not, and that demands and needs may be vastly different.

What, then, can be taken away from this individual case analysis? Sudan has known the most internal struggle and political instability out of these countries and has had the most INGO presence, with the greatest amount of funding and volunteer
numbers. What this might suggest is that other factors play a role in INGO activity. The initial hypothesis of this paper believed that regime type was affecting INGO presence, or possibly vice versa. What this data suggests is that regime type might not be the only factor that needs to be considered. Rather, political instability and internal factors, as well as political motivation for accepting or declining foreign aid need to be closely investigated. As shown here, South Africa as a democratic country, has had the least amount of INGO activity, despite the fact that is usually assumed that democracies will be the most stable regime type and the most amenable to INGO activity. Autocracies, transition, and interruption countries all have had more INGO activity, with greater numbers for funding and volunteers. This is contrary to the hypothesis of this thesis which believes that democracies should have more INGO activity. The next section discusses the factors of these countries that could affect INGO activity, including three possible alternative explanations that could explain these findings.

CHAPTER SIX: Alternative Explanations and Conclusion

When trying to understand what might affect INGO presence, funding, and volunteer numbers in these 4 countries, multiple factors have to be considered. What can be clearly stated is that the original research question of this thesis has become much bigger than anticipated. It cannot be decisively stated if there is one regime type best able to foster a good relationship with a humanitarian INGO. Regime type is simply one of many factors that has to be included in this type of investigation. Additionally, while regime type may influence INGO presence and activity, the reverse can be true as well, with INGOs influencing regimes.
Simply put, this question has evolved over the course of this investigation, becoming more involved than just a question regarding regime type. As can be seen, this question remains mostly unanswered, with nothing decisive being stated by the scholars in this field and no, one, explanatory theory. In addition, when using the variables in this thesis, to act as a proxy for measuring the relationship between regime type and INGO, there are no clear patterns or correlations that can be seen. Due to the lack of patterns or correlations between regime types and variables, I had to look more deeply into the domestic political environments, internal characteristics, economic and social situations, and natural disasters of specific countries. As nothing can be firmly stated from the data presented by the 3 INGOs discussed here (and as much data was not publicly available), more needed to be done.

As such, other avenues had to be investigated, to see if there were other variables or factors that could explain why there may be more or less INGO activity in a country. Therefore, the purpose of individual country case studies was an attempt to see if those factors listed above could provide possible explanations as to why some countries have seen greater INGO activity and others less. As the case studies show, the original assumption of this thesis is incorrect, democracies have not had a greater amount of INGO presence, nor are their relationships with INGOs necessarily better. Therefore, by using the variables found within each country (internal characteristics, domestic political environment, civil society, etc), I also suggest three alternative explanations to possibly explain INGO activity. The quest is to see if one can best explain INGO activity and be applied successfully to all the countries discussed here.
The first alternative explanation looks at political stability. As regime type might not be the deciding factor in determining the amount of INGO activity and the type of relationship present, political stability could have a larger affect. Political stability doesn’t necessarily imply that a regime type is democratic, or pursuing liberal, progressive, or fair policies. Political stability could mean that one regime type has ruled for a long period of time, with very few fluctuations according to the polity IV scale. Less fluctuations in governance could provide more stability (or possibly gridlock) in general, a stability that could spill over into the general populace of a country. However, two sides have to be accounted for. Stability could mean an incredibly harsh and repressive rule in which no civil space is allowed for differing opinions. Stability could also mean space has been created in which there is room for growth, differing opinions, and progress.

Affecting political stability are factors that have been mentioned previously. Natural disasters, civil wars, internal strife, refugees, corruption, displacement, lack of natural resources, disease, ethnic and religious cleavages, etc are all factors that could affect political stability. With this, perhaps INGO activity is determined by the level of political stability in a country. Is there more or less INGO presence in countries with more or less political stability? Or, can INGOs operate in any environment, regardless of political stability?

If we parallel the idea that there should be a greater amount of INGO activity in democracies, it would seem that there should be more INGO activity in those countries that are more politically stable. (However, it should be noted that after the data has shown that there is less INGO presence in democracies, the opposite could be true. As
humanitarian organizations, these INGOs go to countries that have the most need for aid and assistance. Therefore, countries with complicating factors and more political instability could have more INGO activity.)

When applying this explanation to the 4 countries studied here, once applied, the findings seem both able and unable to support this idea. South Africa and Tanzania have arguably, despite internal issues (especially in South Africa), had the most political stability, according to the polity IV scale. Both have firmly stayed as either democratic or autocratic for long periods of time. Tanzania has had the second highest amount of INGO presence, funding given, and volunteers sent. In addition, Tanzania has known relative political stability due to the efforts by Nyerere and his focus on social practices. Therefore, this country would support this as it has had high levels of political stability, less internal issues than other countries, and high INGO presence.

South Africa however, seems to both not support and support this explanation. This country has had the least amount of presence, funding, and volunteers, when compared to the other countries, but at least superficially, according to the polity IV scale, has had some political stability. Therefore, with more political stability, there has been less INGO presence. However, the opposite could be true. There are several problems with this analysis of South Africa. While South Africa has remained firmly democratic for years, which does suggest political stability from a superficial standpoint, it has also known constant unrest and internal strife because of apartheid. This suggests that even though they have been labeled as democratic, they still have had many civil and social problems, creating political instability. Therefore, South Africa does provide support for
this alternative idea, as they could also have had less political stability and less INGO presence.

However, Zambia and Sudan also disprove this. Zambia, while representing the transition category of governance, has appeared relatively stable politically. It spent long years under one autocratic rule, a few years in transition, and has now been under a democratic rule for numerous years. Again, while these rules might have been repressive, they were under one party, decreasing political fluctuations and changes and increasing some semblance of stability. Interestingly, economic policies have been, and are, of high priority and because of this, Zambia has received much foreign aid and assistance. However, despite the relative political stability in Zambia and foreign assistance, they are still second to last (when compared to the other three countries) for INGO presence and funding, and last for volunteers. This would appear incompatible as one should expect to see greater levels of INGO activity with more political stability.

Sudan also disproves this. Sudan has suffered the most political instability of the 4 countries and has had the most INGO activity. Sudan has known nothing but change and upheaval of governance, serious internal issues, and poor foreign relations, but nonetheless, has had the most INGO activity. Therefore, while two countries somewhat support this alternative explanation, two countries strongly disprove this. As such, I don’t believe this explanation can be successfully applied to all of the countries as an explanation for INGO activity.

The second and third explanations approach from a different perspective. Throughout this thesis investigation, I have been guilty of looking at INGO activity and
presence from a liberal, Western bias. I have assumed that humanitarian foreign aid is typically wanted and something about the regime type or internal characteristics create an atmosphere that is either conducive, or not, to fostering a good relationship. However, the opposite perspective needs to be considered, the perspective of the state. The state might not desire humanitarian foreign assistance for multiple reasons. The state is constantly asking why they should let outside influence and intervention enter their country. While INGOs might ask why they should invest in one country or the possible risks of making such an investment, states ask why they should let foreign aid in. Moreover, how a state cares for its people can also determine if aid is allowed in or not. Therefore, explanation two and three approach these issues from the perspective of the state.

The second alternative explanation looks at the relationships with possible patron states to these countries. Perhaps one of the reasons there is more or less INGO activity is due to relationships with other, more wealthy, countries. For example, perhaps Zambia and South Africa (the two countries with the least amount of INGO activity) have declined foreign aid or refused access because they don’t need outside intervention and influence (what is most likely Western aid) because they have a patron state who is helping them. Sudan and Tanzania, with more INGO activity, might be lacking in a patron state, a state which can help them financially and offer resources. Even though this does hold some merit, it does not work for these countries either.

South Africa, despite apartheid, has never really known a patron state. In addition to having a wealth of natural resources, has also acted as a regional and international leader for a number of years. There is no reason they should have refused foreign aid
because they were receiving assistance from another state. Tanzania also refutes this.

Tanzania has known multiple benefactors, but these have come in the form of the World Bank, the IMF, and other Western countries. No one country has acted as a patron. Additionally, Tanzania has acted as a mediator for the region and could be seen, if not through money and resources but other means, as a patron state for others in the region.

Moreover, Zambia and Sudan also refute this second possibility. While Zambia did receive some assistance from China in the 1960s and 1970s, when their borders were closed temporarily because of neighboring issues, Zambia has not had any real patron state to assist them. Zambia is second lowest, in front of South Africa, for INGO activity but has had no patron state to assist. Sudan on the other hand, has received a lot of aid from China, as Chinese interests in the state are high, but Sudan has also had the most INGO activity. Therefore, despite having something of a patron state in the form of China, Sudan still has the greatest amount of INGO activity. As such, this cannot be applied successfully to these countries.

The final alternative explanation stems a little from what was just previously discussed, but looks directly at why states may or may not desire foreign aid. This stands upon the idea mentioned earlier, that INGOs ask why they should invest in a certain country and the possible risks, while states ask why they should allow for foreign intervention. This essentially looks at state interests, with three possible outcomes. First, states, from the realist perspective, will look for things that enhance the power of the state and will benefit them the most. Therefore, most states want to maximize their power and
reduce dependence on foreign aid, limiting any outside influence. States simply don’t want to open themselves up to foreign influence and intervention. So, the first possibility with this third explanation suggests that if a state can provide for its people on its own, there will be no need for international humanitarian support. In fact, if the state can provide for its population in a satisfactory manner, the people will support that government, with no outside assistance needed. If the government is not providing in a satisfactory manner, the people will ask for something more to be done.

The second outcome is that the government can’t support its people or provide satisfactory aid, and will allow for foreign intervention, opening itself up to outside influence. This suggests two things. First, this is a government that cares for its people, by risking losing a small portion of its own power by allowing in outsiders. Second, by allowing for aid to enter, this looks good for the government and could muster up more support for the current regime in power. This enhances legitimacy for the state. So while aid is allowed, it may be for reasons to benefit the population or for reasons that actually benefit the state. Whatever reason behind the motivation, aid and foreign assistance are allowed.

The third outcome is the most realist choice and suggests that the state simply doesn’t need or want aid. Admittedly, the country might desperately need aid but the state won’t allow for it to enter. This type of regime is one that cares little for its people and doesn’t wish to gain favor or legitimacy, at home or abroad. As they repel the idea of outside influence, they don’t need the support of their people to stay in power and don’t wish to lose any power by opening themselves up to outside influence. This is especially
true when considering organizations such as MSF, the humanitarian organization that prides itself on being a watchdog, reporting atrocities and crimes committed by the government. If a state doesn’t need the support of its citizens to maintain its power, if they don’t care about their people, why would they allow outside aid that could possibly threaten their control?

Outside of the African region, an example that could be used for this third outcome would be Burma. From one perspective, Burma is perhaps one of the most politically stable countries in the world, ruled by an extremely repressive and harsh military junta. While a historical analysis of this country isn’t needed here, a single example can support this third outcome for this final idea. In 2008, Burma was struck by Cyclone Nargis, killing and affecting thousands of people. While many regions of Burma were declared as disaster areas and thousands of people were displaced, the military junta refused international aid for multiple days. Despite international pressure and possible sanctions, Burma still refused. The military stated that it needed no outside help and General Thein said, “... his country, with 60 million people has a government, its people and the private sector to tackle the problem by themselves.” (BBC News “Cyclone Nargis”, 2008). While the military did eventually allow for aid to enter, it was delayed for a long time upon entry, there were massive problems with distribution and aid successfully reaching the Burmese people.

The regime in Burma, essentially, didn’t need its people to maintain its power and as such, possibly felt it didn’t need to provide aid, or allow aid to enter. Moreover, the Burmese regime has close political and economic ties with China and if resources were
needed, the Chinese could help. Otherwise, the military would not want to open up Burma to outside influence. When applying this alternative explanation to the 4 African countries, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, when looking at South Africa, this idea could be applied. As South Africa is rich in resources and acting as a regional leader, there hasn’t been much need for outside aid. Even more important is that during apartheid, it is highly possible that the leaders did not want any outside intervention, for fear of sanctions, international condemnation, and loss of power. The political risks were too costly for South Africa to welcome foreign assistance. The people in power during apartheid were satisfied with their rule and by not caring for the condition of their people, had no desire to open South Africa to outside influence. The regime felt it had enough control and did not require any kind of foreign assistance.

As for Zambia, they did receive foreign aid, but in areas of economics and development, not in the humanitarian sphere. However, Zambia has been relatively stable and has had less internal issues than South Africa. Interestingly, problems did manifest with the foreign aid to Zambia (economically and developmentally) due to government corruption and repression. So while Zambia did receive aid, they did not ask for humanitarian assistance, but they also had less need for it.

As for Tanzania and Sudan, they too provide support for this third explanation. Tanzania has received a lot of foreign assistance, but this country has been relatively stable, with a direct focus on developing civil society. Tanzania appears to be a country that supports the idea that if a government can’t provide for its people, they will be willing to lose some control and open themselves up to possible outside influence. As
there has been a lot of INGO activity in Tanzania, this is a likely possibility. While Tanzania has known relative stability, it has not been without issues and therefore, it is possible that the Tanzanian government wanted to care for its people in certain moments when it was unable to do so on its own.

Finally, the situation in Sudan also supports this. Sudan, as mentioned previously, has known no political stability and has suffered for decades from internal strife and civil war. Governance has oscillated significantly for the last 60 years and it simply appears that all regimes have been unable to provide aid. Since Sudan is host to such a prolonged hostile environment, and considering the Darfur situation, Sudan might simply accept aid because the need is so great. Recent regimes, including the current one, may have recognized that there would be no possibility for true growth and development if the situation remained the same within the country. Instead, for progress to be made and for some semblance of stability to enter Sudan, the government may have acknowledged that outside intervention was simply necessary for basic survival. While allowing for aid might not have been their first option, the Sudanese government had to allow for it, as they could not maintain any type of control without massive opposition, nor could they provide for their people. The government might also want to remain in control, a possibility that is more likely if they are seen to be helping their people. Thus, the Sudanese situation provides support for this idea.

Therefore, with some exceptions, the alternative explanation looking specifically at reasons why countries might or might not allow for aid to enter, appears to be applicable to all of the country case studies investigated here. Again, while not perfect,
this does offer a possible explanation as to why there might be more or less INGO presence in certain countries. As stated previously, the question investigating the relationship between regime type and humanitarian INGOs has evolved through the course of this thesis into something much bigger. The initial question, hypotheses, and analysis of data conducted earlier simply proved to be inconclusive. This inconclusive result does not negate the importance of this question, but it required another approach. This approach looked at 4 countries, each one representing each category of regime type. An historical analysis was conducted, to look at specific factors within each country that could suggest why there might be more or less INGO presence. These factors were then used in three different alternative explanations, to see if one could best explain INGO presence. The results of this secondary inquiry show that instead of regime type, the interests of states needs to be considered regarding the entry of aid.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, several things can be discussed regarding this analysis. The main objective of this investigation was to discover if a certain regime type fosters the best relationship with an international humanitarian organization. Is one type of regime more receptive towards an INGO, giving the latitude to do its work? Is it true that democracies are always going to be the best to work with these organizations? Is it correct to make this assumption? Questions that were complementary to the main research question were if it is possible to see an historical trend of certain regime types that have asked for help? On the other hand, are there certain regime types that have not asked for help, for whatever reason? Have there been moments when regime types have blatantly refused help when
offered? All these questions prove important as little is said on this subject, especially when focusing on humanitarian international non-governmental organizations. While there is much in the literature that discusses political and developmental INGOs, the material is quite limited that covers humanitarian INGOs and no firm consensus has been reached.

These questions also prove important because with much indecision, the automatic response appears to be that democracies are simply better. It is assumed that democracies are the regime types best able to foster the best relationship possible. Empirical investigation appears lacking however, as it is taken for granted that democracies will work better with these INGOs. If nothing else, this thesis suggests that perhaps this shouldn’t be the case. Rather, it is necessary that every time, an empirical investigation should be conducted, as it isn’t always certain, that democracies are the best regime type to work with INGOs. This should not be considered a foregone conclusion.

As stated earlier, the initial belief of this thesis agreed with the majority, that democracies will be the most accommodating to INGOs, I assumed what many do. I expected that greater levels of democracy will be associated with greater levels of civil society and greater INGO presence. I expected to see a positive relationship between these variables. Therefore, I anticipated that democracies would have the longest history of INGO presence, the greatest amount of funding and number of volunteers. However, after the literature review and other possibilities that have added layers of complexity to this question, and due to the compelling evidence posited by Mercer, I wanted one other hypothesis to be tested. Hypothesis two states that there will be a negative relationship
between variables and that with greater levels of democracy, there will be less INGO presence. Moreover, this could either be due to the level of democracy of a regime type being the independent variable and affecting INGO presence or, the regime type could be the dependent variable, being affected by INGO presence. Also affecting the outcome of these hypotheses are a multitude of other factors, including domestic political environment and civil society. In addition, could these hypotheses determine if democracies really are the best regime type to work with INGOs.

Therefore, many variables were measured and a multitude of factors were considered to answer these questions and to test my hypotheses in measuring this relationship. This thesis looked at the various regime types of 12 Sub-Saharan African countries, according to the Polity IV scale, while measuring the relationship between regimes and INGOs. The three variables used were chosen as they were considered to be a good representation, or proxy, for the relationship between regime type and INGO. The data represented by the three variables was collected and an aggregated perspective for all 12 countries was shown by four different categorizations of regime types. In addition, 4 specific countries were chosen to show a more singular representation of the relationship being measured by these three variables, highlighted by individual case studies.

Interestingly, when considering the three variables, the years of INGO presence, funding, and volunteer numbers, the results prove interesting. Contrary to the overwhelming belief that democracies are the regime types best able to foster a good relationship, the results of this thesis at least suggest that this might not always be the case. Moreover, when considering the five different variables discussed in chapter 4, a
few conclusions can be drawn. First, there appears to be no observable historical pattern of regime types asking or refusing aid from a humanitarian INGO. Second, after investigating the timing of historical conflict, natural, and man made disasters, no patterns were seen regarding an increase or decrease of presence, funding, or volunteer numbers. When specifically looking at the top ten natural and man made disasters in the last fifty years for each country (according to the number of people both disturbed/displaced and killed), there were no obvious increases or decreases in any of the variables for any of the countries or INGOs. The same is true when considering a country’s natural resources and any political, ideological, and religious objections that might have arisen.

When considering the first variable for the data that was aggregated, transition regimes were those that had the longest INGO presence, followed closely by interruption and autocracy regimes, and then finally democratic regimes. When looking at the total amount of funding, interruption regimes have received the most funding, followed by autocracies, transitions, and finally democracies. Similarly, total number of volunteers have been highest in interruption regimes, followed by transition regimes, democracies, and finally autocracies. Not only does this data show that there isn’t a consistent regime type that has had the longest presence of INGOs, or the highest amount of funding and volunteer numbers, this data shows that democratic regime types tend to be the lowest in numbers when using these variables. Overall, transition and interruption regimes have the greatest number of years of INGO presence, amount of funding, and volunteer numbers.

The question follows, why might this be the case? Why do transition, interruption, and autocratic regimes have greater numbers regarding INGO years of presence, total funding, and volunteer numbers? Why are democracies the only regime
What types that have not restricted access in any manner? What, essentially, is the demand? What are the reasons or factors that demand INGO presence? What is pulling these INGOs in? Is it that non-democratic regimes have a higher demand for humanitarian INGOs and democratic regimes less so? Once INGOs are in democratic regimes, are they in an environment that is more conducive for them to stay, never asked to leave?

These questions allow one to wonder what factors might play a significant role in creating a demand for INGO presence. What factors impact the type of relationship that could be created between regime types and humanitarian organizations? One has to consider a plethora of possible different factors that could affect the demand by different regimes, thereby affecting the relationship between them and humanitarian INGOs.

Harking back to the argument posited by Julie Fisher, it seems that certain political climates, situations, and circumstances do play an important role. It appears that most countries and regimes are willing to foster a good relationship with an INGO but the degree of how good that relationship will be depends on the various political atmospheres, internal dynamics, and characteristics of the country.

Some other factors to consider, and that have been mentioned previously are: political context; political realignment; development and economic problems; foreign policy; history of relationship with INGOs; industry type; degree of industrialization; resources; domestic politics; ability/willingness to work with outside groups; political institutions; ability to make credible commitments; level of modernization and/or dependency; general inability of the state to control domestic situations (e.g.: adverse humanitarian conflicts such as civil war, genocide, natural disaster, human rights abuses, political, religious, ethnic cleavages, etc); disease; lack of any real medical infrastructure.
or assistance programs/plans; and lack of resources/personnel to deal with famine, disease, overpopulation, drought, etc.

Another factor of importance addresses issues of access, this includes considering some of the following: if the regime allowed access by an INGO; if the regime asked an INGO to leave; if serious problems manifested between the regime and INGO or; if obstacles were created by the regime or INGO. While there might be instances that were not discovered, the following are the specific instances that were found during the process of this investigation that highlighted problems between a regime type and an INGO. The instances in which access was denied, refused, or compromised is as follows: Lesotho 1998: the government thought of boycotting the Peace Corps due to accusations of spying. However, nothing manifested (Peace Corps, 2010); Malawi 1907s: the Peace Corps was asked to leave briefly for supposedly not conforming to government regulations. However, it is unknown which regulations they were not in compliance with (U.S. State Department Malawi Profile, 2010); Niger 1996: While these 3 INGOs were not asked to leave, other aid organizations were asked to leave during a military coup, but the situation remained tenuous (U.S. State Department Niger Profile, 2010); DRC 2004, 2006: the MSF left multiple times due to outbreaks of violence and disease (MSF Activity Report 2004, 2006); Sudan 2008, 2009: there were multiple instances in which INGOs were denied access or asked to leave; expulsion (briefly) of MSF, as well as several abductions of both MSF and ICRC staff, which threatened the activity and presence of both INGOs (MSF Activity Report 2008, 2009) (ICRC, 2010).

Overall, it can be stated that more attention needs to be given to the demand factors that may be present in a specific country. Why does a country need INGO
presence? In addition, issues of access also play an important role. Have there been and are there any issues of access? Have INGOs been denied entry or faced obstacles, limiting the ability to do their work? In this thesis, I controlled for various factors the best I could, but more needs to be done for a firmer grasp on control variables. Demand factors and issues of access are two, overarching, variables that must be taken into serious consideration when asking these sorts of questions.

Consequently, what can be taken away from this investigation? Overall, the initial results appear inconclusive. There doesn’t appear to be one specific regime type, using this method of measurement, that consistently fosters the best relationship possible. Regime fluctuation is too varied and there are too many additional factors to consider, factors that could affect the demand and need for these INGOs. Therefore, nothing truly conclusive can be stated. As such, three alternative explanations were presented after the 4 case studies, to try and explain further why there might be more or less INGO activity in a country with a certain regime type. Of the three, the one that seemed to work the best looked at state interests, and why a state would or would not allow foreign aid. Essentially, INGO activity in a country can be traced to the desire and power of the state, to either exercise total control, or be willingness to open up to outside intervention and influence. Those states wishing to remain in complete control and with little regard to their population, had less INGO activity overall. The states that were relatively secure and wished to help their people (for altruistic reasons or otherwise), allowed for foreign intervention, resulting in greater INGO activity.

Additionally, if nothing else, this investigation shows that democracies shouldn’t be the default assumption, as they seem to have the least amount of interaction with
humanitarian INGOs and thus, fewer relationships overall. Democracies, simply by having less need for INGOs and fewer interactions with these organizations, might not foster the best relationship possible, as they might not be fostering any kind of relationship. Regime types such as autocracies, transitions, and interruptions are the regimes that are in need of these organizations and must form relationships with them. It is these regimes that we must look more closely at, to determine what creates the best relationship possible and what other factors need to be considered.

This investigation and analysis has its limitations, but there are ways in which future avenues of study could be improved upon. First, there is an obvious lack of data, as much of the date concerning the INGOs was not available or accessible. More time could be spent on trying to access INGO records that are not available to the public, or different variables could be used as proxies to measure the relationship. Also, the labeling and scoring scale of the Polity IV database might be too detailed in showing regime fluctuations. Perhaps using a database or categorization method that didn’t include so many fluctuations might have produced a more conclusive result. Second, only 12 countries were used in this study, a very small sample. In addition, as a region, Africa only transitioned away from colonization a few decades ago and is still very young, in the midst of massive transitions, and dealing with many issues. Many African countries also have similar histories and experiences, despite their differences. A specific weakness is that there was only one country, South Africa, that was used for the democratic regime categorization. This study would be further enhanced with a larger sample size and using more countries within each categorization. Perhaps too, a future study could use this method of testing but look at different regions of the world, to see if the results are
similar. Finally, a more in depth analysis could be conducted, to further investigate the very specific demand and need factors that are unique to each country and can affect the relationship and presence of INGOs.

In the end, while the variables measuring the relationship did not highlight a specific regime type, the type of governance and state’s interests remain crucial to our understanding of what occurs in a country and what might happen when the aid of an international humanitarian organization is offered and/or received. It must not be assumed that democracies work the best with these humanitarian organizations. It must be acknowledged that along with regime type, there are many other variables to consider, variables that affect the demand and need for INGOs, as well as issues of access. When investigating this relationship, other variables must be included to gain the fullest and greatest understanding of what is happening between regimes and humanitarian INGOs.
Data Appendix

Total Amount of Funding: (all countries)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
Data was available for the following years for each country:

Total of Volunteer Numbers: (all countries)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
Data was available for the following years for each country:

Total Funding of all INGOs: (South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
Funding for MSF is only given for the years of 2004, 2006, and 2007 data for other years was inaccessible. ICRC funding is given the following years: Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia: 2002-2008; Sudan: 1994 - 2008. No funding was given to Sudan by the PC.
Number of Volunteers from all INGOs: (South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan)
Data Source: Annual Reports from ICRC, MSF, and PC
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