Published In

Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG), 2016 IEEE Conference on

Document Type

Post-Print

Publication Date

2-23-2017

Subjects

Cooperativeness -- Mathematical models, Game theory, Altruism, Punishment (Psychology), Free rider problem (Economics)

Abstract

Social dilemmas force individuals to choose between cooperation, which benefits a group, and defection which benefits the individual. The unfortunate outcome in most social dilemmas is mutual defection where nobody benefits. Researchers frequently use mathematical games such as public goods games to help identify circumstances that might improve cooperation levels within a population. Altruistic punishment has shown promise in these games. Many real-world social dilemmas are expressed via a tragedy of the commons metaphor. This paper describes an investigation designed to see if altruistic punishment might work in tragedy of the commons social dilemmas. Simulation results indicate not only does it help resolve a tragedy of the commons but it also effectively deals with the associated first-order and second-order free rider problems.

Description

© 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

The final published version can be found at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CIG.2016.7860402

DOI

10.1109/CIG.2016.7860402

Persistent Identifier

http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/21164

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