Republican Party, Clean Air Act -- United States
Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility-level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)
© 2014 Western Economic Association International
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Innes, R., & Mitra, A. (2015). Parties, politics, and regulation: Evidence from clean air act enforcement. Economic Inquiry, 53(1), 522-539.