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Keywords

policy, public safety, crime, maras, El Salvador

Abstract

On July 23, 2003, Salvadoran President Francisco Flores introduced a punitive and militaristic gang-prevention measure, Plan Mano Dura (Plan Iron Fist), in an attempt to solve the gang phenomenon plaguing El Salvador. Although it turned out to be an abject policy failure, its future effects and significance would far outweigh its intended impact, essentially dictating how El Salvador would combat gang violence for the next 20 years and beyond. As such, it is essential to better understand how such an ineffective policy could arise as a policy approach. This paper examines whether Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) can account for the distinctive policy process that led to the implementation of Plan Mano Dura.

In the end, this paper finds that although Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) provides a satisfactory explanation for the initial rise of the plan, other theoretical frameworks may help explain the rise and application of Plan Mano Dura (e.g., innovation diffusion) and shed light on the persistence of punitive approaches on subsequent policy approaches to gang violence in El Salvador (e.g., Path Dependence Theory).

Publication Date

2025

DOI

10.15760/hgjpa.2025.9.1.4

Persistent Identifier

https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/43701

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.

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