Keywords
Globalization, Cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, Blockchain, Tax Evasion, International Organization, Automatic Exchange of Information
Abstract
This article presents an example of how globalization and digitization force states to rely on international organization. Examining tax policy with respect to cryptocurrency—an innovative, global technology—the implication is that a state levying taxes on cryptocurrency must turn to international monitoring and enforcement regimes to support effective taxation. Based on Margaret Levi’s theory of predatory rule, I submit a theory of “co-predation” to explain international cooperation with respect to taxation of novel, cross-border technologies such as cryptocurrency. The Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI), an anti-tax evasion framework promulgated by the OECD, serves as an example of international cooperation. A comparison of cryptocurrency taxation in Russia and Belarus finds that, where effective tax policy is at stake, states are enjoined to commit to international cooperation through AEOI. The article concludes by considering implications for legitimacy, quasi-voluntary compliance, and strategic tax policy.
Publication Date
May 2020
DOI
10.15760/hgjpa.2020.4.1.7
Persistent Identifier
https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/32866
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Mignano, Jim
(2020)
"Co-Predatory Rule: International Cooperation with Respect to Cryptocurrency Taxation in Russia and Belarus,"
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs:
Vol. 4:
Iss.
1, Article 7.
https://doi.org/10.15760/hgjpa.2020.4.1.7
Included in
Political Economy Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
