Portland State University. Department of History
Date of Award
Master of Science in Teaching (M.S.T.) in History
1 online resource (183 p.)
Japan -- Foreign economic relations -- United States, United States -- Foreign relations -- Japan
This thesis contends from the time of September 1940 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan offered each no workable concessions that might have deterred war. A stalemate was finally established between the two countries. The position of the Japanese nation was to expand and control "Greater East-Asia," while the position the United States held was one that claimed all nations should uphold certain basic principles of democracy, that all nations should honor the sanctity of treaties," and that they should treat neighboring countries in a friendly fashion.
This thesis also contends that Yosuke Matsuoka used his position as Foreign Minister of Japan to determine policy for the entire nation. Matsuoka led Japan in such a way that a settlement of differences between the United States and his country was not attainable through diplomatic talks. Even after Matsuoka had been removed from his position, the Supreme Command was determined to prepare for war and at the same time carry on diplomatic discussions with the United States. The only possible way that war could have been avoided was if one of the two nations had been willing to break the stalemate by giving in to the demands of the other. Neither was willing to compromise.
Overby, David Hoien, "The diplomatic stalemate of Japan and the United States: 1941" (1973). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1746.