First Advisor

Gary L. Scott

Date of Publication


Document Type


Degree Name

Master of Arts (M.A.) in Political Science


Political Science


Nuclear arms control -- United States, Nuclear arms control -- Soviet Union, United States -- Foreign relations -- Soviet Union, Soviet Union -- Foreign relations -- United States, Europe -- Defenses



Physical Description

1 online resource (189 p.)


Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have usually focused on domestic variables to explain US/Soviet arms control behavior. Partly because the number of negotiating parties is only two, there is a propensity to focus on the bilateral relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective domestic political situations. Only superficial attention has usually been given to international systems variables that may well influence the domestic political situation and arms control policy.

This thesis broadens the explanatory scope of US/Soviet arms control by showing how the political environment of a trilateral relationship (a subsystem that includes the West European members of NATO as a single actor as well as the United States and the Soviet Union) is a primary motivator of US/Soviet arms control behavior.


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Persistent Identifier