The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics
Sponsor
Portions of this work was funded by the Australian Research Council Discovery Grant number DP140102590.
Published In
Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on
Document Type
Citation
Publication Date
6-2016
Subjects
Game theory, Games of strategy (Mathematics), Trust
Abstract
Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from evolutionary game theorists. In this paper, an N-player trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and the individuals in the long run, evolutionary dynamics show this ideal situation is reached only in a special case when the initial population contains no untrustworthy individuals. When the initial population consists of even the slightest number of untrustworthy individuals, the society converges to zero trusters, with many untrustworthy individuals. The promotion of trust is an uneasy task, despite the fact that a combination of trusters and trustworthy trustees is the most rational and optimal social state. This paper presents the game and results of replicator dynamics in a hope that researchers in evolutionary games see opportunities in filling this critical gap in the literature.
Rights
© Copyright 2016 IEEE - All rights reserved.
Locate the Document
DOI
10.1109/TEVC.2015.2484840
Persistent Identifier
http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/16658
Citation Details
Abbass, H.; Greenwood, G.; Petraki, E., "The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics," in Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on , vol.PP, no.99, pp.1-1.
Description
Paper originally appeared in Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on (Volume:PP , Issue: 99 ).