Published In

Economic Inquiry

Document Type

Post-Print

Publication Date

1-2015

Subjects

Republican Party, Clean Air Act -- United States

Abstract

Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility-level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)

Rights

© 2014 Western Economic Association International

This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation.

Description

This is the peer reviewed version which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12142

DOI

10.1111/ecin.12142

Persistent Identifier

https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/37605

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