First Advisor

Melina Martinez

Date of Award

Spring 6-10-2026

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in Political Science and University Honors

Department

Political Science

Language

English

Subjects

intellectual property, repeat players, infringement, qualitative, empirical

Abstract

This thesis investigates the applicability of Marc Galanter's 1974 model of repeat-player (RP) and one-shotter (OS) civil litigation to the domain of intellectual property (IP) infringement disputes. While Galanter's framework predicts that repeat players will enjoy structural advantages over one-shotters, this paper argues that IP deviates from that model in consequential ways. Unique features of IP infringement litigation, including the duty to enforce, the risk of invalidation at trial, the inverse relationship between firm size and infringement stakes, and compounding advantages accruing to large firms, produce a hierarchy of strategic advantage that is more steeply resource-dependent than Galanter anticipates.

Drawing on empirical data, alongside a review of scholarship on IP acquisition, ownership, enforcement, and firm behavior, this paper develops a comparative model of small firms, large firms, and individual IP holders as distinct litigant types. It finds that small firms, despite qualifying formally as repeat players, exhibit structural disadvantages characteristic of one-shotters, including disproportionately high infringement stakes, constrained settlement options, and limited ability to leverage litigation strategically, while large firms exceed Galanter's RP ideal type through superior economies of scale, portfolio-based enforcement advantages, and compounding inter-sector IP benefits. Individual holders, meanwhile, occupy a paradoxical position: structurally resembling one-shotters yet embedded in an inherently repeat-litigation environment, rendering their disadvantages uniquely acute.

The paper draws implications for Galanter's thesis regarding the "bending of rules" in favor of repeat players, suggesting that in the IP context, legal and regulatory development is most likely skewed toward the interests of the largest incumbent firms.

Download

Share

COinS