Sponsor
Portland State University. Department of Sociology
First Advisor
Jan Hajda
Date of Publication
1979
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Science (M.S.) in Sociology
Department
Sociology
Language
English
Subjects
Progress
DOI
10.15760/etd.2947
Physical Description
1 online resource (389 p.)
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis was to come to understand the fundamental character of the idea of progress by studying the manner in which the idea emerged. This study, however, embodied more than simply those ideas that comprised its nature. The sociology of knowledge approach emphasizes the importance of understanding that the development of ideas can be strongly affected by the social structure. Taking such an approach into consideration in the task of understanding the fundamental character of the idea of progress, it was necessary to also attend to the influences of the social structure as well as the ideational factors upon the development of this idea. The thesis had a twofold approach in which the majority of work was devoted to ideational changes where the character of the idea was formed, but attention was also turned at appropriate times to the influence of the social structure upon the idea of progress.
Rights
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Persistent Identifier
http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/17537
Recommended Citation
Schmaling, Robert Ray, "The idea of progress: Its rise to power and prominence" (1979). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2954.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.2947
Comments
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