First Advisor

Gary L. Scott

Date of Publication

7-10-1995

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science (M.S.) in Political Science

Department

Political Science

Language

English

Subjects

Environmental protection -- International cooperation, Environmental policy -- International cooperation

DOI

10.15760/etd.6854

Physical Description

1 online resource (2, 137 p.)

Abstract

This study focuses on identifying the conditions which encourage or discourage international cooperation with regard to environmental problem-solving. In particular, the divergence between two key international relations theories, Environmentalism and Realism, will be examined in hopes of forging a rapprochement and stimulating research for a comprehensive theoretical approach to global environmental problem-solving. It is hypothesized that a state-centric political system is both a reality and an effective structure for environmental problem-solving, therefore an examination of state participation and the motivators and inhibitors affecting state response on certain environmental issues is conducted. In particular, this study hypothesizes that uncertainty can act as an inhibitor, and without the introduction of motivators can prevent states from participating in environmental problem-solving. A conceptual model of state courses of action is utilized to illustrate the potential of state participation and the development of a state-centric approach.

Rights

In Copyright. URI: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).

Comments

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Persistent Identifier

https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/28839

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