How to Save Pascal (and Ourselves) From the Mugger

Authors

Avram Hiller, Portland State UniversityFollow
Ali Hasan, University of Iowa

Published In

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

11-2023

Subjects

Moral Epistemology, Moral Demonstration, Morality

Abstract

In this article, we re-examine Pascal's Mugging, and argue that it is a deeper problem than the St. Petersburg paradox. We offer a way out that is consistent with classical decision theory. Specifically, we propose a “many muggers” response analogous to the “many gods” objection to Pascal's Wager. When a very tiny probability of a great reward becomes a salient outcome of a choice, such as in the offer of the mugger, it can be discounted on the condition that there are many other symmetric, non-salient rewards that one may receive if one chooses otherwise.

Rights

Copyright (c) 2023 The Authors

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Locate the Document

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217323000392

DOI

10.1017/S0012217323000392

Persistent Identifier

https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/41074

Citation Details

Hiller, A., & Hasan, A. (2023). How to Save Pascal (and Ourselves) From the Mugger. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, 1-17.